In September 2024, the Swedish authorities accused Iran of responsibility for thousands of text messages sent to residents of Sweden in 2023 and calling to avenge a Quran burning that had occurred in the kingdom. According to official Swedish sources, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had penetrated the Swedish text messaging system in a cyber attack and sent approximately 15,000 text messages in Swedish regarding the Quran burning. The Iranian embassy in Sweden characterized the accusation as “baseless” and as fabricated to “poison” relations between Tehran and Stockholm. For his part, the operational chief of Sweden’s security services (Säpo), Fredrik Hallström, said that the text messages were intended “to paint the picture of Sweden as an Islamophobic country” and “to create division in Swedish society,”

As early as August 2023, Swedish media reported that many people across Sweden had received text messages in Swedish calling for vengeance against those who burned the Quran. According to senior Swedish prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist, the messages were sent by a group that calls itself the Anzu Team. The messages’ content, as broadcast on Sweden’s SVT television network, said that “Those who desecrated the Quran must have their work covered in ashes” and called the Swedes “demons.” The public demonstrations that included Quran burning were covered by freedom of expression as protected under the Swedish constitution and therefore permitted by the police. However, those demonstrations did touch off a storm in the Middle East and brought threats from various sources, including Muslim states, against Sweden and against its citizens.

The storm surrounding the Quran burning began after Rasmus Paludan, a right-wing extremist with Danish and Swedish roots, set fire to a Quran outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm in January 2023, and outside the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen later during the same month. Paludan’s actions were copied by others such as Salwan Momika, an Iraqi refugee in Sweden who had prior connections with Christian militias in Iraq. Momika, demonstrating outside a Stockholm mosque in June 2023 during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha holiday, began setting a Quran afire.

As a result, several Arab countries — including the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia — summoned Swedish diplomatic representatives for reprimands. Iraq went so far as to break off relations with Sweden after a second Quran burning included setting the Iraqi flag on fire as well. In an additional response, crowds of Shiites torched the Swedish embassy in Baghdad. In Iran, the US flag was burned opposite the Swedish embassy and Sweden was warned that it would “suffer consequences.” A spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, summoned the Swedish ambassador for a reprimand and announced: “We strongly condemn the repeated desecration of the Holy Quran … in Sweden, and we hold the Swedish government fully responsible” for events that are “inciting the feelings of Muslims around the world” and for the consequences.

Further to the Iranian reprimand, the Hezbollah organization — a very close proxy of Iran’s — held a demonstration against Sweden in Beirut, in which it brandished a picture of the assassinated commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. In Malmö, Sweden’s third-largest city and home to a large Muslim population, many confrontations broke out as a result of the Quran burning. Many immigrants living in the city’s Rosengård neighborhood threw stones and torched tens of autos in an extremely violent riot. The Quran burnings frightened leaders in Western and Northern Europe. Following the events, the Swedish Prime Minister even added that “We are currently in the most serious security situation since the Second World War,”

In light of the unrest generated by those demonstrations, plus the rage among the Muslim immigrants throughout Sweden, Iran decided to “retaliate” in Sweden by the same method that it has long used against its opponents: intensifying the schisms in the local society. That tactic takes the spreading of the Iranian revolution several steps onward, not only by instigating terror attacks but also by enlarging Iran’s sphere of influence and creating social chaos. First, Iran infiltrates the country’s local Shiite community, if one exists, and then it proceeds into other population sectors or radical elements that can destabilize the country’s government, Iran’s hope being to intensify societal tensions in the case of a western state or to topple the regime in the case of a Mideast state such as Iraq. Spreading disinformation is an established Iranian method of operations in Israel, but now Iran is trying to employ it in countries across the ocean such as the USA, and in European countries such as Sweden.

The Iranians are not only advancing as the main opponent in their rival countries but also advancing against their enemies, or representative offices of their enemies, in third countries — including Israeli missions abroad. Thus, for example, last May the Swedish internal security agency accused Iran of employing criminal organizations in Sweden to attack Israeli or Jewish targets in Swedish territory. Security sources in Sweden confirmed an announcement from the Mossad that the Ayatollahs’ regime was using criminal gangs in European countries, including Sweden and Belgium, to attack Israeli and Jewish targets.

In fact, Iran was behind three unsuccessful attacks against Israeli targets in Sweden and Belgium between January and May 2024. On January 31, a hand grenade was thrown at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. The grenade did not explode. On May 16, shots were fired at the embassy in Stockholm. Subsequently, on May 24, two grenades were thrown at the Israeli embassy in Brussels. Investigation of the incidents revealed that Iran was behind the attacks, having enlisted criminal organizations that, at the same time, were at odds with one another. It appears that even in its relations with criminal organizations, Iran applies a method based on the dynamics between the parties in order to exploit the advantage of one organization over the other or to exploit the rivalry.

The use of criminal organizations for terrorism coincides with Iran’s policy of trying to promote terrorist activity against its enemies without leaving traces of its own involvement. The Iranians fund and direct criminal organizations around Europe just as they fund and direct Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Houthis of Yemen, and others. Iran avoids leaving its national fingerprints, in order to minimize political and legal repercussions that could lead to international sanctions against Tehran.

One of those Swedish criminal organizations is Foxtrot, considered the country’s largest criminal network. Its members have been responsible for many murders and for extensive drug trafficking. The organization’s boss is Rawa Majid, a Swedish citizen of Kurdish origin who is wanted by Interpol and who, on instructions from Iran, instigates attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe. However, a number of young people arrested following the shooting attack at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm were Iranian by background and were connected with the Rumba criminal gang, which is led by Ismail Abdo, a former associate of Majid’s at Foxtrot who is now his greatest rival.

The Ayatollahs’ regime directly threatens Sweden’s national security. Iran spies against Sweden’s industries, research institutes, and universities. Last June a strategic agreement was exposed that enables the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to exploit cooperation between Iranian and Swedish universities in order to advance Iran’s military programs.

That agreement, which until then was unknown to the Swedish authorities, permits the Revolutionary Guards to exploit academic cooperation between Swedish universities and their Iranian counterparts in order to acquire technological knowledge in fields such as UAVs, artificial intelligence, and advanced electronics. There are at least eight Swedish universities with ties to Iranian universities. The agreement threatens the national security not only of Sweden but also of all the other NATO countries. Sweden joined the transatlantic alliance in March 2023, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who for a time had vetoed its membership in the wake of Quran burning and anti-Turkish demonstrations in Stockholm, withdrew his objection. A strategic agreement of this kind serves the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, accentuating the threat of espionage and the infiltration of foreign forces into a NATO country.

Still, the main target of Iranian espionage is the Iranian opposition groups in Sweden. Like other European countries, Sweden has become a base of operations where Iranian agents plan their espionage and their attacks. One example involves Asadollah Asadi, an Iranian diplomat whom a Belgian court sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for terrorism. Asadi, who was third secretary at the Iranian embassy in Austria, was arrested by German security forces on a Bavarian highway in 2018, mere days after passing explosives to two Iranians in Belgium. The explosives were intended for an attack on members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organization — opponents of the Iranian regime — at a rally in Paris where then US Vice President Mike Pence was also in attendance. Although Asadi was posted to Austria and his crime was planned for France, interrogation and confiscated materials showed he was closely connected to Iranian agents in Sweden. The German police confiscated a notebook in which Asadi had recorded 289 sites, in 11 European countries, where he met Iranian agents. Among those countries was Sweden. This proved that the Iranians had active agents there — a fact further emphasized in December 2019 when an Iraqi citizen living in Sweden was convicted of spying for Iran against Iranian exiles who were Swedish residents. In May 2023 Asadi was released in a prisoner swap between Iran and Belgium, in return for Olivier Vandecasteele, a humanitarian worker whom Iran had arrested in 2022.

Europe and the international community must take note of Iran’s behavior, which threatens not only the countries of the Middle East but also those countries of the West that maintain diplomatic ties with Iran. Because of Iran’s extensive network extending into many of the world’s nations, Tehran can enlist local extremist elements or even, if it wishes, local criminal gangs as in the case of Sweden. With its subversion, Iran attempts to deepen the crises and conflicts in many countries, to widen societal rifts in order to topple governments, and to fragment nations. The widening of rifts and disagreements contributes to Iran’s efforts at weakening the West and strengthening its claim that western democracy is fundamentally flawed. The flourishing of local criminal organizations, alongside disinformation campaigns that poison the public discourse, could bring anarchy to the western nations and crumble them from within while the Muslim world grows stronger — with Iran seeing itself as the spearhead leading the Shiite alliance toward a Shiite Islamic hegemony.

The Iranians rule no tactics out. They use various organizations, but in similar methods: exacerbating societal rifts and disagreements, exploiting local groups to advance Iranian interests, using cyber tools to increase Iranian influence, and more. What Iran is doing in Israel, it also does in the western countries. Sweden is a single case among many in which Iran is waging dangerous subversion throughout the West. The Scandinavian countries, and the West in general, must understand that in the face of the Iranian threat, they share an interest with Israel. For a long time now, Iran has been threatening more than just the Middle East. Its subversion has made it a threat to security everywhere in the West.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran’s subversive activity in Sweden הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 5th, during a press conference at Parliament Hill in Ottawa, the UN special rapporteur, Francesca Albanese once again accused Israel of the usual, which means genocide in Gaza, apartheid, atrocities, tortures, occupation, mass arrests and even of executing Palestinian children.

After citing the view of one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party, Antonio Gramsci, regarding the role of financial power in cultural hegemony, she accused the pro-Israel lobbies, quoted as “very vocal, virulent and aggressive”, of pressuring governments to boycott her.

One of the journalists attending the press conference asked her for clarifications, if she really thought that meetings and events were cancelled “because of the pro-Israel groups pressure”.

Albanese replied that she could not tell what the causes behind the withdrawal of the invitations and meetings were and added: “I only know, I mean, I base myself on facts. It happened after pro-Israel groups and pro-Israel individuals started to accuse me of the usual and I won’t repeat the accusations because they are extremely defamatory…”.

She then accused Israel of taking “the land of historical Palestine as it has been doing ever since, even before its existence”.

When asked by one of the reporters if she believed in the right of Israel to exist, Albanese dodged the question by saying:

“Israel does exist, Israel is a recognized member of the UN. Besides this, there is no such thing in international law as the right of a State to exist…It’s not up to us”.

Albanese provided a colorful example saying that “Italy exists, but if tomorrow Italy and France merged and formed “Itafrance”, fine” and she then brought the issue back to “the right of the Palestinians to exist”.

It is worth recalling that on October 14^th 2024, Francesca Albanese, found herself at the center of a media storm after a series of aggressive anti-Israel posts, published in the previous days on her social media accounts, where she compared Israel to Nazi Germany, sparking outrage from several Jewish organizations, including the World Jewish Congress (WJC), which called for her immediate dismissal from the United Nations.

Appointed in May 2022 as special rapporteur, Albanese has used anti-Semitic stereotypes and legitimized support for terrorism in her criticism of Israel. In addition to regularly portraying Israelis as Nazis and reiterating that “Hamas has the right to resist,” since October 7^th , 2023, Albanese has systematically downplayed the atrocities committed by Palestinian terrorists by denying that the pogrom targeted Jews as such and it was rather a consequence of Israel’s aggressions.

Alleged problematic financial issues

Moving to the recent financial controversies, Article 3 of the Special Procedures Code of Conduct expressly forbids Albanese from accepting remuneration from any governmental or nongovernmental source for activities carried out in pursuit of the mandate. In June 2024, UN Watch called for an investigation into Albanese for “illegally requesting payments for work performed in her official UN capacity” over alleged payments for speaking events and honorarium for a fake lecture; specifically, by circumventing this prohibition, by requesting that, in exchange for her lectures, payments by external groups be made to her research assistant.

The following month, the UN launched an investigation into allegations that Albanese illegally accepted funding from the Australian Friends of Palestine Association (AFOPA) and other pro-Pal groups to fund an estimated $20,000 trip to Australia and New Zealand, in which she lobbied a major pension fund to divest from Israel.  Those groups initially stated that they “sponsored” and “supported” her trip, violating the UN’s rules forbidding remuneration from non-governmental sources.

Albanese denied that AFOPA sponsored her trip, claiming that it was funded by the UN. However, the complaint argues that the UN lacks any legal basis to fund trips by its experts beyond their area of investigation.

On July 12^th 2024, the UN Human Rights Office told JNS that the global body paid for the trip. However, these trips did not appear in the mandated UN special procedures annual report because “it was not a designated ‘country visit’ per se.”

“Only official country visits aimed at assessing the human-rights situation in that country itself, and that are followed by a country visit report to the Human Rights Council, are included in this list,” the UNHRO added.

Ideological issues and problematic statements

Going beyond Albanese’s financial controversies, her extreme ideological positions are obvious, and it is not by coincidence that in July 2024 the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, called for Albanese’s removal from the international body:

“There is no place for antisemitism from UN-affiliated officials tasked with promoting human rights. While the United States has never supported Francesca Albanese’s mandate, it is clear she is not fit for this or any position at the UN.”

The statement was posted on X in reaction to Albanese’s post comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler.

United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Michele Taylor tweeted: “Special rapporteurs should be striving to improve human rights challenges, not employing dehumanizing rhetoric.”

The French representative to the UN called for her immediate dismissal and a thorough investigation into the influences to which she was potentially subjected, arguing that Albanese: “By comparing the defensive operations of Israel – at war for its own survival after the pogroms of 7 October – to the expansion of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, she has crossed a new red line. Her violently anti-Israel and anti-Semitic statements, which have been spreading for years, seriously damage the credibility of our international organizations.”

The German representative, for his part, said that Albanese’s remarks were “a disgrace” and that it was “appalling” that the Special Rapporteur appeared to “justify the horrific terrorist attacks and ‘deny their anti-Semitic nature’.”

Albanese is the first special rapporteur to be condemned by Germany and France for anti-Semitism. Indeed, she replied that “the US, Germany and France are clearly involved and supporting what Israel is doing”.

Before her 2022 UN appointment, Albanese had said that Israel was “keeping captive millions of civilians,”; she organized a panel on “Israel Apartheid,” she campaigned for an arms embargo against Israel and argued that the “Jewish lobby” was in full control of the United States.

After the outbreak of war in the Middle East, Albanese went so far as to deny that the Hamas massacre of October 7th was anti-Semitic: “the worst anti-Semitic massacre of the century? No, Mr. President. The victims of 7/10 were killed not because of their Judaism, but in response to Israel’s oppression.”

These comments prompted the International Legal Forum, a body of more than 4,000 lawyers, to address a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, in February to be the first to call for Albanese’s resignation.

Nevertheless, Albanese continued her anti-Semitic propaganda, voicing her support on X for a post published by human rights official Craig Mokhiber in which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was compared to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler: “That’s exactly what I think.”

In November 2023, in a speech to the National Press Club in Canberra, Australia, Albanese said that Israel cannot claim the right of “self-defense” under international law because Gaza is a territory which it occupies. The statement caused the immediate reaction of the Director of Touro Institute of Human Rights and the Holocaust, Anne Bayefsky, who slammed Albanese’s comments, saying they go “hand-in-hand with all her other legally indefensible claims” regarding the conflict.

In August 2024 Albanese once again denied Israel’s right to self-defense citing the West Bank “occupation” and the “unlawful use of force” in one of her tweets. On another occasion, she even admitted that her personal views on the Palestinian issue could compromise her objectivity.

In addition, Francesca Albanese also omitted the fact that her husband, Massimiliano Calì, worked as an economic advisor for the Palestinian Authority and authored a report entitled “The economic costs of Israeli occupation for the Palestinian occupied territories”.

Why didn’t the UNHRC properly scrutinize her background before hiring her?

Albanese’s anti-Israel propaganda in Italy

While maintaining her position as UN special rapporteur, Albanese was busy spreading anti-Israel propaganda on the Italian media.

On September 11^th 2024, Francesca Albanese was hosted on Alessandro Di Battista’s YouTube channel where she once again accused Israel of “genocide”, of dropping the equivalent of “5 nuclear bombs” in Gaza and claimed that the destruction caused by Israel on Gaza is greater than the one occurred during World War 2, citing Japan and Germany.

Di Battista, on his behalf, stated that Israeli settlers are “fundamentalists who believe that only the creation of a Great Israel can bring to the return of the Messiah” and defined them as “the new Ku Klux Klan…because they behave in the exact same way”.  On this occasion, Albanese once again denied that Hamas slaughtered Israeli children and perpetrated mass rapes, stating that they were “fabricated”.  This is just part of the 58-minute-long video where other concerning statements were made by the two.

Di Battista is well known within the Italian pro-Pal area. A former 5 Star Movement MP, he was exposed on several occasions by the Italian press for being close to Mohammad Hannoun, the Genoa-based Palestinian architect who was recently sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for being a member of Hamas and for collecting and sending funds to the Palestinian terrorist organization. According to the United States, Hannoun has solicited funding for Hamas with senior Hamas officials and sent at least $4 million to Hamas over a 10-year period. Di Battista also traveled with Hannoun to Lebanon, taking part in the architect’s “humanitarian” activity, and spent time in Iran in 2020.

Francesca Albanese has also been invited several times to the Italian TV show “Piazza Pulita” on the LA7 channel where she called for “immediate sanctions against Israel” and she accused Israel of not being a democracy because of the “mistreatment of minorities” and of ruling the West Bank through a “military dictatorship”.

In May 2023, Albanese was interviewed by the HRCM MA director of the already cited Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, for the Peacekeeping International Day, where she once again attacked the “Israeli military presence in the occupied territories aimed at protecting the colonial presence”.

In January 2024, Albanese’s husband used his Facebook account to publicly accuse the Italian Democratic Party of silencing a “sacrosanct debate on the extermination Israel is committing in Palestine, to continue protecting the egregious violations of international law of a criminal state”.

In March 2024, Albanese stated that “the Italian government should sanction Israel” and in May of the same year she gave a long interview to the Italian Communist newspaper “Il Manifesto”, where she once again attacked the Jewish state claiming that “Israel did not want to stop its Gaza operations and accept a truce because it was afraid to see what it had done there”. Among other things, she also accused Israel of immediately striking places of Palestinian identity: churches, mosques, cultural centers, universities, instead of military targets.

UN at its lowest in history

All this can be classified as the activity of a propagandist, a militant, and very far from the necessary impartiality and moderation of a special rapporteur. Overall, the extensive work provided by UN Watch will further compromise Albanese’s position as rapporteur and the UN for having appointed her regardless of her views and propaganda activity.

It is also worth pointing out that Rep. Andre Carson (D-IN) had invited Francesca Albanese to Capitol Hill to brief congressional staff at the end of October 2024, but later canceled the event.

One cannot help but wonder how the situation got to this point. UNRWA working as a front for Hamas in Gaza; the UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres, lamenting the elimination of Hamas terrorist and Nukhba commander Mohammad Abu Ittiwi, cited as “UNRWA colleague”; the UNIFIL-Hezbollah scandal and, last but not least, Albanese’s appointment as special rapporteur regardless of her propaganda and networking and activity. This is indeed the darkest time for the UN since its formation in 1945, after World War 2.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Francesca Albanese is at it again and laments “persecution” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Following the Syrian rebels’ takeover of Damascus and approximately 70% of the country’s territory, rebel leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani is striving to establish a new regime in Syria to replace that of Bashar al-Assad’s. The fragile situation in Syria has become a source of deep concern for many nations — including Israel, the United States, Russia, and Turkey, all of which are closely monitoring developments. The primary fear is that these recent changes may lead to a power vacuum in Syria, providing jihadist organizations with fertile ground.

Over the past two weeks, al-Julani has sought to convey a message of moderation to the West, presenting himself in what could be described as a “softer version” in order to improve the image of his group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, his jihadist fighters project a far more uncompromising stance.

This week, jihadist rebels released a video on social media declaring that after victory in Damascus and the rest of Syria, they will “liberate and conquer Jerusalem and its Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as the Kaaba in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.”

The rebels’ bold statements follow the United Kingdom’s announcement that it is reconsidering its designation of HTS as a banned organization, and word from the U.S. government that it may be ceasing to list HTS as a terrorist organizations.

These responses from the U.S. and the U.K. exemplify typical Western naivety in the face of the new situation in Syria. It appears the West has again failed to learn from history, as previously in its dealings with Osama bin Laden, with al-Qaeda, and with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In contrast, al-Julani seems to have learned from the mistakes of major jihadists who came before him, such as bin Laden of al-Qaeda and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS. Al-Julani represents a more modern and sophisticated version of these figures, learning from history and trying not to repeat their errors. Knowing his Islamist roots, could the West truly be so naïve?

A quintessential example of this western perspective can be found in the American intelligence assessments. According to U.S. intelligence, Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS, underwent significant transformation, distancing itself from ties with ISIS and becoming independent from al-Qaeda. Furthermore, American intelligence asserts that al-Julani is energetically working to improve HTS’s image and purging the organization of its more extreme elements.

The American opinion notwithstanding, al-Julani’s actions should be assessed from outside the typical Western perspective. One example of how different the facts are is his visit to the great Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. His triumphant arrival and worship there send his followers a clear message about his and his jihadist fighters’ agenda:

The conquest of Damascus, and worship in the Umayyad Mosque alongside the mausoleum of Salah ad-Din, who was one of Islam’s most renowned military leaders, speaks for itself. It is a symbol with an obvious meaning — true not to how al-Julani seeks to display himself in the western media, but to what his fighters proclaim.

Given the West’s misguided outlook, the Syrian case may turn out to replicate the scenario of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban group promised to adopt a more moderate policy. once it had captured Kabul, in 2021, but in practice, it imposed severe restrictions on women and strictly enforced Sharia law in all aspects of governance.

Moreover, ISIS has a presence in Syria as it had in Afghanistan — a lower-profile presence now for that jihadist organization, but a presence nonetheless. Despite its frictions with HTS and other factions, ISIS could exploit another such power vacuum to expand its foothold in Syria. In fact, this week ISIS reported executing 54 of Assad’s soldiers whom it captured as they attempted to flee Syria.

Thus a power vacuum in Syria could lead to the emergence of a “new Afghanistan” on Israel’s border—a scenario that may afford ISIS a resurgence like the one that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, after which ISIS–Khorasan Province became the group’s most lethal branch.

Such a scenario could intensify competition between ISIS and other jihadist factions and particularly against HTS, which is poised to form the foundation of Syria’s new government. Even more dangerously, a government with roots in a jihadist movement would rule Syria in accordance with jihadist ideology and policies.

It is worth noting that HTS also expressed support for the October 7 attacks. If it consolidates itself and achieves dominance across the border from Israel, it will dramatically increase the Syrian threat and heighten the likelihood of a similar attack — an assault like that of October 7, but this time targeting Israeli communities in the Golan Heights.

The article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Is Syria the New Afghanistan? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As we count the days until the inauguration of President-Elect Donald Trump, we should devote careful thought to Israel’s future relations with the new administration and to attaining Israel’s long-standing strategic objectives.

The president-elect describes his personal approach, as follows: “In my life, there are two things I’ve found I’m very good at: overcoming obstacles and motivating good people to do their best work. One of the challenges ahead is how to use those skills as successfully in the service of others as I’ve done, up to now, on my own behalf.” Trump made this statement in 1977, in his best-seller, The Art of the Deal. At the end of 2024, it is clear that he has remained consistent throughout his election campaign and in his choice of nominees for the new cabinet.

Furthermore, as far as Israel is concerned, we must recall President Trump’s past accomplishments. He kept his promise and moved the American embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and sponsored the Abraham Accords. As a leader and entrepreneur, he is accustomed to thinking big, on a large and ambitious scale. For example, his vision includes the rebuilding of American industry, the exploration of space and space travel.

What does this mean for the Jewish State and its strategic needs? According to the fifteenth-century Florentine political thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli, one should ask powerful men for big things, because it is just as easy for them to grant large requests as small ones.

An episode in our history proves this point, namely, the meeting on March 18, 1948 between President Harry S. Truman and Dr. Chaim Weizmann. President Truman’s grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, tells the story, as follows: “…. On May 14, 1948, President Harry S. Truman made one of the most momentous decisions of his presidency: recognizing the new state of Israel just minutes after its founding. My grandfather is justly celebrated for providing the legitimacy this nascent democracy required to survive, but his WWI buddy and former business partner, Eddie Jacobson, deserves credit, as well. This installment of ‘First Family Stories’ is dedicated to a friendship that changed the world.”

It is well known that President Truman overcame both the opposition of Secretary of State George Marshall and the long-standing hostility of the American foreign policy establishment. Over the years, such attitudes have persisted. Most recently, the Obama/Biden foreign policy, while nominally positive toward Israel, has been ambivalent and, on occasion, downright nasty.

A recent example was President Biden’s arm twisting of

Israel to end the Hamas war by accepting a ceasefire and a compromise, which drew a false equivalence between a terrorist aggressor that had launched a war against a legitimate state and an American ally.

On July 24, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker of the House Mike Johnson of Louisiana. On the following day [July 25], the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Biden ended in a bust up. The President warned Netanyahu that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!”

From a historical perspective, this type of episode was not an isolated occurrence. American policy makers have frequently misunderstood the ways of our region and, consequently, have made costly mistakes that have harmed their own interests as well as those of Israel.

II.

The careful study of our past, particularly the Israeli decision-making process before the Six-Day War, provides valuable insights for the present and the future. The late Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto (1926-2015) was Chief of Planning and Operational Requirements of the Israel Airforce (IAF) prior to the Six-Day War (1967) and a well-informed insider. Several years before the Six-Day War, he visited France, which supplied Israel with Mirage jet fighters. On one of his visits, his colleagues discreetly informed him that the French government planned to end its special relationship with Israel. Subsequently, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol authorized Tsiddon-Chatto to negotiate Israel’s first purchase of an American light attack aircraft, the A4 Skyhawk, manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. Furthermore, it was Tsiddon-Chatto who discovered the American spy-ship, USS Liberty, standing still in the Mediterranean off Sinai during the Six-Day War.

As a military strategist, Tsiddon-Chatto made several basic observations: 1) America failed to distinguish between its friends and its enemies; 2) America refused to let Israel win a war; 3) When writing about pro-active defense and the decision in June 1967 to preempt the war, he emphasized the crucial importance of the dimension of time.

While the circumstances have changed over the past decades, Tsiddon-Chatto’s description of Israel’s situation is timely, as for example, President Biden’s forceful demand of July 25, 2024, that Prime Minister Netanyahu accept a ceasefire in Gaza instead of a decisive victory.

His statements have been gently edited as follows:

…. Since the ‘Czech arms deal’ of 1955, and the Soviet position [of] consolidation in the ME following the Eisenhower / Dulles handling [of] the Anglo-French in the Suez Crisis of 56/7, there was no question in the ME who is on the US and who on the Soviet side. The US seemed to be the only ones oblivious of reality, thus unwittingly reinforcing Soviet penetration in the ME. Moreover, the US, which related to Israel as if it were a millstone on its neck until the Six Day War … [The Americans] “discovered” only as a result of this war that Israel is the major regional power, unconditionally pro-US, and an inexhaustible source of intelligence on Soviet assets, captured in large numbers and handed over. [Author’s bold].

Tsiddon-Chatto had a basic complaint regarding American policy toward Israel, namely, that the U.S. consistently prevented Israel from achieving a decisive victory on the battlefield in order “to placate Arabia which, as it proves since 9/11, is implacable…. It should make sense to see the US picture of Vietnam and [the] ME as just two interacting sectors of the Cold War. There is abundant evidence to prove this, and that the US has, and probably is to this day, misunderstanding the Arab manipulative ways.”

Writing in general terms about the task of the strategist, Yoash describes his methodology and then emphasizes the dimension of time as the most important factor in the decision to preempt a war:

Planning must relate to all possible scenarios. The plan … must respond to the scenarios [which have] the highest probability of materializing, while assuring a response to the most pessimistic scenarios.

The dimension of time is a matter of decisive importance. If the threat increases and becomes more acute with time, it means that the danger grows every day, and it is possible that there will be a time when our weakness will compel us to take the initiative to the point of a preemptive strike, even if the preparations for war have not been completed. (Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Be-Yom, be-Lail be-Arafel [By Day, By Night, through Haze and Fog] (Jerusalem: Keterpress, 1995, in Hebrew): 306.

Tsiddon-Chatto describes the public mood in Israel at the end of May 1967, during the days prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. The Egyptian army was waiting on Israel’s border and the civilian reserves had been mobilized. This state of affairs could not be maintained for too long and paralyzed Israel’s economy. Thus, the dimension of time became the key variable in the equation: “… Were the Arab Coalition to open hostilities first, using their much superior air forces in the way we foresaw, the State of Israel would have ceased to exist….”

It is not well known that, at this critical moment, the U.S. vigorously opposed a pre-emptive strike. (See [Meir] Amit’s report of his meeting of May 25, 1967, with [John] Hadden, the CIA man in Israel. (Rosh be-Rosh (Head On), [Or Yehuda: Hed Arzi, 1999, Hebrew]: 235).

Meir Amit, Director of the Mossad, gives the real backstory of this episode. He wrote that a “tough conversation” took place at midnight in his home. [Also present were Efraim Halevy, a senior member of the Mossad, and Brigadier General David Carmon, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence.] There was shouting, and even shots of whisky did not calm the tense atmosphere. Amit tried hard to convince Hadden that the situation was really critical and that Israel would have to act as soon as possible. But Hadden threatened that if Israel pre-empted the war, America would send forces to fight on the Egyptian side. He held the firm conviction that we had to wait and warned: “Don’t create a situation in which we will be forced to go against you.”

Meir Amit describes how his urgent mission to Washington ultimately resulted in the decision of the government to pre-empt the war:

On the morning of May 29, we gathered [as we did] every day in the office of Eshkol to discuss the ongoing situation. Abba Eban participated at this meeting; as well as the Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Yaakov Herzog; the Head of Military Intelligence, General Aharon Yariv; and I. All of us had the feeling that things had gone too far, and it was necessary to do something to break the stalemate in which we were stuck. During this discussion, the head of military intelligence proposed that the head of the Mossad go to Washington immediately in order to bring us a reliable picture of what is going on.

‘Meir,’ Areleh [Aharon Yariv] said: ‘You are a member of the household there. Dick Helms, Head of the CIA is a personal friend of yours. In an informal chat, you will be able to hear directly from him what is really happening.’ (Amit, 237).

When he arrived in Washington, Amit discovered that his professional colleagues were understanding and well disposed. Meeting with Richard Helms, he learned that his assessment of the facts coincided with those of the CIA. Helms arranged an appointment for Meir Amit with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who grasped the situation immediately and made an important recommendation.

During this meeting, McNamara received two phone calls from President Johnson, asking to be updated on these talks. At a certain point, Amit asked the Secretary of Defense for advice:

‘What should I do now? Wait here a day of two?’

‘He cut me short with a brief sentence, “Go home, your place is there now.”’

Amit learned that America had no intention to help and concluded that time was against Israel. He recommended that Israel open hostilities immediately. (Amit, 241).

Amit added a most important fact — that precisely during the time he was in Washington, it became known that President Johnson received a message from former President Eisenhower reminding him that the Americans had a moral obligation to Israel which was given at the time of its withdrawal from Sinai in 1957. The Americans had undertaken to preserve the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and to assure freedom of navigation through the Straits of Eilat. (Amit, 242).

III.

As we look forward, it is possible to make several cautious predictions based upon past history and recent experience. We can return to the stated preferences of President-Elect Donald Trump and take note of his choices. Frequently, there is a link between domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, we may try to understand the outlook and policy goals of the new administration, and, at the same time, consider some recent changes in Israel’s defense policy.

As he has proclaimed, Donald Trump’s big idea is to “Make America Great Again.” Interestingly, his model has been the promising economic reform program of Javier Milei, President of Argentina. One of Milei’s innovations was to launch a Ministry of Deregulation, an idea which Trump adopted enthusiastically. His new approach embodies the rejection of the hard-left policies of the Obama/Biden administrations. Among his policies are: achieving American energy independence; rebuilding American industry; ending unrestricted immigration; and fighting rampant crime. It is a matter of record that Trump plans to end the Obama/Biden policy toward Iran, which had been consistently lenient and uncritical. It would be reasonable to expect that the new administration would continue some of the policies in our region and expand the framework of the Abraham Accords.

After the Hamas invasion and atrocities of October 7, 2023 and the war which followed, it is clear that Israel will have to be prepared to defend itself on its own and invest in its armaments industry. The entire situation has been transformed by the fact that war has been forced on Israel as an unavoidable policy option, that is, “diplomacy by other means.” This implies a change of approach. Israel must defend itself proactively, as was the case with the recent initiatives in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out that the United States could change its policy and help Israel decisively win this war (in which America has a vital interest).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel and the Second Trump Presidency: The Long Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Yesterday, the Syrian state founded in 1946 ceased to exist. This is the downfall not only of the Assad regime but of the state of Syria as a political framework that can impose order and structure. In this connection, it must be noted that the collapse of Syria, and of its Assad regime, is part of the same regional upheaval that began in 2010 and that has, in fact, not yet ended.

Since 2010, the Middle East has undergone a transformation out of the modern era where the region was organized under the “logic” of states as political frameworks. It has reverted to the pre-modern era of a different “logic” where the region is defined by communities, ethnic groups, transnational structures, and borderless ideologies.

With the developments in Syria, the Middle East is currently continuing a sort of backslide into the pre-nationalist, pre-modern era. In a way, this can be seen as a kind of revenge by the East against the West. The East is breaking away from the foundations of modernism and nationalism that the Europe of the late 19th century and early 20th century forced on it.

But the breakaway and the reversion to pre-nationalism are far from enough for the Middle East. Accompanying the breakaway process, it must be noted, is a quiet, creeping conquest of Western Europe by the pre-modern East through various agents — primarily through immigrant groups who never abandoned the ideological beliefs that they brought from the East and who are undermining the foundations of the modern, European-style order.

It may be said in general that the Middle East now speaks in a neo-olden language of politics and culture — one that is new in that it overrides its previous, European-made nationalist-modernist predecessor but is old in that it connects to the foundations of pre-modern political culture. The message is very difficult to define in simplistic terms of the positive and the negative.

From this standpoint, it must be granted that in the Middle East’s internal power struggle, the Shiite “Axis of Resistance” has suffered a critical blow. To that extent, Israel can claim a significant victory in this year’s battle against that axis’s representatives and proxies. But on the other hand, the collapse of Syria, and of the Assad regime, contains the seeds of a new Mideast reality full of dangers and complexities.

