The organized pogrom perpetrated against the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, in which Jews were humiliated and assaulted on European soil, sounded alarm bells this week. It must be said, however, that these came on top of countless red lights indicating the growing radical Islamic threat germinating European soil. Painful motifs, such as the timing of this pogrom – just moments before the anniversary of the Kristallnacht, the brutal violence, the hurling of Jews into the gracht waters or the blind eye turned by the authorities, made this event all the more outstanding and horrific. In view of the surge in anti-Semitism in Europe throughout the war and the increasing frequency of demonstrations and violent disturbances, one arrives at an unmistakable conclusion: these are no isolated incidents. Rather, this is a new, undeniable reality on European soil. In extreme scenarios, it could amount to fundamentally alter Israeli-European diplomatic and defense relations.

This new reality poses us a clear mirror: the classical continent, which is portrayed as a peaceful Western territory filled with picturesque villages, Gothic cathedrals, steam trains and iconic tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, the Schoenbrunn Palace and London Tower, is gradually undergoing a transformation. The change in the demographics and in the civilization itself in Europe has been taking form over past decades and at an accelerated pace this past decade. Faced with this reality, Europe, for the most part is helpless, slow to respond, and has yet to fully realize the magnitude of the threat that has entered into the belly of the beast.

Aided and abetted by the authorities, millions of immigrants from the Islamic world have been arriving, reshaping the continent with their feet. It is not uncommon nowadays to walk around Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris, Barcelona or London and feel how these so closely-familiar cities, touted as tourism and culinary hotspots, are being enveloped with entire ghettos and filling with large immigrant communities that are tightening their grip on these places. Cultural artifacts like billboards in Arabic and mosque minarets are increasingly becoming a feature of everyday life. “We have become the Gaza of Europe”, lamented Dutch leader Geert Wilders bitterly. “I refuse to accept this.”

But the reality is that 30% of Birmingham’s population is Muslim, some half of Brussels’ is of non-Belgian descent, and the most commonly-given name to newborn children is Muhammad. All of this dovetails with the reality in many other European cities, yet are met with a deep culture of denial among Europeans.

The last time demographic data on Islam’s prevalence in Europe was released was in 2016. For some reason, in the past eight years there has been no release of updated figures. In a conference I attended, a senior European Union official voiced her surprise at the complaints voiced by the “radical right” regarding mass immigration into Europe. She made comparisons to the massive presence of Venezuelan refugees throughout South America, or Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon – to the situation in Europe, which according to her was negligible. Another speaker, a senior NATO official, insisted – mistakenly – that the immigrants were not responsible for even a single terrorist attack in Europe. None other than French President Emmanuel Macron spoke about “séparatisme”, but stressed that the terrorist attacks are perpetrated by French people – not by immigrants – since they are French citizens, totally sidestepping the issue of the civilizational shift underway in his own backyard.

Incidents like the Amsterdam pogrom ought to shake even nationalistic governments out of their doldrums in reaction to these “Wir schaffen das”-type policies of former Chancellor Angela Merkl, but they are slow to react. Laws allowing for revocation of citizenship and deportation of inciters and terrorists are being hollowed out. Thus is the extradition of the “Jihad Widow” in Brussels being delayed for years as the legal wrangling drags on, and the Hamas-sympathizing agitator Muhammad Hanoun in Italy is still leading anti-Semitic demonstrations without his citizenship being revoked or him being deported – even though the US State Department has imposed sanctions against him. The Meloni government in Italy is still working on its Albania Plan without any tangible results, and even the newly-installed right-wing governments in Austria and the Netherlands are slow in implementing an effective immigration policy.

Countries such as France or Switzerland prefer, on the one hand, to pass laws outlawing burkas or mosque minarets in the public space, while on the other hand allowing hundreds of thousands of immigrants to enter their countries and remain there permanently. The European Union’s 2020 counter-terrorism strategy included a pitiful few measures aimed at tightening border security or deportation of agitators. They included mainly measures for strengthening “community resilience” through sport, intelligence cooperation, and removal of youths from the path toward radicalization through soft means.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the only countries that refuse to go along with the family reunion policy and with the pro-immigration policies of the rest of Europe, policies that have seen the admission of millions of immigrants into the continent with the world’s lowest average birth rate. The results are plain to see – an almost total absence of anti-Semitic incidents, even in view of the war in the Middle East, in stark contrast to the surge in such incidents throughout the rest of Europe.

The Amsterdam events are consistent with the European attitude toward the war in Israel. This begins with a profound denial of the root cause of the problem and the preference for “band-aid” solutions – in Israel’s case, Europe’s failure to call out Iran’s hegemonistic motives and Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s anti-Semitism, while focusing on the territorial dispute with the Palestinians and on the “two-state solution”. In the Amsterdam case, this means “severely punishing” the culprits or “strengthening security” – instead of addressing the broader threat from radical Islam. This is also the case when it comes to media coverage – although for the most part it reflected the reality on the ground, it did blow out of proportion isolated incidents perpetrated by “Jewish hooligans”, who had rioted and were arrested, or “Maccabi fans tore down Palestinian flags and provoked riots”. This skewed view of reality is nothing new for Israelis in the context of the war here in the Middle East, where headlines decry “massacre of civilians” or the “catastrophic famine” within the Strip.

Europe is still deep in denial. Around half of the teachers in France avoid discussing certain issues for fear of provoking Muslim students, particularly after the appalling murder of teacher Samuel Pati. The terrorist attacks in Paris, Barcelona and London, the assassinations of artists critical of Islam, as in the case of Dutch director Theo Van Gogh, or the attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, all these still meet a complacent European public, where only 32% of surveyed citizens are prepared to fight to defend their country. The rest of those surveyed are more worried about climate change than security issues.

The first signs of change in the European political landscape have begun to appear – right-wing governments, sometimes radical right-wing, are ascending to power. There is a marked drop in voting for green parties in favor of nationalist parties, and many constraints that have been stifling public debate are now crumbling. This denial has ushered in an ambiance conducive to immigration and radical Islam. Its dismantling is the first step toward confronting these issues.

Absent a change in trajectory, this might force Israel to regard Europe as more of a threat than a partner. Europe might come to be considered a hostile Arab space, and travel there could be categorized at a risk level equal to that of travel to Arab countries. Israelis, who have so far made do with a few simple measures like avoiding speaking Hebrew in public or not wearing anything indicative of their Jewish identities, will be compelled to further recalculate their moves. They might choose to avoid traveling to Germany, the same way they avoid traveling to countries like Egypt. One can only imagine a worst-case scenario in which these elements seize the centers of power, and the political and security implications Israel will have to deal with regarding this nearby, powerful continent. The European states had better wake up and outright reject this shifting cultural orientation, before it is too late.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

הפוסט The Amsterdam Pogrom: Europe could eventually be considered hostile Arab territory for Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After the Taliban extremists took over Afghanistan in August 2021, they announced that they hoped to continue good relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors: China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and the Gulf states as well. However, existing conditions made direct contacts difficult and the country chosen as principal intermediary — which was thus enabled to fill a significant role in shaping Afghanistan’s regional policy — was Qatar. Qatar had already constructed a relationship with the Taliban years before, when in 2013 it allowed the Taliban to open a diplomatic mission in Doha with support from the US government.

Washington had been looking for a neutral location for holding negotiations with the Taliban in preparation for withdrawing American forces from Afghanistan. It opened the diplomatic mission after finding that direct negotiations, with the Taliban on one side and Afghanistan and the NATO of the time on the other side, were a failure and concluding that a clear alternative channel was needed. The Doha mission would enable the Americans to communicate secretly with the Taliban while officially continuing to support the Afghan government. Qatar was ostensibly the go-between in those talks, but in practice it served as the Taliban’s patron. In the negotiations, the Americans agreed to release imprisoned Taliban members; and among those freed was a founder of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. He would become the head of the organization’s diplomatic mission in Qatar.

On the basis of the US support for Qatar as go-between in talks with the Taliban, Qatar was positioned to take on a broader role in matters touching on Afghanistan. Even after the Doha talks between the Taliban and the former Afghan government collapsed in 2020, western countries — and, especially, international organizations — accepted Qatar’s legitimacy as an intermediary and a point of contact with the Taliban. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and foreign ministers from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy arrived in an aerial caravan to Qatar, emphasizing the country’s importance — in comparison with other countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia — as an intermediary with Afghanistan.

In February 2020, the USA signed a historic peace agreement with the Taliban, including a commitment to gradually withdraw from Afghanistan and lift the sanctions against the organization. The Taliban, for their part, agreed to respect human rights, not to permit terrorist activity from the area under their control, and to open a dialogue with the Afghan government in order to find a solution for Afghanistan. Shortly afterward, when Abdul Ghani Baradar — head of the Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Qatar — landed in Afghanistan to take office as the new President on the Taliban’s behalf, he disembarked from a Qatar Emiri air force plane made in the USA.

Since most of the world’s nations do not officially recognize the Taliban regime, and most of the western embassies have left Afghanistan, intercession by a third party is required; and Qatar is in place as the natural candidate for that role. Qatar’s main interest in Afghan affairs, as in other matters, has to do with entrenching itself as the regional intermediary. Qatar advances its regional and international influence by means of the prestigious intermediation that positions it as a central player in the eyes of the world powers and international organizations. Thus, for example, Qatar intermediated between Germany and the Taliban during 2024 for the return of Afghan emigrants to Afghanistan.

However, some international players see Qatar as offering a platform for the extremism of the Taliban organization, which even cooperates directly with Al-Qaeda and assists in international terrorism.

Qatari policy is basically driven by a combination of political Islam and a business agenda. That policy includes granting material assistance, such as funding, favorable publicity, and even armaments, to various recipients. Thus, for example, for years the Qatari television station Al Jazeera, based in Doha, has given the Taliban a platform for addressing the world. The Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Doha underwent a quick process of branding and was presented as the legitimate representative of the Afghan nation — a sort of shadow government as against the government that sits in Kabul.

An example of Qatar’s deep ties in Afghanistan is that shortly after the attacks of September 11, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network was the only mass communications medium that succeeded in interviewing the number one suspect of the day, Al Qaeda commander Osama Bin Laden, at his hideout in Afghanistan. Thus Qatar’s policies advance its interests indirectly while exploiting its close alliance with the USA.

Qatar appears untroubled by its ties with disreputable players such as Hamas, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, it is such connections that have elevated it as the sole, key player that can lessen the distress of the west in the face of those enemies. Thus Qatar exploits the conflicts of the region and the problems of the west in order to propose a solution tailored by the wealthy little emirate itself. Qatar’s strategy displays more business thinking than ideological determination. However, Qatar’s approach is not pure business; it does also involve making western players dependent on its services so that it may be continue as a central player and as the exclusive address for solving problems with the anti-western elements of the Middle East.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Business Islam: On Qatari–Taliban relations and Qatar’s regional agenda הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the Gaza Strip during the Swords of Iron War, the IDF found large quantities of weaponry apparently made in North Korea. Militarily, Hamas — like Iran’s other proxy organizations — is directly or indirectly connected to North Korea in various ways, such as weapons trading, training, and exercises.

North Korea’s primary news agency, KCNA, rejected such contentions and called them “a baseless, mendacious rumor.” The agency furthermore accused the USA of spreading a conspiracy theory designed to divert attention from its participation alongside Israel in the Gaza warfare. However, the findings proved otherwise as the IDF discovered North Korean RPG F7 among the weapons captured from Hamas, as well as North Korean Bang122 artillery shells. How would weaponry from North Korea have reached Hamas in the Gaza Strip?

North Korea’s relations and deep partnership with Iran and Syria cover a history of many years, and so its military technology has reached Iran’s proxy organizations: Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas. In addition, North Korea’s ties with the Palestinians go back many years — to the beginning of the 1960s. During those early years, North Korea began providing financial assistance and military training to PLO personnel; and later, during the 1970s and 1980s, Yasser Arafat and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine met separately with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Those meetings resulted in a constant supply of North Korean weaponry to the Palestinians. After the Cold War ended, ties between North Korea and the Palestinians dwindled; but in 2007 with the ascendancy of Hamas in Gaza, the ties were revived.

In July 2014, when Israel embarked upon Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Hamas requested military aid from North Korea. In that arrangement, Hamas received rockets and military communications equipment; and besides providing weaponry, financial aid, and military training, North Korea may have also helped Hamas build its Gazan “Metro” — the network of Hamas tunnels — just as it helped Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Hostile though it is to the West and Israel, does North Korea assist terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah for ideological reasons alone? Despite its long-standing support for members of the “Axis of Resistance,” apparently North Korea is primarily motivated — aside from ideology — by economic considerations. North Korea lives under heavy international sanctions, but by its involvement in activities such as sales of weaponry to terrorist organizations it can obtain income to fund its own weapons programs.

North Korea is also pleased by the founding of an anti-American, anti-Western block which consists of Russia, China, and Iran. After Russia invaded Ukraine, North Korea sought a way to leverage strategic accomplishments in expanding its cooperation with Russia while interfering with US efforts in Ukraine. Now, as in Ukraine, North Korea is seeking an opportunity to undermine US interests in the Middle East as well while profiting economically from the conflicts there, such as Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These circumstances increase North Korea’s chances of expanding its sales of weaponry to the terrorist organizations, and to Hamas in particular, following a special decree from Kim Jong Un, as early as November 2023, in support of the Palestinians.

The North Korean angle is not well enough publicized, but it is dangerous and its shadow could darken the war. North Korea’s illegal sales of weapons to Hamas could help that terrorist organization recuperate more quickly than expected after the critical blow of the war in which most of its leadership in Gaza was eliminated — including the commander, Yahya Sinwar — and much of its war materiel and terrorist ground force was destroyed. Standing with Iran, which is also suffering heavily in the current war, North Korea may profit economically and strategically as it improves the condition of the terrorist organizations during the war and especially afterward.

“This article was originally published in ynetnews.”

הפוסט The North Korean Angle: On North Korea’s relations with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dr. Moshe Yegar’s home, in Jerusalem, tells a story. There are photos from diplomatic occasions around the world. There are certificates of appreciation and prizes relating to his diplomatic and academic work, including the Jabotinsky Prize for Literature and Research and a special prize for his part in establishing Israeli–Indian relations. In his rich library, 20 books may be found that he wrote in Hebrew. Several of them have been translated into other languages, and four more were written originally in English. Most of them deal with history and with the diplomatic side of Israel’s international relations.

A new immigrant who spoke Hebrew better than the sabras

Dr. Moshe Yegar was born in 1930, and at age 94 he still has his vim. We met him at his home to hear about his 40 years of service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about his perspective on the present situation. It was a special interview with a special person who had occasion to work under such figures as Golda Meir, Abba Eban, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yitzhak Shamir, among others. But we should start at the beginning.

Moshe, let’s go back to 1935. You arrived in Israel from — where?

We came from Argentina when I wasn’t yet five. My father was a Hebrew teacher, and he was sent to teach in Zichron Yaakov. I started kindergarten as a new immigrant, but my Hebrew was correct and graceful thanks to my father. From the day I was born, he’d spoken only Hebrew to me, even before we came to Israel. We lived in Zichron Yaakov for five years, and those years left a deep impression on me.

Did you join the Haganah?

I was a member of the youth brigades in the Haganah for two years. When the War of Independence began as soon as independence was declared, my fellow members and I were recruited into the IDF. I was one of the trainers for the scouts movement, and we were among the founders of the Nahal — together with the United Nahal Movement. We also founded Kibbutz Tel Katzir.

Did you consider continuing into a military career?

At a certain point I left Tel Katzir and went back to being an enlisted man in the IDF. I was in the Nahal’s first NCO course. I also took a Master Sergeant course and I was appointed master sergeant for the Nahal’s first company of privates. I was also sent for paratrooper training, and then to the eighth round of the officer training course. Afterward I was discharged from the IDF and I went to study at the Hebrew University.

And then it was straight out of the university into a diplomatic career?

After my bachelor’s degree in modern Middle Eastern history, political science, and general history, I went on to study for a master’s. But I wanted to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the end, I passed the qualifying exam for cadets. That was the third time it was given, in 1956. In the next 40 years, I held various positions in Israel and in Israeli missions abroad. I finished up my master’s while I was an emissary in Burma.

So was it your time in Burma that prompted you to become an expert in Asian Islam?

Because the Hebrew University wasn’t teaching Asian Islam at that time, I received special permission to write a thesis on Burma’s Muslim minority. Afterward, I researched Islam in British Malaya, which is Malaysia today. That was my doctorate. I worked for about twenty years, in my spare time, on a comparative study of Muslim uprisings in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The Bible as key to diplomatic ties

During his 40 years of diplomatic service, Dr. Yegar filled significant roles around the world. After his service in Malaysia, he was a consul in Los Angeles and consul general in Philadelphia. Among his various assignments in Israel, he was head of public diplomacy and of the Asian division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He participated in Operation Solomon (the airlift of Ethiopian Jews) and played a central role in establishing Israel’s relations with India and other Asian and African nations, besides serving terms as ambassador to Sweden and to the Czech Republic.

You held positions under several Foreign Ministers. What are the specifics?

When I was deputy head of the Asian division and Abba Eban was Foreign Minister, he appointed me to head the training department. When Yigal Alon was Foreign Minister, he appointed me department head for public diplomacy, and when Yitzhak Shamir was Foreign Minister, he appointed me division head for public diplomacy. I held that job for five years.

You developed a special cultural project in the Czech Republic. Tell us about it.

After the communist regime collapsed, the Czech Republic was very friendly toward Israel. I dreamed up a large festival focusing on the Bible as it’s reflected in various art forms. The festival was a year and a half or so in the making, and in the end it included 71 musical events, theatrical performances, art exhibits, academic seminars, and art competitions for schoolchildren — all based on biblical topics. It was a large display of culture in Prague and it made a significant contribution to Israel’s reputation. Everyone understood that the Bible was the gift of the Jewish people to human civilization.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, why are artistic and cultural ties important?

After World War II, technology surged forward and brought a complete change in the diplomatic profession. It’s no longer merely negotiations between the leaders of different countries, but also a means of creating broad-based ties between populations that had lived for generations without caring about their countries’ foreign relations.

Today’s communications media have given very large sectors of the public an interest in the diplomatic relations between countries and peoples. For that reason, there’s a new diplomacy with a new face. Today various countries engage in presenting their culture and their language to other populations in an effort to make friends with them. That’s a different kind of diplomacy, and a very interesting kind. It brings many challenges and it requires appointing diplomats who fit such a job. For example, diplomats today need a wider-ranging education — far beyond what was expected from them in past generations.

When other countries receive more extensive knowledge and understanding of the diplomat’s home country, a friendly atmosphere is created. That atmosphere can contribute directly to deeper economic ties, to security, and to all the other factors that mutually benefit the countries involved.

So there’s special importance to Israel’s integration of the Bible into public and cultural diplomacy in Christian regions, which recognize the Bible as an element of their own culture — the USA, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and even Asia’s sole Christian country, the Philippines.

Zionism should free itself of illusions and think straight

What’s your opinion on Israel’s current diplomatic and security situation?

We need to break free from illusions. At first, Zionism was looking for ways to come to an agreement with the Arabs. We hoped they would yield a little piece of their vast territory and allow the Jewish nation return to its historic homeland. The various streams of the Zionist movement made countless attempts to reach an understanding, an agreed compromise with the Arabs — including partition proposals — but they all failed. Now, after October 7, it’s clearer to us than ever. Likely not many of us still suffer from the illusions of the past. Zionism tried to win the understanding and consent of the Arabs by offering various suggestions, such as territorial compromise, or by advancing the idea that the homecoming of the Jews would bring benefits to the Arabs’ economy, their health system, their educational system, and so on. Nothing helped.

The Arabs received proposals for establishing their own “Palestinian” state, but they showed no interest in those proposals. The most prominent proposals that come to mind are those from the Peel Commission in 1938, the UN in 1947, and Oslo in 1993. There were other attempts as well, but the Arabs, the “Palestinians,” never showed interest in setting up a state of their own. Instead, they were determined and consistent in their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, be it big or small. They used every violent means at their disposal to prevent the birth of the State of Israel and they sank to inconceivable levels of barbarous, monstrous cruelty. Their determination has continued for almost 120 years now, coming to expression in what we call terrorist movements. The Arabs see them differently.

We’re at war now with two cruel terrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah. They both are managed and supported by our great enemy Iran. How do you expect this to end?

This war has gone on too long but it can be expected to end eventually with the destruction of those two movements. Still, we shouldn’t suffer any further illusions. The Arabs can be expected with some certainty to continue their violence and terrorism against us. They can set up new organizations, and many members of Hamas and Hezbollah will continue their activity against us as individuals or small squads. They’re not short of weapons.

In practical terms, what should be the final objective regarding Hamas and Gaza?

As a lesson to other Arab states, Israel should destroy Hamas, wipe out every trace of its presence, and complete the job by taking over the entire Gaza Strip. Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, but despite all its superiority, it hasn’t managed to defeat a terrorist organization like Hamas.

But what’s the definition of defeating Hamas?

We and the other side conceive of victory quite differently. The difference has reappeared in each round of conflict. Each time, I felt afterward that we hadn’t achieved much. From their point of view, they’ve won if their leadership survived and they have the ability to regroup. The loss of life, the destruction of Gaza, the civilian distress aren’t a consideration for them. There’s no deterrence. They believe they have a holy mission to exterminate Israel. As long as we leave them the ability to regroup, even if it takes them years, and as long as they have outside support, they’ll persist. Their ability to regroup needs to be rooted out completely.

Is your outlook, with the benefit of such age and experience, optimistic?

October 7 was a severe event, but yes, I’m optimistic despite our current situation. Throughout history, our enemies have always risen up against us and the Jewish nation has a special resilience even after suffering the greatest damage, such as the loss of six million lives in World War II when European Jewry was slaughtered by the Germans and their accomplices. We need to understand that our presence here is not to be taken for granted, and to remember at the same time that despite the difficulties, the Jewish nation has a certain internal energy, a rare self-healing power. We shall win out.

הפוסט “The nation of Israel has self-healing power. We shall win out.” An interview with Dr. Moshe Yegar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In mid-July 2024, the Azeri Embassy in Tehran was reopened after a year of negotiations to relieve the tensions between the two countries.

Relations soured between Iran and Azerbaijan after an armed assailant stormed the Azeri Embassy in Tehran in January 2023, killing the security officer and injuring two other guards. Despite Iran’s adamant denials, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, called this a “terrorist attack”.  Relations between the two countries deteriorated still further After Azerbaijan decided to open an embassy in Israel in March 2023. This infuriated the Iranians, since while their relations with their northern neighbor hit a new low, Baku’s relations with Jerusalem kept warming up.

It is no surprise the opening of an official Azeri presence in Israel caused the Tehran-Baku relations to sour. This being said, following the October 7 massacre by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two Iranian proxies, and the war in Gaza that ensued – the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan assumed yet another dimension.

In November 2023, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called on all Muslim countries to sever all their diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, given the war in Gaza. Khamenei even stressed that “oil and food export routes to Israel ought to be blocked”. Khamenei attempted to lead an anti-Israeli Islamic resistance front, however it seemed like this initiative failed to produce actual results on the ground.

This was due to the fact that two countries, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), were supplying oil to Israel: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Of these two oil-rich countries, Azerbaijan is the more important for Israel. Azerbaijan provides Israel with some 40% of its oil consumption. In return it is a recipient of advanced Israeli weaponry worth billions of dollars.

The Israeli armaments have enabled Azerbaijan to achieve a military advantage over its adversary, Armenia. On the other hand, Israel is given a foothold in a strategically important region. It uses the area for intelligence operations against Iran, Azerbaijan’s neighbor.

From the Iranian perspective, the close ties between Baku and Jerusalem mean an increased Israeli presence in the region – a presence that includes weapons and economic and security ties. However, the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship is just one factor impeding Tehran’s relations with Baku, a Shiite-majority country. Ever since Azerbaijan became independent with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has regarded it as a backyard of sorts for expanding its Shiite religious and political influence in its quest for regional hegemony.

Iran has always worked to recruit Shiite communities into its “Axis of Resistance”. This began with its strategy of warfare by proxy, which focused on Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Additionally, Iran sought to penetrate the Shiite community in Azerbaijan. In 2013, Iran established the Husayniyun – the Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan – in an effort to form a powerful proxy organization in the Caucasus. The first recruits to the Husayniyun were six Azeri citizens who left for Syria to defend Shiite shrines against Sunni opponents during the civil war against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Qasem Soleimani, the then-commander of the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elite unit, personally declared the establishment of the new proxy unit in 2017.

After Azerbaijan emerged victorious against Armenia in the 2020 war, and having regained control of the Nagorno Karabakh region, Azeris in Iran began identifying more strongly with Azerbaijan. At the same time, shortly after the war, Iranian proxy groups, including the Husayniyun, flooded the social media with videos in Azeri, promoting their radical religious ideology. They called for the local Shiites to rise up against the government and attack government buildings in Azerbaijan.

Later on, Iran stoked the unrest against the Azeri government. In response, Baku embarked on a mass oppression drive against pro-Iranian networks in the country. In November 2022, five persons were arrested and charged with spying for Iran. The detainees were accused of having provided the Iranian security agencies information harmful to Azerbaijan’s security.

In July 2023, an Afghani national Pavzan Musa Khan, was detained in Baku by Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX). He was suspected of conspiring to conduct a terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku. Khan was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison.

Khan mentioned “other brothers” that have attempted to commit such terror acts. This very fact traces back to Tehran and implies on Iranian involvement, as all previous attempts to attack Israeli targets in Baju were plotted by Tehran.

