The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s mission is to engage in a comprehensive effort on numerous levels aiming to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations to come. This goal is governed by two guiding principles: first is the acknowledgement of the unique diplomatic, economic and social environments in which Israel exists.  The second is the understanding that informed decisions must lean on a broad strategy that draws it insights from lessons of the past and aims its decisions to the very long term.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. The present installment of the Ideally series, IDSF HaBithonistim member, orientalist and expert on cyber terror Assaf Yishai explores Israel-Jordan relations and the ?? between their outward appearance and their true nature.

Disputes and interests: background of Israel-Jordan relations

To truly understand the relations between Israeli and Jordan, one must go back to 1921 – the year of the inception of the Kingdom of Jordan. The foundation of the Kingdon was put down already in 1916 when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the head of the royal Hashemite dynasty of Hejaz, led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This revolt was one of the catalysts of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the Middel East and the rise of the British occupation of the area, and the British promised to reward the Hashemite family for its part.

And reward the British did. Hussein’s sons were crowned over two new ??? entities created artificially by the British:  The Transjordan area was given to Abdullah bin Hussein while his brother Faisal received control of Iraq. This arrangement, dubbed “The Hashemite Arrangement”, served Britain well since it allowed it to control its territories through its Arab allies. However, the populations of those areas were loath to accept the ?? of rulers that were not kith and kin.

The Hashemite rule of Iraq was short-lived and ended within 36 years with a revolt and the assassination of the king. Many expected the fate of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan to be more of the same, and even then, Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion said in 1956 “Jordan is an artificial state with no future”.

But despite the somber forecasts, the Hashemite family was able to keep its place on the Jordanian throne for over 100 years now. Protecting the throne is paramount for the Hashemite royal family not only in terms of its own survival but also to ensure the longevity of the entire dynasty. Once the king falls in Jordan – it will spell the end of the Hashemite dynasty.

Milestones in Israel-Jordan relations

Some years after the foundation of the Kingdom of Jordan, the government began establishing relations with the Zionist leaders that were active in pre-state Israel.  After the establishment of the State of Israel, its leadership conveyed to King Abdullah not to wage war against the new state, however, he did not heed their warning and Jordan joined the coalition of Arab states that ganged up on Israel in the War of Independence.

In 1952, grandson of King Abdulla, Hussein, ascended the throne from which he ruled the Hashemite Kingdon for 46 years. During his reign, Hussien was able to maintain stability and prevent the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), which was ousted from Israel, to gain a stronghold in Jordan. Hussein cultivated relations with the US and the West and even had secret relations with the State of Israel. Ben Gurion, despite having doubts about the longevity of the Jordanian entity, thought the Hashemite Kingdom could be a strategic asset to Israel and had no problem openly saying so. Other Israeli leaders as well, such as Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, understood the importance of maintaining warm relations with the Jordanian administration, and diplomatic and security sources in Israel proposed viewing Jordan as Israel’s “little sister”.

However, despite the covert relations between Hussien and Israeli administrations, formally the two countries remained enemies and even fought each other in the Six Day War, in which Israel defeated the Jordanian military, and took the Temple Mount from Jordan. This cost the Hashemite family the last holy Muslim asset under its control.

It was only in 1994 that an official peace accord was signed between the two neighbors. As part of the agreement, the relations and the borders between the two were established, and Israel committed to supply Jordan with 50 million metric cubes of water annually. Over the years, Israel has doubled that quantity and to date it still provides 100 metric cubes of water a year to Jordan. Furthermore, both countries have various military and intelligence collaborations, most of which have been secretly established.

Since 1995, Jordan has been ruled by Hussien’s son, King Abdullah the Second. King Abdullah, like his father, maintained good relations with the US, the West and Israel. However, he cannot seem to gain the popularity and legitimacy in the same manner that his father had. He is perceived as disconnected from the people, and someone who lacks the historical roots to the land, being the son of a British mother, and educated in Britain with Western values. He commands the English language better than Arabic – not to mention the local Jordanian dialect, and the Jordanian public frown upon this. Abdullah’s rule once again raised doubts regarding the ability of the Hashemite dynasty to persevere.

Relations with Jordan since the outbreak of the Gaza War

The relations between Israel and Jordan have always been complicated, and the Jordanian public has always been hostile to Israel. After the October 7 attack and massacre, the already volatile relations have further deteriorated. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, there have been ongoing riots on the streets of Amman, and the Jordanian administration is overtly hostile towards Israel. Already in November 23 Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel – a move that was aimed – according to Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi “to emphasize Jordan’s opposition and condemnation of Israel’s war against Gaza, and the killing of innocents and the creation of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that could lead to a regional conflict”.

In Israel there was an expectation for Jordan to publicly condemn the massacre of October 7, but to no avail. Moreover, King Abdullah’s wife, Rania, had publicly attacked Israel on numerous occasions. The Jordanian administration also condemned Israel’s attack in Iran and said that it was “a violation of international law, an attack on Iran’s sovereignty and a dangerous escalation that further intensifies tensions in the region”. Jordan even called on the international community to take responsibility and take measures against Israel that “end Israel’s attacks against Gaza, the [West] Bank and Lebanon, as a first step to dial back the escalation”.

September 2024 saw further escalation in the relations of the two countries, when a Jordanian truck driver crossed the border illegally and murdered three Israelis working in the Alenbi border checkpoint. The Jordanian government appointed an inquiry committee to investigate the affair but the public – including members of parliament – celebrated the attack on the streets of Amman.

Despite the open hostility and condemnations, many claim that the situation behind the scenes is quite different. Various sources report that Jordan actually helped Israel intercept both Iranian missile attacks in April and October 2024. Some sources close to the matter claim that King Abdullah’s remarks in public are in stark contrast to what he says behind closed doors.

This discrepancy reflects the complex relations Israel has had with Jordan from the onset. On the one hand, the two countries have deep ideological disputes and clashes. On the other hand, both share common interests. When viewing the relations between both countries over the past decades and its frequent changes, it would appear that this duality is the only constant in these relations.

Assaf Yishai: A Vision for Israeli-Jordanian Relations

Aid in maintaining the stability of the Jordanian government

Current situation:

Since its inception, the Jordanian administration has been plagued by instability stemming, among others, from the varied demographic composition of the Jordanian people. Only a minority of these are loyal to King Abdullah II, while the majority perceives the king as a foreign element who does not belong in Jordan in the first place.

Furthermore, Jordan is plagued by a slew of internal problems – predominantly a serious water shortage – that threaten its internal stability. If that were not enough, the king has recently reformed the method of elections aiming to benefit his own interests but in reality, this played out against him. The reform, the purpose of which was to block the election of local leaders that serve only the interests of their clans, had resulted in a rise in the power of the Muslim Brotherhood movement which poses a major threat to the Hashemite rule.

The recent regional changes have also influenced Jordan’s internal stability. The Gaza War, which ostensibly has no relation to Jordan, caused a 40% decline in tourism to the Kingdom – a main engine of the country’s economy. The revolt in Syria, which toppled the Assad regime, is a Damocles sword hanging over the head of King Abdullah, who fears a similar outcome for his own country.

In light of the above mentioned, the main interest of the King is to ensure that he and the entire Hashemite dynasty survive. A king in a survival state of mind is willing to take irrational measures, like a drowning person grasping at straws. For Israel, this makes him an unpredictable leader and places a question mark on any possibility of stability of the Jordanian government.

Ideal situation:

• Placing more focus on Jordan: Israel must not become complacent and think that simply because it has a peace agreement with Jordan, it can enjoy quiet and stability on its eastern border. Already in the immediate term, Israel must allocate intelligence resources toward the Jordanian issue and keep its finger on the pulse to identify any change that could threaten Israel’s interests in the area.

• Continued support of King Abdullah – to a point: Israel should continue aiding the King, as it has always done, out of the understanding that any alternative regime would be far worse for Israel. At the same time, Israel should be clear about what it is willing to accept and what it is not. It cannot continue protecting the King at any cost, even if his regime no longer serves Israel’s interests.

• Prepare for the fall of the Jordanian regime: the State of Israel must prepare a contingency plan and formulate long-term strategies for the day after the fall of the Hashemite dynasty. These plans must be far-reaching, such as the seizure of the eastern face of the hills of Samaria bordering with Jordan, to prevent the capture by hostile Iranian and ISIS forces of this important strategic asset.

Securing the border with Jordan

Current situation:

The border with Jordan is Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country, stretching over 309 kilometers (192 miles). Due to the peace accord between the two countries and the relative quiet between them, the border is ostensibly calm – but in reality, it is far from it. The border with Jordan had always been troublesome, among others due to the lack of a regular security force. Throughout the years, this border has become a hotbed of drug and weapon-smuggling as well as infiltration of terrorist into the territory of Israel – much of this under the auspices of Iran, and ever since the smuggling routes through Syria were closed in the wake of the revolt, the incidents on the Jordanian border are increasing. Furthermore, the closing of the border with Egypt due to the Gaza War, places more criminal and terror demand on the Jordanian border, which remains one of Israel’s last unsecured borders.

Over the past years dozens of arms-smuggling attempts into Israel have been made on this border. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 2023, when a Jordanian MK attempted to smuggle 200 guns into Israel. Aside from the rife smuggling activity, the terror incidents are on the rise as well – the Jordanian truck driver, who crossed the border and murdered three Israelis and a month later – two other terrorists crossed the border illegally in the Dead Sea area and shot and wounded two Israeli soldiers.

To date, Israel’s border with Jordan is full of breaches and not sufficiently secured. Part of the border is fenced but other areas, such as the Negev Desert valley – have no physical barrier. Furthermore, Israel does not allocate sufficient forces to secure the border. It is possible that this laxity stems from complacency and a false trust of the Jordanian peacekeeping abilities and willingness, or it may be pure negligence. Whatever the reason, the current strategy represents a real strategic threat to Israel. Even if most of the illegal activity across the border is criminal, it is important to remember that terror characteristically rides on criminal activity to achieve its ends.

Ideal situation:

• Hermetically sealing the border: The Israel-Jordan border must be hermetically sealed for its entire length to ensure zero breaches. Furthermore, electronic surveillance should not be seen as the only security solution, rather the border must have a physical barrier such as a fence or a wall.

• Reinforcement of the border forces: the IDF should deploy a division to act as a security force on the Jordanian border, creating large-scale surveillance and establishing quick response capabilities.  Naturally, the IDF will have to considerably boost its ranks in order to have the manpower for said division.

Keeping Iran out of Jordan

Current situation:

One of Iran’s common stratagems in the Middle East in service of its global-Islamic vision, is to meddle in the affairs of other countries – especially the unstable among them – and identify the cracks through which it can cause chaos and wield its influence. This is what it had done until recently in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. This is what it had done in the Gaza Strip. Now, having lost most of its hold in the area, it may very well try to reclaim it by taking over Jordan.

Iran may do so with force, for example with pro-Iranian militias operating in neighboring Iraq. However, the King himself might opt to cooperate with Iran, if he believes that Iran would be more conducive to the survival of his reign more than Israel. The connection between Jordan and Iran is not self-evident to say the least, but even Saudia Arabia, Iran’s bitter enemy, chose to sign in March 2023 an agreement for the renewal of diplomatic relations, once it realized that the western axis is growing weak.

Ideal situation:

• Display of power and military prowess: The Middle East is a place that sets great store by strength; hence it behooves the State of Israel to demonstrate its military prowess and impress upon the King of Jordan that he can lean on Israel. If the King feels that Israel cannot guarantee his safety, he might seek another ally to do so, which most likely would be Iran.

• Preparation for an Iranian takeover of Jordan: Israel must prepare for any scenario wherein Iran will try to install its control in Jordan and summarily and decisively thwart any threat on part of pro-Iranian elements in Jordan.

Settlement of the Jordan Valley

Current situation:

The Jordan Valley is a territory under dispute in terms of international law. Many in Israel and the world see the area as an integral part of Israel while others claim it to be an occupied territory that is not part of Israel’s sovereign state.

The Jordan Valley has great security and strategic importance as it is the only stretch of land that protects Israel’s eastern border. Since the establishment of the State, most of Israel’s leadership acknowledged its significance, and even late PM Yitzhak Rabin in his last speech before the Knesset declared that the security protective border of Israel will be charted in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of the term.

Beyond its significance to Israel’s security, the Valley also has a geographic and economic importance, as it is a large swath of land that can be populated and developed. Furthermore, it carries great historic and cultural significance as it is home to numerous Jewish heritage sites.

Currently, the Jordan Valley is not included in Israel sovereign territory, thus Israeli law does not apply in the area as it does in the rest of the country. This sets an obstacle to the settlement and development of the Valley area, and ties Israel’s hands in dealing with violations in the area such as illegal Palestinian construction.

Ideal situation:

• Encouragement of Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley: Over the years Israel has proven that anywhere it creates Jewish settlements – security is higher, whereas areas with no or sparse Jewish population terror hotbeds germinate. Hence, the Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley is a sine qua none for ensuring the security in that area. Beyond that, the development of the Valley could serve as a response to high housing demands that many families in Israel are contending with, and can deepen the connection of Israelis to some of the most important Jewish heritage sites that are in that locale. For this end, Israel must encourage young people and new immigrants to make their homes in the Jordan Valley, among others by way of favorable terms for land acquisition and housing, and the development of local communities.

• Action towards securing Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley: For years there have been many attempts by Israel to gain sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, similarly to what it had achieved in the Golan Hights. This move first and foremost sends out a clear message that Israel is here to stay. Furthermore, once Israel gains sovereignty over the area it will be able to develop it as it sees fit, and establish institutes and infrastructures. Gaining sovereignty may pose a diplomatic issue for Israel, mainly vis a vis Europe, however as it has been proven time and time again – when Israel presents a united and unyielding front, the world remains silent. If Israel can gain consensus in Israeli society for such a move, making it clear that this is a security imperative and not occupation for the sake of occupation, it is highly likely that the international community will fall into line as well.

Condemnation of the Condemnations

Current situation:

Despite the Israel-Jordan peace accord, many people in Jordan openly condemn Israel. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, this state of affairs has only grown worse, until now, there are many anti-Israel protests throughout Jordan.

Even the Jordanian administration, despite its cooperation with Israel and its dependance on its neighbor to the west, exhibits an anti-Israeli front. The King failed to condemn the October 7 massacre, and his wife Rania even disputed it had even truly happened and attacked Israel from every global platform. In an interview to CNN, she spoke of the pain of the babies and children of Gaza, not once mentioning the dozens of innocent Jewish children Hamas heinously butchered. In another interview to CNN she insinuated that the massacre was not on the scale Israel and the US claim, saying that “President Biden did not witness with his own eyes the harsh things that had occurred in Israel, as he himself said”.

A short while after the Gaza War broke out, King Abdullah II sent two air shipments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. He also sent a third plane, whose cargo was deployed by his daughter, Princess Salma of Jordan, as a symbolic gesture to the children of Gaza.

Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, a close associate of the King, has also attacked Israel more than once since the outbreak of the war. Safadi also tried to promote anti-Israel measures at the United Nations, and recommended that Jordan join in the prosecution of Israel at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Even though the Jordanian King’s statements are merely lip service, as apparently, he sings a completely different tune behind closed doors –nevertheless, his statements and those of his family influence the mood on the streets of Jordan as well as the relations between the two countries.

Ideal situation:

• Demand the King moderate his rhetoric: although it is understandable to an extent that the ruler of an Arab state would have to display animosity toward Israel, his current condemnations are beyond the pale. The State of Israel must use the leverages it has on the King and the Jordanian administration – e.g. water supply and military aid – and demand he moderate his and his family’s statements, and halt the anti-Israel measure undertaken and the UN.

There is a lot more than meets the eye: conclusions

The relations between Israel and Jordan can be sketched with a single word: contrast. Contrast between the attitude of the Jordanian administration and the public; contrast between its public statements and what it says behind closed doors; and most importantly – contrast between the quiet on the surface and the threats brewing underneath. Israel must understand that its border with Jordan is not secure and the stability of the government there is not ensured. In the immediate-term, Israel must employ whatever leverages it has on the Jordanian administration – namely the water supply and military aid – to solidify its relations with the Kingdom. In the long term, Israel must create a contingency plan that charts courses of action for possible scenarios such as the ousting of the ruling Hashemite family and a takeover of Jordan by radical elements such as extremist Sunni militias or pro-Iranian forces.

Above all – Israel must populate the Jordan Valley and place it on par with the rest of its geographic strategic assets, both in terms of national security and development.

The state of affairs between Israel and Jordan, wherein the two are at loggerheads on the one hand, but cooperate on the other, can hold only to a certain point. What with the recent changes washing over the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder whether this point has now been reached, and if so – what is in store from now on.

הפוסט Ideally – Vision of the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

What do you do to connect with your base?

“Many mistakenly think that IDSF includes only military personnel and senior officers, but in fact it is open to anyone with our worldview and anyone who shares our values. We grew by more than 70 percent this year, and the goal is to continue growing at the same rate next year. We offer members of the movement a wide range of unique activities, such as lectures given by senior security officials, and tours given by IDSF experts that take place throughout the country – in the north, in the Gaza Envelope, in Judea and Samaria, and in Jerusalem. The movement has silent WhatsApp groups for receiving updates from the field, each of which has over 1,000 members. Until now, mainly news stories have been posted in these groups, but following surveys we conducted, we realized that the public wanted more than that, and we began disseminating dynamic webinars, event tickets, tours, and unique business benefits in these groups. We treat these groups like a members club”.

A community that is attentive to the public

Lev, who came to IDSF from the field of project management in the municipal context, set a goal for himself to not only increase the number of members in the movement, but also to create a community that would be attentive to its members’ opinions, even those who are not senior military people. Subsequently, he initiated the establishment of the Arena of Insights, a digital system that enables the movement’s members to exchange opinions and raise ideas on current affairs. This is a special system that is also used by local authorities and the military, capable of analyzing large amounts of information.

When did you launch the new public participation system?

“In the second half of 2024. Before that, we used to post open questions on social media, and since there was a very good response from the movement’s members, we started working with the new Arena of Insights system. Every month we pose a different current affairs question. For example, recently: ‘Should we establish a state commission of inquiry or a national commission of inquiry?’ So far, over 1,000 people have responded to each of the questions we asked”.

“A question that was recently posed among the movement’s members through the new system, regarding an investigative committee into the events of October 7, received a large number of responses whose analysis results surprised the movement’s leaders”.

What was the rationale behind the Arena of Insights?

“The idea was to develop the system as a tool through which opinions and ideas could be shared from the bottom up – meaning not only from the senior military officials at the head of the movement to the non-expert public, but also in the opposite direction”. The system analyzes the responses and derives some basic insights from them, which we incorporate in our documents. The goal is to incorporate the movement members’ feelings into the movement’s research and position papers that are conveyed to decision-makers. “The movement sees great importance in public participation and in connecting the grassroots with the professional knowledge of military personnel”.

The wisdom of crowds

A question that was recently circulated among the movement’s members regarding a commission of inquiry into the events of October 7 received a large number of responses – over 700 responses in the actual system and another 326 responses on Facebook. When the content of the responses was analyzed, the movement leaders were surprised to discover that most of them did not lean in one direction but rather toward a compromise between the two poles. “The discussion was very lively, and not unequivocal”, says Lev. “It turns out that aside from the extremists, who express extreme positions, the majority wants a merger between a state committee and a national committee. In other words, most of the public thinks that the commission of inquiry should be state-run with aspects of a national commission of inquiry, in terms of its management and authorities”.

When it comes to a large amount of responses that are so complex and ambiguous, doesn’t that make it very difficult to process the information?

“We know that the more Israelis there are, the more opinions there are. The very connection between the two options we proposed was an innovation that came from the public – it did not emerge as a main option before we circulated the question. This opened another window for us: We realized that there is a majority in the public that is looking for the middle ground. Now the IDSF’s research department will have to process these insights and look for the right integrated model that we will offer to decision-makers”.

How is the information processed?

“First of all, the actual system analyzes the information using AI and extracts insights from it, and then we review its conclusions and test them. After our analysis, a summary of the discussion is published for all movement members who participated in the discussion – for each member regarding what they wrote. Then we send the results to the research department, which processes the information and incorporates it into its reports”.

Does this mean that you learn from the public?

“We are attentive to the movement’s members and want them to be part of our thought process”. Although issues related to Israel’s security still remain the domain of professionals, on other issues we want to hear what the movement’s members feel, and we want to incorporate them in the position papers that our professionals in the research department write. This enables us to combine professional knowledge with the “wisdom of crowds”.

Is there another example of public reactions that caused the movement to change its positions?

“It definitely happened. For example, in response to a question about recruiting Haredi soldiers, we received answers that were more complex than we expected, and they influenced and touched us. When we submitted the ‘8000 Plan’ to the government that dealt with this, there were several points that changed thanks to ideas from the public – for example, the understanding that the frameworks would have to be unique, that the uniqueness of Haredi society must be recognized, that there is importance in outreach within Haredi society and in cooperation with Haredi leaders, and that there is a need for benefits and incentives and a need to change the perception of military service – from a burden to a privilege and an opportunity to contribute to the country”.

In your opinion, does the system actually strengthen the democracy in the movement?

“During the discussion of the open question, all participants see the comments that are written, so you can also see the response to the comment. A kind of round table was created between people, one who could be in Kiryat Shmona, one in Jerusalem, and one in the Gaza Envelope. I think this has a lot of power. The system not only strengthens the senior officials’ familiarity with the voices on the ground, but also strengthens the sense of partnership and diversity among the movement’s members”.

Promoting women to the forefront of the movement

Lev did not complete his military service as a senior officer, but after his discharge from the Border Guard, he continued to work in the security field and acquired in-depth knowledge of domestic security issues. Over the years, he has gained significant experience in managing complex systems and leading operations, mainly in the municipal arena, where he specialized in a variety of fields, including education, security, and project management. He previously served as CEO of the “Merkazei HaTzeirim BeIsrael” [Youth Centers in Israel] network and currently serves as a volunteer member of the Harish City Council.

He also brings the same public spirit – of partnership, transparency, and commitment – to IDSF, where he works to promote a broad and in-depth security discourse. “It’s important to me that people get to know the movement’s diverse activities”, he says. “Alongside security, I also promote housing benefits for reservists, the business community, the senior officers community, managing and increasing the movement’s membership, and the IDSF women’s forum, with the goal of placing women more at the forefront.”

How can non-professional voices in the public contribute to the security discourse in the movement?

“Even in the security discourse, there are many elements that are not necessarily military. Amir Avivi often says that it is impossible to compromise on security – but there are dozens of diplomatic ways that may offer solutions that address the issue of security: in education, the economy, settlement, etc. Security is not just about tanks and planes, but also benefits for reservists, agriculture, community, and history. The movement is not only concerned with war and the army, but also with the question of how to remain strong and with an independent National Security Doctrine without compromising our Zionism. In these areas, I believe that ideas from the public can and should be used, and I hope that this trend continues”.

הפוסט “The IDSF also wants to listen to ideas that come from below” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

What comes to mind when you hear the words “lone farm” or “a farm in Judea and Samaria”? It may elicit an image of a subversive complex with a not-so-normative family. But that’s not the case.

Contrary to popular belief, not only are the farms not subversive, but they are part of a vital security, social, and educational enterprise of the State of Israel, as part of a proper strategy. This project thwarts the Palestinian Authority’s scheme to unilaterally establish a state in Area C, all while educating young people to be Zionists, work the land, and love their country. To get to know the project better, let’s go back to its origins.

The farms paved the way for the establishment of the state.

As early as 1908, the Palestine Office (the executive arm of the Zionist Organization in Israel), headed by Arthur Ruppin, decided to establish agricultural farms throughout the country that would train laborers to settle the land. Among other places, farms were established in Sejera, Um Juni, Hulda, Kfar Uriya, Be’er Tuvia, Beit Arif (Ben Shemen), and Hittin, and agronomists and agricultural experts helped them to grow and develop.

The role that the farms played in realizing the Zionist vision and establishing the state far exceeded their official mission. The Hebrew Defense Force (in its first incarnation, as the “Bar Giora” defense organization), the first agricultural collective in the country, and the Labor Legion were established on the Sejera farm, whose most famous laborer was David Ben-Gurion. The first kibbutzim and moshavim grew from the Kinneret Farm, and the foundations for the future state were laid in the form of institutions such as the Haganah organization, Solel Boneh, Tnuva, and the Mashbir.

Agricultural farms: An appropriate Zionist response to the Fayyad Plan

After the establishment of the state, many additional farms were established on vast, uncultivated territories suitable for Jewish settlement. After the Six-Day War, cattle farms were also established in the Golan. In the Negev, over ten lone farms (a farm established and run by a single person, family, or small group) have also been established since the 1990s. However, the most important development in recent decades with regard to the agricultural farms and their contribution to Zionism was in Judea and Samaria.

In 2009, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad published a plan to take over Israeli-controlled Area C and unilaterally establish a de facto Palestinian state by 2011. This plan, known as the Fayyad Plan, posed a significant threat to the Jewish communities across Judea and Samaria and to their security and strategic interests. The appropriate Zionist response to this was the agricultural farm movement.

Maximum territory using minimum resources

What makes farms a particularly effective way to occupy land?

The farms are small and therefore require little investment from the state in terms of resources and infrastructure.

Despite the small area of the actual farm, it grants control over much larger areas, since not only do farmers work the land adjacent to the farm, but the farm’s activities also involve the daily use of extensive grazing areas. In this way, the farm’s ongoing activities thwart attempts by hostile elements to take over the land, and assist in countering agricultural crime and smuggling. The constant presence on site strengthens the rule of law and the state’s sovereignty in the frontier areas, since it facilitates alerting of any illegal construction or suspicious changes in the area. Furthermore, the constant presence of the farmers in the fields and pastures prevents the creation of no man’s land, which may become security-related points of friction.

Another advantage lies in the fact that the farm requires almost no built-up area, and therefore it blends in well, and does not jeopardize military firing ranges or green spaces whose continuity is important from an ecological perspective.

By comparison, establishing a town or city requires a complex planning, legal, and administrative process, which can take years, to approve the plan and precise location in accordance with the Planning and Building Law and the National Outline Plan. This is followed by a construction process and the creation of water, electricity, and drainage infrastructures, as well as other municipal services. This means that a large investment over many years is required by the state for residents to be able to inhabit a relatively small area.

On farms, however, a minimal investment in resources and infrastructure is enough for a small number of conscientious and determined farmers to be able to hold extremely large areas for the state, work the land or graze herds on it, and protect the borders.

In this respect, the farms proved to be an ideal, effective, and economical way for the state to spread over vast areas and create territorial continuity that is strategically vital to its ability to maintain the security of its citizens within defensible borders – all with minimal investment on its part.

A strategic and security Israeli enterprise

The achievements speak for themselves.

There are currently over a hundred agricultural farms, which are protecting over six hundred thousand dunams of state land in Judea and Samaria. The farm enterprise spans vast areas and holds more than twice as much land as all the towns and cities in Judea and Samaria combined, including Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim, Beitar Illit, and Modi’in Illit. The construction boom is continuing, and already since the Swords of Iron War broke out, at least 15 new farms have been established in the area.

A decade and a half after their establishment gained momentum, it can already be stated that the agricultural farms play a crucial role in protecting Israel from the threat posed by the Fayyad Plan, in maintaining security in the region, and in creating a defensible Israeli demographic continuity in Area C.

In November 2021, the government determined that any of its ministries, not just the Ministry of Agriculture, can support voluntary agricultural activity in areas of national priority. In December 2024, we learned that Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter had instructed his ministry to begin granting farms the pasture grants that farmers in every other region of the country have been receiving for years. Dichter defined the move as “tremendous news for farms in Judea and Samaria,” and said that “after decades of being discriminated against, farmers in Judea and Samaria have begun to receive the pasture grants they deserve”.

Unity is Strength

The large number of farms in Judea and Samaria, and the fact that they span vast areas, posed security, economic, logistic, and bureaucratic challenges to their owners that needed to be handled in an organized and coordinated manner. In 2024, farm owners in Judea and Samaria established the Farm Association, whose role is to represent them vis-a-vis the authorities, assist in the requisite coordination vis-a-vis the defense establishment and government agencies, and assist in raising resources and obtaining grants that will support the farms financially.

The establishment of the Farm Association constitutes an important development of the agricultural farm enterprise. The association enables the numerous farms in Judea and Samaria to operate in a more efficient and organized manner, and significantly strengthens the entire movement. The Farm Association currently works to support the farmers and expand the farm enterprise in Judea and Samaria, out of a commitment to the vision behind it – preserving the nation’s lands and ensuring continuous Israeli control over the region.

The association intends, among other things, to provide financial incentives to farms that generate additional sources of income, such as tourism and vineyards, which will boost their stability and economic success, as well as to set up new farms, which requires the construction of infrastructures, security, and a preliminary herd that involve high initial costs. Concurrently, the association plans to operate an educational program for youth and volunteers at the farms, which will include practical training in carpentry, welding, and riding. The plow line is the border line for Israel’s other borders as well

The struggle to thwart the Fayyad Plan to take over Judea and Samaria is still in full swing. Only the establishment of dozens of additional farms will ensure that the Palestinian Authority does not take over Area C and fatally harm Jewish settlement in areas that are essential to maintaining national security and that constitute the cradle of our identity.

However, the momentum of fulfilling the settlement vision through agricultural farms must not stop in Judea and Samaria. In recent years, the number of Jews in the Galilee has been in continuous decline, and as of 2023, it was less than 15% of all residents (compared to about 25% in the past). Meanwhile, in the Negev, the illegal expansion of the unrecognized Bedouin villages and the increased rise of Palestinian nationalism and even involvement in terrorism within it are turning it into a “state within a state” that threatens the southern towns.

In our time, the long-standing Zionist settlement system of agricultural farms, which enables a small population to own large territory in a manner that requires relatively few infrastructures and resources, has become not only more relevant than ever but also a prerequisite for Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state.

As the HaShomer HaChadash (The New Watchman) organization rightly claims, the agricultural farm is the settlement model of the 21st century. Only extensive investment by the State of Israel in establishing dozens of farms in the coming years, not only in Judea and Samaria but also in the Negev and Galilee, as a project of national priority, will allow us to protect all parts of the Land of Israel, and not lose the south and the north again.

More than a century ago, Joseph Trumpeldor said: “Wherever the Jewish plow plows its last furrow, that is where the border will run”. This insight is more relevant than ever. This makes the agricultural farm enterprise the most important security and strategic mission of our time.

To participate in the Farm Association project

הפוסט The Farms: Zionism of the Future הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Nowadays, one would be hard pressed to come up with slurs that have not been hurled already at Generation Tik Tok. It is said that that it is shallow, selfish and mentally feeble; That it lacks true connection to nation and country; that it wants for ethics and morals, and has no purpose and aspirations.

Then came October 7, and shattered that impression of Israeli youth.

“Suddenly, it became evident that Israeli youth is not the problem, but rather the solution”, says Major Matuko Alamu, head of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program. “Our youth isn’t vapid and morally weak. On the contrary – it seeks meaning, purpose and the realization of its potential. In one moment, it understood that Israel is back in 1948 and we are once again facing a war of independence that calls on all of us to step up to the flag, and protect the very existence of the Jewish national home. It was able to put aside differences of opinions, and it united to carry on its shoulders the protection of national security. The current [security] system suffers from issues that had cultivated a general misconception regarding the superiority of Israel’s military and intelligence and the deterred state of Hamas. The ideological youth, which exhibited a strong sense of purpose and mission that arose in the wake of October 7, is the key to change”.

From under the veneer of materialism and “Me–ism”, explains Alamu, rose a generation that responded to the call to the flag and shined in the most brilliant light it could – committed and willing to sacrifice itself for the protection of Israel, united above any sectoral or political divide and with a strong and deep sense of belonging to the Jewish nation and country.

“In one of the most difficult times in the history of the State of Israel, we have been discovering what a fabulous future the Zionist cause can have, if only we enable it and help it grow. This is exactly the reasoning behind the Tkuma preparatory program”.

Cultivating the next generation – aimed at the defense of state, united, committed

The Tkuma pre-military preparatory program named after Sergent Major Omer Smadga May his Memory be Blessed, is one of the flagship initiatives of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement and was created with the aim of cultivating the IDF’s future generation of commanders – proactive, determined, ready to be on the offense, ideological and committed to Zionist security values, to ensure that the worst failure in the history of the State of Israel will never happen again. The choice of the location – the Tkuma moshav – is far from coincidental, as it is one of the communities that was attacked by the Hamas terrorists on October 7 and its members consequently evacuated.

“It was very important for us to educate and encourage the young generation to come live in the Gaza envelope communities”, says Alamu, “to boost agriculture in the moshav and the area and play a role in the rebuilding of Israel’s border communities”.

The directorship of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is just one in a long track-record of positions Alamu (40) has filled in non-formal education. Alamu had immigrated to Israel by walking from Ethiopia to Israel by way of Sudan, in an arduous journey that began when he was just three years old and ended when he was seven. In Israel, he grew up in the town of Ofakim and went to the religious school – yeshiva – in Hebron.

In the army Alamu served as a fighter and commander in the Paratroopers Brigade, now a Major in reserves in the airborne evacuation unit, also serving as a counselor and evaluator in special forces tests. He has a BA in management and public policy and has over ten years’ experience in non-formal education, as a counselor and coordinator in the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement and director of a number of pre-military preparatory and leadership programs. He lives in Ofakim with his wife Anat and their five children.

Against this background, Alamu’s appointment as the Director of the Tkuma program was almost inevitable. Not only has he dedicated his life to security and education – the interconnectivity of which the program focuses on – but he also personifies the three unique aspects of the program: a clear security perception, the interconnection of all parts of Israeli society, and deep commitment and dedication to the Israeli people and country.

The First IDSF Habithonistim Preparatory Program in Israel

The Tkuma program is the only one of its kind that offers the involvement of senior officers from the security establishment. The members of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, which served in the high ranks of the security apparatus, in commanding, combat and management capacities, will be part of a unique mentorship track. They will cultivate the deep comprehension of the military occupation and the Zionist aspect of Israel’s security doctrine, preparing the cadets to meaningful service in the IDF’s spearhead units and positions.

What is special about this mentorship?

“The IDSF HaBithonistim mentors will provide each cadet with an envelope of mentoring and guidance that will be personally tailored, not only during the term of the program but also later, during her or his military service. They will be there to guide, advise and help achieve the goals each cadet sets for themselves, while assisting to fulfill military duties in the optimal manner, including courses, selection of the desired officers’ training, and more. The cadets will be able to continue benefitting from the mentoring and guidance of the movement throughout their lives – even years after they end their military career.”

What kind of focus will the issue of security get in the program?

“Our curriculum includes an in-depth introduction to the national security doctrine of the State of Israel, the defense establishment and the defense industries, and will also place special emphasis on physical fitness and physical and mental preparation for assuming leadership roles and achieving meaningful military service. Whether they join elite forces, in combat roles in the infantry or in the 8200-intelligence service, the goal for them will always be to make the most of their abilities and contribute as much as possible to people, society and the country“.

How actually was the initiative born to found a preparatory program that would focus equally on education and security?