This reality has two immediate implications. The first concerns the situation in Syria, which is no longer Syria as we once knew it. At this stage, it is difficult to define the emerging new entity, which is evolving into a mix of sectarian power centers (Kurds, Druze, Alawites), transnational jihadist power hubs driven by an anti-Israel worldview no less than an anti-regime one, and the presence of actors like Turkey, whose transnational agenda is not far removed from that of Iran.

Practically speaking, the entire system of arrangements on the ground — as worked out between Israel and Syria after the war of 1973 and based on the logic of arrangements between states — is thus called into question and is little protected from those sources of power that do not at all think in terms of the “borders” that characterize a state. Consequently Israel must define red lines of its own befitting the situation, and strive especially to set up an iron wall preventing the “little jihad” against the Assad regime from turning into the “great jihad” against Israel.

But the second immediate ramification, which is even more significant, has to do with Iran — which has lost its Shiite axis, or at least two elements of it (Hamas and Hezbollah). Iran is at a strategic crossroads. It may be pushed into crossing the nuclear threshold in a sort of tit for tat, even before the US president-elect enters office. That move would leave little sand in the hourglass for an Israeli reaction against the prospect of an “Iranian Auschwitz.”

From that standpoint, Israel may possibly be said in general terms to be entering the third stage of its current war in the Middle East. The first stage was the illusory stage between May 2021 (Operation Guardian of the Walls) and October 7, 2023. The second stage proceeded intensively from October 7, 2023, into December 2024. But now Israel is entering the third stage of the war. In the shadow of a changing Mideast reality, Israel faces both veteran players — such as Iran, where the systems of ideology are eroding; and Turkey, which is turning from a shadowy enemy into a much more significant threat — and other players who are newcomers as Israel’s neighbors to the north.

But it is impossible to conclude without one important remark regarding Israel’s domestic arena. The currents of the Middle East have not bypassed Israel. Israel is part of the enormous process that the Middle East has experienced since 2010. In recent years it has also begun to budge away from its clearly state-centered foundations toward definitions of identity based on tribes and communities (haredi, secular, religious Zionist, Arab, and more) who, in their way, are battling for power.

The statehood concept championed by Ben-Gurion, which relied on elements such as the centralization of governmental power, the establishment of a politically neutral civil service, defined rules of governance, and respect for political authority, is undergoing significant erosion. This process is approaching a state akin to an undeclared civil war. So Israel must not only re-establish and rebuild the boundaries between itself and its obvious external enemies, but must also establish the political and cultural boundary between itself and the Middle East in order not to descend to the same condition in which the Middle East as a whole is thickly stewing.

This article was originally published in  Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Assad Regime Fell: Israel is Heading Toward a Third Campaign? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The situation in Syria over the past decade has been characterized by significant regional and international interventions, which have played decisive roles in shaping the current map. The “Arab Spring”, which began in late 2010, initially promised democratic reforms across the Middle East, but met with fierce opposition in Syria. There, the Assad regime, with the support of Iran, Russia, and Shiite proxies, managed to maintain its power despite widespread resistance and a significant number of casualties.

Iran’s involvement in Syria has been presented as a defense strategy against extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, which Tehran views as direct threats to its national security. This intervention was part of a broader regional strategy by Iran, often described as its own “war on terror.” The stabilization of the Assad regime, which depends to a large extent on Iranian and Russian support, has come at a considerable cost, both in human and economic terms. However, this stability was fragile, dependent on the continued presence and support of these foreign powers.

Recent regional developments have further complicated the situation in Syria. Russia’s military focus has changed significantly due to its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which has reduced its ability to maintain the same level of involvement in Syria. At the same time, Hezbollah, a decisive Iranian proxy actor, suffered significant losses due to Israeli military operations during 2024. These factors weakened the basic pillars of Assad’s stability, creating a vacuum that rebel groups in Syria were quick to exploit.

The resumption of rebel activity, especially in the ‘Idlib’ province, highlights the fragility of the current stability in Syria. The rapid collapse of the Syrian army in response to these attacks highlights the ongoing vulnerabilities in the regime’s military infrastructure. This instability has inevitably led to increased Iranian and Russian involvement, as they seek to re-establish their influence and restore a semblance of control.

The geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey further complicates the situation in Syria. The two countries have pursued different strategies, often finding themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. While Iran has focused on supporting the Assad regime, Turkey has conducted a number of military operations in northern Syria, ostensibly to combat cross-border terrorism, but has in fact established a Turkish zone of influence. This competition has the potential to escalate tensions, especially when both countries seek to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of the other.

Despite the establishment of the Astana peace process in 2017, which was intended to manage the conflict in Syria, the reality on the ground indicates that it was mainly used to demarcate areas of control between Iran, Russia, and Turkey, and not to foster a comprehensive peace. As the Assad regime gradually gained territorial control, Iran’s influence increased, while Turkey established its presence in the north. This distribution of influence underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in Syria, Especially in light of the weakening of the “chief groomsmen”, Russia and Iran’s proxies.

The current situation in Syria presents a complex set of opportunities and risks for Israel and for the entire Middle East. While various factions, especially Iran and its proxies, are refocusing their efforts on the internal conflicts in Syria, there is a temporary decline in their attention to Israel. This shift in focus gives Israel strategic breathing space in the short term. However, this reality entails significant risks, especially the potential for instability on the Syrian Golan border, which could expand into the Israeli Golan Heights. This instability could escalate regional tensions and drag the Middle East into a broader conflict.

Historically, the borders of the Middle East were determined after World War I through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided control between France and Britain and granted political sovereignty to various tribal leaders. This division has created countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, which are characterized by ethnic and religious diversity with little common ground between different groups. This situation has led to deep hostility, especially among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, Christians, and others, exacerbated by strategic interests in the region’s oil resources.

The gradual erosion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement over the past decade has intensified the search for a new regional order, manifested in violent clashes and episodes of genocide such as those perpetrated by ISIS, for example. The involvement of world powers such as the United States and Russia has led to temporary stability, but in some ways has further complicated the situation. It is worth noting that stability in Syria during the Trump administration has occurred through coordination with Russia, suggesting that future interventions may work similarly.

The critical question is whether such international interventions can provide long-term stability in the region. The ongoing negative energies and hostility among the peoples of the region indicate that a local response, even if coordinated between major powers such as Russia and the United States, may not achieve sustainable stability. Instead, it is likely that these interventions will only be able to offer temporary relief without addressing the underlying tensions.

From an Israeli perspective, the most urgent concern is Jordan’s stability. Unlike other neighboring countries, Jordan remains relatively affected by the “Arab Spring” or the so-called “Islamic Winter.” However, the current regional dynamics pose significant challenges to Jordan’s stability, which some analysts say is precarious. The potential for chaos in Jordan is a realistic scenario for which Israel must prepare. This includes a strategic reassessment of the IDF’s position along the Jordan Valley, emphasizing the need for a strong and flexible security infrastructure on Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country.

In conclusion, while the internal conflict in Syria offers a temporary reduction in direct threats to Israel, it simultaneously poses significant risks to regional instability. The historical context of arbitrarily established borders and ongoing ethnic and religious hostility underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in the Middle East. For Israel, Jordan’s stability is becoming a critical concern, requiring comprehensive security measures and a proactive defense strategy. Future international interventions, while potentially beneficial in the short term, are unlikely to resolve deep regional tensions, underscoring the need for a multi-layered and long-term approach to regional stability.

This article was originally published on Ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Back to the “Islamic Winter” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Gaza war has been raging in a number of arenas, and accordingly has a number of objectives. On the southern front, reportedly, the objectives are the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia in the Gaza strip, the return home of all of the Israeli hostages from Gaza with no exception, and ensuring that no army of terror could resurface and take control of Gaza again. On the northern front, the objective is to deliver a devastating blow to Hezbollah, ensuring that it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel. However, there is another, less reported front, that does not make headlines like its counterparts but in effect, it holds sway on all the above and more – the global theater.

Israel’s broad strategy extends far beyond the borders of Lebanon and Gaza. The overall objective is the dismantling of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis as the controlling element of much of the Middle East. Local processes such as ceasefires and the separation of fronts, alongside the imminent administration change in the US, offer a valuable opportunity to drive change such that will not only decide the outcome of the current war but has the potential to reshape the entire  balance of power in the Middle East.

As proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles.

Israel has achieved everything. Almost.  Overview of the agreement terms

To better understand whether the ceasefire with Hezbollah is beneficial to Israel, we should first review its terms. Admittedly, it is all too easy to spot some loopholes, but it did hand Israel a few  extremely important achievements.

The first is the divorce between the war in Gaza and the conflict with Hezbollah. This separation has significant ramifications for Hezbollah and Hamas. At the time, Nasrallah proclaimed the Hezbollah’s mission was to come to the aid of their Palestinian brethren and made a commitment to continue the fighting on Israel’s northern border until the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Yet we see how Hezbollah has gone back on its promises, which in its own perception is a terrible humiliation.  This was a debilitating blow to Hamas, which has now been left to its own devices.

An additional achievement produced by the agreement is the demilitarization of southern Lebanon. If properly enforce, this clause will make it very hard for Hezbollah to rebuild its force on the border with Israel.

The third and perhaps the most significant achievement, is that Israel gains complete freedom of action in Lebanon which allows it to act against Hezbollah the moment it threatens Israel. This teaches the heads of Hezbollah that the moment they raise their heads – it will come rolling off. It could be said that Israel had achieved everything it wanted. Nearly. The problem with the agreement though is that it fails to chart a DMZ along the Lebanese border with Israel. In its current form, the agreement allows the population that lives near that border to return to their homes – some of which are located  just hundreds of yards from Israel. The problem is that as proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – many of these people are either Hezbollah terrorists or local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles. Once they return to their villages, Israeli intelligence will have a difficult time discerning which of them is an innocent civilian and which is a terrorist.

There is no doubt that this state of affairs will pose a challenge for Israel when coming to identify irregular activities  and stanch terror activity on the border. Nonetheless, there are three points to consider: Firstly, every negotiation by default entails concessions by all stakeholders, and perhaps this is a bitter pill that Israel has no choice but to swallow. The other point is that even if the population of south Lebanon does return to its villages on the border, Israel now has more tools and experience, and a stronger drive to eradicate terror. Thirdly, this is an interim agreement, meaning that Israel still has a chance to change it. The 60-day period set for the withdrawal and with the eminent entrance of the Trump administration into office, there is a fair chance that Israel could insist on creating a crucial DMZ along the border.

At the bottom line, on paper it appears that for the most part, the agreement is favorable for Israel – but of course, the soundness of these conditions will have to stand the test of enforcement. The US and France are involved in the agreement but at the end of the day, it is up to Israel and its security forces to prove the agreement productive. In the wake of October 7, the decision-making levels in Israel politics and military have come to understand that the international peacekeeping forces cannot be relied upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah. Israel has no choice but to take its own security fully in its own hands by any means necessary and impress upon Hezbollah that it is willing to jump right back in the fray if so pushed.

Upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah.

Why now? The timing of the signing in security and diplomatic terms

The signing of the ceasefire agreement had not materialized out of thin air. The timing was carefully selected with various security and diplomatic considerations. In terms of Israel’s security, the objectives set for the war in the northern border, i.e. the paralyzing of Hezbollah, was achieved to a large measure. Israel had catapulted the terror organization twenty years back in terms of its military prowess, and brought it to a state in which it is no longer a strategic threat on Israel. Admittedly, one can always claim that there was a lot more that Israel could have done to strike an even harsher blow against Hezbollah. Which is not wrong. However, insofar as the military objectives, they were realized for the most part, and the signing of the agreement marked the appropriate point in time to cease the IDSF HaBithonistim  activity in Lebanon.

Diplomatically speaking, it would seem that the timing of the ceasefire is opportune as well. Israel needs the support of the international community to legitimize its actions and to receive weapons and ammunition. The ceasefire agreement allows Israel to improve its position with the UN Security Council and in turn improve its diplomatic relations with the international community.

An additional diplomatic consideration that plays an important part in the timing of the ceasefire agreement is the forthcoming change of administrations in the United States – similarly to the last months of the Obama administration, the support of the US administration in Israel is ebbing. The timing of the agreement allows us to ride out the relations with the current Biden administration and prepare to forge relations with the incoming Trump administration.

Beyond all the above mentioned, the timing carries a critical operational advantage. Israel’s decision to take its foot off the pedal in the north means that it can focus militarily and strategically in its next two crucial objectives: bringing down Hamas and the overturning of the Shi’ite axis.

As per the first objective, a ceasefire up north allows Israel to shift its ground forces back into Gaza and return to high intensity fighting and thus increase the chances of crushing Hamas and returning the hostages. As for the second objective of overturning the Shi’ite axis – more will be detailed below.

The systemic solution is not in Lebanon: the global importance of the agreement

In the Middle East, there are three main forces vying for control of the region – the Shi’ite-Iranian axis, the radical Sunni axis, and the moderate Western-Sunni axis. In recent years, the Shiite axis led by Iran and its proxies was able to gain the upper hand to become the dominant force in the region. However, various processes that have unfolded over the past year have sent this dominance into decline, and if the US plays the right policy cards, the region just may witness the breakdown of the radical Shi’ite machine.

As the Shi’ite axis is yielding to pressure, the radical Sunni axis is coming into the center of the stage, led by Turkey together with extreme Suni terror organizations the likes of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The axis will prove to be no less pernicious than its Shi’ite counterpart if it grows stronger and will pose no less a threat to Israel and the West, and thus merits a red flag as well. Case in point is the recent events in Syria that led to the toppling of the Assad regime. The rebel forces were able to prevail among others thanks to a weakened Hezbollah, proving yet again the interconnectivity of events in the Middle East. For the moment, the fall of the historically hostile Assad regime may be taken as a favorable development for Israel, it is yet to be determined what kind of regime will step into the vacuum and what – if any – kind of threat it might pose to Israel. This means that Israel must not take its eyes of the radical Sunni axis that could be the biggest winner from the fall of the Shi’ite axis and might be no less evil-intentioned toward Israel.

Therefore, the State of Israel must keep a close eye both on the Shi’ite and Sunni axes while at the same time  act toward solidifying the third axis – the moderate West-Sunni axis. For that end, Israel needs to form a coalition with the US, western countries and Sunni countries such as Saudia Arabia, UAE, Indonesia, Malesia and Pakistan. Such a coalition, if strong enough, may even draw other countries to join forces, such as Lebanon and even Iraq. In tandem with this effort, Israel must strive to forge normalization agreements with moderate Sunni countries in the Middle East that will perhaps lead to regional and global peace agreements.

One way or another, Israel must condition any move in the Middle East on a combined offensive against Iran. Once the head of the snake is removed – all the rest will fall into place.

Forward looking: the day after the ceasefire

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is for a 60-day term – but in terms of Middle East security, this is ample time for things to change. There is no way to predict if indeed the ceasefire will be implemented verbatim, or what will transpire once the term is out; Hezbollah may very well breach the agreement, forcing Israel back into battle, and equally possible is that the agreement may lead to a permanent settlement that allows Israel to begin rehabilitating the north and return the evacuated citizens to their homes.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement wishes to see a rehabilitated and healing north. This is a complex process, but with smart resource allocation and oversight, this part of Israel can very soon be on track to recovery. Once this is underway, we can then turn to the next task at hand – the increase of the Jewish population in the north. The IDSF HaBithonistim sees this as a national imperative of top priority. A two-fold increase would make it clear to our enemies that they cannot push us back from our own borders, as well as contribute to the settlement of the land in agency of Israel’s security doctrine.

In order to realize these objectives, IDSF HaBithonistim has been engaging with policy-makers and is founding educational and pre-military programs designed to strengthen the settlements within Israel’s borders. These days the movement is in the midst of developing the “Ha’Tkuma” pre-military preparatory program that will operate in the Gaza border communities. In the future more of such programs will be founded in the north of Israel.

For many, rebuilding and resettling the communities in the ravaged north seems like a distant goal, but we are getting closer – and the ceasefire agreement is the first step in this direction. Despite some of the agreement’s downsides and the concessions Israel is required to make, it is important to understand that the State of Israel is now facing a historic opportunity to realize all of its aspirations. If we take advantage of this opportunity skillfully, we can change our security reality for generations to come and even stabilize the balance of power throughout the Middle East.

הפוסט “Analyzing Lebanon Not Within the General Context Is a Big Mistake” – The Broad Implications of a Ceasefire on Israel’s Northern Border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The trial of the Knave of Hearts scene in “Alice in Wonderland” oddly mirrors the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) unprecedented ruling against Israel. The court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Defense Gallant for alleged war crimes in Gaza. Had proper due process been put in place, surely this outcome would not be reminiscent of the Queen of Spades’ immortal dictum: “Sentence first – verdict afterwards.”

It would not be far-reaching to describe this ruling as initiated and abated by politically-appointed judges and prosecutor with a long anti-Israeli track record. They somehow wish to be believed that this warrant is the result of an evidence-based fair process, rather than reverse engineering a PR decision. They seek to arrest individuals over whom they have no legal jurisdiction, over crimes in a non-existent country invented for the sake of protocol, while ignoring any evidence that runs contrary to the tunnel vision. This is a pre-determined ruling that was backfilled with arguments.

Israel, a country that has thus far provided its enemy in Gaza with over 1 million metric tons of aid during wartime, is now accused of committing “starvation”. The humanitarian aid operation it orchestrated in cooperation with UNRWA – even while its school textbooks teem with anti-Semitic caricatures and many of its employees are on Hamas’ payroll – is described as war crimes. 2 billion dollars were donated by worldwide contributors to provide every Gazan with over 3,400 calories per day. All of that, after having suffered October 7 – the deadliest massacre of Jewish people since the Holocaust, and as 101 Israeli hostages are still unlawfully held in Gaza.

No real evidence has ever been provided for well-recorded starvation cases in Gaza – only smoke and mirrors. UN agencies largely rely on bogus data provided by Hamas, whitewashed as the “Gaza Health Ministry”. The “Ministry” provides the bricks that construct the anti-Israeli edifice, claiming that over 43 thousand Palestinians were killed. No real effort was carried out to validate the authenticity of that data, nor verify how many of those killed were militants. That, in stark contrast to skepticism over other types of disinformation, from Russia’s Sputnik News to ISIS’ Amaq.

During the war, millions of Palestinians were ordered by the IDF to get out of war zones and into safe zones, as Israeli tanks safeguarded them from Hamas sniper fire, fearing evacuation could help Israel defeat it. Gaza’s population continues to grow at an estimate 2% annual rate. This would be a particularly bizarre and inefficient way to carry out a genocide.

It was also the lack of relevant process, not merely evidence, that rattled Jerusalem. Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC, nor does it have jurisdiction in countries with an independent judicial system, as per the principle of complementarity. Only in cases such as Yugoslav strongman Milošević’s war crimes, where local courts are “unwilling and unable” to prosecute, can the ICC move on to intervene.

The opposite party to the ruling would be “Palestine”, which was admitted to the ICC in 2015, in stark violation of the Palestinian Authority’s Oslo Accords with Israel. Since the court cannot discuss unrecognized territories, it agreed to define one for the sake of protocol in 2021. Hungarian Judge Péter Kovács issued a dissenting opinion, criticizing the court for its lack of proper legal basis. Yet the ICC continued to paint the dartboard after the dart hit.

Much like the USSR’s sham trials, the ICC also reflects a deeper and alarming insight into a once-respected international institution. It seems that the media’s limelight rather than real criteria determines its outreach. There is simply no other way to characterize how Gaza’s relatively negligent and unreliable number of fatalities gets much of the attention, while objectively severe war theaters such as the war in Yemen (400 thousand killed and starved and 16 million at the brink of starvation) or the war in South Sudan (7.7 million projected to face acute food insecurity) get practically none. No other way to explain how 156 resolutions passed against Israel at the UN General Assembly since 2015, with Russia far second at 24 and none passed against Qatar or Venezuela.

In the words of prosecutor Khan’s predecessor at the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo: “Everyone knows starvation happened” in Gaza, while falling short of providing evidence. This “everyone knows” attitude determined the court’s proceedings, not evidence.

Legal acrobatics and confirmation bias only help making Israel’s case against the ICC, creating personally-customized law, rather than international law. This is why the ICC’s override managed to set off alarms not just in Jerusalem, but in Washington, and for a good reason. Both President Biden and President Elect Trump strongly condemned this move. They are fully aware that allowing a precedent on Israel would be allowing it on the United States as well. It has been scorched before: in 2020, the Trump administration laid sanctions on ICC officials following the court’s decision to launch a probe into American servicemen in Afghanistan. The court then backed down and “deprioritized” the US case. Then in 2022, during the Biden administration’s tenure, the ICC resumed its investigation. If Israel’s gold standard of 1:1.2 military to civilian ratio is considered “genocide”, now imagine how could the ICC describe the US’ record in Afghanistan.

There is a simple way out of this imbroglio: degrade and defund the ICC. Like any institution, the ICC is only as strong as its legitimacy and its funding. European countries who wish to keep their sovereignty would be wise to pull out funding and opt out of the ICC. Rather than announcing they will respect the ruling, they should be leading the opposition to it. They may gloat over seeing Israel in the hot seat, and may look up to the ICC with awe and reverence, but they could well be next. A real international setting to prosecute war criminals should be set, rather than a kangaroo court. The credibility that the ICC has been selling was exposed as window dressing. Now European countries should stop buying it.

הפוסט The ICC has been selling credibility. Now it’s time to stop buying it. הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The fall of the Assad regime should signal to Israel that, amidst the chaotic sequence of events, it must uphold two critical interests. The first is to destroy the capabilities of the Shiite Ring of Fire. The second is to avoid being trapped in a Sunni Ring of Fire.

The Shiite Ring of Fire was first breached with the downfall of Hezbollah and Hamas. Breaches continued with an Israeli strike that stripped Iran of its air defense capabilities, and with the rapid collapse of the Assad regime — a development echoing across the Middle East. This is not merely the fall of a regime that was hostile to Israel and was part of Iran’s Sunni Ring of Fire. It is also a psychological game-changer that could reinvigorate the Iranian rebels.

In an effort to fortify itself, Iran is accelerating the development of its nuclear weapons. A report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the U.S. indicates that Iran has speeded up its uranium enrichment so that it will potentially be able to manufacture 12 nuclear bombs.

Russia, too, has a stake in Iran’s nuclear progress, raising concerns that Russian technologies could be transferred to Iran to shorten the time required to manufacture a nuclear bomb and strengthen the resistance from the Axis of Evil.

In the face of Iran’s rush toward nuclear armaments, Israel is counting the days until Trump enters the White House. The question is how many days we have left in our quiver before Iran achieves a bomb that could, Heaven forbid, once more reverse the region’s momentum.

Therefore Israel must act immediately to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and, along with it, the remnants of the Ring of Fire that Iran has constructed around Israel.

The second interest that Israel must uphold is rooted in an ancient Machiavellian principle that says every change begets another change.

It is already evident that Iran’s decline paves the way for Turkey’s rise. Erdoğan is lurking around the corner in hopes that Israel will mount the attack and that the Iranian regime will falter. He would then seize the opportunity he has been awaiting and attempt to position himself as the region’s Islamic power.

Whether actively encouraged or passively approved by Turkey, the offensive from Syrian rebels under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was made possible by Turkish financial and military support. It not only benefits Erdoğan strategically by advancing his regional hegemony, but also benefits him tactically by weakening the Shiite axis, pushing the Kurds away from Turkey’s borders, and returning Syrian refugees who have been burdening Turkey’s economy.

Israel’s understanding of its own future interests on the battlefield against the Turks must therefore prompt it to strike inside Syria now. During the current war Erdoğan, an extreme jihadist who seeks Israel’s destruction, has taken every step to label Israel as an enemy and display his practical intent to harm it. In July, for instance, he spoke of invading Israel the way he invaded Karabakh and Libya: “Just like we entered Karabakh and the way we entered Libya, maybe we’ll do the same thing. …We have to be strong.”

Unlike Iran, Erdoğan possesses a modern, well-equipped military. This includes twice as many enlisted troops as Israel, approximately 10% more fighter jets, nearly twice as many tanks, four times as many warships, and more than twice the number of submarines (!).

Although Israel holds military superiority over Turkey in quite a few aspects, one of the challenges in confronting Turkey could lie in a preemptive Israeli strike because Turkey is a NATO member. Under the NATO framework, an attack on one member state is considered tantamount to attack on them all.

In conclusion, it is a necessity — and an obligation — for Israel to complete the destruction of the Shiite Ring of Fire. At the same time, its operations in Syria against Erdoğan-aligned rebels must be subject to a calculated assessment of Israel’s future interests in a possible war against Turkey as well as to a resolute decision that the Shiite Ring of Fire must not be replaced by a Sunni equivalent.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel Must Not Replace a Shiite Ring of Fire with a Sunni Ring of Fire הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The brutal pogrom in Amsterdam against the Israeli fans of Maccabi Tel-Aviv soccer team in early November, with news broadcasts showing Arab-Muslim rioters violently attacking helpless Israeli soccer fans – prove that Israel is dealing with an additional front in its current war. But more then all, it casts a blinding limelight on the snowballing Islamstic threat to Europe’s public domains.

An undeniable fact – Europe is currently undergoing a gradual takeover by Islam. The immigration-wave from Muslim countries to Western Europe was so massive that it had effected a radical change in the very landscape of European countries. The familiar faces and scenes of Europe are increasingly being lost to entire neighborhoods and sections of cities awash with the Muslim Thawbs, Hijabs and Burkas, and store signs in Arabic. Reportedly, over the past years, many churches in Europe – mainly in France – are being purchased by Muslim organizations and converted into Mosques.

This is what religious takeover looks like.

Along with this cultural occupation, among  these immigrants there are many who bring with them from the Middle East a vitriolic and violent breed of antisemitism. Many of the vicious rioters in Amsterdam that night hail from Morocco and Algeria – one of the most antisemitic countries in the world, and these Algerian-Dutch have been weaned on antisemitism since birth.

The Amsterdam events should be a wake-up call for Europe. The Muslim rioters set out to harm Jews in that particular event, but next time – they might very well set their aims on Christians.

European countries such as Holland  are home to very large Muslim communities of Algerians and Moroccans. These communities are growing exponentially while the non-Muslim communities are shrinking. The total population of Holland and Belgium together does not exceed 30 million – 17.8 million in Holland and 11 million in Belgium. A 10-year projection of population growth estimates that in major cities, such as Brussels, the Muslim population will become the majority. They may even become a majority in Belgium as a whole, within several decades. After taking over the public domain in the liberal and multi-cultured BENELUX countries, next in turn will be France, Germany, Sweden and Great Britain – all countries with large Muslim communities. France, for example has the largest Muslim community in Europe, with over 8.5 million people.

Global Intifada

The well-planned pogrom of the Dutch-Muslims against Israelis, who had arrived in Amsterdam simple to watch a soccer game between Maccabi Tel Aviv and Ajax Amsterdam – reminded Israelis and Jews across the world of the October 7 massacre, as well as Kristallnacht of the Holocaust, the 86^th anniversary of which was the next day, ironically.

The pogrom in Amsterdam included very harsh scenes of Israelis being bludgeoned with bats, threatened with knives and some even pushed into the cold night canal waters. The Arab rioters coordinated the attacks through their social networks and with the aid of information they had received on the whereabouts of Israelis in various locations in Amsterdam. The city’s mayor Pamke Helsma even knew to report that “…taxi drivers of Muslim origin participated in the lynch”. Several of the rioters had even hunted down Israelis to the hotels in which they were staying, and the Israeli guests were instructed to remain in their rooms with the doors locked.

The law enforcement forces and the Dutch police demonstrated abject incompetence in seizing control over the event and preventing injury to the Israeli soccer fans. Yet, Amsterdam Police Chief, Peter Holle claimed “…we’ve been planning for weeks, we foresaw the risks to the public order”. After the pogrom, many videos were released on social media showing Arab rioters beating Israelis, and forcing them to repeat the slogan “Free Palestine”. These videos were later used in the Palestinian propaganda channels to mock the Israelis who repeated the slogan under duress, in hopes of being spared by their attackers.

The Amsterdam pogrom is not a singular event restricted only to Holland – this is a red flag to what may very well turn into a wave of similar events in the rest of the Western world. The fact that in many cities in the West, the US included, Arabs poured out into the streets cheering the attack against the Israelis in Amsterdam, just as they had done in the wake of the October 7 massacre – should be a huge red flag for these countries. For some time now, Arabs and Muslims have been calling for a “Globa Intifada” against Jews around the world. Antisemitism is soaring and Muslims in western countries are enjoying immunity under the auspices of western tolerance.

The war’s eighth front

The Amsterdam events and the violent protests across Europe have once again proved that Israel faces yet another front – an eighth front of a violent uprising of Muslims and pro-Palestinians throughout the world; When a crowd of Arab Muslims riots in the streets of Europe and North America, it does so not solely out of solidarity with the Palestinians, but out of zealous antisemitic hatred toward Jews, calling for their slaughter, supporting Hamas and openly and unashamedly holding up the picture of formally designated global terrorist – mass murderer, war criminal and architect of the October 7 slaughter, Yahya Sinwar.

Israel has been forced to deal with this eighth front, as part of the war declared against the State, and thus has experience in this arena. Europe, however, may well find itself for the first time facing this kind of war against a Jihadi movement that had sprouted in its own back yard, bent on taking over the very countries that opened their doors so generously to them.

These events also cast a glaring light on a truism that the Europeans would rather deny: that Europe is more threatened by the Muslims and thus prefers to remain passive rather than protect its law-abiding Jewish citizens. Admitting this would force Europe to face the fact that they are in the same boat as the Jews.

But make no mistake: Islam is spreading all over the world, and we are witnessing the first signs of its designs to take over Europe.

Holland and Belgium first.

This article was originally published in Makor Rishon.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Holland & Belgium First הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The crises around the recruitment, or lack thereof, of Haredi – ultra-orthodox – men, the imperative to secure Israel’s military needs, the economic crises, and the declining support of Israel in the international community – how can all these converge to a golden opportunity for Israel that would allow it to cross several hurdles with one leap?

Four hurdles, to be precise. The solution on the table is the foundation of local Israeli arms production, with manufacturing and operational personnel recruited from the Haredi community, who would be employed under conditions of military or national service. Israel’s government had already agreed on the imperative to increase Israel’s self-production of arms and munitions in light of growing dependance mainly on the US, and other countries, for the supply of arms and munitions, which significantly increased since the onset of the war. This project would afford Israel critical independence, while diminishing its dependence on the good will and political motivations of other countries and one administration or other. The military salaries paid to the recruits employed in this project would ensure its economic viability. Moreover, the global shortages in inventory and growing demand for ammunition will enable Israel to enjoy another source of revenue and a geopolitical status of an arms exporter, rather than an importer.

The crises of the military service objection in the ultra-orthodox community

Much can – and should – be said about the issue of the recruitment of young men from the ultra-orthodox community to the IDF, and an overview consisting of a handful of sentences cannot begin to touch upon the complexity of the issue. But it must be said that the solution above mentioned does not seek to serve as an overall response for the demand for equal participation of the ultra-orthodox sector in civic duties, nor can it create sufficient placements for the entire group. Rather, it offers a partial solution, such that could respond to the genuine concerns regarding the ability of Haredi recruits to aptly preserve their way of life – be it gender separation, kosher food, and daily religious studies – all obstacles to the recruitment of Haredis to the IDF today.

These munitions employees would have to be manned exclusively by male recruits, including professional positions such as managers and engineers, among others, whom also can be recruited from the Haredi community, but not necessarily. The operational workers can be recruited from special recruitment rounds of young men from the ultra-orthodox community. As part of their service, the recruits would be provided with kosher meals, communal prayer services either in the barracks or in a synagogue specially built for that purpose, and even religios studies in their downtime. This model can address many of the concerns of potential recruits from the Haredi community while at the same time provide a solution for a pressing strategic military need in Israel.

Economy of munitions

There is no doubt that Israel has been required to adhere to a well calculated munitions economy since the outbreak of the Gaza war. Although there is no doubt as regards to Israel’s military capabilities – especially thanks to the American supply train that provided Israel with hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment since the war began. However, there are numerous variables in this economy that Israel has to consider, and it cannot always trust that this supply effort will endure. Over the past months the government had held frequent discussions on the issue, with recommendations from the military and political echelons to put into action plans to cut Israel’s dependence on foreign supply and increase the capacity of its independent arms production. This is in the face of high risks of embargo against Israel, or the conditioned or delayed shipments Israel is currently contending with. Furthermore, the arrival of these shipments is subjected to the positions and interests of the various administrations with which Israel has weapons trade agreements. This is compounded by the growing global demand for weapons and ammunition, driven among others by the war in Ukraine which has no conclusion on the horizon, and many countries are now in a race to build up and improve their military power, both in Europe and in Asia, where many countries are concerned about China and North Korea, and of course in the Middle East too. Production is falling short of the growing demand and serious backlogs and delays are becoming a matter of routine. Thus, the decision to increase local production and ensure self-sufficiency is hardly exclusive to Israel. For instance, in March the European Commission presented a plan to cut arms imports from outside the EU and increase production on the continent.

Israel’s economic crisis

There is no doubt that the Gaza war has served Israel with a steep bill and is expected to continue exacting huge costs from the Israeli economy. The military technology is a relatively lucrative endeavor for Israel’s economy and it represents a significant portion of Israel’s exports with trail-blazing Israeli technologies demanded globally at considerable costs. The abovementioned proposal departs from the usual focus of the technology-intensive defense industry by broadening its portfolio to “low-tech” munitions manufacturing, and it offers the potential for a historic turning point in the industry, which could expedite the military and economic advantages for the country and pave the way into new markets where Israel’s reputation in the field of defense production would surely serve to lend credibility to and create demand for its new munitions products.

Israel’s international status

A point to consider is that Israel’s dependence on imported weapons and ammunition might compromise its foreign relations with other countries. This places political power over Israel in the hands of the suppliers and oftentimes is leveraged to dictate preconditions for the supply of weapons to Israel – even to the point of influencing Israel’s policies and decision-making processes, particularly in critical time such as wars. Israel, however, has a golden opportunity at present to turn the tables and gain exactly that kind of influence vis a vis other countries, when they come knocking at the door, wishing to purchase Israeli munitions. This potential says something about the influence Israel wields in the field of advanced military technology exports.

In conclusion, this type of munitions industry could manufacture a wide range of arms and ammunition. Naturally, the feasibility and requirements for each plant and assembly line would have to be established. It may be that certain factories would demand more unprofessional manpower while others may be technology-intensive and demand skilled employees. Differences in the cost of salaries might be significant. The State would of course determine whether it would subsidize these factories and recruit manpower at market salaries, even if it means financial losses. But the proposed model provides a cost-effective solution which is highly competitive, and can create attractive export opportunities, not only in regards to the quality of the output but also in prices.