From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, activities by pro-Iranian forces in the south Caucasus region might potentially exacerbate regional tensions. For this reason, Iran has tried to use the Azerbaijan Husayniyun to deter Azerbaijan and lower the level of relations with Israel.

As Iran shifted its focus toward using its proxies against Israel in the Swords of Iron War, it appears that it has for the time being abandoned its strategy of influencing the Shiite communities in Azerbaijan and that it is now more intent on strengthening its ties with that country. As part of Iran’s fight against Israel through its proxies, it is attempting to isolate it regionally and internationally, meaning that improving its relations with Azerbaijan is now a high priority. Therefore, despite the tensions between the two countries, Iran and Azerbaijan have begun developing their economic ties, and in particular the trade and transport corridor that is also of interest to the northern neighbor, Russia.

Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan are tense and volatile. It is attempting to exert pressure on Baku following the war in Gaza and the widespread international condemnation of Israel. This being said, it appears that the Iranians do not have sufficient leverage to persuade Azerbaijan to sever its relations with Israel, thereby leaving it alone in the face of the threat from Tehran. In contrast to the other Shiite regional players, Iran is being unsuccessful in expanding its influence in a large Shiite country like Azerbaijan, as opposed to the successes it has had among Shiite communities throughout the Middle East, harnessing them under its control through local front-line franchises, as is the case in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Azerbaijan Shiite Challenge: On Iran-Azerbaijan relations and the Israeli Angle הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In an interview on May 8^th, President Biden proclaimed the following: “I made it clear that if they [the Israelis] go into Rafah… I’m not supplying the weapons…”. He said this a day after the operation in which the IDF took over the Philadelphi Corridor and the city of Rafah. At the time, Israeli was facing an unprecedented international campaign to pressure Israel in order to prevent it from reaching Hamas’s southern stronghold in the Gaza Strip and cut it off, advancing from the Philadelphi Corridor. The international community fumed over the possibility that Israel would “exacerbate the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza”, and further deteriorate the situation, which was already in a state if “catastrophe”.

Today’s public discourse on the Israel’s intention to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor casts light on the prevalence of the state of denial throughout the Israeli security establishment regarding the nature of the Gazan threat before the seventh of October – a pendulum that is now repositioning this issue at the heart of public discourse, and has even managed to infect large swathes of the public. Skeptics of the need to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor are leading certain segments of the population, egged on by former senior officials in the security establishment, to associate this objective, which is unequivocally based on security considerations, with political motives. They even describe it as a “spin designed to scuttle the hostage agreement”, for some unknown reason.

“The entire Philadelphi issue is fake news,” quipped one senior official, stating that there was no need to “overstate the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor in preventing Hamas from reconstituting, since it has just been dismantled, and since Hamas has been set back 30 years.” Another official claimed that “control of the Philadelphi Corridor is meaningless”, and even called it “the greatest sham since the establishment of the state.” Using the authoritativeness the comes with their security backgrounds, those former officials are trying to instill fear in the public at the prospect of taking responsibility for 2 million Gazans. They promise that the Gazan problem has been neutralized for the foreseeable future, and call on us to close this chapter in Gaza, and go to elections.

To make matters worse, these irresponsible statements are compounded with the promise that had already been made in the past, according to which the Philadelphi Corridor can be retaken the moment it’s needed to ensure our security. One of those officials even said that it just a “45-minute drive” to retake the 14-kilometer stretch along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The inconsistency reflected in these claims also gives pause for thought. On the one hand, they claim that the Philadelphi Corridor is strategically insignificant, but on the other hand, this insignificant region could easily be retaken when the ceasefire expires.

To be clear, statements like this mislead the general public with false hope, according to which there are “instant”, magical solutions to thorny strategic and security issues. Let’s start with the basics: Hamas has never agreed to release 109 Israeli hostages in exchange for a withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. The corridor was only one of the 29 “amendments” submitted by Hamas to the American-Israeli proposal. The other 28 pertained to the Netzarim Corridor, a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the end of the war, the release of prisoners, the reconstruction of Gaza after the war, among others. Otherwise, one might presume that Israel’s political leadership might have faced an entirely different dilemma.

Moreover, the decision to return to the Philadelphi Corridor after a ceasefire is not and will never be a tactical military decision which could be implemented with ease, based solely on how fast a tank can travel, or how fast three brigades can be mobilized. As in any other wartime decision, it exists within a web of political interests, international pressure, and a strategic objective vis-a-vis Egypt, the IDF, and the Israeli public as well.

Lest we forget, Israel stalled for nearly seven months, until May, to complete the occupation of Gaza from the south. People worldwide reacted hysterically to a possible Israeli incursion into Rafah, as a global campaign aimed at making Israel “stop the massacre in Gaza” was waged through the mass media, the social media, protesters who took to the streets, and decision-makers in foreign governments. Drawn by the “all eyes on Rafah” trend, tens of thousands of demonstrators waving Palestinian flags took to the streets and occupied campuses in Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Not a day went by in which the secretary general of the United Nations didn’t make a declaration peppered with hyperbole on “the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza”, including a statement that “the horror must end”. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, blamed Israel for “provoking famine in Gaza”, and called on the United States to halt arms shipments to Israel. When it came to pressuring Israel to concede and withdraw, it was no holds barred.

On March 25^th, ties between the Israel and the United States soured to the point that the US abstained from voting on a UN Security Council that did not tie the ceasefire to returning the hostages. Secretary of State Blinken repeatedly implored Israel not to insist on carrying out the operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, which was allegedly devoid of any strategic logic and for which it would take many months to evacuate the civilian population. Yet the civilians evacuated within days, relocating to humanitarian zones the IDF had set up, as it directed an unprecedented humanitarian relief effort.

This is also where the question of legitimacy plays in. Israel piggybacked on the momentum and legitimacy that followed the October 7^th massacre in order to carry out action that would decisively defeat Hamas in Gaza. This opportunity may never return. Starting a war to remove the threat hasn’t been defined as a war objective since the Six-Day War. This is evidenced by the fact that Hamas’s buildup in Gaza and Hezbollah’s buildup in Lebanon were neglected. After the Disengagement, the population was promised that a single rocket fired from Gaza would be met with a tough response, and those same people now feel that we’ll be able to take over the Philadelphi Corridor after the first smuggling operation. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The notion that contrary to what occurred in the past fifty years, this time, Israel would act differently and wage an elective war is a delusion. It deludes the public, since it involves a misunderstanding of the nature of the political and military echelons in Israel. This includes, first and foremost, avoiding an elective war, and preferring pinpointed operations, such that the denial zone expands to the point when we have no other choice – not to mention a significant international arm-twisting effort that could constrain Israel’s freedom of action.

A withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor would run contrary to Israel’s interest of not going from one war to the next, but rather, preserving the conditions for a stable security situation for generations to come. The notion that Israel should be forced to reach a tipping point to reproduce its achievements is indicative of myopic thinking, rather than strategic depth. It would be like turning off all of the traffic lights in Israel, since they could always be turned on again, once an accident occurs. These are not the principles upon which we can guarantee that we’ll control the situation on the ground.

Israel never excelled at insisting on rock-hard principles at the heart of its security concept, and it often preferred either taking the risks involved in withdrawals, in exchange for foreign troops being posted in the area – in the case of the Philadelphi Corridor, 750 Egyptian soldiers were posted, along with helicopters and APCs – or placing its security in the hands of foreigners – in the case of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was empowered to fight terror in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, instead of Israel. During the Disengagement, the IDF aligned its position with Prime Minister Sharon, and supported a full surrender of control of the corridor due to “the operational difficulty involved in controlling the narrow strip” and the fact that weapons were being smuggled through tunnels in any case, so for the IDF, surrendering control of the corridor was “the lesser of two evils”.

If there’s any major lesson that Israel could learn from the October 7^th massacre, it’s that metastasizing threats cannot be neglected, and that we can’t remain completely blind to what’s happening in Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, or Iran. The massacre prompted the populace to demand that their decision-makers decisively defeat the enemy and remove the threat – a war objective that hasn’t been set since the Six-Day War. Israel tried to avert war at any cost, following the policy of “quiet in exchange for quiet” and pinpointed operations, with the full blessing of the security establishment, keeping the political echelon in its comfort zone. Our hostages must be returned, while applying massive pressure on Hamas and the Gazan population, clarifying the cost of losing, applying international pressure on Iran as well, and breaking all of the rules that Hamas is trying to keep intact.

The Philadelphi Corridor must remain under Israel’s full control, including above-ground patrols to prevent unrestricted movement, underground detection to combat tunnels, and airborne activity, to prevent the infiltration of drones. This is how we can sever the lifeline used by Hamas and other terror organizations, and fulfill the war objective of destroying the organization in Gaza. Though most Israelis understand the gravity of the situation and rally around this objective, fully recalling the river of blood that flowed in the attempt to fulfill it, it’s unfortunate that this chorus isn’t seeking to remedy this, but rather, to go back to denial.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Retaking the Philadelphi Corridor will not be measured by the tank’s driving speed, but international pressure and Israeli denial הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Egypt, with its steadily growing population of some 113 million people (estimated to reach 160 million by 2050), is currently in the throes of a deep economic crisis, manifesting in a high inflation rate – approximately 34% as of 2023; a steep poverty rate at 29.7% as of 2019; a devaluation of the Egyptian Lira and a staggering debt to the tune of 165 billion dollars.

A new study by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement explores the causes of this crisis, Israel’s economic relations with Egypt and the potential opportunities lying therein for Israel.

One of the main threats to Egypt’s economy is the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on one of the Nile river’s sources. This project might cut off part of Egypt’s water supply, floating concerns of already soaring unemployment rates climbing even higher, as some 20% of the country’s population makes its living in agriculture. This also might deliver a blow to Egypt’s ability to produce food and supply electricity for its population, sinking the country’s GDP to a debilitating low. In turn, Egypt will find itself relying heavily on foreign import, increasing its already staggering debt and drag it into a whirlpool of financial crisis.

If that were not enough, Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, has been fostering various grandiose projects that are costing the Egyptian tax-payer billions of dollars. He is expected to continue pouring funds into these initiatives over the next few years, which will demand additional economic aid that will dig the economy into even deeper debt.

One such undertaking is the construction of the New Nile Delta project, aiming to enhance the country’s agricultural capacity to service its rapidly growing population. Egypt hopes that upon the conclusion of the Nile Delta expansion it will be able to independently produce vaster quantities of food at lower costs, while at the same time create jobs for millions of citizens.

Another such project is The New Administrative City – a new state-of-the-art capital located between its current capital of Cairo to Suez. The new city is expected to sit on an area of some 725 square kilometers (280 square miles) and become home to millions of people. The estimated cost of this project is approximately 58 billion dollars. An additional 14 cities are currently under construction across the country. Despite the fact that large swaths of the new city have already been completed, they remain unpopulated for the time being, and it is estimated that by the end of 2024, some 10,000 families will have relocated to the city.

At the same time, El-Sisi is pushing the construction of a new coastal city on an area of 170 square kilometers (66 square miles), which is planned to include new residential buildings, hotels, tourist attractions, hospitals, universities and more. This project aims to increase the country’s inflow of tourism, investments and foreign currency as a means with which to boost its economy. For this project, Egypt had signed in 2024 a financing agreement with the UAE  to the tune of 35 billion dollars. Estimates in Egypt are that total investments in this endeavor will amount to at least 150 billion dollars.

Another problem for the Egyptian economy is its debt crunch, wherein the country’s foreign debt now exceeds 165 billion dollars. In the 23-24 fiscal year, approximately 56% of the budget costs were allocated to covering past loans and interest, and to date, about 49% of the government’s revenues come from new loans. This creates a state of affairs in which Egypt is taking out gargantuan new loans to repay old debt and is in effect digging itself deeper into its financial hole. In light of this crisis, on December 2022 Egypt reached an agreement with the IMF for a 3-billion-dollar loan against a commitment to overhaul its economy and instate an economic reform. Despite less than adequate performance on this issue on part of Egypt, the IMF had agreed on March 2024 to increase the loan by another 5 billion dollars, and compromised on the execution of the reform, that would stand on four main pillars: an alternative and more flexible rate of exchange system; a tightening of the monetary and fiscal policies; earmarking a budget for supporting under the poverty line households; and attaining a healthy balance between the public and private sectors of the country.

Egypt’s economic relations with Israel

While Egypt is contending with its economic crises, Israel continues  its relatively steady trade relations with the Arab country. These ties are a ray of light in Egypt’s dismal economic situation.

One positive aspect of these relations is the Israeli tourism to the land of the Pharaohs. Every year, a large number of Israelis visit Egypt – mainly in the Sinai – boosting Egypt’s tourism. It is important to note though, that the outbreak of the Gaza war had significantly stemmed that flow.

In addition, the annual trade volume between the two countries is at hundreds of millions of dollars. These prolific relations bred joint trade meetings and conferences to expand economic collaboration and had even led to a plan to increase trade to 700 million dollars over the next several years. Just for comparison – in 2021, the volume of trade between Israel and Egypt – excluding gas – was at some 330 million dollars.

The main engine of the economic relations between the two countries is the gas export from Israel to Egypt – the mainstay of the trade relations. According to an agreement signed in 2018, Israel is to supply Egypt with 15 billion dollars’ worth of gas over a period of ten years. This gas is intended mainly for Egypt’s energy needs but some of it is exported by Egypt to Europe, after being processed by Egypt’s LNG plants, and is an important source of revenue for the government. Later, another agreement was signed between both countries in 2022, for the expansion of the supply from Israel. Additionally, in 2023, Egypt had pressured Israel to increase the supply. The outbreak of the Gaza war significantly reduced the supply of gas from Israel and in Egypt grievances were voiced on the frequent power cuts and the waning revenues from the LNG gas exports. Nonetheless, Israel continues to uphold its end of the deal and the partners of the Tamar gas field had even announced an increase of gas exports to Egypt starting 2025. It is safe to assume that in light of these developments, Egypt’s dependency on Israeli gas will deepen.

In conclusion, in the current state of affairs, Egypt is entrenched in a near-crippling economic crisis which is not expected to end in the next several years. Additionally, since the start of the Gaza war, Egypt has been adopting actions and rhetoric that are contradictory to Israel’s interest. In response, Israel can – and must – bring into play the leverages it possesses in the form of control over the gas tap, its relations with the US and its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, in order to advance Israel’s interest in the current armed conflict, i.e. the  seizure of Rafah, the elimination of Hamas, the return of the Israeli hostages and the control over the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border, and ensure Egypt’s support of these interest, while receiving aid from Israel.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Egypt’s Faltering Economy – A Local Crisis; An Opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The United Nations’ Secretary General, Antonio Gutteres, made a speech to mark one year to the October 7 massacre in Israel. Though he made the most compelling call for condemnation of Hamas, he failed to call upon his organization to recognize it as a terror group, to condemn Iran’s multifront campaign on the Jewish State, as well as touch upon the unprecedented anti-Israeli campaign he and the UN have been engaged in over the past year.

Here is an alternative speech that could still be delivered, if Guterres so choses.

The decision is his to make.

***

Distinguished delegates,

It has been one year since Iranian protégé Hamas’ horrible and inhumane massacre of innocent Israelis on October 7, and the Iran’s ensuing multifront campaign against Israel. It pains me to report, however, that the United Nations so far failed to take the most basic step and condemn this atrocity. One does not need to take sides to outright reject the human suffering caused by these enemies of civilization.

Over the past year, I made 37 work-related trips around the world in my capacity as the United Nations’ Secretary General. My unwavering commitment to the international community that entrusted me with this sacred mission is to be an honest broker, while insisting on fundamental values we should all share. I therefore traveled to all seven continents but Australia and Antarctica, and above all, the Middle East, in an attempt to bring the world together. Yet I regret to inform you that I preferred to skip over Israel, despite the fact that this long-standing member of the United Nations has just suffered the deadliest terrorist attack in its history.

However, I have taken the trouble to repeatedly talk at Israelis, rather than with them. I skipped no superlative in laying out my accusations of Israel, rushing to be “horrified” by Israeli airstrikes on Hamas compounds and averting against “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza. My deputy and a commission I appointed accused Israel of committing “war crimes”, my envoy to the Middle East claimed Israel had “no right of self-defense”, and my organization, the United Nations, still refuses to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. I myself invoked Chapter 99 for the first time since coming into office and only for the fourth time in history, citing concerns on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Yet I failed to explain how Gaza outperforms Yemen, with 400,000 dead from starvation, Syria, Ukraine, drug wars in Mexico, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, theaters that summon frail international reaction.

I repeatedly condemned Israel by name, accusing it of everything from deliberate starvation to genocide, with no evidence but Hamas’ bogus data (the “Gaza Ministry of Health”), ignoring over 1 million aid trucks that entered Gaza this year. Yet when Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles at Israeli cities, I never mentioned the Ayatollah regime by name, simply making a general reference to “escalation in the Middle East”, as if talking about the weather.

I have to admit that under my reign, I continued a UN tradition of anti-Israel bias. Already on October 19, before any Israeli troops ever entered Gaza, I traveled to Egypt and accused Israel of “starving” Palestinians in Gaza. “For nearly two weeks, the people of Gaza have gone without any shipments of fuel, food, water, medicine and other essentials,” I stated at the El Arish airport, as a 747 cargo was landing behind me, carrying 65 metric tons of humanitarian supplies on its way to Gaza.

I was oblivious, perhaps willfully, to the fact that since October 7, Israel remained the only country in the world to supply its enemy with food and fuel during wartime, with a great risk to its soldiers: over 60,000 trucks and airborne deliveries have shipped over 1 million tons of humanitarian aid into Gaza, supplying as many as 3,400 calories per day to every Gazan citizen. This policy remains highly unpopular among the Israeli public, as hostages are still being held in sub-human conditions in Gaza. Israel allowed and facilitated this despite clear indications that Hamas uses much of it to its own advantage.

I came back to Egypt in March, while flagrantly skipping over Israel once again. I did not skip over superlatives, though, claiming it was “monstrous” that “Palestinians in Gaza are marking Ramadan with Israeli bombs still falling, bullets still flying, artillery still pounding and humanitarian assistance still facing obstacle upon obstacle.” However, I made no request to Egypt, my host country, to stop blocking Palestinian refugees from fleeing into its territory or hurdling humanitarian aid, given it shares a border with Gaza. Egyptian President Al-Sisi even fenced out an enclave to block refugees in case the border is breached through the Rafah area. I would have never accepted such a situation had Moldova, Poland, or Romania ever blocked Ukrainian refugees from escaping a war zone.

I also failed to recognize how my own UN agencies actively colluded with Hamas. UNRWA facilitated the murder of Israelis with its teachers participating in the October 7 massacre, holding hostages, and over 400 of its members being part of Hamas’ Al Qassam Brigades. That did not stop me from claiming “188 UN workers” were killed in Gaza, outcrying how the “horror must stop,” while ignoring the oldest trick in the Hamas manual – registering terrorists as UN workers.

My agency UNOCHA, on its part, continues to whitewash Hamas’ disinformation. Figures neatly presented in charts and infographics illustrated how 42,000 Palestinians were allegedly killed in Gaza, based on bogus data provided by Hamas’ “Gaza Ministry of Health” and “various media reports”. I reiterated those figures, while professing to alert against “grave global harm” caused by other types of disinformation. Scores of violent protesters blocked Jewish students from entering campuses and attacked Jewish people on the streets around the world based on these false claims, that my own UN has slashed by half ever since.

Disinformation has even become normalized under my reign – though only when Israel is concerned. 35 Palestinians were never killed in an UNRWA school by an Israeli airstrike on June 6, yet my UN News agency rushed to report just that, and my spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric claimed that the incident was “another horrific example of the price that civilians are paying” in Gaza. Later I found out that 17 Hamas militants used the compound as a military site, a legitimate target according to any international law – with no civilian casualties. 500 Palestinians were never killed in the Al Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza on October 17, yet I rushed to announce I was “horrified” and “shocked” by the incident. Had I awaited the facts, I would have known that this was yet another Hamas fake news. In reality, a misfired PIJ rocket landed in the hospital’s parking lot, all but burning a few cars.

Israel was even excluded from the UN’s report on sexual violence despite multiple evidence on such crimes by Hamas on October 7, while we falsely accused Israel of committing such sexual crimes on Palestinians without a shred of evidence, simply for the sake of false balance.

Unlike my focus on Israel, I never made any significant appeal on Iran to cease funding terrorism, illegally developing nuclear weapons and publicly calling for the annihilation of Israel, while violating practically all of its international obligations. The Iranian regime instigated the October 7 massacre and continues to wreak havoc around the region and the world. I only mentioned Iran when paying tribute to its notorious president Raisi, in a special visit to Tehran, mourning the death of a mass murderer who made a mockery of international law and minority rights I care deeply about.

In general, I cannot report to you that I’m proud of my record from the past year. Rather than harshly criticizing Israel based on cooked numbers and partial reports, or only expressing empathy with Israeli victims within a “yes, but” context (as my famous speech shortly after the massacre, saying it “did not happen in a vacuum”), I should have rallied the international community against the clear and present threats aimed at the only Jewish state.

While Israel is fighting an existential war and is subject to attacks on multiple fronts, I failed to meet my obligations to it. I presided over a UN that according to my predecessor Koffi Annan, is “misused to constantly vilify the Jewish state and, in so doing, damage the world body itself and its universal values.” Its General Assembly dedicates 85% of its annual resolutions to Israel, while its Human Right Council’s infamous Article 7 singles Israel out for no apparent reason. No other country suffers this level existential threat while being in the crosshairs of the international community.

Going back to where I started – I did pay a visit to Israel during my tenure, albeit not in the past year, but in 2017. I stressed my commitment to combat anti-Semitism in the Yad Vashem holocaust memorial, while failing to meet that promise. I then visited the kibbutz of Nahal Oz, who borders Gaza and “heard from them of their fears of rocket attacks from Hamas, as well as tunnel infiltration”. I commended the residents’ will “to see Palestinians and Israelis living both in peace and both well.” I then toured a Hamas attack tunnel crossing the border. I failed to appreciate how this will evolve into an all-out massacre of 1,200 innocent Israelis, of which 16 were murdered and 8 taken hostage in the same Nahal Oz.

I realize my tenure will go down in history as a particularly shameful period as it relates not only to treating Israel, but any freedom-seeking nation. But now we have an opportunity to correct that record. Iran’s campaign of terror, rape and hostage taking must stop. Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire but to be encouraged to do justice with humanity’s most abominable enemies. We should all also appreciate the heroism of Israeli combatants who put their lives on the line not only for the defense of Israel, but all of us in the free world. Israel managed to channel unspeakable suffering into encapsulating human destiny with the spirit of its people and the ferocious Jewish belief in an ultimate good. For failing to meet my commitment, I ask Israel and my Jewish friends around the world for your forgiveness. May we leverage this war to vanquish evil, rather than appeasing it, and empowering Israel, rather than disavowing it.

Thank you.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט The Speech UN’s Guterres Should Have Given on October 7: “Time to Correct Our Record” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In recent years new concepts have been emerging in the global discourse, relating to the psychological warfare both within the cyberspace and beyond. Concepts such as Fake News, Disinformation, and Deep Space have entered popular jargon and brought to light  the gargantuan influence games raging between various global forces. One of those is Iran.

Iran has been waging ongoing sophisticated disinformation campaigns, aiming to sway public opinion against its enemies – namely Israel and the US. But Teheran can take a page out of the playbook of an old hand in sowing disinformation to influence public opinion – Russia.

For instance, Iran is attempting to intervene and influence the results of the upcoming presidential elections in the US. The Washington Post reported that the artificial intelligence (AI) developer OpenAI, announced in August 2024 that it had intercepted attempts by Iranian sources to use its famous chatbot ChatGP to manufacture online content to sow discord and widen the polarization in US society to influence the results of the elections this November. The network disseminated disinformation regarding both candidates – Democratic Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. The fake news aimed to increase the social discord in the United States by stoking social controversy. The Iranian network produced content mainly in the topic of the war in Gaza, LGBTQ rights and of course, the two presidential candidates.

According to intel in the US, the Iranian network, known as “2035-storm” operated a number of new websites and social networks. Iran’s primary objective in the information ecosystem is to stoke existing controversy in American society on particularly sensitive issues, propagate social chaos and undermine America’s political and social order from within. Presumably, even if the Iranians are able to foment discord even on a small scale, they will have considered this testimony to the long-standing claim championed by Iran that democracy is a flawed Western concept.

It seems that one popular topic utilized by the Iranian network is the current war in Gaza, which it frequently addresses. Thus for instance, it operates a website under the name Even Politics.com in which it publishes content on the ongoing Gaza war, the influence of religious groups and threats against American democracy. It is evident that most of the content of the site is biased against Donald Trump.

According to many experts in the field,  this method of disseminating disinformation is not the domain of Iran, and its attempts to sway the elections in the US seems to reflect the methodology employed by Russia, which operated a troll farm – an organized group engaging in the dissemination of disinformation – to flood the social networks with divisive content, ladened with disinformation. The telltale characteristic of the Russian methodology  apparent in the Iranian activity in the cyber ecosystem is the targeting of groups on both sides of the political divide in the US. The disinformation Iran uses aims to radicalize the political discourse, deepen the social discord and undermine the fabric of society in America.