“Education is the central pillar of our existence as a nation, and in turn – of Israel’s security. Therefore, since the establishment of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement five years ago, it has been investing a considerable portion of its enterprise in education, among others in participating in various pre-military preparatory programs, and conducting pre-military talks in high-schools across Israel, in collaboration with the Education Ministry and the government. The establishment of the Tkuma preparatory program is the natural evolution of this involvement. October 7 made it clear that time is of essence in putting this into action”.

Part of the program’s stated vision is teaching security in the broadest sense. What does that mean?

“The military aspect is only one pillar of strong and lasting security. Our security is also based on an independent economy, diplomacy, the settlement of population in strategic areas of the country, social cohesion and education for Zionism. The preparatory program aspires to provide the students with the deep understanding of the interdependence between all these areas and their vitality for the future of the country.”

Reuniting Israeli society

An additional aspect of the Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is its rich and divers human tapestry, which makes it a microcosmos of Israeli society.

“Many such programs do much good”, says Alamu. “But unintentionally they produce a cookie-cutter type of graduates. Our program, on the other hand, will truly encompass all walks of Israeli society – men and women, religious and non-religious, residents of affluent central Israel and from its geoeconomic periphery. This is one of the most important lessons from the state of affairs in our society on October 6 – that a way must be found to reunite Israel’s fragmented society, finding that which unites us in order to strengthen our social cohesion and eliminate the polarization and social discord. It’s clear to me that our rebirth as a strong united nation will grow from the cultivation of values and unity, which are inalienable elements of our national security, as is the connection to the land and working the land – and this is the path of the Tkuma program. For me this is a great honor to be part of the effort to shape the collective national perception among the young generation and to instill in them the belief in our right to live in this land”.

The Tkuma preparatory program: Omer’s legacy

The ideological vision of the Tkuma program reflects the jolting crucial wakeup call that Israeli society received on October 7.

“We witnessed a sudden mass mobilization of the entire nation. People who’ve found a way to shirk their reserves service for years had suddenly showed up to volunteer for duty, and the rate of enlistment was so high that the base supply stores couldn’t keep up with demand for gear and uniforms. We suddenly remembered that we’re part of a nation, of a society, of a bigger story, and not just a random group of individuals, but a collective, and that true self realization demands the contribution to the collective to which we belong”.

The Tkuma program is named after Lt. Col. (res.) Omer Smadja, the son of the famous judoka Oren Smadja, who was killed in battle in the Gaza Strip in June 2024. How did his character and the legacy he left behind reflect these values?

“One of the amazing and inspiring things about Omer’s story is that despite his difficult struggle with attention and concentration deficits, as a result of which he studied in special education, not only did he not give up on realizing his aspirations – but he also chose to do everything in his power to contribute to others – country and society. Not only did he overcome his difficulties, but he also chose to volunteer at the Magen David Adom emergency medical services, to be a cadet in a pre-military preparatory program, to volunteer to service in the IDF, to donate bone marrow, and all the time to give, in more and more ways. In other words, he was always a champion.”

Is that really your slogan – “Program for Champions”? What does that mean?

“Omer, may he be in blessed memory, was an example that in order to be a champion, you don’t need the rank, but rather the strength and perseverance to set goals and objectives every day and strive to meet them, no matter what age and stage of life we are at. It was enough to hear his father, Oren Smadja, eulogize him at the funeral and call on IDF soldiers to continue moving forward and stick to the goal, in order to understand what kind of upbringing Omer had. At the same time, it must be remembered that these goals must be realized within the community, society, and country. A champion is someone who not only excels in everything he or she does, but also someone who chooses to take on leadership positions and contribute to the common good. In the communal living at the Tkuma program, in which the students are together 24 hours a day, this can also materialize in the smallest everyday actions – taking care of your friends, taking responsibility without being asked and stepping up to take on tasks, for example – washing dishes for everyone – rather than trying to shirk responsibility”.

And this is only the beginning

The Tkuma pre-military preparatory program is far from the end of the line of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s initiatives. The movement’s educational vision stretches far beyond this single enterprise: “We want the program to have an influence on our graduates for the rest of their lives. It is imperative that they continue playing an active role in the settlement of Israel, by founding more communities and boosting existing ones across Israel. Wherever the need arises for helping hands for security or settlement – we’ll be there”.

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim’s Tkuma Pre-Military Program – Cultivating the Future Generation of IDF Leadership הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The focus of Palestinian social media channels, which mostly favor Hamas, illustrates the cynical attitude of the organization and of its supporters: The Palestinian channels featured Israeli news photos of the Israeli hostages and added some snide comments that Abu Ubayda, the spokesman for the Hamas military wing, made at the beginning of the war:

“This is what Israel, when it used starvation as a weapon against the residents of Gaza, did to its own people who were held by Hamas… Israeli media publishes photos of a captive Israeli from before his imprisonment in Gaza and from the time of his release.”

Abu Ubayda said at the beginning of the war, “Your prisoners will live the way the residents of Gaza live, in the shadow of an imposed famine. They will eat like the Gazans and will drink when the Gazans drink.”

These hostage releases, taking place in the form of a Hamas production, turn the stomach of every Israeli viewer. Hamas considers that this is a show of force, promoting its brand among supporters at home and abroad and showing that it has survived the war and still rules Gaza. One of the themes that Hamas intends to convey in the horror show at each of the hostage releases is the humiliation of Israel and the “proof” of who the winner is. With each round of releases, Hamas builds its victory narrative and hangs more messages on the scenery.

The fifth round revived the regular practice of bringing the hostages on stage to be ridiculed and humiliated. But this time the hostages were subjected to “interviews,” answering questions in Hebrew. In addition, at the foot of the same stage, a large sign displayed the defiant message “Absolute Victory”; and above the stage, another sign displayed a mordant message to American President Donald Trump: “We are the day after.” That message leaves no doubt that Hamas intends to keep control of the Gaza Strip and opposes moving Palestinians away from it. Hamas addresses its message to three parties: Israel, the United States, and the Palestinian Authority. First, Hamas emphasizes that the Palestinians will certainly not migrate voluntarily; and second, it tells the Palestinian Authority emphatically who will control the Gaza Strip. And those messages also register among the residents of Gaza – including especially the upcoming generation. During preparations for the horror show, small Palestinian children were already being costumed as terrorists from the Hamas military wing. Children wearing the military wing’s headbands were hoisted onto their fathers’ shoulders in front of the abused Israeli hostages on stage. Hamas uses the grotesque festival surrounding the hostage releases as a way of indoctrinating the next generation and bequeathing a belligerent tradition. That generation is now learning from Hamas that the “Al-Aqsa Flood” is a historic milestone and that the every Gazan child will now dream of joining the military wing of Hamas.

Note that while Israeli hostages were being released, Ali Khamenei – Iran’s supreme leader – met with a Hamas delegation in Tehran. Khamenei told the Hamas delegation, led by Khalil al-Hayya: “You defeated America and the Zionist entity and prevented them from achieving their goals.

“In the minds of the Iranian people, the defense of Palestine and the support of its people are beyond question. For us the issue of Palestine is fundamental, and for us the victory of Palestine is inevitable.”

Just as Iran tries to disseminate slogans that are divorced from reality, Hamas is trying to raise echoes with a false equation: Hamas dressed the Israeli hostages in prison uniforms that bore their picture with the caption “I am a prison inmate under the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades” (the Hamas military wing). In that cynical equation, Hamas presents the Israeli hostages, innocent people who were kidnapped from their homes, as equivalent to terrorists who were captured and convicted after carrying out serious terror attacks.

Hamas hones its messages

Throughout the war, Hamas has tried to present false equations, likening the terrorists serving time in Israeli prisons to the Israeli hostages wasting away as captives in Gaza. However, having signed the agreement to return the hostages and respect the ceasefire, Hamas is now honing its messages and sharpening them with each round of releases in order to build up its power and its narrative as the “victor” and the Palestinian people’s “hero.” Hamas turns every hostage release into a grand show displaying its power and branding itself as the authority figure. These performances contribute to rebuilding trust among the residents of Gaza – an important consideration after Hamas was greatly criticized during the war.  Many Palestinians complained that with the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, Hamas brought about a “renewed Nakba” for the Palestinians. Now Hamas is trying to change the conception – to repackage the new “Nakba” into a Hamas victory.

The weekly horror festival of Hamas

The messages from Hamas are groundwork for its vision of “the day after” – which resembles the run-up to October 7th: demonstrations of force by the military wing in Gaza, weapons brandished in the air, Hamas symbols as indications of rulership in the Gaza Strip, and denial of the Palestinian Authority’s influence. The message resoundingly emerging is that Hamas will agree neither to depart voluntarily nor even to relinquish power. On the contrary, Hamas will remain committed to the conflict and to its goal of destroying the State of Israel. Week after week, Hamas updates its “victory” narrative. Harrowing images from the weekly horror festival illustrate the murderous Hamas version of “the day after.” Hamas is showing us its plan for the future of Gaza and of the entire region – the Middle East reverting to October 6th. This once again emphasizes the need for the terrorist organization to be ousted.

After the horror show from Hamas, Israel is expected to send a delegation to Qatar to discuss the conclusion of the first phase of the deal. In light of the difficult displays, Israel is striving to find an appropriate response that will not violate the agreement. A harsh response is required, but Israel’s leverage is limited. One option is a delay in releasing Palestinian prisoners. Such a delay would put Hamas under the pressure of fear that the deal may be torpedoed. That fear would spread to Gaza’s residents – and from the status of the “hero” that promised to release prisoners, the terrorist organization would slip to the status of a group that is bringing the drums of war, and the IDF, back to Gaza. As for Israel – despite Hamas’ brutal use of the hostages, Israel should not upset the applecart. It should continue to advance to the second phase of the deal. After all the hostages are returned, Hamas must be completely eliminated and the ground must be prepared for the implementation of Trump’s plan in Gaza. October 7th taught us once again that Hamas should not remain our neighbor. Victory, including the overthrow of Hamas, is the order of the day and indeed the only option.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The horror festival and the weekly message from Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Swords of Iron War is not Israel’s first prolonged war. The War of Independence, which broke out before the official declaration of the state’s founding was made, lasted around a year and eight months – from November 1947 until the armistice agreements were signed in July 1949.

The operational portion of the war was concluded with Operation Uvda, when Israel established its sovereignty in the southern Negev and southern Arava Valley. Despite the operation’s strategic and political importance, it is currently remembered mainly because of the makeshift Israeli flag that was raised. This flag, which was raised on March 10, 1949, 9th of Adar 5709, was later nicknamed the “Ink Flag”, and became a central symbol of the War of Independence. Documenting the hanging of the flag was also given distinguished status, and to date is considered one of the most iconic photographs in the history of the IDF.

Facts on the Ground: The Backstory for the Operation

Operation Uvda was conducted at the beginning of March 1949. At the time, the armistice agreements between Israel and its neighboring enemy countries began to be signed in an attempt to end the War of Independence. On January 1, 1949, the first agreement was signed with Egypt, and on March 4, talks with Jordan commenced. Already at the start of negotiations it became apparent that Jordan was demanding ownership over the southern Negev, including the city of Eilat. Jordan’s demand won the support of the British, who were very involved in the Kingdom of Jordan, and who strove to create territorial continuity between Transjordan and the Suez Canal, which was to be under their influence.

On the other hand, the State of Israel had strong political and military claims that it needed to control the Negev, and did not intend on relinquishing this control. In order to establish de facto Israeli sovereignty over the Negev, a decision was made to embark on a campaign to take control of the territory on March 6, which was called Operation Uvda.

South of Eilat: How the Operation Unfolded

The goal of Operation Uvda was to reach Umm Rashrash – a small Bedouin village on the coast of the Gulf of Eilat, while taking control of the entire Negev and Arava territories within the Land of Israel. Three brigades participated in the Operation – Negev, Golani, and Alexandroni. The Negev and Golani brigades were meant to reach Umm Rashrash, each moving along a different route. The Alexandroni brigade, however, functioned as a side stabilization campaign operating in the northeast Negev. The air force also participated in the operation, and mainly assisted with aerial reconnaissance and transporting forces and supplies.

The infantry forces began moving southward in the early afternoon hours of March 6. The vanguard forces of the Negev brigade were the first to arrive at the Sde Avraham area, and later in the day they were joined by additional forces from the brigade, along with ground reinforcements of the air force, which helped to prepare the field. Concurrently, the Golani brigade forces advanced in the eastern Negev, and by evening they established themselves the Ein Hatzeva area.

Over the next two days, the Negev and Golani forces continued to advance along their prescribed routes, conquering destinations along the way, including Ein Yahav, Ein Ghamr, and Ein Radyan (now Yotvata). At the same time, the Alexandroni brigade completed the stabilization operation and managed to capture Ein Gedi and Masada without a battle.

The Final Stretch: The End of the Operation and Raising the Flag

On the morning of March 10, military communications discovered that the Arab Legion instructed all of its forces to withdraw east of the international border. Air force patrol revealed that the Jordanian military outpost adjacent to the Egyptian Ras al-Naqb police station had been abandoned.

In light of this information, the commander of the Negev brigade, Nahum Sarig, realized that the forces were close to achieving their goal – capturing Umm Rashrash, however he then noticed that they did not have an Israeli flag to plant there to display their conquest. Sarig instructed his soldiers to create a makeshift flag, which they did. The flag was prepared by the company secretary, Pua Erel. According to her, she used a white sheet that she found and drew a Star of David and two stripes on it with ink.

The makeshift flag was handed to one of the company commanders in the Negev Brigade, Avraham Adan. Complying with Sarig’s instruction, Adan advanced with his forces on foot to Umm Rashrash. Sarig himself advanced to the area in a roundabout way with two jeeps. That same afternoon, a vanguard force of the Negev brigade comprised of 13 officers and soldiers, arrived at Umm Rashrash. They brought with them the makeshift flag the secretary made.

The vanguard force first cleared the buildings in the area, particularly the British police station in the village. Once it was confirmed that the station had indeed been abandoned, the force as able to conduct the flag raising ceremony. Avraham Adan climbed the flagpole that was there and hung the handmade ink-drawn flag. Micha Perry, Deputy Commander of the 9th Battalion of the Negev brigade, who was also a photographer, documented this moment. After the flag was raised, the soldiers there sang Hatikvah.

Despite the successful improvisation, the Ink Flag did not wave from the flagpole for very long. Around two hours after the flag-raising ceremony, Golani forces arrived and brought a proper Israeli flag with them, which replaced the one the Negev brigade made.

The Greatest Event: The Outcomes of the Operation and Commemorating the Ink Flag Ethos

Once Umm Rashrash was captured, Nahum Sarig, commander of the Negev brigade, and Nahum Golan, commander of the Golani Brigade, sent a telegram that said: “On Haganah day, the 11th of Adar, the Palmach Negev brigade and the Golani brigade present the Gulf of Eilat to the State of Israel”.

The next day, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: “This was the greatest event in recent months, if not during the entire war of liberation and conquest”.

Operation Uvda was indeed one of the most important campaigns in the War of Independence, and it greatly shaped the southern border we now know well. Despite Jordan’s initial demands, the armistice agreement Israel signed with Jordan on April 3, 1949 stated that the locations the IDF forces captured during Operation Uvda – including the city of Eilat – will be included in the sovereign territory of the State of Israel.

With regards to the Ink Flag – despite its symbolic and historical significance, it seems to have disappeared during the operation. In fact, for five years no one was even aware of the fact that this was the first flag that flew above the abandoned British police station in Umm Rashrash. Only on March 10, 1954, in an edition of the weekly newspaper Davar LaYeladim that was dedicated to commemorating five years since Eilat’s capture, the photo taken by Micha Perry was published for the first time. This photo was immediately etched into the national memory and became a symbol of the end of the War of Independence.

In 1996, a metal statue created by artist Daniel Kafri was inaugurated at the site of the old police station of Umm Rashrash in Eilat . The statue, which was inspired by Micha’s photograph, depicts Adan hanging the Ink Flag on the flagpole. The Hebrew date on which the flag was raised, the 9th of Adar, was chosen as the official date to celebrate Eilat Day, and this is how the flag

הפוסט 76 Years Ago Today: Operation Uvda Ended and the Ink Flag was Raised in Umm Rashrash הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The “hostage deals,” which are taking place as part of the ceasefire agreement with the terrorist organization Hamas, could have been conducted in a modest and discreet manner that would honor the released living and dead hostages, and their families. And perhaps, if you can even say such a thing, it would also cast Hamas in a slightly more “humane” light, at least to the blind eyes of target audiences in the Arab and international arenas, to whom Hamas directs its cynical and despicable propaganda displays. But when it comes to Hamas, even the hostage handover proceedings, which unfortunately also included a process of handing over the bodies of dead hostages last week, take place as a cynical and horrifying media “carnival” according to carefully planned and detailed rules of ceremony, reflecting the terrorist movement’s murderous ideology that boasts of its “achievements” and that seeks to glorify and praise the distorted values of what it calls “resistance.”

A media analysis of the living and dead hostage handover ceremonies in the Hamas-affiliated media outlets actually makes it possible to quite easily outline the guidelines of the ceremony’s set of rules as determined by Hamas’s “Ceremonies Committee” and according to which Hamas’s meticulous “handover ceremonies” are conducted – ceremonies that, despite ourselves, we have become addicted to and that flood us each time with mixed feelings of joy, immense pain, and copious rage and disgust.

The media “carnival” of the living and dead hostage handovers always begins with introductory coverage of the preliminary preparations for the handover ceremony to emphasize its importance and meticulous management. This is the point where Hamas’s film and documentation crew makes sure that no detail is overlooked – the location, the ceremony stage with the displays on it, including the ceremony’s key messages that appear in three languages: Arabic, English, and Hebrew (rife with spelling and wording errors). The messages and slogans Hamas uses are taken from the terrorist movement’s key messages of the “victory” narrative. The central horrifying message, which appeared on a giant poster on the ceremony stage, above the coffins of the late Shiri Bibas and her young children, Kfir and Ariel, and of Oded Lifshitz, was: “Murdered by the war criminal Netanyahu with fighter jet missiles.” A message in this spirit in Hebrew was also included in the announcement that was attached to each of the victims’ coffins along with their photo, the date of their abduction, and the date of their “murder” by the “occupation.” We all already know the horrifying truth: Shiri and her young children were brutally murdered in captivity, shortly after they were abducted. The vile murderers were not satisfied with cold-blooded murder; they also mutilated their bodies to match the bodies’ condition to the cause of death that would be presented almost a year later, during the dead hostage handover procession: “murdered by the occupation”.

Hamas also carefully selects the location of the “handover ceremonies.” They were intended to demonstrate both full control of strategic points in the Strip and to pay tribute to the legacy of the movement’s symbols, led by the architect of the murderous terrorist attack, Yahya Sinwar, whose compound near his home also served as a hostage handover location. An integral part of the ceremony is dedicated to exhibiting the presence of an armed parade, which includes dozens of masked terrorists, in full military attire. The militants scattered around the ceremony complex are documented taking pictures with the audience that comes to watch the ceremony, especially with the children and toddlers of Gaza, who are never absent from the ceremonies. They are documented and photographed next to their admired militants, wearing the military wing’s headband.

The presence of the numerous armed men at the ceremony serves Hamas for two ideological goals: First, to convey a clear and resounding message that Israel’s claims about the destruction of Hamas and disbanding its combat battalions are false, and that Hamas, with its military wing, is fully functional from a military aspect and is exercising complete sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. From Hamas’s perspective, this is “giving the finger” to anyone who thought that the long intensive war had defeated it militarily. Furthermore, Hamas is also ensuring that commanders in the military wing, who Israel announced had been eliminated, attend the ceremonies, to prove that this was a case of mistaken identity on Israel’s part. For example, at Keith Siegel’s release ceremony on February 1, 2025, Haitham Khawajari, commander of the Shati Battalion, was seen and documented walking among the militants present at the ceremony. The second goal, no less important from Hamas’s perspective, is to link its presence on the ground to its popularity and support among the Gazan people in order to gain additional legitimacy “points” in domestic and even Arab public opinion. But the militants have another significant role in the ceremony, and it is aimed at Israeli public opinion: Hamas wants to humiliate Israel and tarnish the IDF’s image as an invincible army. This is why the elaborate ceremony features armed men carrying IDF weapons, such as the Tavor, which was documented by one of the military wing members at the dead hostages handover ceremony last Thursday (and at Agam Berger’s handover ceremony to the Red Cross, a weapon was displayed that Hamas claims was taken from an IDF combat soldier). Gunmen from the “Shadow Unit,” which is responsible for transporting and securing the hostages, were also filmed making their rounds at the ceremony complex in Khan Younis, riding in a RAM truck that Hamas claims was taken from the “occupation” in a raid on the day of the October 7 murderous terrorist attack.

Hamas also made sure to document the presence of Gazan prisoners who were released in previous rounds and who were brought to the podium of honor at the dead hostages handover ceremony. Hamas considers the prisoners’ presence to be of great importance, since one of its key messages in the victory narrative is that the release of the prisoners was only possible thanks to the October 7 attack, Hamas’s steadfastness and refusal to yield to pressure in negotiations with Israel. This message also helps Hamas silence the voices of its domestic critics who believe that Hamas inflicted a catastrophe on the Gaza Strip.

Ironically and cynically, and most outrageously, Hamas’s show is primarily directed at the released hostages and, unfortunately, even at the dead ones. The production team ensures that each ceremony begins by documenting the transport of the hostages accompanied by armed men, wearing “hostage badges” and being brought to the ceremony stage where they are given signed release certificates in a folder with a photo, as well as “souvenirs and mementos” in a special package stamped with the symbol of Hamas’s military wing. Hamas’s ceremony guidelines also include strict requirements regarding the hostages’ appearance and clothing, ensuring that soldiers appear on the ceremony stage in military uniform. Even a bracelet in the colors of the Palestinian flag is worn by some of the hostages for photo purposes, as seen on Agam Berger’s wrist as she waved to the crowd. The strict staging instructions for the hostages continue on the ceremony stage as well. Before they leave the “stage of honor” and are handed over to the Red Cross representatives, the hostages are required to smile and wave to the camera and the Gazan audience, display their release certificates, and in some ceremonies, the hostages are instructed to deliver speeches that include messages of gratitude and appreciation to their captors for the “kind and compassionate treatment” and, of course, a message to the Israeli government that the only way to release the hostages is through Hamas’s cynical staged ceremonies. The handover of the hostages to the Red Cross effectively concludes the  painstaking ceremony, but this is also the preferred time for Hamas media to post summary videos on its multiple channels of the “impressive” handover ceremony, while concurrently, horrifyingly cynical videos are posted with a montage of “magical moments” of the hostages during their captivity, such as the video of Sasha Troufanov spending quality time with a fishing rod in the sea, and a video of Keith Siegel delivering a message and blessing to his captors, against the backdrop of the pastoral landscape of the Gaza beach.

We all saw the bitter truth about what the hostages are enduring in captivity, during the shocking ceremony in which Eli Sharabi, Ohad Ben Ami, and Or Levi were handed over. It was impossible to ignore their sunken eyes, pallor, and emaciated appearance as they made their way to the ceremony stage like walking skeletons, not before they had also “played their part,” as the lead actors in the worst play in town.

Hamas never stops claiming that it is interested in a comprehensive “all-for-all” hostage-prisoner exchange, but the compensation Hamas demands not only includes the release of prisoners, but “the whole nine yards” and implementation of the second phase of the agreement that is supposed to enable its survival. This is why Hamas consistently works to make the handover ceremonies unbearable for Israel, and it will probably not stop doing so without an Israeli move that forces it to. At first glance, it seems to us that the set, the extras, the stage, and the slogans are the same in every handover ceremony. But in every ceremony, Hamas reveals a new “surprise,” which constitutes a new level of evil cynicism and cruelty. This is exactly what we saw during the release of the hostages last Saturday, when, to our astonishment, the main photographer of the Al-Qassam Brigades approached Omer Shem-Tov and instructed him to kiss the heads of the armed terrorists who were standing next to him on the ceremony stage in order to immortalize the embarrassing and humiliating moment – one that would be leveraged shortly thereafter on all of Hamas and Co.’s media channels. Omer’s forced kiss is a “frog” that many Israelis may be willing to swallow. This is undoubtedly a moment that elicits revulsion, but in these moments our thoughts are more focused on the expectation that the hostages will be handed over to our forces and begin the journey home to Israeli territory. But anyone who thought the ceremony was over after the hostages were handed over to the Red Cross “puppets” was wrong. Hamas prepared another “surprise” that surpassed all its predecessors on the scale of evil and cruelty. A video documenting the hostages Guy Gilboa and Evyatar David, sitting in a vehicle that took them near the ceremony stage to watch, with teary eyes, their friends being released. The car door opened in front of the ceremony stage and Guy and Evyatar were asked in Hebrew by one of the car’s occupants: “How are you feeling now?” This signals to them to convey a message to the government and beg for their release and an end to the terrible suffering they are enduring in captivity. At the end of the poignant message, the camera captures the car door closing.

Hamas is undoubtedly very well aware of what the Israeli public’s weak points are, and it will continue to target its soft underbelly using the strong card it holds: the living and dead hostages. The question that arises and becomes more acute in the wake of these vile ceremonies is why is it even important to focus on Hamas’s release performances, watch, and even analyze them? Should this surprise any of us? Of course not. Will “Hamas Productions Ltd.” continue to stage these performances in Gaza and “perfect” them with displays of evil and cruelty? As long as they have live and dead hostages in their possesion, of course they will. It seems that the immense importance of this is to sear it into our consciousness. But not with the narratives that Hamas wants to impress upon us, but rather with what we knew and suppressed, or perhaps even refused to brand onto our consciousness as a leadership and as a nation, in the many years leading up to the murderous attack. If these horrific ceremonies are burned into our consciousness and shake our fading memory, whenever we tend to forget who the enemy we face is and how we should treat him if we want to live, it may be possible to say that Hamas’s production and directing crews and the handover ceremonies they produced with advance planning and premeditation did indeed contribute to shaping our consciousness and to the long process of our national correction. Let us hope.

By: Avishai Karo

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט “Hamas Productions Ltd.” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The border wall

In his meeting with PM Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, 2025, US President, Donald Trump declared a new initiative aiming for the voluntary relocation of the residents of the Gaza Strip into Egypt and Jordan. This was a reiteration of the written initiative that the White House publish immediately after Trump stepped into the Ovel Office on January 26, 2025. This statement constitutes the most important reference regarding this issue that has been made in years. While it is obvious that objections will be hurled at the initiative from many directions, it provides Israel with the legitimization to operate in ways it deems fit to encourage the exodus of the Arab population from Gaza.

The first proposal by an official body – in this case the British Mandate – to relocate the Arab population from the small piece of land allocated for a Jewish state was the Peel Commission headed by Lord Peel, appointed by the British government to investigate the cause of the riots among the Arabs in Mandatory Palestine in 1936-1939 (these were dubbed “the incidents” by the Jewish population, but there were those who, likely aiming to glorify the bloody riots, went so far as to call them “the Arab uprising” or even “the great Arab uprising”)

The Peel Commission understood that not much was left for a Jewish state in the way of territory from the British promise to assists in the foundation of a “national home” for the Jews. The northern territories from the Upper Galilee up to the Letani River were taken by the French and annexed to Lebanon; the Transjordan territory was cleaved from the Land of Israel in 1922 and declared an Emirate, over which the British appointed as ruler the Emir Abdallah. Later, this emirate became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. On top of that, the Peel Commission was suggesting the partitioning of what is left of the Land of Israel into two states: Jewish and Arab. The Commission thought it was only fair to give the Jews the small scrap of land that was promised to them cleared of its Arab population. As it is known, nothing came of the Peel Commission’s report.

The idea of relocating the Arab population from the western part of the Land of Israel was since raised more than once by various statesmen, however, it remained just that – a theoretical idea that failed to follow through with any real results, not even make waves at that. Even among the pre-state Jewish community there were those who raised the idea., among them the spiritual leader of the workers party Mapai, Berl Katzanelson, who championed the idea and wrote essays in its favor. Others advocated the encouragement of voluntary relocation of the Arab population, among the most notable of those was Dr. Abraham Sharon (Shevadron) – a philosopher who worked in the national library. However, the essays he offered failed to gain critical mass and that too, came to nothing.

Arab countries excelled in transfers

The accepted term for moving a population from one country to another – normally forcibly – is “transfer”. This word means transition. It had entered the international lexicon of diplomacy, especially following the population transfer between Turkey and Greece (and Bulgaria) and the exchange of populations between them in the early 20th century, following a bloody war.

History records even graver incidents of transfers – the deportation of the pro-Nazi German minorities from Czechoslovakia and Poland after World War 2; the deportation of entire Japanese communities from Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines also after WW2. These are but two examples of forcible transfers in modern history.

Arab countries, too, committed their fair share of transfers, excelling in this with the expulsion of minorities and forced deportations often accompanied by bloodshed. Egypt, for example, drove out the minorities in the country – Jews and Greeks in particular, and Iraq drove out most of its Jewish community, imprisoning and murdering under false accusations many of those who remained, as well as openly slaughtering the Assyrians who lived in the country.

Mass population migrations have also been known to occur throughout history, where immigrants sought better lives for themselves and their families in other countries. Millions of native Africans, Muslims from Arab countries, Turks and many more nationals immigrated to western Europe and made their home there. Millions have been illegally entering the US and Canada from Latin America. There are too many examples of population migrations or transfers in modern history to count and to mention in the present paper, but one important example demands mentioning: the migrations and expulsions of Jews, primarily those of the Nazi concentration camps following WW2 and the exodus of Jews from Arab countries – mostly on the backdrop of bloody hostilities against them – in various waves of immigration after the foundation of the State of Israel.

Gaza will not be Singapore

The relocation of populations from one place to another is not always a negative thing. Sometimes it can provide a positive – and an only – solution to a complex problem.

This is the kind of solution needed for the overpopulated Gaza Strip. This narrow piece of land, that lies over a small area holds some two million citizens. It is one of the most crowded areas in the world. The population lives in harsh poverty insofar as food, housing, education, healthcare and any other basic need. It is highly doubtful that the situation of the people in the Gaza Strip can be improved in conditions of peace, as it is militant, hostile to Israel, and sympathetic to Hamas and other anti-Israel terror organizations, allowing them free access and operation in its midst. Indeed, Hamas recruits its ranks from this population.

having this kind of brewing pressure cooker sitting on its border is a major security risk For Israel, or at the very least – a pestering nuisance, as this is a surefire way of perpetuating non-stop terror, violence and bloodshed. All of the usual proposals, parroted time after time by various sources in Israel and the international community, cannot fully address the ailments plaguing the Gaza Strip’s population. Those who believe otherwise are simply deluding themselves and others. In no uncertain terms – Gaza will never be a Singapore. The only recourse for the Strip is the reduction of its population as much as possible.

It is crucial to understand that the abovementioned is not in any way advocating a forcible transfer, but proposes allowing anyone in the Gaza Strip to voluntary relocate to another country where they may begin a new, better life. As forcible transfer is destined to fail not only on the backdrop of strong objection on part of the public in Israel, but also from the international community that would stonewall any such attempt.

Full absorption by Latin American countries

The aim of the voluntary immigration proposal is to encourage the outflow of residents from the Gaza Strip based on a previous plan drafted by former Prime Minister Eshkol Levi after the Six Day War. Eshkol was troubled by the sizable Arab population that had come under Israeli control in one fell swoop as result of that war. He tried to encourage them to immigrate in an orderly manner, promising proper absorption and conditions in Latin American countries for those who comply, as some of these countries expressed their willingness to take in the immigrants. This plan was only partially reported by the press and not everything that was done at the time was shared with the public.

In the days and years following the Six Day War, a public controversy raged on the prospects of achieving true peace with the Palestinians. The left and the peace bloc movement loved to throw around slogans in this vein like “Peace Now”, or “The measure of withdrawal is the measure of peace”. One of their favorites was “We’re here; They’re there”. The fact is that Israel’s Arab population is embedded in the general population and it is hard to come up with a solution for separating the two. Those who authored these slogans failed to explain how to attain a state of affairs of “here” and “there”. The answer is in Eshkol’s plan mentioned above.

The current proposal is for the enaction of that plan today, to incentivize any resident of the Gaza Strip to immigrate. This of course will have to be performed with the utmost consideration of the immigrant’s needs. Those who choose to remain in the Gazan quagmire are welcome to do so. Immigration will be a privilege – not mandatory. Nothing will be done coercively.

Those who buck at the idea should be asked what they think is more humanitarian – helping those who are interested to immigrate to find a better life or letting the bloodshed continue?

About the Author:
Dr. Moshe Yager served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 40 years and served as Israeli ambassador to Sweden and the Czech Republic.

The text is solely the author’s opinion and does not necessarily reflect the movement’s position.

הפוסט “We’re here; They’re there” – Voluntary Immigration of the Gaza Strip Residents הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The End of the Sherman: Do It Yourself

The Armored Corps is currently considered one of the main and most important forces in the IDF, but this was not always the case. During the War of Independence, the State of Israel relied mainly on infantry forces and possessed only 15 tanks. Over the years, the number of tanks gradually increased, and with it the scope of involvement of the armored forces in the IDF’s operational activities. In Operation Kadesh (the 1956 Sinai War), Israel already operated 200 tanks, in the Six Day War (1967) it operated about 1,000 tanks, and in the Yom Kippur War (1973) the number of tanks in use had already risen to 2,000.

Despite the quantitative increase, the quality of the tanks at Israel’s disposal barely improved. Due to various diplomatic motives, countries around the world refused to sell Israel new tanks, and the fledgling country was forced to rely on old and incompetent tanks such as the Shermans from World War II and the British Centurions that had become obsolete. The IDF and the Israeli defense industry made great efforts to rehabilitate and improve those old tanks, but it was clearly impossible to rely on such improvisations in the long run.

During the 1960s, two turning point events occurred that pushed the State of Israel to find a solution to the tank crisis. The first event was the news that Arab countries were expected to receive T-62 tanks from the Soviet Union, which were considered the most advanced tanks in the world at the time. The second event was the Chieftain tank affair, when England withdrew at the last minute from its commitment to sell advanced tanks to Israel. These two events made Israel realize that it had to catch up in the armor race vis-a-vis enemy countries, and that it had no choice but to do this on its own.

Getting the caterpillars moving: The development process begins

In 1969, subsequent to the collapse of the deal to purchase tanks from England, the possibility of Israel producing tanks itself was first considered. To examine the feasibility of this, a committee was formed, comprised of professionals and security experts, headed by Major General Israel Tal, later nicknamed the “Father of the Merkava.” The committee was required to examine both the State of Israel’s technological and infrastructural capabilities, as well as the economic viability of the move. The committee’s conclusions were that the State of Israel is capable of establishing a tank industry and that such an industry would provide a solution to its military needs, reduce dependence on other countries, and even benefit the country economically. A few months later, in August 1970, the official decision was made, and the State of Israel embarked on this ambitious project.