Lastly, an additional important point is the potential abundance of unskilled manpower for this purpose, in a country where there is a shortage of this type of worker, especially in a sensitive military industry. Case in point – in other industries that are mainly based on manual labor such as agriculture and construction, it is hard and even impossible to find Israeli workers, and manpower there almost exclusively comprises of foreign workers. The situation is marginally better in the manufacturing sector. However, when considering the fact that military industry is highly sensitive, it is clear that the benefits of relying on the Haredi community for manpower may create opportunities and remove hurdles that are currently hard to clear.

This article was originally published in Now 14

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Two Hurdles with One Leap? A Proposal for the Recruitment of Haredim to New Arms Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Assistant Commissioner, Brigadier General Betty Lahat served in the Israel Prison Service for 35 years, during which she filled senior positions and headed several prisons, among them the Neveh Tirtza women’s prison, the Sharon Prison and the Hadarim detention center which has been housing many high-profile Palestinian security prisoners. Her last position with the IPS was head of the Service’s intelligence department, in the capacity of which she had met many of the Palestinian security prisoners, Yahya Sinwar among them.

During her years in various positions, Lahat had worked with inmates from many demographics – from youths and women to heads of crime and arch-terrorists. “I’ve experienced a fair share of heartache during my career, and witnessed time and time again our inability to break the cycles of crime and terror”, she says. “I’ve raised generations of inmates – I had female inmates that gave birth while serving prison sentences, and later met their children in juvenile prisons, some of which even remembered me, and how I would throw them birthday parties in the prison cafeteria when they would visit their mothers. I would look at them and think to myself – they’re my children’s age, why did they have to end up in a place like this? It’s a huge heartache. On the other extreme, I have met some of the bloodiest terrorists and had to watch them as they walk around the prison yard, chatting away, laughing and enjoying themselves, while I  had to ensure they received appropriate care. There were times when I would get home and say to myself ‘good lord, what kind of a world am I living in?’”

We knew that his word was the law: the prisoner Yahya Sinwar

Over the years, Betty Lahat had seen some of the most dangerous prisoners Israel’s prisons had known. She had met murderers and heads of crime, and she had met some of the highest profile terrorists. Under her wardenship she had seen the likes of Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin, head of the Hamas military wing Salah Shehade, and head of izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria Ibrahim Hamed, who orchestrated most of the terror attacks during the Second Intifada. However, one of the most memorable inmates for Lahat – mainly due to his nefarious intelligence and shocking cruelty – is Yahya Sinwar.

What was your impression of Sinwar?

“I remember him as a very dominant figure who was very cruel. The prisoners elected him time after time as their prison leader. As such, he put together inmate terror cells and a telecommunications reconnaissance team that was tasked with gathering intel within and outside of the prison. He also commanded special units that interrogated new prisoners. Any prisoner suspected of collaborating with Israel was cruelly tortured. Naturally, Sinwar never did any of the dirty work himself, but it was clear that he was the one pulling the strings. He also took under his wing the most murderous terrorist that would arrive at the prison, and promoted them up the ranks. For example, he took under his wing Abdel-Aziz Salha, a West Bank Hamas militant jailed for life for his part in the lynching of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah, famously depicted standing at a window holding up blood-stained hands, and made him head of the telecommunications units in the prison.  He also added to his ranks the murderers of the Fogel family and the perpetrator of the deadly bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya. Later, during negotiations for the release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Sinwar was involved in the selection of the terrorists to be released. He made sure that he and his cronies were on the list, and left out prisoners that were at odds with him. That was the kind of power he had”.

Would you have believed that Sinwar was able to orchestrate an attack on the scale of the October 7 massacre?

“Absolutely. Sinwar had no interest in coexistence and had always proclaimed he would never be resigned to the ‘Zionist settlers’ living on what he saw as the land of Palestine. I listened to him a lot, both in direct conversations I had with him as well as conversations with his prison associates we tapped. I had never witnessed him stray from his way of thought and staunch ideology. He had grand schemes and he truly believed that by 2027, he would lead a brutal attack that would result in the victory of Hamas over Israel – so whoever tries to claim that Sinwar held a pragmatic approach toward Israel has no idea what he is talking about”.

To what extent was Sinwar involved in events outside of prison?

“In my time, we had designated Sinwar as a national target prisoner, in other words, a prisoner that demands constant surveillance, as his sphere of influence extended beyond prison walls. He was extremely involved with what was happening in other security prisons and was very knowledgeable about current affairs in Israel. You must understand that Sinwar was deviously intelligent. He got to know Israeli society like the back of his hand and could analyze it brilliantly. It was clear from an early stage that he had set his mind on fragmenting Israeli society from within, and he knew just how to do it. His objective of fomenting discord in Israel was clearly evident even during the Gaza war, and it is clear to me that when he emerged from the tunnels and saw Gaza in ruins, he got the tailwind to carry on his fight from seeing the discord in Israel’s society  and he believed he would eventually prevail”.

You participated in the discussions on the list of terrorists to be released as part of the Shalit deal. Where did you stand on the release of Sinwar?

“I had a very hard time with Sinwar’s release, and I had warned them that this is not a terrorist that should be set free. At one point, one of the negotiation team members asked me ‘what do you have against Sinwar? He didn’t kill any Jews, he only killed Palestinian collaborators’, to which I responded – ‘Just wait. He’ll have plenty of Jewish blood on his hands’. I don’t know  exactly what I meant when I said this, but it was clear to me that once he sees an opportunity to commit heinous attacks against Jews – he’ll seize it. Whoever gets to know terrorists like Sinwar, and spends so much time with them as I did, knows what they’re capable of. And whoever was surprised by the sheer cruelty of the terrorist in the October 7 attack didn’t really know them at all”.

It is not a prison. It is summer camp for terrorists

Betty Lahat is very familiar with the situation in Israeli prisons and knows the conditions under which various classes of prisoners are held. She has a hard time accepting the manner in which prisoners – particularly security prisoners – manipulate public opinion in Israel and its justice system to gain unjustified amenities.

“The Palestinian security prisoners know that the Israeli justice system will always take care of them and that the doors of the High Court of Justice are always open to them”, says Lahat. “We are under the impression that when the prisons are quiet, and we give them what they want, we can rehabilitate them and change their ways. But what we fail to understand is that this humane approach is to our detriment. The better the conditions we give them are, the more they perceive us as weak. Even saving their lives has no effect on them. I spoke to Sinwar after he underwent surgery to remove a malignant tumor from his brain in an Israeli hospital. I asked him whether he now has some gratitude toward Israel, to which he replied that he has nothing to be grateful for as we simply did our job. We need to forgo this illusion that if we give them favorable conditions in prison, we can remove them from the path of terror. In all my years with the Israeli Prison Service, I’ve not once encountered a Hamas prisoner that had forsaken his ideology. It just doesn’t happen”.

What does the life of a security inmate look like?

“Each inmate must participate in a mandatory educational program. They also get to study for academic degrees through the Open University. In fact, the Palestinian Authority actually encourages them to earn an education in prison. The higher their academic achievement – the more money they get. In addition, they have a large library and there is not one book that reaches the book stores in Israel that is not added to their library immediately. I’ve seen with my own eyes Palestinian inmates reading canonic Jewish literature such as Jabotinsky’s ‘Iron Wall’ and Yehuda Ha’Levi’s ‘Kuzari’. They also regularly receive Israeli newspapers, their favorite being Ha’aretz – they have a permanent subscription and have a fit when it fails to arrive. In addition to the enrichment programs they’re entitled to from the system, the terror cells within the prisons cultivate education among their members – every member is required to learn Hebrew and serve a period as their spokesman.  They are also taught to gather intel, follow their guards, and follow commentary on Israeli news. They listen to the news and read the papers, and then they sit together and analyze the news and commentary. In particular they pay close attention to the social discord in Israel, to assess how fatigued Israeli society is and thus willing to make concessions. You have to understand that the Palestinian security inmate lives under iron discipline – especially those of them who are members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They waste no time and utilize their prison time to acquire education and skills that will come in handy for their terror activity and long-term plan execution”.

What is your opinion on the criticism on the living conditions of the security inmates?

“Security prisoners are not supposed to have the same conditions that criminal prisoners have, and this is also supported by international law. Whoever murders Jews just for being Jews should be held under completely different conditions. But in practice, the security prisons have long become a summer camp for terrorists. This happens, among others because of the justice system and the High Court of Justice, that hand down phantasmagoric rulings that are utterly out of touch with the reality in the prisons. One day, we were told that we cannot search under the prisoners’ prayer mats because it is disrespectful to their faith – do they even know what prisoners can hide or dig under their mats? As a matter of fact, there are Palestinian security prisoners whose sole job is to sit and compose petitions to the High Court of Justice. That is their job, to send petition after petition, and drive the system crazy. And if that were not enough, they also use lawyers and politicians to help them send out messages to associates on the outside and coordinate plans, and the General Security Service and the Attorney General’s office allow this to happen. If you ask me, the responsibility for the living conditions of security inmates should rest solely in the hands of the IPS, which is the suitable professional body for this, and my vast experience with the IPS teaches me that it would ensure that the security prisoners are treated according to what is stipulated by international law – no more, no less”.

“Every intelligence agency thinks they have a monopoly on brains”

Having climbed to key positions in the Israel Prison Service, Brigadier General Lahat has deep insights not only into the reality within prison walls but also on the fashion in which Israel’s entire security and intelligence apparatus works. One of the most material issues that she points to is the lack of collaboration among the various intelligence agencies. “Each agency thinks it has a monopoly on brains and that it knows better”, she says. “There is a lot of patronizing going around in these agencies, especially on part of the GSS and certain units within IDF Intelligence, and they don’t really strive to cooperate with the police and the prison service. When I was head of the IPS intelligence department, I literally begged them to collaborate with us because I knew we at the prison service, engaging with these prisoners on a daily basis, have valuable input. At that time some improvement was made in the relations between the IP and the intelligence agencies, but I think it pretty much went back to what it used to be. Even today, when I look at what is happening  in the Israeli intelligence community, I see nothing has changed”.

What about the deals for the release of prisoners – are they made without the IPS input?

“When they signed the Jibril prisoner exchange agreement (in 1985, when Israel had released 1,500 Palestinian prisoners – some of them very high profile – in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured in the First Lebanon War), we were not consulted at all, and in the Shalit deal – our involvement was just for appearances. Only after insisting on the presence of the Prison Service in the negotiations on the release of the terrorists, I was invited to the meetings. But even then, my role amounted to presenting background information on the terrorists. After all, the GSS is sure it knows everything, so why should it consult in the IPS?”

Sounds like you have a bellyful of grievances on the GSS. What is your opinion on its work in the past year?

“There are outstanding people in the GSS who do invaluable work, but personally I think that the GSS is a body that takes on responsibilities that are not within its scope of duty  – and often this comes at the expense of tasks that are”.

Generally speaking, do you get the impression that the policy of releasing prisoners in exchange for hostages influences the state of mind of the Palestinian prisoners?

“Very much so. The Palestinian prisoners truly believe that it’s only a matter of time till they are released and this keeps their spirits high. They don’t care how many years they’re sentenced to. Even prisoners who are sentenced to 60 years will say ‘Walla Ishi – “that’s nothing” – because they know that at one point or another, Israelis will be kidnapped and they’ll just be released in an exchange deal. Factually, they are not wrong”.

Are there any prisoners that will never be released with any deal?

“Aside from Yigal Amir (who is serving a life sentence for the assassination of PM Yitzhak Rabin) I know of no such prisoner. In the Jibreal deal and the Shalit deal we’ve released the worst of the terrorists, and I see the names of the terrorist that are on the table for release in the current exchange negotiations  for the Israeli hostages in Gaza and I’m absolutely appalled. When it comes to security prisoners, sooner or later they all get a chance to be released in an exchange deal”.

My family and I received threats, but I was never afraid

Retired Assistant Commissioner Betty Lahat is not just a former senior officer of the Israeli Prison Service – she is one of the first women in the organization to have scaled the ranks and chalk up such an impressive track record. “I don’t wave a feminist banner, but I have opened the doors to many women that followed in my footsteps and I’ve proved that we are every bit as good as the men in the IPS”, she admits. “I was a strong woman in a masculine environment and that wasn’t easy. When I was appointed head of the Sharon Prison,  which is one of Israel’s highest security prisons, there was big drama. Some had a hard time accepting a woman at the head of a men’s prison. When I first arrived, I was the target of scorning looks and remarks. But I didn’t let it affect me. I gathered everyone and proclaimed that I will not apologize for being a woman. Very soon, they all came to see my vast knowledge and experience, coupled with a deep familiarity with the brass tacks. They also saw how motivated I was and the important changes I effected, and no one dared act behind my back or try to sabotage me”.

Your job entailed daily dealings with the most dangerous prisoners in Israel. Weren’t you afraid?

“I had sat in the same room as heads of crime; I’ve sent terrorists to solitary confinement, and there was even a time when I would travel to Gaza by myself – I never felt scared. Even when our intelligence department notified me that there is intel about threats against me, I insisted to go into the wards and meet the prisoners. My family had also received dozens of threats. Marwan Barghouti’s people, for example, threatened to come after me for months because I took away some of their amenities in prison. I had to have a police detail on my house, but even then, I was not afraid. That was my job and that was part of the risk I had assumed with the job”.

What have you learned after 35 years with the IPS?

“One of the most painful insights that I’ve gained from my years with the IPS is that we cannot eradicate the incitement of terror in Palestinian society, and in truth – we really aren’t trying. Many of the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs are weaned from a very young age on hatred toward Jews, and then they go to school – some of them funded by the State of Israel – and are fed yet more false narratives. And if that weren’t enough, young boys are offered incentives for committing terror attacks. There are adolescents that are at the fringe of society, but after committing attacks against Israel, they are suddenly accepted, their families are provided for and they receive a salary. Also, in Israeli prisons, they are required to get their high school diploma, which is something that they could never have hoped to achieve on the outside. So what interest do they have to change their ways?  From what I saw, we do not really have the wherewithal to prevent these boys from becoming heinous terrorists in the future. Just like we cannot prevent the released terrorists from returning  to terrorism, nor from female prisoners from raising future generations of terrorists. These are unbreakable cycles”.

How had your career shape your outlook today as a citizen of Israel?

“I think my work taught me that there is no such thing as black and white. The reality in Israel is very complex and it is about time we stop trying to pull the country to one extreme or another. This is also one of the reasons I had joined the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. To me it is a hate-free movement that comes from a pragmatic stand point. The movement places the well-being of Israel above all and gives serious consideration to every issue related to the country’s security. This gives me the hope that it can lead us and the country to a better place”.

הפוסט “Whoever Was Surprised By the Cruelty of The Terrorists – Did not Really Know Them”, Interview with former Israel Prison Service Assistant Commissioner Brigadier General Betty Lahat הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Analysis: US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon face hurdles as Hezbollah de facto controls Lebanon; Israel must choose between a limited agreement or continued warfare, balancing military success with the need for regional security and international support

The contacts between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States, illustrate the main difficulty of a settlement reality in an era in which a sub-state terrorist organization controls a supposedly sovereign state de facto. The American-mediated contacts are supposed to lead to understandings on the basis of which quiet will be maintained on the border between Israel and Lebanon, but in a situation in which Lebanon is de facto controlled by a terrorist organization whose fingerprints are evident in the negotiations, not to mention the escalation process it led, it is difficult to understand how such an agreement can last, for how long and if at all.

The alternatives available for Israel on the Lebanese border are divided between two options – a local arrangement that does not fundamentally change the geostrategic situation, or the continuation of the war to destroy the Hezbollah terrorist organization. The reality that Israel reached after a year of fighting in the Gaza Strip, while fighting defensively on the Lebanese border, led it to a significant operational achievement vis-à-vis the terrorist organization, both in terms of damage to infrastructure, damage to the top command and control leadership, damage to weapons stockpiles and harm to fighters. Above all, neutralizing Hezbollah’s operative ability to implement the plan it has been working on for years, which is a ground-intensive operation to conquer the Galilee – Hezbollah has lost this capability.

If Israel reaches an arrangement vis-à-vis Lebanon, and assuming that Iran, which controls Hezbollah and indirectly Lebanon, where the radical ideology of the Ayatollahs’ “umbrella” will not change, under this assumption it can be assumed that such an arrangement will last for a short period of time, and certainly will not prevent the strengthening of the terrorist organization, a clear Iranian proxy in Lebanon.

In fact, as far as Israel is concerned, and certainly in today’s public opinion, expects Hezbollah not to regain strength, and certainly not to cross the geographical border of the Litani River, in order to prevent the reestablishment of the option of occupying the Galilee, as well as removing the communities in northern Israel from the direct threat of anti-tank weapons.

The alternative, from the Israelis’ perspective, and among a wide Israeli consensus, even a preferred alternative, is for the IDF to enforce the agreement, i.e., the IDF to prevent Hezbollah’s renewed buildup in the area south of the Litani River. This demand is fraught with a paradox, since Lebanon is a sovereign state, and there is no bilateral rationale whatsoever for a neighboring country to operate on the territory of a sovereign state defined as an enemy, this is a violation of sovereignty and Lebanon will not accept it, certainly not the Iranians.

Hence, the two real alternatives are a limited liability arrangement, or ongoing warfare. With the understanding that Israel will not be able to impose military control of the IDF on the ground on Lebanon, and assuming that Iran will not accept this under any circumstances either, Israel must demand two critical dimensions in the arrangement agreement: first, freedom of action in order to prevent Hezbollah’s buildup, which includes neutralization the smuggling routes – such an action also requires intelligence coverage, and this must be demanded by Israel, even if the visual intelligence is transmitted through an American intermediary, At the CENTCOM level.

On the operational level, Israel must demand a buffer zone into which no weapons will enter, just as defined in the separation of forces agreement between Syria and Israel after the Yom Kippur War (1974). The combination of a buffer zone, legitimacy to act against the axes of buildup, and an informed security assessment on the Lebanese border, which is also based on quality intelligence – are the best guarantee Israel can receive, and this guarantee will also be limited.

There should also be an understanding among the international community that agreements between a democratic state and a state ruled by a terrorist state such as Iran cannot be trusted. As long as Iran seeks to expand in the Middle East, it will find a way to strengthen its destructive arms in the region, including Lebanon. Therefore, the arrangement between Israel and Lebanon is a very likely short-term operation, and no more than a few years until something significant happens in Iran – if it continues its radical strategy, all the peoples of the region, and certainly Israel, will suffer from this.

Therefore, the international community, and certainly Israel, must act immediately for a strategic change vis-à-vis Iran – its different conduct can provide a more realistic guarantee of agreements, especially when the Russian axis, which has a clear interest in the northeastern Mediterranean basin, is integrated into this story.

Can Israel afford to wait for a change of government in the United States?

In general, Israel can suspend negotiations with Lebanon and wait for the Trump administration, which appears to be clearly pro-Israel compared to the Biden administration and in general. At the same time, it is worth being realistic – such a wait means continuing the fighting for at least another year in Lebanon, which means: increasing the burden on IDF reserve duty, continuing the lives of those evacuated from northern communities in the existing format, i.e., another year away from home, which has deep and problematic consequences.

The fighting as it stands these days is characterized mainly by “counter fire,” i.e., the firing of missiles and rockets, combined with unmanned aerial vehicles that violate the security of Israel’s civilian home front several times a day. The IDF, on the other hand, continues to “clear” the Lebanese territory, destroying additional Hezbollah capabilities. On the face of it, time seems to be working against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena – the Israeli home front is showing greater resilience than the Iranians thought, and with each passing day Hezbollah is getting closer and closer to breaking. It is possible that from this perspective, it is convenient for Israel to actually “play the game” according to the current rules, and in this way bring Iran, Hezbollah and Lebanon to an arrangement that is much better for Israel in a few months, certainly under the auspices of a sympathetic American administration – Reaching an arrangement when the terrorist organization is defeated is infinitely more credible than the agreement currently proposed.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Arrangement or escalation: Security alternatives on the Lebanese border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, is turning 89 this month. Even before the open and pressing question of his successor as the chairman of the PA, his rule is already leaving the Authority in disarray. “The PA is in a state of collapse and dilapidation,” says Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid. “It doesn’t pay salaries to its employees; the entire Samaria region is no longer under its control; it doesn’t manage to operate as a political entity, and in regards to the Authority’s future – that’s the big question”.

The Lost Generation of the PA

Baruch, in an article you published last April, you mention a survey according to which most Palestinians view the PA as dead weight and demand its dismantling. Is that still true?

“True. But not a single survey – but a series of poles that found that a significantly high number of Palestinians – sometimes as high as 60 or 80 percent of them – view the Authority as a burden and do not perceive it as a historical achievement. They understand that aside from security coordination that serves mainly the IDF – the Palestinian Authority does not serve the Palestinian dream. It is on the background of this unrest that Hamas was able to garner such widespread sympathy”.

Even today, after the war, the organization enjoys such broad support?

“It’s hard and perhaps even impossible to know how much support Hamas currently has in Gaza, however, in Judea and Samaria it is very well supported. The buildup of Hamas in Judea and Samaria on the expense of the PA is a trend that was evident in all of the surveys on the topic from the past five-six years, although one must take Palestinian surveys with a grain of salt as they often distort the data. At any rate, these surveys clearly show what the world already knows: the Palestinian public harshly criticizes Abu Mazen, who originally was elected for a term of only five years, but after nearly 20 years is still in power, without ever having held elections for the presidency of the PA or its parliament”.

Who will step in to fill the vacuum left by the PA?

“At the present, there are some 40 organizations of Hamas, PIJ and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, particularly in the Samaria region and further north. These are young people, the group of 15–30-year-olds, which in regards to the PA are a lost generation. They were born after the Oslo Accords and hate the Authority because nothing in their lives had improved. They view Hamas and the military path as the realization of their ideological aspirations. Add to that the money that Hamas and Hezbollah pour into the region”.

How can the PA restore the public’s trust?

“Fatah members as well as Abu Mazen know that that in the 2006 elections, Fatah got more votes than Hamas, but the votes were distributed among the factions that comprise Fatah – nowadays it has three and a half leaders and several organizations and this is its greatest problem and the reason Hamas won the elections at the time with a landslide. So the solution is a reform, and everyone is pressuring Abu Mazen to introduce reforms; The Egyptians and Saudis also demanded that the PA undergo reform, but Abu Mazen has not complied due to fatigue and conservatism and his unwillingness to open the government to additional players”.

Why has he not complied with the demands?

“Most likely he hasn’t the energy to make reforms and open up the system and prefers to lean of the current situation. He prefers to preserve the current state rather than take risks. Everyone surrounding him is waiting for him to leave. He is more a token leader that a leader in effect. However, it is unclear what the day after will bring in the PA – whether he will be succeeded by another element in Fatah, if his moderate line will remain, or whether his successor will be Marwan Barghouti, who is very close to Hamas and very militant, or another leader that would collaborate with Hamas, and if elections will be held – in the event that Hamas takes over the Authority”.

The Return of the Saudis to the Abraham Accords

So many open questions. And what are the implications for Israel?

“The conclusion is that, in my opinion, Israel cannot rely on the PA as a viable factor.  I believe that the Egyptians and Saudis also realize this. Everyone – including the Americans and Emiratis – are demanding that Abbas carry out the reforms in order to prepare the ground for his successor, and after he steps down, everything will be open to a new reality,  and not necessarily a positive one.”

How should Israel act at the moment?

“It should maintain full security control of Judea and Samaria and Gaza, while at the same time cultivating a Palestinian civilian apparatus that will undertake the care of the population. For the time, under Abbas, this is happening, but there is no guarantee that it will be so in the future, and certainly there is no guarantee that it will be so in the long term. Israel should also try to expand the Abraham Accords, including interim agreements regarding the Palestinian Authority.”

That means agreeing to a Palestinian State, right?

“It will be necessary to give the Sunni states a horizon of some two-state solution, but this doesn’t have to happen at this moment, and is the biggest political challenge, since the Saudis, for example, declare morning, noon and night that without a Palestinian state, there will be no normalization. Although the messages Israel is receiving are different, this is the general direction”.

“At this stage, the model should be one in which Israel does not forgo the two-state option – i.e. does not annex Judea and Samaria and does not dismantle the Palestinian Authority. This would allow Saudi Arabia to enter an agreement. But the implementation of the solution itself will depend on a long-term agreement and will also be subject to changes. We’re talking about a period of 10 to 20 years, during which the Palestinian street will have to undergo significant change, and it also depends on the decline of Iran’s influence. Some sources in the Gulf states say it’s possible.”

Will the PA Return to Gaza?

In  order to understand the relations between the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, we need to go back to 2007, when Hamas deposed Fatah and seized control of Gaza in a series of violent clashes. Until that point, the PA had a bureaucratic apparatus set up in Gaza with its own officials. “Until today the PA claims it still has 18 thousand civil servants and 18 thousand security personnel in the Gaza Strip. In other words – over 30 thousand people that have remained in their positions, even under Hamas rule”.

Is this true?

“It’s unclear, and it is highly unlikely in the case of the security apparatus. Hamas did keep some Fatah members in professional positions withing Gaza’s civil service, and in many cases chose to place its own people in executive positions alone. However, it remains unclear how many Fatah members have actually remained in Gaza after Hamas’ takeover”.

And now the PA is planning its return to Gaza?

“As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned – and this it had stated even before the outbreak of the war – it is still the boss in Gaza. The Authority views its demand for a return to control in Gaza as only natural, thus it endeavored dozens of reconciliation attempts with Hamas. Two months ago, the Authority sent the Americans a 101-page document, in which it claims that it is the governing body of Gaza and that it has a plan for the reinstatement of its governance, such as reopening the hospitals, schools, government offices, and more. The Americans – it must be said – were not convinced”.

What is the position of the Arab states?

“Here things start getting complicated. Naturally the Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis all publicly support the control of the PA in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, as it serves the two-state vision. But under the surface the Egyptians and Saudis have a lot of criticism against the Authority and they are appalled by the corruption and its dysfunction and from the fact that Abu Mazen hasn’t held elections for the chairmanship of the Authority and for its parliament for nearly 20 years. But this is under the surface, and the Saudis still continue to transfer broad financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Only recently Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with the Saudi ambassador to Jodan, who transferred him aid money”.

In other words – the Arab world does not publicly criticize the PA?

“Public criticism of the Palestinian Authority is heard mainly in the Emirates. Two months ago, a proposal was made according to which the UAE undertakes financial support to the Authority, but the UAE rejected the suggestion out of hand, because they object to Abu Mazen heading the PA. This is why in an interview to The New York Times,  Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan proclaimed ‘no Abbas and no Hamas’. I’ve encountered this position on part of many sources in the Authority even before Dahlan. There are other sources that would like to see a governing body in Gaza as well as Judea and Samaria that is neither Abu Mazen nor Hamas”.

Abu Mazen’s Condition: Hamas Acknowledges the Oslo Accords

What is the position of the Sunni Arab states on Gaza?

“Egypt, Jordan and Saudia view Hamas as a terror organization. The UAE has plans for Gaza which designates as Chairman of the PA Dr. Salam Fayyad, former PM of the Authority under Abu Mazen more than a decade ago. Dr. Fayyad is not a member of Fatah or the PLO. He is an expert on economics. The moderate Arab world and the US wish to see him as head of the Palestinian Authority. However, Qatar has a long-standing vision of political Islam, which they hoped Hamas would realize. Already in 2019, the Qataris met with Hamas in Judea and Samaria and offered to fund them in the elections, but they would rather see Khaled Mashal as head of Hamas, They don’t favor Sinwar, who had detested and insulted them. There was no love lost between them– Qatar and Sinwar. Some claim that now the Qataris have the opportunity to try and reassert their influence with the Hamas leadership that resides overseas, but the Iranian’s and Hezbollah also want to maintain close ties with Hamas”.

What kind of relations would Qatar have between Hamas and the PA?

“Qatar would like to see Hamas as part of the PLO, as it would legitimize Hamas, and make it less militant. But Abu Mazen set a condition for this: if you want to be part of the PLO – you have to accept the Oslo Accords, which means the implied recognition in the State of Israel.  Meanwhile, Hamas is led by a council in lieu of a new leader, and it there appears to be a power struggle between the more moderate camp – the Muslim Brotherhood supported by Qatar – and the militant camp, which is close to Iran”.

In April you wrote that Mohammad Dahlan – the Fata leader living in Abu Dabi – is promoting a plan for leadership of the Gaza Strip, with the backing of a Arab Sunni force. Is this still true?

“Yes, he’s still working on it. But he also understands that forming the Arab force he’s talking about can only happen as part of a diplomatic process, and he understands that for the time being, Israel is not seeking any diplomatic arrangement, He understands that he’ll be forced to find a solution in collaboration with the Palestinian Authority. According to my sources, Dahlan’s people have recently  spoke on numerous occasions with Abu Mazen’s people to find a path to reconciliation and unite the forces in Gaza,. Also Israeli Defense Minister Galant’s ‘Security Island Plan’ for concentrating Gaza’s population in ‘humanitarian bubbles’ with a civil apparatus for each such bubble comprising locals that will be armed with light arms – is very acceptable on part of the Emiratis”.

הפוסט Lt. Col. (Res.) Baruch Yedid: “The Palestinian Authority Is In A State Of Collapse” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For years now, there are voices which would have the world view some of the most bloodthirsty and cruel terror organizations the world has ever known, i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah, not as the terrorists they are, but as “freedom fighters”. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, this bias has been pushed even further. They are being chanted in pro-Palestinian rallies, openly declared on banners on campuses of the most prestigious universities of the world, and are even heard in certain Israeli circles.

This paper reviews the goals that govern these organizations and their methods of operation and shows beyond doubt that equating terrorists and their organizations with freedom fighters is nothing short of fallacious. Aside from being a falsehood, this is a grave claim that harbors very dangerous consequences. When terrorist perpetrating war crimes are called freedom fighters, they are in effect gaining license to commit criminal activities and even immunity from the consequences thereof, and moreover, such claims breed further problematic misconceptions that view terror organizations as legitimate resistance movements, and the acts of terror themselves – as brutal and bloody as they might be – as legitimate means of popular struggle.

Therefore, any claims to that effect should be categorically denounced. At the same time, a comprehensive endeavor should be undertaken to debunk this narrative and reinforce the true understanding of terrorism and its overall end, for which any means are exploited: the annihilation of the Jewish state and its Jewish citizens.

In the name of enlightenment: how have terrorists become to be known as “liberators”?

The fictitious claim according to which terrorists are freedom fighters draws on an anti-Zionism narrative, according to which the Jews are colonialists that have seized control of a country called Palestine, with the aim of taking over a land with which they have no connection whatsoever. This contrived narrative is wrong on two accounts: the so-called state of Palestine had never existed, and secondly, the connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is undisputable and is established both historically and legally. The people of Israel are not foreign colonizers – they are a people returning to their rightful land after 2,000 years of unjust exile, which forced upon them an existence as mostly unwanted foreign elements in their hosting countries.

It follows that anyone who supports the Palestinian narrative is refuting the national rights of the Jewish people and disputing major legal rulings made by the international community, such as the British Mandate, granted by the League of Nations and the Partition Plan by the UN from 1947.

Although such claims have been voiced since the establishment of the State of Israel, they have been regaining tailwind under the auspices of radical progressive movements that had risen from the radical left in the Unites States such as the WOKE movement. WOKE and its counterparts are governed by the undiscerning principle that the weak are invariably in the right and victimized, and tend to turn what it perceives as the victim into the hero of the story. As part of this paradigm, the so-called struggle of the Islamic terror organizations for the “liberation” of “oppressed” minorities and the right to self-determination is perceived in some circles as a valiant post-modern struggle, and from there only a short leap was needed to view such terrorists as would-be freedom fighters.

The question of goals: what really motivates terrorists?

The raison d’etre of true freedom fighters is the liberation of their people and land from foreign conquerors that have invaded and seized it by force. A prime example of this is Mahatma Gandhi, who led a peaceful struggle against the British Empire’s rule in India and for national independence. In stark contrast, even a cursory examination of the stated objectives of some terror organizations clearly yields a completely different picture.

A quick look at the Hamas charter, for example, reveals that the organization makes no qualms about stating its overall goal – the all-out, end-justifying “Holy War” (Jihad) against the State of Israel, and the absolute rejection of any agreement or arrangement that would recognize the right of Israel to exist. The charter even quotes Hasan al-Banna ,the founder of its ally movement, The Muslim Brotherhood, who said: “Israel will rise and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it”.

As for Hezbollah, it too does not march under any banner of liberation – neither of people nor of country. It operates out of Lebanon – an independent state with no permanent Israeli  presence within its sovereign borders, and with no land dispute whatsoever with its southern neighbor such that calls for an irridentist agreement. Moreover, Hezbollah operates in Lebanon as a proxy and under the auspices and military support of another sovereign country, Iran, which resides 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Israel, and non-democratically forces its presence on the Lebanese people solely for its proclaimed purpose of annihilating the State of Israel and its citizens.

Another manifestation of the true non-peaceful intentions of terror organizations the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah – and indeed even official Arab organizations such as  the Palestinian Authority – is the fact that for decades, they have been rejecting out of hand nearly every solution or offer that Israel and Western administrations have brought to the table to bring the conflict to a resolution, thus proving that they are not motivated by the desire for emancipation. The underlying reason they have not accepted any diplomatic solution thus far is that all of these recognize the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. In other words – they strive only for a resolution that ensures the eradication of Israel from the map.

The question of operating method: how do terrorists differ from freedom fighters?

In 1984, acclaimed historian, Professor Benzion Netanyahu spoke at the second international conference of the Jonathan Institute for the study of terror. He spoke of the urgent need to fight the misconception regarding the true nature of terrorism, and in particular the perception of terrorists as “freedom fighters” or “protectors” of oppressed people. Professor Netanyahu addresses the manner in which freedom fighters operate and how it vastly differs from that of terrorists. He mentions three points of comparison that still hold true today, even after forty years:

Operating against civilians

Professor Netanyahu points to the fact that freedom fighters wage their struggle for a political or social end, with a fundamental respect to human rights of innocents. In stark contrast, terrorist make it a point to target innocent civilians as a means with which to foment fear and achieve their self-serving political interests.

Looking at the long list of terrorist attacks that have plagued Israel through recent decades – including the October 7 massacre in 2023, it is clear that terrorist organizations are systematically and deliberately targeting the civilian population as well, including the elderly, children and babies.