Iranian efforts to influence the presidential elections in the US were evident already in 2018, when they set up a sophisticated system of fake accounts supposedly belonging to US House candidates and journalists. The Iranian campaign, which began in 2018, scaled up following the elimination of Qassem Soleimani, former Qods Force commander in Iraq in January 2020, under the order of then President, Donal Trump. Thus for instance, two Iranian nationals were charged in the US of involvement in the cybernetic disinformation  campaign targeting American voters ahead of the 2020 elections. Iranian perpetrators also sent threatening emails to voters during the 2020 campaign. Iran also used websites such as Even Politics to try and sway the 2022 midterm elections as well.

In addition to its use of social platforms, Iran utilizes other cyber instruments such as hacking and phishing, to try and throw the November elections into disarray. On August 10, officials in Trump’s campaign accused Teheran of hacking parts of its internal communications, leading to a federal investigation in the US. On August 19, the American federal Intelligence officials released an assessment confirming that there was “increasingly aggressive Iranian activity during this elections cycle”, which included “the recently reported activities targeting former President Trump’s campaign”. The intelligence assessment came after U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines suggested that Tehran’s efforts to influence the U.S. election were likely “because Iran’s leaders want to avoid an outcome that they believe would increase tensions with the United States,” i.e. Trump.

Iranian disinformation targeting Israel

Iran’s hostile interference activity in the cyberspace targets Israel as well. In the wake of October 7, Iran stepped up its activity aimed at spreading disinformation among the Israeli public. It was also recently revealed that a Telegram channel disguised as pro-Israel, “Tears of War”, has published dozens of messages since the beginning of the war, including heartbreaking posts pushing for the return of the hostages from Hamas captivity in Gaza. The posts were designed to convey a clear message: the Israeli government is to blame for the ongoing suffering of the hostages, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions were to blame for undermining prospects of a ceasefire. These are just a few examples of how this channel, along with others, is trying to deepen the discord in Israels’ political-social discourse on loaded issues that concern the Israeli public, such as the hostages and the ceasefire.

In all likelihood, the Tears of War account is operated by someone connected to Teheran and is used as a bellow with which to inflame tensions in Israel’s public. Through this and other channels, the Iranians are undermining the official Israeli narrative regarding the issue of the hostages and the war in Gaza in order to influence and manoeuvre the campaign according to Iranian interests. However, this devious campaign is just part of the picture of Iran’s network of activity in the information ecosystem against Israel.

From 2021 to date, Iran has been operating a widespread campaign in the digital ecosystem aiming to psychologically manipulate the Israeli public and further tear at the social and ideological conflict, particularly evident following Israel’s Operation Guardian of the Walls that year. Tehran’s ultimate goal is to turn the public in Israel against the government, to undermine the government and affect anarchy that would serve to weaken Israel.

To this end, Iran employs advanced tactics and methods, such as digital email campaigns, social media landing pages, and the dissemination of deep fake AI-generated content designed to reach more accurately segmented audiences and increase engagement.

The Iranian activity in the cyberspace has three discrete phases, each with specific objectives:

The escalation of tensions between the various groups from all sides of the social divides in Israel, e.g. religious groups and the LGBTQ community; religion and non-religious etc. The next step is fomenting pollical discord between the right and left of the political map. The third stage, of which Iran is presently engaged in, is to saw discontent in the Israeli public with regards to the Israeli government’s response to the actions of Hamas.

Teheran’s expansive use of the digital ecosystem is intended to create a skewed perception of reality among Israel’s public to the extent that they cannot discern between fact and fiction; victim and aggressor. Thus, the Iranians try to swamp the web with disinformation and distorted intentional narratives by exploiting – often unwitting – local resources to spread this content, amplified by of local content in leading channels.

Case in point: last May, the abovementioned “Tears of War” telegram channel paid for sponsored promotion on a Telegram channel of an Israeli blogger, Daniel Amram,  called “Uncensored Daniel Amram”, which has 378 thousand followers. The posts on Daniel Amram’s  channel gave the Iranian’s access to the mobile devices of thousands of Israeli followers and disseminate content calling for the cessation of the war. The use of local channels to promote fake narrative through such content is one instrument Tehran utilizes to saw confusion in the Israel’s public, obscuring the boundaries between what is in effect occurring and cyberspace. The disparity between the misguided perception and reality provides a convenient platform for mind engineering and influencing campaigns and for collecting data on followers, even for the recruitment of civilians for their cause. Iranian cyber networks use fake accounts to contact Israeli civilians by sending them private messages on social networks such as Telegram, WhatsApp etc. The use of content-intensive networks, which are full of fake accounts the respond to or upload posts lend a veneer  of credibility that allowד spreading messages to users, who are contacted through private messages, unaware that they are being recruited.

On January 2024, the Israeli General Security Services announce that fake accounts operated by an Iranian network posted fake job offers and surveys to recruit Israelis to carry out various tasks. These privately-sent requests included, among others, prompts to hang signs with slogans phrased by the Iranians, surveys, photographing protesters and so on. The Iranian network operated to recruit Israelis by deceit, and to use them for purposes of intelligence collection, such as photographing houses of anti-Iranians and individuals belonging to the Israeli security establishment.

In conclusion, it seems that the Iranian networks operating in the Israeli and American digital ecosystem have a deep understanding of the public discourse of both publics. The use of the various social networks and other means of dissemination, such as emails, is spreading by exploiting the ease with which massive numbers of users can be reached privately to deceitfully collect intelligence.

Furthermore, it seems that the Iranian methods of operations are becoming increasingly streamlined and Tehran’s influencing campaigns are able to hit upon exposed nerves in the social rift both in America and Israel. Moreover, the daily interaction with citizens affords Iran with comprehensive social insights, enabling it to analyze the social discourse and accordingly modify the messages it seeks to promote and advance its strategic objectives through instant messaging to users.

The US is heading toward its presidential elections, while Israel is in a state of a multi-theater war, and events are developing at breakneck speed. A  large part of the population uses social networks to stay abreast on current events, mainly on Telegram and -X (Twitter). This increased dissemination of content is a fertile ground for Iran’s frequent disinformation and mind engineering campaigns.

This sophisticated method of spreading messages and content via social networks serves Iran’s long-term strategic goals. The disinformation foments distrust in the governing institution of its enemies and disintegrate their societies – Israeli and American – from within.

Additionally, all this cements Iran’s status as a powerful player in the digital ecosystem and offensive cyber, increasing its ability to collect intelligence and hurt civilians. Teheran’s deep understanding of the main issues of social discourse in Israel, and its ability to influence sentiments in Israel’s public reflect an escalation in its ability to orchestrate influencing campaigns and spark social discord and controversy.

Moreover, the Iranian disinformation campaigns are greatly accelerated with the help of artificial intelligence, which they even use to produce deepfake videos, increase the quality of their fake content and mislead public officials, media outlets and many citizens. Teheran’s use of fake, manipulative content produced by artificial intelligence is expected to further expand, to increase the output and dissemination. The use of artificial intelligence will also contribute to the fine-tuning of messages to increase their influence on the public discourse, in Israel, the United States, or any other country Teheran considers its enemy.

Examples of posts from the “tears of War” Telegram channel

Many of the channel’s posts contain the hashtag #Its All His Fault! referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, aiming to widen the divide in Israel’s society and increase opposition to the government and its system:

This is one of many posts on the ‘Tears of War’ Telegram channel with the hashtag #It’s All His Fault, aiming to increase social controversy and opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government through an image insinuating the situation of the hostages in Gaza, depicting a drawing of the radar operators while being kidnapped from their base on October 7. The post aims to counter balance the shift of attention to the fighting in the northern arena against Hezbollah and Lebanon.

Some posts focus on Iran, suggesting that the channel’s operators are of Iranian source. Below is an example of such two posts published during the 2024 Paris Olympics, emphasizing that Iran has won more medals than Israel:

הפוסט Games of Influence: Iranian Disinformation in Israel and the USA הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the aftermath of Yahya Sinwar’s death, Hamas is in deep shock. They are now struggling to recover and choose a new leader. Sinwar’s killing is perceived to be much more significant than that of Ismail Haniyeh, and even of Ahmad Yassin in 2004. This is due to the fact that the Hamas leadership is now divided between the “Iranian-Shiite” axis and the “Sunni Axis”. Following Ismail Haniyeh’s killing in July, when it seemed that Khaled Mashal would take over from Haniyeh and resume his former role as Head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Iran and Sinwar were adamantly opposed to this move. Khaled Mashal was reputed to be the leader of the “Sunni Axis” in Hamas, close to and supportive of Qatar and Turkey.

In view of the schisms within the Hamas leadership – between the Shiite axis and the Sunni axis, and between the “Hamas Leadership Abroad” and the “Hamas Leadership in Gaza”, what are the implications of Sinwar’s death on this murderous terrorist organization?

The Hamas leadership is struggling to select a new leader so as to continue the war against Israel. The removal of Sinwar is a severe blow to the organization, however it is thought the organization is not going to disappear completely, and it might even recover. One of the prevailing assessments in the Israel security forces is that the center of gravity, where decisions will be made, will now migrate from the Hamas Leadership in Gaza to the Hamas Leadership Abroad, and that Sinwar’s replacement will be selected from this group.

A feverish battle of succession is now underway, where the Hamas Gaza also has a “trump card” in the form of Muhammad Sinwar, Yahya Sinwar’s brother, who is now leading Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The latter is now running the fight against Israel, he holds the Israeli hostages. With him is Muhammad Shabana, commander of the organization’s Rafah Brigade.

The Hamas senior leadership is now divided. The battle behind the scenes is between the candidates affiliated with Iran and those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent movement. Iran, it seems, will do whatever it can to retain Hamas as its proxy. Hamas, which is not an Iranian proxy by nature, since it is a Sunni organization, product of the Muslim Brotherhood, does have a convergence of interests with Iran – namely the destruction of the State of Israel.

Who are the senior Hamas figures out of whom the next leader will emerge?

“Shiite Axis” members, favoring Iran:

1. Khalil Al-Haya, who was Yahya Sinwar’s right-hand man, and who officially announced Sinwar’s death on behalf of Hamas. Al-Haya is based in Qatar, where he coordinates the indirect hostage release negotiations with Israel as part of the Hamas Leadership Abroad. Al-Haya is very closely aligned with the Iranian Faction of Hamas. He has even met with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, in Istanbul together with the organization’s Chairman of the Hamas Shura Council, Muhammad Darwish following Yahya Sinwar’s death.
2. Muhammad, Head of the Hamas Shura Council, is also affiliated with the Hamas Iranian faction.
3. Muhammad Sinwar, who masterminded the abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006, is supported by Iran, He is holding the Israeli hostages and is running the war against Israel in the Gaza Strip.

“Sunni Axis” members, favoring the Muslim Brotherhood:

1. Khaled Mashal, head of the Hamas leadership abroad, is the former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is affiliated with Qatar and Turkey as well as Pakistan. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement and is at odds with Iran. The Iranians have not forgotten his past statements and his sympathies with the Sunni world. Masal even went so far recently in his statements, in an interview, that Iran was behind the killing of Ismail Haniyeh.
2. Mousa Abu Marzouk, former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. Abu Marzouk speaks frequently about the hostage deals and reflects Hamas’ position on this issue.

Sinwar’s death is an important pivotal point in the war. It might even tip the balance, subdue Hamas and trigger a renewed hostage deal. This being said, Muhammad Sinwar, who has Iran’s backing, might not agree to a hostage deal with Israel while the latter has the upper hand – this might constitute a surrender of the organization and admission of its defeat in the war. A decision has even been made recently in Hamas, to appoint Muhammad Sinwar as the decision-maker in all matters concerning a hostage deal with Israel. He has also apparently been named acting commander of the terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. This is not to say that Muhammad Sinwar has been elected as supreme leader of the organization, which would include the overseas branch, but it does elevate his standing considerably and it also increases the likelihood that he will eventually be chosen to replace Yahya Sinwar at the helm of the terrorist organization.

Moreover, Muhammad Sinwar might continue to tow the line mapped out by his brother Yahya Sinwar, who prior to his death decided to renew the suicide attacks inside Israel. It also seems that as far as the military wing of Hamas in Gaza is concerned, there are hopes of a further escalation in the hostilities between Israel and Iran and Hezbollah, which would divert the main thrust of the IDF’s pressure toward Lebanon or Iran.

This article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Implications on Hamas from the Killing of Yahya Sinwar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Israeli military response against Hamas in Gaza, following the October 7^th massacre, and the current campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah has also sparked criticism, even ire, on the part of a significant part of the international community. This phenomenon has not skipped several Latin American governments, especially those belonging to the “Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas” (ALBA), which includes Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia. Shortly after the October 7^th massacre, when Israel began striking Hamas in Gaza, La Paz cut diplomatic ties with Israel and presented a request to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to “investigate the situation in Palestine”, while the governments of Colombia and Chile recalled their ambassadors on the same day and later backed South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICC, together with Brazil and Mexico.

In early October 2024, Nicaragua also announced plans to cut diplomatic ties with Israel. The move is essentially symbolic, since relations between Israel and the central American country are nonexistent. It is worth recalling that, in June 2023, Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, welcomed former Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Managua.

Nicaragua had already broken relations with Israel two times, once in 2010 under Ortega, and previously in 1982 under the Sandinista revolutionary regime.

On the contrary, Argentina’s newly-elected President, Javier Milei, as well asEl Salvador’s Nayyib Bukele, confirmed their support for Israel, with the latter comparing Hamas’ violence to the one perpetrated by the Maras and praising the liberation of the Palestinians from Hamas’ clutches.

Paraguay is also backing Israel while planning the relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem. In 2019, Paraguay also added Hamas and Hezbollah to its terrorist blacklist, along with ISIS and al-Qaeda.

This general situation generates concern, considering that Latin America has been a hub for terror activity for the last four decades, with its long history of terrorist attacks by local groups, including the FARC and ELN guerrillas in Colombia, and the Shining Path in Peru, as well as the longtime presence of Hezbollah, as explained by Jennifer Teale of the IDSF.

Hezbollah is not the only terrorist organization that found a safe harbor in Latin America. Starting in the 1990s, several other groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Group, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al-Qaeda, and more recently the Islamic State (ISIS) have all found footholds in Latin America.

The reason why Islamist terrorism is widely present in Latin America is due to a series of reasons such as the possibility of exploiting illicit trafficking networks, especially for drugs and money laundering, porous borders, inadequate law enforcement, and lack of proper counter-terror laws.

There is no doubt that the undisputed Islamist organization who dominates Latin America is Hezbollah, which has been present and operational in the continent since the early 1980s. It has been relying mostly on a vast networking operation, implemented by Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah has also been widely involved in drug trafficking and money-laundering activities, especially from its base in the Triple Frontier: the intersection point where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet.

Iran and Hezbollah’s current spearhead in Latin America is Venezuela, due to the strong links between Maduro’s regime and Teheran. Iran has invested heavily in Venezuelan oil refineries and assisted President Maduro’s regime in reviving their struggling oil industry. Maduro’s Venezuela has practically aligned with Iran’s radical axis, ramping up its vile rhetoric against Israel and the West, its accusations against Israel of “genocide” on the UN stage, and Maduro’s open anti-Semitism, accusing “international Zionism” of anti-government protests in his country.

Hezbollah managed to root itself on Venezuelan soil and establish networks that can operate throughout Latin America, taking advantage of the sizable Lebanese community in the country. A similar situation occurred in Brazil, another country with a vast Lebanese presence and it is not by coincidence that, in November 2023, the Brazilian security services unfoiled an attack against the country’s Jewish community, which was planned by Hezbollah.

In 2021, Colombia’s security apparatus thwarted an Iranian plot to assassinate two Israeli businessmen in the country and expelled two Hezbollah operatives.

In March 2024, the Peruvian police arrested an Iranian and a Peruvian national who were planning an attack on an Israeli person at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), scheduled to be held in November in the Andean country.

In addition, on August 16, Argentina’s Federal Police thwarted an Islamist terror plot reportedly linked to ISIS and the Taliban to murder Jews in Mendoza, the second such plot uncovered in Argentina this year.

While these plots were exposed in time to be thwarted, they are a proof that the Jewish communities and Israelis in Latin America remain a primary target of both Sunni and Shia terrorist organizations that, until recently, have been able to operate with impunity.

Potential threats

Regarding potential targets, another aspect that must not be underestimated is the flourishing Israeli tourism industry in Latin America, with post-military “mochileros” who travel to these areas for long periods of time, often in remote parts, and could become a target of terrorists.

Given the current situation in Lebanon, with Hezbollah brought to its knees by the Israeli offensive and with Iran appearing hesitant to actively enter the field in support of its Lebanese proxy, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian regime and Hezbollah may try to strike where they still have operational networks, and attempt to target Jewish communities and Israelis abroad. In September 2023, Mossad chief David Barnea announced that the Israeli intelligence organization has managed to thwart 27 attempted terrorist attacks by Iran over one year alone, including in Latin America. The normally quiet continent could be one of the most suitable areas, considering the huge gaps in the security sector both on the legislative level and on law enforcing.

One must not forget the difficulty of the authorities in controlling vast areas of the “selva”, the “sierra”, and the long, often impervious borders, such as the one between Colombia and Venezuela, whose neighboring areas have become strongholds for the FARC and ELN terror groups. Other problematic areas are the Vraem in Peru, where Sendero Luminoso is based, and the borders connecting Brazil with Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay, not difficult to cross and major transit points for drug traffickers, often linked to the Iranian terror network.

Extreme caution is therefore recommended when traveling throughout Latin America, not just in cities but also in the more remote natural areas, and avoid those countries hostile to Israelis and Jews.

This article was originally published in Jewish News Syndicate – JNS.org

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט How safe is Latin America for Israelis and Jews? A few thoughts הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On October 29, 2024, responding to a request from Algeria, Russia and Iran, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session, to discuss the Israeli response to the Iranian attack on Israel. During the session, the UNSC again fell foul to the anti-Israel propaganda.

While the UNSC was quick to answer the call to provide a platform to again attack Israel, an examination of the record of the UNSC resolutions adopted since the October 7 massacre, shows that in breach of its ostensibly lofty goals, the UNSC has failed to show even the most basic moral clarity.

For over a year, since the October 7 ,2023, massacre, Israel has been under attack from seven different fronts. Genocidal terrorists and a terror-sponsoring rogue state, who openly declare their goal to destroy Israel have all participated in the attacks on Israel. Despite having had multiple discussions on the “situation in the Middle East,” the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has consistently failed to show any moral leadership. Seemingly powerless in the face of the aggression of the Ayatollahs from Tehran and their terror proxies, the UNSC has been entirely neutralized.

The failure is so great, that the UNSC has not even been able to muster an unequivocal condemnation of the Palestinian terrorist murderers – Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and others – who carried out the massacre, let alone promote their designation as UN recognized terror organizations. The UNSC has similarly been unable to muster a clear condemnation of Hezbollah, an internationally designated terror organization, for its aggression against Israel. So too, the UNSC has been incapable of condemning Iran for launching, on two separate occasions, over 500 explosive projectiles, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UAV’s, towards Israel.

In contrast to its refusal to condemn the terrorists and the Ayatollahs for attacking Israel, when it wanted to act, the UNSC knew how to respond.

The message being bull horned around the globe by the UNSC is that the massacre of Jews and the continued threat posed to the only Jewish state simply do not interest the UNSC.

Instead of aspiring to live up to the foremost goal of the UN,^[1] “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,” the UNSC is cowering in the face of fanatical terrorism.

While the UNSC has had ample time to demonstrate moral leadership, it chose instead to ignore, excuse and UN-wash the actions of genocidal terrorists and the Ayatollahs. Instead of promoting peace, the actions of the terrorists and the Ayatollahs, combined with the abject failure of the UNSC, have now brought the entire middle east to the brink of the abyss.

Since the October 7 massacre and the ensuing war with the terrorists in the Gaza Strip, the war in Lebanon initiated by Hezbollah, the attacks launched by the Houtis from Yemen, and the Iranian missile barrage, the UNSC has adopted a number of resolutions regarding the middle east.^[2] None of these resolutions condemned the genocidal terrorists or Iran.

UNSCR 2707 (2023)^[3]

The first UNSC resolution regarding the middle east was adopted on November 14, 2023, over a month after the October 7 massacre. At the time, the war in Gaza raged on and hundreds of hostages taken by the genocidal Gazan terrorists during the massacre languished in Gazan dungeons, and while the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah and the Houtis, were actively engaged in attacking Israel.

Shockingly, the resolution made no mention of Hamas, no mention of the other Gazan terrorist organizations, no mention of the October 7 massacre, no mention of the hostages and no mention of the attack on Israel by Hezbollah.

Rather, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution reaffirmed the UNSC’s “strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen” and determined that “the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.”

UNSCR 2712 (2023)^[4]

UNSC resolution 2712 regarding “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” was adopted the next day, on November 15, 2023.

As if written and adopted in a vacuum devoid of any context, the resolution merely referred to the “armed conflict” underway and made a number of general statements. The resolution did not mention the October 7 massacre and did not condemn Hamas or the other Gazan terrorist organizations for their heinous acts. The resolution was similarly devoid of any mention of Hezbollah, the Houtis, or any of their attacks on Israel.

Rather the resolution adopted the all-too-familiar approach of ignoring the Palestinian and Iranian-backed terror, while trying to shackle the arms of Israel.

The only reference the resolution made to the real situation, was the mealy-mouthed call to the genocidal terrorists, as if they cared a damn about the resolutions of the UNSC, “for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas and other groups, especially children, as well as ensuring immediate humanitarian access.”

While substantial attention was paid to the situation in the Gaza Strip, no mention was made of the over 140,000^[5] Israelis who had been forced to abandon their homes, or what was left of them, due to the terror of the Gazan and Hezbollah terrorists.

By comparison, when the UNSC truly wanted to denounce terror, it certainly knew how to do so. Just a month earlier, on September 15, 2023, the UNSC adopted resolution 2697 (2023).^[6] In that resolution the UNSC made clear that “that ISIL/Da’esh constitutes a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, particularly those committed against women and children…” The UNSC further condemned “the commission of acts by ISIL/Da’esh involving murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking,…”

UNSC resolution 2716,^[7] adopted on December 21, 2023, and titled on the UNSC website as “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” was similarly lacking. Instead of addressing the Palestinian terrorists and the Iran-back terror proxies, Hezbollah and the Houtis, the resolution dealt solely with Afghanistan, never mentioning the threat to international security posed by the Gazan terrorists or the Iranian proxy war against Israel.

Once again, the UNSC proved that when it truly sought to address the root causes of terror and its horrors, it certainly had the ability to do so.

UNSC resolution 2718,^[8] adopted on the same day, also ignored the actions of the Palestinian terrorists and the Iran-back terror proxies, Hezbollah and the Houtis. Rather, it focused on the activities of United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), another one of a plethora of UN organizations that fails to acknowledge reality.

According to its website, UNDOF was established in 1974, after “war erupted in the Middle East between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai, and between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”^[9] Shamefully, undermining its basic mandate, UNDOF is even incapable of clearly stating that it was the Egyptians and the Syrians who, on October 6, 1973, launched the war in the hope of annihilating Israel. Apparently, the inability of the UN and its organizations to clearly identify the true aggressors is nothing new, but rather a longstanding pattern of failure.

Having said that, UNSC resolution 2718 again demonstrated the UNSC’s ability to clearly identify terrorists and adopt measures to combat them. Thus for example, one provision of the resolution provides that UNSC reaffirmed “its readiness to consider listing individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities providing support to ISIL (Da’esh) or to the Al-Nusra Front (also known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham or Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), including those who are financing, arming, planning, or recruiting for ISIL (Da’esh) or the Al-Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida as listed on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including those participating in or otherwise supporting attacks against UNDOF peacekeepers.”

Needless to say, to this day, the UNSC has expressed no such commitment to sanction members of the genocidal Gazan terror organizations or those who support, fund and arm them. Clearly, in the so-called global battle against terror, in the eyes of the UNSC, terrorists who murder, rape, torture and kidnap Jews are not worthy of being sanctioned.

UNSCR 2720^[10]

UNSC resolution 2720 was adopted on December 22, 2023, and directly addressed the war. However, following what had already become the UNSC’s clear course of action, the resolution again failed to mention the October 7 massacre, the genocidal Gazan terrorists, or the Iranian terror proxies. Most of the resolution was devoted to the alleged hardships of the Gazans.

Most noticeable, was the maliciously misleading language of the resolution used to make demands of “all parties to the conflict.” Failing again to identify the true aggressors, the UNSC chose to adopt language that placed democratic, law-abiding Israel, on the same footing as the genocidal terrorists. While appearing even-handed, the UNSC knows that the Gazan terrorists have no basic respect for human life, let alone UNSC resolutions. Thus, in the attempt to appear neutral, in reality the UNSC was not only ignoring the actions of the genocidal terrorists, but also, simultaneously castigating and making demands solely of Israel.

The only reference the resolution made to the actions of the genocidal terrorists was to repeat the mealy-mouthed call for the “immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address medical needs of all hostages.”

As if the genocidal Gazan terrorists had not just committed a massacre in an attempt to annihilate Israel, the resolution continued delusionally by reiterating the UNSC’s “unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace.”

Seemingly oblivious to the situation on the ground, the resolution then stressed “the importance of unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.” Were the members of the UNSC unaware of the fact that as a result of internal Palestinian politics, the Palestinian Authority (PA) had not had any governance role in Gaza since 2007? Were they unaware that when given the chance, the Palestinian people elected the genocidal terrorists from Hamas to head the PA?

When combined, the true meaning of the UNSC commitment to establish a Palestinian state that would be governed by the PA, is nothing more than a call to reward the genocidal terrorists from Hamas for raping, murdering, torturing and beheading 1,200 people and kidnapping over 250 others.