In order to promote the project, the Merkava Tank Planning Directorate was established, which bore overall responsibility for development, and the Tank Development Authority (TDA), which dealt with engineering planning. To save time and costs, it was decided to rely as much as possible on infrastructure that already existed in the IDF and the defense establishment. This is how the IDF Tank Rehabilitation and Maintenance Center (RMC), which until then had been used to improve tanks, became the assembly plant for the new tank. Similarly, the IDF’s Equipment and Spare Parts Center and the Procurement and Production Directorate were modified in order to meet the needs of the project. Another decision made was to make tank production a nationwide project, and for this purpose about 200 factories in the defense and civilian industries were converted into factories to manufacture tank parts. The Ardan foundry, for example, began producing heavy armor castings that were used for the turret and the chassis (the bottom portion of the tank), and the IMI factories began producing tank cannons.

The Israeli tank production process lasted a total of about nine years, and on February 20, 1979, the long-awaited moment arrived and the first Merkava tank entered operational use in the 7th Armored Corps Brigade.

Improving and perfecting the Merkava

The first Merkava tank, known as the Merkava Mark 1, was considered a modern and advanced tank at the time. It boasted unprecedented defense capabilities and high survivability, made possible in part by the revolutionary decision to move the engine to the front of the tank.

Since then, the Merkava tank has undergone a series of modifications, which improved both its defense and performance on the battlefield. The Merkava tanks were equipped with fire control systems, night vision devices, and improved firepower systems. Over the years, more advanced models were also developed, and the most advanced – the Merkava Mark 4 – entered IDF service in 2003. Today, the improved models of the Merkava Mark 4 tank benefit from advanced command and control systems, and are equipped with the Wind Jacket active defense system that facilitates maximum protection for the soldiers inside the tank.

Over the years, the State of Israel has produced thousands of Merkava tanks, and these have been used in all the campaigns and wars that have erupted since: In the First Lebanon War, the Merkava Mark 1 tank was used against Syrian armored forces; during the Second Intifada, the Merkava Mark 2 and 3 tanks were used for patrols in dangerous areas and to support infantry forces; during the Second Lebanon War, three armored divisions entered Lebanese territory; and during the Sword of Iron War, the tanks – mainly the Merkava Mark 3 and Mark 4 models – played a central combat role and greatly assisted in ground operations in Gaza and Lebanon.

Only in Israel: Sales prohibited to foreign countries

The Israeli Merkava tank is currently considered the most advanced tank in the world, and few tanks manage to come close to its capabilities. One might expect that the State of Israel would want to exploit the inherent economic advantage of this and export the tank to other countries, but from the very beginning of Merkava tank production, its sale to foreign countries was prohibited in order to maintain the Israeli Armored Corps’ unique advantage.

It was only in 2010 that the Ministry of Defense decided to permit, in principle, the sale of the Merkava Mark 4 tank to “select customers”. In 2014, the Ministry of Defense signed the first Merkava export deal with a foreign country, whose name is prohibited from publication. In 2023, negotiations were held to sell Merkava Mark 2 and Merkava Mark 3 tanks, which are retired from IDF service, to a European country and a South American country whose names were also not disclosed, but these plans were halted due to the Swords of Iron War. So, to date, the State of Israel is probably the only country in the world, or one of the few, in possession of the Merkava tank.

Besides its uniqueness, another source of pride lies in the fact that approximately 80% of the tank’s components are manufactured in Israel, so the project provides a source of livelihood for tens of thousands of Israelis in more than 200 factories nationwide. Nowadays, when there is much talk about the importance of self-development of weapons and combat equipment, it is good to remember the strength of the Israeli defense industry and the immense potential of domestic production.

הפוסט 46 years ago today: The Merkava tank entered operational use in the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The narrative that the root cause of the Middle East’s wars is Israel’s lack of acceptance of Palestinian freedom is a misconception. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict garners significant attention, an objective analysis of the region’s history over the past century reveals that most wars in the Middle East are unrelated to the Palestinian issue. The data unequivocally shows that over 98% of war-related deaths in the region stem from conflicts that have nothing to do with neither Israel or the Palestinians.

Over the last 100 years, the Middle East has been plagued by numerous conflicts, yet only 5 of the 20 most significant wars in the region had any direct connection to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These five wars, which include the Arab-Israeli wars and the Intifadas, resulted in approximately 156,000 deaths—a tragic number, but a small fraction compared to the approximately 5.7 million deaths from wars in the region overall.

The remaining conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Syrian Civil War, and the Yemen Civil War, were driven by power struggles, sectarian divisions, and geopolitical rivalries, not the Palestinian cause. For example:

• Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988): This devastating war resulted in up to 1,000,000 deaths and was rooted in territorial disputes and ideological differences between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Iranian government.

• Syrian Civil War (2011–present): With an estimated death toll of 500,000, this ongoing conflict involves a complex web of factions, including ISIS, Kurdish forces, and international powers like Russia and the U.S.

• Yemen Civil War (2015–present): Over 377,000 deaths have been attributed to this proxy war between Iran-backed Houthi rebels and a Saudi-led coalition.

These conflicts, among others, highlight the multifaceted nature of Middle Eastern wars, which are often fueled by internal divisions, external interventions, and competing ideologies rather than the Palestinian question.

Even within the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, the death tolls are overshadowed by the scale of other wars in the region.

A Fixation on the Palestinian Cause

Despite its relatively small human cost in the context of the region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receives disproportionate attention. This focus stems from several factors:

1. Media Coverage: The conflict often involves Western powers, which amplifies its visibility in global media disproportionately to the ears actual size and importance.
2. Geopolitical Interests: The involvement of influential countries like the U.S. and EU creates a narrative of global importance.
3. Symbolism: For many in the Arab and Muslim worlds, the Palestinian cause symbolizes resistance to Western influence, even as internal divisions persist. For them, Israel remains a foreign bastion representing Western interests over a once-Muslim occupied land, rather than the homeland of the Jewish people. Therefore fixation on the Palestinians issue draws attention away from crimes that are committed inside the Arab world and unites Muslim populations around their authoritarian leader. The Palestinian narrative has therefore become a cudgle to use against Israel rather than a real pressing issue.

Would a Palestinian State End Middle Eastern Wars?

The evidence suggests otherwise. Even if a new Palestinian state were established, the underlying causes of regional conflicts—such as sectarian divides, power struggles, and external meddling—would remain. The wars in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and beyond would likely continue unabated, as they are rooted in issues far removed from the Palestinian question.

The myth that Israel’s actions regarding Palestinian freedom are the linchpin for peace in the Middle East ignores the facts. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is impactful in geopolitical terms, it is neither the sole nor the primary driver of Middle Eastern instability, death, poverty and destruction. The broader challenges of governance, sectarianism, authoritarianism, radical Islamist ideologies and external interference are the main reasons that there is no “peace” in the Middle East.

Full Data

Syrian Civil War (2011–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 400,000 to 500,000

• Sides: Syrian government (Assad regime) vs. Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups, with involvement from ISIS, Kurdish forces, and foreign powers like Russia and the U.S

• Data: SOHR, UN Human Rights Office.

Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000

• Sides: Iran vs. Iraq

• Data: The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications” by Efraim Karsh, Britannica

Yemen Civil War (2015–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Over 377,000 (including direct and indirect causes)

• Sides: Houthi rebels vs. Yemeni government, with involvement from Saudi-led coalition and Iran

• Data: UN Reports on Yemen Civil War Casualties​

Iraq War (2003–2011)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 151,000 to 600,000

• Sides: United States-led coalition vs. Iraq (Saddam Hussein’s regime)

Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 120,000

• Sides: Various factions, including Christian militias, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and Muslim militias, with involvement from Syria and Israel

• Data: NY Times Report, AGBU Magazine

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1948–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 97,000

• Sides: Israel vs. various Palestinian groups and neighboring Arab states

• Data: Combination of many sources: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tmiA5j9zGOXV4FeYRjA5usareSFf8P73/edit?pli=1&gid=1185783474#gid=1185783474

Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 300,000 to 1,500,000

• Sides: France vs. Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)

• Data: Britannica

First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 500,000

• Sides: Sudanese government vs. Anyanya (Southern Sudanese rebels)

• Data: USHMM

Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 2,000,000

• Sides: Sudanese government vs. Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

• Data: PBS

Libyan Civil War (2011)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 30,000

• Sides: Muammar Gaddafi’s regime vs. rebel groups, with NATO involvement

• Data: SMH

Six-Day War (1967)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 20,000 (11,500 Egyptians, 6,094 Jordanians, 1,000 Syrians, 776 Israelis, 2,000 Iraq)

• Sides: Israel vs. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria

• Data: Britannica, Jewish National Library

Yom Kippur War (1973)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 19,000 (2500 Israelis, 15,000 Egyptians, 3,500 Syrians)

• Sides: Israel vs. Egypt and Syria

• Data: Jewish National Library

Suez Crisis (1956)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 3,000

• Sides: Egypt vs. Israel, United Kingdom, and France

• Data: Jewish National Library

First Intifada (1987–1993)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 1,250 (1,100 Palestinians, 162 Israelis)

• Sides: Palestinian protesters and militias vs. Israel

• Jewish National Library, Middle East Monitor

Second Intifada (2000–2005)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 3,200 (2,000 Palestinians, over 1,000 Israelis)

• Sides: Palestinian militants vs. Israel

• Data: Israeli Government

2006 Lebanon War

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 1,300

• Sides: Israel vs. Hezbollah (Lebanese militia)

• Data: HRW

Gulf War (1990–1991)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 20,000 to 35,000

• Sides: Iraq vs. Coalition forces (United States, Saudi Arabia, and others)

• Data: US Navy

Sinai Insurgency (2011–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 1,000 to 2,000

• Sides: Egypt vs. ISIS-affiliated groups

Iraq Insurgency and ISIS War (2014–2017)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 67,000

• Sides: ISIS vs. Iraqi government, Kurdish Peshmerga, and U.S.-led coalition

October War (2023)

• Estimated Deaths: An estimated 43,000 (23,500 terrorist, 17,000 others) Palestinians and 1840 Israeli’s (IDF and others)

• Sides: Israel vs. Hamas and allied Palestinian factions in Gaza

• Data: Warinisrael.org, IDF, OCHA . OCHA claims that over 51,700 Palestinians were killed. The Gaza Health Ministry identified 40,717 of those deaths. The IDF claims that 23,500 Terrorists were killed. The number of Palestinian deaths is anywhere between 23,500-50,000.

The text is solely the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the movement’s opinion.

הפוסט Debunking the Myth: As long as Israel does not accept Palestinians’ Right to Self Determination’, the wars in the Middle East will continue. הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dearborn, a city with a predominantly Arab and Muslim population, recently made headlines when most of its residents voted for Trump. It has long been known as “America’s Jihad capital“. This Detroit suburb is infamous for its widespread support for the Palestinians and Iran’s proxy organizations, which are designated as terrorist groups by the United States. However, Dearborn has a twin city right next to it, just as extreme: Meet Dearborn Heights.

Dearborn Heights, a newer Detroit suburb, also has a significant Muslim population, primarily Shiite, which supports Iran and Hezbollah.

In July, Shiite ceremonies were held at the Islamic House of Wisdom in Dearborn Heights. During these events, local Islamic scholar Hussein Al-Nashed praised Iran and Hezbollah. Al-Nashed stated: “It is only with the Islamic Revolution that our lot has changed.” He went on to praise Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the revolution, saying, “(Khomeini) taught you dignity… and honored your religion (as a Shiite).” Al-Nashed further claimed that in America, there is no freedom of thought. “If I want to think for myself… and I say ‘you know what, Hezbollah is actually not bad, Hezbollah is a very good thing’, next thing I know, the FBI is at my doorstep. Is that freedom of thought?“

Al-Nashed argues that the problem lies with the United States itself, which opposes states and entities like Iran and Hezbollah. This is just one example of the rhetoric within Muslim communities that encourages resistance to democratic regimes in Western countries while supporting extremist, anti-Western Islamic elements like Iran and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s Stronghold in the U.S.

The situation is similar in Dearborn, its twin Jihad Capital. Here too, an agenda is being promoted that opposes the United States or any other Western entity for that matter, while glorifying extremist elements. In the case of the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, these are individuals who were directly responsible for harming American civilians and soldiers. In July, a large gathering commemorated the memory of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent Lebanese Shiite scholar, regarded as a spiritual leader of Hezbollah. His writings were instrumental in shaping the ideological foundations of the Lebanese terrorist organization.

Fadlallah issued a fatwa (religious decree) authorizing the suicide bombing of the multinational force barracks in Beirut in October 1983. That attack killed 241 American Marines, 58 French soldiers, and six civilians. Despite his pivotal role in authorizing this horrific attack by issuing the fatwa, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah is now honored with memorials on American soil.

Annual memorial services for Fadlallah have been held since his death in 2010. These ceremonies are organized by a local charity associated with Hezbollah, known as Al-Mabarrat Charitable Organization. In 2006, Al-Mabarrat was accused of being part of a global fundraising infrastructure for Hezbollah, including operations in the United States and Canada.

Further evidence of Al-Mabarrat’s deep ties to Hezbollah lies in the fact that Fadlallah personally managed the organization until his death in 2010. Today, his son, Ja‘far Fadlallah, leads the charity and also serves as its “General Religious Supervisor.”

Dearborn and Dearborn Heights are majority-Muslim cities that promote a quiet jihad within America. Both cities have significant ties and deep connections to Iran and Hezbollah. Numerous charitable organizations in these communities have been advancing an anti-American, anti-Western agenda for many years.

President Donald Trump garnered significant support from Muslim voters, who were protesting President Biden’s administration’s backing of Israel during the war in Gaza.

Trump thus became the first Republican candidate since 2000 to win a majority of votes in Dearborn. It is no coincidence that the person scheduled to speak at Trump’s inauguration was the extremist Shiite imam, Husham al-Husseini, a Hezbollah supporter from the Karbala Shiite Islamic Center in Dearborn who holds strongly anti-Israel views. It should be noted that in the end, it was decided that in light of al-Husseini’s factional views and his support for the terrorist organization Hezbollah, he would not speak at Trump’s inauguration.

After Trump appointed a strongly pro-Israel cabinet, Muslims referred to it as a “cabinet that supports extreme Israel.”

These reactions reveal the interests of the Muslim community in the United States and its efforts to influence American policy in favor of Arab interests. The new administration must be attentive to the motives of Islamic entities, like those in America’s jihad capitals, whose goals conflict with American interests. This marks another phase in the process of silent jihad, as America’s two jihad capitals—strongholds of Iran and Hezbollah—lead a direct anti-American agenda.

This article was originally published in–ynetnews.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Twin Cities: Two Jihad Capitals in America הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Since its inception, the Zionist movement has striven to gain Arab understanding and acceptance of the idea of the Return to Zion: That Jews have legitimate claims to the Land of Israel, that they wish to establish a national home in cooperation with the Arabs, and that the Jews’ return to their homeland will greatly benefit the Arabs and bring them development, and progress.

The Arabs, who, as a result of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, gained several states, stretching from the borders of Iran to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, firmly and resolutely refused to listen to the Zionist claims and vehemently opposed any affirmation to any Zionist claim.

The Arabs also exhibited this strong and determined opposition to all Zionist compromise proposals and concessions, such as the various partition plans, which left the Zionists with a very small area of land compared to the Zionist demands regarding the National Home area, as presented at the Peace Conference held in Paris in 1919.

The Arabs did not even respond to any of these attempts at compromise. For them, it made no difference whether the Jewish state, if established, is large or small. They fundamentally opposed the notion of such a state being established at all. In various Zionist circles, especially among the “peace seekers”, the illusion prevailed that if the Zionist movement gave up some of its demands, it would elicit a desire for peace among the Arabs, as existed among the Jews.

From the beginning, the Arab governments or the Palestinian Arab leadership never intended to engage in negotiations or bargaining diplomacy. From the beginning, they pursued a policy of violence against the Jewish community in the Land of Israel. This was the case throughout the years of British Mandate rule and since the establishment of the State of Israel, and continues to this very day.

The intensity and sophistication of Arab violent resistance varied according to circumstances, but it has persisted until today. This resistance to Zionism reached its peak in the series of military campaigns in which the regular armies of Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan participated. In all of these military campaigns, the Arab armies suffered severe and humiliating defeats, but the IDF victories were not enough to cause the Arabs to surrender. Between the campaigns, the Arabs engaged in small-scale fighting, which we call terrorist acts. It is not easy to fight a war against terrorism, and it may also be impossible to achieve complete victory in such a war. This is a war that has been going on, in various forms, for many long years and it may continue for many more.

The Arabs were not satisfied solely with violent military combat against Israel, whether by regular armies or religiously inspired terrorist organizations. They have terrorized Israel in many other domains, provided they do everything possible to make life miserable for Israel and to weaken it. Many probably remember the period of the economic boycott against Israel, which was not very successful, but caused Israel considerable inconvenience and damage.

We are currently in the midst of a broad-scale political-social campaign, encompassing many countries and international organizations, aimed at boycotting anything Israeli, delegitimizing Israel, and creating a hostile international environment that legitimizes Israel’s destruction.

Recruiting the Diaspora for public diplomacy

Strong Arab propaganda, inspired by intense hatred and a heavy reliance on lies, aimed at harassing and weakening Israel, undermining its legitimacy in the world, and tarnishing its image, has accompanied the Zionist enterprise almost since its inception. This propaganda operates in tandem with all other Arab efforts: military violence, political and economic boycott, and any other means capable of harming Israel. Arab anti-Israel efforts are absolute.

It should be mentioned that the domestic crisis in Israel, with its accompanying hatred and uncivilized internal debates, lends a helping hand to Arab propaganda. What more could hostile Arab propaganda ask for than hate speech from a former Chief of the General Staff or other senior figures against their country?

This Arab propaganda has had periods of success and periods of failure, but it seems that it has never had such a successful time at Israel’s expense as since October 7th.

The incomprehensible paradox here is difficult to explain: Israel was the one that suffered a surprise attack by a terrorist organization who slaughtered about 1,200 people in the Gaza Envelope that day and perpetrated monstrous acts of cruelty; kidnapping about two hundred men and women, children and the elderly, the sick and the healthy – which in itself is considered a crime against humanity. How is it possible that Israel, who was surprised, beaten, and bruised, is being condemned from all sides, and not the murderers? How is it possible that the vast majority of the world’s countries did not condemn the murderers and did not even ensure that the Red Cross could visit the hostages? The UN and its agencies, including the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which has long since become an arm of Arab anti-Semitism, also did nothing to help rescue the hostages. And when the IDF began hitting Hamas, how come the masses took to the streets in various places around the world, in mass demonstrations against Israel and not against Hamas? And why did political leaders and the International Criminal Court in The Hague accuse Israel of genocide and not the Gazan terrorist organization?

There are explanations for this phenomenon, and for the alliance that has been formed between the large Arab communities around the world and various anti-Semitic circles, and between extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing circles. This is not a pleasant or easy situation, and it is difficult to deal with.

The savage Arab propaganda currently being waged in various forms against Israel has various advantages, but it is also possible to oppose it and try to weaken it. Israel has many allies that should be recruited and activated in a systematic and coordinated manner to weaken the power of that propaganda.

In places where there is a Jewish community, action should be taken to utilize the community, its institutions, and appropriate individuals from within it to coordinate counter-actions, in each place according to its conditions. Many places have friendship associations with Israel, Jewish professional associations such as doctors, lawyers, and the like. Many of these will join in counter-action. The major Jewish donors to universities and cultural institutions will definitely be eager to cooperate; after all, the clear anti-Semitic threat posed by the Arab movement against Israel endangers them as well.

Such actions, and many other similar ones, have also been taken in previous times of crisis, with varying degrees of success. There were successful precedents for this, especially during and after the Yom Kippur War. A system of organizations and aggressive public diplomacy campaigns against Arab propaganda must be reorganized. Its success depends on coordinated and vigorous organizational action. The natural entity to coordinate such actions is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Public Diplomacy Division, which has representative offices deployed in dozens of countries worldwide, and has also carried out such actions in the past. There is no point in entrusting this task to a special government public diplomacy ministry, headed by a minister who lacks any understanding of the subject.

Religious ruling recognizing Israel

On the surface, the picture is bleak. Israel is surrounded by enemies on all sides and there is no end to the bloodshed in sight, despite its military achievements and victories, and its accomplishments in so many other areas as well.

Although Israel has signed peace agreements with its two neighbors – Egypt and Jordan – we should not delude ourselves again and not see these agreements for what they are not. Both are important agreements that are highly beneficial, in various domains and for all the signatory countries, but they all lack one clear thing – they do not bring true peace, as we, in israel, had hoped. It could be said that these peace agreements more closely resemble armistices than peace treaties. In any case, this is better than a state of war.

And yet, although it seems that true peace is unlikely in the foreseeable future, there is something worth trying. Maybe it will bear fruit.

Let us first explain that in Arab and Islamic countries, even those considered secular, religion and those holding senior religious positions are held in high regard. In these countries, senior religious figures and those with the authority to issue religious rulings (“muftis”) are treated with great respect. Such a legal ruling is called a “fatwa”, and the more esteemed the mufti who issues it is, the greater influence it has on public opinion. Such muftis are found in all Arab countries, and there have previously already been those who have issued fatwas that are relatively positive or sympathetic to Israel. The most important Muslim institution in the Arab world for such religious scholars is Al-Azhar University in Cairo. The religious rulings that are issued on various topics by the heads of this institution carry great weight.

Israel’s goal should be to obtain such a fatwa, which recognizes the Jews’ right to the Land of Israel and recognizes Israel as the land of the Jewish people.

Is this possible? It’s hard to know. The chances seem negligible, but we should attempt to develop dialogues with every Muslim religious scholar wherever such a connection can be made. This can undoubtedly be done; such connections have already been made in various places. This is not the place to detail how to try and develop such an operation, which must be conducted wisely, cautiously, and quietly. The chances may be very slim, but it is still worth trying. Without religious sanction for peace with Israel, the longed-for peace will not be achieved.

About the author:
Dr. Moshe Yager. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 40 years and held ambassadorial positions in Sweden and the Czech Republic.

The text is solely the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the movement’s opinion.

הפוסט War and Peace: The Arab Propaganda Assault Against Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After the stabbing attack in Tel Aviv, carried out by Moroccan terrorist and US green card holder Abd Al-Aziz Qadi, the Hamas terrorist organization and the Muslim Brotherhood movement were quick to praise him for his deed.

The Muslim Brotherhood said in its statement that “Abd Al-Aziz, an ‘American’ of ‘Moroccan’ origin, boarded a plane from America to the [Zionist] entity, and answered the call to support Palestine in however he could… He prepared a clean knife, with a clean hand and a heart full of faith, and killed four settlers before he died.”

Some hours after terrorist Abd Al-Aziz Qadi wounded five Israelis at Nahalat Binyamin neighborhood in Tel Aviv, a Moroccan citizen who was planning to carry out a terror attack against the Jewish community of Naples, Italy, was arrested in that city. Italian media announced that the suspect, who apparently belonged to ISIS, had distributed items of Islamist propaganda and support for the organization, and had voiced his intent to obtain a knife and carry out a stabbing attack. The mode of operations invites comparison to the terror attack in Tel Aviv, but there is no answer as to whether Qadi actually represented ISIS, another organization, or only himself.

Still, the terror attack in Tel Aviv and the attempted terror attack in Naples shed light on the activities of jihadist organizations in Morocco Terrorist organizations, with ISIS in the lead, have found a convenient operating base in Morocco. There, they cultivate new operatives who directly threaten the stability of the kingdom and of the European continent. Jihadist organizations recruit and train large numbers of followers online, exposing them to inciteful content. Some recruits are used as a fighting force in other African countries in the Sahel region. They join terrorist cells established by ISIS terrorists who returned, after the fall of ISIS in the Middle East, to Morocco. Thus, Morocco has become a cardinal source of recruitment for the radical jihadist organizations that threaten Europe and the Middle East.

Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS operate jihadist recruitment and training centers across Western Sahara and benefit from the protection of Algeria, Morocco’s neighbor and rival. Algeria, refusing to cooperate with Morocco on counterterrorism efforts, provides a safe haven for these organizations.

After ISIS’ defeat in the Middle East in 2019, many Moroccan jihadists returned to Morocco and focused their efforts on increasing ISIS’ power on the African continent. According to the Moroccan Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations, in the years since the founding of ISIS approximately 1,645 Moroccan terrorist operatives have joined various jihadist organizations in Iraq and Syria. Approximately 745 of them have died in suicide attacks or in battle. Most of them had joined and fought for ISIS. Of those who survived the fall of ISIS in the Middle East, approximately 270 terrorists returned to Morocco; and of them, 137 were brought to trial. In addition, roughly 288 women and 391 minors also came to ISIS combat areas to earn a livelihood.

The operatives’ activities in the Sahel region—a belt of countries stretching from Mali and Mauritania through Chad, Niger, and Sudan—include fighting against groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other African Islamist organizations. This conflict is part of a broader struggle for dominance among international jihadist movements, each vying to establish a global caliphate.

The Sahel countries suffer from the presence of various Jihadist organizations in their region, with Niger, Chad, and Mali battling Jihadist organizations that exploit the region’s lax border security and its arms trafficking networks. The Jihadist organizations are constantly carrying out murderous terror attacks, with an emphasis on harming Christian populations – whom they consider infidels. Despite Morocco’s offer to share intelligence to aid in the arrest of jihadists and the prevention of terror attacks in Europe and the United States, the flow of jihadists from its territory to Europe persists.

Morocco itself experienced a major terror attack from ISIS in December 2018, when two Scandinavian tourists, Louisa Vesterager Jespersen and Maren Ueland, were murdered in the Atlas Mountains. Their killers swore allegiance to ISIS while beheading the two women. That shocking event echoed strongly, as there had not been a major terror attack in Morocco since 2011, when 17 people were killed in an explosion at a restaurant in Marrakesh.

The Silent Junction: Morocco as a Crossroads for Jihadists

Many jihadists have taken advantage of Morocco’s geographical proximity to Europe in order to infiltrate European territory as immigrants or refugees and establish sleeper cells in Western European countries. This infiltration spurred wide-ranging cooperation between the counter-terrorism units of Spain and Morocco, which over the past ten years have dismantled dozens of terrorist cells in both countries.

Despite Spain and Morocco’s extensive efforts to eliminate terrorist elements within Morocco and prevent their infiltration into Europe, lone-wolf attackers—supporting ISIS and other jihadist groups—continue to emerge across Europe, many originating from North Africa. They are a burden further to the already existing difficulty of dealing with many citizens who find solace in Islamic radicalism and who feed on radical Islamist, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic content online.

At the same time, extremist movements remain active within Morocco, including the Muslim Brotherhood—which operates differently from ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Despite their differences, these groups all promote anti-Western and anti-Semitic discourse that encourages jihad. Morocco serves as a key transit hub for jihadist operatives. Some move into the Sahel region, now a major stronghold for global jihadist organizations, while others attempt to infiltrate Europe—either to carry out jihadist activities directly or to establish sleeper cells awaiting the right moment to act.

Morocco’s central location makes it a strategic point for jihadist organizations en route to Europe. While the kingdom itself is not considered a jihadist stronghold, its relative obscurity—due to the more active jihadi movements in the Middle East and East Africa—means it often receives less intelligence attention compared to other regions, such as Somalia and Mozambique in the east, or Libya to the north. As a result, Morocco’s location at the tip of the African continent provides a quiet path into Europe for jihadists.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Moroccan Connection: The Tel Aviv Stabbing Attack and the Moroccan Jihadist Organizations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Re-defining the political divide in Israel as “Doves vs Hawks” rather than “Left vs Right” is a matter of far-reaching substantive significance, well beyond mere semantics.

“…[dissenting] intellectuals tend to be scorned and abused and vilified as “the Right”; Right-wing”—that all-purpose, nonsensical, infantile insult which is designed to shut down argument. There is nothing remotely right-wing about standing up for truth against lies, justice against injustice, freedom against those who would snuff out freedom

– Melanie Phillips Israeli TV (8th January 2011)

This insightful remark by the ever-incisive British-Israeli political pundit encapsulates much of the deep malaise that has, to a large degree, afflicted both the Israeli political system and civil society institutions with which it interacts—such as Israel legal system, the academe, and mainstream media.

The political divide in Israel

For decades, the rivalry over political power in Israel has focused principally on a divide between opposing political credos classified (or rather, misclassified) as “Left” and “Right” and the political parties allegedly affiliated with these divergent world views, perceived (or rather misperceived)  as being mutually exclusive.

This, however, is a dichotomy that is not only overly simplistic, but also misleading, inappropriate, and in the final analysis, deeply detrimental to the conduct of political life in the country.  Indeed, in Israel, it is a divide that is even more deceptive and distortive than elsewhere in the world, because here the real “watershed” between the so-called “Left” and “Right” is generally not determined by the usual socioeconomic criteria, but rather more by one’s leanings on defense and foreign policy.

Indeed, in Israel, the overriding factor in determining whether a person or party is designated “Left” or “Right” is their position on the Palestinian issue and their attitude to the prospects of territorial concessions precipitating peace. Thus, those advocating large-scale territorial withdrawals/political concessions to the Palestinian-Arabs are labeled “Left”, while those opposing them, are dubbed “Right”.

This frequently results in some absurdly bizarre political outcomes—on which I   elaborate later. For the present, however, it will suffice to point out that, paradoxically, an avowed free-market advocate, who avidly supports a policy of dovish concessions to the Palestinian-Arabs, would unequivocally be considered a “Leftist”. By contrast, a strong advocate of enhanced social welfare, who uncompromisingly opposes any significant concessions would be considered a “Right-winger”, even—gasp—an “extremist”.

The Bogus Litmus Test

Thus, in Israel, the discourse as to whether one is “Right-wing” or not, has little to do with one’s views on socioeconomics or domestic politics.

Accordingly, one’s positions on matters such as government intervention in the marketplace, social welfare, gay liaisons, abortion, tolerance of political dissent, cultural diversity, and freedom of worship, carry scant weight in establishing whether or not one is to be doomed to the dreaded “Right-wing” label.

Instead, the definitive litmus test of being “Right-wing” is all about one’s perspective on the Arab-Israeli conflict, in general; and the Israeli-Palestinian one, in particular. This has become the definitive measure determining the perception of the “Left-Right” divide. If one supports a concessionary policy towards the Arabs, one is elevated to the exalted ranks of “enlightened Left”; if one opposes them, one is relegated to the “retrograde reactionary Right”.

To illustrate the point: Some time ago, the New York Times’s Ethan Bronner referred to a Jerusalem Post column I had written on the “social justice” protests then sweeping the streets of urban Israel (“Come to the carnival, comrade!”). In it, he referred to me as “a right-wing columnist“—apparently because I pointed out that building constraints in areas across the pre-1967 Green Line were contributing to the high cost of housing. Significantly—or is that, ironically?—this was something even the Rabin government—initiators of the Oslo debacle—recognized when, in contradiction to its electoral pledges, it launched extensive construction projects in “settlements” to bring prices down.

The fact that I also noted that social workers, police, doctors, and teachers were “scandalously” underpaid and should be better remunerated, or that avaricious oligopolistic cartels should be targeted and the excess profits cut, had no effect on the way I was categorized.

Tri-axial political realities; three-dimensional “political space”

One of the lamentable features of political life in Israel is that in designating what is “Left”, what is “Right” and what divides them, several unrelated factors have been “lumped” together, despite the fact there are no substantive links between them at all.

After all, there is no intrinsic reason why someone’s attitude on one issue (say, national security) should define, or be defined by, their position on any other issue (say economics or religion).

However, sadly, this is not the case in practice. Indeed, as a general rule, if someone is identified as a hardliner on security issues, they are more likely to be assumed to be religious rather than secular and a socio-economic conservative rather than a “social justice liberal”.

As mentioned previously this is a cognitive norm that is as distortive as it is deceptive—and its effects are both detrimental and dysfunctional.

In Israel, this detrimental dysfunctionality has ramifications far graver than for most other Western countries. After all, while in most of the Western world, the issues that constitute the routine political discourse have –at least until very recently, (with the war in Ukraine and the exacerbation of the immigration crisis)—had little tangible impact on the existential realities of daily life, in Israel, they frequently comprise matters of life and death.

Accordingly, rather than being conceived of as uni-dimensional, “political space” should be viewed as having three dimensions, defined by three independent axes:

(a)    A Hawk-Dove axis for security and foreign policy;

(b)   A Conservative-Liberal axis for socio-economic issues;

(c)    A Secular-Religious axis for faith-based issues.

Viewing “political space” in this manner allows for a far more comprehensive, nuanced—and accurate—classification of an individual’s political identity, than a simplistic, and frequently misleading, “Left-Right” dichotomy.

No political home for secular hawks

Indeed, this tri-axial representation allows one to conceive of a wide variety of differing complex political identities. Thus, one can envisage individuals with hardline hawkish views on security, who might be either secular or religious on the one hand; and free-marketeers or welfare-state advocates on the other. Conversely, the same clearly holds for those with concessionary dovish credos.

In this regard, Israel’s political history is replete with examples of religious politicians—even rabbis, including Orthodox rabbis—who illustrate how inapt the invalid, inaccurate, and inadequate the commonly held stereotypes of the “Left-Right” can be. For example, Michael Melchior, himself an orthodox rabbi, who served as a minister in the short-lived (1999-2001) Labor-led coalition under Ehud Barak, headed the distinctly dovish religious faction, Meimad. Indeed, Melchior’s far-reaching pacifistic views, as expressed in a 2012 interview, headlined “Islam is ready for peace with Israel”, have an almost unhinged ring to them in light of the October 7, 2023 atrocities and the incandescent hatred manifested towards Jews by the followers of Islam, with whom that Melchior engaged.

Similarly, Gilad Kariv, an ordained Reform rabbi, is a member of the far-Left “The Democrats” party formed by a merger of the former Labor party and the radical Left Meretz faction, again showing that there is not rigid nexus between religion and hardline security positions.

Accordingly, there is no inherent reason to assign either religious fervor or tightfisted fiscal frugality to anyone who opposes a policy of appeasement of Israel’s despotic foes.

However, although one might expect this to be almost self-evident, in Israeli political realities this is not at all the case.

Indeed, there has been no political faction that could genuinely serve as a stable political home for a non-observant hardliner, with a platform, endorsing what could be described as a doctrine of the non-observant liberal hawk.

After all, given Likud’s lurch leftward—notably since 2009 with Netanyahu’s acceptance (albeit under duress) of the possibility of Palestinian statehood–and its embrace of policies it previously vilified, it has been three decades—arguably since the demise of the Tsomet party, in the mid-90s—that there has been no political faction that could authentically serve as a political home of a non-observant hardliner, with a platform, endorsing what could be described as a doctrine of such secular liberal hawks.

Those who might be tempted to point to Avigdor Liberman or Naftali Bennett as a patron for such a party would do well to remember that their allegedly hardline views did little to prevent them from forging a political alliance, not only with radical non-Zionists, such as Nitzan Horowitz and Meirav Micheli but blatant the anti-Zionist Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, the Islamist United Arab List (Raam)

Substantive significance of semantics

This is a lacuna that has grave repercussions for the conduct of both domestic politics inside the country and for its foreign policy abroad.