The installation of totalitarian regimes

Freedom fighters are committed to ensuring universal liberties and rights, says Prof. Netanyahu, which terrorists habitually ignore and violate – even the most basic of human rights – and propagate oppression in territories under their control. In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, it is common knowledge that they use their own people as human shields and ensconce themselves in densely populated areas, often causing intentional harm to innocent people on their side in self-protection or as a means of swaying public opinion with publicized propaganda. Furthermore, terrorist organizations violently oppress weak groups within their own population  such as women, minorities and members of the LGBTQ community. Hence, it would be absurd to present these organizations as champions of human rights and liberties.

Relations with dictatorships, oppressive regimes and organizations

The third point mentioned by Prof. Netanyahu relates to the connection frequently seen between terror organizations and violent groups and oppressive regimes. He explains that the aid terrorist often receive from these sources underscores their affinity to aims of oppression rather than values of liberty.

This connection is particularly evident with those terror organizations that operate on Israel’s borders. Hezbollah is an arm of the Shi’ite Iranian regime – a totalitarian state that had set its sights on orchestrating a world-wide Islamic revolution, and openly proclaims its intention of annihilating the State of Israel.   Interestingly, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), although members of the historically rival Islamic Sunni stream, are willing to benefit from Iran’s sponsorship just to further their cause against Israel, and view themselves as an affiliate of another extremist group – the Muslim Brotherhood – a  fundamentalist Sunni Islamist movement that calls for the eradication of the State of Israel, and is designated as a terrorist group in many countries.

It is evident that these terror groups enjoy the backing of powerful elements with a clear ideology of world dominance, and not only do they have no agenda of liberation – they are motivated by a desire to control and oppress.

Debunking a claim of equivalence: Jewish resistance vs. Islamic terror

There are those who would equate the terror organizations threatening Israel to the struggle of the pre-state Jewish resistance, such as the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and Etzel (the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel). They claim that the members of these groups were no less terrorists than the members of Hamas or Hezbollah today, or alternatively – that the terrorists of the latter two are no less freedom fighters than the members of the Jewish resistance.

However, this comparison disregards all the points mentioned above, and fails to consider that different nature of these resistance movements and the terror organization in terms of objectives and methods of operation.

As far as the objectives of the Jewish resistance – as oppose to the terror organizations, they indeed were committed to true liberation and independence. In 1922, the predecessor to the UN – the League of Nations – ratified the British mandate. This was an international accord standing on solid legal ground that cemented Britain’s commitment to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel. In effect, the British blatantly violated this accord and banned the entrance of Jews in to Israel while at the same time encouraging the settlement of Arabs in the area and transferring territories from Israel to the Emirate of Transjordan. Thus, the Jewish resistance movement did indeed fight for the legal right given to them, and more importantly – once this aim was achieved, the resistance was disbanded or assimilated into the new state’s formal military.

The terror organizations, as above demonstrated, demand independence for a state that does not exist and had never existed. And still, they had received numerous offers over the course of the past decades but rejected any compromise, calling for the destruction of the State of Israel – an objective that has nothing in common with those of the Jewish resistance movement or any other freedom fighting movement for that matter.

A comparison of the methods of operation shows fundamental differences between the two: as oppose to the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, the members of the Jewish militias targeted the British military personnel in the country and not civilians of any nationality. Furthermore, they did all in their power to protect the Jewish population, even at the price of their own lives. Moreover, the fighters of the Jewish resistance did not operate under the auspices or with the support of any state or global organization, and were not affiliated with dictatorships or totalitarian regimes.

The attempt at attributing any equivalence between the pre-state Jewish resistance and the terror organizations is nothing more than a populistic ruse motivated by the aim of creating a distorted picture of reality, or at the very least – it stems from pure ignorance.

A policy of zero tolerance: conclusion and insights

Equating murderous terrorists with freedom fighters is not only fallacious and indeed offensive on many levels – it is downright dangerous. This comparison awards terrorists with justification for their actions, including murder, rape, torture and kidnapping innocents. Statements in support of such actions cannot be accepted, not even in the name of tolerance and freedom of speech, as they legitimize violence against and the murder of Jews. When the equation of terrorists with freedom fighters is heard from sources within Israel itself – not to mention on part of  Israeli officials – they are tenfold graver.

Sadly, these terror organizations have learned and perfected the art of propaganda and disinformation, and their abilities in this area are boosted by the skillful use of internet and AI. They are also very adept at  exploiting Western values and ways of thought to sway public opinion in the West and even in Israel, citing duplicitous pretexts of “human rights”.

Hence, it behooves Israel and the Jewish nation to conduct a holding action and do their share in informing and shaping public opinion – in Israel and the world.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement was formed precisely out of the need to bring the truth and advocate Israel and Zionism to the public. Our organization believes in the imperative of educating on the Jewish national ethos as it is our believe that first and foremost – it is the bedrock of Israel’s national security.

For this end, the IDSF HaBithonistim conducts various activities such as excursions to historic heritage sites across Israel and talks and conferences on Zionism. Recently we have established the pre-military program “Ha’tkuma” that is situated in the Gaza envelop area and held in collaboration with the communities there.

The IDSF HaBithonistim website provides a wide range of content, from commentary on current affairs to opinion pieces and analyses – all with the aim of providing a broad perspective rooted in facts and truth, reinforcing the conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause and above all – to stand as a reminder that in the story of the Jewish people and Zionism – the Jewish nation and the miracle that is the State of Israel are the true heroes.

הפוסט “Freedom Fighters”? Hamas and Hezbollah Are Terrorist Organizations; Any Attempt to Claim Otherwise is Condemnable הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The organized pogrom perpetrated against the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, in which Jews were humiliated and assaulted on European soil, sounded alarm bells this week. It must be said, however, that these came on top of countless red lights indicating the growing radical Islamic threat germinating European soil. Painful motifs, such as the timing of this pogrom – just moments before the anniversary of the Kristallnacht, the brutal violence, the hurling of Jews into the gracht waters or the blind eye turned by the authorities, made this event all the more outstanding and horrific. In view of the surge in anti-Semitism in Europe throughout the war and the increasing frequency of demonstrations and violent disturbances, one arrives at an unmistakable conclusion: these are no isolated incidents. Rather, this is a new, undeniable reality on European soil. In extreme scenarios, it could amount to fundamentally alter Israeli-European diplomatic and defense relations.

This new reality poses us a clear mirror: the classical continent, which is portrayed as a peaceful Western territory filled with picturesque villages, Gothic cathedrals, steam trains and iconic tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, the Schoenbrunn Palace and London Tower, is gradually undergoing a transformation. The change in the demographics and in the civilization itself in Europe has been taking form over past decades and at an accelerated pace this past decade. Faced with this reality, Europe, for the most part is helpless, slow to respond, and has yet to fully realize the magnitude of the threat that has entered into the belly of the beast.

Aided and abetted by the authorities, millions of immigrants from the Islamic world have been arriving, reshaping the continent with their feet. It is not uncommon nowadays to walk around Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris, Barcelona or London and feel how these so closely-familiar cities, touted as tourism and culinary hotspots, are being enveloped with entire ghettos and filling with large immigrant communities that are tightening their grip on these places. Cultural artifacts like billboards in Arabic and mosque minarets are increasingly becoming a feature of everyday life. “We have become the Gaza of Europe”, lamented Dutch leader Geert Wilders bitterly. “I refuse to accept this.”

But the reality is that 30% of Birmingham’s population is Muslim, some half of Brussels’ is of non-Belgian descent, and the most commonly-given name to newborn children is Muhammad. All of this dovetails with the reality in many other European cities, yet are met with a deep culture of denial among Europeans.

The last time demographic data on Islam’s prevalence in Europe was released was in 2016. For some reason, in the past eight years there has been no release of updated figures. In a conference I attended, a senior European Union official voiced her surprise at the complaints voiced by the “radical right” regarding mass immigration into Europe. She made comparisons to the massive presence of Venezuelan refugees throughout South America, or Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon – to the situation in Europe, which according to her was negligible. Another speaker, a senior NATO official, insisted – mistakenly – that the immigrants were not responsible for even a single terrorist attack in Europe. None other than French President Emmanuel Macron spoke about “séparatisme”, but stressed that the terrorist attacks are perpetrated by French people – not by immigrants – since they are French citizens, totally sidestepping the issue of the civilizational shift underway in his own backyard.

Incidents like the Amsterdam pogrom ought to shake even nationalistic governments out of their doldrums in reaction to these “Wir schaffen das”-type policies of former Chancellor Angela Merkl, but they are slow to react. Laws allowing for revocation of citizenship and deportation of inciters and terrorists are being hollowed out. Thus is the extradition of the “Jihad Widow” in Brussels being delayed for years as the legal wrangling drags on, and the Hamas-sympathizing agitator Muhammad Hanoun in Italy is still leading anti-Semitic demonstrations without his citizenship being revoked or him being deported – even though the US State Department has imposed sanctions against him. The Meloni government in Italy is still working on its Albania Plan without any tangible results, and even the newly-installed right-wing governments in Austria and the Netherlands are slow in implementing an effective immigration policy.

Countries such as France or Switzerland prefer, on the one hand, to pass laws outlawing burkas or mosque minarets in the public space, while on the other hand allowing hundreds of thousands of immigrants to enter their countries and remain there permanently. The European Union’s 2020 counter-terrorism strategy included a pitiful few measures aimed at tightening border security or deportation of agitators. They included mainly measures for strengthening “community resilience” through sport, intelligence cooperation, and removal of youths from the path toward radicalization through soft means.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the only countries that refuse to go along with the family reunion policy and with the pro-immigration policies of the rest of Europe, policies that have seen the admission of millions of immigrants into the continent with the world’s lowest average birth rate. The results are plain to see – an almost total absence of anti-Semitic incidents, even in view of the war in the Middle East, in stark contrast to the surge in such incidents throughout the rest of Europe.

The Amsterdam events are consistent with the European attitude toward the war in Israel. This begins with a profound denial of the root cause of the problem and the preference for “band-aid” solutions – in Israel’s case, Europe’s failure to call out Iran’s hegemonistic motives and Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s anti-Semitism, while focusing on the territorial dispute with the Palestinians and on the “two-state solution”. In the Amsterdam case, this means “severely punishing” the culprits or “strengthening security” – instead of addressing the broader threat from radical Islam. This is also the case when it comes to media coverage – although for the most part it reflected the reality on the ground, it did blow out of proportion isolated incidents perpetrated by “Jewish hooligans”, who had rioted and were arrested, or “Maccabi fans tore down Palestinian flags and provoked riots”. This skewed view of reality is nothing new for Israelis in the context of the war here in the Middle East, where headlines decry “massacre of civilians” or the “catastrophic famine” within the Strip.

Europe is still deep in denial. Around half of the teachers in France avoid discussing certain issues for fear of provoking Muslim students, particularly after the appalling murder of teacher Samuel Pati. The terrorist attacks in Paris, Barcelona and London, the assassinations of artists critical of Islam, as in the case of Dutch director Theo Van Gogh, or the attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, all these still meet a complacent European public, where only 32% of surveyed citizens are prepared to fight to defend their country. The rest of those surveyed are more worried about climate change than security issues.

The first signs of change in the European political landscape have begun to appear – right-wing governments, sometimes radical right-wing, are ascending to power. There is a marked drop in voting for green parties in favor of nationalist parties, and many constraints that have been stifling public debate are now crumbling. This denial has ushered in an ambiance conducive to immigration and radical Islam. Its dismantling is the first step toward confronting these issues.

Absent a change in trajectory, this might force Israel to regard Europe as more of a threat than a partner. Europe might come to be considered a hostile Arab space, and travel there could be categorized at a risk level equal to that of travel to Arab countries. Israelis, who have so far made do with a few simple measures like avoiding speaking Hebrew in public or not wearing anything indicative of their Jewish identities, will be compelled to further recalculate their moves. They might choose to avoid traveling to Germany, the same way they avoid traveling to countries like Egypt. One can only imagine a worst-case scenario in which these elements seize the centers of power, and the political and security implications Israel will have to deal with regarding this nearby, powerful continent. The European states had better wake up and outright reject this shifting cultural orientation, before it is too late.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

הפוסט The Amsterdam Pogrom: Europe could eventually be considered hostile Arab territory for Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After the Taliban extremists took over Afghanistan in August 2021, they announced that they hoped to continue good relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors: China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and the Gulf states as well. However, existing conditions made direct contacts difficult and the country chosen as principal intermediary — which was thus enabled to fill a significant role in shaping Afghanistan’s regional policy — was Qatar. Qatar had already constructed a relationship with the Taliban years before, when in 2013 it allowed the Taliban to open a diplomatic mission in Doha with support from the US government.

Washington had been looking for a neutral location for holding negotiations with the Taliban in preparation for withdrawing American forces from Afghanistan. It opened the diplomatic mission after finding that direct negotiations, with the Taliban on one side and Afghanistan and the NATO of the time on the other side, were a failure and concluding that a clear alternative channel was needed. The Doha mission would enable the Americans to communicate secretly with the Taliban while officially continuing to support the Afghan government. Qatar was ostensibly the go-between in those talks, but in practice it served as the Taliban’s patron. In the negotiations, the Americans agreed to release imprisoned Taliban members; and among those freed was a founder of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. He would become the head of the organization’s diplomatic mission in Qatar.

On the basis of the US support for Qatar as go-between in talks with the Taliban, Qatar was positioned to take on a broader role in matters touching on Afghanistan. Even after the Doha talks between the Taliban and the former Afghan government collapsed in 2020, western countries — and, especially, international organizations — accepted Qatar’s legitimacy as an intermediary and a point of contact with the Taliban. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and foreign ministers from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy arrived in an aerial caravan to Qatar, emphasizing the country’s importance — in comparison with other countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia — as an intermediary with Afghanistan.

In February 2020, the USA signed a historic peace agreement with the Taliban, including a commitment to gradually withdraw from Afghanistan and lift the sanctions against the organization. The Taliban, for their part, agreed to respect human rights, not to permit terrorist activity from the area under their control, and to open a dialogue with the Afghan government in order to find a solution for Afghanistan. Shortly afterward, when Abdul Ghani Baradar — head of the Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Qatar — landed in Afghanistan to take office as the new President on the Taliban’s behalf, he disembarked from a Qatar Emiri air force plane made in the USA.

Since most of the world’s nations do not officially recognize the Taliban regime, and most of the western embassies have left Afghanistan, intercession by a third party is required; and Qatar is in place as the natural candidate for that role. Qatar’s main interest in Afghan affairs, as in other matters, has to do with entrenching itself as the regional intermediary. Qatar advances its regional and international influence by means of the prestigious intermediation that positions it as a central player in the eyes of the world powers and international organizations. Thus, for example, Qatar intermediated between Germany and the Taliban during 2024 for the return of Afghan emigrants to Afghanistan.

However, some international players see Qatar as offering a platform for the extremism of the Taliban organization, which even cooperates directly with Al-Qaeda and assists in international terrorism.

Qatari policy is basically driven by a combination of political Islam and a business agenda. That policy includes granting material assistance, such as funding, favorable publicity, and even armaments, to various recipients. Thus, for example, for years the Qatari television station Al Jazeera, based in Doha, has given the Taliban a platform for addressing the world. The Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Doha underwent a quick process of branding and was presented as the legitimate representative of the Afghan nation — a sort of shadow government as against the government that sits in Kabul.

An example of Qatar’s deep ties in Afghanistan is that shortly after the attacks of September 11, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network was the only mass communications medium that succeeded in interviewing the number one suspect of the day, Al Qaeda commander Osama Bin Laden, at his hideout in Afghanistan. Thus Qatar’s policies advance its interests indirectly while exploiting its close alliance with the USA.

Qatar appears untroubled by its ties with disreputable players such as Hamas, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, it is such connections that have elevated it as the sole, key player that can lessen the distress of the west in the face of those enemies. Thus Qatar exploits the conflicts of the region and the problems of the west in order to propose a solution tailored by the wealthy little emirate itself. Qatar’s strategy displays more business thinking than ideological determination. However, Qatar’s approach is not pure business; it does also involve making western players dependent on its services so that it may be continue as a central player and as the exclusive address for solving problems with the anti-western elements of the Middle East.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Business Islam: On Qatari–Taliban relations and Qatar’s regional agenda הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the past year, anyone who has given even a cursory glimpse at the newspapers knows that Israel has been fighting a multi-theater war on its borders in Gaza and Lebanon, and overseas against Iran and Yemen, but many are not aware of the fact that this is a multi-dimensional war, says Yishai Gelb. “We’re fighting in a number of theaters, but also in several dimensions”, he clarifies. “Aside from the battles in the field, the State of Israel is also waging battle in international courts, and also over public opinion in the international community. It’s important to understand that a positive public opinion is critical for the overall war effort, as Israel is in the midst of a prolonged campaign and needs diplomatic and economic support from the countries of the world”.

Since the outbreak of the Iron Swords war (Gaza war), Yishai Gelb has been spearheading the War in Israel initiative, which is part of the IDSF HaBithonistim website. This is a comprehensive data base, updated on a daily basis, which provides reliable data on the war and its casualties. The website was founded and sponsored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, after it had become clear that the Foreign Ministry and the IDF spokesman unit are overloaded with the public diplomacy demands. The website hit the air already in November 2023, in Hebrew and English, becoming a pioneer in the private sector of Israeli public diplomacy.

“Our enemies are sharing information through a host of platforms, and a very large portion of this information is false and is contrived for the purpose of establishing and promoting an anti-Israel narrative”, says Gelb. “Our aim is to provide an alternative source of information that is based on credible and verified facts, and to mobilize the international public opinion to support Israel, advocate the justness of Israel’s actions, and afford the world access to reliable information on which they could base their support of Israel”.

Debunking disinformation begins with hard, cold facts

Yishai Gelb and his team of data workers collect large volumes of information, some is basic, statistical data such as numbers of casualties on both sides, numbers of wounded and the number of hostages still held in Hamas tunnels; other information is operational – the Israeli cities and villages targeted, the number of shells fired into Israeli territory and the number of targets that the IDF had eliminated in Gaza. Additional data provides a broader outlook with which the current war can be compared with other conflicts around the world, both current and from modern history e.g. the Cambodian Civil War, and the ongoing armed conflict in Darfur. This data examines among others the ratio of soldiers to casualties recorded during various wars and armed conflicts.

“We’ve created a database of figures from many wars and conflicts across the world that have occurred since the establishment of the ‘New World Order’ in 1945, and are comparing these figures to those of the Gaza war”, explains Gelb. “Our goal is to project a broad and clear picture that reflects Israel’s status as oppose to other conflict zones and prove beyond doubt just how groundless the accusations hurled at Israel are”.

The data collected in the IDSF HaBithonistim database shows among others that the current war in Gaza has claimed the lives of 22,000 civilians – both on Israel’s side and the reported casualties in Gaza. This admittedly, is a regretfully high number; however, a comparison with the numbers of casualties in other recent conflicts casts this figure in a rather different light. Case in point: The ongoing civil war in Yemen has claimed to date some 150,000 casualties; the Nigerian civil war – claimed the lives of about 225,000 civilians, and in Syria – approximately 206,000 civilians had lost their lives in the civil war there. These figures are instrumental in fighting the false allegations, such as the claim that Israel is committing genocide.

Similarly, the figures in the database irrefutably disprove the claim that the State of Israel is deliberately causing  mass starvation of the Gaza population. A look at starvation casualties of other conflicts shows that in Yemen, 85,000 died of starvation; in Somalia – 260,000, and in Congo – four million. In Gaza, according to the highest end of estimates – 33 people have died of starvation, hence debunking the claim of deliberate mass starvation by the hands of Israel.

Furthermore, claims of humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip due to insufficient aid – whether on Israel’s part of the international community – take on a different perspective when comparing the two-billion-dollar aid sent into the Gaza Strip for its 2 million citizens, to the Ukraine – which had received humanitarian aid in the value of two billion dollars as well – for a population of over 40 million people.

“The debunking of myths is one of the most important tools in the shaping of public opinion”, explains Gelb. “When you see the figures relating to Israel as oppose to the global numbers, it’s plain to see that the war in Gaza is certainly nearly not as horrific as some are attempting to portray it. Moreover, it shows the world’s hypocrisy that is all too happy to hurl accusations at Israel while remaining silent about the horrible war crimes other countries are committing”.

Credibility above all: challenges in the age of fake news

In the current digital age, we are all constantly inundated with information, and it is hard to tell what is true and reliable and what is biased, false, or downright lies. This challenge is keeping the War in Israel research team busy at their desks. In order to tackle this issue and ensure that the data in the database is reliable, they check and recheck every piece of information, and cross-reference the data with different sources. The main sources of information that are used to glean data are the official reports of Israel’s General Security Service and the IDF, authorized research institutes such as Israel’s Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the broad proprietary IDSF HaBithonistim database, which also collects discrete data such as every fallen Israeli soldier and every senior terrorist operative eliminated. Furthermore, the researchers themselves engage in data collection, diligently laboring for long hours each day.

On the other side of the divide are information sources that the  IDSF HaBithonistim research team steer clear of, like the media and social platforms and of course information published by Palestinian sources or platforms such as  Al-Jazeera, since they tend to propagate mis- or disinformation. Furthermore, the team will not use data from classified sources as it cannot be revealed and therefor verified. They are able to verify to a high degree a large majority of the data they collect, and in the few cases in which the information could not be fully validated – it is mentioned. Furthermore, each data that is presented with references to its sources and explanations on how the research was done, to allow the reader to independently determine whether they view the information as reliable or not.

“Sadly, it’s very easy to fabricate information today”, says Yishai Gelb. “There are many sites, such as the “Betzelem” organization website, that operate huge databases, but refrain from referencing their sources of information, thus, it is virtually impossible to determine how they obtain the data they publish. Additionally, there are reputed bodies that albeit a credible reputation at first glance, are found upon a more circumspect examination to rely on biased sources. One prominent example is the UN, which adopts resolutions and decisions based on data published by the Gaza Ministry of Health, which is in reality controlled by no other than Hamas – in other words, even data published by the UN’s official bodies must be taken with a grain of salt, and such data published on the War in Israel is accompanied by a disclaimer mentioning this. An additional issue in this field is the problem of cyclic requoting, when for example, the UN quotes a certain organization that had quoted the UN to begin with, creating a closed circuit of sorts, making it hard to discern the original source”.

Artificial intelligence (AI) tools, which are multiplying and becoming increasingly sophisticated by the day, do significantly contribute to the work of data-gathering, but also open the door to  irresponsible and even intentionally malicious use of information, and at times actually make it even harder to corroborate information.  “We use AI tools quite a lot, mainly for cross-referencing information”, explains Gelb. “Until these tools were introduced, we would have to first find the information, determine the source and then cross-reference it with other data and sources. AI tools actually reverse the process by starting with cross-referencing, thereby considerably streamlining the work. Nonetheless, these tools must be used with circumspection because as tempting as it may be to use them, the information they present must be carefully inspected”.

Not a lie, but not exactly true: crafty methods of misrepresenting information

The credibility of sources and figures is a complicated issue, but the validity of the information in itself is hardly an assurance to the overall integrity of the report, as even true facts can be introduced in a biased manner to serve agendas. According to Yishai Gelb, there is no shortage of website that do in fact present verified and true information, yet manage to portray a biased picture.

One method often employed by such sites is selectively presenting certain facts while omitting others. Many niche sites do exactly that. A prime example is the website called “Israel Palestine Timeline”, which shows a timeline of the figures of casualties in each side of the Gaza war, however, the information in the site shows a much higher casualty-count of Palestinians as compared to Israelis. Hence, when such information is presented without any context or background, it immediately achieves the impression of injustices committed on part of Israel.

Another method of misrepresentation of  true facts to convey a one-sided and skewed impression is optics. Yishai explains that any body that engages in data collection knows that presentation is everything, and not the facts themselves. Terminology is also a tool that is used deliberately and discerningly in support of the presentation. For this reason, databases put a lot of effort into planning the presentation of the facts. Information appearing at the head of the page, or presented through graphics, for example, carries more weight, while information that appears in small letters in text form, or at the bottom of the page – is often overlooked or ignored. Additionally, the segmentation of the information, i.e. the breakdown of a information into smaller units according to specific criteria, is another method with which to formulate intentional messages and create desired  impressions.

Not only with tanks: Israel’a all-out campaign

The data Gelb and his research team use, are posted in the website on a regular basis, with an exposure of some 30-30 thousand views a month, in addition to exposure on various social networks. Furthermore, they are published on the IDSF HaBithonistim weekly report, which is submitted to diplomats and members of government across the world, and presented in the movement’s various conferences and events. Oftentimes, the data is used for research purposes, and researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department and from other research institutes, such as the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), rely on them regularly for their research. Much of this data is also often used by leading media outlets in Israel, such as Ynet and Channel 14, and appears in newspaper articles and investigative stories.

Gelb welcomes any publicity the information receives but expresses his desire to gain even more exposure. “It makes me very happy to read reports that are based on data we’ve collected, and I feel especially pleased to see researchers using this data because it lends them validity and credibility”, he says. “Now our challenge is to connect this data to other bodies that present data on Israel, and expand to additional platforms such as more research institutions and social networks”.

The waves that the information in Gelb’s website created, reinforce his sense of mission that comes with his job. “All my activity is centered around supporting the Israeli narrative, and with that, the collection of data stems from my desire to promote the interests of the State of Israel”, he says. “It’s true that data collection is a very technical endeavor, but it’s not the be all and end all of the work. A lot of marketing skills and psychology are needed  to optimally determine how to present each piece of data, how to turn data into infographics or articles. In a nutshell – my job is to take numbers and use then to support Israel in the campaign over the local and international public opinion  – and viewed through that lens, the entire endeavor takes on a whole new meaning”.

Yishai Gelb is determined to collect data so long as the Gaza war is raging, and plans to continue maintaining the website after the war ends, and to make it into a vast and rich database with information pertaining to Israel’s security situation. However, it is clear to him that his activity and that of other similar NGO websites is not enough. “Israel’s war is not restricted to the use of tanks, planes and submarines”, he states. “To win this campaign, the State must take the war over public opinion seriously, as it directly affects the support and legitimacy Israel gains. It cannot be that Israel’s public diplomacy has become the task of the private sector alone, and the government and its official agencies must take this matter seriously and invest the appropriate resources and effort into it”.

Iron Swords War (Gaza War) database

הפוסט Through the Statistics: The “Dry” Figures that Promote Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the Gaza Strip during the Swords of Iron War, the IDF found large quantities of weaponry apparently made in North Korea. Militarily, Hamas — like Iran’s other proxy organizations — is directly or indirectly connected to North Korea in various ways, such as weapons trading, training, and exercises.

North Korea’s primary news agency, KCNA, rejected such contentions and called them “a baseless, mendacious rumor.” The agency furthermore accused the USA of spreading a conspiracy theory designed to divert attention from its participation alongside Israel in the Gaza warfare. However, the findings proved otherwise as the IDF discovered North Korean RPG F7 among the weapons captured from Hamas, as well as North Korean Bang122 artillery shells. How would weaponry from North Korea have reached Hamas in the Gaza Strip?

North Korea’s relations and deep partnership with Iran and Syria cover a history of many years, and so its military technology has reached Iran’s proxy organizations: Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas. In addition, North Korea’s ties with the Palestinians go back many years — to the beginning of the 1960s. During those early years, North Korea began providing financial assistance and military training to PLO personnel; and later, during the 1970s and 1980s, Yasser Arafat and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine met separately with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Those meetings resulted in a constant supply of North Korean weaponry to the Palestinians. After the Cold War ended, ties between North Korea and the Palestinians dwindled; but in 2007 with the ascendancy of Hamas in Gaza, the ties were revived.

In July 2014, when Israel embarked upon Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Hamas requested military aid from North Korea. In that arrangement, Hamas received rockets and military communications equipment; and besides providing weaponry, financial aid, and military training, North Korea may have also helped Hamas build its Gazan “Metro” — the network of Hamas tunnels — just as it helped Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Hostile though it is to the West and Israel, does North Korea assist terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah for ideological reasons alone? Despite its long-standing support for members of the “Axis of Resistance,” apparently North Korea is primarily motivated — aside from ideology — by economic considerations. North Korea lives under heavy international sanctions, but by its involvement in activities such as sales of weaponry to terrorist organizations it can obtain income to fund its own weapons programs.

North Korea is also pleased by the founding of an anti-American, anti-Western block which consists of Russia, China, and Iran. After Russia invaded Ukraine, North Korea sought a way to leverage strategic accomplishments in expanding its cooperation with Russia while interfering with US efforts in Ukraine. Now, as in Ukraine, North Korea is seeking an opportunity to undermine US interests in the Middle East as well while profiting economically from the conflicts there, such as Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These circumstances increase North Korea’s chances of expanding its sales of weaponry to the terrorist organizations, and to Hamas in particular, following a special decree from Kim Jong Un, as early as November 2023, in support of the Palestinians.

The North Korean angle is not well enough publicized, but it is dangerous and its shadow could darken the war. North Korea’s illegal sales of weapons to Hamas could help that terrorist organization recuperate more quickly than expected after the critical blow of the war in which most of its leadership in Gaza was eliminated — including the commander, Yahya Sinwar — and much of its war materiel and terrorist ground force was destroyed. Standing with Iran, which is also suffering heavily in the current war, North Korea may profit economically and strategically as it improves the condition of the terrorist organizations during the war and especially afterward.

“This article was originally published in ynetnews.”

הפוסט The North Korean Angle: On North Korea’s relations with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dr. Moshe Yegar’s home, in Jerusalem, tells a story. There are photos from diplomatic occasions around the world. There are certificates of appreciation and prizes relating to his diplomatic and academic work, including the Jabotinsky Prize for Literature and Research and a special prize for his part in establishing Israeli–Indian relations. In his rich library, 20 books may be found that he wrote in Hebrew. Several of them have been translated into other languages, and four more were written originally in English. Most of them deal with history and with the diplomatic side of Israel’s international relations.

A new immigrant who spoke Hebrew better than the sabras

Dr. Moshe Yegar was born in 1930, and at age 94 he still has his vim. We met him at his home to hear about his 40 years of service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about his perspective on the present situation. It was a special interview with a special person who had occasion to work under such figures as Golda Meir, Abba Eban, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yitzhak Shamir, among others. But we should start at the beginning.

Moshe, let’s go back to 1935. You arrived in Israel from — where?

We came from Argentina when I wasn’t yet five. My father was a Hebrew teacher, and he was sent to teach in Zichron Yaakov. I started kindergarten as a new immigrant, but my Hebrew was correct and graceful thanks to my father. From the day I was born, he’d spoken only Hebrew to me, even before we came to Israel. We lived in Zichron Yaakov for five years, and those years left a deep impression on me.

Did you join the Haganah?

I was a member of the youth brigades in the Haganah for two years. When the War of Independence began as soon as independence was declared, my fellow members and I were recruited into the IDF. I was one of the trainers for the scouts movement, and we were among the founders of the Nahal — together with the United Nahal Movement. We also founded Kibbutz Tel Katzir.

Did you consider continuing into a military career?

At a certain point I left Tel Katzir and went back to being an enlisted man in the IDF. I was in the Nahal’s first NCO course. I also took a Master Sergeant course and I was appointed master sergeant for the Nahal’s first company of privates. I was also sent for paratrooper training, and then to the eighth round of the officer training course. Afterward I was discharged from the IDF and I went to study at the Hebrew University.

And then it was straight out of the university into a diplomatic career?

After my bachelor’s degree in modern Middle Eastern history, political science, and general history, I went on to study for a master’s. But I wanted to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the end, I passed the qualifying exam for cadets. That was the third time it was given, in 1956. In the next 40 years, I held various positions in Israel and in Israeli missions abroad. I finished up my master’s while I was an emissary in Burma.

So was it your time in Burma that prompted you to become an expert in Asian Islam?

Because the Hebrew University wasn’t teaching Asian Islam at that time, I received special permission to write a thesis on Burma’s Muslim minority. Afterward, I researched Islam in British Malaya, which is Malaysia today. That was my doctorate. I worked for about twenty years, in my spare time, on a comparative study of Muslim uprisings in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The Bible as key to diplomatic ties

During his 40 years of diplomatic service, Dr. Yegar filled significant roles around the world. After his service in Malaysia, he was a consul in Los Angeles and consul general in Philadelphia. Among his various assignments in Israel, he was head of public diplomacy and of the Asian division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He participated in Operation Solomon (the airlift of Ethiopian Jews) and played a central role in establishing Israel’s relations with India and other Asian and African nations, besides serving terms as ambassador to Sweden and to the Czech Republic.

You held positions under several Foreign Ministers. What are the specifics?

When I was deputy head of the Asian division and Abba Eban was Foreign Minister, he appointed me to head the training department. When Yigal Alon was Foreign Minister, he appointed me department head for public diplomacy, and when Yitzhak Shamir was Foreign Minister, he appointed me division head for public diplomacy. I held that job for five years.

You developed a special cultural project in the Czech Republic. Tell us about it.

After the communist regime collapsed, the Czech Republic was very friendly toward Israel. I dreamed up a large festival focusing on the Bible as it’s reflected in various art forms. The festival was a year and a half or so in the making, and in the end it included 71 musical events, theatrical performances, art exhibits, academic seminars, and art competitions for schoolchildren — all based on biblical topics. It was a large display of culture in Prague and it made a significant contribution to Israel’s reputation. Everyone understood that the Bible was the gift of the Jewish people to human civilization.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, why are artistic and cultural ties important?

After World War II, technology surged forward and brought a complete change in the diplomatic profession. It’s no longer merely negotiations between the leaders of different countries, but also a means of creating broad-based ties between populations that had lived for generations without caring about their countries’ foreign relations.

Today’s communications media have given very large sectors of the public an interest in the diplomatic relations between countries and peoples. For that reason, there’s a new diplomacy with a new face. Today various countries engage in presenting their culture and their language to other populations in an effort to make friends with them. That’s a different kind of diplomacy, and a very interesting kind. It brings many challenges and it requires appointing diplomats who fit such a job. For example, diplomats today need a wider-ranging education — far beyond what was expected from them in past generations.

When other countries receive more extensive knowledge and understanding of the diplomat’s home country, a friendly atmosphere is created. That atmosphere can contribute directly to deeper economic ties, to security, and to all the other factors that mutually benefit the countries involved.

So there’s special importance to Israel’s integration of the Bible into public and cultural diplomacy in Christian regions, which recognize the Bible as an element of their own culture — the USA, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and even Asia’s sole Christian country, the Philippines.

Zionism should free itself of illusions and think straight

What’s your opinion on Israel’s current diplomatic and security situation?