Resolution 2722,^[11] adopted on January 10, 2024, gave the UNSC another opportunity to address the attacks on Israel. Focusing on the activities of the Houti terrorists in Yemen, the resolution addressed at length the terror organization’s attacks on “merchant and commercial vessels transiting the Baab al-Mandab” and emphasized the resulting “increased cost of transportation of essential goods will have a negative impact on the economic and humanitarian situation worldwide.”

While commerce and freedom of navigation were clearly of great importance, the UNSC failed to make any mention of the Houti attacks on Israel.

UNSCR 2728^[12]

Adopted on March 25, 2024, resolution 2728 again directly addressed the war between Israel and the genocidal terrorists. Following in its already established tradition, the resolution ignored the October 7 massacre and the attacks on Israel by Hezbollah and the Houtis.

Instead of addressing the true aggressors, the resolution called on Israel to unconditionally surrender to the terrorists, by implementing “an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire.”

Knowing that their calls would fall on the deaf ears of the genocidal terrorists, the UNSC again tried to feign concern by demanding “the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address their medical and other humanitarian needs.”

On the morning of April 13, 2024, the homicidal Ayatollahs in Iran fired over 330 explosive projectiles – ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UAV’s – at Israel. Despite the blatant breach of international law, the UNSC again failed to pass any resolution condemning the Ayatollahs.

On June 10, 2024, the UNSC adopted two resolutions – UNSCR 2734 and UNSCR 2735. While both resolutions theoretically addressed the threats of terrorism and the international response required, they were divided by an abyss.

Resolution 2734,^[13] titled on the UNSC website^[14] as a resolution on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” spanned 30 pages and included over 100 paragraphs. The resolution opened by restating the fundamental truth that “terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever committed.” The resolution added “that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional, and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations.” The resolution continued by detailing a list of steps – including, inter alia, financial steps, trade embargoes, designation of terrorists, international cooperation etc. – that should be adopted and implemented on both the national and international level to deal effectively with the threat posed by terrorism.

While talking in universal terms about the global threat of terrorism, shamefully, the resolution focused solely on ISIL and Al-Qaida and made no reference whatsoever to any of the Palestinian terrorist organizations dedicated to murdering Jews and destroying Israel – Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and many others. The resolution similarly excluded any reference to Hezbollah or the Houtis.

UNSCR 2735^[15]

In contrast to the unwavering condemnation of terror contained in UNSCR 2734, UNSCR 2735 focused on the response to the genocidal terror of the Gazan terrorists. Instead of proscribing a detailed and agreed international framework for combatting the Gazan terrorists, all the resolution did was present a plan for the implementation of a ceasefire.

The plan itself was fundamentally flawed and reflected another major moral regression of the UNSC.

While the previous UNSC resolutions had at least paid mealy-mouthed lip-service to the unconditional release of all the hostages held by the genocidal terrorists, suddenly UNSCR 2735 merely included a call for the release of the hostages as part of Israels multi-stage surrender to the terrorists. According to the resolution, Israel was not only required to stop fighting the terrorists and withdraw from the Gaza Strip, but it would also be required to agree to the “the exchange of Palestinian prisoners” – a synonym for releasing thousands of convicted terrorist murderers – and to implement a “major multi-year reconstruction plan for Gaza.”

Having metaphorically, but practically presented Israel’s head on a platter to the genocidal terrorists, by including in the resolution Israel’s agreement to its terms, the UNSC then called “upon Hamas to also accept it.”

History shows that the genocidal terrorists rejected the UNSC resolution.

While the website of the UNSC gave resolution 2737,^[16] adopted on June 27, 2024, the title of “The situation in the Middle East,” it solely addressed the continued functioning of UNDOF, without mentioning any aspect of the attacks on Israel.

Similarly, while UNSCR 2739^[17] and UNSCR 2742^[18] focused on the terrorism of the Houtis and Yemen, they made no mention of the Houti terror directed against Israel and its civilians.

UNSCR 2749^[19]

Adopted on August 28, 2024, UNSCR 2749 addressed, for the first time, the war between Israel and Lebanon. Continuing its moral failing and inability to objectively recognize the terrorist actions of Hezbollah, as the cause for the war, the resolution ignored the fact that the terrorist organization had launched thousands of rockets, UAV’s and anti-tank missiles into Israel, indiscriminately targeting Israel’s civilian population.

Alongside its failure to recognize the terrorist aggression, the resolution similarly failed to recognize Israel’s right to self-defence. Instead, the resolution reaffirmed the UNSC “commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701.”

UNSCR 1701^[20] was adopted in 2006 following the Second Lebanon War. Similar to the current conflict, the Second Lebanon War started after Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israel from Gaza in June 2006, killed a number of Israeli soldiers and kidnapped another, taking him into Gaza. Two weeks later, as Israel was conducting a military operation in Gaza to secure the release of the soldier, Hezbollah decided to come to the assistance of its genocidal Gazan friends. On the instruction of the organizations Secretary-General, on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah terrorists infiltrated Israel, attacked an IDF patrol, and then proceeded to take hostage the bodies of two of the murdered soldiers.

Adopted on August 11, 2006, UNSCR 1701 called for the removal of the Hezbollah terrorists from southern Lebanon, the deployment of the Lebanese army in that area, and for measures to be adopted to prevent the Iranian terror regime from re-arming its terror proxy.

The only provision of the resolution that was ever implemented was the requirement that Israel withdraws all its forces from Lebanon. The rest of the resolution was never implemented. Hezbollah never retreated from southern Lebanon and despite receiving substantial US aid, the Lebanese army never deployed in the south. While Hezbollah finished the Second Lebanon War with between 13,000-15,000 rockets of limited range, by October 8, 2024, when Hezbollah again came to the assistance of Hamas, its arsenal had grown ten-fold to over 150,000 warheads. The new weaponry was also technologically developed and included not only short-range rockets, but also long-range GPS-guided precision missiles^[21] and an array of UAVs.^[22]

To complete the disgrace of the Security Council, UNSCR 2749 reiterated its “its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,” but made no similar recognition of Israel’s right to territorial integrity or sovereignty.

Understanding the complete impotence of the UNSC, on October 1, 2024, the Ayatollahs in Iran launched another massive attack on Israel, firing over 180 ballistic missiles.

Despite the blatant Iranian aggression, the UNSC again shamefully failed to adopt any resolution.

The October 7 Massacre

On the morning of October 7, 2023, more than 3,000 terrorists from Gaza, including members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, all internationally designated terror organizations, together with others, invaded Israel and conducted a heinous massacre. The terrorists flooded more than 30 Israeli towns, villages, kibbutzim, and a number of military installations.

Men, women, the elderly, sick people, children, and babies were murdered. Some were shot, others were raped.^[23] Some were beheaded, many were tortured, others were burned alive. Approximately 1,200 people were murdered. Among those murdered were 822 civilians,^[24] including 531 men and 291 women; 40 were children under the age of 18; 68 were foreign nationals; 18 Bedouin citizens of Israel were murdered, 11 of them on October 7 and seven more due to rocket strikes; 61 police officers were killed, of whom, 58 fell in combat during the October 7 massacre, including 15 who fell during the attack on the Nova Music Festival, during which 379 people were murdered; 10 personnel of the Israel Security Agency were murdered; and 5 firefighters were murdered.

All that remained of some victims were their teeth, requiring the assistance of archaeologists to identify them^[25]. An additional 6,900 people were wounded to different degrees.

Over two hundred and fifty hostages, most of them alive but also some dead bodies,^[26] were snatched by the terrorists to be used as leverage against Israel. While some of the hostages were released in a deal with the genocidal terrorists, and others were rescued in daring IDF operations,^[27] as of October 30, 2024, 101 hostages continue to be held by the genocidal terrorists in the Gaza Strip.

The October 7 attack was carried out under cover of a barrage of more than 3,000 rockets and mortars fired by the terrorists, indiscriminately targeting Israel’s civilian population.^[28]

The way forward

If the UNSC seeks to maintain even a modicum of respectability, let alone legitimacy, it must be willing to clearly identify and sanction the true aggressors. In stark contradiction of the dominant discussions in the UNSC, the source of violence and terror, and the sole culprit for undermining the security of the middle east is Iran, not Israel.

For over a year, Iran and its multiple terror proxies have been engaged in thousands of attacks on Israel and its citizens. From the October 7 massacre carried out by the Gazan terrorists, through the war on Israel launched by Hezbollah, the attacks of the Houtis and the direct ballistic missile attacks, Iran and its axis of evil, have been doing their utmost to attack Israel, murder Jews, and torpedo the expansion of Abraham Peace Accords.

Similar to the United Nations General Assembly, the UNSC has lost its moral compass. Instead of clearly identifying the Iranian aggressor and its terror proxies, the UNSC is kowtowing to the belligerency of the Ayatollahs.

The failure to adopt a clear resolution condemning the October 7 massacre, and to sanction Iran and its terror proxies will forever remain a stain on the UNSC.

If the UNSC does not change direction and show the moral clarity and leadership needed, it risks losing whatever minimal standing it still enjoys.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

^[1] Article 1, para. 1 of the UN Charter
^[2] See: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions
^[3] n2335249.pdf (un.org)
^[4] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/359/02/pdf/n2335902.pdf
^[5] https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/bb4ad946-3c2d-ef11-815f-005056aac6c3/2_bb4ad946-3c2d-ef11-815f-005056aac6c3_11_20597.pdf
^[6] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/269/50/pdf/n2326950.pdf
^[7] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/407/49/pdf/n2340749.pdf
^[8] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/415/70/pdf/n2341570.pdf
^[9] https://undof.unmissions.org/background
^[10] n2342487.pdf (un.org)
^[11] n2400928.pdf (un.org)
^[12] n2408081.pdf (un.org)
^[13] n2416483.pdf (un.org)
^[14] Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 2024 | Security Council
^[15] n2416511.pdf (un.org)
^[16] n2418731.pdf (un.org)
^[17] n2418724.pdf (un.org)
^[18] n2419892.pdf (un.org)
^[19] n2425089.pdf (un.org)
^[20] Etpu (un.org)
^[21] https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hezbollah-and-lebanon-an-in-depth-examination-under-hassan-nasrallah-s-leadership/hezbollah-s-precision-guided-missile-project/
^[22] https://israel-alma.org/2023/12/17/hezbollah-its-origin-growth-and-capability/
^[23] In the course of the massacre, the terrorists specifically used sexual violence against the victims – https://palwatch.org/page/35268; https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/report/mission-report-official-visit-of-the-office-of-the-srsg-svc-to-israel-and-the-occupied-west-bank-29-january-14-february-2024/20240304-Israel-oWB-CRSV-report.pdf
^[24] https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023
^[25] https://www.timesofisrael.com/archaeologists-sift-through-devastation-to-help-families-of-oct-7-victims-gain-closure/
^[26] The body of at least one victim was taken by an UNRWA employee – https://www.timesofisrael.com/mother-whose-sons-body-was-seized-by-unrwa-staff-calls-on-un-head-to-meet-in-geneva/
^[27] https://www.gov.il/en/pages/hostages-and-missing-persons-report
^[28] For more comprehensive details of the massacre, see (among others): https://govextra.gov.il/mda/october-7/october-7/what-happened-on-the-7th-of-october/; https://www.hamas-massacre.net/; https://oct7map.com/; https://www.october7.org/; https://t.me/hamasdid; https://www.memri.org/reports/special-announcement-%E2%80%93-hamas-atrocities-documentation-center-hadc; https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-civilian-casualties; https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hamas-israel-war-24/all-articles/what-happened-in-the-october-7th-massacre/

הפוסט The failure of the UN Security Council to respond to the ongoing attempt to destroy Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Not many people are as strongly connected to the northern region of Israel as Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi. Although she wasn’t born in the Galilee, she spent many years there during her military service, and today she lives in the Galilee with her family. Zehavi is the founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in the security challenges Israel faces on its northern border. “What happens in the North,” Zehavi says, “must be recognized as important by every Israeli citizen. The State of Israel must recognize that the North is a strategic asset that demands investment. The equation is simple: If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us.”

“The state didn’t take the North seriously”

Because Zehavi warned of the Hezbollah forces’ considerable preparations at the northern border long before the war, and because she is well experienced with the results of inattention to those warnings, the past year of warfare has got her goat. “The state didn’t take the North seriously,” she asserts. “The attribution scenarios relating to an attack from the North and a combined attack were well known, yet we did not prepare for them, neither offensively, nor defensively. If there had been any such preparations, maybe matters in the North would have developed differently and we wouldn’t have needed to evacuate 60 thousand people from their homes.”

Despite her anger and frustration, Zehavi acknowledges that the recent progress on the northern front, including the elimination of senior Hezbollah leaders and the significant damage to the organization’s infrastructures, certainly inspires some optimism in her. “The past weeks have given me hope that things will be changing and that we’ll be able to rebuild the North,” she notes. “You could say that we have the color back in our cheeks, after going through a whole year without seeing where this was headed.”

Research and fieldwork at the Alma Research and Education Center

Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi served for close to 15 years in the Intelligence Corps, and many of her positions were in the Northern Command. In 2018, four years after her discharge from the army, she founded the Alma Research and Education Center, which focuses on the security challenges facing the State of Israel at its northern border and how they affect Israel’s home front.

Zehavi grants that her Center didn’t anticipate the current war that broke out from the south, but she and her team of researchers did give plentiful warning that Hezbollah operatives, including the organization’s elite Radwan Force, were coming closer and closer to the fence and that they appeared to be actively preparing for an attack. At the same time, the Center’s researchers were also monitoring global trends, particularly on the Shiite axis; and there too, they saw a growing inclination to attack Israel. “Our main conclusion as a research institute was that the ability to observe at the juncture between tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence is an important ability — and without it, anyone would be hard put to warn of a coming war,” she relates. “Taking the tactical viewpoint, you look at what’s actually happening around the fence, like Hezbollah operatives gathering or patrolling. Taking the strategic viewpoint, you examine the moves that are under way on the Shiite axis, like Iran cultivating militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, or like the detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Only from the combination of both viewpoints, one up close and one at a distance, can you construct a complete intelligence picture and truly understand the scope of the danger we’re facing. Today we can see clearly how various processes that occurred in the Middle East converged eventually in the activities at the Israeli-Lebanese border.”

Since the outbreak of the war, the Alma Research and Education Center has been focusing mainly on creating a database that details all the attacks on the North. “We are monitoring every single incident and cross-checking data from different sources,” Zehavi relates. “Our objective is to understand the attributes of those attacks to assemble the clearest possible picture of the situation. The data we assembled enabled us, for example, to point out that since July the targeting of areas that had not been evacuated has expanded. Similarly, we can also point out increases and decreases in the use of means such as UAVs and anti-tank guided missiles.”

The progress is impressive, but the threat has not yet been removed

Many operations on the northern front during last September weakened Hezbollah significantly. Most of the organization’s senior leaders, foremost among them Hasan Nasrallah, were eliminated already in the initial stages. In parallel, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks not only hit thousands of operatives but also damaged the internal communications of the organization. Additionally, attacks by the Israel Air Force damaged many of the organization’s infrastructures. Although it is still early to talk about the dissolution of Hezbollah, the organization certainly is in a very different place today than only a few weeks ago.

According to Zehavi, the many blows being dealt to Hezbollah are necessary and welcome; but she does not delude herself into thinking that this will restore complete calm to the North. In fact, she expects new problems that may arise at this very moment, when Hezbollah is already not the same powerful, hierarchical organization that it was. “When we take action against an organization that isn’t really organized any longer, new challenges come up and they require different methods of operation,” she explains. “I expect that in the future we’ll see a lot of scattered operations by all kinds of offshoots and squads that are trying to take charge — and in such a situation, prior warning is harder to attain. Besides that, when it’s not clear who the commander is, pushing for negotiations and diplomatic arrangements is harder.”

Nonetheless, she emphasizes that the terrorist threat from squads and individual operatives is less severe than the strategic threat from a well-structured organization backed by a strong state such as Iran. “I’m not saying that the strategic threat that challenged us at the northern border has been completely removed,” she says, “but if we keep up what we’re doing — I believe that we’re approaching the point where that will happen.”

“Without security, we have nothing” — the North’s most urgent problems

Despite the impressive progress in dealing with Hezbollah, many problems on the northern front still require a response. In Zehavi’s opinion, the state and its society will need to mobilize for the rehabilitation of the North and the rebuilding of the communities there, but currently the most urgent of the problems on the table is the security problem because “without security, we have nothing.” Zehavi believes in confronting the remaining security threats on three levels: offensive, defensive, and the quest for a diplomatic arrangement.

On the offensive level, attacks should continue intensely over at least the short term. Afterward, there should be zero tolerance. Hezbollah and all its operatives should be made to understand that for every missile launched toward Israel, hundreds will be launched in return. On the defensive level, Israel should devise a dedicated defense plan for each community. In each community, a civilian emergency squad should be armed and trained. It should be able to rely on reservists who are on alert, without a full-scale mobilization that would require more budgeted personnel. In addition, all homes and institutions in the North must be properly secured, as there are still many private homes, schools, and kindergartens that do not have shelters.

Zehavi explains that progress must be made not only on the offensive and defensive levels but also on processes that will eventually lead to a diplomatic arrangement, since Israel has no interest in dealing with endless guerilla warfare. Zahavi emphasizes that such an arrangement is not intended to replace the military actions currently taking place and that it should occur only after we achieve a sufficient outcome against Hezbollah. A sufficient outcome, according to Zahavi, would be having clear evidence that a high percentage of Hezbollah’s rockets and launchers have been destroyed and that there are no operatives near the border. “Two messages for the decision-makers are important to me in this connection,” she adds. “The first is that we must be prepared for the attribution scenarios already the stage of the military’s force buildup, and the second is that the only way to deter our enemies is to take away as many of their capabilities as possible.”

“Returning civilians to their homes in the North is a national mission”

Beyond the security aspects, returning the residents of the North to their homes requires a comprehensive solution to problems and providing incentives for the residents. Even before the outbreak of the war, many northern communities were suffering from insufficient infrastructure, limited opportunities for work and recreation, and a shortage of basic public services – including health services. Since the war began, that situation has only worsened. Today there is also a need to repair many roads and buildings that were wrecked by missile fire and by various military operations.

According to Zehavi, the approach to that problem must involve first mapping out the various needs of all the communities. “Thought needs to be invested in each type of locality here — moshavim, kibbutzim, community settlements, and cities — because each type of locality has different requirements,” she says. “While the war damage is being repaired, projects need to be resumed that were under way before war broke out. There were lots of initiatives here for setting up centers of employment and frameworks for young people. Improving public services was also discussed a lot because, for example, a city like Kiryat Shmona can’t do without an emergency room.”

Zehavi notes that along with the work of repair and construction, there must be incentives encouraging residents to return to the North, and even attracting new residents to the area. Those incentives, she says, must take the form of financial grants, tax benefits, and preferential housing terms. She also indicates that where demography is concerned, preference should be given to young families with children because the children will be the foundation of the area’s future; and where occupations are concerned, preference should be given to the fields of agriculture and industry. “In recent years, the North has seen investment primarily in tourism, while fields that are no less important, like agriculture, have been badly ignored. It’s important to understand that besides being a profession, agriculture is a major instrument in carrying out the Zionist vision. Trumpeldor said that the plough’s furrow marks the boundaries of the state. It was true a hundred years ago and it’s just as true today.”

The end of the war? It’s not here yet, but it’s coming into sight.

In her professional capacity as a researcher, Sarit Zehavi had an eventful and fascinating year — but in her capacity as a Galilean, she primarily faced difficulties. “During the war’s first weeks, there was real fear that Hezbollah would invade in the way Hamas did. And the fear was backed up by proclamations from Hezbollah and statements by the Foreign Minister of Iran,” she recounts. “Later, a new kind of difficulty set in, and it’s still with us. The children haven’t been to school in a long time, we constantly hear alerts and explosions, and dozens of communities are still evacuated. The beautiful North that we had is burnt and unsafe. But the real difficulty, for sure, was that we could see no end to it all. Even before the strong attack in the northern front began, we were living for months with the feeling that something horrible was about to happen at any moment. And that feeling can drive you crazy.”

Despite all the difficulty, Zehavi stresses that she has never for a moment had second thoughts about living in the North. “We’ve been through a lot recently, but we never thought of leaving,” she says. “I’m happy that I put down stakes in the North. My children have the privilege of growing up in a mixed population, and they’re used to being around people with different lifestyles and different beliefs. This special Galilean atmosphere is something we won’t give up on.”

הפוסט “If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us”: A research-based and personal perspective on the reality of the northern border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Islamic terror attacks on the rise in turbulent Russia

Russia has been subject to increasing Islamic terror attacks in recent years. Two synagogues in Russia’s southern republic of Dagestan—one in the city of Derbent and one in the town of Makhachkala—were attacked in August this year.  Following these latest attacks, the Russian splinter branch of the Islamic State, ISIS-K, issued a statement cheering on the assault, saying the gunmen had responded to “the call.” “Our brothers from the Caucasus let us know that they are still strong,” ISIS-K said on social media. At the time, Russia was still reeling from its worst terror attack in decades. Over 130 people were killed this March after ISIS-K assailants stormed a concert venue complex in Moscow. These relentless attacks and threats by ISIS-K are seriously challenging President Putin’s self-declared reputation as a leader able to guarantee order across the vast, turbulent nation of Russia writes Jennifer Teale.

ISIS-K influence is spreading from Afghanistan into Russia

ISIS-K is presently implementing a regionalization and internationalization strategy that has increasingly focused on extending its reach into Central Asia and appealing to associated diaspora elements, especially in Russia. The movement’s Central Asian contingent has accounted for a notable share of ISIS-K-linked activity outside of Afghanistan, but still with a rising number of terrorist attacks involving Russian nationals, Chechens, and others from the Caucasus.

ISIS-K are critical of the Taliban’s relations with Moscow

In 2022, ISIS-K was already becoming more vocal in its online criticisms of the Taliban’s relations with Moscow for “befriending Russians, the murderers of Chechen Muslims.” It had also become increasingly overt online about its persistent intent to target Russia, urging supporters to continually “cast fear into the hearts of the sons of Putin and Russia, and to kill them with cars and knives.” With such calls to action, the ISIS-K media branch Al-Azaim was then preparing the information space for a suicide bombing against the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022, resulting in the deaths of two staffers.

Moscow remains cordial with the Taliban

In July, President Putin acknowledged that Afghanistan faces issues that require constant attention from Russia and the international community. President Putin now consistently refers to the Taliban governance of Afghanistan, as an “ally” in the fight against terrorism. “Generally, we have to proceed from the fact that the Taliban controls power in the country. In this sense, the Taliban are certainly our allies in the fight against terrorism, because any acting government is concerned with the stability of its administration and the state it governs,” he said. His cordiality prevails even though not one country has extended de jure diplomatic recognition to the new regime since it was taken over by force by the Taliban in 2021.

Russian global alliances cause concern

At the same time, Russia is building greater, more dubious alliances elsewhere. The BRINK quartet of countries of Belarus, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are becoming more strategically connected—a grouping geographically distant yet increasingly dangerous. Russia has the largest weapons of mass destruction arsenal in the world; North Korea continues to develop its nascent nuclear capabilities; Iran is at the nuclear threshold and Belarus hosts Russian nuclear weapons and delivery means.

Cooperation with violent regimes may be hindered by ideological and strategic differences

BRINK members are associated with ideologically close regimes to Russia including Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Eritrea, and the African Sahel. The group’s connections also include the post-Soviet para-state “black holes” of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria and the empowered violent non-state terrorist actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. While all BRINK states share the same strategic center of gravity, mutual misunderstandings between these states are still likely. What Moscow understands as sophisticated strategic signaling, Pyongyang may mistake for real commitment. Beijing maintains a delicate balance between North and South Korea.

To conclude

Moscow wants to enhance its political standing and influence as a superpower while minimizing potential risks to Russian domestic security coming from the region—especially, Islamist extremism and terrorism. Russia is attempting to advance its soft power diplomacy but with alliances such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea that exploit and destabilize Western cohesion.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Russia fends off domestic Islamic State attacks while expanding new dangerous alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Upon the collapse of the USSR, the USA remained as the sole and undisputed hegemonic power in the international arena. America’s dominance led many people of the West to adopt a worldview in which a substantial threat to their accustomed western way of life, culture, or freedom was unimaginable. Most of the West was a sleeping giant while existential threats took form.

Even when western leaders speak of the threats, most give no sign of having examined the dangers realistically and comprehensively. Their vision is narrow. They examine the situation as it stands, without seriously considering the efforts at undermining and weakening society from within; and they certainly are unready to consider far-reaching decisions that involve paying a price.

In contrast with the western slumber, the enemies of the West are working shrewdly according to a long-term plan designed to damage and eventually replace American hegemony and the liberal democratic culture that it oversees. Those enemies are working inside the world’s countries, including the western countries themselves, to take assets and power away and to weaken and undermine the regimes. Their efforts, despite an imbalance of capabilities that still appears significant on the surface, have succeeded more than once in disrupting the foundations of US power. Examination of the current situation suggests that the imbalance is not as large as many of us would like to think, and the threat is more powerful than ever. In fact, there are spheres in which the West no longer holds the initiative. For example, according to reports at the end of July, the cyber war between China and the USA has tipped in China’s favor.