For it has allowed opposition to political appeasement and territorial withdrawal to be painted—or rather tainted with—colors considered, rightly or wrongly, unpalatable to many within the political mainstream –inseparably entwined with elements they find objectionable in other spheres.

This has had a chilling effect on public debate on one of the most—arguably the most—crucial topics on the national agenda. Indeed, as Melanie Phillips pointed out (see introductory excerpt), in many influential circles, it is sufficient to brand your adversary “Right-wing” to “shut down argument” and dismiss whatever he/she has to say without any need to contend with the substantive merits of their contentions.

Accordingly, it is crucial to decouple the debate on issues of security and foreign policy, in general, and of territorial withdrawal, political concessions, and permanent frontiers, in particular, from other issues usually, but inappropriately, associated with them. This calls for the formulation of a political doctrine that combines a hardline stance on matters of defense and diplomacy with a domestic agenda that is liberal in terms of its socio-economic credo and secular (or at least non-observant) in faith-based realms.

For as we shall see, semantics do, indeed, have far-reaching substantive ramifications.

Reaching across the perceived political divide

The formulation and propagation of such a doctrine will provide those, who may have grave misgivings as to the prudence of the “Left’s” policies of appeasement,  a vehicle to identify openly with opposition to these policies—without being branded a religious zealot or a retrograde rightwing extremist, or any other “unseemly” epithet.

To quote Phillips once again “There is nothing remotely right-wing about standing up for truth against lies, justice against injustice, freedom against those who would snuff out freedom.”

Thus, to break away from the old stereotypes and existing stigmas that have plagued Israeli politics for decades, the formulation of a doctrine of the “liberal hawk” is an urgent imperative. It is a doctrine that would provide the hitherto reticent with both the substance and the symbolism that would allow them to publically embrace an uncompromising approach to security matters, without having to relinquish their self-image of “enlightened” liberals or preclude them from continued affiliation with their long-held socio-economic beliefs.

It is, arguably, the only way to reach across the prevailing political divide, and rally political support, beyond the current array of the “Right-wing” parties, to oppose injudicious concessionary initiatives that gravely imperil the survival of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Hawks vs Doves: The real distinction

It is crucial that one thing be made unequivocally clear:

The divide between Doves and Hawks in Israel is not that the one desires peace while the other advocates war. Both Israeli Hawks and Doves desire peace (or at least, wish to avert war). The fundamental divide between them is this: The Doves believe that adversaries can be coaxed into making peace by means of a concessionary policy of compromise and goodwill gestures. By contrast, the Hawks believe that adversaries must be deterred from making war by adopting an uncompromisingly resolute policy of rejecting any appeasement or concessions, which might embolden them to attack.

Accordingly, the divide is not over the desired outcome i.e., what to achieve, but over the preferred process i.e., how to achieve it.

There is historical precedent to support both schools of thought in different contexts. However for Israel, given its geo-political location in the Middle East, the crucial—indeed existential— question is this: Which is the appropriate approach for it to adopt as its national policy?

Perversely, although it is perhaps the most divisive issue among Israelis,  it is the one, on which there should be no dispute at all, whether one subscribes to a vision of an ultra-Orthodox religious state governed by ancient “Halachic” laws; or a post-Zionist secular “state of all its citizens”, governed by the laws of liberal democracy.

For one thing should be beyond dispute. Situated as it is, in an area dominated by forces of political tyranny and Islamist theocracy, who reject its very right to exist, Israel will remain neither Jewish nor democratic, from within—unless it is secure against the dangers from without. And an indispensable precondition for such security against outside threat is defensible borders—and defensible at a bearable economic cost.

Rebranding the Right; restructuring the divide

Clearly then, there is nothing “illiberal” in rejection of a policy of perilous withdrawal and concessions. To the contrary—such rejection is the sine qua non for sustaining any hope for a durable liberal reality in the country.

Accordingly, the supreme challenge confronting anti-appeasement intellectuals today is to rebrand the “Right”; and restructure the dominant divide in Israeli politics from “Left vs Right” to “Doves vs Hawks”– whatever their socio-economic proclivities, their cultural preferences, or spiritual credos.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel’s urgent imperative: A doctrine of the Liberal Hawk הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

With these outrageous images, Hamas may have helped Israel convince world leaders to have its back to remove Hamas’ terrorist regime from power in the Gaza Strip.

The gruesome PR spectacles produced by Hamas during the release of Israeli hostages have been offering the world a glimpse into the core elements of the Gaza conflict. The true nature of what is often described as a mere territorial dispute, or careless and pointless warfare, is now being exposed as a deep-seated clash between civilizations.

Hamas’ propaganda machine thus resurfaced the central role of information, image, and symbolism in communicating this clash and highlighted how it stretches far beyond the sandy, dusty battlefield. In a way, it also inadvertently helped Israel make its case in its demand to end the war with nothing short of a clear, victorious result.

Over the past fortnight, Hamas released several batches of Israeli hostages in exchange for the release from Israeli prisons of notorious terrorists as part of its commitment to the deal mediated by the United States. Evidently, the terror group was not going to acknowledge loss, concede a compromise, and quietly hand out hostages.

That would be uncharacteristic of insurgent strongmen in an honor-bound Arab culture, heavily reliant on commanding and coercing the respect and awe of their public. Surrounded by destruction and debris, Hamas militants thus chose to stage a carefully-branded victory parade, oblivious to the extent of irony involved – at least, in Western eyes.

As opposed to the ritual in November 2023 – the first hostage deal, when terrorists wearing uniforms simply handed out hostages to the Red Cross, Hamas leveraged the release this time to produce a meticulously-planned show of force. The hostages were forced to become the main actors in the epicenter of a PR spectacle designated to muscle up Hamas’ regained control in Gaza.

Petrified Israeli young women and elderly were forced to march through a stampede of jeering Gaza residents, paraded like trophies. Hamas constructed a stage and invited journalists. It handed the hostages self-proclaimed “release kits” and certificates that it proudly signed and stamped with the Red Cross as a sign of confirmation of its authority toward its people in Gaza.

The frenzied crowd that mobbed the hostages witnessed how Hamas prevents them from accessing their “property” – and Israeli, the most valuable “prize” possible – all while half-enjoying the attention and the respect they commanded.

Hamas then instructed the hostages to wave and smile to the crowd, as captured in one video featuring instructions by a Hamas cameraman signaled to hostage Agam Berger. Other female soldiers kidnapped on October 7 victoriously waved to the crowd as well, in a courageous way that commanded the awe of the Israeli public.

Effectively, Hamas transposed the asset that these hostages constituted for it. It cynically used them as bargaining chips to obtain concessions from Israel. When Israel agreed, their asset converted into being used as props in Hamas’ propaganda machine.

The sensationalized way in which Hamas chose to release these hostages dials back to a fundamental principle of terrorism – intimidate, spread the message, and impose policy through fear. The lesson by Brazilian guerilla combatant and radical author Carlos Marighella to carry out “armed propaganda,” or heinous acts that would shock and awe public opinion, was not lost on Hamas. It recognizes the power of propaganda to accomplish its goals and does not hesitate to use international media attention to do just that.

Backstage banners

For this reason, it chose to send a message to international viewers by printing out backstage banners in both Arabic and English – one for their home front, one for outsiders. Broadcasted to millions of viewers, the banners denounced “criminal Zionism” and praising “Palestinian freedom fighters”. All of these resonate well with some of the young progressive protesters who cheered Hamas up on college campuses and view it as part of the so-called coalition of the oppressed.

Had anyone doubted Hamas’ true objective, they evaporated with these images. Its determination not to end the so-called occupation but to annihilate Israel and replace it with a Palestinian state that it controls, a vision shared by almost all surveyed Palestinians, was presented in broad daylight for all to see.

In that, Hamas took a page out of the playbook of the Soviet communist regime, the Nazi party, the Iranian mullahs, and the Russian government, who place a high premium on appearances and propaganda. Russian state media featured President Putin shaking hands with released Ukrainian child hostages, who were forced to thank him for allegedly salvaging them from their families.

ISIS handpicked the infamous orange jumpers worn by its slain victims to reflect revenge over the way they see the treatment of Islamist terrorists in the Guantanamo Bay prison. The Nazis invested heavily in propaganda through caricatures, movies, and symbolism and swayed the public by staging heavily-budgeted light spectacles with lit torches in Nuremberg.

Much like it did in the October 7 massacre, when it cruelly livestreamed its slain victims and used everything from go-pro body cameras to drones, Hamas has proven its recognition of the value in mass media. Gone are the days of home-recorded footage showing the abducted Nahshon Waxman (1994) or Gilad Shalit (2009) speaking to the camera. Hamas now invests in blockbuster-level quality video productions showing hostages in cages or militants targeting IDF soldiers, competing for the top spot with their jihadist counterparts at ISIS and the PIJ.

The live coverage by the media, the excitement ramped up in public squares in Israel, and the inflow of pundits and posts only encouraged Hamas to invest more in this diabolical abuse of victims. Former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher scorned journalists who inadvertently gave a platform to the IRA’s intimidation campaign, telling them not to cover it and “starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.”

Granted, today’s hyperstimulated media environment makes it much more complicated to ignore such events, but Thatcher’s lesson does invite us to rethink our attitude to information during war. For example, the avalanche of narratives and claims posing as journalistic reporting during the Gaza war were put to the test by these images, in a way that Hamas did not necessarily intend.

Viewers and readers are repeatedly told to believe that the people of Gaza reject Hamas and unilaterally suffer from Israel’s military actions – in a way that cannot be reconciled with the images of the masses mobbing the hostages and actively participating in their humiliation.

The Gazan population that was alleged to be starving showed up wearing top-to-toe fashion outfits, filming the hostages with fully-charged phones in a way that would make the people of Yemen or South Sudan jealous. One could only wonder how claims over a “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza, propelled by no other than the United Nations’ Secretary General, reconcile with the HD cameras and HR microphones that documented the hostages’ release, the printing shop that produced the back stage, or the luxurious Chevrolet that brought them to the pickup point.

Propaganda as a viable dimension of war did serve Hamas for intimidation, and certainly scored political points among the Gazans public, yet it is also not unthinkable that Hamas outdid its own success. These over-the-top productions could have done Israel’s job in explaining the true humanitarian situation in Gaza, by raising doubts on the common wisdom surrounding the claims on deliberate starvation and genocide.

These images served Israel better than any chart in debunking these accusations, especially as it committed to allowing hundreds more trucks per day – so far exceeding 1 million tons of aid flowing into Gaza.

Public opinion may have been swayed in Gaza and among Hamas sympathizers abroad, but these images also obtained the opposite result than what Hamas had hoped for. Leaders, commentators, and leading journals widely condemned and rejected this circus. This may help Israel make its case to resume the war after the cease-fire is over.

If there is any lesson learned by the October 7 massacre, it is that such a grave and present threat cannot be left to metastasize unchecked in the Gaza Strip, and needs to be duly removed from power before it can carry out another atrocity. With these outrageous images, Hamas may have helped Israel convince world leaders to have its back to do just that.

This article was originally published on the Jerusalem Post.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Hamas’s hostage circus exposes the hypocrisy of Gaza’s victim narrative – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As long as Gaza exists in its current format, Israel will not have security, and the drums of war will continue to beat – on all fronts. The opportunity given to Israel must be exploited.

President Donald Trump’s latest announcement, demanding the release of all hostages by Saturday at 12:00, or the ceasefire will be canceled and “all hell is going to break out”, is a test not only for Hamas, but mainly for Israel’s leadership. This statement brings the Israeli cabinet back to square one, making it possible for it to reexamine the war management strategy, and even the goals of the war .

Since October 7, two main strategies have been voiced: One, defeating Hamas and only then returning the hostages. As part of this strategy, Israel had to resort to various offensive methods; massive bombing of Gaza, stopping humanitarian aid, and evacuating the population. The second, the return of the hostages and only then the surrender of Hamas. As part of this strategy, Israel should have gone for an “all for all” deal, and then destroy the enemy .

Now, with a reset of the historical clock, the Israeli government must reexamine all the cards, including the possibility of first cutting off the head of the Iranian snake by attacking its nuclear program .

In doing so, the Israeli government must establish a fundamental fact as a starting point, and that is that Gaza is the root of the conflict. If all of Israel’s other enemies cause harm to Israel, then Gaza (and Iran) are the real evil. Evil incarnate. Gaza is no longer a side front in Israel’s struggle. Gaza is a hotbed of terrorism, which is being used against Israel in various ways: dividing the people as a primary strategy, causing instability, carrying out terrorist attacks, causing economic harm, and an ongoing effort to delegitimize the State of Israel in the international arena .

A fundamental solution to the problem in Gaza will have a decisive impact on Israel’s security, as Gaza is the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even among the Israeli right, the claim is sometimes voiced that “there is no solution for Gaza”. Precisely for this reason, resetting the Gaza arena will have a positive impact on the entire regional picture .

A solution in Gaza is not just a local issue – it will also directly affect Judea and Samaria, and allow for constructive solutions to be implemented to the hotbeds of terrorism there. Over the years, the State of Israel has been engaged in putting out fires – operation after operation, round after round – but none of this has changed the strategic balance, leaving the enemy standing on its feet, waiting for the next opportunity. Despite the scale of the current destruction in Gaza, there is a danger that nothing has changed at the strategic level.

Therefore, the central question is whether Israel will choose to completely destroy the enemy, or will it be content with another round with Hamas still standing afterward, growing stronger and waiting for the next blow .

Beyond the security implications, Israel’s decision on how to act in Gaza will also directly affect its relations with the Trump administration. Trump, who demonstrated unprecedented support for Israel during his previous term, and since he reentered the White House, expects Israel to stand behind his aggressive and pro-Israeli policy. If it becomes clear that Israel is unwilling to do what is necessary to ensure its security, he may respond accordingly .

In conclusion, as long as Gaza exists in its current format, Israel will not have security, and the drums of war will continue to beat – on all fronts. The opportunity given to Israel with Trump’s ultimatum must be exploited, and the face of the Middle East must be changed in a way that will bring certainty, peace, and security to Israel .

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט A New Opportunity: Victory in Gaza is Way More Than a Local Problem הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The current political echelon in Israel is perceived as trying to shirk its responsibility for the events of October 7th. There is a lot of truth in this. The “congratulations” that government officials bestowed upon the resigning IDF Chief of the General Staff, along the lines of “well done, we salute him”, without mentioning in the same breath the great shame and humility that should encompass their every move during this period – are shameful. But the discussion around this issue is not on point.

There is a tendency to divide responsibility for the events of October 7, and also for what happened afterwards – the successes and failures – into military and political domains. But the truth is that the mutual influence the two ecehlons have on each other is too great to separate. The dichotomous separation is the real shirking of responsibility.

Who is responsible for the misconception?

There are too many causes to count for what led to the October 7th misconception. The intelligence responsibility of the Military Intelligence Directorate and the other intelligence agencies is clear and undisputed. But what caused this intelligence failure is the lack of a true critical culture. The responsibility of the IDF, and of the intelligence community in general, is to examine the veracity of their perceptions, which ultimately lead to the intelligence assessments that reach the political echelon. It’s enough to listen to Brigadier General (res.) Itay Baron, who was previously Head of the Research and Analysis Division at the Military Intelligence Directorate and who returned to the position after October 7, to understand that this is not the situation within the army: “If we have such information, and the information is of high quality, then it has greatly strengthened this culture of ‘we know because it’s impossible that we don’t'”^[1]. The professional assumption that it is possible to know and understand reality accurately, is what lies at the heart of the failure.

After the Yom Kippur War, the Audits Department, also known as Ipcha Mistabra (Aramaic for “The Devil’s Advocate”) was established at the Military Intelligence Directorate. This department’s role is to challenge the Military Intelligence Directorate and its concepts before they even reach the political echelon. But even this tool, and other tools such as red teams (teams whose job is to think through the enemy’s eyes), have proven ineffective in the face of a culture of arrogance, as evidenced by the IDF’s decision to expand the Audits Department and its authorities after the events of October 7 in light of its failure.

But intelligence responsibility does not stop with the IDF or other intelligence agencies. The political echelon has the responsibility to cast professional doubt on intelligence assessments. The political echelon has the authority and responsibility to demand additional expert opinions, and to place common sense into the mix of considerations. The professional echelons, on the other hand, have the responsibility to provide politicians with any information that may be relevant in order to enable them to make the right decisions, and they should present this information when it is processed from a professional aspect only and not from an ideological aspect.

Who is responsible for meeting the goals?

The political echelon must not only cast doubt on intelligence assessments, but also on everything that comes out of the military: strategic goals and plans of action to achieve these goals must also be put to the test. Statements made during this period by government ministers, accusing the army of trying to evade meeting clear goals, are nothing short of negligence. The political echelon has the duty to define clear goals according to which the military can plan its programs and mode of operation.

Let’s take, for example, the second goal of the Swords of Iron War, as defined by the political echelon: eliminating Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. It’s enough to read a little news to understand that this is not the situation in the Gaza Strip, even at a stage when a hostage deal is already taking place. The claim made by government members is that the military echelon fears control over the civilian population and is trying to avoid it, and as a result, Hamas is still the most powerful entity in Gaza. The failure of the uncontrolled humanitarian aid entering Gaza, and not taking the appropriate political steps to verify who is distributing the food in Gaza, are being blamed by the political echelon on the fact that “the army chiefs are not aggressive enough”, and are therefore demanding their resignation, hence their congratulations to the outgoing IDF Chief of the General Staff.

Who benefits from the current situation?

The truth is that it is the responsibility of the political echelon to audit the progress in achieving the goals it has set. And it has a host of other options to promote this, if the army does not succeed. So where is the gap?

1. In the current system structure, the political echelon does not have the professional tools to question what the military says. There is no civil body capable of giving the government alternative plans or additional intelligence assessments. Choosing from among different alternatives is a basic principle in proper decision-making processes, and it cannot exist in such a reality.
2. The definition of the term “national security” varies in its scope and content. Some include social domains due to the fact that they also indirectly affect national security, and some narrow the definition to purely security domains. But there is no denying that national security includes more than dealing with military threats. It is standard to view national security as also encompassing diplomatic, political, and economic issues, which have a direct and clear impact on national security. However, despite the complexity of the issue, the person considered to be the “national evaluator” is the Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, even though his considerations are limited to military ones. The monopoly of knowledge that exists in professional bodies pertaining to intelligence, planning, and more is not all that prevents the political echelon from casting doubt and choosing between alternatives, but also minimizes the engagement in national security to the military stratum alone. Even if political steps are taken, they are done so in isolation from military ones, and this is clearly evident in the current situation in the Gaza Strip, where the military actions have not provided leverage for significant political steps that would replace Hamas’ rule.
3. There is not enough synchronization between the various security and intelligence agencies. The structure of the Israeli defense establishment is complicated and dispersed. There are intelligence agencies in the IDF, the Israel Security Agency, and the Mossad. There are planning bodies in the Ministry of Defense and the IDF. There are research bodies in the IDF, the Foreign Ministry, and more. However, there is no effective body in Israel that will synchronize these bodies, and more importantly, there is no synchronization between the professional echelon and the political echelon that is responsible for making decisions. The person entrusted with this synchronization is the National Security Council, which has suffered from a lack of efficiency and real authority since its establishment. The separation in the day-to-day work between the profession and the decision-making has been the basis, for many years, for the deficiencies in the defense establishment’s work. Any cooperation is coincidental, circumstantial, and not the result of a well-oiled, efficient system.
4. There is an entire stratum, the one between the major goals set by the government (if any) and the military operational plans, which remains a void. The goals of the war, as they were defined, are somewhat amorphous. Cuasing the collapse of Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities is a major goal, the military aspect of which is only one step in achieving it. Although a decisive military victory is indeed a prerequisite for replacing the civil rule, history shows that even after a military defeat, a rapid move must be made to capture the sphere of civilian life without leaving a vacuum. This issue was not properly defined, and this vacuum left Hamas as the most powerful ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

   It is easy to attribute this failure to the raid method adopted by the IDF since March 2024, but this method stems from the lack of clarity of the war’s goals, of a lack of control over these goals, and of course of the absence of the political component of these goals. Without the political component, the military step can never achieve the ultimate goal.

5. Convenience. The disconnect between the echelons is convenient for everyone. It’s convenient for the government to have someone to blame, and it’s convenient for the army to set facts on the ground. The government can pride itself on setting goals for the war, even though they are partial, vague, and not enough efforts are made to achieve them. On the other hand, the army can take pride in military achievements, even if these correspond to its goals and not the goals set by the political echelon.

Convenience, in these situations, is the opposite of responsibility. The relationship between the military and political echelons has been structured in a crooked manner since the days of David Ben Gurion. The structure of the security system is inefficient, does not facilitate synchronization between bodies, grants a monopoly of knowledge and opinion to the professional ranks over policymakers, and above all, creates a culture of shirking responsibility. The IDF Chief of the General Staff and the Head of Southern Command did well to fulfill their responsibility, and the government would do well if at some point it also assumed its responsibility. However, responsibility is not a personal matter. Resignation is not the solution to the real problem, just as one or another appointment is not the solution. The real responsibility lies in leaving the defense establishment’s comfort zone, which is to dismantle the structure of the system and reassemble it.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

^[1] From an article in N12 – https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm “Former senior officialhttps://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm warns: “October 7 may happen to us again“

הפוסט So, who is responsible for national security? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A New World Order. These grand words take on a new meaning these days, with President Donald Trump stepping into office for his second term.

Having driven a spoke in Tehran’s wheels as well as those of its vassals to an unprecedented level – complemented by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria – Israel has left the Shi’ite axis all but paralyzed. Were it the US’s current administration’s wish to topple the Ayatullah regime, it could deliver a coup de grace in the form of a quick, targeted air strike to crush the skull of the Iranian snake, and in the same breath, take care of the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

Time to conclude the tale of Iran’s nuclear program

This rare and favorable window of opportunity represents a historic moment in which a coalition of the West, Israel, and moderate Sunni states, led by the US can and must bring a decisive end to the Iranian threat. However, one of the largest obstacles on the US’s way to green-lighting an overseas campaign is the public opinion on its streets.

The American public is weary and wary at any prospect of an overseas war, especially in light of the accumulative high death toll of the wars and engagements in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the staggering resources they drained. However, in this instance, the US would not actually be forced to initiate war – but to end it. The Israeli blitz airstrikes left a devastated Iranian air force, shattered many of the Republic’s strategic assets and delivered a crippling blow to its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Ayatullah reign is now more exposed than ever.

Hence, all that is required is a swift targeted move – a devastating airstrike on Iran’s nuclear sites, missile sites and military facilities, delivered by strategic bombers, without the need for boots on the ground, similarly to Israel’s attack last October. A campaign of mere days could bring the Shi’ite axis to its knees, and change the political map and balance of powers in the entire Middle East.

That same coalition should also launch a campaign against the reign of Houthi terror in Yemen, in collaboration with Saudia Arabia and the country’s internal opposition forces. The Houthis, as a proxy of Iran, have made themselves into an all-global nuisance with their disruptive attacks on international trade vessels in the Red Sea. If the US indeed does decide to exercise its full military might – it will have effected dramatic changes in that area within a very short period of time.

The attack against Iran is not only advisable – it is a sine qua non. Because Iran understands that it had lost significant assets such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, it will in all likelihood try to compensate and attempt by all means at hand to break out to a nuclear weapon. If the West cherishes its survival – it behooves it to prevent this at all costs.

Trump understands: the key to peace is might

The election of Trump to the presidency could not have come at a better time for Israel.

Over the past years, , the US has been gradually paring down its presence and involvement in the Middle East, leaving a vacuum into which Russia and China were all too happy to step. As a result of America’s wanning status in the region, an increasing number of countries are aligning themselves with the East. China, the main trade partner of the KSA and Iran, had already brokered an agreement between the two. China’s trade agreements in the Middle East have ballooned to seven times the current volume of the US’s – after it had cut its trade activity and reduced its dependance on Arab oil. The one thing the US can offer Middle East countries in order to reinstate its status as a dominant player in the region is military might.

Trump understands this all too well. He knows that peace and stability can come about only in the presence of military might and not appeasement. The mere fact that even before taking up residence in the White House, Trump declared  that he was interested in making Canada the 51st state of the US, and that he is interested in taking over Greenland and the Panama Canal, indicate that he views the United States as a super power that bears the task of reshaping the global map – and has no qualms about using the necessary force to make America great again.

An opportunity for new world order

Israel is quite literally handing the Middle East to the US on a silver platter.  After pulling the rug of hegemony in the Shi’ite axis from under Tehran’s feet and incapacitating its allies, the US can now step into the frame and reestablish its dominance on the chessboard with a move that would entail minimal effort, restoring its deterrence against the Chinese-Iranian-Russian syndicate.

Admittedly, it would be unwise of the US to ignite a direct military confrontation with the China-Russia sisterhood in the eastern theater. On the other hand – the weakest link in the chain, i.e. Iran, can be flicked off the gameboard almost effortlessly, thereby creating a strong deterrent for US’s adversaries in the region, and bulwarking the Middle East from China’s overtures.

This tactic would pave the road to broad regional peace accords, from Saudia to Indonesia, churning a tailwind for positive moves in the Middle East such as the formation of a moderate Sunni coalition with Israel in partnership with UAE and KSA.

Such a coalition, alongside Israel, moderate Sunni powerful countries and the West led by the US, coupled with normalization with the rest of the Sunni world, can stem the spread of the radical Shi’ite axis, including Turkey, Qatar, Afghanistan, and terror organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaida. The western coalition would prevent the Shi’ite axis from toppling the governments in countries such as Egypt and Jordan and seizing control thereof, and can form a new balance of power in the Middle East region.

This moderate alliance can potentially attract unaligned countries, such as Lebanon, which is controlled at present by Iran through Hezbollah; Iraq, which is partially controlled by Iran, and Libia, Egypt and Saudia. Taking Tehran out of the equation will leave the US alone at the top of the Middle East totem pole, which will in turn bring the unaligned countries – and perhaps more – to choose to align themselves with the moderate coalition, and perhaps even in a year or two, Lebanon will come around and sign – under the influence of Saudia – a peace accord with Israel.

Israel is the key

In a new regional alliance that would deepen and grow stronger with time, Israel would play a central role. Israel is the key that connects West to East, and is the crossroads in which new trade routes can be charted to provide land and maritime trade routes among India, the UAE, KSA and Israel. Israel has already set in place a network of mega-harbors, each under different supervision (The Sinai, Indian, European and Israeli) in preparation for this eventuality, with the aim of creating a global interest in using that network for trade and shipping activity. Making Israel into a global Singapore – a world trade center – is well within the country’s reach.

With new trade routes, regional peace and commercial cooperation with Saudia and other countries in the Middle East, coupled with the security and diplomatic support on part of the US, Israel would be able, for the first time in its history, to do what it has to do in order to ensure the future existence of the State for generations.

Fundamental dictate: maintaining sovereignty

After dealing with the Shi’ite axis and signing regional peace and normalization agreements, Israel will be required to present to the US administration a definitive resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, that must include the crucial elements that will ensure the long-lasting security of Israel.

Such a plan must include Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and most of the C areas in Judia and Samaria, cleared of Palestinian presence that might compromise the Jewish demographic hegemony in the State of Israel. It should outline a definitive solution of the conflict, such that does not allow for a Palestinian state and surely removes any possibility for the rule of terror organizations such as is the situation currently with Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah.

This is an opportunity to snuff out the Oslo Accords, dismantle the Palestinian Authority – a body that is in effect governed by a murderous terror organization that is actively pushing for the global delegitimization of Israel – and adopt an alternative model, to mention a few are: cantonization; emirate-style decentralized “Hamula” (family) government; a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or a Palestinian autonomy in the Sinai Peninsula under Egyptian supervision. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has presented to the Israeli governments various blueprints for this end. The choice of each specific model would depend on shifting circumstances. For example, a future scenario of the collapse of the Jordanian regime would push toward a Jordanian-Palestinian solution, whereas a willingness on part of Egyptian President el-Sisi to play an instrumental role in the stabilization of the Middle East would allow for a Palestinian autonomy in northern Sinai and Gaza.

The common ground for all these prospective solutions is the governing principle that the Zionist claim to the right of the Jewish people to the State of Israel and sovereignty thereof are non-negotiable. Cementing Israel’s right over the State of Israel is crucial spiritually and for its security – both aspects indivisibly interlinked. Israel cannot be completely secure without the spiritual conviction in the justness of this cause, and there is no understanding the security of cities in the heart of Israel without acknowledging the importance of settlements in Judia and Samaria.

Learning the lessons of October 7

A new plan to resolve the conflict would be different than that ideated by President Trump in his previous term. Trump’s Peace for Prosperity demanded painful concessions on part of Israel. But the October 7 attack made it clear that there is no room for such concessions. Any new plan must acknowledge Israel’s overall responsibility for the security of the entire area of the State of Israel. In the past round, Israel abstained from exercising sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and C areas, at Trum’s behest. Today, the public in Israel is more than ever ready for this step, that would anchor the eastern border belt as an integral part of the land of Israel, similarly to the southern and northern envelope areas. Trump’s current presidency is a historic opportunity to right this wrong and proclaim Israeli sovereignty – even unilaterally – in the territories over which the US acknowledges Israel’s right.

At the same time, Israel must present an exhaustive long-term plan for Gaza and Judia and Samaria. After learning the hard way over the past twenty years that the terror and Gaza cannot be eliminated solely with air strikes, precise as they may be, it is now clear that the Gaza Strip must have the presence of Israeli security forces – this is a unnegotiable condition if Israel wishes to see the objectives of the Gaza War materialize, among others affording Israel the freedom of immediate action in the event that terror – in any form whatsoever – lifts its head once again in the Gaza Strip.

It also must be acknowledged that a threat of territorial losses is a strong deterrent for organizations such as Hamas, since the loss of lives – even in the tens of thousands – and destruction have no meaning to the proponents of such ideologies. To ensure a long-lasting deterrence in the Gaza Strip, a portion of its territory must remain under Israel’s control. One such possibility that would gain wide support among Israeli public, is a militarized security zone along the parameter of Gaza under the control of Israel. These swaths of land can be used for cultivating agriculture by the communities that were the victims of the Hamas October 7 attack and breath life where Hamas has strewn death. This not only makes sense in terms of Israel’s security – it brings with it the much-needed historic justice.

Optimism is not enough

Trump’s reelection is a rare historic opportunity for Israel. With the support of a strong, realistic leader that had proven himself a true friend to the Jewish people, can the picture of the Middle East be radically changed, from which both Israel and the US can gain considerable – and crucial – advantages.

In order to ensure this historic opportunity is not missed, Israel must do two things. The first – enhance the cooperation with the US in a joint aim of eliminating the Iranian nuclear program.

The second is the formulation of a clear and definite long-term solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict that cements Israel’s security and diplomatic status in the Middle East region, and has zero tolerance for any approach that does not acknowledge Israel’s inalienable right over the land of Israel and its uncompromising right to maintain the security of the State and its citizens, ensuring the Trump administration’s full support of this aim.

Will Trump move the first piece on the board and launch an attack against Iran? Trump is a well-seasoned business mogul, who is very adept at identifying opportunities. However, at the end of the day, it is up to him and Israel to put forth proof of intent. In light of what is known about his previous term in the Oval Office, his recent appointments, and his guiding world views, it is likely that he will give Israel his security and diplomatic support and spearhead an attack on Iran.

One way or another, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement leads a steady clear line:

Israel’s national security leans on the State’s national ethos, the justness of the cause and its ability to protect its own security by itself with defensible borders and the understanding that the long-term security and the prosperity of Israel lies only in Israe’s hands.

This understanding must first and foremost stem from a common faith in the justness of Israel’s path, remembering the truth that has been at the foundation of Zionism since its inception – that if Israel does not take care of itself, no one else will.

Not even Donald Trump.

הפוסט Trump’s Second Presidency: A Critical Opportunity on a Silver Platter הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The campaign for the eradication of the murderous Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip had placed the IDF in a humanitarian conundrum: on one hand, there are over a million displaced who are in need of aid and housing. On the other hand, Hamas pillaged the humanitarian aid and is fortifying itself in areas of dense population.

At present, Israel is facing a triple challenge: it is demanded to provide the population with humanitarian aid, but must do so without the unintended consequence of boosting Hamas in the Strip. Is there a way to ensure the population has a roof over its head without having to rehabilitate the stronghold of terror in the Strip? How can Israel install the future civil leadership that would replace Hamas and the Palestinian Authority?

The Humanitarian Islands Plan, authored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement research department, led by researchers Adv. Yifa Segal, Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid, and contributing researcher Mrs. Jennifer Thiel, provides an answer to all these questions, which could change the face of Gaza.

A dangerous problem – Hamas takes advantage of humanitarian aid

The humanitarian aid predicament is a direct result of the October 7 massacre, that had brought Israel to launch the war in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has instructed the civilian population to evacuate the areas of fighting to eliminate the risk of hurting innocents, and allow the army to conduct operational activities against terror infrastructures that Hamas operated from within these areas. As a result of this activity, large areas were left either razed to the ground or unfit for habitation. To date, there are over one million Gazans that are considered displaced after having evacuated the battle areas.

Naturally, these displace are in need of humanitarian aid. And indeed, since the outbreak of the war, large-scale aid has been continuously shipped into the Gaza Strip, totaling as of now some one million tons. However, the displaced also need proper housing as well.

With that said, there are two prominent obstacles for the supply of this aid and housing. The first is that Hamas pillages huge amounts of food and equipment that arrive into the Strip for its own survival, on the expense of the lives of its own people.  The other challenge is that the people cannot return to their homes and rehabilitate the pre-war centers of population because here too, Hamas – concerned solely with its own preservation at whatever cost – had established its terror network above and underground in these areas.

The question is: how may Israel help the displaced citizens of the Strip while refraining to indirectly aid the terrorists?

The humanitarian islands – no entrance for terrorism

In order to untangle this predicament, a solution is called for, such that will allow for the flow of aid to the citizens to prevent a full-fledged humanitarian crisis in the strip, while ensuring Hamas does not gain control over the population centers and the aid, and expediting its eradication.

The most effective manner of achieving the aforementioned is by the establishment of displaced cities only in the Strip’s open areas rather than in the populace centers controlled by Hamas. Each city would be under Israeli supervision, without access by UNRWA or Hamas. This can be instrumental in the eradication of the pernicious presence of these two organizations in the Strip. The authority to distribute the aid would be in the hands of a new body that would be established in the Gaza Strip – the Humanitarian Administration of the Gaza Strip.

The role of that body will be the close supervision over the distribution of aid and ensuring these cities are clean of Hamas – or any other organization – terrorist. The displaced cities and the aid they receive will be managed autonomously, with the involvement of local public and aid organizations, without Israeli intervention in their daily operation.

How does it work?

Each displaced city will collaborate with the General Humanitarian Coordination Administration. The Administration’s role will be to ensure that the IDF has cleared the area of underground and other terrorist infrastructures even before the establishment of the new cities, to supervise their construction and lists of eligible residents, to ensure they remain clean of Hamas members, and to coordinate the arrival of supplies.