We need to break free from illusions. At first, Zionism was looking for ways to come to an agreement with the Arabs. We hoped they would yield a little piece of their vast territory and allow the Jewish nation return to its historic homeland. The various streams of the Zionist movement made countless attempts to reach an understanding, an agreed compromise with the Arabs — including partition proposals — but they all failed. Now, after October 7, it’s clearer to us than ever. Likely not many of us still suffer from the illusions of the past. Zionism tried to win the understanding and consent of the Arabs by offering various suggestions, such as territorial compromise, or by advancing the idea that the homecoming of the Jews would bring benefits to the Arabs’ economy, their health system, their educational system, and so on. Nothing helped.

The Arabs received proposals for establishing their own “Palestinian” state, but they showed no interest in those proposals. The most prominent proposals that come to mind are those from the Peel Commission in 1938, the UN in 1947, and Oslo in 1993. There were other attempts as well, but the Arabs, the “Palestinians,” never showed interest in setting up a state of their own. Instead, they were determined and consistent in their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, be it big or small. They used every violent means at their disposal to prevent the birth of the State of Israel and they sank to inconceivable levels of barbarous, monstrous cruelty. Their determination has continued for almost 120 years now, coming to expression in what we call terrorist movements. The Arabs see them differently.

We’re at war now with two cruel terrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah. They both are managed and supported by our great enemy Iran. How do you expect this to end?

This war has gone on too long but it can be expected to end eventually with the destruction of those two movements. Still, we shouldn’t suffer any further illusions. The Arabs can be expected with some certainty to continue their violence and terrorism against us. They can set up new organizations, and many members of Hamas and Hezbollah will continue their activity against us as individuals or small squads. They’re not short of weapons.

In practical terms, what should be the final objective regarding Hamas and Gaza?

As a lesson to other Arab states, Israel should destroy Hamas, wipe out every trace of its presence, and complete the job by taking over the entire Gaza Strip. Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, but despite all its superiority, it hasn’t managed to defeat a terrorist organization like Hamas.

But what’s the definition of defeating Hamas?

We and the other side conceive of victory quite differently. The difference has reappeared in each round of conflict. Each time, I felt afterward that we hadn’t achieved much. From their point of view, they’ve won if their leadership survived and they have the ability to regroup. The loss of life, the destruction of Gaza, the civilian distress aren’t a consideration for them. There’s no deterrence. They believe they have a holy mission to exterminate Israel. As long as we leave them the ability to regroup, even if it takes them years, and as long as they have outside support, they’ll persist. Their ability to regroup needs to be rooted out completely.

Is your outlook, with the benefit of such age and experience, optimistic?

October 7 was a severe event, but yes, I’m optimistic despite our current situation. Throughout history, our enemies have always risen up against us and the Jewish nation has a special resilience even after suffering the greatest damage, such as the loss of six million lives in World War II when European Jewry was slaughtered by the Germans and their accomplices. We need to understand that our presence here is not to be taken for granted, and to remember at the same time that despite the difficulties, the Jewish nation has a certain internal energy, a rare self-healing power. We shall win out.

הפוסט “The nation of Israel has self-healing power. We shall win out.” An interview with Dr. Moshe Yegar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In mid-July 2024, the Azeri Embassy in Tehran was reopened after a year of negotiations to relieve the tensions between the two countries.

Relations soured between Iran and Azerbaijan after an armed assailant stormed the Azeri Embassy in Tehran in January 2023, killing the security officer and injuring two other guards. Despite Iran’s adamant denials, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, called this a “terrorist attack”.  Relations between the two countries deteriorated still further After Azerbaijan decided to open an embassy in Israel in March 2023. This infuriated the Iranians, since while their relations with their northern neighbor hit a new low, Baku’s relations with Jerusalem kept warming up.

It is no surprise the opening of an official Azeri presence in Israel caused the Tehran-Baku relations to sour. This being said, following the October 7 massacre by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two Iranian proxies, and the war in Gaza that ensued – the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan assumed yet another dimension.

In November 2023, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called on all Muslim countries to sever all their diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, given the war in Gaza. Khamenei even stressed that “oil and food export routes to Israel ought to be blocked”. Khamenei attempted to lead an anti-Israeli Islamic resistance front, however it seemed like this initiative failed to produce actual results on the ground.

This was due to the fact that two countries, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), were supplying oil to Israel: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Of these two oil-rich countries, Azerbaijan is the more important for Israel. Azerbaijan provides Israel with some 40% of its oil consumption. In return it is a recipient of advanced Israeli weaponry worth billions of dollars.

The Israeli armaments have enabled Azerbaijan to achieve a military advantage over its adversary, Armenia. On the other hand, Israel is given a foothold in a strategically important region. It uses the area for intelligence operations against Iran, Azerbaijan’s neighbor.

From the Iranian perspective, the close ties between Baku and Jerusalem mean an increased Israeli presence in the region – a presence that includes weapons and economic and security ties. However, the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship is just one factor impeding Tehran’s relations with Baku, a Shiite-majority country. Ever since Azerbaijan became independent with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has regarded it as a backyard of sorts for expanding its Shiite religious and political influence in its quest for regional hegemony.

Iran has always worked to recruit Shiite communities into its “Axis of Resistance”. This began with its strategy of warfare by proxy, which focused on Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Additionally, Iran sought to penetrate the Shiite community in Azerbaijan. In 2013, Iran established the Husayniyun – the Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan – in an effort to form a powerful proxy organization in the Caucasus. The first recruits to the Husayniyun were six Azeri citizens who left for Syria to defend Shiite shrines against Sunni opponents during the civil war against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Qasem Soleimani, the then-commander of the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elite unit, personally declared the establishment of the new proxy unit in 2017.

After Azerbaijan emerged victorious against Armenia in the 2020 war, and having regained control of the Nagorno Karabakh region, Azeris in Iran began identifying more strongly with Azerbaijan. At the same time, shortly after the war, Iranian proxy groups, including the Husayniyun, flooded the social media with videos in Azeri, promoting their radical religious ideology. They called for the local Shiites to rise up against the government and attack government buildings in Azerbaijan.

Later on, Iran stoked the unrest against the Azeri government. In response, Baku embarked on a mass oppression drive against pro-Iranian networks in the country. In November 2022, five persons were arrested and charged with spying for Iran. The detainees were accused of having provided the Iranian security agencies information harmful to Azerbaijan’s security.

In July 2023, an Afghani national Pavzan Musa Khan, was detained in Baku by Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX). He was suspected of conspiring to conduct a terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku. Khan was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison.

Khan mentioned “other brothers” that have attempted to commit such terror acts. This very fact traces back to Tehran and implies on Iranian involvement, as all previous attempts to attack Israeli targets in Baju were plotted by Tehran.

From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, activities by pro-Iranian forces in the south Caucasus region might potentially exacerbate regional tensions. For this reason, Iran has tried to use the Azerbaijan Husayniyun to deter Azerbaijan and lower the level of relations with Israel.

As Iran shifted its focus toward using its proxies against Israel in the Swords of Iron War, it appears that it has for the time being abandoned its strategy of influencing the Shiite communities in Azerbaijan and that it is now more intent on strengthening its ties with that country. As part of Iran’s fight against Israel through its proxies, it is attempting to isolate it regionally and internationally, meaning that improving its relations with Azerbaijan is now a high priority. Therefore, despite the tensions between the two countries, Iran and Azerbaijan have begun developing their economic ties, and in particular the trade and transport corridor that is also of interest to the northern neighbor, Russia.

Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan are tense and volatile. It is attempting to exert pressure on Baku following the war in Gaza and the widespread international condemnation of Israel. This being said, it appears that the Iranians do not have sufficient leverage to persuade Azerbaijan to sever its relations with Israel, thereby leaving it alone in the face of the threat from Tehran. In contrast to the other Shiite regional players, Iran is being unsuccessful in expanding its influence in a large Shiite country like Azerbaijan, as opposed to the successes it has had among Shiite communities throughout the Middle East, harnessing them under its control through local front-line franchises, as is the case in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Azerbaijan Shiite Challenge: On Iran-Azerbaijan relations and the Israeli Angle הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In an interview on May 8^th, President Biden proclaimed the following: “I made it clear that if they [the Israelis] go into Rafah… I’m not supplying the weapons…”. He said this a day after the operation in which the IDF took over the Philadelphi Corridor and the city of Rafah. At the time, Israeli was facing an unprecedented international campaign to pressure Israel in order to prevent it from reaching Hamas’s southern stronghold in the Gaza Strip and cut it off, advancing from the Philadelphi Corridor. The international community fumed over the possibility that Israel would “exacerbate the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza”, and further deteriorate the situation, which was already in a state if “catastrophe”.

Today’s public discourse on the Israel’s intention to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor casts light on the prevalence of the state of denial throughout the Israeli security establishment regarding the nature of the Gazan threat before the seventh of October – a pendulum that is now repositioning this issue at the heart of public discourse, and has even managed to infect large swathes of the public. Skeptics of the need to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor are leading certain segments of the population, egged on by former senior officials in the security establishment, to associate this objective, which is unequivocally based on security considerations, with political motives. They even describe it as a “spin designed to scuttle the hostage agreement”, for some unknown reason.

“The entire Philadelphi issue is fake news,” quipped one senior official, stating that there was no need to “overstate the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor in preventing Hamas from reconstituting, since it has just been dismantled, and since Hamas has been set back 30 years.” Another official claimed that “control of the Philadelphi Corridor is meaningless”, and even called it “the greatest sham since the establishment of the state.” Using the authoritativeness the comes with their security backgrounds, those former officials are trying to instill fear in the public at the prospect of taking responsibility for 2 million Gazans. They promise that the Gazan problem has been neutralized for the foreseeable future, and call on us to close this chapter in Gaza, and go to elections.

To make matters worse, these irresponsible statements are compounded with the promise that had already been made in the past, according to which the Philadelphi Corridor can be retaken the moment it’s needed to ensure our security. One of those officials even said that it just a “45-minute drive” to retake the 14-kilometer stretch along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The inconsistency reflected in these claims also gives pause for thought. On the one hand, they claim that the Philadelphi Corridor is strategically insignificant, but on the other hand, this insignificant region could easily be retaken when the ceasefire expires.

To be clear, statements like this mislead the general public with false hope, according to which there are “instant”, magical solutions to thorny strategic and security issues. Let’s start with the basics: Hamas has never agreed to release 109 Israeli hostages in exchange for a withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. The corridor was only one of the 29 “amendments” submitted by Hamas to the American-Israeli proposal. The other 28 pertained to the Netzarim Corridor, a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the end of the war, the release of prisoners, the reconstruction of Gaza after the war, among others. Otherwise, one might presume that Israel’s political leadership might have faced an entirely different dilemma.

Moreover, the decision to return to the Philadelphi Corridor after a ceasefire is not and will never be a tactical military decision which could be implemented with ease, based solely on how fast a tank can travel, or how fast three brigades can be mobilized. As in any other wartime decision, it exists within a web of political interests, international pressure, and a strategic objective vis-a-vis Egypt, the IDF, and the Israeli public as well.

Lest we forget, Israel stalled for nearly seven months, until May, to complete the occupation of Gaza from the south. People worldwide reacted hysterically to a possible Israeli incursion into Rafah, as a global campaign aimed at making Israel “stop the massacre in Gaza” was waged through the mass media, the social media, protesters who took to the streets, and decision-makers in foreign governments. Drawn by the “all eyes on Rafah” trend, tens of thousands of demonstrators waving Palestinian flags took to the streets and occupied campuses in Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Not a day went by in which the secretary general of the United Nations didn’t make a declaration peppered with hyperbole on “the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza”, including a statement that “the horror must end”. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, blamed Israel for “provoking famine in Gaza”, and called on the United States to halt arms shipments to Israel. When it came to pressuring Israel to concede and withdraw, it was no holds barred.

On March 25^th, ties between the Israel and the United States soured to the point that the US abstained from voting on a UN Security Council that did not tie the ceasefire to returning the hostages. Secretary of State Blinken repeatedly implored Israel not to insist on carrying out the operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, which was allegedly devoid of any strategic logic and for which it would take many months to evacuate the civilian population. Yet the civilians evacuated within days, relocating to humanitarian zones the IDF had set up, as it directed an unprecedented humanitarian relief effort.

This is also where the question of legitimacy plays in. Israel piggybacked on the momentum and legitimacy that followed the October 7^th massacre in order to carry out action that would decisively defeat Hamas in Gaza. This opportunity may never return. Starting a war to remove the threat hasn’t been defined as a war objective since the Six-Day War. This is evidenced by the fact that Hamas’s buildup in Gaza and Hezbollah’s buildup in Lebanon were neglected. After the Disengagement, the population was promised that a single rocket fired from Gaza would be met with a tough response, and those same people now feel that we’ll be able to take over the Philadelphi Corridor after the first smuggling operation. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The notion that contrary to what occurred in the past fifty years, this time, Israel would act differently and wage an elective war is a delusion. It deludes the public, since it involves a misunderstanding of the nature of the political and military echelons in Israel. This includes, first and foremost, avoiding an elective war, and preferring pinpointed operations, such that the denial zone expands to the point when we have no other choice – not to mention a significant international arm-twisting effort that could constrain Israel’s freedom of action.

A withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor would run contrary to Israel’s interest of not going from one war to the next, but rather, preserving the conditions for a stable security situation for generations to come. The notion that Israel should be forced to reach a tipping point to reproduce its achievements is indicative of myopic thinking, rather than strategic depth. It would be like turning off all of the traffic lights in Israel, since they could always be turned on again, once an accident occurs. These are not the principles upon which we can guarantee that we’ll control the situation on the ground.

Israel never excelled at insisting on rock-hard principles at the heart of its security concept, and it often preferred either taking the risks involved in withdrawals, in exchange for foreign troops being posted in the area – in the case of the Philadelphi Corridor, 750 Egyptian soldiers were posted, along with helicopters and APCs – or placing its security in the hands of foreigners – in the case of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was empowered to fight terror in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, instead of Israel. During the Disengagement, the IDF aligned its position with Prime Minister Sharon, and supported a full surrender of control of the corridor due to “the operational difficulty involved in controlling the narrow strip” and the fact that weapons were being smuggled through tunnels in any case, so for the IDF, surrendering control of the corridor was “the lesser of two evils”.

If there’s any major lesson that Israel could learn from the October 7^th massacre, it’s that metastasizing threats cannot be neglected, and that we can’t remain completely blind to what’s happening in Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, or Iran. The massacre prompted the populace to demand that their decision-makers decisively defeat the enemy and remove the threat – a war objective that hasn’t been set since the Six-Day War. Israel tried to avert war at any cost, following the policy of “quiet in exchange for quiet” and pinpointed operations, with the full blessing of the security establishment, keeping the political echelon in its comfort zone. Our hostages must be returned, while applying massive pressure on Hamas and the Gazan population, clarifying the cost of losing, applying international pressure on Iran as well, and breaking all of the rules that Hamas is trying to keep intact.

The Philadelphi Corridor must remain under Israel’s full control, including above-ground patrols to prevent unrestricted movement, underground detection to combat tunnels, and airborne activity, to prevent the infiltration of drones. This is how we can sever the lifeline used by Hamas and other terror organizations, and fulfill the war objective of destroying the organization in Gaza. Though most Israelis understand the gravity of the situation and rally around this objective, fully recalling the river of blood that flowed in the attempt to fulfill it, it’s unfortunate that this chorus isn’t seeking to remedy this, but rather, to go back to denial.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Retaking the Philadelphi Corridor will not be measured by the tank’s driving speed, but international pressure and Israeli denial הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Egypt, with its steadily growing population of some 113 million people (estimated to reach 160 million by 2050), is currently in the throes of a deep economic crisis, manifesting in a high inflation rate – approximately 34% as of 2023; a steep poverty rate at 29.7% as of 2019; a devaluation of the Egyptian Lira and a staggering debt to the tune of 165 billion dollars.

A new study by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement explores the causes of this crisis, Israel’s economic relations with Egypt and the potential opportunities lying therein for Israel.

One of the main threats to Egypt’s economy is the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on one of the Nile river’s sources. This project might cut off part of Egypt’s water supply, floating concerns of already soaring unemployment rates climbing even higher, as some 20% of the country’s population makes its living in agriculture. This also might deliver a blow to Egypt’s ability to produce food and supply electricity for its population, sinking the country’s GDP to a debilitating low. In turn, Egypt will find itself relying heavily on foreign import, increasing its already staggering debt and drag it into a whirlpool of financial crisis.

If that were not enough, Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, has been fostering various grandiose projects that are costing the Egyptian tax-payer billions of dollars. He is expected to continue pouring funds into these initiatives over the next few years, which will demand additional economic aid that will dig the economy into even deeper debt.

One such undertaking is the construction of the New Nile Delta project, aiming to enhance the country’s agricultural capacity to service its rapidly growing population. Egypt hopes that upon the conclusion of the Nile Delta expansion it will be able to independently produce vaster quantities of food at lower costs, while at the same time create jobs for millions of citizens.

Another such project is The New Administrative City – a new state-of-the-art capital located between its current capital of Cairo to Suez. The new city is expected to sit on an area of some 725 square kilometers (280 square miles) and become home to millions of people. The estimated cost of this project is approximately 58 billion dollars. An additional 14 cities are currently under construction across the country. Despite the fact that large swaths of the new city have already been completed, they remain unpopulated for the time being, and it is estimated that by the end of 2024, some 10,000 families will have relocated to the city.

At the same time, El-Sisi is pushing the construction of a new coastal city on an area of 170 square kilometers (66 square miles), which is planned to include new residential buildings, hotels, tourist attractions, hospitals, universities and more. This project aims to increase the country’s inflow of tourism, investments and foreign currency as a means with which to boost its economy. For this project, Egypt had signed in 2024 a financing agreement with the UAE  to the tune of 35 billion dollars. Estimates in Egypt are that total investments in this endeavor will amount to at least 150 billion dollars.

Another problem for the Egyptian economy is its debt crunch, wherein the country’s foreign debt now exceeds 165 billion dollars. In the 23-24 fiscal year, approximately 56% of the budget costs were allocated to covering past loans and interest, and to date, about 49% of the government’s revenues come from new loans. This creates a state of affairs in which Egypt is taking out gargantuan new loans to repay old debt and is in effect digging itself deeper into its financial hole. In light of this crisis, on December 2022 Egypt reached an agreement with the IMF for a 3-billion-dollar loan against a commitment to overhaul its economy and instate an economic reform. Despite less than adequate performance on this issue on part of Egypt, the IMF had agreed on March 2024 to increase the loan by another 5 billion dollars, and compromised on the execution of the reform, that would stand on four main pillars: an alternative and more flexible rate of exchange system; a tightening of the monetary and fiscal policies; earmarking a budget for supporting under the poverty line households; and attaining a healthy balance between the public and private sectors of the country.

Egypt’s economic relations with Israel

While Egypt is contending with its economic crises, Israel continues  its relatively steady trade relations with the Arab country. These ties are a ray of light in Egypt’s dismal economic situation.

One positive aspect of these relations is the Israeli tourism to the land of the Pharaohs. Every year, a large number of Israelis visit Egypt – mainly in the Sinai – boosting Egypt’s tourism. It is important to note though, that the outbreak of the Gaza war had significantly stemmed that flow.

In addition, the annual trade volume between the two countries is at hundreds of millions of dollars. These prolific relations bred joint trade meetings and conferences to expand economic collaboration and had even led to a plan to increase trade to 700 million dollars over the next several years. Just for comparison – in 2021, the volume of trade between Israel and Egypt – excluding gas – was at some 330 million dollars.

The main engine of the economic relations between the two countries is the gas export from Israel to Egypt – the mainstay of the trade relations. According to an agreement signed in 2018, Israel is to supply Egypt with 15 billion dollars’ worth of gas over a period of ten years. This gas is intended mainly for Egypt’s energy needs but some of it is exported by Egypt to Europe, after being processed by Egypt’s LNG plants, and is an important source of revenue for the government. Later, another agreement was signed between both countries in 2022, for the expansion of the supply from Israel. Additionally, in 2023, Egypt had pressured Israel to increase the supply. The outbreak of the Gaza war significantly reduced the supply of gas from Israel and in Egypt grievances were voiced on the frequent power cuts and the waning revenues from the LNG gas exports. Nonetheless, Israel continues to uphold its end of the deal and the partners of the Tamar gas field had even announced an increase of gas exports to Egypt starting 2025. It is safe to assume that in light of these developments, Egypt’s dependency on Israeli gas will deepen.

In conclusion, in the current state of affairs, Egypt is entrenched in a near-crippling economic crisis which is not expected to end in the next several years. Additionally, since the start of the Gaza war, Egypt has been adopting actions and rhetoric that are contradictory to Israel’s interest. In response, Israel can – and must – bring into play the leverages it possesses in the form of control over the gas tap, its relations with the US and its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, in order to advance Israel’s interest in the current armed conflict, i.e. the  seizure of Rafah, the elimination of Hamas, the return of the Israeli hostages and the control over the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border, and ensure Egypt’s support of these interest, while receiving aid from Israel.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Egypt’s Faltering Economy – A Local Crisis; An Opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The United Nations’ Secretary General, Antonio Gutteres, made a speech to mark one year to the October 7 massacre in Israel. Though he made the most compelling call for condemnation of Hamas, he failed to call upon his organization to recognize it as a terror group, to condemn Iran’s multifront campaign on the Jewish State, as well as touch upon the unprecedented anti-Israeli campaign he and the UN have been engaged in over the past year.

Here is an alternative speech that could still be delivered, if Guterres so choses.

The decision is his to make.

***

Distinguished delegates,

It has been one year since Iranian protégé Hamas’ horrible and inhumane massacre of innocent Israelis on October 7, and the Iran’s ensuing multifront campaign against Israel. It pains me to report, however, that the United Nations so far failed to take the most basic step and condemn this atrocity. One does not need to take sides to outright reject the human suffering caused by these enemies of civilization.

Over the past year, I made 37 work-related trips around the world in my capacity as the United Nations’ Secretary General. My unwavering commitment to the international community that entrusted me with this sacred mission is to be an honest broker, while insisting on fundamental values we should all share. I therefore traveled to all seven continents but Australia and Antarctica, and above all, the Middle East, in an attempt to bring the world together. Yet I regret to inform you that I preferred to skip over Israel, despite the fact that this long-standing member of the United Nations has just suffered the deadliest terrorist attack in its history.

However, I have taken the trouble to repeatedly talk at Israelis, rather than with them. I skipped no superlative in laying out my accusations of Israel, rushing to be “horrified” by Israeli airstrikes on Hamas compounds and averting against “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza. My deputy and a commission I appointed accused Israel of committing “war crimes”, my envoy to the Middle East claimed Israel had “no right of self-defense”, and my organization, the United Nations, still refuses to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. I myself invoked Chapter 99 for the first time since coming into office and only for the fourth time in history, citing concerns on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Yet I failed to explain how Gaza outperforms Yemen, with 400,000 dead from starvation, Syria, Ukraine, drug wars in Mexico, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, theaters that summon frail international reaction.

I repeatedly condemned Israel by name, accusing it of everything from deliberate starvation to genocide, with no evidence but Hamas’ bogus data (the “Gaza Ministry of Health”), ignoring over 1 million aid trucks that entered Gaza this year. Yet when Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles at Israeli cities, I never mentioned the Ayatollah regime by name, simply making a general reference to “escalation in the Middle East”, as if talking about the weather.

I have to admit that under my reign, I continued a UN tradition of anti-Israel bias. Already on October 19, before any Israeli troops ever entered Gaza, I traveled to Egypt and accused Israel of “starving” Palestinians in Gaza. “For nearly two weeks, the people of Gaza have gone without any shipments of fuel, food, water, medicine and other essentials,” I stated at the El Arish airport, as a 747 cargo was landing behind me, carrying 65 metric tons of humanitarian supplies on its way to Gaza.

I was oblivious, perhaps willfully, to the fact that since October 7, Israel remained the only country in the world to supply its enemy with food and fuel during wartime, with a great risk to its soldiers: over 60,000 trucks and airborne deliveries have shipped over 1 million tons of humanitarian aid into Gaza, supplying as many as 3,400 calories per day to every Gazan citizen. This policy remains highly unpopular among the Israeli public, as hostages are still being held in sub-human conditions in Gaza. Israel allowed and facilitated this despite clear indications that Hamas uses much of it to its own advantage.

I came back to Egypt in March, while flagrantly skipping over Israel once again. I did not skip over superlatives, though, claiming it was “monstrous” that “Palestinians in Gaza are marking Ramadan with Israeli bombs still falling, bullets still flying, artillery still pounding and humanitarian assistance still facing obstacle upon obstacle.” However, I made no request to Egypt, my host country, to stop blocking Palestinian refugees from fleeing into its territory or hurdling humanitarian aid, given it shares a border with Gaza. Egyptian President Al-Sisi even fenced out an enclave to block refugees in case the border is breached through the Rafah area. I would have never accepted such a situation had Moldova, Poland, or Romania ever blocked Ukrainian refugees from escaping a war zone.

I also failed to recognize how my own UN agencies actively colluded with Hamas. UNRWA facilitated the murder of Israelis with its teachers participating in the October 7 massacre, holding hostages, and over 400 of its members being part of Hamas’ Al Qassam Brigades. That did not stop me from claiming “188 UN workers” were killed in Gaza, outcrying how the “horror must stop,” while ignoring the oldest trick in the Hamas manual – registering terrorists as UN workers.

My agency UNOCHA, on its part, continues to whitewash Hamas’ disinformation. Figures neatly presented in charts and infographics illustrated how 42,000 Palestinians were allegedly killed in Gaza, based on bogus data provided by Hamas’ “Gaza Ministry of Health” and “various media reports”. I reiterated those figures, while professing to alert against “grave global harm” caused by other types of disinformation. Scores of violent protesters blocked Jewish students from entering campuses and attacked Jewish people on the streets around the world based on these false claims, that my own UN has slashed by half ever since.

Disinformation has even become normalized under my reign – though only when Israel is concerned. 35 Palestinians were never killed in an UNRWA school by an Israeli airstrike on June 6, yet my UN News agency rushed to report just that, and my spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric claimed that the incident was “another horrific example of the price that civilians are paying” in Gaza. Later I found out that 17 Hamas militants used the compound as a military site, a legitimate target according to any international law – with no civilian casualties. 500 Palestinians were never killed in the Al Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza on October 17, yet I rushed to announce I was “horrified” and “shocked” by the incident. Had I awaited the facts, I would have known that this was yet another Hamas fake news. In reality, a misfired PIJ rocket landed in the hospital’s parking lot, all but burning a few cars.

Israel was even excluded from the UN’s report on sexual violence despite multiple evidence on such crimes by Hamas on October 7, while we falsely accused Israel of committing such sexual crimes on Palestinians without a shred of evidence, simply for the sake of false balance.

Unlike my focus on Israel, I never made any significant appeal on Iran to cease funding terrorism, illegally developing nuclear weapons and publicly calling for the annihilation of Israel, while violating practically all of its international obligations. The Iranian regime instigated the October 7 massacre and continues to wreak havoc around the region and the world. I only mentioned Iran when paying tribute to its notorious president Raisi, in a special visit to Tehran, mourning the death of a mass murderer who made a mockery of international law and minority rights I care deeply about.

In general, I cannot report to you that I’m proud of my record from the past year. Rather than harshly criticizing Israel based on cooked numbers and partial reports, or only expressing empathy with Israeli victims within a “yes, but” context (as my famous speech shortly after the massacre, saying it “did not happen in a vacuum”), I should have rallied the international community against the clear and present threats aimed at the only Jewish state.

While Israel is fighting an existential war and is subject to attacks on multiple fronts, I failed to meet my obligations to it. I presided over a UN that according to my predecessor Koffi Annan, is “misused to constantly vilify the Jewish state and, in so doing, damage the world body itself and its universal values.” Its General Assembly dedicates 85% of its annual resolutions to Israel, while its Human Right Council’s infamous Article 7 singles Israel out for no apparent reason. No other country suffers this level existential threat while being in the crosshairs of the international community.

Going back to where I started – I did pay a visit to Israel during my tenure, albeit not in the past year, but in 2017. I stressed my commitment to combat anti-Semitism in the Yad Vashem holocaust memorial, while failing to meet that promise. I then visited the kibbutz of Nahal Oz, who borders Gaza and “heard from them of their fears of rocket attacks from Hamas, as well as tunnel infiltration”. I commended the residents’ will “to see Palestinians and Israelis living both in peace and both well.” I then toured a Hamas attack tunnel crossing the border. I failed to appreciate how this will evolve into an all-out massacre of 1,200 innocent Israelis, of which 16 were murdered and 8 taken hostage in the same Nahal Oz.

I realize my tenure will go down in history as a particularly shameful period as it relates not only to treating Israel, but any freedom-seeking nation. But now we have an opportunity to correct that record. Iran’s campaign of terror, rape and hostage taking must stop. Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire but to be encouraged to do justice with humanity’s most abominable enemies. We should all also appreciate the heroism of Israeli combatants who put their lives on the line not only for the defense of Israel, but all of us in the free world. Israel managed to channel unspeakable suffering into encapsulating human destiny with the spirit of its people and the ferocious Jewish belief in an ultimate good. For failing to meet my commitment, I ask Israel and my Jewish friends around the world for your forgiveness. May we leverage this war to vanquish evil, rather than appeasing it, and empowering Israel, rather than disavowing it.

Thank you.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט The Speech UN’s Guterres Should Have Given on October 7: “Time to Correct Our Record” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In recent years new concepts have been emerging in the global discourse, relating to the psychological warfare both within the cyberspace and beyond. Concepts such as Fake News, Disinformation, and Deep Space have entered popular jargon and brought to light  the gargantuan influence games raging between various global forces. One of those is Iran.

Iran has been waging ongoing sophisticated disinformation campaigns, aiming to sway public opinion against its enemies – namely Israel and the US. But Teheran can take a page out of the playbook of an old hand in sowing disinformation to influence public opinion – Russia.

For instance, Iran is attempting to intervene and influence the results of the upcoming presidential elections in the US. The Washington Post reported that the artificial intelligence (AI) developer OpenAI, announced in August 2024 that it had intercepted attempts by Iranian sources to use its famous chatbot ChatGP to manufacture online content to sow discord and widen the polarization in US society to influence the results of the elections this November. The network disseminated disinformation regarding both candidates – Democratic Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. The fake news aimed to increase the social discord in the United States by stoking social controversy. The Iranian network produced content mainly in the topic of the war in Gaza, LGBTQ rights and of course, the two presidential candidates.

According to intel in the US, the Iranian network, known as “2035-storm” operated a number of new websites and social networks. Iran’s primary objective in the information ecosystem is to stoke existing controversy in American society on particularly sensitive issues, propagate social chaos and undermine America’s political and social order from within. Presumably, even if the Iranians are able to foment discord even on a small scale, they will have considered this testimony to the long-standing claim championed by Iran that democracy is a flawed Western concept.

It seems that one popular topic utilized by the Iranian network is the current war in Gaza, which it frequently addresses. Thus for instance, it operates a website under the name Even Politics.com in which it publishes content on the ongoing Gaza war, the influence of religious groups and threats against American democracy. It is evident that most of the content of the site is biased against Donald Trump.

According to many experts in the field,  this method of disseminating disinformation is not the domain of Iran, and its attempts to sway the elections in the US seems to reflect the methodology employed by Russia, which operated a troll farm – an organized group engaging in the dissemination of disinformation – to flood the social networks with divisive content, ladened with disinformation. The telltale characteristic of the Russian methodology  apparent in the Iranian activity in the cyber ecosystem is the targeting of groups on both sides of the political divide in the US. The disinformation Iran uses aims to radicalize the political discourse, deepen the social discord and undermine the fabric of society in America.

Iranian efforts to influence the presidential elections in the US were evident already in 2018, when they set up a sophisticated system of fake accounts supposedly belonging to US House candidates and journalists. The Iranian campaign, which began in 2018, scaled up following the elimination of Qassem Soleimani, former Qods Force commander in Iraq in January 2020, under the order of then President, Donal Trump. Thus for instance, two Iranian nationals were charged in the US of involvement in the cybernetic disinformation  campaign targeting American voters ahead of the 2020 elections. Iranian perpetrators also sent threatening emails to voters during the 2020 campaign. Iran also used websites such as Even Politics to try and sway the 2022 midterm elections as well.

In addition to its use of social platforms, Iran utilizes other cyber instruments such as hacking and phishing, to try and throw the November elections into disarray. On August 10, officials in Trump’s campaign accused Teheran of hacking parts of its internal communications, leading to a federal investigation in the US. On August 19, the American federal Intelligence officials released an assessment confirming that there was “increasingly aggressive Iranian activity during this elections cycle”, which included “the recently reported activities targeting former President Trump’s campaign”. The intelligence assessment came after U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines suggested that Tehran’s efforts to influence the U.S. election were likely “because Iran’s leaders want to avoid an outcome that they believe would increase tensions with the United States,” i.e. Trump.

Iranian disinformation targeting Israel

Iran’s hostile interference activity in the cyberspace targets Israel as well. In the wake of October 7, Iran stepped up its activity aimed at spreading disinformation among the Israeli public. It was also recently revealed that a Telegram channel disguised as pro-Israel, “Tears of War”, has published dozens of messages since the beginning of the war, including heartbreaking posts pushing for the return of the hostages from Hamas captivity in Gaza. The posts were designed to convey a clear message: the Israeli government is to blame for the ongoing suffering of the hostages, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions were to blame for undermining prospects of a ceasefire. These are just a few examples of how this channel, along with others, is trying to deepen the discord in Israels’ political-social discourse on loaded issues that concern the Israeli public, such as the hostages and the ceasefire.

In all likelihood, the Tears of War account is operated by someone connected to Teheran and is used as a bellow with which to inflame tensions in Israel’s public. Through this and other channels, the Iranians are undermining the official Israeli narrative regarding the issue of the hostages and the war in Gaza in order to influence and manoeuvre the campaign according to Iranian interests. However, this devious campaign is just part of the picture of Iran’s network of activity in the information ecosystem against Israel.

From 2021 to date, Iran has been operating a widespread campaign in the digital ecosystem aiming to psychologically manipulate the Israeli public and further tear at the social and ideological conflict, particularly evident following Israel’s Operation Guardian of the Walls that year. Tehran’s ultimate goal is to turn the public in Israel against the government, to undermine the government and affect anarchy that would serve to weaken Israel.

To this end, Iran employs advanced tactics and methods, such as digital email campaigns, social media landing pages, and the dissemination of deep fake AI-generated content designed to reach more accurately segmented audiences and increase engagement.