It seems that in recent years not only are hostile nations challenging the American-led world order one by one but an anti-western bloc is consolidating, gathering strength, coordinating, and cooperating in its efforts. The anti-western bloc is led by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. In addition to those hostile states, the Muslim Brotherhood also deserves mention. Alongside the states whose leadership represents the Muslim Brotherhood — that is, Qatar and Turkey — the movement poses a much broader threat. In dozens of states around the world, both Arab and western, it is working quietly and methodically to expand its power and achieve its goal —building up the Islamic nation and making Islam the world’s dominant religion. The Brotherhood’s leaders at the global level guide and coordinate the activities of the various branches. Essentially, this is a broad-based global movement with long-term abilities of planning, integration, and performance; but the West has not yet had the presence of mind to treat it as an enemy. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, like that of the Islamic revolution in Iran, seeks not to live in peace as equals alongside the Western regimes but rather to replace them and rule in their stead.

The anti-western states and organizations are widely separated ideologically, they even compete with one another, and sometimes they carry long-standing mutual grudges. For example, Russia and China are disputing territory and resources, and between the Shiite Islam of the revolution and the Sunni Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood there are theological differences which they consider enormous and there are many centuries of extreme hostility. Those tensions are very comforting to many a western analyst who believes (or wishes to believe) that they will prevent the anti-westerners from cooperating as well as possible and dealing significant damage to the West in the long term. Possibly. But as I’ve found myself telling western leaders many times in recent years — hoping is not a policy. True leadership is not content merely to hope for the best. It prepares for the worst.

Moreover, reality has proven that despite their differences, the anti-western players are in ever-closer cooperation, in spheres that involve, among other things, the infliction of strategic damage — successfully — on the West. An excellent example is the establishment of SPFS, a Russian system that bypasses the SWIFT system used by America for transmitting financial instructions. The Russians began developing their system after the Americans threatened, as long ago as 2014, to use SWIFT for retaliation. Today many hundreds of financial institutions have joined the SPFS network. In my opinion, this episode should have sent wake-up tremors through the USA and the entire West, since it weakens the USA considerably in the international arena of finance, depriving the West of its monopoly and, together with that, of a palpable fraction of its influence.

Another instance that should have deeply rattled the West is China’s demand that Saudi Arabia accept payment for energy in Chinese currency (yuan). That demand was received in March 2022, around the time Russia detached itself from SWIFT. Previously the US dollar had held a near-monopoly over energy transactions, but its power is steadily weakening. Naturally the more transactions are performed in other currencies, the more the dollar’s clout is altered in the international marketplace — and together with the dollar’s clout, the clout of the USA. China, as the world’s largest oil importer, may significantly influence the balance with its purchasing power. In addition to buying oil from Saudi Arabia, China buys large quantities from Iran in violation of American sanctions.

Besides cooperating economically, creating detours around dependency on the USA, and making the USA weaker, the anti-western countries are also cooperating militarily. Such cooperation has increased significantly in the recent years following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Russians are purchasing enormous quantities of drones and missiles from the Iranians. The Iranians are requesting air defense technology from the Russians. North Korea is apparently contributing greatly to military efforts in both Russia and Iran, in projects involving missiles and, in the case of Iran, possibly nuclear weapons as well.

Still the West remains unaware that a new war is brewing between the two blocs. Its enemies are cooperating against it, while profiting from connections with it to the extent that it allows. The West, for its part, is bogged down at an earlier stage where, for the most part, it refrains from defining who the enemy is and certainly from undertaking firm countermeasures. The West is essentially allowing the countries of the world to play on both teams. A country will work with SWIFT on the one hand, for example, but also with Russia’s SPSF as convenient. It isn’t surprising that the West doesn’t demand that other countries choose a side, when the West’s indecisive behavior resembles their own.

Consider Iran for example. The West, including strategic allies of the USA such as the UK and France, continues trading with Iran on a large scale. The USA has not enforced sanctions against Iran in recent years, and it has even unfrozen large sums of money for Iran. Trade with China continues to be very significant for the entire western world, as does cooperation in other areas, perhaps the oddest of them being the renewal of funding for the laboratory in Wuhan that apparently spawned the Covid-19 epidemic. Countries such as Turkey and Qatar are not penalized for being run by Islamist ideologies or for supporting terrorist organizations.

In Israel, the war that broke out on October 7 has been widely termed a war by Iran and its proxies against Israel and its western allies, although all the western countries insist on trying to restrict the conflict terminologically to a local war between Israel and Hamas — even though American forces and assets are attacked frequently in Syria and Iraq, and though growing numbers of American soldiers have been hit. And even though maritime trade, the economy, and the world order under America’s aegis have been severely harmed by Houthi attacks, the West still refuses to call a spade a spade. The Americans are doing all they can to prevent the war from continuing and expanding. They are willing to pay any price, especially if Israel pays it. The current American government’s interest in stopping the war, and in continuing to belittle it by misdefinition, is clear; but it derives, once more, from a narrow perspective that considers nothing but short-term benefit. A strategic view of the threat would impel the USA to take more significant action for the world to see. The enemies of the West are watching developments and drawing important conclusions — for example, regarding how reliable a friend the USA is, especially as a supporter of Israel, which is considered one of its most significant allies. And can American assets and soldiers be targeted at no great cost? And how far can America be made to stretch its appeasement? There are further implications for the world order in the wake of this war; for example, China has been the big winner from the crisis that the Houthi attacks engendered in the Red Sea. Although the USA did form a coalition to attack the Houthis in Yemen, the Houthis continued nonetheless to enforce their de facto blockade in one of the world’s most important sea straits.

In conclusion, I must note that it would be wrong to call the USA blind to all those threats. There is a certain movement in a favorable direction. For some years already, there has been an attempt to investigate banning the sale of dual-purpose technologies to countries that are not close US allies. There is a deeper understanding of the competition from China, including the economic aspects and of course the threat against Taiwan. With regard to Russia, of course there has been very significant progress since the invasion of Ukraine. But the West is still hesitates to adopt difficult decisions and to pay a price in the short term. Its leaders aren’t telling their public about the scope of the threat — particularly the threat of an emerging anti-western bloc. And therefore, the public is unaware and almost no measures are being taken yet against subversion inside the western nations themselves. The West still largely prefers appeasement to confrontation and believes that appeasement can bring peace and coexistence. But the more strength its opponent gathers, the less easy — or even the less possible — withstanding that opponent will be.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Intensifying War Against The Sleeping West — The New Bipolar War הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

One year ago, on October 7, 2023, Hamas perpetrated the largest and most brutal massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, a premeditated and executed slaughter of men, women, children, the elderly, and even infants. Rapes, beheadings, mutilations, cold-blooded murders, and abductions. The scenes of such atrocities shocked even seasoned soldiers who rushed to assist the devastated population in southern Israel.

Despite this, many rejoiced and celebrated the massacre, deeming it “resistance” or justifying it as a defensive action. Mohammad Hannoun, for example, the leader of Italy’s Associazione Palestinesi (Palestinian Association), referred to the massacre in a statement made to Italian television, as “legitimate self-defense” during a Palestinian demonstration in central Milan held a mere three days after the attack.

Hannoun’s comment is just one of many expressions of hatred toward Israel that multiplied throughout the West immediately after the massacre and well before the IDF began its ground operations in Gaza. For those espousing these views, Israel should not have even reacted. Indeed, Israel should not even exist, as highlighted by one of the popular slogans at “pro-Palestinian” demonstrations: “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,” clearly calling for the destruction of the Jewish state.

The disingenuous pretense of anti-Zionism has now been thoroughly exposed. As the World Jewish Congress has shown, anti-Zionism is simply a form of antisemitism, denying the right of the Jewish people to self-determination in their ancestral homeland and disregarding the historical and archaeological evidence of the Jewish connection to the Land of Israel. For too many, anyone supporting Jewish self-determination and the existence of the State of Israel is automatically labeled a “Zionist,” and therefore an “enemy.” This paves the way for violent actions against Jews in both Israel and the diaspora.

This toxic blend of antisemitism and anti-Zionism has dominated pro-Palestinian demonstrations throughout the West, from Canada to Australia, from the United States to Europe. University campuses have become strongholds of anti-Israel hatred, in some instances escalating beyond chants and slogans to violence against Jews. At the University of Pittsburgh, two Jewish students were assaulted by pro-Palestinian thugs after the yarmulkes they were wearing identified them as Jews.

In Britain, just one month after the October 7 massacre, Edward Isaacs, the president of the Union of Jewish Students, reported an unprecedented spike in assaults on Jewish students. Britain’s Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 67 antisemitic incidents from October 7 to November 3, 2023, across 29 campuses, compared to 12 during the same period in 2022. According to the BBC, which is far from being pro-Israel, this represents a significant increase in antisemitic incidents.

The CST also recorded 5,583 antisemitic incidents from October 7, 2023, to September 30, 2024, representing a 204% increase from the 1,830 such incidents reported the previous year. These are the highest figures recorded since the center began operations in 1984.

Following a similar pattern, in France, the Ministry of the Interior and the Jewish Community Protection Service reported 1,676 antisemitic acts in 2023, compared to 436 the previous year.

An independent public body fighting discrimination in neighboring Belgium reported 91 antisemitic incidents between October 7 and December 7, 2023, compared to 57 for the entire year of 2022.

According to data collected by Italy’s Osservatorio sicurezza Contro gli Atti Discriminatori (Observatory for Security Against Discriminatory Acts), 406 cases of antisemitism were recorded from October 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024, a figure that later rose to 456 following new incidents.

These are just the official numbers, but we can safely assume that not all incidents of slander, spitting, intimidation, and insults are recorded or reported.

Across Europe, imams have glorified Hamas and spread antisemitic propaganda. Protesters have hoisted black flags and Hezbollah flags and called for the destruction of Israel. The double standard has sometimes risen to the absurd. For example, in London, pro-Israel demonstrators were confined to a small fenced-off area while, just ahead, a procession of Islamists, left-wing extremists, and Israel-haters marched freely. Why were only Israel’s supporters prohibited from demonstrating?

Similarly, a Met Police officer near a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London threatened Gideon Falter, an activist from the “Campaign Against Antisemitism,” with arrest simply for his “openly Jewish appearance”– Falter was wearing a yarmulke. At Heathrow Airport, customs officers harassed some passengers arriving from Israel on an El Al flight.

Returning to Italy, in Milan, on January 27, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Italian student Mihael Melnic displayed a sign from his apartment window reading “Free Gaza from Hamas.” At the same time, the street below had become the scene of yet another unauthorized pro-Palestinian demonstration. Melnic, subjected to insults and threats by protesters, later received an intimidating visit from two police officers. They entered his apartment, identified him, and unsuccessfully tried to confiscate his sign. Melnic later gave an interview to The Times of Israel recounting the incident.

In Padua, Israeli student Jasmine Kolodro was summoned to the police station for displaying an Israeli flag near a pro-Palestinian demonstration.

These are alarming episodes, especially considering Forza Italia Senator Maurizio Gasparri’s assertion on October 1, 2024, that antisemitism is present in both journalism and security apparatuses.

The situation for Jews in Spain has also worsened. The Spanish Jewish community has expressed deep concern, and Jewish university students are afraid to attend classes.

In reality, the spread of antisemitism since October 7, 2023, is merely the evolution of a pre-existing “sick seed” that had already taken root throughout the West, just awaiting a trigger to erupt in full force.

The attacks on Jewish museums and schools in Belgium and France a decade ago during the so-called ISIS phase were a clear signal of what was to come. As was the 2014 assault on a Paris synagogue, which was met by the triumphant remark “the party’s over,” from no less than Davide Piccardo, coordinator of Coordinamento delle Associazioni Islamiche di Milano (Coordination of Islamic Associations of Milan) – a convert to Islam, and now the editorial director of the Islamist Italian-language website La Luce News.

It is notable that in France, the imams Mohamed Tataiat, Hassan Iquioussen, and Mahjoub Mahjoubi, after repeatedly coming under fire for spreading virulent antisemitic rhetoric, were eventually expelled earlier this year.

In Italy, too, the antisemitic atmosphere is quite dire. According to the Osservatorio Antisemitismo (Observatory on Antisemitism), Prime Minister Meloni’s government’s “let them vent” approach has led to blacklists, calls to mark the homes of “Jews and Zionists,” parades with signs portraying “Zionist agents,” defacing of Jewish elementary schools, pro-Hamas and antisemitic sermons in mosques, and the publication of antisemitic caricatures .

To make matters worse, the Shia Islamic center “Imam Mahdi” in Rome announced a commemoration for Hassan Nasrallah on October 3. The threat of antisemitism is becoming ever more serious, and a further escalation is likely unless the authorities intervene, even if belatedly.

As long as the distinction continues to be made between “antisemitism” and “anti-Zionism,” instead of the latter being recognized as an expression of the former, the antisemitism unleashed after the October 7 massacre cannot be addressed with the necessary intellectual clarity.

It is also important to remember that the Iranian regime oppresses and persecutes not only its own population but also the Lebanese, using Hezbollah—an organization that, until recently, had a more powerful army than that of Lebanon itself. All of this is met by international silence, with voices raised only when Israel defends itself. This, too, can be understood as antisemitism.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Antisemitism Proliferates After the October 7 Massacre הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Anyone looking for an indication of Israel’s success against Hezbollah, need not check the number of missiles the IDF destroyed, or the number of those killed. It is enough to look at a report that came out today (Wednesday) from Reuters, stating that Hezbollah is asking for a ceasefire now, regardless of the cessation of the fighting against Hamas.

Hezbollah’s announcement stands in stark contrast to the policy it has declared since October 8, and comes only against the backdrop of the organization’s military defeat.

Beyond the fact that Iran’s ring of fire around Israel was breached, Israel’s successes vis-à-vis Hezbollah have dramatic implications on several levels. First, they constitute a tremendous opportunity for the Lebanese state to create stability, after Hezbollah’s prolonged and longstanding occupation of the Lebanese people and all its sources of livelihood and subsistence. Second, they provide a stabilizing factor in regimes such as Jordan and Egypt. Third, they “maintain the path of peace” for “threshold countries” with a tendency toward the axis of evil, such as Turkey.

But beyond the shift in the regional power structure, the most important implications concern the evil regime of the Ayatollahs and the Iran-Russia-China axis. Israel’s success, thank God, creates new opportunities that until a few weeks ago were completely unthinkable.

An opportunity has arisen that no one had realistically considered before the war, to cut off the head of the octopus, to liberate the Iranian people from the murderous regime of the Ayatollahs, and to destroy the evil nuclear enterprise that it is working on. This is an opportunity that is not only rare, but likely also the last before Iran breaks through with a nuclear bomb.

That is why in recent days there have been many voices in Israel encouraging, in fact demanding, that the government attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

This call is correct and justified, but it is not accurate. This is because all the speakers directed their remarks to the Israeli government, while they should be directing their words and pressure to the American administration and the European community.

An Iranian bomb would cast a dark and threatening shadow over the world, cause instability, strengthen the Russia-China-Iran axis, and cause World War III in which the United States itself would be attacked. This is without mentioning the misery of the Iranian people and the peoples of the Middle East, who are already suffering from the regime of the Ayatollahs.

Therefore, to use the successful images from the prime minister’s recent speeches at the UN, the Americans must head the coalition of the “blessing”, and destroy the “curse” that the Iranians are trying to bring to the Middle East and the entire world.

The results of a successful attack will lead to the overthrow of the Ayatollahs’ regime and the establishment of a benevolent regime in Iran, to calm in the Middle East, and the breaking of the Russia-Iran-China axis of evil, which will help Ukraine and European countries. Such an attack would bring calm and stability, and prevent an all-out global war.

The credit that Israel provided for the free world with the blood of its sons must be redeemed and realized now!

Contrary to the prevailing assessment that the United States will not embark on an adventurous move before elections, I would argue that in the present case, due to the special circumstances and the tremendous opportunity that has been created, the upcoming elections actually constitute an incentive for an attack.

The incentive could come from President Biden, who will want to make his mark in world history before he retires. This is also a golden opportunity for him to contrast himself with Obama, who leads a Chamberlain policy vis-à-vis the Ayatollahs. Iran is Obama’s baby. The elimination of the Ayatollahs’ regime could be Biden’s last word in the fight for his impeachment, which he says was waged by Obama.

The incentive could also come from Vice President Harris, who will see an opportunity in a successful strike that will free the free world from Iran’s shadow and contribute to geopolitical stability in the world, to reach elections on the waves of glory and secure the next four years in the White House.

Former President Trump is likely to welcome the move, as he led a hawkish line against Iran and carried out the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. He would certainly be happy to resolve these difficulties before taking office, if elected.

Whether Biden, Harris or the convergence of interests of both, the coming days and articulate Israeli spokesmen should be used to mobilize the Americans to head the coalition of blessed countries and free the world from the curse of the Ayatollahs.

The bottom line is that even if the United States of America does not assume its historic role, Israel has the obligation, and the right, to destroy the Iranian nuclear project. This last opportunity must be exercised!

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Coalition of “Blessing” Must Destroy the Iranian Nuclear Project הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A year and a half before October 7, officers of the IDSF movement sat in the living room of Amir Avivi, the movement’s founder and CEO. They understood that something was afoot and that they must warn the security services about what was liable to happen. At the meeting, they discussed a “strategic, tectonic, global, and regional change” that we were experiencing and that would lead, in their view, to immense escalation. “When we connected the dots, we understood that we were heading for war,” Avivi recalls.

At the same meeting, they decided to write a situational assessment. The IDSF movement delivered a 300-page document to Naftali Bennett and Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time were prime minister and opposition leader respectively, and to the head of the Mossad, the National Security Council, and others.

As early as May 2022, Avivi visited the Knesset with the report, which he’d prepared together with some leaders of the security services, and he warned that “today we’re in a situation where processes that have been under way for many years are reaching their culmination.” He expanded on the existential threats against the State of Israel. “There is an Iranian deployment that, in practice, embraces both the drive for nuclearization and the rockets, missiles, and drones. There is a force that will guide Iran toward the understanding that on the one hand they can attack, and on the other hand we’ll be forced to if they don’t.”

Today, a year after the Sabbath that saw the murder of more than 1,200 people, Avivi isn’t brandishing the report and its prophetic conclusions. Instead he is thinking of what comes next. He speaks of the hostages’ return as a matter of central importance, of the need for broad democratic consensus regarding the State’s deep-level processes, and of what the future may hold — a campaign for regional peace agreements.

“There was a belief in holding out a little longer”

On the anniversary of the events that opened the war, Avivi visited the Ynet studio for a special interview with Sharon Kidon. “Israel has been avoiding war, as part of a strategic choice that resembles what the USA chose in the face of the USSR — to wait for everything to settle down on its own,” Avivi said, explaining why Israel hadn’t taken action that would have prevented the massacre. “The Arab Spring gave the security services and the Israeli government a lot of confidence that the strategy was working. That while we were avoiding war, the other Mideastern states were reducing themselves to fragments. Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Syria. There was a belief that if we held out a little longer and then a little longer, eventually Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranians would all collapse. It was just a matter of holding out a bit.”

The IDSF warned of a severe attack impending, but without knowing what the timing would be. “I said, ‘When you see a swarm of rockets flying, you can be sure that’s the beginning of the war,’” Avivi relates. “We’ve learned that when you have a terrorist army at your fence, even the security services won’t necessarily be aware of the timing. For that reason, terrorist armies shouldn’t be at the fence.”

You’ve mentioned victory more than once. What’s your vision of victory?

“The developments we’re currently experiencing will force us to adjust our war objectives. We started out on October 7, a year ago, entering a war really against our will, and we set three objectives: eliminating Hamas as a governmental and military organization, returning all our hostages, and creating conditions in Gaza that will prevent a terrorist army from ever reappearing. We’ve more or less dismantled Hamas as a military organization, but not as a government. This is where the pronouncements of the security services and the prime minister come in, and they’re now getting into the humanitarian issue. We need to finish the work. We need to return our hostages.”

Can you define what victory looks like in this connection?

“Victory doesn’t mean that there’s not a single terrorist in Gaza,” he clarifies. “So what does it mean? That all the hostages are back. That Hamas has lost its hold on Gaza both militarily and governmentally. That everyone with a home in northern Israel is back, is safe, and can live confidently with no threat from Hezbollah. The State of Israel understands that it must add the Iranian nuclear program to its war objectives. Victory will mean that the existential danger from the Iranian nuclear umbrella has been dealt with. I hope that the Americans will open their eyes and understand that we need to handle that one together.”

“No need for uniformity — just unity”

On the issue of internal polarization in Israel, Avivi contends that what’s needed is not uniformity but unity. Differences in outlook should be put aside for the sake of joint decision-making that will make development and growth possible. “We don’t need to be uniform,” he explains. “We have lots of opinions, but we need to converge on the ethos on which the nation was founded. Let’s remember what we are here for, what the Land of Israel means to us, who and what we are as a people — and let’s hold a tolerant discussion. We don’t need to reach agreement on everything. Where we don’t, our democracy decides. But we need to agree on broad issues. Our culture needs a lot of work. A firm majority of Israeli society is tired of the squabbles and wants a safe, thriving, meaningful future.”

Avivi’s expectations for the future are optimistic, including regional peace agreements. “We all feel that within this war, there was a revolution,” he emphasizes. “We’ve all seen now what we’re capable of doing when we’re together in battle. I think that this year will be the decisive one, with us defeating our enemies. From there, we must proceed to peace agreements, a thriving economy, mass immigration, and a discourse among ourselves that makes for togetherness and unity in the spirit of our ethos. We have a tendency to embrace extremes, but we need to converge in the center. I’m optimistic. I think our society’s has wonderful days ahead.”

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט From the unheeded warning to the vision of peace: “This will be the decisive year” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel’s military operations in Lebanon have crippled Hezbollah, decimating not only its missile arsenal but also its command-and-control chain, to the point that only two senior commanders, Ali Karaki and Abu Ali Rida, are reportedly still alive. Initially, it was even believed that Karaki had died in an Israeli airstrike. The secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, remains hidden in his bunker.[1]

Additionally, the use of explosive beepers to target Hezbollah terrorists, a tactic never before used by any fighting force – and one that will go down in history—has sparked both amazement and harsh criticism.

As usual, Israel has once again faced accusations from multiple sources, the narrative always the same: the IDF attacks are not surgical and cause civilian casualties; Israel’s operations cannot be defined as counter-terrorism but rather as aggression against Lebanon; Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack; and finally, Israel is bombing Lebanese civilian homes.

It is vital to refute these biased and completely baseless accusations once and for all.

First, the surgical nature of the attacks and civilian casualties must be addressed. On January 2, 2024, the IDF missile that eliminated Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut directly hit the floor of the building where he was hiding, achieving the objective without causing the building’s collapse. The same tactic was used to eliminate Ibrahim Muhammad Qubeisi in Beirut’s densely populated Dahiyeh neighborhood on September 25, 2024.

The missile that successfully targeted Ibrahim Akil on September 20, 2024 hit the basement, causing the unintentional collapse of the adjacent building’s foundations. In contrast, in the attempted killing of Ali Karaki that same day, the wrong floor was hit, enabling the Hezbollah commander to survive the attack.

Can such attacks be considered non-surgical? Have other armed forces done better in other conflicts? The intelligence gathering behind Israel’s strikes, the work of years, is highly valuable. Similarly, missiles are very costly. It is not in Israel’s interest to waste them.

Taking the Lebanese population into consideration, the IDF repeatedly sends messages to civilians using SMS, audio messages, and radio broadcasts, warning them to stay away from civilian buildings where Hezbollah hides its forces and arsenals and fires at Israel. This same strategy has also been used in Gaza.

With regard to the detonation of Hezbollah terrorists’ beepers and walkie-talkies, it is a complete distortion of logic to argue that it is not surgical. It is clear that because terrorists hide among civilians, there is always a risk of civilian injury. However, this danger is caused by Hezbollah, not Israel. Moreover, eliminating terrorists saves lives, both Israeli and Lebanese.

Another accusation against Israel is that under the guise of counter-terrorism, it has attacked the sovereign state of Lebanon. This, too, is an incorrect oversimplification that reveals a misunderstanding of the current situation. Hezbollah is a fully-fledged military organization, dedicated to terrorism, which has taken control of Lebanon. It commands a true army, one more powerful than Lebanon’s, that answers to Hezbollah’s political arm. This army also serves as an Iranian proxy and a tool for regional destabilization.

The reality is that a full-scale war is taking place between the Israeli army and a military organization occupying Lebanese territory with the aim of attacking Israel.

Addressing the issue of civilian homes hit by the IDF in southern Lebanon, once again, the responsibility falls on Hezbollah. As noted above, Hezbollah uses civilian homes to hide missiles and other weapons and to launch attacks against Israel. This is a well-known tactic, used also by Hamas in Gaza. The image of a cruise missile positioned inside a civilian home, ready to be launched from a window, has made headlines worldwide, exposing Hezbollah’s true terrorist nature.

It is also important to mention that Hezbollah has been targeting populated areas in northern Israel for months. More than 60,000 Israeli citizens are currently displaced and waiting to return to their homes and businesses which they were forced to leave a year ago. The situation has become intolerable, and Israel has the right and duty to ensure safety and normalcy for its citizens. This can happen only through strong action against the threat, which is Hezbollah.

Finally, some have even claimed that Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack, despite boasting military and operational capabilities superior to those of Hamas. Such a statement is inherently contradictory, as greater capabilities and resources allow for more tactical choices.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog revealed that Hezbollah commanders (eliminated in an airstrike) had gathered in Beirut precisely to plan an October 7-style attack in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon. The U.S. site Al-Monitor also cited a source close to Hezbollah, who confirmed that this meeting was organized to plan a large-scale invasion of northern Galilee.