Entry to cities will be possible only with biometric entry documents specific to each city, and through security checks and metal detectors, which will prevent terrorists or gangs from infiltrating the cities or bringing in weapons.

At the same time, the IDF’s perimeter security force in the area and a system of routes and crossings will enable Israel to dissect the Gaza Strip into separate units, and will increase Israel’s control over the Strip and its ability to prevent Hamas from regaining control of the territory.

The goal – creating an alternative government to Hamas

The proximity to the population and control over aid supply will make it easier for Israel to cultivate a positive and peace-oriented local leadership that will assume only civilian powers. This leadership will be an alternative to both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which has proved to be a weak, corrupt and terror-supporting body that must not rule Gaza again.

To ensure that the local administration does not undermine Israel, it will be given only civil and humanitarian powers – not political or policy-making authorities. Although the IDF will not have a role inside the cities, it will have the full freedom to operate within them when the need arises in order to cleanse them of terrorists and terrorist infrastructure.

The best solution – safe, efficient and cost-effective

The “Humanitarian Islands” program has distinct advantages over other solutions – it is based on a well-known international model of creating displaced persons cities, which has been successfully implemented many times over the years across the world, e.g. in Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as on the experience gathered from the creation of improvised displaced cities in the Gaza Strip today.

In light of the extensive and successful experience with similar initiatives, it is possible to implement the program already in an efficient and gradual manner. It is worthwhile to start by establishing displaced towns in the northern Gaza Strip, where Hamas has relatively little military and civilian control, and later to establish additional cities in other parts of the Strip.

Another significant advantage of this plan is that the cost will not fall on the Israeli taxpayer. As is already the case in Gaza today and in similar situations around the world, funding will come only from international sources and will be budgeted for the various aid agencies.

In contrast to military rule or any form of Israeli control, a temporary humanitarian administration, which will hold no political authority and is operated by the local population, will encourage cooperation and reduce resistance.

The bottom line: The Humanitarian Island Plan will allow Israel to isolate Hamas, deny it access to aid and population centers, and eradicate it as a governing force, while at the same time cultivating local representation in the cities as an alternative leadership for the day after the war. All of this makes its implementation a necessary condition for the Gaza War to end with a real and decisive victory for Israel over Hamas.

For the full study >>

הפוסט Aid Displace, Cripple Hamas: A Humanitarian Solution that Could Change the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Days away from President-Elect Trump’s inauguration, a clear foreign policy vision is shaping around who used to be considered as a supposed isolationist-in-chief. In spite of his clear domestic priorities on the economy and mass migration, Trump wisely realized what his predecessor and ideological forebear, President Reagan, did: keeping the American people safe means maintaining a “margin of safety” for America. This, in a nutshell, is the doctrine of Peace Through Strength: muscling up American effort abroad to keep peace at home.

There is no greater arena where this margin has been gradually waning than the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis, that I would dare to refer to as CRIN. As Trump is calling out China for its malicious trade practices and grave danger to the US national security; vowing to end the Russian invasion to Ukraine; and threatening to take military control over the Panama Canal and Greenland “for national security purposes”, as he did during this week’s press conference. Trump is certainly not signaling he is only introspective as 2025 begins.

Yet one weak link is standing out in this axis, an opportunity to make good on Trump’s pledge to “stop the chaos” in the Middle East that ensued the Hamas horrific October 7 attacks on Israel: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran with its nuclear weapons program has become the number one destabilizing force in the Middle East, rendering Trump’s much-sought-after stability and prosperity so elusive. Its Leader Ali Khamenei is committed to destroy Israel, a major US ally, openly marking it in his crosshairs as a “cancerous tumor that needs to be removed”. Khamenei envisions bringing Israel’s unceremonious end while destabilizing the Sunni regimes in the Arab countries that neighbor Iran, uniting the Middle East under his rule. And he laid out a multi-billion-dollar plan to do just that.

Yet now, as Israel is methodically toppling the Iranian domino stones, Khamenei’s vision and aggression are backfiring. That represents an unprecedented opportunity to take a limited, pre-emptive military action against the Iranian nuclear danger, taking it off the table for good – with a relatively low cost. One of the very first decisions the newly-elected President will have to make is how to finally bring stability to the Middle East, and the key lies not in Gaza, but in Tehran.

The nuclear gun on the table

There are two main reasons why this crossroads represents a viable opportunity to take action against Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

First, Iran is more dangerous than ever before. Iran has been fast-tracking its nuclear weapons program over the course of Biden’s presidency with little international scrutiny. According to the recent report by the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Iran is a mere nod away from acquiring a sufficient amount of weapon-grade enriched uranium for a dozen nuclear devices. The only thing standing in its way is a green light by Khamenei and his cronies – and the Middle East and the world will face red alert.

Secondly, however, is that Iran is less ominous and more vulnerable than it is ready to admit. Its regional proxy strategy to checkmate Israel has gone on a downward spiral since the horrific October 7 atrocities. Its protégés Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen – all suffered heavy blows by Israel’s military efforts. Meanwhile, Assad fled Syria, leaving it at the mercy of HTS’ jihadists. This frontal defense has collapsed, and can no longer protect the Iranian homeland.

That, while Israel’s first-ever retaliation on Iranian soil in October reportedly eliminated much of Tehran’s much-dreaded air defense systems. It highlighted Tehran’s cluelessness in thwarting attacks on its well-protected, most-valued strategic assets.

Finally, even as Tehran was determined to avenge Israel for the series of humiliating blows it was inflicted by, it failed. In both April and October, Iran launched hundreds of missiles and attack drones, only to be mostly derailed by Israel’s tip-of-the-spear air defense and F-35 squadrons. That, on top of regional cooperation under MEAD (Middle East Air Defense) by stealthily supportive Arab countries, that shared critical intelligence, under the auspices of the United States Military’s Central Command.

Removing the Iranian cloud, gaining regional cooperation

The real tie-breaking Iranian gun on the table is the one with nuclear bullets. Especially now, as the Assad regime fell, Iran might conclude it has no other choice to secure its regime but to break out to a bomb, to compensate for its perceived weakness after all the blows it has suffered.

Trump, much like Reagan, despises the idea of nuclear proliferation. His continuous alerts again a possible Russian use of nukes against Ukraine and his graphic, somber descriptions of the terrible human tragedy that might ensue teaches that he considers global security much more ominous than the way he is usually described.

Removing the Iranian shady cloud over the Middle East will also obtain large-scale regional shifts: Saudi Arabia, and many other pragmatic countries in the Arab world, preferred to sit on the sidelines at best, or alienate themselves from the United States and warm up relations with Iran at worst. Iran’s threats on their sovereignty were well received, and short of any meaningful support from Washington, they preferred to equip themselves with an insurance policy, and side with the regional bully. Without this threat, the path for Israeli-Arab normalization and for long-term stability in the Middle East will be wide-open.

On the global level, this heavy blow to Iran will also significantly weaken its superpower patrons, Russia and China. Those continue to support Iran, whether its Russia’s continued purchasing of military equipment like drones and missiles that fuel the war in Ukraine, or China’s circumvention of American sanctions in buying massive amounts of oil barrels from the Ayatollahs, saving the Iranian petro-state from economic collapse.

Only inches away from clinching nuclear weapons, Iran does not stop threatening the US and its allies. Especially since October 7, Israel and the world have learned the hard way that their enemies should be taken at their word. Should not be taken lightly. The disastrous results of allowing Iran to nuclearize cannot be overstressed.

Trump is now facing a golden opportunity to take the Iranian gun off the table, and deny Khamenei of his radical vision. The new reality in the Middle East renders limited pre-emptive military action – no boots on the ground – much more realistic. This option used to be considered risking regional war, yet the Iranian gates of hell have already broken on the region, and backfired. Iran’s newfound weakness invites American leadership, not against the regime – but against its capabilities to threaten the region and the world.

Recently Trump declared he was looking to establish “long-lasting peace” in the region. Now it is his time to greenlight the strike that will close the Iranian nuclear program and open the door for this very peace. Weakened proxies and air defenses, a readier-than-ever region, and gains that clearly trump the cost. Checkmate.

The article was originally published on the Jerusalem Post

הפוסט Trump’s Golden Opportunity to Checkmate Iran and Stabilize the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

n the past years – and increasingly so during the Gaza War – Israel has been conducting targeted eliminations against arch-terrorists at the top of Hamas and Hezbollah. However, this is hardly a new modus operandi for Israe. 29 years ago, on January 5, 1996, Israel had staged one of its most iconic assassinations, in which it took out the arch-terrorists Yahya Abdul Latif Ayyash, a.k.a “The Engineer” or in Arabic “Al Muhandis”.

Ayyash was the chief architect at the time of the Hama’s first suicide bombings, and under his tutelage, the organization carried out dozens of deadly terror attacks that amounted in a total death count of some 100 Israeli civilians and the wounding of some 400. In the early 90s Ayyash was at the top of Israel’s most wanted list, and for a long time Israel’s security establishment tried to get its hands on him. It was only after long months of meticulous planning, and after a number of misses, that Israel was able to eliminate Ayyash in a daring operation the likes of which the country had never seen. The death of Al Muhandis became a longstanding symbol till this day – both for his followers and rivals.

The student who became an arch terrorist: Who is Yahya Ayyash?

Yahya Ayyash was born and raised in the township of Rafat, in western Samaria, and already at a young age found his way into the arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. As an adult, Ayyash enrolled in the Bir Zeit university, where he learned electric engineering.  As a student he was an active member of the university’s “Muslim Bloc” of student organizations.

In the early 90s, a short while after graduating, Ayyash became one of the founders of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam brigades (EQB) – the military wing of Hamas – then and today. Ayyash harnessed the knowledge he acquired at in engineering school to tailor improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for the organization’s terror attacks. By 1992, al Muhandis was already designing his first attacks in Israel. In 1993 he orchestrated Hamas’ debut suicide bombing at Mahula Junction in the Jordan Valley. Since that first attack and until his death, Ayyash churned out numerous deadly attacks, among them the car bomb in the northern city of Afula and the suicide bombing in the number 5 bus in Tel Aviv. He was actively involved in terror attacks, being not only the one who prepared the explosive devices – but actually attacked them to the bodies of the suicide bombers.

A long manhunt, one failed attempt, and stellar success: the road to the elimination of “The Engineer”

Israeli security forces understood pretty quickly that Yahya Ayyash is the name behind the Hamas’ deadly terror attacks, and he climbs to the top of Israel’s most wanted list. Over a long period of time, many attempts were made to capture him, however, Ayyash would never stay in one place for long and would even disguise himself, thus escaping Israel’s clutches time and time again.

Until 1994, the pursuit of Ayyash took place chiefly in the Palestinian cities of Judia and Samaria, but at that time he moved to the Gaza Strip and the security forces continued with the attempts to track him down there as well, and even made an attempt on his life at the end of 1995. Israel’s security forces worked for months to put together the operation. The governing principle was not to harm innocents in the surrounding area. At first, the plan was to kill Ayyash by rigging a fax machine. Eventually it was decided to use a much smaller device – a mobile phone.

The General Security Service technology unit packed 11 grams of explosive material into a Motorola mobile device. The minute quantity of explosives meant that the success of the operation hinged on Ayyash holding the phone to his head long enough. To ensure this, the security forces had to devise a way to ensure Ayyash received – and used – the device. This was a real challenge as Ayyash would never stay in one place for long and would frequently change mobile phones.

Despite his unpredictable pattern of behavior, Ayyash had one constant – a phone call he would make religiously to his father every Friday. It was obvious to the security forces that his is the opportune moment in which the assassination would take place. In 1995, on the last Friday of the year, the rigged device was delivered to Ayyash though a collaborator within his inner circle. The collaborator, not knowing the purpose of the device, was also instructed to disconnect the landline phone in the apartment where Ayyash was staying, thus ensuring that Ayyash would use the deadly device.

Until that point, the operation was on track, with Ayyash receiving and using the mobile device to phone his father, however, the attempt to trigger the bombe failed, thus Ayyash was able to complete the phone call without harm, oblivious to the threat.

The device was recalled from Ayyash through the collaborator the very next day and sent to a lab to determine the cause of the malfunction, which was found to be a disconnected wire between the ear and mouth pieces. The detonation mechanism was swiftly repaired and on the following Friday, January 5, 1996, the collaborator returned the device returned to Ayyash.

As per planned, the collaborated handed Ayyash the phone to make his weekly call to his father. This time the detonator did not fail and Ayyash was killed on the spot.

The elimination of Ayyash was without doubt a stellar success, but those in the thick of the affair know to tell that immediately after Ayyash was killed, many high-level commanders from the Hamas arrived on the scene, among them head of the organization’s military wing – Muhammed Deif, and could have been eliminated on the spot. However, the government cabinet did not give the green light and that opportunity was missed.

From revenge terror attacks to memorials: the aftermath of the assassination

The elimination of “al Muhandis” was a major affair – for Israel, that wanted him off the map, and for his followers that mourned his death. For Israel this was a milestone operational achievement, as not only had one of the leaders of the deadly terrorist organization been taken out of its roster, but it also denied the organization a huge trove of technical knowledge. Granted, Ayyash was able to train additional Hamas terrorist in the preparation of IEDs, but none had the knowledge and experience he had.

Another crucial outcome of the assassination was the message it conveyed to other Hamas leaders and other terror organizations that they are well within the reach of Israel.

Yahya Ayyash was buried in Gaza in a mass funeral, and retaliations did not wait for long. Later that year, a number of retaliatory attacks occurred in Israel, including the attack on bus No. 18 in Jerusalem and the attack at Dizengoff Center in Tel Aviv, killing a total of 59 people. Beyond this severe reaction, Ayyash had become an icon for Hamas supporters. Armed cells of the organization began to boast nicknames such as “The Engineer’s Students” or “The Yahya Ayyash Cells,” and various sites and locales throughout the Gaza Strip were dedicated to him. The Ayyash memorial project continued for many more years – in 2010 it was decided to name the Palestinian Authority compound in Ramallah after the engineer, and about a decade later, Hamas produced a long-range rocket that was given the name “Ayyash 250.” This rocket was used in Operation Guardian of the Walls, and also during the Gaza War.

The Hamas rocket was not the only reminder of Yahya Ayyash of the Gaza War. In December 2023, Abd al-Fattah Ma’ali, once considered Ayyash’s right-hand man, was assassinated. Another reminder also came in September 2024 with the pager attack against Hezbollah operatives, which was somewhat reminiscent of the method in which the notorious engineer was killed, as the widespread use of pagers by the Hezbollah that allowed for the targeting of so many terrorists, was prompted by the attack on Ayyash by mobile phone after which Hezbollah instructed its members to opt for beepers instead of the mobile devices.

The story of the assassination of Yahya Ayyash is testament to the capabilities and perseverance of Israel’s security forces. But more than all, it shows that targeted eliminations are much more than operations against one individual or another – they bring a message that echoes decades later to those who choose to follow in the target’s path.

הפוסט 29 Years Ago: Architect of Hamas Deadly Attacks, Yahya Ayyash, the “Engineer” – Eliminated הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 27, 2024, the day the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect, the Syrian rebels took advantage of the opportunity and launched an attack against Bashar al-Assad’s army. After only 11 days, their forces had taken control of Damascus and completed the conquest of Syria. Assad himself fled to Russia.

Many were amazed at the dizzying speed with which the Syrian regime fell, and at the depth of hatred among the enraged crowd that wrecked the statue of the elder Assad and dragged it through Damascus.

The person least surprised was Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a member of the IDSF movement and one of the leading experts in Middle East studies. His analysis seems to imply that the Baath regime in Syria could have come to no different end.

Greater infidels than Jews and Christians

“The rebels succeeded in taking control of Syria so quickly because Syria is a hollow country. The people don’t believe in it and the army isn’t willing to die for it,” Kedar said in a special conversation with Or Yissachar, head of the IDSF research department, after the dramatic developments in Syria. “My book ‘Assad in Search of Legitimacy’ (2005) proves what other Orientalists have tried to deny or ignore,” claims Kedar, “which is that Hafez Assad, and later his son Bashar, tried in vain all these years to become legitimate rulers in the eyes of the public. They never succeeded. They didn’t have a nickel’s worth of legitimacy. Nothing, zero, nada. They ruled by force. Everything was phony, and that’s why it fell apart so quickly.”

Kedar explains that this is a chronicle of a collapse foretold. “Syria’s biggest problem is that in 1966 it was taken over by members of the Alawite religion, a minority who are considered by the country’s Sunni Muslim majority to be infidels – idolaters whose fate is to either convert to Islam or be slaughtered. The renowned medieval Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyyah called the Alawites ‘greater infidels than the Jews and Christians.’ Therefore, from the perspective of Muslims, an Alawite cannot be a ruler.”

Brutal repression and strategic surprise

“To deal with the hostility of the Muslim majority towards them,” says Kedar, “the Alawite leaders from the Marxist faction of the Baath Party – the secular nationalist party that has ruled Syria since taking over in 1966 – established a terrible dictatorial regime. It suppressed rebellions brutally. In 1976, the Muslim Brotherhood mounted an uprising in Syria and thousands of Sunni rebels fought against the government. The uprising ended in February 1982 with the Great Hama Massacre, where between 20,000 and 40,000 people were murdered. Military forces under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother, blew up houses with the residents inside – including old people, women, and children – and they killed other victims with gas. About 20,000 more people, who were taken into custody, were murdered in Palmyra prison.

“The next round began in March 2011, with a wave of anti-government protests that erupted as part of what was then called the ‘Arab Spring.’ Then too, in various regions, the rebellion was suppressed with deadly force. Many Syrian Muslims fled north to the Idlib region, close to Turkiye. The Turks helped them arm and equip themselves, organize, train, and prepare for the great day when they would break out and liberate the country from the rule of the Assad family.”

For 14 years, the rebels in the Idlib region waited, gathered strength, armed themselves, and watched for the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow to the Assad regime. “The turning point,” explains Kedar, “came with the end of Hezbollah’s war against Israel, which left the regime especially weakened.”

How did the rebels mount their surprise attack?

“Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – an Islamist organization formerly called Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated with al-Qaeda – was the first to attack, under the command of Muhammad al-Julani. The other rebel organizations quickly followed suit, to take advantage of the strategic surprise that wound up costing the Assad regime its life.”

Kedar describes the course of the battles: “First the rebel forces attacked in Aleppo, and a few days later they proceeded south to Hama and later to Homs. After that area was conquered, the Druze in As-Suwayda and the Bedouin in Daraa also joined the rebellion against the government. Then it was a short path to the conquest of Damascus and the final defeat of Assad.”

We will have won when Israeli flags are hoisted over former Iranian embassies

Although the rebels fought as a single front in the recent campaign, in reality they are a variety of organizations and their agendas differ and sometimes clash. “In the Idlib region, refugees from Daesh, Al Qaeda, and other organizations have accumulated over the years, especially after 2018. In contrast, there were also secular and multi-ethnic organizations without any religious agenda. They included Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawites, and members of other groups. These organizations appear more moderate and pragmatic, and at least two of them accept Israel. I know this because I’m in contact with their leaders,” Kedar reveals.

Does the agenda of most rebels actually appear to be relatively moderate?

“The statements that most organizations are issuing are quite positive. Some even say that Israel has nothing to fear. One of the organizations I’m in contact with wrote to me that for them the great victory over Assad, the Iranians, and Hezbollah will be when the Iranian embassies in Damascus and Amman have Israeli flags flying, meaning those buildings have become the Israeli embassies.”

It would be better for the rebels to establish a liberal regime

“There is no unified Syrian people,” explains Kedar. “Syria is an artificial state. It’s deeply divided ethnically, into Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Armenians – and religiously, into Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Alawites – and tribally, into powerful clans and extended families, many of them armed and valuing their internal loyalties and their own agendas. Those groups were together only because of the arbitrary border that France established when it concluded its mandate in the region. The gaps and tensions along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines have prevented a true Syrian people from forming.” According to Kedar, this is precisely the reason that it would be beneficial for al-Julani to establish a relatively liberal regime.

“If Syria becomes an Islamist state like Daesh or a dictatorship that tries to impose a unified national identity, it could fall apart – because the Druze, Kurds, and other minorities would not want to live in such a state.” On the other hand, if Syria were a pluralistic state as it was in the 1950s, intervening less harshly in the lives of its citizens, then all sorts of forces that want independence – such as the Alawites in the coastal region – could very possibly be content with what they have and not try to dismantle the country.”

If the alternative is Iran – I prefer Daesh

When asked whether the disintegration of countries like Iran or Syria will negatively affect stability in the Middle East, Kedar replies surprisingly that on the contrary, it will only improve stability.

“Only the Emirates, which are homogeneous countries, have remained stable over many years in this region. In contrast, countries made of several groups, heterogeneous countries, are very unstable. Consider, for example, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. They each include ethnic, religious, and tribal groups that don’t associate with each other, so why force them to live in a single framework?

If an extremist Islamist state like Daesh is established, is it still good for Israel that the Assad regime has fallen?

“Even the worst militias in Syria pose a threat that is primarily tactical – automatic weapons and heavy machine guns mounted on Toyotas. If I have to choose between that and a strategic threat from Iran in the form of ballistic missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons soon, then I prefer to deal with Daesh. Of course I really want to avoid that. But if the alternative is Iran, I prefer Daesh.”

Israel is ready for any scenario

Is uncertainty about the nature of Syria’s emerging regime the reason for the preventive measures that Israel has taken in recent weeks?

“Exactly. Israel is preparing for the worst-case scenario, in which extremist Islamists have control of Syria. That’s why we’re seeing a very large concentration of forces in the Golan. For the meantime, until it becomes clear where the new government is headed, the IDF has captured the Syrian side of Mount Hermon – which is higher than the Israeli side – and has also improved the Israeli positions on the Golan itself. These steps are important and it’s good that they were taken as a way of warding off danger and ensuring that we don’t relive October 7th – this time on the Golan – with military forces entering the State of Israel because it fell asleep on the watch.

“It’s impossible to know what will happen in Syria,” concludes Kedar. “It could be an Islamist terrorist state like Daesh, or an open, modern, liberal state like Syria was in the past. We have to wait and see. We can only hope that a reasonable, normal government will be established there that Israel can reach a dialogue with, so that we all can feel calmer about what’s happening across the border.”

הפוסט “Syria was always a fake – that’s why it fell apart so quickly” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the last three months, the center of gravity of the Swords of Iron war has shifted northward, but according to journalist Yair Kraus, the story of the northern sector began unfolding as early as October 7, 2023. As someone who lives in Acre and covers the northern region for Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, he discerned from the beginning that his region was an integral part of the war.

“When we saw the terrible attack on the southern communities, we realized that such an attack could have happened here too, and in much more monstrous proportions,” he relates. “This completely changed our perception of security as residents of the north. It created a deep crisis in our trust for the state and the IDF. Today, when we hear statements like ‘Hezbollah is deterred,’ for us it’s a warning that the situation on the ground is probably the opposite.”

The days of a “sense of security” are over

Yair Kraus lives in Acre, so he and his family were not evacuated. But they certainly felt the echoes of the war. His eldest daughter, for example, had to leave home for an entire month to go to school in the center of the country, and his three younger children had no educational framework for about three months. Kraus also personally knows many families who were displaced from their homes, and has seen firsthand the difficulties they faced and are still facing. He is aware of many residents – mainly elderly – who are waiting for the moment when they can return home. Moreover, there are quite a few others who are not at all sure they wish to return, and some have already decided to leave the north for good. The trend toward relocating permanently is especially noticeable among young families whose children have already settled into new frameworks in central Israel. Those families do not want to uproot them again.

However, even if we focus on residents who are waiting to return – and even on exceptional individuals who decide to move to the north of the country now of all times – there is still a serious problem in that most of them are not yet able to do so.

According to Kraus, who has been covering the northern region since the Second Lebanon War, several conditions must be met before the north can be repopulated. The first involves security and survival. “The residents in the north, especially the evacuees, will carefully examine what conditions the state and the army want to return them to,” he says. “I hear from many friends that they will not return to a situation where they will see Hezbollah terrorists and their families settling again in the villages where attacks were launched, or go back to being on the front line with the army behind them.”

The residents of the north have had enough of promises, Kraus adds, and they will now demand to see changes on the ground. “The security establishment’s usual boasting and lying will no longer work, and there’s no use for more of their statements that have repeatedly turned out to be unfounded,” he concludes. “The days of ‘a sense of security’ are also over. The issue here is no longer what people feel. It’s what people see with their own eyes – and when you see the villages where attacks were launched being rebuilt, and when there’s no buffer zone, it doesn’t look like security. Remember, we didn’t defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. And Hezbollah’s stated goal is still to conquer the northern settlements. It’s time for us to start believing Hezbollah and stop underestimating its buildup. We also need to wean ourselves from the addiction to respite – and from methods of action such as the kind we used in the so-called war between the wars. There is a major lesson here for the leadership, the army officers, and the northern residents, and it is that the peace and quiet we long for can be bought only with determination and the force of arms.”

So what will security on the northern border look like?

“We constantly hear about weapons being seized and terrorist infrastructure being destroyed, even now during the ceasefire, but what will change the reality the day after the war is not how many weapons we removed, but whether the weapons will return to those places. As long as the army and government show no willingness to hold on to the areas where Hezbollah operated, we should be worried. It’s clear to me and many other residents that for security in the north, we must create a buffer zone like the ones at the Gaza border and the Syrian border. Besides keeping security threats away from the communities at the fence, a buffer zone would also deliver humiliation. The Lebanese will see abandoned villages standing as monuments that proclaim what happens to those who try to harm us.”

Don’t say “rehabilitation,” say “development”

Besides restoring security, another condition that must be met in order to return the residents of the north to their homes is the restoration of the damaged infrastructure, including the ruined drainage systems, the destroyed roads, the wrecked buildings, and the many homes that suffer from abandonment. Of course, we also need repairs at public institutions such as health funds and schools, and at businesses, because they are all integral to a reasonable lifestyle.

However, alongside physical restoration, there is another aspect, less talked about, which is the development aspect. “We hear all the time about ‘rehabilitating the north,’ but in my opinion, rehabilitation is the wrong concept because it implies restoring the conditions of October 6,” says Yair Kraus. The situation in the north has been shaky for many years, and it is impossible to prop something back up that has long been falling apart. There is an issue of attitude here, and it is time for us to replace the term ‘rehabilitation’ with the terms ‘momentum’ and ‘development.'”

Kraus expresses a feeling that many northern residents share – especially now, after they have glimpsed the lifestyle of the center’s residents. “Exposure to life in the center of the country made the residents of the north realize how far behind they were. The rift strongly affected their perception,” he explains. “After a few months of living in the center, residents of the north began to get used to conditions that residents of the center have long taken for granted, such as accessible public transportation, advanced health services, well-paying jobs, and a variety of leisure activities. It’s enough to notice how many movie theaters an average city has in central Israel and then look at the Upper Galilee. There isn’t a single movie theater in that entire region. But the problem is much deeper than that, of course. Such gaps exist in every field and influence every aspect of the residents’ daily lives. So if the state wants those residents to return to the north, it cannot be satisfied with merely restoring what they had before. It must assure them that they will receive the same conditions that exist in the center. People say that you don’t cry out for what you don’t notice the lack of – but now the residents of the north know what they lack and they will cry out.”

What should the development plan for the north include?

“We need to start improving public transportation and expanding railroad lines, build advanced medical centers, and place an emphasis on employment, education, and leisure. Beyond that, we need to work on reducing land prices in the decaying rural communities at the heart of the Galilee – because currently the prices are exorbitant, to the point where they harm the entire Jewish settlement enterprise in the Galilee. But above all, a new point of view is needed. Currently the state treats the north as an unwelcome assignment and not as an asset. For that reason, it develops the north according to economic and administrative considerations, and not considerations of Zionism and societal values.”

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north.

The people of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem aren’t wiser than we are

It is impossible discuss the rehabilitation and development of the north without addressing the question of responsibility. Currently there are various bodies trying to drive the process, and they are roughly divided into two groups – outsiders and insiders. The first group includes mainly government bodies and regulatory officials. The second group includes local leaders, residents, and private associations. Synchronization among the various bodies is not always successful, and sometimes it does not exist at all. Currently the reins are held by those external offices.

According to Yair Kraus, this trend is not new. “For years, the people in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem decided what was right for us, and how we should live, and even now there is a feeling that do-gooders are coming from outside again to save and heal us,” he says. “This criminal policy may derive from good intentions, but in practice it weakens the local leadership and the community’s resilience. It sends the message that the residents can’t take care of themselves.”

Kraus compares the situation in the north to national disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes. In such disasters too, we see delegations from elsewhere arriving to save the locals. The missions operate out of good will, and their assistance is indeed needed, but when they operate without the cooperation of the local population, their benefit is only partial.

“All the studies in the world prove that sustainable reconstruction after a national disaster is possible only when the community is part of the reconstruction and part of the action,” he explains. “We need to create a situation where we exert ourselves not merely for the community but together with it. Not only do the locals know best what they need. In addition, by taking responsibility for themselves they can achieve a sense of triumph and restore their own resilience, which is no less important than physical rehabilitation.”

Why, in your opinion, are the people of the north excluded from the reconstruction and development processes?

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north. Billions have been invested in the region over the years and have given back almost no profit. In my opinion, a solution needs to be found that will provide for supervision but also give the north a certain freedom of action. I don’t know what the solution is, but I know we must try to find it.”

No “state,” no “army,” only people

One of the clearest conclusions that Yair Kraus draws from the last year of the war is that we need to discard amorphous terms like “state” and “army,” and instead start talking about the people who make up these bodies.

He harks back to the period when he covered Operation Guardian of the Walls and many media outlets reported on various decisions made by the court. He, as a journalist, opposed that unspecific term and made sure to mention the name of the judge who made each decision. In today’s context, Kraus emphasizes that there is no army, but rather a Chief of Staff, a head of the Northern Command, a divisional commander, and so on. Similarly, there is no state. There are ministers, there are members of Knesset, there are advisors. “This precision is important because when you attribute the responsibility to the body, then no one is responsible,” he explains. “In contrast, when you say who has the authority, by name and position, and indicate what decision or what action that person took – then immediately an individual is responsible.”

His hope is that those in authority, from the most senior to the most junior, will take responsibility and truly fulfill their roles. Only in this way, he believes, will it be possible to influence the future of the country and its development.

Another conclusion that Kraus has retained is that we must no longer be captivated by promises. “In the last year and a quarter, we have received a very big lesson in realism, and I can no longer look at the future through a prism,” he says. “In my lifetime, I’ve heard enough exciting announcements that ultimately led to nothing. I hope that now, with the reality of the north finally on the public agenda, we will see real change. It’s a very harsh thing to say, but this terrible war could be a blessing for the north. If it weren’t for a game-changing event of this magnitude, I doubt we would be talking about the importance of the north and recognizing how acute the need is to take care of this region of the country and improve its conditions. In my view, we must leverage this event into development, so that out of the fearsome comes forth sweetness.”

הפוסט The North Needs a New Story: An Interview with Journalist Yair Kraus הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In September 2024, the Swedish authorities accused Iran of responsibility for thousands of text messages sent to residents of Sweden in 2023 and calling to avenge a Quran burning that had occurred in the kingdom. According to official Swedish sources, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had penetrated the Swedish text messaging system in a cyber attack and sent approximately 15,000 text messages in Swedish regarding the Quran burning. The Iranian embassy in Sweden characterized the accusation as “baseless” and as fabricated to “poison” relations between Tehran and Stockholm. For his part, the operational chief of Sweden’s security services (Säpo), Fredrik Hallström, said that the text messages were intended “to paint the picture of Sweden as an Islamophobic country” and “to create division in Swedish society,”

As early as August 2023, Swedish media reported that many people across Sweden had received text messages in Swedish calling for vengeance against those who burned the Quran. According to senior Swedish prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist, the messages were sent by a group that calls itself the Anzu Team. The messages’ content, as broadcast on Sweden’s SVT television network, said that “Those who desecrated the Quran must have their work covered in ashes” and called the Swedes “demons.” The public demonstrations that included Quran burning were covered by freedom of expression as protected under the Swedish constitution and therefore permitted by the police. However, those demonstrations did touch off a storm in the Middle East and brought threats from various sources, including Muslim states, against Sweden and against its citizens.

The storm surrounding the Quran burning began after Rasmus Paludan, a right-wing extremist with Danish and Swedish roots, set fire to a Quran outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm in January 2023, and outside the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen later during the same month. Paludan’s actions were copied by others such as Salwan Momika, an Iraqi refugee in Sweden who had prior connections with Christian militias in Iraq. Momika, demonstrating outside a Stockholm mosque in June 2023 during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha holiday, began setting a Quran afire.

As a result, several Arab countries — including the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia — summoned Swedish diplomatic representatives for reprimands. Iraq went so far as to break off relations with Sweden after a second Quran burning included setting the Iraqi flag on fire as well. In an additional response, crowds of Shiites torched the Swedish embassy in Baghdad. In Iran, the US flag was burned opposite the Swedish embassy and Sweden was warned that it would “suffer consequences.” A spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, summoned the Swedish ambassador for a reprimand and announced: “We strongly condemn the repeated desecration of the Holy Quran … in Sweden, and we hold the Swedish government fully responsible” for events that are “inciting the feelings of Muslims around the world” and for the consequences.

Further to the Iranian reprimand, the Hezbollah organization — a very close proxy of Iran’s — held a demonstration against Sweden in Beirut, in which it brandished a picture of the assassinated commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. In Malmö, Sweden’s third-largest city and home to a large Muslim population, many confrontations broke out as a result of the Quran burning. Many immigrants living in the city’s Rosengård neighborhood threw stones and torched tens of autos in an extremely violent riot. The Quran burnings frightened leaders in Western and Northern Europe. Following the events, the Swedish Prime Minister even added that “We are currently in the most serious security situation since the Second World War,”

In light of the unrest generated by those demonstrations, plus the rage among the Muslim immigrants throughout Sweden, Iran decided to “retaliate” in Sweden by the same method that it has long used against its opponents: intensifying the schisms in the local society. That tactic takes the spreading of the Iranian revolution several steps onward, not only by instigating terror attacks but also by enlarging Iran’s sphere of influence and creating social chaos. First, Iran infiltrates the country’s local Shiite community, if one exists, and then it proceeds into other population sectors or radical elements that can destabilize the country’s government, Iran’s hope being to intensify societal tensions in the case of a western state or to topple the regime in the case of a Mideast state such as Iraq. Spreading disinformation is an established Iranian method of operations in Israel, but now Iran is trying to employ it in countries across the ocean such as the USA, and in European countries such as Sweden.

The Iranians are not only advancing as the main opponent in their rival countries but also advancing against their enemies, or representative offices of their enemies, in third countries — including Israeli missions abroad. Thus, for example, last May the Swedish internal security agency accused Iran of employing criminal organizations in Sweden to attack Israeli or Jewish targets in Swedish territory. Security sources in Sweden confirmed an announcement from the Mossad that the Ayatollahs’ regime was using criminal gangs in European countries, including Sweden and Belgium, to attack Israeli and Jewish targets.