The Iranian activity in the cyberspace has three discrete phases, each with specific objectives:

The escalation of tensions between the various groups from all sides of the social divides in Israel, e.g. religious groups and the LGBTQ community; religion and non-religious etc. The next step is fomenting pollical discord between the right and left of the political map. The third stage, of which Iran is presently engaged in, is to saw discontent in the Israeli public with regards to the Israeli government’s response to the actions of Hamas.

Teheran’s expansive use of the digital ecosystem is intended to create a skewed perception of reality among Israel’s public to the extent that they cannot discern between fact and fiction; victim and aggressor. Thus, the Iranians try to swamp the web with disinformation and distorted intentional narratives by exploiting – often unwitting – local resources to spread this content, amplified by of local content in leading channels.

Case in point: last May, the abovementioned “Tears of War” telegram channel paid for sponsored promotion on a Telegram channel of an Israeli blogger, Daniel Amram,  called “Uncensored Daniel Amram”, which has 378 thousand followers. The posts on Daniel Amram’s  channel gave the Iranian’s access to the mobile devices of thousands of Israeli followers and disseminate content calling for the cessation of the war. The use of local channels to promote fake narrative through such content is one instrument Tehran utilizes to saw confusion in the Israel’s public, obscuring the boundaries between what is in effect occurring and cyberspace. The disparity between the misguided perception and reality provides a convenient platform for mind engineering and influencing campaigns and for collecting data on followers, even for the recruitment of civilians for their cause. Iranian cyber networks use fake accounts to contact Israeli civilians by sending them private messages on social networks such as Telegram, WhatsApp etc. The use of content-intensive networks, which are full of fake accounts the respond to or upload posts lend a veneer  of credibility that allowד spreading messages to users, who are contacted through private messages, unaware that they are being recruited.

On January 2024, the Israeli General Security Services announce that fake accounts operated by an Iranian network posted fake job offers and surveys to recruit Israelis to carry out various tasks. These privately-sent requests included, among others, prompts to hang signs with slogans phrased by the Iranians, surveys, photographing protesters and so on. The Iranian network operated to recruit Israelis by deceit, and to use them for purposes of intelligence collection, such as photographing houses of anti-Iranians and individuals belonging to the Israeli security establishment.

In conclusion, it seems that the Iranian networks operating in the Israeli and American digital ecosystem have a deep understanding of the public discourse of both publics. The use of the various social networks and other means of dissemination, such as emails, is spreading by exploiting the ease with which massive numbers of users can be reached privately to deceitfully collect intelligence.

Furthermore, it seems that the Iranian methods of operations are becoming increasingly streamlined and Tehran’s influencing campaigns are able to hit upon exposed nerves in the social rift both in America and Israel. Moreover, the daily interaction with citizens affords Iran with comprehensive social insights, enabling it to analyze the social discourse and accordingly modify the messages it seeks to promote and advance its strategic objectives through instant messaging to users.

The US is heading toward its presidential elections, while Israel is in a state of a multi-theater war, and events are developing at breakneck speed. A  large part of the population uses social networks to stay abreast on current events, mainly on Telegram and -X (Twitter). This increased dissemination of content is a fertile ground for Iran’s frequent disinformation and mind engineering campaigns.

This sophisticated method of spreading messages and content via social networks serves Iran’s long-term strategic goals. The disinformation foments distrust in the governing institution of its enemies and disintegrate their societies – Israeli and American – from within.

Additionally, all this cements Iran’s status as a powerful player in the digital ecosystem and offensive cyber, increasing its ability to collect intelligence and hurt civilians. Teheran’s deep understanding of the main issues of social discourse in Israel, and its ability to influence sentiments in Israel’s public reflect an escalation in its ability to orchestrate influencing campaigns and spark social discord and controversy.

Moreover, the Iranian disinformation campaigns are greatly accelerated with the help of artificial intelligence, which they even use to produce deepfake videos, increase the quality of their fake content and mislead public officials, media outlets and many citizens. Teheran’s use of fake, manipulative content produced by artificial intelligence is expected to further expand, to increase the output and dissemination. The use of artificial intelligence will also contribute to the fine-tuning of messages to increase their influence on the public discourse, in Israel, the United States, or any other country Teheran considers its enemy.

Examples of posts from the “tears of War” Telegram channel

Many of the channel’s posts contain the hashtag #Its All His Fault! referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, aiming to widen the divide in Israel’s society and increase opposition to the government and its system:

This is one of many posts on the ‘Tears of War’ Telegram channel with the hashtag #It’s All His Fault, aiming to increase social controversy and opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government through an image insinuating the situation of the hostages in Gaza, depicting a drawing of the radar operators while being kidnapped from their base on October 7. The post aims to counter balance the shift of attention to the fighting in the northern arena against Hezbollah and Lebanon.

Some posts focus on Iran, suggesting that the channel’s operators are of Iranian source. Below is an example of such two posts published during the 2024 Paris Olympics, emphasizing that Iran has won more medals than Israel:

הפוסט Games of Influence: Iranian Disinformation in Israel and the USA הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the aftermath of Yahya Sinwar’s death, Hamas is in deep shock. They are now struggling to recover and choose a new leader. Sinwar’s killing is perceived to be much more significant than that of Ismail Haniyeh, and even of Ahmad Yassin in 2004. This is due to the fact that the Hamas leadership is now divided between the “Iranian-Shiite” axis and the “Sunni Axis”. Following Ismail Haniyeh’s killing in July, when it seemed that Khaled Mashal would take over from Haniyeh and resume his former role as Head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Iran and Sinwar were adamantly opposed to this move. Khaled Mashal was reputed to be the leader of the “Sunni Axis” in Hamas, close to and supportive of Qatar and Turkey.

In view of the schisms within the Hamas leadership – between the Shiite axis and the Sunni axis, and between the “Hamas Leadership Abroad” and the “Hamas Leadership in Gaza”, what are the implications of Sinwar’s death on this murderous terrorist organization?

The Hamas leadership is struggling to select a new leader so as to continue the war against Israel. The removal of Sinwar is a severe blow to the organization, however it is thought the organization is not going to disappear completely, and it might even recover. One of the prevailing assessments in the Israel security forces is that the center of gravity, where decisions will be made, will now migrate from the Hamas Leadership in Gaza to the Hamas Leadership Abroad, and that Sinwar’s replacement will be selected from this group.

A feverish battle of succession is now underway, where the Hamas Gaza also has a “trump card” in the form of Muhammad Sinwar, Yahya Sinwar’s brother, who is now leading Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The latter is now running the fight against Israel, he holds the Israeli hostages. With him is Muhammad Shabana, commander of the organization’s Rafah Brigade.

The Hamas senior leadership is now divided. The battle behind the scenes is between the candidates affiliated with Iran and those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent movement. Iran, it seems, will do whatever it can to retain Hamas as its proxy. Hamas, which is not an Iranian proxy by nature, since it is a Sunni organization, product of the Muslim Brotherhood, does have a convergence of interests with Iran – namely the destruction of the State of Israel.

Who are the senior Hamas figures out of whom the next leader will emerge?

“Shiite Axis” members, favoring Iran:

1. Khalil Al-Haya, who was Yahya Sinwar’s right-hand man, and who officially announced Sinwar’s death on behalf of Hamas. Al-Haya is based in Qatar, where he coordinates the indirect hostage release negotiations with Israel as part of the Hamas Leadership Abroad. Al-Haya is very closely aligned with the Iranian Faction of Hamas. He has even met with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, in Istanbul together with the organization’s Chairman of the Hamas Shura Council, Muhammad Darwish following Yahya Sinwar’s death.
2. Muhammad, Head of the Hamas Shura Council, is also affiliated with the Hamas Iranian faction.
3. Muhammad Sinwar, who masterminded the abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006, is supported by Iran, He is holding the Israeli hostages and is running the war against Israel in the Gaza Strip.

“Sunni Axis” members, favoring the Muslim Brotherhood:

1. Khaled Mashal, head of the Hamas leadership abroad, is the former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is affiliated with Qatar and Turkey as well as Pakistan. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement and is at odds with Iran. The Iranians have not forgotten his past statements and his sympathies with the Sunni world. Masal even went so far recently in his statements, in an interview, that Iran was behind the killing of Ismail Haniyeh.
2. Mousa Abu Marzouk, former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. Abu Marzouk speaks frequently about the hostage deals and reflects Hamas’ position on this issue.

Sinwar’s death is an important pivotal point in the war. It might even tip the balance, subdue Hamas and trigger a renewed hostage deal. This being said, Muhammad Sinwar, who has Iran’s backing, might not agree to a hostage deal with Israel while the latter has the upper hand – this might constitute a surrender of the organization and admission of its defeat in the war. A decision has even been made recently in Hamas, to appoint Muhammad Sinwar as the decision-maker in all matters concerning a hostage deal with Israel. He has also apparently been named acting commander of the terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. This is not to say that Muhammad Sinwar has been elected as supreme leader of the organization, which would include the overseas branch, but it does elevate his standing considerably and it also increases the likelihood that he will eventually be chosen to replace Yahya Sinwar at the helm of the terrorist organization.

Moreover, Muhammad Sinwar might continue to tow the line mapped out by his brother Yahya Sinwar, who prior to his death decided to renew the suicide attacks inside Israel. It also seems that as far as the military wing of Hamas in Gaza is concerned, there are hopes of a further escalation in the hostilities between Israel and Iran and Hezbollah, which would divert the main thrust of the IDF’s pressure toward Lebanon or Iran.

This article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Implications on Hamas from the Killing of Yahya Sinwar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Israeli military response against Hamas in Gaza, following the October 7^th massacre, and the current campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah has also sparked criticism, even ire, on the part of a significant part of the international community. This phenomenon has not skipped several Latin American governments, especially those belonging to the “Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas” (ALBA), which includes Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia. Shortly after the October 7^th massacre, when Israel began striking Hamas in Gaza, La Paz cut diplomatic ties with Israel and presented a request to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to “investigate the situation in Palestine”, while the governments of Colombia and Chile recalled their ambassadors on the same day and later backed South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICC, together with Brazil and Mexico.

In early October 2024, Nicaragua also announced plans to cut diplomatic ties with Israel. The move is essentially symbolic, since relations between Israel and the central American country are nonexistent. It is worth recalling that, in June 2023, Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, welcomed former Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Managua.

Nicaragua had already broken relations with Israel two times, once in 2010 under Ortega, and previously in 1982 under the Sandinista revolutionary regime.

On the contrary, Argentina’s newly-elected President, Javier Milei, as well asEl Salvador’s Nayyib Bukele, confirmed their support for Israel, with the latter comparing Hamas’ violence to the one perpetrated by the Maras and praising the liberation of the Palestinians from Hamas’ clutches.

Paraguay is also backing Israel while planning the relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem. In 2019, Paraguay also added Hamas and Hezbollah to its terrorist blacklist, along with ISIS and al-Qaeda.

This general situation generates concern, considering that Latin America has been a hub for terror activity for the last four decades, with its long history of terrorist attacks by local groups, including the FARC and ELN guerrillas in Colombia, and the Shining Path in Peru, as well as the longtime presence of Hezbollah, as explained by Jennifer Teale of the IDSF.

Hezbollah is not the only terrorist organization that found a safe harbor in Latin America. Starting in the 1990s, several other groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Group, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al-Qaeda, and more recently the Islamic State (ISIS) have all found footholds in Latin America.

The reason why Islamist terrorism is widely present in Latin America is due to a series of reasons such as the possibility of exploiting illicit trafficking networks, especially for drugs and money laundering, porous borders, inadequate law enforcement, and lack of proper counter-terror laws.

There is no doubt that the undisputed Islamist organization who dominates Latin America is Hezbollah, which has been present and operational in the continent since the early 1980s. It has been relying mostly on a vast networking operation, implemented by Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah has also been widely involved in drug trafficking and money-laundering activities, especially from its base in the Triple Frontier: the intersection point where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet.

Iran and Hezbollah’s current spearhead in Latin America is Venezuela, due to the strong links between Maduro’s regime and Teheran. Iran has invested heavily in Venezuelan oil refineries and assisted President Maduro’s regime in reviving their struggling oil industry. Maduro’s Venezuela has practically aligned with Iran’s radical axis, ramping up its vile rhetoric against Israel and the West, its accusations against Israel of “genocide” on the UN stage, and Maduro’s open anti-Semitism, accusing “international Zionism” of anti-government protests in his country.

Hezbollah managed to root itself on Venezuelan soil and establish networks that can operate throughout Latin America, taking advantage of the sizable Lebanese community in the country. A similar situation occurred in Brazil, another country with a vast Lebanese presence and it is not by coincidence that, in November 2023, the Brazilian security services unfoiled an attack against the country’s Jewish community, which was planned by Hezbollah.

In 2021, Colombia’s security apparatus thwarted an Iranian plot to assassinate two Israeli businessmen in the country and expelled two Hezbollah operatives.

In March 2024, the Peruvian police arrested an Iranian and a Peruvian national who were planning an attack on an Israeli person at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), scheduled to be held in November in the Andean country.

In addition, on August 16, Argentina’s Federal Police thwarted an Islamist terror plot reportedly linked to ISIS and the Taliban to murder Jews in Mendoza, the second such plot uncovered in Argentina this year.

While these plots were exposed in time to be thwarted, they are a proof that the Jewish communities and Israelis in Latin America remain a primary target of both Sunni and Shia terrorist organizations that, until recently, have been able to operate with impunity.

Potential threats

Regarding potential targets, another aspect that must not be underestimated is the flourishing Israeli tourism industry in Latin America, with post-military “mochileros” who travel to these areas for long periods of time, often in remote parts, and could become a target of terrorists.

Given the current situation in Lebanon, with Hezbollah brought to its knees by the Israeli offensive and with Iran appearing hesitant to actively enter the field in support of its Lebanese proxy, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian regime and Hezbollah may try to strike where they still have operational networks, and attempt to target Jewish communities and Israelis abroad. In September 2023, Mossad chief David Barnea announced that the Israeli intelligence organization has managed to thwart 27 attempted terrorist attacks by Iran over one year alone, including in Latin America. The normally quiet continent could be one of the most suitable areas, considering the huge gaps in the security sector both on the legislative level and on law enforcing.

One must not forget the difficulty of the authorities in controlling vast areas of the “selva”, the “sierra”, and the long, often impervious borders, such as the one between Colombia and Venezuela, whose neighboring areas have become strongholds for the FARC and ELN terror groups. Other problematic areas are the Vraem in Peru, where Sendero Luminoso is based, and the borders connecting Brazil with Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay, not difficult to cross and major transit points for drug traffickers, often linked to the Iranian terror network.

Extreme caution is therefore recommended when traveling throughout Latin America, not just in cities but also in the more remote natural areas, and avoid those countries hostile to Israelis and Jews.

This article was originally published in Jewish News Syndicate – JNS.org

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט How safe is Latin America for Israelis and Jews? A few thoughts הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On October 29, 2024, responding to a request from Algeria, Russia and Iran, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session, to discuss the Israeli response to the Iranian attack on Israel. During the session, the UNSC again fell foul to the anti-Israel propaganda.

While the UNSC was quick to answer the call to provide a platform to again attack Israel, an examination of the record of the UNSC resolutions adopted since the October 7 massacre, shows that in breach of its ostensibly lofty goals, the UNSC has failed to show even the most basic moral clarity.

For over a year, since the October 7 ,2023, massacre, Israel has been under attack from seven different fronts. Genocidal terrorists and a terror-sponsoring rogue state, who openly declare their goal to destroy Israel have all participated in the attacks on Israel. Despite having had multiple discussions on the “situation in the Middle East,” the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has consistently failed to show any moral leadership. Seemingly powerless in the face of the aggression of the Ayatollahs from Tehran and their terror proxies, the UNSC has been entirely neutralized.

The failure is so great, that the UNSC has not even been able to muster an unequivocal condemnation of the Palestinian terrorist murderers – Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and others – who carried out the massacre, let alone promote their designation as UN recognized terror organizations. The UNSC has similarly been unable to muster a clear condemnation of Hezbollah, an internationally designated terror organization, for its aggression against Israel. So too, the UNSC has been incapable of condemning Iran for launching, on two separate occasions, over 500 explosive projectiles, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UAV’s, towards Israel.

In contrast to its refusal to condemn the terrorists and the Ayatollahs for attacking Israel, when it wanted to act, the UNSC knew how to respond.

The message being bull horned around the globe by the UNSC is that the massacre of Jews and the continued threat posed to the only Jewish state simply do not interest the UNSC.

Instead of aspiring to live up to the foremost goal of the UN,^[1] “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,” the UNSC is cowering in the face of fanatical terrorism.

While the UNSC has had ample time to demonstrate moral leadership, it chose instead to ignore, excuse and UN-wash the actions of genocidal terrorists and the Ayatollahs. Instead of promoting peace, the actions of the terrorists and the Ayatollahs, combined with the abject failure of the UNSC, have now brought the entire middle east to the brink of the abyss.

Since the October 7 massacre and the ensuing war with the terrorists in the Gaza Strip, the war in Lebanon initiated by Hezbollah, the attacks launched by the Houtis from Yemen, and the Iranian missile barrage, the UNSC has adopted a number of resolutions regarding the middle east.^[2] None of these resolutions condemned the genocidal terrorists or Iran.

UNSCR 2707 (2023)^[3]

The first UNSC resolution regarding the middle east was adopted on November 14, 2023, over a month after the October 7 massacre. At the time, the war in Gaza raged on and hundreds of hostages taken by the genocidal Gazan terrorists during the massacre languished in Gazan dungeons, and while the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah and the Houtis, were actively engaged in attacking Israel.

Shockingly, the resolution made no mention of Hamas, no mention of the other Gazan terrorist organizations, no mention of the October 7 massacre, no mention of the hostages and no mention of the attack on Israel by Hezbollah.

Rather, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution reaffirmed the UNSC’s “strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen” and determined that “the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.”

UNSCR 2712 (2023)^[4]

UNSC resolution 2712 regarding “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” was adopted the next day, on November 15, 2023.

As if written and adopted in a vacuum devoid of any context, the resolution merely referred to the “armed conflict” underway and made a number of general statements. The resolution did not mention the October 7 massacre and did not condemn Hamas or the other Gazan terrorist organizations for their heinous acts. The resolution was similarly devoid of any mention of Hezbollah, the Houtis, or any of their attacks on Israel.

Rather the resolution adopted the all-too-familiar approach of ignoring the Palestinian and Iranian-backed terror, while trying to shackle the arms of Israel.

The only reference the resolution made to the real situation, was the mealy-mouthed call to the genocidal terrorists, as if they cared a damn about the resolutions of the UNSC, “for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas and other groups, especially children, as well as ensuring immediate humanitarian access.”

While substantial attention was paid to the situation in the Gaza Strip, no mention was made of the over 140,000^[5] Israelis who had been forced to abandon their homes, or what was left of them, due to the terror of the Gazan and Hezbollah terrorists.

By comparison, when the UNSC truly wanted to denounce terror, it certainly knew how to do so. Just a month earlier, on September 15, 2023, the UNSC adopted resolution 2697 (2023).^[6] In that resolution the UNSC made clear that “that ISIL/Da’esh constitutes a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, particularly those committed against women and children…” The UNSC further condemned “the commission of acts by ISIL/Da’esh involving murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking,…”

UNSC resolution 2716,^[7] adopted on December 21, 2023, and titled on the UNSC website as “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” was similarly lacking. Instead of addressing the Palestinian terrorists and the Iran-back terror proxies, Hezbollah and the Houtis, the resolution dealt solely with Afghanistan, never mentioning the threat to international security posed by the Gazan terrorists or the Iranian proxy war against Israel.

Once again, the UNSC proved that when it truly sought to address the root causes of terror and its horrors, it certainly had the ability to do so.

UNSC resolution 2718,^[8] adopted on the same day, also ignored the actions of the Palestinian terrorists and the Iran-back terror proxies, Hezbollah and the Houtis. Rather, it focused on the activities of United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), another one of a plethora of UN organizations that fails to acknowledge reality.

According to its website, UNDOF was established in 1974, after “war erupted in the Middle East between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai, and between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”^[9] Shamefully, undermining its basic mandate, UNDOF is even incapable of clearly stating that it was the Egyptians and the Syrians who, on October 6, 1973, launched the war in the hope of annihilating Israel. Apparently, the inability of the UN and its organizations to clearly identify the true aggressors is nothing new, but rather a longstanding pattern of failure.

Having said that, UNSC resolution 2718 again demonstrated the UNSC’s ability to clearly identify terrorists and adopt measures to combat them. Thus for example, one provision of the resolution provides that UNSC reaffirmed “its readiness to consider listing individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities providing support to ISIL (Da’esh) or to the Al-Nusra Front (also known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham or Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), including those who are financing, arming, planning, or recruiting for ISIL (Da’esh) or the Al-Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida as listed on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including those participating in or otherwise supporting attacks against UNDOF peacekeepers.”

Needless to say, to this day, the UNSC has expressed no such commitment to sanction members of the genocidal Gazan terror organizations or those who support, fund and arm them. Clearly, in the so-called global battle against terror, in the eyes of the UNSC, terrorists who murder, rape, torture and kidnap Jews are not worthy of being sanctioned.

UNSCR 2720^[10]

UNSC resolution 2720 was adopted on December 22, 2023, and directly addressed the war. However, following what had already become the UNSC’s clear course of action, the resolution again failed to mention the October 7 massacre, the genocidal Gazan terrorists, or the Iranian terror proxies. Most of the resolution was devoted to the alleged hardships of the Gazans.

Most noticeable, was the maliciously misleading language of the resolution used to make demands of “all parties to the conflict.” Failing again to identify the true aggressors, the UNSC chose to adopt language that placed democratic, law-abiding Israel, on the same footing as the genocidal terrorists. While appearing even-handed, the UNSC knows that the Gazan terrorists have no basic respect for human life, let alone UNSC resolutions. Thus, in the attempt to appear neutral, in reality the UNSC was not only ignoring the actions of the genocidal terrorists, but also, simultaneously castigating and making demands solely of Israel.

The only reference the resolution made to the actions of the genocidal terrorists was to repeat the mealy-mouthed call for the “immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address medical needs of all hostages.”

As if the genocidal Gazan terrorists had not just committed a massacre in an attempt to annihilate Israel, the resolution continued delusionally by reiterating the UNSC’s “unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace.”

Seemingly oblivious to the situation on the ground, the resolution then stressed “the importance of unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.” Were the members of the UNSC unaware of the fact that as a result of internal Palestinian politics, the Palestinian Authority (PA) had not had any governance role in Gaza since 2007? Were they unaware that when given the chance, the Palestinian people elected the genocidal terrorists from Hamas to head the PA?

When combined, the true meaning of the UNSC commitment to establish a Palestinian state that would be governed by the PA, is nothing more than a call to reward the genocidal terrorists from Hamas for raping, murdering, torturing and beheading 1,200 people and kidnapping over 250 others.

Resolution 2722,^[11] adopted on January 10, 2024, gave the UNSC another opportunity to address the attacks on Israel. Focusing on the activities of the Houti terrorists in Yemen, the resolution addressed at length the terror organization’s attacks on “merchant and commercial vessels transiting the Baab al-Mandab” and emphasized the resulting “increased cost of transportation of essential goods will have a negative impact on the economic and humanitarian situation worldwide.”

While commerce and freedom of navigation were clearly of great importance, the UNSC failed to make any mention of the Houti attacks on Israel.

UNSCR 2728^[12]

Adopted on March 25, 2024, resolution 2728 again directly addressed the war between Israel and the genocidal terrorists. Following in its already established tradition, the resolution ignored the October 7 massacre and the attacks on Israel by Hezbollah and the Houtis.

Instead of addressing the true aggressors, the resolution called on Israel to unconditionally surrender to the terrorists, by implementing “an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire.”

Knowing that their calls would fall on the deaf ears of the genocidal terrorists, the UNSC again tried to feign concern by demanding “the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address their medical and other humanitarian needs.”

On the morning of April 13, 2024, the homicidal Ayatollahs in Iran fired over 330 explosive projectiles – ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UAV’s – at Israel. Despite the blatant breach of international law, the UNSC again failed to pass any resolution condemning the Ayatollahs.

On June 10, 2024, the UNSC adopted two resolutions – UNSCR 2734 and UNSCR 2735. While both resolutions theoretically addressed the threats of terrorism and the international response required, they were divided by an abyss.

Resolution 2734,^[13] titled on the UNSC website^[14] as a resolution on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” spanned 30 pages and included over 100 paragraphs. The resolution opened by restating the fundamental truth that “terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever committed.” The resolution added “that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional, and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations.” The resolution continued by detailing a list of steps – including, inter alia, financial steps, trade embargoes, designation of terrorists, international cooperation etc. – that should be adopted and implemented on both the national and international level to deal effectively with the threat posed by terrorism.

While talking in universal terms about the global threat of terrorism, shamefully, the resolution focused solely on ISIL and Al-Qaida and made no reference whatsoever to any of the Palestinian terrorist organizations dedicated to murdering Jews and destroying Israel – Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and many others. The resolution similarly excluded any reference to Hezbollah or the Houtis.

UNSCR 2735^[15]

In contrast to the unwavering condemnation of terror contained in UNSCR 2734, UNSCR 2735 focused on the response to the genocidal terror of the Gazan terrorists. Instead of proscribing a detailed and agreed international framework for combatting the Gazan terrorists, all the resolution did was present a plan for the implementation of a ceasefire.

The plan itself was fundamentally flawed and reflected another major moral regression of the UNSC.

While the previous UNSC resolutions had at least paid mealy-mouthed lip-service to the unconditional release of all the hostages held by the genocidal terrorists, suddenly UNSCR 2735 merely included a call for the release of the hostages as part of Israels multi-stage surrender to the terrorists. According to the resolution, Israel was not only required to stop fighting the terrorists and withdraw from the Gaza Strip, but it would also be required to agree to the “the exchange of Palestinian prisoners” – a synonym for releasing thousands of convicted terrorist murderers – and to implement a “major multi-year reconstruction plan for Gaza.”

Having metaphorically, but practically presented Israel’s head on a platter to the genocidal terrorists, by including in the resolution Israel’s agreement to its terms, the UNSC then called “upon Hamas to also accept it.”

History shows that the genocidal terrorists rejected the UNSC resolution.

While the website of the UNSC gave resolution 2737,^[16] adopted on June 27, 2024, the title of “The situation in the Middle East,” it solely addressed the continued functioning of UNDOF, without mentioning any aspect of the attacks on Israel.

Similarly, while UNSCR 2739^[17] and UNSCR 2742^[18] focused on the terrorism of the Houtis and Yemen, they made no mention of the Houti terror directed against Israel and its civilians.

UNSCR 2749^[19]

Adopted on August 28, 2024, UNSCR 2749 addressed, for the first time, the war between Israel and Lebanon. Continuing its moral failing and inability to objectively recognize the terrorist actions of Hezbollah, as the cause for the war, the resolution ignored the fact that the terrorist organization had launched thousands of rockets, UAV’s and anti-tank missiles into Israel, indiscriminately targeting Israel’s civilian population.

Alongside its failure to recognize the terrorist aggression, the resolution similarly failed to recognize Israel’s right to self-defence. Instead, the resolution reaffirmed the UNSC “commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701.”

UNSCR 1701^[20] was adopted in 2006 following the Second Lebanon War. Similar to the current conflict, the Second Lebanon War started after Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israel from Gaza in June 2006, killed a number of Israeli soldiers and kidnapped another, taking him into Gaza. Two weeks later, as Israel was conducting a military operation in Gaza to secure the release of the soldier, Hezbollah decided to come to the assistance of its genocidal Gazan friends. On the instruction of the organizations Secretary-General, on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah terrorists infiltrated Israel, attacked an IDF patrol, and then proceeded to take hostage the bodies of two of the murdered soldiers.

Adopted on August 11, 2006, UNSCR 1701 called for the removal of the Hezbollah terrorists from southern Lebanon, the deployment of the Lebanese army in that area, and for measures to be adopted to prevent the Iranian terror regime from re-arming its terror proxy.

The only provision of the resolution that was ever implemented was the requirement that Israel withdraws all its forces from Lebanon. The rest of the resolution was never implemented. Hezbollah never retreated from southern Lebanon and despite receiving substantial US aid, the Lebanese army never deployed in the south. While Hezbollah finished the Second Lebanon War with between 13,000-15,000 rockets of limited range, by October 8, 2024, when Hezbollah again came to the assistance of Hamas, its arsenal had grown ten-fold to over 150,000 warheads. The new weaponry was also technologically developed and included not only short-range rockets, but also long-range GPS-guided precision missiles^[21] and an array of UAVs.^[22]

To complete the disgrace of the Security Council, UNSCR 2749 reiterated its “its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,” but made no similar recognition of Israel’s right to territorial integrity or sovereignty.

Understanding the complete impotence of the UNSC, on October 1, 2024, the Ayatollahs in Iran launched another massive attack on Israel, firing over 180 ballistic missiles.

Despite the blatant Iranian aggression, the UNSC again shamefully failed to adopt any resolution.

The October 7 Massacre

On the morning of October 7, 2023, more than 3,000 terrorists from Gaza, including members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, all internationally designated terror organizations, together with others, invaded Israel and conducted a heinous massacre. The terrorists flooded more than 30 Israeli towns, villages, kibbutzim, and a number of military installations.

Men, women, the elderly, sick people, children, and babies were murdered. Some were shot, others were raped.^[23] Some were beheaded, many were tortured, others were burned alive. Approximately 1,200 people were murdered. Among those murdered were 822 civilians,^[24] including 531 men and 291 women; 40 were children under the age of 18; 68 were foreign nationals; 18 Bedouin citizens of Israel were murdered, 11 of them on October 7 and seven more due to rocket strikes; 61 police officers were killed, of whom, 58 fell in combat during the October 7 massacre, including 15 who fell during the attack on the Nova Music Festival, during which 379 people were murdered; 10 personnel of the Israel Security Agency were murdered; and 5 firefighters were murdered.

All that remained of some victims were their teeth, requiring the assistance of archaeologists to identify them^[25]. An additional 6,900 people were wounded to different degrees.

Over two hundred and fifty hostages, most of them alive but also some dead bodies,^[26] were snatched by the terrorists to be used as leverage against Israel. While some of the hostages were released in a deal with the genocidal terrorists, and others were rescued in daring IDF operations,^[27] as of October 30, 2024, 101 hostages continue to be held by the genocidal terrorists in the Gaza Strip.

The October 7 attack was carried out under cover of a barrage of more than 3,000 rockets and mortars fired by the terrorists, indiscriminately targeting Israel’s civilian population.^[28]

The way forward

If the UNSC seeks to maintain even a modicum of respectability, let alone legitimacy, it must be willing to clearly identify and sanction the true aggressors. In stark contradiction of the dominant discussions in the UNSC, the source of violence and terror, and the sole culprit for undermining the security of the middle east is Iran, not Israel.

For over a year, Iran and its multiple terror proxies have been engaged in thousands of attacks on Israel and its citizens. From the October 7 massacre carried out by the Gazan terrorists, through the war on Israel launched by Hezbollah, the attacks of the Houtis and the direct ballistic missile attacks, Iran and its axis of evil, have been doing their utmost to attack Israel, murder Jews, and torpedo the expansion of Abraham Peace Accords.

Similar to the United Nations General Assembly, the UNSC has lost its moral compass. Instead of clearly identifying the Iranian aggressor and its terror proxies, the UNSC is kowtowing to the belligerency of the Ayatollahs.

The failure to adopt a clear resolution condemning the October 7 massacre, and to sanction Iran and its terror proxies will forever remain a stain on the UNSC.

If the UNSC does not change direction and show the moral clarity and leadership needed, it risks losing whatever minimal standing it still enjoys.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

^[1] Article 1, para. 1 of the UN Charter
^[2] See: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions
^[3] n2335249.pdf (un.org)
^[4] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/359/02/pdf/n2335902.pdf
^[5] https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/bb4ad946-3c2d-ef11-815f-005056aac6c3/2_bb4ad946-3c2d-ef11-815f-005056aac6c3_11_20597.pdf
^[6] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/269/50/pdf/n2326950.pdf
^[7] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/407/49/pdf/n2340749.pdf
^[8] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/415/70/pdf/n2341570.pdf
^[9] https://undof.unmissions.org/background
^[10] n2342487.pdf (un.org)
^[11] n2400928.pdf (un.org)
^[12] n2408081.pdf (un.org)
^[13] n2416483.pdf (un.org)
^[14] Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 2024 | Security Council
^[15] n2416511.pdf (un.org)
^[16] n2418731.pdf (un.org)
^[17] n2418724.pdf (un.org)
^[18] n2419892.pdf (un.org)
^[19] n2425089.pdf (un.org)
^[20] Etpu (un.org)
^[21] https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hezbollah-and-lebanon-an-in-depth-examination-under-hassan-nasrallah-s-leadership/hezbollah-s-precision-guided-missile-project/
^[22] https://israel-alma.org/2023/12/17/hezbollah-its-origin-growth-and-capability/
^[23] In the course of the massacre, the terrorists specifically used sexual violence against the victims – https://palwatch.org/page/35268; https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/report/mission-report-official-visit-of-the-office-of-the-srsg-svc-to-israel-and-the-occupied-west-bank-29-january-14-february-2024/20240304-Israel-oWB-CRSV-report.pdf
^[24] https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023
^[25] https://www.timesofisrael.com/archaeologists-sift-through-devastation-to-help-families-of-oct-7-victims-gain-closure/
^[26] The body of at least one victim was taken by an UNRWA employee – https://www.timesofisrael.com/mother-whose-sons-body-was-seized-by-unrwa-staff-calls-on-un-head-to-meet-in-geneva/
^[27] https://www.gov.il/en/pages/hostages-and-missing-persons-report
^[28] For more comprehensive details of the massacre, see (among others): https://govextra.gov.il/mda/october-7/october-7/what-happened-on-the-7th-of-october/; https://www.hamas-massacre.net/; https://oct7map.com/; https://www.october7.org/; https://t.me/hamasdid; https://www.memri.org/reports/special-announcement-%E2%80%93-hamas-atrocities-documentation-center-hadc; https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-civilian-casualties; https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hamas-israel-war-24/all-articles/what-happened-in-the-october-7th-massacre/

הפוסט The failure of the UN Security Council to respond to the ongoing attempt to destroy Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Not many people are as strongly connected to the northern region of Israel as Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi. Although she wasn’t born in the Galilee, she spent many years there during her military service, and today she lives in the Galilee with her family. Zehavi is the founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in the security challenges Israel faces on its northern border. “What happens in the North,” Zehavi says, “must be recognized as important by every Israeli citizen. The State of Israel must recognize that the North is a strategic asset that demands investment. The equation is simple: If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us.”