This, then, is the reality of the situation on the ground, free from biased theories that ignore concrete facts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

[1] This article was written just days before Karaki and Nasrallah were killed in an Israeli airstrike.

הפוסט Reflections on Israel’s “Surgical” Operations against Hezbollah: No Tactical-Strategic Merit to Criticisms הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This week has been rife with reports that Israel is leaning toward a military campaign in the north. A moment before the planes scramble, it may be worth rethinking the plans.

On October 8, Hezbollah opened war against Israel. While Hezbollah has primarily mounted attacks, and done so over a constantly expanding area, Israel has primarily mounted defense, using preventive operations, targeted killings, and destruction of launchers.

Israel is displaying weakness despite its actual strength. But at the same time, the more Israel refrains from displaying strength, the weaker it becomes. So why not go toe to toe at last and pay Hezbollah back in its own coin?

In a “Hezbollah First” scenario, as I’ll call it, Israel presses forward in the fight against Hezbollah, suffers weeks (or more) of accurate attacks on strategic assets, on civilians, and on fighters, and draws criticism from abroad that might be expressed in an arms embargo or in arrest warrants from the Hague against the country’s leaders. At this point, the Iranians may blithely assemble their nuke.

The Iranian leaders are rational players who want to reach their goal as efficiently as possible. If they consider the nuke an appropriate tool, they’ll use it. But even more ominously — they won’t have to.

An Iranian nuke will mean Israel’s hands are tied. Israel will have no role in the next round of play. Iran’s standing will benefit, and so will its military and its economy. Iran will quickly restore the military clout of its proxies but leave spots of ruin, and civilians with their diseases, as a powerful resource for propaganda and international funding.

What’s more, in order to halt the suffering of civilians “on both sides,” the US will revive a policy that it’s already tried to push through: It will declare a Palestinian state.

The result may well be a weakened Israel, completely dependent on the Americans — an Israel with a stumbling economy and a shattered society. The wolves lurking all around will find their hunger hard to control.

In an “Iran First” scenario, on the other hand, an Israeli attack could bring down the Iranian regime and put paid to the Iranian nuke. Israel would have enough strength left for dealing with the Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Gaza, which would be weakened by the bashing of the head of the snake. And after that, it would be time for rebuilding and growth.

There are those who believe that an attack against Iran must concentrate on its nuclear facilities. Prof. Benny Morris, the historian, published an article in the Haaretz newspaper headlined “To Survive, Israel Must Strike Iran Now: If Israel proves incapable of destroying the Iranian nuclear project using conventional weaponry, then it may not have any option but to resort to its nonconventional capabilities.”

Morris, who in the past was considered too far left to be employable in Israel and considered emigrating, has come to the conclusion that Iran does seriously intend to destroy Israel, that the day of judgment has come, and that the appropriate weapon should be deployed to the extent that it’s available.

I don’t know whether Morris has made a perfect prediction. But I’d like to put forward the proposition here that we don’t need to attack the Iranian nuclear sites in specific, although that might be the best course. Conventional weapons can be enough to destroy the Iranian nuclear capability.

Iran is suffering from a number of problems. Among its many ethnic and national minorities, the regime’s legitimacy is broadly rejected. The country’s air defenses are weak, its borders are long and undefended, and its military capabilities are not very strong. In order to sow destruction and shock in Tehran, no doomsday weapon is necessary.

One example showing the fragility of the Iranian regime is the episode of the “War of the Cities” during the Iran–Iraq war.

After eight years of bloodletting between Iran and Iraq, the war turned a corner at the end of February 1988. Military operations by Iraq brought a change. First Iraq attacked the refineries in Tehran and forced Iran to return to rationing fuel.

Next, after Tehran began the War of the Cities, Iraq launched a pre-planned attack by bombarding Tehran every day with long-range missiles. Although damage from the attacks was limited, for more than two months they combined with additional psychological factors to severely damage Iranian morale and they spurred millions of civilians to leave. What Iraq hadn’t accomplished in eight years, it managed to do in a couple of months.

Granted, today’s circumstances are different, historically and militarily. But the War of the Cities does carry a lesson, and an inspiration.

Would such an attack cost Israel very heavily? Apparently yes. Can Israel resort to some other strategic option that doesn’t depend on the hope for a deus ex machina? Not confidently.

Wise recruitment work can build an international coalition to lead the attack, to destabilize the Iranian regime from outside, to challenge it from inside, and to bring it down. Then a new regime can be helped to establish itself, to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure, and to rehabilitate Iran.

Israel needs to go to work assembling a Middle Eastern coalition that can in turn enlist the Europeans, the Americans, and the international public. They all need to understand that if the Iranians entrench their control of the Middle East, they will proceed to attack Europe and then, with the assets they have acquired there, they’ll attack the US. The US will be standing alone then, with no allies, when Iran, Russia, and China come to divide it up.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran First, and the Sooner the Better! הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Russia is avoiding direct military engagement in the Middle East

Russia has been walking a fine line between undermining U.S. strength in the Middle East and sidestepping commitment in the region – in a bid to avoid wider conflagration in the region. Moscow has shown little interest in U.S. diplomacy to achieve calm and stability, but it also does not want a regional conflagration writes Jennifer Teale. Such an escalation may well also complicate Russia’s relationships with Iran and the Gulf Arab states. It is much easier for Russia to maintain Gulf state relationships when the region is harmonious and conflict-free, rather than engaging in a perilous zero-sum game. Ultimately, Russia is more likely to support Iran or Hezbollah through electronic warfare or by funneling weapons to its partners that are not needed for the Ukraine campaign that to actually engage militarily in the Middle East directly, therefore.

Mounting Iran-Israel tensions could divert attention from Ukraine-Russia war

Mounting tensions between Iran and Israel could have advantages for Moscow, however. For one, such further escalation would almost certainly further divert Washington’s attention and supplies from Ukraine, where Russia is currently on the offensive.

Wider war in the Middle East would complicate Russia’s Gulf relations

Nonetheless, a wider war in the region would also most certainly carry major risks for Moscow. If Israel began to fight Hezbollah or Iran, the Kremlin would have to contend with three dangerous outcomes: the entanglement of its ally Syria, a weakening of Iran’s capacity to supply Russia with weapons, and a complication of its relations with the Gulf Arab states and Iran. Depending on what Israel—or the United States, should it opt to join in—decided to attack in an escalated situation, Iran’s defense industry could also come under serious strain.

Iran-Russia military co-operation hampered by Ukraine

Indeed, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow and Tehran have considerably expanded their military-technical cooperation, with Russia receiving various types of Iranian combat drones, artillery shells, small arms ammunition and glide bombs. For the moment however, the size of these deliveries from Iran is limited by the conflict situation in Ukraine.

Hamas assassination makes Russia wary of greater involvement

The July assassination of Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran has however left Iran in a precarious position regionally. On the one hand, it needs to respond to maintain its credibility both at home and among its regional allies. On the other, any significant retaliation risks escalating into a war with Israel. As after Israel’s relations with Russia became even more strained. Because of this, Russians now have smaller-scale diplomatic goals, for example, engaging with Hamas to get Russian hostages out from their territory.

In August, following the assassination, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited Iran and the US increased its military presence there. Shoigu’s trip aimed to strengthen interactions and examine regional and international issues and bilateral political security relations. Despite Russia’s broad military cooperation with Iran, it will still likely not fuel the flames of conflict in the Middle East, but instead still aims to deter escalation and prevent damage. Neither Washington nor Moscow wants an escalation in the Middle East, as they have priorities on the Ukraine crisis in Europe with little resources to spare.

To conclude

Russia’s engagement in the current conflict is about more than just Gaza. It is about really cementing themselves within the Arab world. More broadly, a distracted and destabilized Middle East serves Russia’s broader geopolitical goals by diverting Western attention and resources away from Eastern Europe where Russia is more directly engaged. Moscow has shown little interest in Western diplomacy to achieve calm and stability, but it also does not want a regional conflagration in the Middle East which could further complicate its relations.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Russia protecting its interests in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the days of gloom that followed October 7, 2023, it was unclear exactly how we would manage to win the war. Now, with Hamas already shattered as a military organization and with Hezbollah being heavily hit, not only can an Israeli victory be glimpsed on the horizon but a time of thriving, initiated upon the Day After, can be dreamt of.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

Most decisions were right: The war in retrospect

The October 7 disaster wrought great confusion and uncertainty, but one thing was certain from the start: This war will take time. There were two main reasons — first, that the Gaza Strip was full of tunnels and that the Hamas infrastructure there would require a complex, systematic effort of dismantling; and second, that among the ground forces the level of strength and armament was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. In recent decades, the IDF had closed down a number of reserve battalions and the army had a relatively small stock of weaponry at hand. Israel had to resolve itself to mount a counterattack in Gaza while mounting nothing more than a defense on the other fronts. Because of that gradation of fighting, it was only after 11 months that the State of Israel shifted the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

From examination of the circumstances in which we entered the war, it appears that the fighting was handled successfully for the most part and that most of the decisions were correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to act differently.

First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. The military dismissed large numbers of reservists relatively early, and it may be that if it had not done so, we would have been able to pressure Hamas more strongly and shorten the fighting in Gaza.

Second, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Hamas long enjoyed an oxygen supply in the form of control over the Corridor, which enabled it to fortify itself through the Sinai. If we had cut off that oxygen supply in the first days of the war, the entire course of fighting would have looked different.

The third point, which to this day has not been properly addressed, is the control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives and thus it enables Hamas both to strengthen itself and to preserve its standing as the authority governing the Gazan populace.

Shock and awe: The current state of the war

The southern front

At the start of the war, the Southern Command estimated that it would need a year to dismantle Hamas as a military organization. Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity, as shown by its markedly reduced ability to launch rockets into Israeli territory.

The nature of the fighting in Gaza today differs from what we saw at the war’s beginning. In the first months, the IDF was obliged to operate at great intensity, with a large deployment and with coordinated attacks. In addition, it needed to operate systematically — that is to say, street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood — in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy the infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks together with air force personnel. At the same time we see systematic elimination of senior Hamas officials. Most senior officials of the organization, including Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif, have already been eliminated. The loss of senior officials weakens the organization not only militarily but in terms of governance as well, and it is an important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. We see a method of operation in the north that is reminiscent of the military doctrine developed by the USA in the late 1990s, known as “Shock and Awe.” The idea behind the doctrine is to frighten and weaken the enemy until it loses the will to fight. In that spirit, almost all the senior officials of Hezbollah, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, were already eliminated early in the fighting.

Furthermore, the IDF is undermining Hezbollah with a series of unusual operations. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. Over and above the physical harm to the terrorists, the operation also spread powerful intimidation and proved how penetrable the organization was. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force, which battered the Hezbollah infrastructures and deprived the organization of some significant capabilities.

Israel hoped that such a sequence of operations would compel Hezbollah to retreat completely from southern Lebanon and to stop firing at Israel — thus enabling the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Still, Israel took into account that Hezbollah might continue fighting nonetheless, in which case a ground operation in Lebanon would be necessary.

That operation, if it goes forward, will differ from the operation that we saw in Gaza. On the one hand, southern Lebanon is significantly less densely populated than Gaza and most of its residents have already fled, so that there will be less friction with the locals. On the other hand, southern Lebanon’s landscape is liable to present a greater challenge, with its many hills and abundant foliage. It must be stressed that Hezbollah, like Hamas, has upgraded its subterranean capabilities; and we know that many of the organization’s strategic assets — including arms factories and bases — are underground. Thus southern Lebanon too portends difficult fighting, at least some of it in tunnels.

You can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon: Important conclusions from the war’s first year

On October 7 last year, we suffered a catastrophe. But that catastrophe awakened Israel from a long sleep and made Israel aware of what sizeable threats it faces. With time, that awareness has eroded among some of the leadership and public; and today there are those who call upon us to return to a policy of keeping our eyes closed.

In order that Israel remain secure over the coming generations, the State of Israel — leaders and society alike — must take action at a number of levels:

• Strictly preserving external security: First of all, we must confront the immediate threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But there’s more to the story. We must revise our outdated national security doctrine and understand that “deterring, alerting, and defeating” does not sum up the essentials. Israel’s security doctrine must include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders, and of nipping any terrorist force in the bud. It is unthinkable that we tolerate a situation where 50 thousand armed terrorists are located 100 meters from our border fence. That is a tsunami, and you can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon. Or a tablespoon.
• Strengthening governability and internal security: In the shadow of the external threats, we must not forget that the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has dogged us for 100 years now, is still alive domestically. The State of Israel must deal with the matter of governance within the country and ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel may feel safe in their country.
• Battling delegitimization and anti-Semitism: For years we have been confronted with inciteful attempts to delegitimize Israel and stir up anti-Semitism all over the world, and since the outbreak of war the campaign has only intensified. The State of Israel must subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague, encouraging demonstrations, and bringing anti-Semitism into the streets and universities — forces led by the Palestinian Authority. To our regret, the State of Israel has not yet formulated a strategy for concrete action in the face of this severe problem.
• Instilling a common national ethos: We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. Solidarity is not a luxury but a requirement for ensuring our security and survival, because without a set of values and an ethos, no tanks or airplanes will avail.
• Establishing an enlisted society— In the State of Israel, not serving is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate. At the same time, it must be stressed that this does not mean turning into Sparta. Israel is not a nation that glorifies power and violence. On the contrary, this nation lionizes culture and innovation. The balance is an important one, which we must all practice as individuals and as a society.

As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the pathway is a long one. Today, after the many drubbings we’ve delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts.

We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Our view is that the more greatly Israel triumphs in the war, the more greatly it will thrive after the war. When the states of the world, including our enemies’ states, see our strength displayed, they will be spurred to sign peace agreements and establish strong coalitions with us. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon. There will be mass immigration to Israel and we will also see the birthrate surge as it generally does after wartime.

In order to reach those optimal days, we must maintain patience, determination, and solidarity, and not ease off the gas pedal until we have passed successfully through all the challenges that lie before us.

הפוסט The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges: Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges

One year after October 7, a clear direction is emerging. The journey’s end is not yet here however, and the decisions we adopt now will influence Israel’s security for years to come. Despite the optimism that is developing, we must not forget that important battles and dangers still await us. At the start of the war, it was apparent that the ground forces the level of strength was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. It was only after 11 months of war that the State of Israel was able to shift the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Most decisions were right

Nevertheless, the fighting has been handled successfully overall and most decisions have been correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to have acted differently. First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. Secondly, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Thirdly, Israel has still not taken proper control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives.

The Current State of War

The southern front

Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity. At the beginning of the war, fighting needed to be systematic, moving street by street in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy their infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks. These attacks include those on its leadership which important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force.

Important conclusions from the first year

The catastrophe of October 7 last year awakened Israel from a long sleep and made it aware of the sizeable threats it faces. In order for Israel to remain secure over coming generations, it must take action at a number of levels. Firstly, we must revise our outdated national security doctrine to include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders. The State must also deal with the matter of governance within the country to ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel feel safe.

The State of Israel must also subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague. We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. To that end, not serving in the military is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate.

To conclude-  As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the way ahead is still long. Today, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts. We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

China’s underhand aims with Middle Eastern diplomacy

Viewed from the West, it is easy to ascribe Chinese enthusiasm for the so-called “Beijing Declaration” between Hamas and Fatah as simple naiveté. Yet it would be a mistake to view Palestinian reconciliation as Beijing’s true aim writes Jennifer Teale. There are clear motivations for Beijing’s sudden emphasis on the war in Gaza and on Palestinian politics. For one, China has long sought to position itself as the champion and leader of the so-called “Global South.”

How China’s security approach differs from the West

Key to understanding China’s true objectives in the Middle East is an appreciation of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s concept of security. In Western strategic discourse, security is broadly defined as the absence of conflict. Beijing’s view of security however more closely aligns with international relations securitization theory more popular in the Global South where any issue from migration to environmental issues are cast as existential threats to justify the extraordinary measures made to address them.

Beijing’s mediation with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations

Since 2013, China has assumed this approach in its more assertive role in conflict mediation beyond the Western world. This includes the Middle East, where it has undertaken mediation efforts in Afghanistan and Syria, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, between the Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas, and in Yemen, including with the Houthis. Over time, such growing influence could provide China with significant leverage in shaping broader regional policy agendas and navigating alliances.

China forges ties with the Taliban

In September 2023, it became the first country to appoint an ambassador to Kabul. Then in December, it became the first to host a Taliban ambassador. Such engagement was partly fueled by Beijing’s security considerations in the Xinjiang region, which borders Afghanistan. Yet in forging closer ties with the Taliban, Beijing has validated engagement with the terrorist group, particularly among non-Western nations, in ways that could reshape alliances worldwide.

China’s weak influence in Hamas talks

Despite China’s efforts to position itself as a regional mediator, its initial response to the Hamas attack on Israel was also subdued. Since then, a proactive approach by Beijing towards has been evident in the intra-Palestinian talks held between Fatah and Hamas, which Beijing pushed for and hosted in April. These talks were somewhat of an uphill battle for China’s diplomacy given its little leverage inside Gaza, lukewarm ties with the Palestinian Authority and worsening relations with Israel. That said, Beijing learned to navigate difficult political environments as it did in Africa in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is likely to do the same more broadly in the Middle East, especially given the region’s strategic significance and its role in Beijing’s intended new world order.

China’s decades-long partnerships with Israel

Apart from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, China had developed strong partnerships with Israel over decades that has expanded across various domains, from infrastructure to agriculture and education. Trade between Israel and China reached a record $21 billion in 2022, and Chinese firms have been engaged in about 500 investment deals in Israel over the past decade, predominantly in the technology sector.

Unchecked antisemitism in China rallying public opinion

However, a troubling motivation has also been apparent in Beijing’s actions since the October Hamas attack on Israel. Chinese officials have pivoted from a pro-Israel footing to indulging not just criticisms of Israeli government policy but now permitting the spread of antisemitism across Chinese media. This appears to reflect not a newfound concern for Palestinian aspirations, but an effort by Beijing to use conflicts, whether in Ukraine or Gaza, to rally global public opinion, even at the cost of sacrificing relationships—like those with both Israel and Ukraine—that it has spent decades cultivating.

To conclude

China has long sought to position itself as the champion and leader of the so-called “Global South.” Yet Beijing insists on forging ties with known terrorist groups including the Taliban, Fatah and Hamas. China is now permitting the spread of antisemitism content across its media. The concern is that Beijing uses conflicts, to rally global public opinion even at the cost of sacrificing relationships—like those with both Israel and Ukraine—that it has spent decades cultivating.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט China manipulates terror ties to further its global security aims הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After 2 weeks of spectacular military operations in Lebanon including feats, taken straight from a spy thriller film, Israel finally took out the most powerful terrorist in the world: Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nassrallah.

Israel’s repeated strikes and operations against the Shia terror group have demonstrated that Israeli decision makers have decided to shift gears and be willing to take calculated risks to change the geopolitical balance of power. For the first time there is a sense that Israel is willing to go all the way for a decisive victory, leaving no stone unturned rather than kicking the Hezbollah can down the road for the next generations of Israelis to deal with.

Israel is at a crossroads and has found a golden opportunity to finish off Hezbollah, potentially changing the fabric of Lebanon and the Iranian entrenchment on its northern borders from Lebanon and Syria.

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden, now a lame duck, has a much weaker leverage over Israel in attempting to hamstring Israel from dominating the escalator ladder. The US is fully immersed in the election cycle and the White House signals that it is not too keen to divert attention and resources to another Middle East crisis it needs to “contain”.

On its part, however, Iran is making strides in its attempts to assuage the west and get a new nuclear deal as reiterated by the New Iranian president. Iran cannot afford to get directly involved in a conflict with Israel right now when it needs the West. According to reports, Iran declined to directly attack Israel and protect its proxy to the chagrin of Hezbollah. After the strikes on Friday on Beirut’s Dahia quarter, Hezbollah’s infamous stronghold, former IRGC commander and Minister of Interior Ahmad Vahidi said in an interview to the Iranian national TV that every leader is replaceable, hinting that they have a successor to Nassralah. Irans allies see it as abandoning them in the money time.

Israel now has the opportunity to further the wedge between Iran and its strongest proxy Hezbollah. With continued attacks against Hezbollah, Israel could force Iran to either allow it to finish off Hezbollah in order to save a potential nuclear deal or get involved and “kiss goodbye” a lucrative nuclear deal that would fill the Islamic Republic’s coffers. Neither choice would benefit Iran.

Moreover, a weakened Hezbollah coupled with the ecstatic swathes of the Syrian and Lebanese factions who openly celebrated Nassralah’s demise, could be pushed and assisted into weakening Iran’s iron grip over these countries. Once a critical mass of anti-Hezbollah forces coalesce at a time when the Shia terror group is overwhelmed, a social tipping point could be reached changing the balance of power against Iran for the next decades.

Cutting off the largest tentacle of the Iranian octopus could also have a trinkle down effect for other proxies and restore Israel’s lost deterrence. Following the news on Nassralah’s elimination, Iranian supreme leader Ali Kameniei was moved to a secure location fearing another Israeli attack.

This momentum must continue so Israel will be able to break the tie in northern Israel and have its own internal displaced persons return to their homes. It would prove to Israelis and the jihadists that Israel will achieve its other war aims just like it achieved the restoration of the north.

This is the way to end the war, maintain and image of victory and change the narrative that Israel’s enemies tell themselves about Israel’s vulnerability.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel’s golden opportunity post Nasrallah הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building—Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, on the erosion of demilitarization.

The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered. Shimon Peres Tomorrow is Now, 1978.

We don’t need to issue a daily report to Israel on the operation [in Sinai] as it is a matter of sovereignty and national security—Egyptian Military, Reuters, August 21, 2012.

As the war rages on unabated in Gaza, the idea of demilitarization has once again taken center stage in the debate on how the fighting is to end. However, its proponents seem blissfully unaware of the fact that Gaza is already supposed to be demilitarized right now under the terms of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords.

A unique context?

The stunning failure of demilitarization in Gaza as a means for attaining peace makes a thorough probe into the notion—its theoretical rationale, its practical feasibility, an analysis of its past practice, and an assessment of its future prospects for success—both timely and apt.

As a cautionary aside, it should be noted that this paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all examples of demilitarization across the globe (such as the Solomon Islands and Costa Rica); or a comprehensive study of the history of demilitarization since the initial implementation of the notion (arguably from the 1856 Treaty of Paris).

Rather, it is meant to be confined to instances where demilitarization arrangements are likely to have policy relevance for Israel, making examples such as the demilitarization of Japan or in the Korean peninsula beyond the scope examined.

Indeed, the policy-pertinence of demilitarization regarding the Middle East conflict, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, has its own unique characteristics and exigencies. Accordingly, inferences valid in numerous other instances may not be readily transferable for application in this case. Indeed, as a Foreign Policy article correctly underlines:

“None of the existing states and territories without armed forces compare to the uniquely difficult circumstances faced by Israelis and Palestinians, and none offers a model that can simply be adopted to resolve one of the most intractable conflicts in one of the world’s most restive regions.”

The sovereignty imperative

According to Oxford Public International Law:

“The concept of demilitarization denotes the reduction or even total abolishment of armaments…and military presence in a specific geographic area. In operational terms, it implies the dismantlement of arms, ammunition, and armed forces in order to put them beyond military use. Demilitarization also connotes the process of sustained reductions in the influence of the military in a given State and society”.

For the purposes of this analysis, we distinguish between “Demilitarization,” an externally imposed arrangement (see below), and “Demobilization,” which refers to the voluntary reduction in the size of the demobilizing party’s army.

As such, demilitarization cuts against the grain of the overarching organizing concept of the international system—that of sovereign nation-states existing in an anarchic system in which there is no recognized hierarchical order. It is, thus, a process that is antithetical to the existential nature of a sovereign political organism. Indeed, one might say that it runs directly counter to the “primal DNA” of the nation-state.

Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the political landscape is littered with the burnt-out wrecks of demilitarization agreements that have failed—more often than not, with disastrous results. Indeed, in an analysis of the “special challenges” demilitarization poses, the late Professor David Bederman warns that such attempts are often doomed to failure. He elaborates:

“…the chief reason for the failure of demilitarization is the weakness of institutional mechanisms to effectively encourage and monitor compliance, as well as to punish transgressions.”

Significantly, the same malaise can, to a large degree, be discerned in the events leading up to October 7.

Demilitarization: A violation of the sovereignty imperative?

In essence, “sovereignty” is the supreme authority within a defined territory. As such, it does not recognize the legitimacy of any other source of authority in that territory as superior to it.

Now, any demilitarization arrangement effectively annuls the right of the demilitarizing country to determine what weapons it can deploy, how many it can deploy, and where they can be deployed.

Thus, by its very nature, demilitarization entails a violation—or at least, constriction—of the sovereign rights of the demilitarizing country.

Clearly, there are only two ways such an arrangement can be maintained. Either by the imposition on the demilitarizing country by a more powerful external force (such as an alien state or a coalition of such states); or by the willing acquiescence of the demilitarizing state to refrain from—or limit—the deployment of military forces in that state—or in a portion of the state.

Accordingly, demilitarization, as a stable reality, can prevail only as long as the demilitarizing party continues to agree to be demilitarized. For, if such agreement is revoked, it will either lead to the restrictions previously consented to being thrown off and militarization reinstated, or to their forcible reimposition by external parties.

The history of the past hundred years has included several major demilitarization agreements, few of which instill great confidence in the idea as an effective remedy for conflict.