In fact, Iran was behind three unsuccessful attacks against Israeli targets in Sweden and Belgium between January and May 2024. On January 31, a hand grenade was thrown at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. The grenade did not explode. On May 16, shots were fired at the embassy in Stockholm. Subsequently, on May 24, two grenades were thrown at the Israeli embassy in Brussels. Investigation of the incidents revealed that Iran was behind the attacks, having enlisted criminal organizations that, at the same time, were at odds with one another. It appears that even in its relations with criminal organizations, Iran applies a method based on the dynamics between the parties in order to exploit the advantage of one organization over the other or to exploit the rivalry.

The use of criminal organizations for terrorism coincides with Iran’s policy of trying to promote terrorist activity against its enemies without leaving traces of its own involvement. The Iranians fund and direct criminal organizations around Europe just as they fund and direct Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Houthis of Yemen, and others. Iran avoids leaving its national fingerprints, in order to minimize political and legal repercussions that could lead to international sanctions against Tehran.

One of those Swedish criminal organizations is Foxtrot, considered the country’s largest criminal network. Its members have been responsible for many murders and for extensive drug trafficking. The organization’s boss is Rawa Majid, a Swedish citizen of Kurdish origin who is wanted by Interpol and who, on instructions from Iran, instigates attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe. However, a number of young people arrested following the shooting attack at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm were Iranian by background and were connected with the Rumba criminal gang, which is led by Ismail Abdo, a former associate of Majid’s at Foxtrot who is now his greatest rival.

The Ayatollahs’ regime directly threatens Sweden’s national security. Iran spies against Sweden’s industries, research institutes, and universities. Last June a strategic agreement was exposed that enables the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to exploit cooperation between Iranian and Swedish universities in order to advance Iran’s military programs.

That agreement, which until then was unknown to the Swedish authorities, permits the Revolutionary Guards to exploit academic cooperation between Swedish universities and their Iranian counterparts in order to acquire technological knowledge in fields such as UAVs, artificial intelligence, and advanced electronics. There are at least eight Swedish universities with ties to Iranian universities. The agreement threatens the national security not only of Sweden but also of all the other NATO countries. Sweden joined the transatlantic alliance in March 2023, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who for a time had vetoed its membership in the wake of Quran burning and anti-Turkish demonstrations in Stockholm, withdrew his objection. A strategic agreement of this kind serves the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, accentuating the threat of espionage and the infiltration of foreign forces into a NATO country.

Still, the main target of Iranian espionage is the Iranian opposition groups in Sweden. Like other European countries, Sweden has become a base of operations where Iranian agents plan their espionage and their attacks. One example involves Asadollah Asadi, an Iranian diplomat whom a Belgian court sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for terrorism. Asadi, who was third secretary at the Iranian embassy in Austria, was arrested by German security forces on a Bavarian highway in 2018, mere days after passing explosives to two Iranians in Belgium. The explosives were intended for an attack on members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organization — opponents of the Iranian regime — at a rally in Paris where then US Vice President Mike Pence was also in attendance. Although Asadi was posted to Austria and his crime was planned for France, interrogation and confiscated materials showed he was closely connected to Iranian agents in Sweden. The German police confiscated a notebook in which Asadi had recorded 289 sites, in 11 European countries, where he met Iranian agents. Among those countries was Sweden. This proved that the Iranians had active agents there — a fact further emphasized in December 2019 when an Iraqi citizen living in Sweden was convicted of spying for Iran against Iranian exiles who were Swedish residents. In May 2023 Asadi was released in a prisoner swap between Iran and Belgium, in return for Olivier Vandecasteele, a humanitarian worker whom Iran had arrested in 2022.

Europe and the international community must take note of Iran’s behavior, which threatens not only the countries of the Middle East but also those countries of the West that maintain diplomatic ties with Iran. Because of Iran’s extensive network extending into many of the world’s nations, Tehran can enlist local extremist elements or even, if it wishes, local criminal gangs as in the case of Sweden. With its subversion, Iran attempts to deepen the crises and conflicts in many countries, to widen societal rifts in order to topple governments, and to fragment nations. The widening of rifts and disagreements contributes to Iran’s efforts at weakening the West and strengthening its claim that western democracy is fundamentally flawed. The flourishing of local criminal organizations, alongside disinformation campaigns that poison the public discourse, could bring anarchy to the western nations and crumble them from within while the Muslim world grows stronger — with Iran seeing itself as the spearhead leading the Shiite alliance toward a Shiite Islamic hegemony.

The Iranians rule no tactics out. They use various organizations, but in similar methods: exacerbating societal rifts and disagreements, exploiting local groups to advance Iranian interests, using cyber tools to increase Iranian influence, and more. What Iran is doing in Israel, it also does in the western countries. Sweden is a single case among many in which Iran is waging dangerous subversion throughout the West. The Scandinavian countries, and the West in general, must understand that in the face of the Iranian threat, they share an interest with Israel. For a long time now, Iran has been threatening more than just the Middle East. Its subversion has made it a threat to security everywhere in the West.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran’s subversive activity in Sweden הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 5th, during a press conference at Parliament Hill in Ottawa, the UN special rapporteur, Francesca Albanese once again accused Israel of the usual, which means genocide in Gaza, apartheid, atrocities, tortures, occupation, mass arrests and even of executing Palestinian children.

After citing the view of one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party, Antonio Gramsci, regarding the role of financial power in cultural hegemony, she accused the pro-Israel lobbies, quoted as “very vocal, virulent and aggressive”, of pressuring governments to boycott her.

One of the journalists attending the press conference asked her for clarifications, if she really thought that meetings and events were cancelled “because of the pro-Israel groups pressure”.

Albanese replied that she could not tell what the causes behind the withdrawal of the invitations and meetings were and added: “I only know, I mean, I base myself on facts. It happened after pro-Israel groups and pro-Israel individuals started to accuse me of the usual and I won’t repeat the accusations because they are extremely defamatory…”.

She then accused Israel of taking “the land of historical Palestine as it has been doing ever since, even before its existence”.

When asked by one of the reporters if she believed in the right of Israel to exist, Albanese dodged the question by saying:

“Israel does exist, Israel is a recognized member of the UN. Besides this, there is no such thing in international law as the right of a State to exist…It’s not up to us”.

Albanese provided a colorful example saying that “Italy exists, but if tomorrow Italy and France merged and formed “Itafrance”, fine” and she then brought the issue back to “the right of the Palestinians to exist”.

It is worth recalling that on October 14^th 2024, Francesca Albanese, found herself at the center of a media storm after a series of aggressive anti-Israel posts, published in the previous days on her social media accounts, where she compared Israel to Nazi Germany, sparking outrage from several Jewish organizations, including the World Jewish Congress (WJC), which called for her immediate dismissal from the United Nations.

Appointed in May 2022 as special rapporteur, Albanese has used anti-Semitic stereotypes and legitimized support for terrorism in her criticism of Israel. In addition to regularly portraying Israelis as Nazis and reiterating that “Hamas has the right to resist,” since October 7^th , 2023, Albanese has systematically downplayed the atrocities committed by Palestinian terrorists by denying that the pogrom targeted Jews as such and it was rather a consequence of Israel’s aggressions.

Alleged problematic financial issues

Moving to the recent financial controversies, Article 3 of the Special Procedures Code of Conduct expressly forbids Albanese from accepting remuneration from any governmental or nongovernmental source for activities carried out in pursuit of the mandate. In June 2024, UN Watch called for an investigation into Albanese for “illegally requesting payments for work performed in her official UN capacity” over alleged payments for speaking events and honorarium for a fake lecture; specifically, by circumventing this prohibition, by requesting that, in exchange for her lectures, payments by external groups be made to her research assistant.

The following month, the UN launched an investigation into allegations that Albanese illegally accepted funding from the Australian Friends of Palestine Association (AFOPA) and other pro-Pal groups to fund an estimated $20,000 trip to Australia and New Zealand, in which she lobbied a major pension fund to divest from Israel.  Those groups initially stated that they “sponsored” and “supported” her trip, violating the UN’s rules forbidding remuneration from non-governmental sources.

Albanese denied that AFOPA sponsored her trip, claiming that it was funded by the UN. However, the complaint argues that the UN lacks any legal basis to fund trips by its experts beyond their area of investigation.

On July 12^th 2024, the UN Human Rights Office told JNS that the global body paid for the trip. However, these trips did not appear in the mandated UN special procedures annual report because “it was not a designated ‘country visit’ per se.”

“Only official country visits aimed at assessing the human-rights situation in that country itself, and that are followed by a country visit report to the Human Rights Council, are included in this list,” the UNHRO added.

Ideological issues and problematic statements

Going beyond Albanese’s financial controversies, her extreme ideological positions are obvious, and it is not by coincidence that in July 2024 the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, called for Albanese’s removal from the international body:

“There is no place for antisemitism from UN-affiliated officials tasked with promoting human rights. While the United States has never supported Francesca Albanese’s mandate, it is clear she is not fit for this or any position at the UN.”

The statement was posted on X in reaction to Albanese’s post comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler.

United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Michele Taylor tweeted: “Special rapporteurs should be striving to improve human rights challenges, not employing dehumanizing rhetoric.”

The French representative to the UN called for her immediate dismissal and a thorough investigation into the influences to which she was potentially subjected, arguing that Albanese: “By comparing the defensive operations of Israel – at war for its own survival after the pogroms of 7 October – to the expansion of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, she has crossed a new red line. Her violently anti-Israel and anti-Semitic statements, which have been spreading for years, seriously damage the credibility of our international organizations.”

The German representative, for his part, said that Albanese’s remarks were “a disgrace” and that it was “appalling” that the Special Rapporteur appeared to “justify the horrific terrorist attacks and ‘deny their anti-Semitic nature’.”

Albanese is the first special rapporteur to be condemned by Germany and France for anti-Semitism. Indeed, she replied that “the US, Germany and France are clearly involved and supporting what Israel is doing”.

Before her 2022 UN appointment, Albanese had said that Israel was “keeping captive millions of civilians,”; she organized a panel on “Israel Apartheid,” she campaigned for an arms embargo against Israel and argued that the “Jewish lobby” was in full control of the United States.

After the outbreak of war in the Middle East, Albanese went so far as to deny that the Hamas massacre of October 7th was anti-Semitic: “the worst anti-Semitic massacre of the century? No, Mr. President. The victims of 7/10 were killed not because of their Judaism, but in response to Israel’s oppression.”

These comments prompted the International Legal Forum, a body of more than 4,000 lawyers, to address a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, in February to be the first to call for Albanese’s resignation.

Nevertheless, Albanese continued her anti-Semitic propaganda, voicing her support on X for a post published by human rights official Craig Mokhiber in which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was compared to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler: “That’s exactly what I think.”

In November 2023, in a speech to the National Press Club in Canberra, Australia, Albanese said that Israel cannot claim the right of “self-defense” under international law because Gaza is a territory which it occupies. The statement caused the immediate reaction of the Director of Touro Institute of Human Rights and the Holocaust, Anne Bayefsky, who slammed Albanese’s comments, saying they go “hand-in-hand with all her other legally indefensible claims” regarding the conflict.

In August 2024 Albanese once again denied Israel’s right to self-defense citing the West Bank “occupation” and the “unlawful use of force” in one of her tweets. On another occasion, she even admitted that her personal views on the Palestinian issue could compromise her objectivity.

In addition, Francesca Albanese also omitted the fact that her husband, Massimiliano Calì, worked as an economic advisor for the Palestinian Authority and authored a report entitled “The economic costs of Israeli occupation for the Palestinian occupied territories”.

Why didn’t the UNHRC properly scrutinize her background before hiring her?

Albanese’s anti-Israel propaganda in Italy

While maintaining her position as UN special rapporteur, Albanese was busy spreading anti-Israel propaganda on the Italian media.

On September 11^th 2024, Francesca Albanese was hosted on Alessandro Di Battista’s YouTube channel where she once again accused Israel of “genocide”, of dropping the equivalent of “5 nuclear bombs” in Gaza and claimed that the destruction caused by Israel on Gaza is greater than the one occurred during World War 2, citing Japan and Germany.

Di Battista, on his behalf, stated that Israeli settlers are “fundamentalists who believe that only the creation of a Great Israel can bring to the return of the Messiah” and defined them as “the new Ku Klux Klan…because they behave in the exact same way”.  On this occasion, Albanese once again denied that Hamas slaughtered Israeli children and perpetrated mass rapes, stating that they were “fabricated”.  This is just part of the 58-minute-long video where other concerning statements were made by the two.

Di Battista is well known within the Italian pro-Pal area. A former 5 Star Movement MP, he was exposed on several occasions by the Italian press for being close to Mohammad Hannoun, the Genoa-based Palestinian architect who was recently sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for being a member of Hamas and for collecting and sending funds to the Palestinian terrorist organization. According to the United States, Hannoun has solicited funding for Hamas with senior Hamas officials and sent at least $4 million to Hamas over a 10-year period. Di Battista also traveled with Hannoun to Lebanon, taking part in the architect’s “humanitarian” activity, and spent time in Iran in 2020.

Francesca Albanese has also been invited several times to the Italian TV show “Piazza Pulita” on the LA7 channel where she called for “immediate sanctions against Israel” and she accused Israel of not being a democracy because of the “mistreatment of minorities” and of ruling the West Bank through a “military dictatorship”.

In May 2023, Albanese was interviewed by the HRCM MA director of the already cited Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, for the Peacekeeping International Day, where she once again attacked the “Israeli military presence in the occupied territories aimed at protecting the colonial presence”.

In January 2024, Albanese’s husband used his Facebook account to publicly accuse the Italian Democratic Party of silencing a “sacrosanct debate on the extermination Israel is committing in Palestine, to continue protecting the egregious violations of international law of a criminal state”.

In March 2024, Albanese stated that “the Italian government should sanction Israel” and in May of the same year she gave a long interview to the Italian Communist newspaper “Il Manifesto”, where she once again attacked the Jewish state claiming that “Israel did not want to stop its Gaza operations and accept a truce because it was afraid to see what it had done there”. Among other things, she also accused Israel of immediately striking places of Palestinian identity: churches, mosques, cultural centers, universities, instead of military targets.

UN at its lowest in history

All this can be classified as the activity of a propagandist, a militant, and very far from the necessary impartiality and moderation of a special rapporteur. Overall, the extensive work provided by UN Watch will further compromise Albanese’s position as rapporteur and the UN for having appointed her regardless of her views and propaganda activity.

It is also worth pointing out that Rep. Andre Carson (D-IN) had invited Francesca Albanese to Capitol Hill to brief congressional staff at the end of October 2024, but later canceled the event.

One cannot help but wonder how the situation got to this point. UNRWA working as a front for Hamas in Gaza; the UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres, lamenting the elimination of Hamas terrorist and Nukhba commander Mohammad Abu Ittiwi, cited as “UNRWA colleague”; the UNIFIL-Hezbollah scandal and, last but not least, Albanese’s appointment as special rapporteur regardless of her propaganda and networking and activity. This is indeed the darkest time for the UN since its formation in 1945, after World War 2.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Francesca Albanese is at it again and laments “persecution” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Following the Syrian rebels’ takeover of Damascus and approximately 70% of the country’s territory, rebel leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani is striving to establish a new regime in Syria to replace that of Bashar al-Assad’s. The fragile situation in Syria has become a source of deep concern for many nations — including Israel, the United States, Russia, and Turkey, all of which are closely monitoring developments. The primary fear is that these recent changes may lead to a power vacuum in Syria, providing jihadist organizations with fertile ground.

Over the past two weeks, al-Julani has sought to convey a message of moderation to the West, presenting himself in what could be described as a “softer version” in order to improve the image of his group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, his jihadist fighters project a far more uncompromising stance.

This week, jihadist rebels released a video on social media declaring that after victory in Damascus and the rest of Syria, they will “liberate and conquer Jerusalem and its Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as the Kaaba in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.”

The rebels’ bold statements follow the United Kingdom’s announcement that it is reconsidering its designation of HTS as a banned organization, and word from the U.S. government that it may be ceasing to list HTS as a terrorist organizations.

These responses from the U.S. and the U.K. exemplify typical Western naivety in the face of the new situation in Syria. It appears the West has again failed to learn from history, as previously in its dealings with Osama bin Laden, with al-Qaeda, and with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In contrast, al-Julani seems to have learned from the mistakes of major jihadists who came before him, such as bin Laden of al-Qaeda and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS. Al-Julani represents a more modern and sophisticated version of these figures, learning from history and trying not to repeat their errors. Knowing his Islamist roots, could the West truly be so naïve?

A quintessential example of this western perspective can be found in the American intelligence assessments. According to U.S. intelligence, Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS, underwent significant transformation, distancing itself from ties with ISIS and becoming independent from al-Qaeda. Furthermore, American intelligence asserts that al-Julani is energetically working to improve HTS’s image and purging the organization of its more extreme elements.

The American opinion notwithstanding, al-Julani’s actions should be assessed from outside the typical Western perspective. One example of how different the facts are is his visit to the great Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. His triumphant arrival and worship there send his followers a clear message about his and his jihadist fighters’ agenda:

The conquest of Damascus, and worship in the Umayyad Mosque alongside the mausoleum of Salah ad-Din, who was one of Islam’s most renowned military leaders, speaks for itself. It is a symbol with an obvious meaning — true not to how al-Julani seeks to display himself in the western media, but to what his fighters proclaim.

Given the West’s misguided outlook, the Syrian case may turn out to replicate the scenario of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban group promised to adopt a more moderate policy. once it had captured Kabul, in 2021, but in practice, it imposed severe restrictions on women and strictly enforced Sharia law in all aspects of governance.

Moreover, ISIS has a presence in Syria as it had in Afghanistan — a lower-profile presence now for that jihadist organization, but a presence nonetheless. Despite its frictions with HTS and other factions, ISIS could exploit another such power vacuum to expand its foothold in Syria. In fact, this week ISIS reported executing 54 of Assad’s soldiers whom it captured as they attempted to flee Syria.

Thus a power vacuum in Syria could lead to the emergence of a “new Afghanistan” on Israel’s border—a scenario that may afford ISIS a resurgence like the one that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, after which ISIS–Khorasan Province became the group’s most lethal branch.

Such a scenario could intensify competition between ISIS and other jihadist factions and particularly against HTS, which is poised to form the foundation of Syria’s new government. Even more dangerously, a government with roots in a jihadist movement would rule Syria in accordance with jihadist ideology and policies.

It is worth noting that HTS also expressed support for the October 7 attacks. If it consolidates itself and achieves dominance across the border from Israel, it will dramatically increase the Syrian threat and heighten the likelihood of a similar attack — an assault like that of October 7, but this time targeting Israeli communities in the Golan Heights.

The article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Is Syria the New Afghanistan? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As we count the days until the inauguration of President-Elect Donald Trump, we should devote careful thought to Israel’s future relations with the new administration and to attaining Israel’s long-standing strategic objectives.

The president-elect describes his personal approach, as follows: “In my life, there are two things I’ve found I’m very good at: overcoming obstacles and motivating good people to do their best work. One of the challenges ahead is how to use those skills as successfully in the service of others as I’ve done, up to now, on my own behalf.” Trump made this statement in 1977, in his best-seller, The Art of the Deal. At the end of 2024, it is clear that he has remained consistent throughout his election campaign and in his choice of nominees for the new cabinet.

Furthermore, as far as Israel is concerned, we must recall President Trump’s past accomplishments. He kept his promise and moved the American embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and sponsored the Abraham Accords. As a leader and entrepreneur, he is accustomed to thinking big, on a large and ambitious scale. For example, his vision includes the rebuilding of American industry, the exploration of space and space travel.

What does this mean for the Jewish State and its strategic needs? According to the fifteenth-century Florentine political thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli, one should ask powerful men for big things, because it is just as easy for them to grant large requests as small ones.

An episode in our history proves this point, namely, the meeting on March 18, 1948 between President Harry S. Truman and Dr. Chaim Weizmann. President Truman’s grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, tells the story, as follows: “…. On May 14, 1948, President Harry S. Truman made one of the most momentous decisions of his presidency: recognizing the new state of Israel just minutes after its founding. My grandfather is justly celebrated for providing the legitimacy this nascent democracy required to survive, but his WWI buddy and former business partner, Eddie Jacobson, deserves credit, as well. This installment of ‘First Family Stories’ is dedicated to a friendship that changed the world.”

It is well known that President Truman overcame both the opposition of Secretary of State George Marshall and the long-standing hostility of the American foreign policy establishment. Over the years, such attitudes have persisted. Most recently, the Obama/Biden foreign policy, while nominally positive toward Israel, has been ambivalent and, on occasion, downright nasty.

A recent example was President Biden’s arm twisting of

Israel to end the Hamas war by accepting a ceasefire and a compromise, which drew a false equivalence between a terrorist aggressor that had launched a war against a legitimate state and an American ally.

On July 24, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker of the House Mike Johnson of Louisiana. On the following day [July 25], the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Biden ended in a bust up. The President warned Netanyahu that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!”

From a historical perspective, this type of episode was not an isolated occurrence. American policy makers have frequently misunderstood the ways of our region and, consequently, have made costly mistakes that have harmed their own interests as well as those of Israel.

II.

The careful study of our past, particularly the Israeli decision-making process before the Six-Day War, provides valuable insights for the present and the future. The late Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto (1926-2015) was Chief of Planning and Operational Requirements of the Israel Airforce (IAF) prior to the Six-Day War (1967) and a well-informed insider. Several years before the Six-Day War, he visited France, which supplied Israel with Mirage jet fighters. On one of his visits, his colleagues discreetly informed him that the French government planned to end its special relationship with Israel. Subsequently, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol authorized Tsiddon-Chatto to negotiate Israel’s first purchase of an American light attack aircraft, the A4 Skyhawk, manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. Furthermore, it was Tsiddon-Chatto who discovered the American spy-ship, USS Liberty, standing still in the Mediterranean off Sinai during the Six-Day War.

As a military strategist, Tsiddon-Chatto made several basic observations: 1) America failed to distinguish between its friends and its enemies; 2) America refused to let Israel win a war; 3) When writing about pro-active defense and the decision in June 1967 to preempt the war, he emphasized the crucial importance of the dimension of time.

While the circumstances have changed over the past decades, Tsiddon-Chatto’s description of Israel’s situation is timely, as for example, President Biden’s forceful demand of July 25, 2024, that Prime Minister Netanyahu accept a ceasefire in Gaza instead of a decisive victory.

His statements have been gently edited as follows:

…. Since the ‘Czech arms deal’ of 1955, and the Soviet position [of] consolidation in the ME following the Eisenhower / Dulles handling [of] the Anglo-French in the Suez Crisis of 56/7, there was no question in the ME who is on the US and who on the Soviet side. The US seemed to be the only ones oblivious of reality, thus unwittingly reinforcing Soviet penetration in the ME. Moreover, the US, which related to Israel as if it were a millstone on its neck until the Six Day War … [The Americans] “discovered” only as a result of this war that Israel is the major regional power, unconditionally pro-US, and an inexhaustible source of intelligence on Soviet assets, captured in large numbers and handed over. [Author’s bold].

Tsiddon-Chatto had a basic complaint regarding American policy toward Israel, namely, that the U.S. consistently prevented Israel from achieving a decisive victory on the battlefield in order “to placate Arabia which, as it proves since 9/11, is implacable…. It should make sense to see the US picture of Vietnam and [the] ME as just two interacting sectors of the Cold War. There is abundant evidence to prove this, and that the US has, and probably is to this day, misunderstanding the Arab manipulative ways.”

Writing in general terms about the task of the strategist, Yoash describes his methodology and then emphasizes the dimension of time as the most important factor in the decision to preempt a war:

Planning must relate to all possible scenarios. The plan … must respond to the scenarios [which have] the highest probability of materializing, while assuring a response to the most pessimistic scenarios.

The dimension of time is a matter of decisive importance. If the threat increases and becomes more acute with time, it means that the danger grows every day, and it is possible that there will be a time when our weakness will compel us to take the initiative to the point of a preemptive strike, even if the preparations for war have not been completed. (Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Be-Yom, be-Lail be-Arafel [By Day, By Night, through Haze and Fog] (Jerusalem: Keterpress, 1995, in Hebrew): 306.

Tsiddon-Chatto describes the public mood in Israel at the end of May 1967, during the days prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. The Egyptian army was waiting on Israel’s border and the civilian reserves had been mobilized. This state of affairs could not be maintained for too long and paralyzed Israel’s economy. Thus, the dimension of time became the key variable in the equation: “… Were the Arab Coalition to open hostilities first, using their much superior air forces in the way we foresaw, the State of Israel would have ceased to exist….”

It is not well known that, at this critical moment, the U.S. vigorously opposed a pre-emptive strike. (See [Meir] Amit’s report of his meeting of May 25, 1967, with [John] Hadden, the CIA man in Israel. (Rosh be-Rosh (Head On), [Or Yehuda: Hed Arzi, 1999, Hebrew]: 235).

Meir Amit, Director of the Mossad, gives the real backstory of this episode. He wrote that a “tough conversation” took place at midnight in his home. [Also present were Efraim Halevy, a senior member of the Mossad, and Brigadier General David Carmon, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence.] There was shouting, and even shots of whisky did not calm the tense atmosphere. Amit tried hard to convince Hadden that the situation was really critical and that Israel would have to act as soon as possible. But Hadden threatened that if Israel pre-empted the war, America would send forces to fight on the Egyptian side. He held the firm conviction that we had to wait and warned: “Don’t create a situation in which we will be forced to go against you.”

Meir Amit describes how his urgent mission to Washington ultimately resulted in the decision of the government to pre-empt the war:

On the morning of May 29, we gathered [as we did] every day in the office of Eshkol to discuss the ongoing situation. Abba Eban participated at this meeting; as well as the Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Yaakov Herzog; the Head of Military Intelligence, General Aharon Yariv; and I. All of us had the feeling that things had gone too far, and it was necessary to do something to break the stalemate in which we were stuck. During this discussion, the head of military intelligence proposed that the head of the Mossad go to Washington immediately in order to bring us a reliable picture of what is going on.

‘Meir,’ Areleh [Aharon Yariv] said: ‘You are a member of the household there. Dick Helms, Head of the CIA is a personal friend of yours. In an informal chat, you will be able to hear directly from him what is really happening.’ (Amit, 237).

When he arrived in Washington, Amit discovered that his professional colleagues were understanding and well disposed. Meeting with Richard Helms, he learned that his assessment of the facts coincided with those of the CIA. Helms arranged an appointment for Meir Amit with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who grasped the situation immediately and made an important recommendation.

During this meeting, McNamara received two phone calls from President Johnson, asking to be updated on these talks. At a certain point, Amit asked the Secretary of Defense for advice:

‘What should I do now? Wait here a day of two?’

‘He cut me short with a brief sentence, “Go home, your place is there now.”’

Amit learned that America had no intention to help and concluded that time was against Israel. He recommended that Israel open hostilities immediately. (Amit, 241).

Amit added a most important fact — that precisely during the time he was in Washington, it became known that President Johnson received a message from former President Eisenhower reminding him that the Americans had a moral obligation to Israel which was given at the time of its withdrawal from Sinai in 1957. The Americans had undertaken to preserve the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and to assure freedom of navigation through the Straits of Eilat. (Amit, 242).

III.

As we look forward, it is possible to make several cautious predictions based upon past history and recent experience. We can return to the stated preferences of President-Elect Donald Trump and take note of his choices. Frequently, there is a link between domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, we may try to understand the outlook and policy goals of the new administration, and, at the same time, consider some recent changes in Israel’s defense policy.

As he has proclaimed, Donald Trump’s big idea is to “Make America Great Again.” Interestingly, his model has been the promising economic reform program of Javier Milei, President of Argentina. One of Milei’s innovations was to launch a Ministry of Deregulation, an idea which Trump adopted enthusiastically. His new approach embodies the rejection of the hard-left policies of the Obama/Biden administrations. Among his policies are: achieving American energy independence; rebuilding American industry; ending unrestricted immigration; and fighting rampant crime. It is a matter of record that Trump plans to end the Obama/Biden policy toward Iran, which had been consistently lenient and uncritical. It would be reasonable to expect that the new administration would continue some of the policies in our region and expand the framework of the Abraham Accords.

After the Hamas invasion and atrocities of October 7, 2023 and the war which followed, it is clear that Israel will have to be prepared to defend itself on its own and invest in its armaments industry. The entire situation has been transformed by the fact that war has been forced on Israel as an unavoidable policy option, that is, “diplomacy by other means.” This implies a change of approach. Israel must defend itself proactively, as was the case with the recent initiatives in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out that the United States could change its policy and help Israel decisively win this war (in which America has a vital interest).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel and the Second Trump Presidency: The Long Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Major (res.) Yossi Levi testifies that he has been an Israeli for 15 years. As far as he is concerned, this count of “national years” began the day he enlisted in the IDF. “Before I joined the army, I identified exclusively as ultra-Orthodox,” he says. “To me, concepts such as ‘Israeli’ or ‘Zionist’ belonged purely to the secular world and were strictly off-limits. There was nothing to talk about serving in the IDF at all – it was completely not in my plans. But today I can say with all my heart that the decision to enlist was the best step I took in my life.”

First of all, a security imperative: the importance of enlisting ultra-Orthodox in the IDF

Yossi practically stumbled on his enlistment. Exactly at a time when he was beginning to feel that studying in yeshivot (religious colleges) did not allow him to reach his full potential, he met a recruit from the Netzah Yehuda battalion, and was persuaded to give the military option a chance. Once in the army, he began climbing the ranks, reaching command and officer positions. Today, he is an infantry officer in active reserve duty. Levi is about to complete the battalion commander program, after which he is expected to attain the rank of lieutenant colonel and be given the command over a combat reserve battalion. At the same time, he serves as the Director General of Netzah Yehuda, an NGO that is dedicated to the support of ultra-Orthodox soldiers serving in the IDF, and helps ultra-Orthodox who have completed their service integrate into civil society.

As one who has served in the IDF for many years, and is even authoring a doctorate on ultra-Orthodox conscription, he can attest to the fact that the army provides young ultra-Orthodox with important tools for life – from instilling values such as work ethics and personal responsibility, to professional knowledge and practical experience. It is equally clear to him that the army has also benefited greatly from the integration of ultra-Orthodox into its ranks, especially in the current period in which the shortage of combat personnel has become a major security issue.

“The integration of the ultra-Orthodox into the IDF has two chief aspects: social and security,” he explains. “In recent years, the IDF has been mustering out many units, scaling down its manpower, and it has become very difficult to advocate security demands. There was a sense that there is really no operational justification for the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox, and the demand thereof stems mainly from the desire to establish a more egalitarian society. All of this was true until the Gaza War. Today, every member of the ultra-Orthodox community understands all too well that there is a significant need to boost the IDF’s rank and file, and that this is a national imperative of the highest order. This doesn’t mean there can be an en mass enlistment of the ultra-Orthodox, but they do understand that this is a real security demand, which is something that couldn’t really be argued before the war.”

Kashrut is just an excuse: the barriers that turn the ultra-Orthodox against conscription

Maj. (res.) Yossi Levi’s claims indicate that, for the most part, the ultra-Orthodox community understands the importance of the military service, but nevertheless, there are various obstacles to the expansion of conscription to this sector.

According to Levi, one of the main obstacles is related to the manner in which the discourse on ultra-Orthodox conscription is conducted. “The current public discourse on the subject is such that does not understand the intricacies of ultra-Orthodox society,” Levi states. “This is especially evident when we talk about equality. Israelis think that this is a universal value, but this value is simply irrelevant in ultra-Orthodox society. This is a society that is not governed by the value of equality – not between men and women, or between rabbi and student – so it was never a notion that we had to uphold. Therefore, when you mention to the ultra-Orthodox the need of ‘sharing the burden,’ it only deters them. Similarly, it is also incorrect to talk to them about the importance of protecting the State of Israel, because they do not see themselves as part of the State to begin with. On the other hand, if we talk to them about the importance of protecting the people of Israel – this is something they can get behind.”

Another major obstacle, according to Levi, is the fear of losing the ultra-Orthodox identity. “The biggest fear is that young people will adopt secular or Western values, and replace their ultra-Orthodox identity with an Israeli identity,” he explains. “You have to understand that the ultra-Orthodox see themselves as the keepers of the flame. As far as they are concerned, the overall purpose of the Jewish people is to preserve tradition down the generation line, and this is done with the help of those who dedicate their lives to the study of Torah. In the ultra-Orthodox view, in order to keep the flame burning, we must first keep the young people within the sector, and that is why we are so afraid of dropping out of religion. When we see the various sectors, such as the national religious or the national ultra-Orthodox, which are more involved in general society, we see that dropout rates among the ultra-Orthodox are indeed the lowest. The conclusion that many draw from this is that in order to preserve tradition, one must distance oneself from any external influence, and this is one of the reasons for the strong objection to enlistment in the IDF.”

Another barrier concerns the negative attitude that has become entrenched in ultra-Orthodox society toward enlistment in the IDF, so much so that oftentimes even when a young ultra-Orthodox man does wish to enlist, he will not do so simply because he fears repercussions – excommunication for one – from the Ultra-Orthodox society and even his family. “When you grow up in ultra-Orthodox society, you are instilled with one central value: the study of Torah,” Levi explains. “As far as the ultra-Orthodox community is concerned, anyone who doesn’t study Torah is second class members of the community. One of our struggles is to turn ultra-Orthodox soldiers into ‘first class’ members. The way to do this is only by expanding the number of ultra-Orthodox soldiers. This will normalize military service and turn it into a matter that is not only legitimate but even appreciated. If today only about 1,000 ultra-Orthodox men enlist each year, it means that the average ultra-Orthodox person knows perhaps one soldier, and probably not someone close. On the other hand, if we succeed in recruiting even just a third of the ultra-Orthodox population that is eligible for enlistment, this will mean that every ultra-Orthodox home will have a soldier. When that happens, the entire attitude in the ultra-Orthodox society toward soldiers will change, and we will see both an increase in enlistment and a decrease in the unfortunate phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox soldiers becoming excommunicated.”

What about objective obstacles such as the need to observe the kashrut laws or separation of men and women?

“People tend to think that these are the reasons that deter the ultra-Orthodox from enlisting, but that’s not really the case. Let’s start with kashrut (Jewish Orthodox dietary laws) – all units in the army maintain kashrut, and units designated for ultra-Orthodox maintain strict (Mehadrin) kashrut at the most exacting levels, so, for the most part, there really shouldn’t be a problem. Regarding gender separation – it is indeed a complex issue because an ultra-Orthodox Jew will not serve in a place where women serve. However, there are units that are designated for men only, so this should not constitute a problem either. When we examine all these excuses in depth, we see that they can all be shelved. The ultra-Orthodox can and should serve, but the army, for its part, is obligated to provide them with all the necessary accommodations.”

Such as?

“We insist on five main principles: Mehadrin (strict) kashrut, gender separation, prayer time, study time and an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle – that is, a non-explicit environment, devoid of topics of conversation that are considered inappropriate in the ultra-Orthodox culture. In order for an ultra-Orthodox to feel comfortable in the IDF, he has to receive this whole package.”