“The state didn’t take the North seriously”

Because Zehavi warned of the Hezbollah forces’ considerable preparations at the northern border long before the war, and because she is well experienced with the results of inattention to those warnings, the past year of warfare has got her goat. “The state didn’t take the North seriously,” she asserts. “The attribution scenarios relating to an attack from the North and a combined attack were well known, yet we did not prepare for them, neither offensively, nor defensively. If there had been any such preparations, maybe matters in the North would have developed differently and we wouldn’t have needed to evacuate 60 thousand people from their homes.”

Despite her anger and frustration, Zehavi acknowledges that the recent progress on the northern front, including the elimination of senior Hezbollah leaders and the significant damage to the organization’s infrastructures, certainly inspires some optimism in her. “The past weeks have given me hope that things will be changing and that we’ll be able to rebuild the North,” she notes. “You could say that we have the color back in our cheeks, after going through a whole year without seeing where this was headed.”

Research and fieldwork at the Alma Research and Education Center

Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi served for close to 15 years in the Intelligence Corps, and many of her positions were in the Northern Command. In 2018, four years after her discharge from the army, she founded the Alma Research and Education Center, which focuses on the security challenges facing the State of Israel at its northern border and how they affect Israel’s home front.

Zehavi grants that her Center didn’t anticipate the current war that broke out from the south, but she and her team of researchers did give plentiful warning that Hezbollah operatives, including the organization’s elite Radwan Force, were coming closer and closer to the fence and that they appeared to be actively preparing for an attack. At the same time, the Center’s researchers were also monitoring global trends, particularly on the Shiite axis; and there too, they saw a growing inclination to attack Israel. “Our main conclusion as a research institute was that the ability to observe at the juncture between tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence is an important ability — and without it, anyone would be hard put to warn of a coming war,” she relates. “Taking the tactical viewpoint, you look at what’s actually happening around the fence, like Hezbollah operatives gathering or patrolling. Taking the strategic viewpoint, you examine the moves that are under way on the Shiite axis, like Iran cultivating militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, or like the detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Only from the combination of both viewpoints, one up close and one at a distance, can you construct a complete intelligence picture and truly understand the scope of the danger we’re facing. Today we can see clearly how various processes that occurred in the Middle East converged eventually in the activities at the Israeli-Lebanese border.”

Since the outbreak of the war, the Alma Research and Education Center has been focusing mainly on creating a database that details all the attacks on the North. “We are monitoring every single incident and cross-checking data from different sources,” Zehavi relates. “Our objective is to understand the attributes of those attacks to assemble the clearest possible picture of the situation. The data we assembled enabled us, for example, to point out that since July the targeting of areas that had not been evacuated has expanded. Similarly, we can also point out increases and decreases in the use of means such as UAVs and anti-tank guided missiles.”

The progress is impressive, but the threat has not yet been removed

Many operations on the northern front during last September weakened Hezbollah significantly. Most of the organization’s senior leaders, foremost among them Hasan Nasrallah, were eliminated already in the initial stages. In parallel, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks not only hit thousands of operatives but also damaged the internal communications of the organization. Additionally, attacks by the Israel Air Force damaged many of the organization’s infrastructures. Although it is still early to talk about the dissolution of Hezbollah, the organization certainly is in a very different place today than only a few weeks ago.

According to Zehavi, the many blows being dealt to Hezbollah are necessary and welcome; but she does not delude herself into thinking that this will restore complete calm to the North. In fact, she expects new problems that may arise at this very moment, when Hezbollah is already not the same powerful, hierarchical organization that it was. “When we take action against an organization that isn’t really organized any longer, new challenges come up and they require different methods of operation,” she explains. “I expect that in the future we’ll see a lot of scattered operations by all kinds of offshoots and squads that are trying to take charge — and in such a situation, prior warning is harder to attain. Besides that, when it’s not clear who the commander is, pushing for negotiations and diplomatic arrangements is harder.”

Nonetheless, she emphasizes that the terrorist threat from squads and individual operatives is less severe than the strategic threat from a well-structured organization backed by a strong state such as Iran. “I’m not saying that the strategic threat that challenged us at the northern border has been completely removed,” she says, “but if we keep up what we’re doing — I believe that we’re approaching the point where that will happen.”

“Without security, we have nothing” — the North’s most urgent problems

Despite the impressive progress in dealing with Hezbollah, many problems on the northern front still require a response. In Zehavi’s opinion, the state and its society will need to mobilize for the rehabilitation of the North and the rebuilding of the communities there, but currently the most urgent of the problems on the table is the security problem because “without security, we have nothing.” Zehavi believes in confronting the remaining security threats on three levels: offensive, defensive, and the quest for a diplomatic arrangement.

On the offensive level, attacks should continue intensely over at least the short term. Afterward, there should be zero tolerance. Hezbollah and all its operatives should be made to understand that for every missile launched toward Israel, hundreds will be launched in return. On the defensive level, Israel should devise a dedicated defense plan for each community. In each community, a civilian emergency squad should be armed and trained. It should be able to rely on reservists who are on alert, without a full-scale mobilization that would require more budgeted personnel. In addition, all homes and institutions in the North must be properly secured, as there are still many private homes, schools, and kindergartens that do not have shelters.

Zehavi explains that progress must be made not only on the offensive and defensive levels but also on processes that will eventually lead to a diplomatic arrangement, since Israel has no interest in dealing with endless guerilla warfare. Zahavi emphasizes that such an arrangement is not intended to replace the military actions currently taking place and that it should occur only after we achieve a sufficient outcome against Hezbollah. A sufficient outcome, according to Zahavi, would be having clear evidence that a high percentage of Hezbollah’s rockets and launchers have been destroyed and that there are no operatives near the border. “Two messages for the decision-makers are important to me in this connection,” she adds. “The first is that we must be prepared for the attribution scenarios already the stage of the military’s force buildup, and the second is that the only way to deter our enemies is to take away as many of their capabilities as possible.”

“Returning civilians to their homes in the North is a national mission”

Beyond the security aspects, returning the residents of the North to their homes requires a comprehensive solution to problems and providing incentives for the residents. Even before the outbreak of the war, many northern communities were suffering from insufficient infrastructure, limited opportunities for work and recreation, and a shortage of basic public services – including health services. Since the war began, that situation has only worsened. Today there is also a need to repair many roads and buildings that were wrecked by missile fire and by various military operations.

According to Zehavi, the approach to that problem must involve first mapping out the various needs of all the communities. “Thought needs to be invested in each type of locality here — moshavim, kibbutzim, community settlements, and cities — because each type of locality has different requirements,” she says. “While the war damage is being repaired, projects need to be resumed that were under way before war broke out. There were lots of initiatives here for setting up centers of employment and frameworks for young people. Improving public services was also discussed a lot because, for example, a city like Kiryat Shmona can’t do without an emergency room.”

Zehavi notes that along with the work of repair and construction, there must be incentives encouraging residents to return to the North, and even attracting new residents to the area. Those incentives, she says, must take the form of financial grants, tax benefits, and preferential housing terms. She also indicates that where demography is concerned, preference should be given to young families with children because the children will be the foundation of the area’s future; and where occupations are concerned, preference should be given to the fields of agriculture and industry. “In recent years, the North has seen investment primarily in tourism, while fields that are no less important, like agriculture, have been badly ignored. It’s important to understand that besides being a profession, agriculture is a major instrument in carrying out the Zionist vision. Trumpeldor said that the plough’s furrow marks the boundaries of the state. It was true a hundred years ago and it’s just as true today.”

The end of the war? It’s not here yet, but it’s coming into sight.

In her professional capacity as a researcher, Sarit Zehavi had an eventful and fascinating year — but in her capacity as a Galilean, she primarily faced difficulties. “During the war’s first weeks, there was real fear that Hezbollah would invade in the way Hamas did. And the fear was backed up by proclamations from Hezbollah and statements by the Foreign Minister of Iran,” she recounts. “Later, a new kind of difficulty set in, and it’s still with us. The children haven’t been to school in a long time, we constantly hear alerts and explosions, and dozens of communities are still evacuated. The beautiful North that we had is burnt and unsafe. But the real difficulty, for sure, was that we could see no end to it all. Even before the strong attack in the northern front began, we were living for months with the feeling that something horrible was about to happen at any moment. And that feeling can drive you crazy.”

Despite all the difficulty, Zehavi stresses that she has never for a moment had second thoughts about living in the North. “We’ve been through a lot recently, but we never thought of leaving,” she says. “I’m happy that I put down stakes in the North. My children have the privilege of growing up in a mixed population, and they’re used to being around people with different lifestyles and different beliefs. This special Galilean atmosphere is something we won’t give up on.”

הפוסט “If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us”: A research-based and personal perspective on the reality of the northern border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Islamic terror attacks on the rise in turbulent Russia

Russia has been subject to increasing Islamic terror attacks in recent years. Two synagogues in Russia’s southern republic of Dagestan—one in the city of Derbent and one in the town of Makhachkala—were attacked in August this year.  Following these latest attacks, the Russian splinter branch of the Islamic State, ISIS-K, issued a statement cheering on the assault, saying the gunmen had responded to “the call.” “Our brothers from the Caucasus let us know that they are still strong,” ISIS-K said on social media. At the time, Russia was still reeling from its worst terror attack in decades. Over 130 people were killed this March after ISIS-K assailants stormed a concert venue complex in Moscow. These relentless attacks and threats by ISIS-K are seriously challenging President Putin’s self-declared reputation as a leader able to guarantee order across the vast, turbulent nation of Russia writes Jennifer Teale.

ISIS-K influence is spreading from Afghanistan into Russia

ISIS-K is presently implementing a regionalization and internationalization strategy that has increasingly focused on extending its reach into Central Asia and appealing to associated diaspora elements, especially in Russia. The movement’s Central Asian contingent has accounted for a notable share of ISIS-K-linked activity outside of Afghanistan, but still with a rising number of terrorist attacks involving Russian nationals, Chechens, and others from the Caucasus.

ISIS-K are critical of the Taliban’s relations with Moscow

In 2022, ISIS-K was already becoming more vocal in its online criticisms of the Taliban’s relations with Moscow for “befriending Russians, the murderers of Chechen Muslims.” It had also become increasingly overt online about its persistent intent to target Russia, urging supporters to continually “cast fear into the hearts of the sons of Putin and Russia, and to kill them with cars and knives.” With such calls to action, the ISIS-K media branch Al-Azaim was then preparing the information space for a suicide bombing against the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022, resulting in the deaths of two staffers.

Moscow remains cordial with the Taliban

In July, President Putin acknowledged that Afghanistan faces issues that require constant attention from Russia and the international community. President Putin now consistently refers to the Taliban governance of Afghanistan, as an “ally” in the fight against terrorism. “Generally, we have to proceed from the fact that the Taliban controls power in the country. In this sense, the Taliban are certainly our allies in the fight against terrorism, because any acting government is concerned with the stability of its administration and the state it governs,” he said. His cordiality prevails even though not one country has extended de jure diplomatic recognition to the new regime since it was taken over by force by the Taliban in 2021.

Russian global alliances cause concern

At the same time, Russia is building greater, more dubious alliances elsewhere. The BRINK quartet of countries of Belarus, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are becoming more strategically connected—a grouping geographically distant yet increasingly dangerous. Russia has the largest weapons of mass destruction arsenal in the world; North Korea continues to develop its nascent nuclear capabilities; Iran is at the nuclear threshold and Belarus hosts Russian nuclear weapons and delivery means.

Cooperation with violent regimes may be hindered by ideological and strategic differences

BRINK members are associated with ideologically close regimes to Russia including Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Eritrea, and the African Sahel. The group’s connections also include the post-Soviet para-state “black holes” of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria and the empowered violent non-state terrorist actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. While all BRINK states share the same strategic center of gravity, mutual misunderstandings between these states are still likely. What Moscow understands as sophisticated strategic signaling, Pyongyang may mistake for real commitment. Beijing maintains a delicate balance between North and South Korea.

To conclude

Moscow wants to enhance its political standing and influence as a superpower while minimizing potential risks to Russian domestic security coming from the region—especially, Islamist extremism and terrorism. Russia is attempting to advance its soft power diplomacy but with alliances such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea that exploit and destabilize Western cohesion.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Russia fends off domestic Islamic State attacks while expanding new dangerous alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Upon the collapse of the USSR, the USA remained as the sole and undisputed hegemonic power in the international arena. America’s dominance led many people of the West to adopt a worldview in which a substantial threat to their accustomed western way of life, culture, or freedom was unimaginable. Most of the West was a sleeping giant while existential threats took form.

Even when western leaders speak of the threats, most give no sign of having examined the dangers realistically and comprehensively. Their vision is narrow. They examine the situation as it stands, without seriously considering the efforts at undermining and weakening society from within; and they certainly are unready to consider far-reaching decisions that involve paying a price.

In contrast with the western slumber, the enemies of the West are working shrewdly according to a long-term plan designed to damage and eventually replace American hegemony and the liberal democratic culture that it oversees. Those enemies are working inside the world’s countries, including the western countries themselves, to take assets and power away and to weaken and undermine the regimes. Their efforts, despite an imbalance of capabilities that still appears significant on the surface, have succeeded more than once in disrupting the foundations of US power. Examination of the current situation suggests that the imbalance is not as large as many of us would like to think, and the threat is more powerful than ever. In fact, there are spheres in which the West no longer holds the initiative. For example, according to reports at the end of July, the cyber war between China and the USA has tipped in China’s favor.

It seems that in recent years not only are hostile nations challenging the American-led world order one by one but an anti-western bloc is consolidating, gathering strength, coordinating, and cooperating in its efforts. The anti-western bloc is led by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. In addition to those hostile states, the Muslim Brotherhood also deserves mention. Alongside the states whose leadership represents the Muslim Brotherhood — that is, Qatar and Turkey — the movement poses a much broader threat. In dozens of states around the world, both Arab and western, it is working quietly and methodically to expand its power and achieve its goal —building up the Islamic nation and making Islam the world’s dominant religion. The Brotherhood’s leaders at the global level guide and coordinate the activities of the various branches. Essentially, this is a broad-based global movement with long-term abilities of planning, integration, and performance; but the West has not yet had the presence of mind to treat it as an enemy. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, like that of the Islamic revolution in Iran, seeks not to live in peace as equals alongside the Western regimes but rather to replace them and rule in their stead.

The anti-western states and organizations are widely separated ideologically, they even compete with one another, and sometimes they carry long-standing mutual grudges. For example, Russia and China are disputing territory and resources, and between the Shiite Islam of the revolution and the Sunni Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood there are theological differences which they consider enormous and there are many centuries of extreme hostility. Those tensions are very comforting to many a western analyst who believes (or wishes to believe) that they will prevent the anti-westerners from cooperating as well as possible and dealing significant damage to the West in the long term. Possibly. But as I’ve found myself telling western leaders many times in recent years — hoping is not a policy. True leadership is not content merely to hope for the best. It prepares for the worst.

Moreover, reality has proven that despite their differences, the anti-western players are in ever-closer cooperation, in spheres that involve, among other things, the infliction of strategic damage — successfully — on the West. An excellent example is the establishment of SPFS, a Russian system that bypasses the SWIFT system used by America for transmitting financial instructions. The Russians began developing their system after the Americans threatened, as long ago as 2014, to use SWIFT for retaliation. Today many hundreds of financial institutions have joined the SPFS network. In my opinion, this episode should have sent wake-up tremors through the USA and the entire West, since it weakens the USA considerably in the international arena of finance, depriving the West of its monopoly and, together with that, of a palpable fraction of its influence.

Another instance that should have deeply rattled the West is China’s demand that Saudi Arabia accept payment for energy in Chinese currency (yuan). That demand was received in March 2022, around the time Russia detached itself from SWIFT. Previously the US dollar had held a near-monopoly over energy transactions, but its power is steadily weakening. Naturally the more transactions are performed in other currencies, the more the dollar’s clout is altered in the international marketplace — and together with the dollar’s clout, the clout of the USA. China, as the world’s largest oil importer, may significantly influence the balance with its purchasing power. In addition to buying oil from Saudi Arabia, China buys large quantities from Iran in violation of American sanctions.

Besides cooperating economically, creating detours around dependency on the USA, and making the USA weaker, the anti-western countries are also cooperating militarily. Such cooperation has increased significantly in the recent years following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Russians are purchasing enormous quantities of drones and missiles from the Iranians. The Iranians are requesting air defense technology from the Russians. North Korea is apparently contributing greatly to military efforts in both Russia and Iran, in projects involving missiles and, in the case of Iran, possibly nuclear weapons as well.

Still the West remains unaware that a new war is brewing between the two blocs. Its enemies are cooperating against it, while profiting from connections with it to the extent that it allows. The West, for its part, is bogged down at an earlier stage where, for the most part, it refrains from defining who the enemy is and certainly from undertaking firm countermeasures. The West is essentially allowing the countries of the world to play on both teams. A country will work with SWIFT on the one hand, for example, but also with Russia’s SPSF as convenient. It isn’t surprising that the West doesn’t demand that other countries choose a side, when the West’s indecisive behavior resembles their own.

Consider Iran for example. The West, including strategic allies of the USA such as the UK and France, continues trading with Iran on a large scale. The USA has not enforced sanctions against Iran in recent years, and it has even unfrozen large sums of money for Iran. Trade with China continues to be very significant for the entire western world, as does cooperation in other areas, perhaps the oddest of them being the renewal of funding for the laboratory in Wuhan that apparently spawned the Covid-19 epidemic. Countries such as Turkey and Qatar are not penalized for being run by Islamist ideologies or for supporting terrorist organizations.

In Israel, the war that broke out on October 7 has been widely termed a war by Iran and its proxies against Israel and its western allies, although all the western countries insist on trying to restrict the conflict terminologically to a local war between Israel and Hamas — even though American forces and assets are attacked frequently in Syria and Iraq, and though growing numbers of American soldiers have been hit. And even though maritime trade, the economy, and the world order under America’s aegis have been severely harmed by Houthi attacks, the West still refuses to call a spade a spade. The Americans are doing all they can to prevent the war from continuing and expanding. They are willing to pay any price, especially if Israel pays it. The current American government’s interest in stopping the war, and in continuing to belittle it by misdefinition, is clear; but it derives, once more, from a narrow perspective that considers nothing but short-term benefit. A strategic view of the threat would impel the USA to take more significant action for the world to see. The enemies of the West are watching developments and drawing important conclusions — for example, regarding how reliable a friend the USA is, especially as a supporter of Israel, which is considered one of its most significant allies. And can American assets and soldiers be targeted at no great cost? And how far can America be made to stretch its appeasement? There are further implications for the world order in the wake of this war; for example, China has been the big winner from the crisis that the Houthi attacks engendered in the Red Sea. Although the USA did form a coalition to attack the Houthis in Yemen, the Houthis continued nonetheless to enforce their de facto blockade in one of the world’s most important sea straits.

In conclusion, I must note that it would be wrong to call the USA blind to all those threats. There is a certain movement in a favorable direction. For some years already, there has been an attempt to investigate banning the sale of dual-purpose technologies to countries that are not close US allies. There is a deeper understanding of the competition from China, including the economic aspects and of course the threat against Taiwan. With regard to Russia, of course there has been very significant progress since the invasion of Ukraine. But the West is still hesitates to adopt difficult decisions and to pay a price in the short term. Its leaders aren’t telling their public about the scope of the threat — particularly the threat of an emerging anti-western bloc. And therefore, the public is unaware and almost no measures are being taken yet against subversion inside the western nations themselves. The West still largely prefers appeasement to confrontation and believes that appeasement can bring peace and coexistence. But the more strength its opponent gathers, the less easy — or even the less possible — withstanding that opponent will be.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Intensifying War Against The Sleeping West — The New Bipolar War הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

One year ago, on October 7, 2023, Hamas perpetrated the largest and most brutal massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, a premeditated and executed slaughter of men, women, children, the elderly, and even infants. Rapes, beheadings, mutilations, cold-blooded murders, and abductions. The scenes of such atrocities shocked even seasoned soldiers who rushed to assist the devastated population in southern Israel.

Despite this, many rejoiced and celebrated the massacre, deeming it “resistance” or justifying it as a defensive action. Mohammad Hannoun, for example, the leader of Italy’s Associazione Palestinesi (Palestinian Association), referred to the massacre in a statement made to Italian television, as “legitimate self-defense” during a Palestinian demonstration in central Milan held a mere three days after the attack.

Hannoun’s comment is just one of many expressions of hatred toward Israel that multiplied throughout the West immediately after the massacre and well before the IDF began its ground operations in Gaza. For those espousing these views, Israel should not have even reacted. Indeed, Israel should not even exist, as highlighted by one of the popular slogans at “pro-Palestinian” demonstrations: “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,” clearly calling for the destruction of the Jewish state.

The disingenuous pretense of anti-Zionism has now been thoroughly exposed. As the World Jewish Congress has shown, anti-Zionism is simply a form of antisemitism, denying the right of the Jewish people to self-determination in their ancestral homeland and disregarding the historical and archaeological evidence of the Jewish connection to the Land of Israel. For too many, anyone supporting Jewish self-determination and the existence of the State of Israel is automatically labeled a “Zionist,” and therefore an “enemy.” This paves the way for violent actions against Jews in both Israel and the diaspora.

This toxic blend of antisemitism and anti-Zionism has dominated pro-Palestinian demonstrations throughout the West, from Canada to Australia, from the United States to Europe. University campuses have become strongholds of anti-Israel hatred, in some instances escalating beyond chants and slogans to violence against Jews. At the University of Pittsburgh, two Jewish students were assaulted by pro-Palestinian thugs after the yarmulkes they were wearing identified them as Jews.

In Britain, just one month after the October 7 massacre, Edward Isaacs, the president of the Union of Jewish Students, reported an unprecedented spike in assaults on Jewish students. Britain’s Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 67 antisemitic incidents from October 7 to November 3, 2023, across 29 campuses, compared to 12 during the same period in 2022. According to the BBC, which is far from being pro-Israel, this represents a significant increase in antisemitic incidents.

The CST also recorded 5,583 antisemitic incidents from October 7, 2023, to September 30, 2024, representing a 204% increase from the 1,830 such incidents reported the previous year. These are the highest figures recorded since the center began operations in 1984.

Following a similar pattern, in France, the Ministry of the Interior and the Jewish Community Protection Service reported 1,676 antisemitic acts in 2023, compared to 436 the previous year.

An independent public body fighting discrimination in neighboring Belgium reported 91 antisemitic incidents between October 7 and December 7, 2023, compared to 57 for the entire year of 2022.

According to data collected by Italy’s Osservatorio sicurezza Contro gli Atti Discriminatori (Observatory for Security Against Discriminatory Acts), 406 cases of antisemitism were recorded from October 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024, a figure that later rose to 456 following new incidents.

These are just the official numbers, but we can safely assume that not all incidents of slander, spitting, intimidation, and insults are recorded or reported.

Across Europe, imams have glorified Hamas and spread antisemitic propaganda. Protesters have hoisted black flags and Hezbollah flags and called for the destruction of Israel. The double standard has sometimes risen to the absurd. For example, in London, pro-Israel demonstrators were confined to a small fenced-off area while, just ahead, a procession of Islamists, left-wing extremists, and Israel-haters marched freely. Why were only Israel’s supporters prohibited from demonstrating?

Similarly, a Met Police officer near a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London threatened Gideon Falter, an activist from the “Campaign Against Antisemitism,” with arrest simply for his “openly Jewish appearance”– Falter was wearing a yarmulke. At Heathrow Airport, customs officers harassed some passengers arriving from Israel on an El Al flight.

Returning to Italy, in Milan, on January 27, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Italian student Mihael Melnic displayed a sign from his apartment window reading “Free Gaza from Hamas.” At the same time, the street below had become the scene of yet another unauthorized pro-Palestinian demonstration. Melnic, subjected to insults and threats by protesters, later received an intimidating visit from two police officers. They entered his apartment, identified him, and unsuccessfully tried to confiscate his sign. Melnic later gave an interview to The Times of Israel recounting the incident.

In Padua, Israeli student Jasmine Kolodro was summoned to the police station for displaying an Israeli flag near a pro-Palestinian demonstration.

These are alarming episodes, especially considering Forza Italia Senator Maurizio Gasparri’s assertion on October 1, 2024, that antisemitism is present in both journalism and security apparatuses.

The situation for Jews in Spain has also worsened. The Spanish Jewish community has expressed deep concern, and Jewish university students are afraid to attend classes.

In reality, the spread of antisemitism since October 7, 2023, is merely the evolution of a pre-existing “sick seed” that had already taken root throughout the West, just awaiting a trigger to erupt in full force.

The attacks on Jewish museums and schools in Belgium and France a decade ago during the so-called ISIS phase were a clear signal of what was to come. As was the 2014 assault on a Paris synagogue, which was met by the triumphant remark “the party’s over,” from no less than Davide Piccardo, coordinator of Coordinamento delle Associazioni Islamiche di Milano (Coordination of Islamic Associations of Milan) – a convert to Islam, and now the editorial director of the Islamist Italian-language website La Luce News.

It is notable that in France, the imams Mohamed Tataiat, Hassan Iquioussen, and Mahjoub Mahjoubi, after repeatedly coming under fire for spreading virulent antisemitic rhetoric, were eventually expelled earlier this year.

In Italy, too, the antisemitic atmosphere is quite dire. According to the Osservatorio Antisemitismo (Observatory on Antisemitism), Prime Minister Meloni’s government’s “let them vent” approach has led to blacklists, calls to mark the homes of “Jews and Zionists,” parades with signs portraying “Zionist agents,” defacing of Jewish elementary schools, pro-Hamas and antisemitic sermons in mosques, and the publication of antisemitic caricatures .

To make matters worse, the Shia Islamic center “Imam Mahdi” in Rome announced a commemoration for Hassan Nasrallah on October 3. The threat of antisemitism is becoming ever more serious, and a further escalation is likely unless the authorities intervene, even if belatedly.

As long as the distinction continues to be made between “antisemitism” and “anti-Zionism,” instead of the latter being recognized as an expression of the former, the antisemitism unleashed after the October 7 massacre cannot be addressed with the necessary intellectual clarity.

It is also important to remember that the Iranian regime oppresses and persecutes not only its own population but also the Lebanese, using Hezbollah—an organization that, until recently, had a more powerful army than that of Lebanon itself. All of this is met by international silence, with voices raised only when Israel defends itself. This, too, can be understood as antisemitism.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Antisemitism Proliferates After the October 7 Massacre הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Anyone looking for an indication of Israel’s success against Hezbollah, need not check the number of missiles the IDF destroyed, or the number of those killed. It is enough to look at a report that came out today (Wednesday) from Reuters, stating that Hezbollah is asking for a ceasefire now, regardless of the cessation of the fighting against Hamas.

Hezbollah’s announcement stands in stark contrast to the policy it has declared since October 8, and comes only against the backdrop of the organization’s military defeat.

Beyond the fact that Iran’s ring of fire around Israel was breached, Israel’s successes vis-à-vis Hezbollah have dramatic implications on several levels. First, they constitute a tremendous opportunity for the Lebanese state to create stability, after Hezbollah’s prolonged and longstanding occupation of the Lebanese people and all its sources of livelihood and subsistence. Second, they provide a stabilizing factor in regimes such as Jordan and Egypt. Third, they “maintain the path of peace” for “threshold countries” with a tendency toward the axis of evil, such as Turkey.

But beyond the shift in the regional power structure, the most important implications concern the evil regime of the Ayatollahs and the Iran-Russia-China axis. Israel’s success, thank God, creates new opportunities that until a few weeks ago were completely unthinkable.

An opportunity has arisen that no one had realistically considered before the war, to cut off the head of the octopus, to liberate the Iranian people from the murderous regime of the Ayatollahs, and to destroy the evil nuclear enterprise that it is working on. This is an opportunity that is not only rare, but likely also the last before Iran breaks through with a nuclear bomb.

That is why in recent days there have been many voices in Israel encouraging, in fact demanding, that the government attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

This call is correct and justified, but it is not accurate. This is because all the speakers directed their remarks to the Israeli government, while they should be directing their words and pressure to the American administration and the European community.

An Iranian bomb would cast a dark and threatening shadow over the world, cause instability, strengthen the Russia-China-Iran axis, and cause World War III in which the United States itself would be attacked. This is without mentioning the misery of the Iranian people and the peoples of the Middle East, who are already suffering from the regime of the Ayatollahs.

Therefore, to use the successful images from the prime minister’s recent speeches at the UN, the Americans must head the coalition of the “blessing”, and destroy the “curse” that the Iranians are trying to bring to the Middle East and the entire world.

The results of a successful attack will lead to the overthrow of the Ayatollahs’ regime and the establishment of a benevolent regime in Iran, to calm in the Middle East, and the breaking of the Russia-Iran-China axis of evil, which will help Ukraine and European countries. Such an attack would bring calm and stability, and prevent an all-out global war.

The credit that Israel provided for the free world with the blood of its sons must be redeemed and realized now!

Contrary to the prevailing assessment that the United States will not embark on an adventurous move before elections, I would argue that in the present case, due to the special circumstances and the tremendous opportunity that has been created, the upcoming elections actually constitute an incentive for an attack.

The incentive could come from President Biden, who will want to make his mark in world history before he retires. This is also a golden opportunity for him to contrast himself with Obama, who leads a Chamberlain policy vis-à-vis the Ayatollahs. Iran is Obama’s baby. The elimination of the Ayatollahs’ regime could be Biden’s last word in the fight for his impeachment, which he says was waged by Obama.

The incentive could also come from Vice President Harris, who will see an opportunity in a successful strike that will free the free world from Iran’s shadow and contribute to geopolitical stability in the world, to reach elections on the waves of glory and secure the next four years in the White House.

Former President Trump is likely to welcome the move, as he led a hawkish line against Iran and carried out the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. He would certainly be happy to resolve these difficulties before taking office, if elected.

Whether Biden, Harris or the convergence of interests of both, the coming days and articulate Israeli spokesmen should be used to mobilize the Americans to head the coalition of blessed countries and free the world from the curse of the Ayatollahs.

The bottom line is that even if the United States of America does not assume its historic role, Israel has the obligation, and the right, to destroy the Iranian nuclear project. This last opportunity must be exercised!

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Coalition of “Blessing” Must Destroy the Iranian Nuclear Project הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A year and a half before October 7, officers of the IDSF movement sat in the living room of Amir Avivi, the movement’s founder and CEO. They understood that something was afoot and that they must warn the security services about what was liable to happen. At the meeting, they discussed a “strategic, tectonic, global, and regional change” that we were experiencing and that would lead, in their view, to immense escalation. “When we connected the dots, we understood that we were heading for war,” Avivi recalls.

At the same meeting, they decided to write a situational assessment. The IDSF movement delivered a 300-page document to Naftali Bennett and Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time were prime minister and opposition leader respectively, and to the head of the Mossad, the National Security Council, and others.

As early as May 2022, Avivi visited the Knesset with the report, which he’d prepared together with some leaders of the security services, and he warned that “today we’re in a situation where processes that have been under way for many years are reaching their culmination.” He expanded on the existential threats against the State of Israel. “There is an Iranian deployment that, in practice, embraces both the drive for nuclearization and the rockets, missiles, and drones. There is a force that will guide Iran toward the understanding that on the one hand they can attack, and on the other hand we’ll be forced to if they don’t.”

Today, a year after the Sabbath that saw the murder of more than 1,200 people, Avivi isn’t brandishing the report and its prophetic conclusions. Instead he is thinking of what comes next. He speaks of the hostages’ return as a matter of central importance, of the need for broad democratic consensus regarding the State’s deep-level processes, and of what the future may hold — a campaign for regional peace agreements.

“There was a belief in holding out a little longer”

On the anniversary of the events that opened the war, Avivi visited the Ynet studio for a special interview with Sharon Kidon. “Israel has been avoiding war, as part of a strategic choice that resembles what the USA chose in the face of the USSR — to wait for everything to settle down on its own,” Avivi said, explaining why Israel hadn’t taken action that would have prevented the massacre. “The Arab Spring gave the security services and the Israeli government a lot of confidence that the strategy was working. That while we were avoiding war, the other Mideastern states were reducing themselves to fragments. Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Syria. There was a belief that if we held out a little longer and then a little longer, eventually Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranians would all collapse. It was just a matter of holding out a bit.”

The IDSF warned of a severe attack impending, but without knowing what the timing would be. “I said, ‘When you see a swarm of rockets flying, you can be sure that’s the beginning of the war,’” Avivi relates. “We’ve learned that when you have a terrorist army at your fence, even the security services won’t necessarily be aware of the timing. For that reason, terrorist armies shouldn’t be at the fence.”

You’ve mentioned victory more than once. What’s your vision of victory?

“The developments we’re currently experiencing will force us to adjust our war objectives. We started out on October 7, a year ago, entering a war really against our will, and we set three objectives: eliminating Hamas as a governmental and military organization, returning all our hostages, and creating conditions in Gaza that will prevent a terrorist army from ever reappearing. We’ve more or less dismantled Hamas as a military organization, but not as a government. This is where the pronouncements of the security services and the prime minister come in, and they’re now getting into the humanitarian issue. We need to finish the work. We need to return our hostages.”

Can you define what victory looks like in this connection?

“Victory doesn’t mean that there’s not a single terrorist in Gaza,” he clarifies. “So what does it mean? That all the hostages are back. That Hamas has lost its hold on Gaza both militarily and governmentally. That everyone with a home in northern Israel is back, is safe, and can live confidently with no threat from Hezbollah. The State of Israel understands that it must add the Iranian nuclear program to its war objectives. Victory will mean that the existential danger from the Iranian nuclear umbrella has been dealt with. I hope that the Americans will open their eyes and understand that we need to handle that one together.”

“No need for uniformity — just unity”

On the issue of internal polarization in Israel, Avivi contends that what’s needed is not uniformity but unity. Differences in outlook should be put aside for the sake of joint decision-making that will make development and growth possible. “We don’t need to be uniform,” he explains. “We have lots of opinions, but we need to converge on the ethos on which the nation was founded. Let’s remember what we are here for, what the Land of Israel means to us, who and what we are as a people — and let’s hold a tolerant discussion. We don’t need to reach agreement on everything. Where we don’t, our democracy decides. But we need to agree on broad issues. Our culture needs a lot of work. A firm majority of Israeli society is tired of the squabbles and wants a safe, thriving, meaningful future.”