Arguably, the most significant example—and the one whose collapse precipitated the gravest consequences—was the demilitarization of the Rhineland after WWI and whose violation precipitated WWII.

Demilitarization as a harbinger of war

The gory battles of WWI ended with the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed complex and comprehensive constraints—both quantitative and qualitative—on the German military with the purpose of stripping it of the ability to instigate future offensive action. These also included the demilitarization of the Rhineland, with the demolition of existing fortification 50 km east of the Rhine River, and a prohibition on the construction of new ones.

Germany was severely limited as to the kind and amount of weapons it could possess, manufacture, or store and was even forbidden completely with regard to others, such as submarines (Article 181) and an air force (Article 198).

However, as Germany rebuilt its national capabilities—and the resolve of the Europeans waned—the demilitarization arrangement fell apart.

Indeed, it was Winston Churchill, in his epic chronicle of the history of the outbreak of WWII, The Gathering Storm, who vividly described how the demilitarization conditions were eroded out of existence. He wrote:

“Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building; the Berlin- Rome Axis established; Austria devoured and digested by the Reich; Czechoslovakia deserted and ruined by the Munich Pact, its fortress line in German hands, its mighty arsenal of Skoda henceforward making munitions for the German armies… the services of thirty five Czech divisions against the still unripened German Army cast away… all gone with the wind.”

Indeed, as demilitarization disintegrated, an increasingly confident Germany with its arsenal replenished unleashed a wave of aggression that culminated in the bloodiest war in the history of humanity, in which an estimated total of 70–85 million people perished, or about 3% of the estimated global population of 2.3 billion in 1940.

Sinai: A fraying accord

Another example of a demilitarization agreement, signed to bring hostilities between Egypt and Israel to an end following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was included in the 1979 Camp David Accords.

In recent years, this agreement is also showing signs of strain and is beginning to “fray around the edges.”

For well over a decade, Egypt has been champing at the bit to shake off the restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the Sinai,

Annex 1 of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accords established a system of security arrangements intended to allow Israel to withdraw from Sinai without incurring serious risk. Unequivocal constraints were placed on Egyptian military activities and deployments in the area. The rationale was clear: Should Cairo’s disposition toward Israel change for the worse, Sinai would continue to comprise a buffer between Egyptian forces and the Israeli border. If Cairo deployed any sizeable ground forces or armed aircraft into the peninsula, it would comprise a clear violation of the Accords and provide a warning of aggressive intentions. Thus, should war break out, Egypt’s long lines of supply in Sinai would be vulnerable, particularly to Israel’s powerful air force.

However, with the passage of time and the deteriorating internal situation in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula—given the dilution of military power (due to demilitarization) and the commensurate decline of Cairo’s ability to impose its will in the remote region—became a tempting target of Islamist insurgency.

Insurgency as justification for remilitarization

This provided Egypt with grounds to claim that the demilitarization clauses in the peace accords with Israel denied it sufficient forces to impose law and order in the peninsula.

Indeed, as early as 2007, Israel allowed the Egyptians to deploy additional troops into Sinai to fight weapons smuggling particularly to Jihadi elements.

Since then, at least two processes have fueled the attrition of the demilitarization of Sinai.

The one is the ongoing modernization and acquisition of offensive arms by the Egyptian military; the other is the deeply ingrained animus towards Israel and affiliation with Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. Indeed, as an analysis from the American University in Cairo underscores:

“Even after three decades of formal peace, most Egyptians still view Israel as a threat to national security and as an enemy, not only of Palestinians but of all Arabs.”

As the years passed, Jihadi attacks on Egyptian forces in Sinai intensified. This provided Cairo with grounds for demanding forces beyond those specified in the 1979 peace agreement. Gradually these violations increased—enabled either by ex-ante Israeli approval, or` ex-post Israeli approval, or despite no Israeli approval at all. When Egypt, in 2023, ` eventually managed to rein in the jihadi insurgency, the post-October 7th fighting in Gaza–particularly close to the Southern border of Rafa, gave Egypt fuel for continued allegations to bolster its forces in violation of the treaty.

Thus, in a Foreign Policy analysis, entitled Egypt’s Remilitarized Sinai Is a Future Powder Keg, the Washington Institute’s David Schenker provided a cautionary critique of the developments in the Peninsula up to mid-2022:

“…Israel also allowed Cairo to flood Sinai with troops and heavy equipment substantially in excess of the treaty’s limits…The longer Egypt’s additional forces remain in Sinai, especially now that the Islamic State appears to be under control, the more challenging it will become to revert to the limits imposed by the treaty”.

A poor bulkhead against war

Sadly, Israel’s history provides ample testimony as to the inadequacy of demilitarization as an effective barrier to war—or even as a device for reining in violence.

Indeed, immediately following its inception in 1948, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) established on the Golan as a means to separate Israeli and Syrian forces failed to prevent periodic clashes between the two militaries, which—among other things—eventually led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War.

But quite apart from the manifest difficulty sustaining demilitarization in an area such as Gaza, there are, perversely, no less acute difficulties that could arise if, in fact, it was achieved. Indeed, the possibilities for unintended—and undesired—consequences seem boundless.

After all, if, Israel were somehow to compel the rulers of Gaza to disarm and to deny them the capacity to rearm, this would inevitably undermine, not only their ability to impose law and order internally in the Strip, but externally against more radical opponents from within the adjacent Sinai Peninsula. Indeed, if some future disarmed successor regime were faced with a significant challenge to its rule, whether from domestic or foreign sources, who—would be called upon to defend it?

If some foreign military force, this would imply the remilitarization of Gaza—leaving open the question of to whom such a force would be answerable.

If Israel, it is difficult to conceive of a more absurd scenario than one in which IDF forces need to be mobilized to prop up an Arab regime, so “unsavory” that cannot be trusted with the wherewithal needed to defend itself.

The preceding discussion—both of the political-scientific theory and the empirical case studies—ought to provide Israeli policymakers with sufficient caveats against succumbing to the temptation of a repeat attempt at adopting the failed and fatally flawed formula of demilitarization as a means of inducing—if not peace, them at least stable and durable non-belligerence. This is particularly true when the demilitarizing party is governed by an authoritarian regime that, on the one hand, places considerable stock on martial might and, on the other, has scant regard for implications violation of the demilitarization may have for its own citizenry, (Emmanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 1799).

There appears, therefore, little option but to embrace the dire warning against demilitarization as a prudent policy prescription, once forcefully articulated by the very person who later endorsed it—with calamitous consequences.

This was Shimon Peres, who counseled:

“ …the idea of demilitarization…seems to me a dubious remedy, The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Demilitarization: Policy pertinent parameters הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article we shall focus, with the help of Adv. Yifa Segal, on the international legal system and the way Israel’s standing worldwide influences our national security and our very existence here. We shall also examine how to use our leveraging powers and technological advantages to better present ourselves and to improve our standing in the global arena.

Background – rules of war, Anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism: Trends in the world legal and social conversation

The international rules of war began taking shape less than 200 years ago. They were officially delineated only in the past century. The history of rules of war began in 1859. That is when the Battle of Solferino took place in Lombardy (present-day northern Italy), as part of the process of unifying Italy. Jean-Henri Dunant, an Austrian businessman, witnessed the consequences of the battle and was appalled by the way thousands of wounded were abandoned in the field. These spectacles drove him to establish a medical assistance organization to help the war-wounded, better known today as the “Red Cross”. About a year later a convention was held in Geneva, in which 12 countries signed a treaty, or convention, that granted immunity to medical teams and to any civilian assisting medical staff in a war zone. This was the first Geneva Convention.

In the early 20th century, two more Geneva Conventions were signed, which dealt with maritime warfare and with the treatment of prisoners of war. In 1949, following World War 2 and the horrific war crimes committed against civilian population by Nazi Germany, the first three Geneva Conventions were rewritten and another was added, which included rules concerning the treatment of civilians in wars and also concerning civilians within occupied territories, who are subject to the martial law of a hostile army. The Geneva Conventions and the lessons learned from the two World Wars form the basis for the rules of war which nowadays fall under the category of “international humanitarian law”.

Since there has not been another world ware since World War 2, the rules of war have remained unchanged for the most part. This being said, talk about human rights has in recent decades become a more and more key issue in the global social conversation. We see this conversation beginning to trickle down to international law, influencing rulings and decisions made in international courts, in various UN councils and in national parliaments. Using “human rights” as its pretext, the International Court of Justice ruled in 2004 that the Separation Fence, which was intended to provide us with a security defense, constitutes illegal annexation. Similarly, many countries have latched onto, and are still adhering to, the humanitarian excuse for boycotting Israel economically, culturally and academically.

More political, less just: the absurdity behind the international legal system

The international legal system includes two main institutions, both seated in the city of Hague in The Netherlands: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), tasked with adjudicating in disputes between countries, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is tasked with adjudicating the accountability of individuals in crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Besides the differences between their respective tasks, the two courts also have different authorities.

The International Court of Justice can rule only on matters concerning countries that have chosen to accept its authority – whether through advance consent or ad-hoc consent, or due to the signing of one Convention or another. Additionally, it is authorized to issue an advisory opinion on legal issues, at the request of the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

The International Criminal Court, on the other hand, has more far-reaching judicial authority. Since it deals with individuals, it is authorized to issue international arrest warrants against individuals and it is also authorized to impose international sanctions. Until recently the International Criminal Court worked against brutal dictatorships such as Sudan and Libya but, following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel too has found itself in the company of these undesirables. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, an attempt was made to issue arrest warrants against senior Israeli individuals, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. The charge – involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Meanwhile these warrants have not yet been issued, however if they do get issued, then the 124 member-states of the International Criminal Court will be obliged to arrest and extradite each and any defendant entering their territory – meaning that there might well be severe legal implications.

To all intents and purposes, the two international courts are apolitical judicial organs. The process of appointing the serving judges is, however, a decidedly political process and as a result, these two institutions have consistently been exhibiting a glaring anti-Israel attitude. This unfairness is also related to ingrained anti-Semitism – more on that later – and also to the disparity in the expectations, which began taking form already back in the days the rules of international war were written.

When the western powers wrote the rules of war in the early twentieth century, the hope was that these would form the rules that would dictate the global agenda and would apply to every country in the world as well as to non-state entities. In reality they only affect a handful of countries that share similar values. Then and now, most players on the international stage do not share the values of democracy and liberalism. As a result, many of them disregard the international rules and even openly support terrorism.

One might have expected a well-functioning legal system to mete out its judgments equally with any country that violates international law, however what we see is that most countries manage to evade judgment thanks to the close-knit bloc they belong to and to the powerful political influences. This is the case with Muslim countries and with anti-Western countries, which have banded together and shield each other, including in cases where egregious crimes are being committed. In the same vane, this is also what happens with western, democratic countries, which ally themselves with one another or with powers that are powerful enough to defend themselves, like the United States. In this context one such case stands out – in which the international court sought to examine whether the United States committed war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. John Bolton, who at the time was President Trump’s National Security Advisor, attacked the international court and declared that the United States would not cooperate with an illegitimate institution. Bolton went as far as to threaten sanctioning the court in the Hague, which ultimately caused the court to withdraw and the investigation evaporated.

When one looks at the politics behind the international legal system, one realizes that there is no real concern for justice; instead it is simply a power play. If international courts take one course of action against certain countries, and a different course against other countries just because they uphold a different set of values, or because they wield considerable political power – then the inevitable outcome is that they lose credibility, and that the entire raison d’être comes into question.

From Anti-Semitism to Anti-Israelism

The international system’s preoccupation with Israel exceeds the volume of occupation with all the rest of the world’s countries combined. Unfortunately, this disproportionate dealing with Israel is not confined to the halls of justice alone. It spills over into the streets in the form of demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, and even terrorism and violence.

The anti-Israeli sentiments prevalent worldwide are undoubtedly a form of anti-Semitism. Suffice it to listen to the chants and speeches at the various demonstrations to understand that people are not merely condemning Israel, the conversation is about the very delegitimization of the existence of the State. It goes so far as to justify extreme, violent actions such as kidnapping and murder of civilians.

There is no other case in the world in which the very legitimacy of a country is called into question, as is the case with Israel. Even in the most glaring cases of violent, rogue regimes and illegal conduct – including what is happening in Russia, China and Iran – one does not hear claims that these countries should not have existed in the first place and that they should cease to exist without delay. Clearly the conversation about Israel goes far beyond reason, It is driven – at least in part – by a clear hatred of Jews as a people.

Adv. Yifa Segal: The Vision for International Law and Israeli Public Diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Continue Resisting the International Legal System

Current state:

The international courts hide under a thin patina of judicial neutrality, while in reality they are biased political bodies. Suffice it to consider the identity of the judges to understand that a country like Israel has no hope of receiving a fair hearing. The person presently serving (September 2024) as presiding judge in the International Court of Justice is a Lebanese judge – Nawaf Salam, who has a documented history of extreme anti-Israeli statements. He has even voted against Israel several times in the United Nations. According to the rules of that court, when a judge is called upon to adjudicate in matters concerning a country towards which he has an obvious negative attitude, he must recuse himself. Salam did indeed receive requests that he recuse himself from proceedings involving Israel but he refused to do so.

Besides the panel of judges, many of the rulings and legal opinions handed down by the International Court base themselves on distorted facts and ignore international precedents. Thus for example, in July 2024 the International Court of Justice ruled in a non-binding legal opinion that all of the Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, in Judea and Samaria and in the Jordan Valley is illegal. When taking a closer look at the ruling, it transpires that the court is in fact calling for a total ethnic cleansing of all the Jews living in these territories – a completely unprecedented ruling anywhere in the world. The court ignores the deep historic link between Jerusalem and the Jewish People, it completely disregards the right of the Jews to self-determination, and it regards Palestine to be a full-fledged country with full sovereign rights, despite the fact that such a state has never been established.

No less incensing is the discrepancy between the yardstick to which Israel is being held, and the total absence of any yardstick when it comes to our enemies. Ever since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel has been subjected to numerous allegations, while at the same time there is virtually no scrutiny of the legal violations on the part of the Palestinians.

In a properly-functioning international order, one that is not driven by short-sighted political expediency, we would expect a more detailed response from the ICC to Hamas’s horrific crimes, one would hope Israel would be examined under the context of the crimes committed on October 7. Besides that, it would have been desirable that many countries, not just a handful, would be alarmed by this blaming of the victim in the ICJ, that they would submit their objections accordingly.

Israel is also subjected to unjust treatment in the International Criminal Court, the ICC. When the possibility of issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, the possibility of issuing similar arrest warrants against Yahya Sinwar, Muhammad Deiff and Isma’il Haniyah. Make no mistake – this is not about trying to strike a balance – the very idea of placing Israeli leaders in the same dock as the senior Hamas leaders is indicative of the crooked perception of reality and of a dangerous equation of Israel and a murderous terrorist organization.

The line Israel has been following in recent years, in most of the trials and debates held against us is a line of resistance. Realizing we will not be given a fair trial, Israel has deliberately opted not to take part in proceedings being conducted against it, thereby sending the message that it does not recognize the authority of the International Court. Besides this message, non-cooperation on the part of Israel also impedes the court when it attempts to drill down in its investigations since it is barred from accessing all the testimony and data, such that sometimes it is unable to deliver a ruling.

Ideally:

• Work to change the methodology at the international legal system: the international legal system purportedly operates democratically, however so long as most of the players involved are undemocratic, the distortions we are experiencing to our cost are bound to persist. Israel has got to exert Hasbara and diplomatic efforts to expose this injustice, which besets the international legal system. The goal should be to reorganize the method and the balance of power within the international courts.
• Refuse to cooperate with injustice: changing the international legal system will take time but it is also a long, complicated process. We must therefore focus mainly on its conduct. Israel has got to persist with the its policy of non-cooperation with biased legal proceedings. Contrary to what many believe, in most cases there is no point in participating in these proceedings since most of the judges arrive with a “precooked” verdict and we have no real way of influencing their decisions through legal means. The best we can do is repeatedly echo the message that we do not recognize the court’s authority, since it is operating in a manner that contradicts every conceivable principle of law and justice.

Use the leverage we have in the bilateral arena

Current state:

There are two different spheres of activity when it comes to diplomatic relations. The first is the multilateral arena – the domain of international institutions. The second is the bilateral arena – where the focus is on relations between two countries cooperating based on common interests.

In the multilateral arena, Israel is relatively isolated. We do not have a bloc to shield us like the Muslim countries have. On the other hand in the bilateral sphere we have many tools and leverage vis-à-vis individual countries with which we have collaborations. At the moment, however, these are not sufficiently being used.

Ideally:

• Improve our standing in the multilateral arena: Israel has got to invest in forming a bloc with other western countries or in joining an existing bloc, so as not to be isolated in the international arena and to ensure there will be countries that will shield it – as is exactly the case with the Muslim countries.
• Move from defensive to offensive: rather than work within a group of countries and try to stave off threats and sanctions, we ought to go on the offensive vis-à-vis countries where we do have leverage. Thus, will we be able to alter voting patterns in the United Nations and gain advantages in the international arena. One good example is our relationship with Jordan: behind the scenes, Jordan is dependent on us militarily and economically. It needs its cooperation with us but in the international arena it continually condemns us and works against us. We need to use our levers with Jordan, as we ought with other countries, and exact a price for the various anti-Israeli actions taken against us internationally.

Improve Israeli Public diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Current state:

There is an expectation that the State should take responsibility for the entire issue of Hasbara. There are two reasons why this is an unrealistic expectation. First of all, many of the technologies that could be extremely effective in the Hasbara world belong to the private market. Secondly, Israel, being a state, is subject to copious bureaucracy and rules that do not apply to private citizens. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to operate freely.

Another problem with Israeli Hasbara is that Israel is numerically inferior compared to its adversary states. This makes it very difficult for us to counteract our enemies using traditional tools. No matter how much we might demonstrate – our enemies will always be able to outnumber us on the streets. No matter how much information we might release – our enemies will release more. We have therefore got to find a way to neutralize the quantitative element and achieve advantage by other means.

Another problem we face in this respect is that Jewish communities in the diaspora also occasionally turn against us and even inside Israel there are numerous voices that question the entire faith in the righteousness of our ways. It is obviously acceptable that one or another government policy can be criticized, but when Jews and Israelis criticize the State of Israel per se, the Hasbara damage is tremendous. It also results in internal fissures that weaken us as a nation.

Ideally:

• Hasbara is everybody’s responsibility: we need to let go of the state of mind that says that the State is supposed to take care of everything. After all, the State is the collective representing all of us. In the early stages of the war there was widespread engagement by the general public, which mobilized especially in favor of Hasbara and we scored some impressive results. Over time most people resumed their everyday life and the issue was abandoned. Once people realize that it is their responsibility, and that they are able to take part in the Israeli national Hasbara effort, we will be able to engage our best minds, freeing ourselves of the constraints that hobble the state and do wonders for Israel’s international standing.
• Leverage our technological superiority: since we cannot bridge the quantitative gap with our enemies, we have to find our advantages in other areas. Outstanding among these is technology. Israel is a leader in this area. If we concentrate our efforts and adopt new tools, such as AI, we could improve our Hasbara capacity and better echo the messages we want to convey.

Not neglect the domestic Hasbara channels: The Israeli Hasbara efforts need to be directed inwards, not only outwards. We must see to it that the country’s citizens do not fall prey to false information and that they do not take part in propagating these lies to the rest of the world, since this weakens us as a people and is even more detrimental to our international image.

Increase enforcement in Israel and worldwide

Current state:

Around the world, and in Israel as well, there are various organizations that are operating under the umbrella of humanitarian work and human rights while in actual fact they are part of a well-organized terrorist network. These organizations pose a great danger since they create a false picture of the reality and drive processes harmful to Israel in terms of its Hasbara, its legal standing, and sometimes they even result in actual terrorist attacks.

These organizations employ sophisticated modus operandi. In most cases it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the link between them and terrorist organizations of terror-supporting countries. The result is an absurd state of affairs where around the world and in Israel itself, various NGOs are operating, benefitting from tax exemptions and other advantages while in effect calling for the destruction of Israel.

Despite the difficulty, a concerted effort and efficient investigation and interrogation techniques would enable incrimination of the fraudulent organizations and taking effective anti-crime measures against them. Germany has provided one example of this . Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war and the global rise in anti-Semitism, Germany has increased its investigation and enforcement in this area. In July 2024 it managed to shut down an organization that had for many years been operating as an offshoot of Iran.

Ideally:

• Fight terrorism-supporting organizations: Israel has to increase the State’s domestic enforcement and carefully scrutinize suspicious organizations operating within it so as to understand where their financing is coming from and with whom they are in contact. The State has also got to withhold tax benefits from NGOs that condemn it and even call for its destruction.
• Mobilize foreign states: Israel must harness other countries in favor of the fight against terror-supporting organizations and make it clear to them that if there are organizations within them calling for anti-Semitism and genocide, this is a national problem requiring their intervention.

No Quick Fix: Summary and Conclusions

The international institutions, primarily the United Nations and the international courts, have long ago become yet another weapon in Israel’s enemies’ arsenal – a weapon they use skillfully. Even though the international courts have no way of enforcing their rulings against Israel, the damage caused to Israel’s image abroad is considerable. It shapes a false image of Israel and brands it as a rogue state.

It is important to understand that the courts’ rulings affect not only the legal and diplomatic arenas. They filter down into society and influence public opinion, including the opinions of key media personalities and influential global political and security influencers. The courts’ rulings also lend legitimacy to various NGOs and humanitarian organizations worldwide and sometimes lead to sanctions and boycotts being imposed on Israel, causing it economic harm and damaging cultural exchanges. Worse than that, the rulings by the international courts play into the hands of Israel’s enemies. They fan the flames of anti-Semitism around the world and stimulate the calls to delegitimize Israel.

The inherent injustice typical of the international legal system is infuriating and our ability to reshape the system is very limited. This being said, we should not remain idle. Israel has got to exploit its leverage with various countries worldwide, it must augment its control and enforcement capabilities, and it must achieve technological advantages to enable it to counteract its enemies, who far outnumber us. The population at large must also understand that they bear their share of responsibility. They have to seek ways to contribute toward improving Israel’s Hasbara worldwide. They must help silence the voices from outside and from within that call for banishing us from our land and even for our extermination.

At the same time we must realize that we need to take a deep breath, that there is no instant precooked solution for our predicaments. The task of improving Israel’s image and legal standing is going to take a lot of long-term, hard, challenging work. Our enemies have been patiently working to tarnish our image for decades. Now is the time for us to exhibit the same patience.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: International Law, Israel’s Public Diplomacy and Delegitimization הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the year that has passed since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, the State of Israel has been grappling with an historic challenge requiring total national mobilization. Without such a mobilization, we are not going to be able to share the burden properly over time, and we are bound to burn out the few servicemen and women who are currently doing reserve military service.

The solution to this crisis within the reserve military lies in two main areas: the first is augmenting the pool of servicemen and women through measures such as recruitment of additional populations, extending the retirement age from reserve military service, and granting substantial benefits to servicemen and women, including in housing.

However before we get down to the solutions, one must first understand how this severe crisis arose in the first place – a crisis in the State of Israel’s most important defensive apparatus.

The military reserve force: Problems

A small, smart army? Not in Israel’s circumstances

In the early 1990s, with the fall of the Iron Curtain. there was a feeling the world was heading into an agreement-oriented reality, in which there will be no more large-scale world wars. This optimism filtered down to Israel as well, where it drove various political processes like the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan, and later on the signing of the Oslo Accords.

Along with these moves, the conviction that there are not going to be any more large-scale wars brought about a change in the nature of the IDF. The Israeli military began focusing on localized operations and, as a consequence, it placed its main emphasis on developing the Air Force and the special forces, and on procurement of precision weapons. At the same time, more and more commanders that got promoted to key positions in the IDF came from the special forces. This served to reinforce the concepts of reliance on special operations.

Besides the intra-military processes, various politicians promoted the notion of a “small, smart military” – meaning an army less reliant on manpower and more reliant on technology. According to this concept, the regular army and the reserve army got substantially downsized over the years. This gave rise to two significant vulnerabilities: the first is the functional capabilities of the Israel security forces – the trimmed-down order of battle led to a reality in which nowadays only a small percentage of the entire Israeli population serves an active reserve military service, which creates a burden disparity and at the same time prevents the security forces from waging large-scale warfare on multiple fronts. This is the reason why the Swords of Iron War is taking so long. The second impact is hardly ever mentioned, since it is a creeping impact. However to my mind it is more severe than the first: erosion of the ethos of the mobilized nation – an ethos that has been with us since the inception of the State, which recognized the importance of the contribution to be made by each and every citizen.

In this context it is worth mentioning that the downsizing of the IDF manpower and the defensive organs within the settlements and communities is not the sole factor that erodes the mobilized society ethos and the ethic of service, on which the State of Israel had been based in the past. In recent years we have been witnessing an alarming process of politization of the security forces. One such example was evident a mere year and a half ago, when as part of the conflict over the judicial reform, many reservists, including senior Air Force pilots, refused to show up for duty. As a society, we have got to understand that the security of the State of Israel supersedes all else. Security issues must not be mingled with political considerations.

The military reserve force: Solutions

Comprehensive national mobilization

As mentioned, nowadays only a small percentage of Israeli society does active reserve military service. This disparity cannot be sustained for long. We must recall what had been so clearly obvious in the early days of the State – that in order to sustain the State of Israel, the entire Israeli society has got to do its share.