Can these adjustments hurt other demographics that serve in the army, namely women?

“The IDF is the largest organization in Israel, with the ability to make adjustments to one sector without infringing the rights of another. That is why we encourage the establishment of dedicated homogeneous ultra-Orthodox units. There is a tendency to see sectoral and single-gender units as a negative thing, but in practice, such units allow the ultra-Orthodox to integrate into the army without causing the exclusion of other serving populations.”

The goal: the recruitment of 22,000 ultra-Orthodox

Recently, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement published Plan 8000 – a proposal for the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox society in the security service. This plan addresses the need to recruit 8,000 ultra-Orthodox men to serve in the IDF, the police and additional security bodies as early as the upcoming year. To implement this, the IDSF offers four main service programs: service in the IDF, service in the Israel Police or Border Patrol, service in the search and rescue forces, and service in the armaments industry.

Maj. (res.) Yossi Levi had read the plan in depth and supports most of the points it touches upon, but he also has some reservations – the first relates to the number of ultra-Orthodox soldiers that must be recruited. “Security experts are talking about 8,000 soldiers, I’m talking about 22,000,” he says. “Today, there are 66,000 ultra-Orthodox men aged 18-24 who do not serve in the IDF, and at least a third of them are suitable for enlistment even in the eyes of the great leaders of the Orthodox communities, and that third is the target audience as far as I’m concerned.”

In Levi’s opinion, one way to encourage ultra-Orthodox recruitment is to expand the IDF’s service offerings. This understanding is also at the basis of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s proposal, Thus, each of the recruitment tracks presented in the proposal also includes several sub-tracks. The IDF enlistment program for ultra-Orthodox men, for example, includes designated combat units such as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion. In addition, it was suggested to establish the first ultra-Orthodox brigade that would operate as a dedicated security force along the Seam Line – the security separation zone between Palestinian and Jewish population areas in the Jordan Valley and Judea and Samaria. “Such a border enforcing division offers two main advantages,” Yossi Levi elaborates. “First of all, it allows for a softer integration into the IDF, because the operational training there can be shorter and less taxing physically. Beyond that, an important matter of perception figures into this option – ultra-Orthodox Jews who serve in the Jordan Valley or Judea and Samaria will de facto be protecting their home because many of them live in the area, and that alone connects them emotionally to the mission.”

Another sub-track proposed for the IDF Ultra-Orthodox enlistment plan is service options in the Home-Front forces, in a format of staggered weeks of service and religious studies. According to Levi, this idea is actually not very advisable simply because a week-long absence from military duty might compromise continuity and performance. As far as he is concerned, the preferred alternative is to allow a format of half a day of service and a half-day of study. “This format,” he explains, “can allow the soldiers to still get a lot of study time, while at the same time – remain in the system and maintain continuity of service.”

Another proposal included in Plan 8000 is the recruitment of Ultra-Orthodox into Israel Police, Border Police or the National Guard. According to Yossi Levi, the great advantage of this track lies in the fact that many ultra-Orthodox communities hold a better opinion of the civilian enforcement forces than the IDF, hence, integration in those forces could be more comfortable for some ultra-Orthodox.

Similarly, he supports a recruitment initiative of ultra-Orthodox men to munitions factories that are expected to be built as part of the lessons of the Gaza War. According to Levi, such a service will both connect the ultra-Orthodox to operational activity while enabling them to acquire a profession. His hope is that this kind of service will be done in uniform, in order to normalize the use of uniforms in ultra-Orthodox society.

The only track in the 8000 plan that Yossi Levi has reservations about is the recruitment track for rescue organizations the likes of as ZAKA disaster response search and rescue NGO and United Hatzala emergency medical response NGO. In his view, this volunteering is welcome and worthy of recognition, but it cannot be an alternative to military service. According to Levi, young people up to the age of 22 should enlist in a security body such as the IDF or the police, and perform full-time service there. However, since ultra-Orthodox Jews who have already passed this age will probably not enlist at all, he agrees that they could be appropriate candidates for recognized national service in one of the rescue organizations.

Beyond the public discourse: Conscription of Ultra-Orthodox in practice

Major Levi has been active in the military system for a decade and a half. Over the years, he has seen the issue of the integration of the ultra-Orthodox into the IDF take form – not only in public discourse but also on the ground. His conclusion is that it is possible – and indeed necessary – to integrate ultra-Orthodox into the IDF, and that such a move – if done correctly – could contribute to both the state and ultra-Orthodox society.

In order to promote the enlistment of ultra-Orthodox men in the IDF, or any other national security service, Yossi Levi emphasizes the need for an authorized civilian body to oversee the process. “The army is constantly changing and there is a high churn rate of commanders, so you can’t rely on the IDF alone to upkeep the know-how and maintain the processes,” he explains. “In order to carry out long-term support for ultra-Orthodox recruitment, you need a civilian body that knows that society from the inside out, and can provide support to ultra-Orthodox soldiers even after their discharge.”

Another conclusion Levi had drawn from his many years of enterprise is that in ultra-Orthodox society, there is no second chance. “When establishing a conscription program for the ultra-Orthodox, it is very important that it be perceived from the onset as a program that is tailored to the specific needs of the ultra-Orthodox way of life, such that allows them to preserve their religious identity,” he explains. “If we succeed in correctly branding the program from the very beginning, and establish trust with the ultra-Orthodox community, that’s where our victory will lie.”

הפוסט The Notion of Equality is Irrelevant”: Netzah Yehuda Director General Yossi Levi Believes Ultra-Orthodox Can be Conscripted הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Yesterday, the Syrian state founded in 1946 ceased to exist. This is the downfall not only of the Assad regime but of the state of Syria as a political framework that can impose order and structure. In this connection, it must be noted that the collapse of Syria, and of its Assad regime, is part of the same regional upheaval that began in 2010 and that has, in fact, not yet ended.

Since 2010, the Middle East has undergone a transformation out of the modern era where the region was organized under the “logic” of states as political frameworks. It has reverted to the pre-modern era of a different “logic” where the region is defined by communities, ethnic groups, transnational structures, and borderless ideologies.

With the developments in Syria, the Middle East is currently continuing a sort of backslide into the pre-nationalist, pre-modern era. In a way, this can be seen as a kind of revenge by the East against the West. The East is breaking away from the foundations of modernism and nationalism that the Europe of the late 19th century and early 20th century forced on it.

But the breakaway and the reversion to pre-nationalism are far from enough for the Middle East. Accompanying the breakaway process, it must be noted, is a quiet, creeping conquest of Western Europe by the pre-modern East through various agents — primarily through immigrant groups who never abandoned the ideological beliefs that they brought from the East and who are undermining the foundations of the modern, European-style order.

It may be said in general that the Middle East now speaks in a neo-olden language of politics and culture — one that is new in that it overrides its previous, European-made nationalist-modernist predecessor but is old in that it connects to the foundations of pre-modern political culture. The message is very difficult to define in simplistic terms of the positive and the negative.

From this standpoint, it must be granted that in the Middle East’s internal power struggle, the Shiite “Axis of Resistance” has suffered a critical blow. To that extent, Israel can claim a significant victory in this year’s battle against that axis’s representatives and proxies. But on the other hand, the collapse of Syria, and of the Assad regime, contains the seeds of a new Mideast reality full of dangers and complexities.

This reality has two immediate implications. The first concerns the situation in Syria, which is no longer Syria as we once knew it. At this stage, it is difficult to define the emerging new entity, which is evolving into a mix of sectarian power centers (Kurds, Druze, Alawites), transnational jihadist power hubs driven by an anti-Israel worldview no less than an anti-regime one, and the presence of actors like Turkey, whose transnational agenda is not far removed from that of Iran.

Practically speaking, the entire system of arrangements on the ground — as worked out between Israel and Syria after the war of 1973 and based on the logic of arrangements between states — is thus called into question and is little protected from those sources of power that do not at all think in terms of the “borders” that characterize a state. Consequently Israel must define red lines of its own befitting the situation, and strive especially to set up an iron wall preventing the “little jihad” against the Assad regime from turning into the “great jihad” against Israel.

But the second immediate ramification, which is even more significant, has to do with Iran — which has lost its Shiite axis, or at least two elements of it (Hamas and Hezbollah). Iran is at a strategic crossroads. It may be pushed into crossing the nuclear threshold in a sort of tit for tat, even before the US president-elect enters office. That move would leave little sand in the hourglass for an Israeli reaction against the prospect of an “Iranian Auschwitz.”

From that standpoint, Israel may possibly be said in general terms to be entering the third stage of its current war in the Middle East. The first stage was the illusory stage between May 2021 (Operation Guardian of the Walls) and October 7, 2023. The second stage proceeded intensively from October 7, 2023, into December 2024. But now Israel is entering the third stage of the war. In the shadow of a changing Mideast reality, Israel faces both veteran players — such as Iran, where the systems of ideology are eroding; and Turkey, which is turning from a shadowy enemy into a much more significant threat — and other players who are newcomers as Israel’s neighbors to the north.

But it is impossible to conclude without one important remark regarding Israel’s domestic arena. The currents of the Middle East have not bypassed Israel. Israel is part of the enormous process that the Middle East has experienced since 2010. In recent years it has also begun to budge away from its clearly state-centered foundations toward definitions of identity based on tribes and communities (haredi, secular, religious Zionist, Arab, and more) who, in their way, are battling for power.

The statehood concept championed by Ben-Gurion, which relied on elements such as the centralization of governmental power, the establishment of a politically neutral civil service, defined rules of governance, and respect for political authority, is undergoing significant erosion. This process is approaching a state akin to an undeclared civil war. So Israel must not only re-establish and rebuild the boundaries between itself and its obvious external enemies, but must also establish the political and cultural boundary between itself and the Middle East in order not to descend to the same condition in which the Middle East as a whole is thickly stewing.

This article was originally published in  Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Assad Regime Fell: Israel is Heading Toward a Third Campaign? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The situation in Syria over the past decade has been characterized by significant regional and international interventions, which have played decisive roles in shaping the current map. The “Arab Spring”, which began in late 2010, initially promised democratic reforms across the Middle East, but met with fierce opposition in Syria. There, the Assad regime, with the support of Iran, Russia, and Shiite proxies, managed to maintain its power despite widespread resistance and a significant number of casualties.

Iran’s involvement in Syria has been presented as a defense strategy against extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, which Tehran views as direct threats to its national security. This intervention was part of a broader regional strategy by Iran, often described as its own “war on terror.” The stabilization of the Assad regime, which depends to a large extent on Iranian and Russian support, has come at a considerable cost, both in human and economic terms. However, this stability was fragile, dependent on the continued presence and support of these foreign powers.

Recent regional developments have further complicated the situation in Syria. Russia’s military focus has changed significantly due to its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which has reduced its ability to maintain the same level of involvement in Syria. At the same time, Hezbollah, a decisive Iranian proxy actor, suffered significant losses due to Israeli military operations during 2024. These factors weakened the basic pillars of Assad’s stability, creating a vacuum that rebel groups in Syria were quick to exploit.

The resumption of rebel activity, especially in the ‘Idlib’ province, highlights the fragility of the current stability in Syria. The rapid collapse of the Syrian army in response to these attacks highlights the ongoing vulnerabilities in the regime’s military infrastructure. This instability has inevitably led to increased Iranian and Russian involvement, as they seek to re-establish their influence and restore a semblance of control.

The geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey further complicates the situation in Syria. The two countries have pursued different strategies, often finding themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. While Iran has focused on supporting the Assad regime, Turkey has conducted a number of military operations in northern Syria, ostensibly to combat cross-border terrorism, but has in fact established a Turkish zone of influence. This competition has the potential to escalate tensions, especially when both countries seek to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of the other.

Despite the establishment of the Astana peace process in 2017, which was intended to manage the conflict in Syria, the reality on the ground indicates that it was mainly used to demarcate areas of control between Iran, Russia, and Turkey, and not to foster a comprehensive peace. As the Assad regime gradually gained territorial control, Iran’s influence increased, while Turkey established its presence in the north. This distribution of influence underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in Syria, Especially in light of the weakening of the “chief groomsmen”, Russia and Iran’s proxies.

The current situation in Syria presents a complex set of opportunities and risks for Israel and for the entire Middle East. While various factions, especially Iran and its proxies, are refocusing their efforts on the internal conflicts in Syria, there is a temporary decline in their attention to Israel. This shift in focus gives Israel strategic breathing space in the short term. However, this reality entails significant risks, especially the potential for instability on the Syrian Golan border, which could expand into the Israeli Golan Heights. This instability could escalate regional tensions and drag the Middle East into a broader conflict.

Historically, the borders of the Middle East were determined after World War I through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided control between France and Britain and granted political sovereignty to various tribal leaders. This division has created countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, which are characterized by ethnic and religious diversity with little common ground between different groups. This situation has led to deep hostility, especially among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, Christians, and others, exacerbated by strategic interests in the region’s oil resources.

The gradual erosion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement over the past decade has intensified the search for a new regional order, manifested in violent clashes and episodes of genocide such as those perpetrated by ISIS, for example. The involvement of world powers such as the United States and Russia has led to temporary stability, but in some ways has further complicated the situation. It is worth noting that stability in Syria during the Trump administration has occurred through coordination with Russia, suggesting that future interventions may work similarly.

The critical question is whether such international interventions can provide long-term stability in the region. The ongoing negative energies and hostility among the peoples of the region indicate that a local response, even if coordinated between major powers such as Russia and the United States, may not achieve sustainable stability. Instead, it is likely that these interventions will only be able to offer temporary relief without addressing the underlying tensions.

From an Israeli perspective, the most urgent concern is Jordan’s stability. Unlike other neighboring countries, Jordan remains relatively affected by the “Arab Spring” or the so-called “Islamic Winter.” However, the current regional dynamics pose significant challenges to Jordan’s stability, which some analysts say is precarious. The potential for chaos in Jordan is a realistic scenario for which Israel must prepare. This includes a strategic reassessment of the IDF’s position along the Jordan Valley, emphasizing the need for a strong and flexible security infrastructure on Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country.

In conclusion, while the internal conflict in Syria offers a temporary reduction in direct threats to Israel, it simultaneously poses significant risks to regional instability. The historical context of arbitrarily established borders and ongoing ethnic and religious hostility underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in the Middle East. For Israel, Jordan’s stability is becoming a critical concern, requiring comprehensive security measures and a proactive defense strategy. Future international interventions, while potentially beneficial in the short term, are unlikely to resolve deep regional tensions, underscoring the need for a multi-layered and long-term approach to regional stability.

This article was originally published on Ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Back to the “Islamic Winter” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. In formulating the national vision, the IDSF HaBithonistim research department examines the security threats on Israel through a magnifying glass, to obtain a comprehensive understanding thereof and yield recommendations for the most effective method of addressing them. Recently an IDSF HaBithonistim research team spoke before the Nagel Commission on Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Building, and presented a detailed opinion paper to the decision makers.

This paper was written with the assistance of six key researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik, Lt. Col. (res.) Shosh Raban, Dr. Yaakov Rimmer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Or Issachar. They elaborate on the current challenges and perceptions that govern the IDF, and detail the steps that must be taken to ensure that the IDF’s force buildup fully responds to the reference scenarios facing the State of Israel.

Reference scenarios as the basis for the IDF’s force buildup

Israel is a small country with little strategic depth, surrounded by a choke ring of enemies and a slew of threats. Many of these threats have existed from the very first moment of Israel’s existence. However, the past decades have seen processes and changes that had bred new trends. If the formative years of Israel saw the young state surrounded by enemy countries, then today, after 75 years of fighting against many of them for its mere existence, Israel is now contending with a pernicious remote enemy in the form of Iran, and with terror militias operating on its borders and in its very midst. Nowadays, Israel is contending with a convergence of theaters, meaning that any conflagration of one almost inevitably sparks a flare-up in another. In this current map of challenges, Israel exists in a permanent state of security volatility that may see unexpected attacks from foreign entities and from hostile elements from within.

In order to optimally deal with such threats, as well as with many others, the IDF’s force buildup must be carefully designed and executed. Traditionally, the Israeli army’s force buildup had stood on six pillars: doctrine, armaments, training, professional advancement, organization and infrastructure. Force buildup has long-term implications on Israel’s military readiness, and demands careful consideration of the current reference scenarios and threats, as well as projections thereof for the future.

Paramount security threats:

• Iran: although almost 1,000 miles from Israel, Tehran operates a vast proxy-terror mechanism across the Middle East, and has succeeded in sending its tentacles into the heart of Israel, into the Palestinian arena. Iran sits on a huge stockpile of missile and drones, developed and dedicated solely to target the civilian heart of Israel. And on top of it all – Iran is now a nuclear threshold state that is dedicated to the development of weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with Iran’s aspirations for instilling global Shi’ite Islam, this places it not only as a major threat to Israel, but indeed a threat to the rest of the world.

• Syria and Lebanon: the conflict on Israel’s northern border is a clear and present danger to Israel as Syria and Lebanon, its neighbors to the north, are enemy states. Syria had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war, and its outcome is not yet clear in terms of the new regime’s stability or long-term intentions towards Israel. Lebanon is for all intents and purposes, ruled by Hezbollah and by proxy – Iran. This state of affairs renders Israel’s northern border highly volatile and demands the constant presence of Israeli forces along that border and a high level of military readiness.

• Egypt and Jordan: the State of Israel does have peace agreements with these two countries. However, they are extremely precarious, and with more than a few inherent vulnerabilities. One is the fact that these accords do not really render redundant the IDF’s activity along the borders with these countries. But they do limit it to a great extent, simply due to the fact that one country cannot operate militarily against an ally in the same manner it can against an enemy. Furthermore, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan do not reflect the current sentiment on the streets of Cairo and Amman. Most of their citizens are openly hostile towards Israel. In the event of a change of governments – a very plausible scenario in both highly unstable countries – their relations with Israel may in all likelihood be impacted. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a reversal of alliances wherein either or both countries become once again enemies of Israel.

• Gaza: the destiny of Gaza in the day after the Gaza War is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, Israel must be prepared for a long period of instability in the Strip. Once the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia of Gaza is completed, the IDF will have to remain deployed in the area to act as a bulwark and ensure the safety of the population along the Gaza border, while crushing further attempts from within the Strip to reignite terror activity against Israe.

• Terror militias: during the past several years, due mainly to misguided concepts, Israel had allowed the terror organizations on its borders to build up their force and stockpile weapons to staggering levels, with the help of Iran. Thus, these organizations – namely Hezbollah and Hamas – have grown to become highly trained and armed terror militaries. The October 7 massacre had made it clear beyond any shred of doubt that Israel cannot allow terror and terror militias to germinate on its borders or anywhere near them, and it must adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards any such attempts.

• The Palestinian arena: this is a pressing challenge for Israel. the Stability achieved by the security forces in Judea and Samaria in the wake of Operation Defensive Shield is wearing thin, and the area has become a hornet’s nest of renewed terror activity, inspired by the October 7 events. The Palestinian Authority is failing – if indeed it even wishes to – conduct effective counter-terror activity in the area against the mounting Islamic terror in its jurisdiction, forcing Israeli security forces to undertake this task in these areas as well.

• Internal arena: the multi-front conflagration is pouring over into the Israeli Arab population. Since the outset of the Gaza War, there has been an awakening of terror activity among the Arab population living within the Green Line and holding a full Israeli citizenship. To contend with this problem without further drawing on the already buckling IDF, Israel must form a national guard to reenforce the civil guard system.

The sad truth of the matter is that the IDF does not have the numbers to address the entire spectrum of threats and reference scenarios with which Israel is currently contending. Therefore, the IDF must build up its force in terms of manpower as well as its operational and firepower capabilities. Some of these changes, such as higher recruitment rates must be executed on a systemic level while others, such as the buildup of new divisions or the incorporation of advance technologies that better enable the designated units to achieve their mission, should be delivered in a manner tailored to the specific needs of each of these units, as detailed below.

The Vision for IDF Force Buildup – A Systemic Point of View

Upscaling manpower

Over the past decades, certain processes have been put in place to downscale the IDF’s manpower, mainly in the ground forces. This led among others to the mustering out of entire divisions, the reduction of mandatory service duration, and increased cuts in mandatory and reserves personnel. These processes were undertaken with the notion that the “army of the people”, as the IDF is perceived in Israel, could be downsized and shaped into a “small and smart army”. However, the outbreak of the Gaza War proved the fallacy of this approach, and has led to the detrimental shortage of regular and reserve manpower with which the IDF is currently struggling.

An additional manpower crisis, dubbed “The Captain Crisis”, referring to the phenomenon in which low raking officers opt to end their military career at the rank of captain, mostly due to better conditions waiting for them in the civilian labor market. This creates a shortage of officers that could have been designated to be the next generation of the IDF’s leadership.

The personnel shortage in the IDF consequent of these cuts, is a significant operational constraint for the IDF, in particular when it must juggle a number of fronts at the same time. Compounding this problem, is the erosion of those of the forces that bear most of the operational brunt due to an unbalanced assignment of the operational load.

Ideal situation:

• Extension of service: in June 2015, the length of the men’s mandatory service – and some of the women’s – was cut from 36 to 12 months. The mandatory three-year term must be reinstated as was the standard for decades – a move that will boost the ranks of the regular army.

• Extension of the reserve service: the increase in the number of reservists is an indispensable element of the buildup of the IDF, such that responds effectively to the current security realities. Recently, the age of discharge from reserves duty was upped by a year, and it may have to be further extended, at least until the army’s manpower had sufficiently been boosted and service exemption policies tightened.
• Expansion of mandatory service to additional demographics: for decades, there have been in Israel’s society entire demographics, which for numerous reasons are automatically exempt from military service – some under the dictates of law and policy, while others slip “under the radar”. This means that there are tens of thousands of able individuals, who are not part of the IDF’s service cycle. In order to address this issue, there are steps that the army can adopt, such as expansion of female induction and the extension of the mandatory induction to “special” demographics such as the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab populations. An additional course of action would be to have soldiers sign on for a short – salaried – extension of their service once their mandatory term is done.

• Improved officer retention: The army must improve the retention of its officers and boost the attractivity of the military careers it can offer young officers, with the aim of keeping them in the system for long-term careers. For this end the military must overhaul and modernize its HR practices and offer terms and conditions of service that can parallel with comparable jobs on the civilian labor market.

• Modernization of the organizational operation: As a hierarchal structure, the IDF is weighted down by a uniformity of approach and thought and its resistance to creative ways of thought that challenge deep seated conceptions. The IDF must adopt organizational cultures that accept diverse ways of thought and are open to a diversity of opinions and concepts.
• Establishment of an auxiliary national guard force: in tandem with the expansion of the military ranks, the IDF’s areas of responsibility must be streamlined. Currently, beyond its border security and defense of the country, the army is also burdened with the task of internal security, which hinders its capacity to prioritize missions and assign sufficient manpower to this and other tasks. To alleviate this burden and allow the army to focus on the missions for which it exists, a national guard that is subordinate to Israel Police should be formed, responsible for all matters pertaining to internal security threats and sharing the army’s workload.

Optimization of logistic readiness

Current situation:

The IDF’s logistic readiness is part and parcel of its operational readiness, but sadly, it is plagued by various problems mainly in the areas of armaments, maintenance and infrastructure.

In terms of armaments, Israel has been developing an increasing dependance on the import of technology and weapons from foreign countries, mainly the US. The Gaza War made it clear to what extent Israel’s deep dependance on foreign munition supplies is to the detriment of the IDF’s operational flexibility and its freedom of action.

In terms of maintenance, many of the army’s bases and headquarters are in dilapidated condition, and are not fully prepared for internal threats and ballistic attacks. This state of affairs poses a risk factor to IDF’s operational capability. Furthermore, most of the IDF’s infrastructures are above ground, and exposed to threats in scenarios of surface-to-surface rocket and missile attacks.

Ideal situation:

• Upscaling inventory and supervising its integrity: Inventories should be assigned minimal stock threshold as per standardized operational requirements, with mechanisms of timely restocking in times of emergency. Furthermore, munitions and weapons should be inspected regularly to maintain integrity and immediate usability.

• Reinforcement of the security industry: Israel’s security industry must be allotted further investment and developed to reduce Israel’s dependance on imported weapons, lower costs of ammunition, and develop dedicated technologies and systems, while allowing for fast restocking in times of war. A positive by-product of this kind of policy would be the creation of new jobs and a boost to the economy.

• Expansion of international arms supply relations: Alongside the development of a more robust local industry, Israel must establish procurement deals with as many countries as possible, to free it from the shackles of dependency on a handful of leading countries for weapons and ammunitions supply.

• Upscaling and optimization of military infrastructures: The IDSF bases and headquarters are a strategic asset for the State of Israel, and as such they must be maintained and secured to the highest level. The bases should be inspected to determine their level of regular operation and their readiness for a state of war.

• Introduction of underground infrastructures: Important strategic assets must be relocated to underground premises to ensure their protection in the event of missile and rocket attack. Additionally, Israel must be prepared for a contingency wherein it must use underground routes to deploy forces. Alongside the planning of dedicated underground spaces, it is advisable to turn existing civilian infrastructures such as tunnels and public parking lots into dual-use infrastructures that can serve military purposes in emergency times.

Technology & Cyber

Current situation:

Alongside the traditional battlefield exists an emerging crucial theater of battle – the technological arena. Over the past several decades, technology – and war technology – has advanced by leaps and bounds, introducing new weapons and widely used cyber warfare.  Recently, with the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), new, highly sophisticated systems have been introduced that pose even a greater challenge for Israel security establishment.

Israel’s security technology and cyber warfare are some of the most advanced in the world, but there are still significant barriers to the incorporation of these technologies on the battlefield. These are related, among others, to the organization’s resistance to changes, the need to work exclusively with large vendors and the limited access to such technologies for commanders in the field.

Even though technology is by no means a complete substitute for human capabilities and for the value of the national contribution of a people’s army, Israel must ensure technological superiority over its enemies, and remain at the forefront of technological development and progress.

Ideal situation:

• After-action review: the shortcomings that arose during the Gaza War must be studied, such as the shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and uncrewed vehicles, the lack of technologies that would allow the forces to deal with the Hamas tunnels and shortcomings in quick and effective responses to anti-tank rockets.

• Investment in technology: Israel must allocate considerable budgets and manpower for the development of defense technology while at the same time boost existing local industry, with an emphasis on dedicated weapons and systems for the use specified by the IDF.

• Incorporation of robotics: robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive motorboats, can bring a significant advantage on the battle field and considerably reduce the cost in human lives. Therefore, robotics should be incorporated in all of the IDF branches.

• Cyber warfare and AI: the cyber arena is getting more sophisticated by the moment, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is on the increase, posing yet new security threats. In order to ensure it maintains the upper hand in this arena, Israel must continue to invest in research and development of offensive and defensive cyber, and begin incorporating AI in its security needs.

• Tech training: The forces in the field must be trained to use the advanced tech tools that are and will become available to them. This calls for the installation of a whole new training array across all IDF branches and units, and the professional training of all the professional personnel allocated to this end.

• Diversification of tech acquisition portfolio: Israel’s security establishment currently deals with only a handful of large tech vendors, with which it has trade relations for decades. In order to introduce sophisticated tech systems, it must be open to doing business with smaller tech vendors and entrepreneurs.

The Vision of IDF Force Buildup According to Branches and Corps

Ground forces

Current situation:

The State of Israel is often forced to engage in multiple combat arenas, wherein the escalation in one often leads immediately to a domino effect conflagration of others. As demonstrated throughout the Gaza War, the battle of order of the IDF’s ground forces proved too short to cover more than one broad campaign in a single arena, while holding a defensive position in others. This also means that in the event of unexpected developments, the army does not have enough reserves to deploy.

In light of existing and projected threats outlined by reference scenarios, the State of Israel must boost its capabilities such that it can engage in high intensity combat in at least two fronts simultaneously, while assuming a broad defensive position in others.

Ideal situation:

• Overhaul of readiness protocols: the IDF must ensure that regular and reserve forces incorporate improved readiness protocols –in terms of quantity and quality of combat gear and weaponry, and in terms of the professional and physical operational readiness of troops and commanders, in order to allow short response times in a reality where surprise terror attacks have become part and parcel of daily life.

• Augmentation of forces by one regular service division and several reserves’ divisions: The IDF should add at least one more regular army division and two more reserves maneuver enhancement divisions to its personnel headcount. These divisions will include a full divisional structure and auxiliary units including tanks, artillery, engineering and logistics. One should be deployed at Israel’s northern border and the other in the Jordan Valley. This is a necessity in order to deal with the operative shortcomings in some arenas, and will additionally serve as reserve forces when needed.

• Establishment of a dedicated standalone combat auxiliary force: a reserve force at the level of at least a division, under the command of General HQ, should be formed to provide operational flexibility and provide relief to forces in the event of unexpected or prolonged events. The reserve force may be kept at a lower level of readiness and mid-level operational fitness, ensuring that these can be brought up to par quickly in times of need.

• Formation of a tunnel capture-and-destroy combat unit: In light of the growing tunnel warfare threat on Israel’s borders, the security establishment must seriously consider the formation of a new dedicated army corps specializing in the detection and destruction of tunnels and subterranean warfare.

• General internal audit of IDF units: The IDF must conduct an in-depth audit of relevant units to asses manpower, equipment and armament needs and shortages. For example, it has become clear in the current conflict that there is a pressing need to increase the numbers of tank in the armored units. Also, in the current climate in Israel’s multiple arena reality, special units such as the Oketz canine unit and the Yahalom combat engineering unit, must be augmented.

• Improvement of mobilization and deployment mechanisms and procedures: The convergence and interconnectivity of arenas in Israel demand that the army install a streamlined mobilization and deployment system and procedures to enable the swift reallocation of forces from one front to another. For this purpose, the army would have to create a dedicated road and rail infrastructure as an alternative to the congested civilian routes, and upscale its fleet of heavy carriers to included armored vehicles. To streamline quick force deployment and movement, civilian infrastructure, such as railways, should be considered for use as supplementary systems.

The Air Force: Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles

Current situation:

The Israeli Air Force is charged with three main missions: The protection of Israel’s areal space, offensives in enemy territories, and the support of ground campaigns. In order to accomplish these missions to their fullest, the IAF is required to have extremely complex and resource-intensive capabilities. It must be understood that no matter how supreme an army’s air force is – it cannot compensate for inadequate ground forces. It can, however, provide operational flexibility to its counterparts on the ground and in the ocean. This can be further boosted by newer advanced drone technology, which aside from expanding military capabilities, help reduce the cost in human lives.

Over the past years, significant changes have been occurring in the map of the areal threats. Israel’s enemies on its borders and remotely understand that they cannot contend with the superiority of Israel’s Air Force and thus abandoned the use of fighter jets, instead opting for the development of ballistic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, steep trajectory surface-to-surface missiles, and low-tech warfare i.e. glider terror attacks, and improvised explosive kites and balloons. These new threats demand the IAF to recalculate its offensive and defensive tactics and set in place procedures for force and resource deployment and means and weapons it uses.

Ideal situation:

• Increase of drone warfare: The most important objective for the use of UMAVs is the protection of the lives of soldiers. Even in the event that the use of human forces is unavoidable, drones can support IAF’s strikes in the heart of enemy territory. UMAV’s can assist in the protection of ground sectors and lend significant aid to ground campaigns. It is highly recommended that the IDF invest resources in increasing the use of this means of war.

• Incorporation of a steep trajectory array: the IDF should examine the incorporation of a steep trajectory array with rocket and attack glider capabilities.

• Streamlining Israel’s air defense system: In order to ensure the protection of the Home Front, the IDF’s air defense must undergo a comprehensive inspection to ensure it is able to contend with scenarios of attacks of thousands of rockets and missiles a day. Furthermore, Israel should consider forging regional alliances for the protection of Israel’s areal space.

Navy: Defense as a Priority

Current situation:

Israel’s naval arena is important on a number of levels: security-wise, Israel has expansive maritime borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Egypt. Economically, Israel has prolific maritime trade activities; strategically, the most substantial source of energy in the country comes from the natural gas fields within the country’s territorial waters.

Therefore, the State of Israel must maintain superiority in all naval arenas, securing its maritime supply routes, protect its shores, protect free passage of vessels and maritime trade, and protect its gas fields. However, as the most pressing threats are ground-based and since the military is struggling with manpower deficits, coupled with traditionally high costs of maintaining and operating naval vessels, the IDF must plan how to prioritize the Navy’s needs.

Ideal situation:

• Prioritization of defensive capabilities: Controlling the maritime territory demands superior offensive capabilities from the Navy, however, due to current constraints abovementioned the focus on the IDF’s Navy must be the development of defensive capabilities.

• Integration of unmanned platforms: It is possible, and necessary, to integrate unmanned surface and underwater vessels, which would be deployed primarily for patrolling, guarding Israel’s maritime borders, routine security, allowing the IDF forces to deal with more complex threats.

Home Front Command: Delegating responsibilities effectively

Current situation:

The Home Front plays a crucial role in the protection of the citizens of Israel, but the delegation of responsibilities between the body and the civil defense and rescue forces remains unclear. This unclarity leads to overlapping of responsibilities in some cases, and in others – tasks that fall between the cracks and remain unattended.

Furthermore, the Home Front Command has been red flagging its personnel shortage for some time. Over the recent years this demanded the allocation of IDF combat forces to supplement the Home Front’s search and rescue activities – forces that should have been serving in other critical ground-force missions. This demands the rethinking of the allocation of resources between the Home Front Command and the IDF operational units.

Another issue that demands attention is the auxiliary Territorial Defense array. Nowadays the territorial defense’s main area of operation is centered around the defense against external threats and search and rescue missions. The area of territorial defense that deals with internal threats such as terror attacks remains nearly untreated by the Home Front Command and this requires revisiting to consider including this task in the Home Front’s responsibilities.

Ideal situation:

• Assignation of areas of responsibilities: The responsibilities of the Home Front and the civil rescue bodies must be assigned and delineated in a clear manner, with consideration of the capabilities each body brings to the table, to allow for the most effective fulfillment of each responsibility.

• Improvement of protection of civil structures: In order to improve the protection of the civil Home Front and reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the wake of attacks against civilians, the Home Front must identify the public structures which lack protective areas and spaces, especially those near and in conflict areas.

• Balanced distribution of recruits: Since there are certain units in the Home Front Command that are in need of recruits with the same profile as the IDF’s other ground force units, the assignment of recruits must be based on considerations of operational priorities of each of the units.

• Reinforcement of the territorial defense array: In light of the terror threats against Israel from within the Arab-Israeli population, it is worth examining the integration of Home Front forces in the protection of the communities in conflict areas and border zones.

The Intelligence Directorate: Collaboration with Civil Bodies

Current situation:

The security intelligence establishment is a critical component in Israel’s security, strategically and tactically. However, Israel had developed over the recent years a dangerous dependence on its intelligence deterrence – the full implication of which was revealed in the October 7 disaster.

Therefore, the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence establishment must be further expanded and maintained but at the same time the security establishment’s other capabilities – especially in the operational field – must be boosted. Furthermore, the intelligence apparatus is currently plagued with some deeply engrained problems that pose a challenge to Israel’ superiority in the field, such as inadequate investment in diverse fields of intelligence, and the brain drain of the system due to much more economically gratifying jobs in the civilian job market.