Avivi’s expectations for the future are optimistic, including regional peace agreements. “We all feel that within this war, there was a revolution,” he emphasizes. “We’ve all seen now what we’re capable of doing when we’re together in battle. I think that this year will be the decisive one, with us defeating our enemies. From there, we must proceed to peace agreements, a thriving economy, mass immigration, and a discourse among ourselves that makes for togetherness and unity in the spirit of our ethos. We have a tendency to embrace extremes, but we need to converge in the center. I’m optimistic. I think our society’s has wonderful days ahead.”

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט From the unheeded warning to the vision of peace: “This will be the decisive year” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel’s military operations in Lebanon have crippled Hezbollah, decimating not only its missile arsenal but also its command-and-control chain, to the point that only two senior commanders, Ali Karaki and Abu Ali Rida, are reportedly still alive. Initially, it was even believed that Karaki had died in an Israeli airstrike. The secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, remains hidden in his bunker.[1]

Additionally, the use of explosive beepers to target Hezbollah terrorists, a tactic never before used by any fighting force – and one that will go down in history—has sparked both amazement and harsh criticism.

As usual, Israel has once again faced accusations from multiple sources, the narrative always the same: the IDF attacks are not surgical and cause civilian casualties; Israel’s operations cannot be defined as counter-terrorism but rather as aggression against Lebanon; Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack; and finally, Israel is bombing Lebanese civilian homes.

It is vital to refute these biased and completely baseless accusations once and for all.

First, the surgical nature of the attacks and civilian casualties must be addressed. On January 2, 2024, the IDF missile that eliminated Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut directly hit the floor of the building where he was hiding, achieving the objective without causing the building’s collapse. The same tactic was used to eliminate Ibrahim Muhammad Qubeisi in Beirut’s densely populated Dahiyeh neighborhood on September 25, 2024.

The missile that successfully targeted Ibrahim Akil on September 20, 2024 hit the basement, causing the unintentional collapse of the adjacent building’s foundations. In contrast, in the attempted killing of Ali Karaki that same day, the wrong floor was hit, enabling the Hezbollah commander to survive the attack.

Can such attacks be considered non-surgical? Have other armed forces done better in other conflicts? The intelligence gathering behind Israel’s strikes, the work of years, is highly valuable. Similarly, missiles are very costly. It is not in Israel’s interest to waste them.

Taking the Lebanese population into consideration, the IDF repeatedly sends messages to civilians using SMS, audio messages, and radio broadcasts, warning them to stay away from civilian buildings where Hezbollah hides its forces and arsenals and fires at Israel. This same strategy has also been used in Gaza.

With regard to the detonation of Hezbollah terrorists’ beepers and walkie-talkies, it is a complete distortion of logic to argue that it is not surgical. It is clear that because terrorists hide among civilians, there is always a risk of civilian injury. However, this danger is caused by Hezbollah, not Israel. Moreover, eliminating terrorists saves lives, both Israeli and Lebanese.

Another accusation against Israel is that under the guise of counter-terrorism, it has attacked the sovereign state of Lebanon. This, too, is an incorrect oversimplification that reveals a misunderstanding of the current situation. Hezbollah is a fully-fledged military organization, dedicated to terrorism, which has taken control of Lebanon. It commands a true army, one more powerful than Lebanon’s, that answers to Hezbollah’s political arm. This army also serves as an Iranian proxy and a tool for regional destabilization.

The reality is that a full-scale war is taking place between the Israeli army and a military organization occupying Lebanese territory with the aim of attacking Israel.

Addressing the issue of civilian homes hit by the IDF in southern Lebanon, once again, the responsibility falls on Hezbollah. As noted above, Hezbollah uses civilian homes to hide missiles and other weapons and to launch attacks against Israel. This is a well-known tactic, used also by Hamas in Gaza. The image of a cruise missile positioned inside a civilian home, ready to be launched from a window, has made headlines worldwide, exposing Hezbollah’s true terrorist nature.

It is also important to mention that Hezbollah has been targeting populated areas in northern Israel for months. More than 60,000 Israeli citizens are currently displaced and waiting to return to their homes and businesses which they were forced to leave a year ago. The situation has become intolerable, and Israel has the right and duty to ensure safety and normalcy for its citizens. This can happen only through strong action against the threat, which is Hezbollah.

Finally, some have even claimed that Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack, despite boasting military and operational capabilities superior to those of Hamas. Such a statement is inherently contradictory, as greater capabilities and resources allow for more tactical choices.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog revealed that Hezbollah commanders (eliminated in an airstrike) had gathered in Beirut precisely to plan an October 7-style attack in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon. The U.S. site Al-Monitor also cited a source close to Hezbollah, who confirmed that this meeting was organized to plan a large-scale invasion of northern Galilee.

This, then, is the reality of the situation on the ground, free from biased theories that ignore concrete facts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

[1] This article was written just days before Karaki and Nasrallah were killed in an Israeli airstrike.

הפוסט Reflections on Israel’s “Surgical” Operations against Hezbollah: No Tactical-Strategic Merit to Criticisms הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This week has been rife with reports that Israel is leaning toward a military campaign in the north. A moment before the planes scramble, it may be worth rethinking the plans.

On October 8, Hezbollah opened war against Israel. While Hezbollah has primarily mounted attacks, and done so over a constantly expanding area, Israel has primarily mounted defense, using preventive operations, targeted killings, and destruction of launchers.

Israel is displaying weakness despite its actual strength. But at the same time, the more Israel refrains from displaying strength, the weaker it becomes. So why not go toe to toe at last and pay Hezbollah back in its own coin?

In a “Hezbollah First” scenario, as I’ll call it, Israel presses forward in the fight against Hezbollah, suffers weeks (or more) of accurate attacks on strategic assets, on civilians, and on fighters, and draws criticism from abroad that might be expressed in an arms embargo or in arrest warrants from the Hague against the country’s leaders. At this point, the Iranians may blithely assemble their nuke.

The Iranian leaders are rational players who want to reach their goal as efficiently as possible. If they consider the nuke an appropriate tool, they’ll use it. But even more ominously — they won’t have to.

An Iranian nuke will mean Israel’s hands are tied. Israel will have no role in the next round of play. Iran’s standing will benefit, and so will its military and its economy. Iran will quickly restore the military clout of its proxies but leave spots of ruin, and civilians with their diseases, as a powerful resource for propaganda and international funding.

What’s more, in order to halt the suffering of civilians “on both sides,” the US will revive a policy that it’s already tried to push through: It will declare a Palestinian state.

The result may well be a weakened Israel, completely dependent on the Americans — an Israel with a stumbling economy and a shattered society. The wolves lurking all around will find their hunger hard to control.

In an “Iran First” scenario, on the other hand, an Israeli attack could bring down the Iranian regime and put paid to the Iranian nuke. Israel would have enough strength left for dealing with the Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Gaza, which would be weakened by the bashing of the head of the snake. And after that, it would be time for rebuilding and growth.

There are those who believe that an attack against Iran must concentrate on its nuclear facilities. Prof. Benny Morris, the historian, published an article in the Haaretz newspaper headlined “To Survive, Israel Must Strike Iran Now: If Israel proves incapable of destroying the Iranian nuclear project using conventional weaponry, then it may not have any option but to resort to its nonconventional capabilities.”

Morris, who in the past was considered too far left to be employable in Israel and considered emigrating, has come to the conclusion that Iran does seriously intend to destroy Israel, that the day of judgment has come, and that the appropriate weapon should be deployed to the extent that it’s available.

I don’t know whether Morris has made a perfect prediction. But I’d like to put forward the proposition here that we don’t need to attack the Iranian nuclear sites in specific, although that might be the best course. Conventional weapons can be enough to destroy the Iranian nuclear capability.

Iran is suffering from a number of problems. Among its many ethnic and national minorities, the regime’s legitimacy is broadly rejected. The country’s air defenses are weak, its borders are long and undefended, and its military capabilities are not very strong. In order to sow destruction and shock in Tehran, no doomsday weapon is necessary.

One example showing the fragility of the Iranian regime is the episode of the “War of the Cities” during the Iran–Iraq war.

After eight years of bloodletting between Iran and Iraq, the war turned a corner at the end of February 1988. Military operations by Iraq brought a change. First Iraq attacked the refineries in Tehran and forced Iran to return to rationing fuel.

Next, after Tehran began the War of the Cities, Iraq launched a pre-planned attack by bombarding Tehran every day with long-range missiles. Although damage from the attacks was limited, for more than two months they combined with additional psychological factors to severely damage Iranian morale and they spurred millions of civilians to leave. What Iraq hadn’t accomplished in eight years, it managed to do in a couple of months.

Granted, today’s circumstances are different, historically and militarily. But the War of the Cities does carry a lesson, and an inspiration.

Would such an attack cost Israel very heavily? Apparently yes. Can Israel resort to some other strategic option that doesn’t depend on the hope for a deus ex machina? Not confidently.

Wise recruitment work can build an international coalition to lead the attack, to destabilize the Iranian regime from outside, to challenge it from inside, and to bring it down. Then a new regime can be helped to establish itself, to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure, and to rehabilitate Iran.

Israel needs to go to work assembling a Middle Eastern coalition that can in turn enlist the Europeans, the Americans, and the international public. They all need to understand that if the Iranians entrench their control of the Middle East, they will proceed to attack Europe and then, with the assets they have acquired there, they’ll attack the US. The US will be standing alone then, with no allies, when Iran, Russia, and China come to divide it up.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran First, and the Sooner the Better! הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Russia is avoiding direct military engagement in the Middle East

Russia has been walking a fine line between undermining U.S. strength in the Middle East and sidestepping commitment in the region – in a bid to avoid wider conflagration in the region. Moscow has shown little interest in U.S. diplomacy to achieve calm and stability, but it also does not want a regional conflagration writes Jennifer Teale. Such an escalation may well also complicate Russia’s relationships with Iran and the Gulf Arab states. It is much easier for Russia to maintain Gulf state relationships when the region is harmonious and conflict-free, rather than engaging in a perilous zero-sum game. Ultimately, Russia is more likely to support Iran or Hezbollah through electronic warfare or by funneling weapons to its partners that are not needed for the Ukraine campaign that to actually engage militarily in the Middle East directly, therefore.

Mounting Iran-Israel tensions could divert attention from Ukraine-Russia war

Mounting tensions between Iran and Israel could have advantages for Moscow, however. For one, such further escalation would almost certainly further divert Washington’s attention and supplies from Ukraine, where Russia is currently on the offensive.

Wider war in the Middle East would complicate Russia’s Gulf relations

Nonetheless, a wider war in the region would also most certainly carry major risks for Moscow. If Israel began to fight Hezbollah or Iran, the Kremlin would have to contend with three dangerous outcomes: the entanglement of its ally Syria, a weakening of Iran’s capacity to supply Russia with weapons, and a complication of its relations with the Gulf Arab states and Iran. Depending on what Israel—or the United States, should it opt to join in—decided to attack in an escalated situation, Iran’s defense industry could also come under serious strain.

Iran-Russia military co-operation hampered by Ukraine

Indeed, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow and Tehran have considerably expanded their military-technical cooperation, with Russia receiving various types of Iranian combat drones, artillery shells, small arms ammunition and glide bombs. For the moment however, the size of these deliveries from Iran is limited by the conflict situation in Ukraine.

Hamas assassination makes Russia wary of greater involvement

The July assassination of Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran has however left Iran in a precarious position regionally. On the one hand, it needs to respond to maintain its credibility both at home and among its regional allies. On the other, any significant retaliation risks escalating into a war with Israel. As after Israel’s relations with Russia became even more strained. Because of this, Russians now have smaller-scale diplomatic goals, for example, engaging with Hamas to get Russian hostages out from their territory.

In August, following the assassination, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited Iran and the US increased its military presence there. Shoigu’s trip aimed to strengthen interactions and examine regional and international issues and bilateral political security relations. Despite Russia’s broad military cooperation with Iran, it will still likely not fuel the flames of conflict in the Middle East, but instead still aims to deter escalation and prevent damage. Neither Washington nor Moscow wants an escalation in the Middle East, as they have priorities on the Ukraine crisis in Europe with little resources to spare.

To conclude

Russia’s engagement in the current conflict is about more than just Gaza. It is about really cementing themselves within the Arab world. More broadly, a distracted and destabilized Middle East serves Russia’s broader geopolitical goals by diverting Western attention and resources away from Eastern Europe where Russia is more directly engaged. Moscow has shown little interest in Western diplomacy to achieve calm and stability, but it also does not want a regional conflagration in the Middle East which could further complicate its relations.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Russia protecting its interests in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the days of gloom that followed October 7, 2023, it was unclear exactly how we would manage to win the war. Now, with Hamas already shattered as a military organization and with Hezbollah being heavily hit, not only can an Israeli victory be glimpsed on the horizon but a time of thriving, initiated upon the Day After, can be dreamt of.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

Most decisions were right: The war in retrospect

The October 7 disaster wrought great confusion and uncertainty, but one thing was certain from the start: This war will take time. There were two main reasons — first, that the Gaza Strip was full of tunnels and that the Hamas infrastructure there would require a complex, systematic effort of dismantling; and second, that among the ground forces the level of strength and armament was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. In recent decades, the IDF had closed down a number of reserve battalions and the army had a relatively small stock of weaponry at hand. Israel had to resolve itself to mount a counterattack in Gaza while mounting nothing more than a defense on the other fronts. Because of that gradation of fighting, it was only after 11 months that the State of Israel shifted the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

From examination of the circumstances in which we entered the war, it appears that the fighting was handled successfully for the most part and that most of the decisions were correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to act differently.

First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. The military dismissed large numbers of reservists relatively early, and it may be that if it had not done so, we would have been able to pressure Hamas more strongly and shorten the fighting in Gaza.

Second, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Hamas long enjoyed an oxygen supply in the form of control over the Corridor, which enabled it to fortify itself through the Sinai. If we had cut off that oxygen supply in the first days of the war, the entire course of fighting would have looked different.

The third point, which to this day has not been properly addressed, is the control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives and thus it enables Hamas both to strengthen itself and to preserve its standing as the authority governing the Gazan populace.

Shock and awe: The current state of the war

The southern front

At the start of the war, the Southern Command estimated that it would need a year to dismantle Hamas as a military organization. Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity, as shown by its markedly reduced ability to launch rockets into Israeli territory.

The nature of the fighting in Gaza today differs from what we saw at the war’s beginning. In the first months, the IDF was obliged to operate at great intensity, with a large deployment and with coordinated attacks. In addition, it needed to operate systematically — that is to say, street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood — in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy the infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks together with air force personnel. At the same time we see systematic elimination of senior Hamas officials. Most senior officials of the organization, including Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif, have already been eliminated. The loss of senior officials weakens the organization not only militarily but in terms of governance as well, and it is an important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. We see a method of operation in the north that is reminiscent of the military doctrine developed by the USA in the late 1990s, known as “Shock and Awe.” The idea behind the doctrine is to frighten and weaken the enemy until it loses the will to fight. In that spirit, almost all the senior officials of Hezbollah, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, were already eliminated early in the fighting.

Furthermore, the IDF is undermining Hezbollah with a series of unusual operations. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. Over and above the physical harm to the terrorists, the operation also spread powerful intimidation and proved how penetrable the organization was. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force, which battered the Hezbollah infrastructures and deprived the organization of some significant capabilities.

Israel hoped that such a sequence of operations would compel Hezbollah to retreat completely from southern Lebanon and to stop firing at Israel — thus enabling the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Still, Israel took into account that Hezbollah might continue fighting nonetheless, in which case a ground operation in Lebanon would be necessary.

That operation, if it goes forward, will differ from the operation that we saw in Gaza. On the one hand, southern Lebanon is significantly less densely populated than Gaza and most of its residents have already fled, so that there will be less friction with the locals. On the other hand, southern Lebanon’s landscape is liable to present a greater challenge, with its many hills and abundant foliage. It must be stressed that Hezbollah, like Hamas, has upgraded its subterranean capabilities; and we know that many of the organization’s strategic assets — including arms factories and bases — are underground. Thus southern Lebanon too portends difficult fighting, at least some of it in tunnels.

You can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon: Important conclusions from the war’s first year

On October 7 last year, we suffered a catastrophe. But that catastrophe awakened Israel from a long sleep and made Israel aware of what sizeable threats it faces. With time, that awareness has eroded among some of the leadership and public; and today there are those who call upon us to return to a policy of keeping our eyes closed.

In order that Israel remain secure over the coming generations, the State of Israel — leaders and society alike — must take action at a number of levels:

• Strictly preserving external security: First of all, we must confront the immediate threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But there’s more to the story. We must revise our outdated national security doctrine and understand that “deterring, alerting, and defeating” does not sum up the essentials. Israel’s security doctrine must include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders, and of nipping any terrorist force in the bud. It is unthinkable that we tolerate a situation where 50 thousand armed terrorists are located 100 meters from our border fence. That is a tsunami, and you can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon. Or a tablespoon.
• Strengthening governability and internal security: In the shadow of the external threats, we must not forget that the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has dogged us for 100 years now, is still alive domestically. The State of Israel must deal with the matter of governance within the country and ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel may feel safe in their country.
• Battling delegitimization and anti-Semitism: For years we have been confronted with inciteful attempts to delegitimize Israel and stir up anti-Semitism all over the world, and since the outbreak of war the campaign has only intensified. The State of Israel must subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague, encouraging demonstrations, and bringing anti-Semitism into the streets and universities — forces led by the Palestinian Authority. To our regret, the State of Israel has not yet formulated a strategy for concrete action in the face of this severe problem.
• Instilling a common national ethos: We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. Solidarity is not a luxury but a requirement for ensuring our security and survival, because without a set of values and an ethos, no tanks or airplanes will avail.
• Establishing an enlisted society— In the State of Israel, not serving is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate. At the same time, it must be stressed that this does not mean turning into Sparta. Israel is not a nation that glorifies power and violence. On the contrary, this nation lionizes culture and innovation. The balance is an important one, which we must all practice as individuals and as a society.

As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the pathway is a long one. Today, after the many drubbings we’ve delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts.

We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Our view is that the more greatly Israel triumphs in the war, the more greatly it will thrive after the war. When the states of the world, including our enemies’ states, see our strength displayed, they will be spurred to sign peace agreements and establish strong coalitions with us. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon. There will be mass immigration to Israel and we will also see the birthrate surge as it generally does after wartime.

In order to reach those optimal days, we must maintain patience, determination, and solidarity, and not ease off the gas pedal until we have passed successfully through all the challenges that lie before us.

הפוסט The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges: Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges

One year after October 7, a clear direction is emerging. The journey’s end is not yet here however, and the decisions we adopt now will influence Israel’s security for years to come. Despite the optimism that is developing, we must not forget that important battles and dangers still await us. At the start of the war, it was apparent that the ground forces the level of strength was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. It was only after 11 months of war that the State of Israel was able to shift the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Most decisions were right

Nevertheless, the fighting has been handled successfully overall and most decisions have been correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to have acted differently. First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. Secondly, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Thirdly, Israel has still not taken proper control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives.

The Current State of War

The southern front

Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity. At the beginning of the war, fighting needed to be systematic, moving street by street in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy their infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks. These attacks include those on its leadership which important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force.

Important conclusions from the first year

The catastrophe of October 7 last year awakened Israel from a long sleep and made it aware of the sizeable threats it faces. In order for Israel to remain secure over coming generations, it must take action at a number of levels. Firstly, we must revise our outdated national security doctrine to include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders. The State must also deal with the matter of governance within the country to ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel feel safe.

The State of Israel must also subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague. We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. To that end, not serving in the military is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate.

To conclude-  As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the way ahead is still long. Today, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts. We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

China’s underhand aims with Middle Eastern diplomacy

Viewed from the West, it is easy to ascribe Chinese enthusiasm for the so-called “Beijing Declaration” between Hamas and Fatah as simple naiveté. Yet it would be a mistake to view Palestinian reconciliation as Beijing’s true aim writes Jennifer Teale. There are clear motivations for Beijing’s sudden emphasis on the war in Gaza and on Palestinian politics. For one, China has long sought to position itself as the champion and leader of the so-called “Global South.”

How China’s security approach differs from the West

Key to understanding China’s true objectives in the Middle East is an appreciation of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s concept of security. In Western strategic discourse, security is broadly defined as the absence of conflict. Beijing’s view of security however more closely aligns with international relations securitization theory more popular in the Global South where any issue from migration to environmental issues are cast as existential threats to justify the extraordinary measures made to address them.

Beijing’s mediation with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations

Since 2013, China has assumed this approach in its more assertive role in conflict mediation beyond the Western world. This includes the Middle East, where it has undertaken mediation efforts in Afghanistan and Syria, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, between the Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas, and in Yemen, including with the Houthis. Over time, such growing influence could provide China with significant leverage in shaping broader regional policy agendas and navigating alliances.

China forges ties with the Taliban

In September 2023, it became the first country to appoint an ambassador to Kabul. Then in December, it became the first to host a Taliban ambassador. Such engagement was partly fueled by Beijing’s security considerations in the Xinjiang region, which borders Afghanistan. Yet in forging closer ties with the Taliban, Beijing has validated engagement with the terrorist group, particularly among non-Western nations, in ways that could reshape alliances worldwide.

China’s weak influence in Hamas talks

Despite China’s efforts to position itself as a regional mediator, its initial response to the Hamas attack on Israel was also subdued. Since then, a proactive approach by Beijing towards has been evident in the intra-Palestinian talks held between Fatah and Hamas, which Beijing pushed for and hosted in April. These talks were somewhat of an uphill battle for China’s diplomacy given its little leverage inside Gaza, lukewarm ties with the Palestinian Authority and worsening relations with Israel. That said, Beijing learned to navigate difficult political environments as it did in Africa in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is likely to do the same more broadly in the Middle East, especially given the region’s strategic significance and its role in Beijing’s intended new world order.

China’s decades-long partnerships with Israel

Apart from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, China had developed strong partnerships with Israel over decades that has expanded across various domains, from infrastructure to agriculture and education. Trade between Israel and China reached a record $21 billion in 2022, and Chinese firms have been engaged in about 500 investment deals in Israel over the past decade, predominantly in the technology sector.

Unchecked antisemitism in China rallying public opinion

However, a troubling motivation has also been apparent in Beijing’s actions since the October Hamas attack on Israel. Chinese officials have pivoted from a pro-Israel footing to indulging not just criticisms of Israeli government policy but now permitting the spread of antisemitism across Chinese media. This appears to reflect not a newfound concern for Palestinian aspirations, but an effort by Beijing to use conflicts, whether in Ukraine or Gaza, to rally global public opinion, even at the cost of sacrificing relationships—like those with both Israel and Ukraine—that it has spent decades cultivating.

To conclude

China has long sought to position itself as the champion and leader of the so-called “Global South.” Yet Beijing insists on forging ties with known terrorist groups including the Taliban, Fatah and Hamas. China is now permitting the spread of antisemitism content across its media. The concern is that Beijing uses conflicts, to rally global public opinion even at the cost of sacrificing relationships—like those with both Israel and Ukraine—that it has spent decades cultivating.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט China manipulates terror ties to further its global security aims הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After 2 weeks of spectacular military operations in Lebanon including feats, taken straight from a spy thriller film, Israel finally took out the most powerful terrorist in the world: Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nassrallah.

Israel’s repeated strikes and operations against the Shia terror group have demonstrated that Israeli decision makers have decided to shift gears and be willing to take calculated risks to change the geopolitical balance of power. For the first time there is a sense that Israel is willing to go all the way for a decisive victory, leaving no stone unturned rather than kicking the Hezbollah can down the road for the next generations of Israelis to deal with.

Israel is at a crossroads and has found a golden opportunity to finish off Hezbollah, potentially changing the fabric of Lebanon and the Iranian entrenchment on its northern borders from Lebanon and Syria.

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden, now a lame duck, has a much weaker leverage over Israel in attempting to hamstring Israel from dominating the escalator ladder. The US is fully immersed in the election cycle and the White House signals that it is not too keen to divert attention and resources to another Middle East crisis it needs to “contain”.

On its part, however, Iran is making strides in its attempts to assuage the west and get a new nuclear deal as reiterated by the New Iranian president. Iran cannot afford to get directly involved in a conflict with Israel right now when it needs the West. According to reports, Iran declined to directly attack Israel and protect its proxy to the chagrin of Hezbollah. After the strikes on Friday on Beirut’s Dahia quarter, Hezbollah’s infamous stronghold, former IRGC commander and Minister of Interior Ahmad Vahidi said in an interview to the Iranian national TV that every leader is replaceable, hinting that they have a successor to Nassralah. Irans allies see it as abandoning them in the money time.

Israel now has the opportunity to further the wedge between Iran and its strongest proxy Hezbollah. With continued attacks against Hezbollah, Israel could force Iran to either allow it to finish off Hezbollah in order to save a potential nuclear deal or get involved and “kiss goodbye” a lucrative nuclear deal that would fill the Islamic Republic’s coffers. Neither choice would benefit Iran.

Moreover, a weakened Hezbollah coupled with the ecstatic swathes of the Syrian and Lebanese factions who openly celebrated Nassralah’s demise, could be pushed and assisted into weakening Iran’s iron grip over these countries. Once a critical mass of anti-Hezbollah forces coalesce at a time when the Shia terror group is overwhelmed, a social tipping point could be reached changing the balance of power against Iran for the next decades.

Cutting off the largest tentacle of the Iranian octopus could also have a trinkle down effect for other proxies and restore Israel’s lost deterrence. Following the news on Nassralah’s elimination, Iranian supreme leader Ali Kameniei was moved to a secure location fearing another Israeli attack.

This momentum must continue so Israel will be able to break the tie in northern Israel and have its own internal displaced persons return to their homes. It would prove to Israelis and the jihadists that Israel will achieve its other war aims just like it achieved the restoration of the north.

This is the way to end the war, maintain and image of victory and change the narrative that Israel’s enemies tell themselves about Israel’s vulnerability.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel’s golden opportunity post Nasrallah הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The principal goal of the IDSF movement is to safeguard the security of Israel for the coming generations, but the movement understands that security and economics advance hand in hand. In this article, Dr. Zvi Marom will detail what the State of Israel must do in order to develop its industrial sector and maintain its standing as a “start-up nation.”

Dr. Marom is one of the best-known and most experienced figures in Israel’s technological sector. As an academic, he holds degrees in electronic engineering and industrial electronics as well as a doctorate in dentistry from Tel Aviv University. As a businessman, he founded BATM Ltd. and managed it until December 2022; and for years he chaired the board of directors at the Israeli High-Tech Association (part of the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel). Dr. Marom is also the recipient of important awards including techMARK Personality of the Year and the 2021 Industry Prize from the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel. In March 2024 he was even awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit of Hungary.

Background — Hi-tech and other advanced industries in Israel today

Israelis have come to consider their country a “hi-tech nation,” but in fact it is primarily a “start-up nation.” Israeli entrepreneurs excel at forming small and medium-size companies based on innovation and creativity, but in many cases those companies are sold to large enterprises, or are floated on the stock exchange, so that control passes to new shareholders — primarily American. Figures show that the number of start-ups in Israel is high even in comparison much larger countries, and the reason lies in two factors:

• In the past, the country aided start-ups with government guarantees and conditional grants, for example under the “Yozma” program, and thus the start-ups were better able to raise funds for the critical fledgling stage.
• Israel has skilled and talented workers in the engineering and computer fields. It owes that workforce to a number of factors: immigration of experienced professionals from the former Soviet Union, the release of trained engineering workers upon the halt of the Lavie project, and demobilized soldiers who bring training and experience from the IDF’s technological units.
• The hi-tech sector has gained in strength worldwide, and it set many private venture capital funds scouting in Israel. Those funds established channels of nongovernmental funding and presented start-ups with further opportunities for growth.
• The large number of start-up companies produced an accumulation of managerial knowhow that contributed to the growth of further start-ups, so that a self-nourishing cycle emerged here.

Today we are witness to a new process in which Israel is changing from a “start-up nation” into an “innovation nation.” That is to say, Israel’s economy rests on creative, innovative workers at the forefront of their fields. The objective is to advance Israeli innovativeness while continuing to support the founding of start-ups.

Aside from hi-tech companies and start-ups, the technology sector in Israel also includes advanced industries and security industries that are also considered world leaders in their fields. Those companies have the potential to contribute enormously to Israel’s economy and security, and they can also help by leveraging projects of international cooperation.

However, we must not rest on our laurels. The hi-tech and other advanced industrial sectors, however successful they may be, must constantly innovate in order to retain Israel’s technological advantage in the world. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that those sectors are already suffering today from more than a few difficulties that threaten not only themselves but also the overall Israeli economy and security services, which depend on innovations and technological developments from Israeli industries.

Dr. Zvi Marom: The Economic Vision for the Hi-Tech and Other Advanced Technology Sectors

Advancing education and professional training

The current situation:

Like all other fields, hi-tech and other advanced industries depend strongly on their workforce. Among the measures of a workforce’s quality are education and professional skills — two aspects that require improvement.

Where education is concerned, academia in Israel and worldwide is deteriorating. A portion has turned into a trade guild, and a portion has surrendered to the progressive agenda that prevents it from impartially promoting academic learning. In addition, many universities have become diploma mills where the demands on students — and especially on those considered “less privileged” — constantly decline.

Where professionalism is concerned, certain jobs in technological industry are unjustly considered inferior. Technology in all its aspects is an intrinsic part of industry as a whole, and jobs such as operating industrial machinery, which require higher education, should be properly rewarded.

Ideally:

• Investment in technological education: Technological education in Israel needs to be dramatically strengthened, and young people need to be encouraged to study technical subjects. In that connection, the universities must adapt themselves to the technological demand from the marketplace, update their curricula, and expand the relevant departments such as computer engineering. The students from underprivileged backgrounds should be supported with scholarships and benefits but not by means of academic concessions that reduce their level of education.
• Professional training: Technological workers must be trained, with an emphasis on industrial workers who will command the technological knowledge necessary for operating heavy machinery and for undertaking advanced manufacturing processes. Appropriate education and high standards should be expected from those workers, and at the same time they should be rewarded with good conditions and suitable salaries.

Encouraging competition in the defense industry

The current situation:

Our defense industry is outstanding, but because of excessive bureaucracy and regulatory difficulties, small companies are not managing to enter the defense industry. Thus a situation has evolved in which the defense industry rests primarily on three companies: Elbit, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael. They have become a near-monopoly. Such a situation violates the principle of business competition and brings harm to Israel’s standing as a hi-tech nation.

Furthermore, whereas in the past Israel’s armaments industry was highly developed, over time it has shrunk and today we rely primarily on importing materiel from the USA — thus harming our economy and our self-reliance.

Ideally:

• Total war against monopolies: Entrepreneurship and competition must be nurtured, especially in the defense industries, and small companies must be encouraged to grow alongside the three giant defense corporations.
• Enlarging the armaments industries: A well-developed armaments industry will be very profitable to Israel, in contrast to today when we are paying more for American materiel than we would pay to manufacture our own. Moreover, a well-developed armaments industry will also give Israeli security more independence.

Fighting bureaucracy and wastefulness

The current situation:

Israel’s governmental services are mostly inefficient and rife with obstacles, resulting in delays and in improper usage of workers and of resources. Regrettably, many of the difficulties that the governmental services present are deliberate. The jobs are intended to inflate the staff of one manager or another, and their usefulness is nil.

Similarly, the military suffers from inefficiency and has slipped heavily into wastefulness in terms of resources and staff. Waste in the military takes various forms: Many units, such as the Army Radio, make no contribution to security but use up money and personnel; many bases, including the Kirya in Tel Aviv, are tying up some of Israel’s most valuable real estate; soldiers in the regular army receive outsized financial benefits; IDF delegations travelling overseas are overstaffed; and the list goes on and on.

Both in the civil service and in the security establishment, the wastefulness peaks toward the end of the fiscal year on the understanding that any money remaining unspent will be lost and possibly even excluded from the next year’s budget. Thus as each calendar year nears its end, we witness voluminous unnecessary spending.

The problem of wastefulness is well recognized, but budget cutting is greatly opposed at the highest levels of government. Among the reasons for that opposition is the overly close relationship between security and politics. After all, many security figures in Israel continue almost immediately into a political career — so instead of considering the good of the military, they’re considering mainly their professional future.

Ideally:

• Tackle the government bureaucracy: Israel’s public services must be made more efficient in order to prevent wastage of time, resources, and staff. To that purpose, the way of management at the ministries must be comprehensively improved, from the point of budgeting to the point of implementation.
• Fight wastefulness: Wastefulness, in the public services and in the IDF, must be attacked with full force. First, budget-cutting options must be examined — such as closing departments and units and relocating offices and bases to locations in the periphery. Second, the budget must be managed transparently and there must be certainty that outlays contribute to the nation and to its security.
• Separating security from politics: In order to make budget-cutting possible, the political and military systems must be separated. More precisely, there must be an end to the cycle of Chiefs of Staff who become Ministers of Defense. It was clear to David Ben-Gurion, back in his day, that the army must not be its own regulator. And even the Romans asked: Who will stand watch over the watchmen?

Grant tax relief

The current situation:

A liberal policy of taxation is fundamental to the development of entrepreneurship. If burdened by taxes from the outset, an entrepreneur will have great difficulty achieving growth and may fail to reach take-off. The State must understand that it has an economic interest in encouraging business growth and success. Successful entrepreneurs contribute in due course to increasing the treasury’s tax revenues.

However, as of today Israel’s state support for its growing businesses is insufficient, imposing difficulty on entrepreneurs and harming economic growth.

Ideally:

• Tax benefits: The government must provide significant tax benefits to growing businesses so that they may consolidate a foothold in the early stages of business development.

The defense industry: Two sides of the same coin — Summation and conclusions

It is pleasant and easy to keep viewing Israel as a start-up nation or hi-tech nation, but it is necessary to understand that technology moves ceaselessly forward and if we become complacent we will no longer deserve those titles. For the sake of its economy and security, Israel must strengthen its hi-tech sector and other advanced industrial sectors, with an emphasis on military industry.

To that end, we must examine the existing difficulties — including bureaucratic restrictions, wastage of resources, and insufficiently trained students — and find a way to overcome those difficulties and make Israel not merely a start-up nation worthy of the name but also a nation of innovation one step ahead of all others.

It must be understood that the necessary changes will not come about at a single stroke. Long-term processes must be put into place encompassing all the relevant fields in order to return Israel’s hi-tech and other industries to a stable leading position in the international arena.

הפוסט Ideally — The Economic Vision of the IDSF Movement Featuring: Hi-tech and Other Advanced Industries הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.