The goal is to see a mobilized nation – whether in conscription service or in the reserves, whether in a civilian national guard, which is an issue in and of itself. If there will indeed be a comprehensive national mobilization, including within populations that currently do not serve, then each citizen will be required to do reserve military service for two to three weeks every year and the burden, when distributed equitably across the board, will be relatively lighter. It is important to emphasize that the burden sharing is vital not merely for practical reasons, but also for ethical reasons. Such sharing constitutes a degree of social justice – signaling that we are all equal and that we are all working together for a common goal.

Genuine support for those who serve

The Israeli public, for the most part, is deeply appreciative of the reservists. However it is also important that the State should prove its appreciation of their contribution by compensating them accordingly. To make it clear just how important the reserve military service is, the State has got to work in two main thrusts.

The first is the ethical thrust – this is a long-term process that begins in the earliest stages of the education system. It is intended to institute the service ethos. A comprehensive study in the field of education, conducted by the IDSF among hundreds of teachers and schoolchildren in Israel shows that the education system barely deals with the national ethos and with matters concerning Israeli society, knowledge of the land and preparation for military service.

The second is the practical thrust – the State has got to prove, through its actions here and now, that it is appreciative of the reservists and that it supports them.

Already now the State and the IDF grant the reservists benefits in accordance with the number of days served, however due to cumbersome processes and communication problems, the serving reservists are not always aware of their entitlements and they are not always able to benefit fully from them. Besides these impediments, there is also scope for improving the benefits given to the reservists and to offer them opportunities transcending the financial benefits. Thus for example, the families of the servicemen, which pay a heavy toll as well, ought to be given support – one thing would be to make sure that the spouses, who stay at home and need to care for the household and children receive assistance, another thing would be to provide the servicemen’s children subsidized psychological therapy as needed, and even to offer the spouses themselves marital counseling to help them get through these challenging times.

Another important benefit should be concessions in housing and land in areas of strategic importance. This idea, as will be shown in the next section, represents a clear convergence of interests both of the reserve military servicemen and women and of the State.

Housing solutions in areas of strategic importance

We have got to place the reserve military servicemen and women at the top of the list of priorities when it comes to housing while leveraging the State of Israel’s strategic interests. The point is to grant them substantial discounts for the purchase of land and housing in the Negev and Galilee – areas of great strategic importance for Israel. Additionally, in these areas, neighborhoods dedicated to the reserve military servicemen and women should be built, just as special neighborhoods get built for ultra-Orthodox Jews or for new immigrants.

Such an initiative will also be of value to the servicemen and women themselves, helping them achieve decent housing solutions. It will also increase the motivation to serve, and it will advance Israel’s interests of populating those regions with a high-quality, robust people. Obviously the State must also work to develop the infrastructures in these areas with special emphasis on opening employment centers and on developing a high-quality education system.

This idea has already been put on the table and the State has even declared that it would grant substantial discounts for the reserve servicemen and women for the purchase of lands in the Negev and in the Galilee, however there is an insufficient supply of land and apartments, and there is no clear communication between the State and the servicemen and women, resulting in most of them not knowing how to exercise their entitlements.

We at the IDSF regard affordable housing for the reservists in the Negev and Galilee to be a national mission of the first order. We have therefore decided to actively promote this idea. To this end we are conducting registration of reservists interested in living in the Negev and Galilee, in order to prove that there is indeed demand and to build a purchase group. At the same time we are in touch with the government ministries and with mayors in the Negev and Galilee to advance land allocation and the construction of neighborhoods for reserve military servicemen and women.

Summary and conclusions

The solution for the profound reserve military service crisis begins with a return to the seminal ethos that has been with us since the establishment of the State – the ethos of the mobilized nation. First and foremost there has to be equitable sharing of the burden, and populations need to be recruited into the conscription and reserve army, which so far have not been recruited.

Beyond distributing the burden, the State must support the reservists and their families. They must be granted financial benefits, including sizable discounts in the purchase of land in the Negev and Galilee. Such an initiative would signal to the reservists that their service is being appreciated, it will increase the motivation to serve, and it will also make a positive contribution toward the settlement and security interests of the State of Israel.

הפוסט The solution to the reserve military service crisis:   Realization of the “Mobilized Nation” Vision הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik will discuss the future of the Israeli educational system and the responsibility it bears regarding the generations yet to come.

Israel’s educational system – Grades instead of Zionism

The education system meets the citizens of Israel during the most formative years of their lives, and has a decisive role in instilling national values, creating a sense of belonging, and forging the fortitude of each person as an individual and of all of us as a society and a nation.

However, from in-depth studies conducted among parents, teachers and students, including a comprehensive study conducted by the IDSF, it appears that everything in Israel’s education system that is related to instilling values, and in particular in instilling the values ​​of heritage, Jewish identity and the national ethos, is steadily eroding. In addition, due to a fear of public pressure and parental criticism, the education system avoids dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, does not discuss in any significant way the security incidents that have taken place here over recent years, and almost never touches on the significance of IDF service and the importance of personal sacrifice for the common good. Furthermore, the system has become a “grades factory” that emphasizes only individual achievements while ignoring the principles of teamwork and cooperation, and with no desire to prepare the male and female students for life in the State of Israel in all its unique characteristics.

Some of the problems mentioned are the product of global social trends that emphasize individualism over collectivism and preach political correctness at any cost and in any situation. Other problems arise from a process of alienation from the heritage of the Jewish people and the history of the State of Israel. In addition, there are also problems related to systemic issues such as inefficiency, the lack of appropriate staff, and the use of outdated educational methodologies.

Below, Dr. Ronen Itzik will lay out his ideas for the future of the education system in Israel, so that it can fulfill its deepest purpose.

Dr. Ronen Itzik: The Vision for the Future of the Israeli Education

The importance of the group and looking at the individual in a group context

Current state: Throughout the Western world, there has been a trend of individualism in recent years that glorifies the individual at the expense of the group. Israel is also affected by this trend, and it can also be seen in its education system, which almost completely neglects its responsibility towards the collective. The system mainly puts an emphasis on individual accomplishments and is busy with incessantly testing the individual student while ignoring group achievements and products of cooperative efforts.

The individual is undoubtedly the cornerstone of the Western world as well as the Jewish one, but Israeli reality, in which the group is a condition for the existence of the individual, dictates a different and more balanced approach.

Ideally:

Besides developing the individual’s abilities and aspirations, the education system should also deal with the responsibility of the individual towards the group, strengthen the students in the group, and instill in them the understanding that what will lead to achievements, national as well as private, is the group and not the individual. The way to accomplish this change is by focusing on two levels:

• Operational: Significant reduction of the weight given to personal achievements while encouraging group achievements, and measuring the individual’s achievements within the group and in connection to it.

• Values: Already in elementary school, the values, shared history, shared Jewish identity and traditions that accompany us as a nation should be instilled in the children, and a common national and group identity should be created for them.

Deliberate and structured engagement in the history of the regional conflict

Current state: The struggle between the State of Israel and the countries that surround it, which includes the national-Palestinian conflict, affects the existence of us all, and we do not have the luxury of not understanding its roots, the reasons why we are here in Israel, and the values that form the basis of our belief in the righteousness of our path. And yet, the education system systematically avoids dealing with the national struggle and political matters. This avoidance leaves the students with completely unreasonable gaps in their knowledge of the security reality and the national challenges connected to the State of Israel. So, for example, according to an IDSF survey, 45% of young adults in Israel do not know anything about Operation Defensive Shield– a significant and formative military campaign that took place only some twenty years ago.

As long as the education system continues to avoid discussing these important topics, we are exposed to two fundamental problems: The first is that many students will not understand Israeli reality at all and will lose their attachment to the land and the values of protecting the homeland. The second – and much more serious one – is that some of the students will search for information in other, unreliable and biased places, and will construct a world view that is far from their national and self-identity.

Ideally:

• The education system should strengthen the curriculum on the subject of the history of the Jewish people in general and the roots of the regional conflict in particular. To preserve balance and prevent a situation in which deviations of one kind or another occur, it is advisable to combine the contents in one organized and approved set of lesson plans that will be created by a representatives of diverse sectors of Israeli society and focus first and foremost on research, facts, and knowledge.

• The education system should outline a way to put the history of the national struggle onto the agenda, and convey politically complex ideas to the students by providing time for open discussions in the classrooms and their conducting guided research work, among other ways. The basic concept required to achieve this is that “Zionism” is not a political issue.

Changing teaching methodologies

Current state: The prevailing methodologies in most schools are outdated and do not lead to the full exploitation of students’ learning potential. According to an IDSF survey, most teachers claim that working in groups is more effective than the “teacher-centered” method, where the students sit and listen to the teacher speak. Nevertheless, most concede that they practically never allow learning in groups due to the lack of time, the difficulty in controlling the class, and the lack of cooperation both on the part of the students and the staff.

Moreover, there is almost no learning taking place outside the classroom, even though during the COVID-19 epidemic we saw that classes held out of doors provide students with experiential learning, and help them maintain concentration and interest. Similarly, there are almost no extracurricular activities such as tours and tutorials, which reinforce the social aspect of education, give students an opportunity to broaden their horizons, and connect them to sites in the country.

Another problem is that every subject is learned separately, as a discipline unto itself, and there is no understanding of its broader context. Thus most students do not know how to connect topics they have studied in the Bible, for example, with topics they have studied in other fields, such as history and geography.

Ideally:

• Teachers should be encouraged to minimize the “teacher-centered” educational method, and incorporate during the lesson as much group work as possible, which encourages the students to be active and cooperate with each other.

• Time should be dedicated to extra-curricular activities and teachers’ private initiatives to teach outside the classroom walls and even outside the school building should be supported.

• We should strive for integrative and multidisciplinary learning that enables creative connections between several subjects and thus contributes to understanding the whole picture.

Preparation for life, not for academia

Current state: The education system regards higher education as an anchor, and busies itself with preparing students for academia rather than preparing them for life. This approach leads to the system putting the main emphasis on the high schools, and tends to neglect the elementary schools that actually play a more central role in shaping the students’ personalities. On top of that, the system is engaged in the non-stop calculation of subject-oriented grades.

Another product of the academic-oriented approach is that in most schools the curriculum includes only theoretical subjects and does not integrate practical subjects at all. Furthermore, the vocational schools, which were prevalent in Israel until the Nineties, have been almost completely erased from the educational landscape.

This is how the sad situation was created in which students in Israel finish 12 years of study without being ready for life or having any professional training. Many of the students who are not suited for academia but rather for other professions, lose interest in their studies and even drop out of the system.

Ideally:

• The education system must change its approach and understand that academia is not the be-all and end-all, and that it is much more important to prepare the students for life. To this end, it must shift the center of gravity away from high schools and recognize the importance of the elementary school years as those that are the most formative.

• Evaluation methods must be found that are not based on dry grades alone, but rather look at all of the students’ abilities. Such methods will enable more students to express their abilities, and will save a great deal of frustration for those who do not manage to attain high grades.

• Along with the theoretical studies, subjects and majors that will give students practical tools and life skills must be integrated into the educational system. In addition, it is worthwhile rebuilding vocational schools and allowing students interested in acquiring a profession already during their school years to do so. It is worth noting that vocational training will not only help the students but also the country, which will gain a skilled workforce that will contribute to the development of local industry.

The education system should take on the task of preparing students for meaningful service

Current state: Just as the schools in Israel do not prepare the students for life, they also do not prepare them for service in the IDF. According to IDSF research, 65% of teachers believe that it is very important to deal with the subject. However, fewer than 30% of them believe that this involvement is taking place at the required level.

Since the students – and as a result, the teachers and administrators as well – are measured by their grade scores, the interest of the system is to devote as much time as possible to augmenting study and preparation for the matriculation exams, and not “waste” it on other activities, such as preparation for the IDF. We have seen in recent years that fewer and fewer schools are sending students out for the week of “Gadna” (where teens experience military training on army bases), and other preparatory activities for IDF service, such as lectures and tours of bases, have also been reduced and downgraded.

Since preparation for IDF service in high schools is lacking, many young men and women feel the need to enroll in a year-long preparatory program. From the point of view of the education system, this is a wonderful solution because there is an alternate body that is dealing with getting ready for the IDF, but it does not make sense that students should be required to use a year of their lives to compensate for the fact that their schools did not prepare them properly for military service.

Ideally:

• The education system has a responsibility to prepare both male and female students for the military service that awaits them immediately upon graduation from high school. To this end, it should recognize the importance of integrating contents related to IDF service, and encourage collaborations with nonprofits and organizations that specialize in this subject.

• The education system should devote time dedicated to activities that will prepare their students for army duty. One option is to allocate time slots during grades 11-12 that will be devoted exclusively to such activities. Another option is to shorten twelfth grade by several months and devote the remaining time until the end of the school year to focused preparation for military service.

Longer classes, shorter days

Current state: The way in which the school day is structured is fundamentally wrong. In many schools, the day lasts from 8AM until 4PM. Many studies in education and psychology show that it is impossible to keep children and youth for so many hours and expect them to be focused.

Another problem is linked to the length of the class. We are stuck to the idea that a lesson should be 45 minutes long, but when looking at it from a practical point of view, we see that it is impossible to teach almost anything in such a short amount of time. It is certainly impossible to conduct any in-depth discussions in a classroom situation.

Ideally:

• The length of the school day should be re-evaluated and verified that it conforms to the capabilities of the students. We recommend that the school day should end no later than 1PM, and then the students should be released to their homes or provided with extracurricular activities within the class setting.

• We must free ourselves of the concept that a lesson has to be an academic hour long, and extend its duration from 45 minutes to a full hour. Only in this way will the teachers be able to convey the material effectively, and encourage the students to take an active part in the lesson.

Improving the education system

Current state: It is accepted to claim that the education system is not functioning properly because of a lack of money, but in practice this system receives a huge annual budget of approximately NIS75 billion. The problem, then, is not the money but what is done with it.

Ideally:

• The education budget should be managed in an intelligent and transparent manner, and the financial investment should focus on the school and the teachers – where the education actually takes place.

Excellence and innovation above all else

Current state: Leaders are needed for any process of change, but in the State of Israel there are almost no visionary leaders anymore who would be willing to push the education system forward. This is related, among other things, to the fact that the role of education in Israel is not important enough. In addition, the teachers’ organizations are very powerful bodies that stick spokes in the wheels of any process that seeks to optimize the system, thereby weaking the hands of the few who try to bring about change.

Moreover, the staff – including teachers, coordinators, and administrators – are not always qualified enough to fulfill their roles properly. Today, almost anyone who wants to obtain a teaching certificate can do so, since the threshold requirements are very low.

Thus, when the educational leadership does not come from a place of vision and lacks the ability to lead, when teachers’ unions do not cooperate with processes of change, and when many educators do not possess the required abilities, the results are predictable.

Ideally:

• The status of the education system should be improved, both in the eyes of the government and those of the public. If the Minister of Education is perceived as one of the three most important ministers in government, the entire system will attract visionary leaders.

• In order to carry out in-depth processes and bring about real changes, the teachers’ organizations must be put in their place and we cannot succumb to their whims and threats.

• The minimum requirements for issuing a teaching certificate should be raised, and quality personnel with a sense of mission should be recruited. At the same time, the teachers and administrators must be rewarded with an adequate salary, and they should be provided with working conditions that will allow them to feel professional satisfaction, and encourage them to choose the profession and persevere in it.

Evolution, not Revolution: Summary and Conclusions

From the dawn of history Israeli society has lived under threat. In order to survive and thrive here, we must recognize what the local reality is, understand what dangers and challenges face us, and learn how to deal with them. All these things, as a concept, simply do not exist in the education system. We tend to look to Western and European countries and try to adopt educational models that are successful in other parts of the world, but do are not suitable for the nature of the State of Israel and Israeli society. If we continue to look for solutions in foreign places, it will only lead to frustration. The State of Israel has unique cultural elements, and the challenges of the education system must be derived from our national challenges.

Unfortunately, the results on the ground prove again and again that the education system – despite enjoying a very high budget – is not run effectively. It uses outdated and uncreative teaching methodologies, prefers high grade scores over any other value, and neglects all involvement with the national ethos. As a result, the system fails to prepare the younger generation for life in the State of Israel.

One thing is clear about the education system and that is that the situation as it is cannot continue. A fundamental, vision-based reform is required here, which includes a change in personnel, educational methodologies and contents. However, it is important to understand that processes of this type take time, and therefore we must forget about a revolution and prepare for a long evolutionary process. The goal is not to dismantle the framework and rebuild it, but to bring about measured and intelligent changes that will gradually and persistently improve the system.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Future of Israeli Education הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, IDSF researcher Shahar Citron will discuss the relationship between Israel and the important country that borders it to the south: Egypt. Based on past experience and political and security assessments, he will explain why both sides have interests in preserving the peace treaty, what will happen if the agreement is canceled anyway, and whether there will come a day when Israelis will be able to stroll relaxedly among the pyramids.

Background – Cold, Cold, Getting Colder: The Israel-Egypt Relationship

The relationship between Israel and Egypt has experienced many ups and downs since the establishment of the State. During the first three decades of the State of Israel, the two were bitter enemies and fought each other in five different wars. The process of change began in 1977, with the visit to Israel of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, which signaled a warming of relations and opened the door to a peace initiative.  Two years later, the two countries indeed signed a historic peace agreement, and since then they have cooperated on various economic, political and security issues.

When examining the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, one can clearly see that both countries have an interest in preserving it.

The Egyptian Interest:

Egypt borders on Libya and Sudan – two countries in deep internal turmoil. It is therefore convenient that at least there is quiet on its northern border with Israel.

Furthermore, the peace treaty with Israel contains an element of reaching out a hand to the West. Thanks to the agreement and to American interests, the Egyptians receive very significant economic support from the USA.

Egypt also enjoys military cooperation with Israel – for example, when the two worked together against ISIS forces in the Sinai Desert. In addition, Egypt used Israel’s good relations with Ethiopia to try to resolve the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which threatens the Nile River.

Beyond the political and security interests, over recent years Egypt has also derived considerable economic benefit from its relations with Israel, as Israel exports natural gas to Egypt on a large scale, which helps Cairo deal with the country’s energy crisis.

The Israeli Interest:

For its part, Israel also enjoys the fruits of the peace treaty with Egypt. Above all else, it benefits from the quiet on the southern border, and instead of dealing with a strong enemy it has a strong partner. In addition, it has allies on the border with Gaza that at least on the theoretical level can help it fight the terror organizations there.

Beyond that, Egypt serves as a liaison with the Muslim world – a role that has reached its peak in the current war, in which it mediates extensively between Israel and Hamas.

From the economic point of view, Israel also benefits from the gas export agreement with Egypt, and does not want to jeopardize it.

When one understands what each country gains from the peace agreement, one can assume with high probability that they will make sure to preserve it. However, one must not forget that peace with Egypt is a “cold peace,” as the two countries are not really friendly with each other, and the Egyptian population is mostly hostile to Israel.

Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, and due to its geographic location and diplomatic status, Egypt has become the natural mediator between Israel and Hamas. This role creates new opportunities for the relationship between Israel and Egypt, although it also presents challenges that could threaten their peace agreement. At the same time, various developments are taking place in Egypt in both domestic and foreign policy that also make it clear that the partnership between it and Israel cannot be taken for granted.

So what will be the deciding factor – common interests or the growing pressures? In order to assess what the relationship between Israel and Egypt will look like in the future, one needs to know the main factors that threaten it, as well as the opportunities that the State of Israel can take advantage of for its own benefit.

Shahar Citron: The Vision for the Israel-Egypt relationship

Swords of Iron: Harnessing the Egyptians for the war effort

Current state: The Swords of Iron War is challenging the relationship between Israel and Egypt. First, Egypt’s role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas naturally creates a situation in which it finds itself in a conflict of interests. Second, since Egypt borders on Gaza and controls part of the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel’s actions in the war have a direct impact on its national security. Above all, Egypt is concerned that Israel’s military operations will cause a wave of immigration of Gazan refugees into Egyptian territory, which is why it opposes many actions of the IDF. Third, the Egyptian government is under heavy pressure from its citizens, who demand that it stand firm on the side of the Palestinians.

Ideally:

• Israel should act in Gaza according to the war goals it defined, but it must show sensitivity to the Egyptians’ interests, strive to reach agreements with Egypt as much as possible, and make it clear to Egypt that the operations in Gaza do not endanger them.

• In order to reach agreements with Egypt, Israel can use its economic, military and political levers.

• Economically, Israel can limit or ease the export of gas to Egypt.

• Politically, Israel has two main levers: It can influence the relationship between Egypt and the United States, and it can use its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia to help Egypt deal with the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that threatens to damage the water supply of the Nile River.

• Militarily, Israel can support Egypt in its fight against the Houthis, who are attacking vessels in the Red Sea, thereby causing the loss of dozens of percentage points in Egyptian income from the Suez Canal.

Stopping Egypt from drawing closer to the “Axis of Evil”

Current state: Over recent years, there has been a decline in American support for Egypt – both in terms of financial aid and in terms of military supplies. This decline led Egypt to look for other sources of support, and to team up with countries such as Russia and China. Egypt currently purchases billions of dollars’ worth of arms and weaponry from these countries. At the same time, it has become clear that a certain thawing of relations between Egypt and Iran has taken place, and there is even a warming of relations between it and countries associated with the “Muslim Brotherhood,” such as Qatar and Turkey. The Egyptian rapprochement with the countries of the “Axis of Evil” and extremist Muslim countries could lead to a strategic change in Egyptian policy, a change that will damage the sphere of influence of the Western world as well as relations with the State of Israel.

Ideally:

• On the political level: The State of Israel is the bridge between the West and East, and as such, it should take advantage of its ties with the United States to encourage it to support Egypt, and ease the sanctions that were imposed upon it.

• On the public diplomacy level: Israel must invest effort in the public diplomacy effort and clarify to Western countries that if they won’t be there for Egypt, Egypt won’t be there for them.

Keep an eye on the growing strength of the Egyptian army

Current state: In recent years, the Egyptian army has undergone modernization and has significantly improved in the aspects of force building, arming itself, upgrading infrastructure and upgrading its training. These processes are making it one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East, and even in the entire world. According to the GFP ranking for 2024, the Egyptian army ranks 15th among the strongest militaries in the world, while the IDF is only 17th. If so, the Egyptians’ military capabilities are a threat to Israel’s security, especially since Israel is not seriously preparing for the possibility of an Egyptian attack.

Ideally:

• Israel must become familiar with Egypt’s power and prepare for a situation in which in turns against the Jewish state. Instead of developing complacency in the face of the calm on the Egyptian front, Israel should take advantage of it to gather intelligence, study the Egyptian army, and plan an adequate military response right now.

• At the same time, as long as Israel and Egypt are at peace with each other, Israel can be helped by the power of the Egyptian army by cooperating together against common enemies such as the Houthis.

Influencing public opinion in Egypt

Current state: With 34% inflation, 7% unemployment, and a national debt of $165 billion, Egpyt is in a deep economic crisis. Nevertheless, President el-Sisi is initiating grandiose projects such as the establishment of the “New Administrative City” and the expansion of the “Nile Delta” area, which have no immediate benefit to the citizens. This reality generates great anger among Egyptian citizens, and leads to many protests.

Parallel to the economic protests, since the Swords of Iron War began, many Egyptians have come out against the government with the claim that it does not offer enough support to the residents of Gaza.

The strong public opposition in both these arenas could affect the government’s decision-making process and perhaps even bring about its downfall – exactly as occurred in the 2011 protests that caused President Hosni Mubarak to resign. If Egypt’s government should fall, it’s possible that the new one who would arise would be more hostile to Israel, which would put the countries’ peace agreement in real danger.

The Ideal Situation

• Israel should prove the importance of the peace treaty not only to Egypt’s government but also to its people. To do this, Israel must try to help Egypt’s economy, among other ways by exporting gas and drumming up support from the U.S. and other Western countries.

• Israel should try to involve Egypt as much as possible in the decisions regarding the fighting in Gaza, in order to quieten public opinion and reduce the pressure that the public is applying to the regime.

• It is worthwhile trying to reshape Egyptian public opinion, through activity on social networks and through social initiatives that will mobilize the younger generation. As soon as Israel has a toehold in the Egyptian consciousness, it will be able to expand its influence, and hopefully it will also succeed in creating a real perceptual change among the Egyptian public.

Hope for the Good, Expect the Bad: This is How the State of Israel Must Approach Its Relationship with Egypt

Since the Swords of Iron War began, there have been numerous claims that the war endangers the relations between Israel and Egypt. In practice, the war only brings out problems that have existed under the surface for many years. In a certain sense, the war is actually good for the relationship between the two countries because it caused some sobering reflections and now requires both sides to see reality as it truly exists.

As demonstrated above, the relationship between Israel and Egypt is a complex one. On the one hand, the countries have been reinforcing their peace agreement for nearly fifty years, conducting many collaborations together, and benefiting greatly from the mutual ties. On the other hand, there is hostility between the countries, and in recent years there have been many processes that threaten to create a deep rift between them and damage all stability in the region.

In their essence, Israel and Egypt are both pragmatic countries, and there are many reasons to believe that they will keep the peace agreement between them, and perhaps even manage to warm their relations by a degree or two. However, in a reality where Egypt is growing closer to the countries of the “Axis of Evil,” getting stronger militarily and suffering from public protests, the peace agreement cannot be taken for granted.

If so, the State of Israel must act on two seemingly contradictory levels – on one level, it must ensure the preservation and improvement of relations with Egypt, but on the other level it must keep one observant eye open and prepare intelligence-wise and militarily for a situation in which the current reality will change.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Relationship with Egypt הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.