The ideal:

• Recruitment of speakers of foreign languages: In order to respond to the current operational needs, the Intelligence Corps must augment the ranks of its foreign language speakers through a specially tailored recruitment and training program.

• Reinstatement of an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) array: The Israeli Intelligence OSINT array plays a critical role in the understanding of the broad political landscape in Israel and is indispensable for monitoring unforeseen sudden events, identifying information leaks, producing projections and for influencing public opinion. Therefore, the OSINT array in the intelligence establishment must be rehabilitated and further cultivated.

• Social networks as a viable source of intelligence (SOCMINT): Intelligence gathering from social networks should be increased as it is an indispensable source of intel yielding platform.

• Collaboration with civilian market: It is worth examining the integration of capabilities from Israeli high-tech and local industry. This kind of collaboration can allow the IDF Intelligence Corps to adopt advanced civilian technologies to maintain superiority in the field. Furthermore, it is worth considering opening some of the career military jobs in the Intelligence Corp to the civilian job market to obtain additional professional expert manpower from outside of the military system.

IDF Force Buildup Vision – Decision Making Processes

Improvement of decision-making processes

Current situation:

The security and strategic decision-making processes, including those that pertain to the IDF force buildup and budget allocation, mostly happen in the military executive branch, and are not always transparent to the relevant political and public factors. The limited number of participants in these processes often lead to perceptual shortcomings in the absence of broad perspectives and different points of view.

Another issue regarding decision making processes is related to control and monitoring processes. Currently, most if the control and monitoring of the Israel’s security establishment and the IDF’s activity are internal and are not transparent to the political system, not to mention to the public, which subjects them to a risk of partiality and bias.

Ideal situation:

• Transparent decision-making: The IDF must incorporate non-military professionals, such as public representatives and suitable professionals from each relevant field in its strategic decision-making processes, such that allows for decision-making that is based on multiple opinions and perspectives through organizational processes such as brainstorming sessions.

• Introduction of “red teams”: The intelligence analysis process often uses “red teams” – which simulates hostile attacks with the aim of detecting vulnerabilities and flaws in existing systems and responses. Many times, these teams comprise non-military professionals who bring knowledge and perspectives from outside of the military system. To improve decision-making across the entire security system, red teams should be incorporated in every branch and arm of the IDF.

• Bi-annual Cabinet updates: The Cabinet should hold bi-annual briefings focusing on various aspects of the IDF’s force buildup – including threat assessments, manpower allocations, operational readiness, procurement and armament. These meetings should be anchored in appropriate legislation, and the consequent decisions should be shared with the public. Furthermore, the security establishment should be required to present to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee all information pertaining to changes in the IDF force buildup.

• Establishment of independent supervisory committees: Independent supervisory committees comprising public and civilian representatives are needed to examine the IDF force buildup and report to the government and official control bodies. The government’s security cabinet will be obligated to discuss the committee’s findings and include civilian representatives to partake in discussions on unclassified findings.

Thought on Israel’s security: conclusion

The dynamic map of the security challenges characteristic to Israel and the Middle East region demands constant scrutiny of the present and future threats. Only with a broad understanding of the reference scenarios Israel faces, its military force can be built up in a proper and informed manner.

Nowadays, Israel is forced to contend with a long list of threats, spearheaded by Iran, which can turn into a nuclear state at any moment. Additionally, the current reference scenarios point to a multi-arena war placing Israel on several fronts at the same time, as well as a surprise attack that could be launched by any one of the terror organizations operating on Israel’s borders.

The Gaza War has proven that Israel and its security establishment must recalculate its route forward and methodically and skillfully plan the force buildup across the system. This is the only way to ensure a strong army that could protect Israel security now and in the future.

הפוסט Ideally – IDSF HaBithonistim National Security Vision. The Force buildup of the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Gaza war has been raging in a number of arenas, and accordingly has a number of objectives. On the southern front, reportedly, the objectives are the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia in the Gaza strip, the return home of all of the Israeli hostages from Gaza with no exception, and ensuring that no army of terror could resurface and take control of Gaza again. On the northern front, the objective is to deliver a devastating blow to Hezbollah, ensuring that it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel. However, there is another, less reported front, that does not make headlines like its counterparts but in effect, it holds sway on all the above and more – the global theater.

Israel’s broad strategy extends far beyond the borders of Lebanon and Gaza. The overall objective is the dismantling of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis as the controlling element of much of the Middle East. Local processes such as ceasefires and the separation of fronts, alongside the imminent administration change in the US, offer a valuable opportunity to drive change such that will not only decide the outcome of the current war but has the potential to reshape the entire  balance of power in the Middle East.

As proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles.

Israel has achieved everything. Almost.  Overview of the agreement terms

To better understand whether the ceasefire with Hezbollah is beneficial to Israel, we should first review its terms. Admittedly, it is all too easy to spot some loopholes, but it did hand Israel a few  extremely important achievements.

The first is the divorce between the war in Gaza and the conflict with Hezbollah. This separation has significant ramifications for Hezbollah and Hamas. At the time, Nasrallah proclaimed the Hezbollah’s mission was to come to the aid of their Palestinian brethren and made a commitment to continue the fighting on Israel’s northern border until the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Yet we see how Hezbollah has gone back on its promises, which in its own perception is a terrible humiliation.  This was a debilitating blow to Hamas, which has now been left to its own devices.

An additional achievement produced by the agreement is the demilitarization of southern Lebanon. If properly enforce, this clause will make it very hard for Hezbollah to rebuild its force on the border with Israel.

The third and perhaps the most significant achievement, is that Israel gains complete freedom of action in Lebanon which allows it to act against Hezbollah the moment it threatens Israel. This teaches the heads of Hezbollah that the moment they raise their heads – it will come rolling off. It could be said that Israel had achieved everything it wanted. Nearly. The problem with the agreement though is that it fails to chart a DMZ along the Lebanese border with Israel. In its current form, the agreement allows the population that lives near that border to return to their homes – some of which are located  just hundreds of yards from Israel. The problem is that as proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – many of these people are either Hezbollah terrorists or local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles. Once they return to their villages, Israeli intelligence will have a difficult time discerning which of them is an innocent civilian and which is a terrorist.

There is no doubt that this state of affairs will pose a challenge for Israel when coming to identify irregular activities  and stanch terror activity on the border. Nonetheless, there are three points to consider: Firstly, every negotiation by default entails concessions by all stakeholders, and perhaps this is a bitter pill that Israel has no choice but to swallow. The other point is that even if the population of south Lebanon does return to its villages on the border, Israel now has more tools and experience, and a stronger drive to eradicate terror. Thirdly, this is an interim agreement, meaning that Israel still has a chance to change it. The 60-day period set for the withdrawal and with the eminent entrance of the Trump administration into office, there is a fair chance that Israel could insist on creating a crucial DMZ along the border.

At the bottom line, on paper it appears that for the most part, the agreement is favorable for Israel – but of course, the soundness of these conditions will have to stand the test of enforcement. The US and France are involved in the agreement but at the end of the day, it is up to Israel and its security forces to prove the agreement productive. In the wake of October 7, the decision-making levels in Israel politics and military have come to understand that the international peacekeeping forces cannot be relied upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah. Israel has no choice but to take its own security fully in its own hands by any means necessary and impress upon Hezbollah that it is willing to jump right back in the fray if so pushed.

Upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah.

Why now? The timing of the signing in security and diplomatic terms

The signing of the ceasefire agreement had not materialized out of thin air. The timing was carefully selected with various security and diplomatic considerations. In terms of Israel’s security, the objectives set for the war in the northern border, i.e. the paralyzing of Hezbollah, was achieved to a large measure. Israel had catapulted the terror organization twenty years back in terms of its military prowess, and brought it to a state in which it is no longer a strategic threat on Israel. Admittedly, one can always claim that there was a lot more that Israel could have done to strike an even harsher blow against Hezbollah. Which is not wrong. However, insofar as the military objectives, they were realized for the most part, and the signing of the agreement marked the appropriate point in time to cease the IDSF HaBithonistim  activity in Lebanon.

Diplomatically speaking, it would seem that the timing of the ceasefire is opportune as well. Israel needs the support of the international community to legitimize its actions and to receive weapons and ammunition. The ceasefire agreement allows Israel to improve its position with the UN Security Council and in turn improve its diplomatic relations with the international community.

An additional diplomatic consideration that plays an important part in the timing of the ceasefire agreement is the forthcoming change of administrations in the United States – similarly to the last months of the Obama administration, the support of the US administration in Israel is ebbing. The timing of the agreement allows us to ride out the relations with the current Biden administration and prepare to forge relations with the incoming Trump administration.

Beyond all the above mentioned, the timing carries a critical operational advantage. Israel’s decision to take its foot off the pedal in the north means that it can focus militarily and strategically in its next two crucial objectives: bringing down Hamas and the overturning of the Shi’ite axis.

As per the first objective, a ceasefire up north allows Israel to shift its ground forces back into Gaza and return to high intensity fighting and thus increase the chances of crushing Hamas and returning the hostages. As for the second objective of overturning the Shi’ite axis – more will be detailed below.

The systemic solution is not in Lebanon: the global importance of the agreement

In the Middle East, there are three main forces vying for control of the region – the Shi’ite-Iranian axis, the radical Sunni axis, and the moderate Western-Sunni axis. In recent years, the Shiite axis led by Iran and its proxies was able to gain the upper hand to become the dominant force in the region. However, various processes that have unfolded over the past year have sent this dominance into decline, and if the US plays the right policy cards, the region just may witness the breakdown of the radical Shi’ite machine.

As the Shi’ite axis is yielding to pressure, the radical Sunni axis is coming into the center of the stage, led by Turkey together with extreme Suni terror organizations the likes of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The axis will prove to be no less pernicious than its Shi’ite counterpart if it grows stronger and will pose no less a threat to Israel and the West, and thus merits a red flag as well. Case in point is the recent events in Syria that led to the toppling of the Assad regime. The rebel forces were able to prevail among others thanks to a weakened Hezbollah, proving yet again the interconnectivity of events in the Middle East. For the moment, the fall of the historically hostile Assad regime may be taken as a favorable development for Israel, it is yet to be determined what kind of regime will step into the vacuum and what – if any – kind of threat it might pose to Israel. This means that Israel must not take its eyes of the radical Sunni axis that could be the biggest winner from the fall of the Shi’ite axis and might be no less evil-intentioned toward Israel.

Therefore, the State of Israel must keep a close eye both on the Shi’ite and Sunni axes while at the same time  act toward solidifying the third axis – the moderate West-Sunni axis. For that end, Israel needs to form a coalition with the US, western countries and Sunni countries such as Saudia Arabia, UAE, Indonesia, Malesia and Pakistan. Such a coalition, if strong enough, may even draw other countries to join forces, such as Lebanon and even Iraq. In tandem with this effort, Israel must strive to forge normalization agreements with moderate Sunni countries in the Middle East that will perhaps lead to regional and global peace agreements.

One way or another, Israel must condition any move in the Middle East on a combined offensive against Iran. Once the head of the snake is removed – all the rest will fall into place.

Forward looking: the day after the ceasefire

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is for a 60-day term – but in terms of Middle East security, this is ample time for things to change. There is no way to predict if indeed the ceasefire will be implemented verbatim, or what will transpire once the term is out; Hezbollah may very well breach the agreement, forcing Israel back into battle, and equally possible is that the agreement may lead to a permanent settlement that allows Israel to begin rehabilitating the north and return the evacuated citizens to their homes.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement wishes to see a rehabilitated and healing north. This is a complex process, but with smart resource allocation and oversight, this part of Israel can very soon be on track to recovery. Once this is underway, we can then turn to the next task at hand – the increase of the Jewish population in the north. The IDSF HaBithonistim sees this as a national imperative of top priority. A two-fold increase would make it clear to our enemies that they cannot push us back from our own borders, as well as contribute to the settlement of the land in agency of Israel’s security doctrine.

In order to realize these objectives, IDSF HaBithonistim has been engaging with policy-makers and is founding educational and pre-military programs designed to strengthen the settlements within Israel’s borders. These days the movement is in the midst of developing the “Ha’Tkuma” pre-military preparatory program that will operate in the Gaza border communities. In the future more of such programs will be founded in the north of Israel.

For many, rebuilding and resettling the communities in the ravaged north seems like a distant goal, but we are getting closer – and the ceasefire agreement is the first step in this direction. Despite some of the agreement’s downsides and the concessions Israel is required to make, it is important to understand that the State of Israel is now facing a historic opportunity to realize all of its aspirations. If we take advantage of this opportunity skillfully, we can change our security reality for generations to come and even stabilize the balance of power throughout the Middle East.

הפוסט “Analyzing Lebanon Not Within the General Context Is a Big Mistake” – The Broad Implications of a Ceasefire on Israel’s Northern Border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The trial of the Knave of Hearts scene in “Alice in Wonderland” oddly mirrors the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) unprecedented ruling against Israel. The court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Defense Gallant for alleged war crimes in Gaza. Had proper due process been put in place, surely this outcome would not be reminiscent of the Queen of Spades’ immortal dictum: “Sentence first – verdict afterwards.”

It would not be far-reaching to describe this ruling as initiated and abated by politically-appointed judges and prosecutor with a long anti-Israeli track record. They somehow wish to be believed that this warrant is the result of an evidence-based fair process, rather than reverse engineering a PR decision. They seek to arrest individuals over whom they have no legal jurisdiction, over crimes in a non-existent country invented for the sake of protocol, while ignoring any evidence that runs contrary to the tunnel vision. This is a pre-determined ruling that was backfilled with arguments.

Israel, a country that has thus far provided its enemy in Gaza with over 1 million metric tons of aid during wartime, is now accused of committing “starvation”. The humanitarian aid operation it orchestrated in cooperation with UNRWA – even while its school textbooks teem with anti-Semitic caricatures and many of its employees are on Hamas’ payroll – is described as war crimes. 2 billion dollars were donated by worldwide contributors to provide every Gazan with over 3,400 calories per day. All of that, after having suffered October 7 – the deadliest massacre of Jewish people since the Holocaust, and as 101 Israeli hostages are still unlawfully held in Gaza.

No real evidence has ever been provided for well-recorded starvation cases in Gaza – only smoke and mirrors. UN agencies largely rely on bogus data provided by Hamas, whitewashed as the “Gaza Health Ministry”. The “Ministry” provides the bricks that construct the anti-Israeli edifice, claiming that over 43 thousand Palestinians were killed. No real effort was carried out to validate the authenticity of that data, nor verify how many of those killed were militants. That, in stark contrast to skepticism over other types of disinformation, from Russia’s Sputnik News to ISIS’ Amaq.

During the war, millions of Palestinians were ordered by the IDF to get out of war zones and into safe zones, as Israeli tanks safeguarded them from Hamas sniper fire, fearing evacuation could help Israel defeat it. Gaza’s population continues to grow at an estimate 2% annual rate. This would be a particularly bizarre and inefficient way to carry out a genocide.

It was also the lack of relevant process, not merely evidence, that rattled Jerusalem. Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC, nor does it have jurisdiction in countries with an independent judicial system, as per the principle of complementarity. Only in cases such as Yugoslav strongman Milošević’s war crimes, where local courts are “unwilling and unable” to prosecute, can the ICC move on to intervene.

The opposite party to the ruling would be “Palestine”, which was admitted to the ICC in 2015, in stark violation of the Palestinian Authority’s Oslo Accords with Israel. Since the court cannot discuss unrecognized territories, it agreed to define one for the sake of protocol in 2021. Hungarian Judge Péter Kovács issued a dissenting opinion, criticizing the court for its lack of proper legal basis. Yet the ICC continued to paint the dartboard after the dart hit.

Much like the USSR’s sham trials, the ICC also reflects a deeper and alarming insight into a once-respected international institution. It seems that the media’s limelight rather than real criteria determines its outreach. There is simply no other way to characterize how Gaza’s relatively negligent and unreliable number of fatalities gets much of the attention, while objectively severe war theaters such as the war in Yemen (400 thousand killed and starved and 16 million at the brink of starvation) or the war in South Sudan (7.7 million projected to face acute food insecurity) get practically none. No other way to explain how 156 resolutions passed against Israel at the UN General Assembly since 2015, with Russia far second at 24 and none passed against Qatar or Venezuela.

In the words of prosecutor Khan’s predecessor at the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo: “Everyone knows starvation happened” in Gaza, while falling short of providing evidence. This “everyone knows” attitude determined the court’s proceedings, not evidence.

Legal acrobatics and confirmation bias only help making Israel’s case against the ICC, creating personally-customized law, rather than international law. This is why the ICC’s override managed to set off alarms not just in Jerusalem, but in Washington, and for a good reason. Both President Biden and President Elect Trump strongly condemned this move. They are fully aware that allowing a precedent on Israel would be allowing it on the United States as well. It has been scorched before: in 2020, the Trump administration laid sanctions on ICC officials following the court’s decision to launch a probe into American servicemen in Afghanistan. The court then backed down and “deprioritized” the US case. Then in 2022, during the Biden administration’s tenure, the ICC resumed its investigation. If Israel’s gold standard of 1:1.2 military to civilian ratio is considered “genocide”, now imagine how could the ICC describe the US’ record in Afghanistan.

There is a simple way out of this imbroglio: degrade and defund the ICC. Like any institution, the ICC is only as strong as its legitimacy and its funding. European countries who wish to keep their sovereignty would be wise to pull out funding and opt out of the ICC. Rather than announcing they will respect the ruling, they should be leading the opposition to it. They may gloat over seeing Israel in the hot seat, and may look up to the ICC with awe and reverence, but they could well be next. A real international setting to prosecute war criminals should be set, rather than a kangaroo court. The credibility that the ICC has been selling was exposed as window dressing. Now European countries should stop buying it.

הפוסט The ICC has been selling credibility. Now it’s time to stop buying it. הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The fall of the Assad regime should signal to Israel that, amidst the chaotic sequence of events, it must uphold two critical interests. The first is to destroy the capabilities of the Shiite Ring of Fire. The second is to avoid being trapped in a Sunni Ring of Fire.

The Shiite Ring of Fire was first breached with the downfall of Hezbollah and Hamas. Breaches continued with an Israeli strike that stripped Iran of its air defense capabilities, and with the rapid collapse of the Assad regime — a development echoing across the Middle East. This is not merely the fall of a regime that was hostile to Israel and was part of Iran’s Sunni Ring of Fire. It is also a psychological game-changer that could reinvigorate the Iranian rebels.

In an effort to fortify itself, Iran is accelerating the development of its nuclear weapons. A report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the U.S. indicates that Iran has speeded up its uranium enrichment so that it will potentially be able to manufacture 12 nuclear bombs.

Russia, too, has a stake in Iran’s nuclear progress, raising concerns that Russian technologies could be transferred to Iran to shorten the time required to manufacture a nuclear bomb and strengthen the resistance from the Axis of Evil.

In the face of Iran’s rush toward nuclear armaments, Israel is counting the days until Trump enters the White House. The question is how many days we have left in our quiver before Iran achieves a bomb that could, Heaven forbid, once more reverse the region’s momentum.

Therefore Israel must act immediately to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and, along with it, the remnants of the Ring of Fire that Iran has constructed around Israel.

The second interest that Israel must uphold is rooted in an ancient Machiavellian principle that says every change begets another change.

It is already evident that Iran’s decline paves the way for Turkey’s rise. Erdoğan is lurking around the corner in hopes that Israel will mount the attack and that the Iranian regime will falter. He would then seize the opportunity he has been awaiting and attempt to position himself as the region’s Islamic power.

Whether actively encouraged or passively approved by Turkey, the offensive from Syrian rebels under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was made possible by Turkish financial and military support. It not only benefits Erdoğan strategically by advancing his regional hegemony, but also benefits him tactically by weakening the Shiite axis, pushing the Kurds away from Turkey’s borders, and returning Syrian refugees who have been burdening Turkey’s economy.

Israel’s understanding of its own future interests on the battlefield against the Turks must therefore prompt it to strike inside Syria now. During the current war Erdoğan, an extreme jihadist who seeks Israel’s destruction, has taken every step to label Israel as an enemy and display his practical intent to harm it. In July, for instance, he spoke of invading Israel the way he invaded Karabakh and Libya: “Just like we entered Karabakh and the way we entered Libya, maybe we’ll do the same thing. …We have to be strong.”

Unlike Iran, Erdoğan possesses a modern, well-equipped military. This includes twice as many enlisted troops as Israel, approximately 10% more fighter jets, nearly twice as many tanks, four times as many warships, and more than twice the number of submarines (!).

Although Israel holds military superiority over Turkey in quite a few aspects, one of the challenges in confronting Turkey could lie in a preemptive Israeli strike because Turkey is a NATO member. Under the NATO framework, an attack on one member state is considered tantamount to attack on them all.

In conclusion, it is a necessity — and an obligation — for Israel to complete the destruction of the Shiite Ring of Fire. At the same time, its operations in Syria against Erdoğan-aligned rebels must be subject to a calculated assessment of Israel’s future interests in a possible war against Turkey as well as to a resolute decision that the Shiite Ring of Fire must not be replaced by a Sunni equivalent.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel Must Not Replace a Shiite Ring of Fire with a Sunni Ring of Fire הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The brutal pogrom in Amsterdam against the Israeli fans of Maccabi Tel-Aviv soccer team in early November, with news broadcasts showing Arab-Muslim rioters violently attacking helpless Israeli soccer fans – prove that Israel is dealing with an additional front in its current war. But more then all, it casts a blinding limelight on the snowballing Islamstic threat to Europe’s public domains.

An undeniable fact – Europe is currently undergoing a gradual takeover by Islam. The immigration-wave from Muslim countries to Western Europe was so massive that it had effected a radical change in the very landscape of European countries. The familiar faces and scenes of Europe are increasingly being lost to entire neighborhoods and sections of cities awash with the Muslim Thawbs, Hijabs and Burkas, and store signs in Arabic. Reportedly, over the past years, many churches in Europe – mainly in France – are being purchased by Muslim organizations and converted into Mosques.

This is what religious takeover looks like.

Along with this cultural occupation, among  these immigrants there are many who bring with them from the Middle East a vitriolic and violent breed of antisemitism. Many of the vicious rioters in Amsterdam that night hail from Morocco and Algeria – one of the most antisemitic countries in the world, and these Algerian-Dutch have been weaned on antisemitism since birth.

The Amsterdam events should be a wake-up call for Europe. The Muslim rioters set out to harm Jews in that particular event, but next time – they might very well set their aims on Christians.

European countries such as Holland  are home to very large Muslim communities of Algerians and Moroccans. These communities are growing exponentially while the non-Muslim communities are shrinking. The total population of Holland and Belgium together does not exceed 30 million – 17.8 million in Holland and 11 million in Belgium. A 10-year projection of population growth estimates that in major cities, such as Brussels, the Muslim population will become the majority. They may even become a majority in Belgium as a whole, within several decades. After taking over the public domain in the liberal and multi-cultured BENELUX countries, next in turn will be France, Germany, Sweden and Great Britain – all countries with large Muslim communities. France, for example has the largest Muslim community in Europe, with over 8.5 million people.

Global Intifada

The well-planned pogrom of the Dutch-Muslims against Israelis, who had arrived in Amsterdam simple to watch a soccer game between Maccabi Tel Aviv and Ajax Amsterdam – reminded Israelis and Jews across the world of the October 7 massacre, as well as Kristallnacht of the Holocaust, the 86^th anniversary of which was the next day, ironically.

The pogrom in Amsterdam included very harsh scenes of Israelis being bludgeoned with bats, threatened with knives and some even pushed into the cold night canal waters. The Arab rioters coordinated the attacks through their social networks and with the aid of information they had received on the whereabouts of Israelis in various locations in Amsterdam. The city’s mayor Pamke Helsma even knew to report that “…taxi drivers of Muslim origin participated in the lynch”. Several of the rioters had even hunted down Israelis to the hotels in which they were staying, and the Israeli guests were instructed to remain in their rooms with the doors locked.

The law enforcement forces and the Dutch police demonstrated abject incompetence in seizing control over the event and preventing injury to the Israeli soccer fans. Yet, Amsterdam Police Chief, Peter Holle claimed “…we’ve been planning for weeks, we foresaw the risks to the public order”. After the pogrom, many videos were released on social media showing Arab rioters beating Israelis, and forcing them to repeat the slogan “Free Palestine”. These videos were later used in the Palestinian propaganda channels to mock the Israelis who repeated the slogan under duress, in hopes of being spared by their attackers.

The Amsterdam pogrom is not a singular event restricted only to Holland – this is a red flag to what may very well turn into a wave of similar events in the rest of the Western world. The fact that in many cities in the West, the US included, Arabs poured out into the streets cheering the attack against the Israelis in Amsterdam, just as they had done in the wake of the October 7 massacre – should be a huge red flag for these countries. For some time now, Arabs and Muslims have been calling for a “Globa Intifada” against Jews around the world. Antisemitism is soaring and Muslims in western countries are enjoying immunity under the auspices of western tolerance.

The war’s eighth front

The Amsterdam events and the violent protests across Europe have once again proved that Israel faces yet another front – an eighth front of a violent uprising of Muslims and pro-Palestinians throughout the world; When a crowd of Arab Muslims riots in the streets of Europe and North America, it does so not solely out of solidarity with the Palestinians, but out of zealous antisemitic hatred toward Jews, calling for their slaughter, supporting Hamas and openly and unashamedly holding up the picture of formally designated global terrorist – mass murderer, war criminal and architect of the October 7 slaughter, Yahya Sinwar.

Israel has been forced to deal with this eighth front, as part of the war declared against the State, and thus has experience in this arena. Europe, however, may well find itself for the first time facing this kind of war against a Jihadi movement that had sprouted in its own back yard, bent on taking over the very countries that opened their doors so generously to them.

These events also cast a glaring light on a truism that the Europeans would rather deny: that Europe is more threatened by the Muslims and thus prefers to remain passive rather than protect its law-abiding Jewish citizens. Admitting this would force Europe to face the fact that they are in the same boat as the Jews.

But make no mistake: Islam is spreading all over the world, and we are witnessing the first signs of its designs to take over Europe.

Holland and Belgium first.

This article was originally published in Makor Rishon.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Holland & Belgium First הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The crises around the recruitment, or lack thereof, of Haredi – ultra-orthodox – men, the imperative to secure Israel’s military needs, the economic crises, and the declining support of Israel in the international community – how can all these converge to a golden opportunity for Israel that would allow it to cross several hurdles with one leap?

Four hurdles, to be precise. The solution on the table is the foundation of local Israeli arms production, with manufacturing and operational personnel recruited from the Haredi community, who would be employed under conditions of military or national service. Israel’s government had already agreed on the imperative to increase Israel’s self-production of arms and munitions in light of growing dependance mainly on the US, and other countries, for the supply of arms and munitions, which significantly increased since the onset of the war. This project would afford Israel critical independence, while diminishing its dependence on the good will and political motivations of other countries and one administration or other. The military salaries paid to the recruits employed in this project would ensure its economic viability. Moreover, the global shortages in inventory and growing demand for ammunition will enable Israel to enjoy another source of revenue and a geopolitical status of an arms exporter, rather than an importer.

The crises of the military service objection in the ultra-orthodox community

Much can – and should – be said about the issue of the recruitment of young men from the ultra-orthodox community to the IDF, and an overview consisting of a handful of sentences cannot begin to touch upon the complexity of the issue. But it must be said that the solution above mentioned does not seek to serve as an overall response for the demand for equal participation of the ultra-orthodox sector in civic duties, nor can it create sufficient placements for the entire group. Rather, it offers a partial solution, such that could respond to the genuine concerns regarding the ability of Haredi recruits to aptly preserve their way of life – be it gender separation, kosher food, and daily religious studies – all obstacles to the recruitment of Haredis to the IDF today.

These munitions employees would have to be manned exclusively by male recruits, including professional positions such as managers and engineers, among others, whom also can be recruited from the Haredi community, but not necessarily. The operational workers can be recruited from special recruitment rounds of young men from the ultra-orthodox community. As part of their service, the recruits would be provided with kosher meals, communal prayer services either in the barracks or in a synagogue specially built for that purpose, and even religios studies in their downtime. This model can address many of the concerns of potential recruits from the Haredi community while at the same time provide a solution for a pressing strategic military need in Israel.

Economy of munitions

There is no doubt that Israel has been required to adhere to a well calculated munitions economy since the outbreak of the Gaza war. Although there is no doubt as regards to Israel’s military capabilities – especially thanks to the American supply train that provided Israel with hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment since the war began. However, there are numerous variables in this economy that Israel has to consider, and it cannot always trust that this supply effort will endure. Over the past months the government had held frequent discussions on the issue, with recommendations from the military and political echelons to put into action plans to cut Israel’s dependence on foreign supply and increase the capacity of its independent arms production. This is in the face of high risks of embargo against Israel, or the conditioned or delayed shipments Israel is currently contending with. Furthermore, the arrival of these shipments is subjected to the positions and interests of the various administrations with which Israel has weapons trade agreements. This is compounded by the growing global demand for weapons and ammunition, driven among others by the war in Ukraine which has no conclusion on the horizon, and many countries are now in a race to build up and improve their military power, both in Europe and in Asia, where many countries are concerned about China and North Korea, and of course in the Middle East too. Production is falling short of the growing demand and serious backlogs and delays are becoming a matter of routine. Thus, the decision to increase local production and ensure self-sufficiency is hardly exclusive to Israel. For instance, in March the European Commission presented a plan to cut arms imports from outside the EU and increase production on the continent.

Israel’s economic crisis

There is no doubt that the Gaza war has served Israel with a steep bill and is expected to continue exacting huge costs from the Israeli economy. The military technology is a relatively lucrative endeavor for Israel’s economy and it represents a significant portion of Israel’s exports with trail-blazing Israeli technologies demanded globally at considerable costs. The abovementioned proposal departs from the usual focus of the technology-intensive defense industry by broadening its portfolio to “low-tech” munitions manufacturing, and it offers the potential for a historic turning point in the industry, which could expedite the military and economic advantages for the country and pave the way into new markets where Israel’s reputation in the field of defense production would surely serve to lend credibility to and create demand for its new munitions products.

Israel’s international status

A point to consider is that Israel’s dependence on imported weapons and ammunition might compromise its foreign relations with other countries. This places political power over Israel in the hands of the suppliers and oftentimes is leveraged to dictate preconditions for the supply of weapons to Israel – even to the point of influencing Israel’s policies and decision-making processes, particularly in critical time such as wars. Israel, however, has a golden opportunity at present to turn the tables and gain exactly that kind of influence vis a vis other countries, when they come knocking at the door, wishing to purchase Israeli munitions. This potential says something about the influence Israel wields in the field of advanced military technology exports.

In conclusion, this type of munitions industry could manufacture a wide range of arms and ammunition. Naturally, the feasibility and requirements for each plant and assembly line would have to be established. It may be that certain factories would demand more unprofessional manpower while others may be technology-intensive and demand skilled employees. Differences in the cost of salaries might be significant. The State would of course determine whether it would subsidize these factories and recruit manpower at market salaries, even if it means financial losses. But the proposed model provides a cost-effective solution which is highly competitive, and can create attractive export opportunities, not only in regards to the quality of the output but also in prices.

Lastly, an additional important point is the potential abundance of unskilled manpower for this purpose, in a country where there is a shortage of this type of worker, especially in a sensitive military industry. Case in point – in other industries that are mainly based on manual labor such as agriculture and construction, it is hard and even impossible to find Israeli workers, and manpower there almost exclusively comprises of foreign workers. The situation is marginally better in the manufacturing sector. However, when considering the fact that military industry is highly sensitive, it is clear that the benefits of relying on the Haredi community for manpower may create opportunities and remove hurdles that are currently hard to clear.

This article was originally published in Now 14

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Two Hurdles with One Leap? A Proposal for the Recruitment of Haredim to New Arms Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Assistant Commissioner, Brigadier General Betty Lahat served in the Israel Prison Service for 35 years, during which she filled senior positions and headed several prisons, among them the Neveh Tirtza women’s prison, the Sharon Prison and the Hadarim detention center which has been housing many high-profile Palestinian security prisoners. Her last position with the IPS was head of the Service’s intelligence department, in the capacity of which she had met many of the Palestinian security prisoners, Yahya Sinwar among them.

During her years in various positions, Lahat had worked with inmates from many demographics – from youths and women to heads of crime and arch-terrorists. “I’ve experienced a fair share of heartache during my career, and witnessed time and time again our inability to break the cycles of crime and terror”, she says. “I’ve raised generations of inmates – I had female inmates that gave birth while serving prison sentences, and later met their children in juvenile prisons, some of which even remembered me, and how I would throw them birthday parties in the prison cafeteria when they would visit their mothers. I would look at them and think to myself – they’re my children’s age, why did they have to end up in a place like this? It’s a huge heartache. On the other extreme, I have met some of the bloodiest terrorists and had to watch them as they walk around the prison yard, chatting away, laughing and enjoying themselves, while I  had to ensure they received appropriate care. There were times when I would get home and say to myself ‘good lord, what kind of a world am I living in?’”

We knew that his word was the law: the prisoner Yahya Sinwar

Over the years, Betty Lahat had seen some of the most dangerous prisoners Israel’s prisons had known. She had met murderers and heads of crime, and she had met some of the highest profile terrorists. Under her wardenship she had seen the likes of Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin, head of the Hamas military wing Salah Shehade, and head of izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria Ibrahim Hamed, who orchestrated most of the terror attacks during the Second Intifada. However, one of the most memorable inmates for Lahat – mainly due to his nefarious intelligence and shocking cruelty – is Yahya Sinwar.

What was your impression of Sinwar?

“I remember him as a very dominant figure who was very cruel. The prisoners elected him time after time as their prison leader. As such, he put together inmate terror cells and a telecommunications reconnaissance team that was tasked with gathering intel within and outside of the prison. He also commanded special units that interrogated new prisoners. Any prisoner suspected of collaborating with Israel was cruelly tortured. Naturally, Sinwar never did any of the dirty work himself, but it was clear that he was the one pulling the strings. He also took under his wing the most murderous terrorist that would arrive at the prison, and promoted them up the ranks. For example, he took under his wing Abdel-Aziz Salha, a West Bank Hamas militant jailed for life for his part in the lynching of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah, famously depicted standing at a window holding up blood-stained hands, and made him head of the telecommunications units in the prison.  He also added to his ranks the murderers of the Fogel family and the perpetrator of the deadly bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya. Later, during negotiations for the release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Sinwar was involved in the selection of the terrorists to be released. He made sure that he and his cronies were on the list, and left out prisoners that were at odds with him. That was the kind of power he had”.

Would you have believed that Sinwar was able to orchestrate an attack on the scale of the October 7 massacre?

“Absolutely. Sinwar had no interest in coexistence and had always proclaimed he would never be resigned to the ‘Zionist settlers’ living on what he saw as the land of Palestine. I listened to him a lot, both in direct conversations I had with him as well as conversations with his prison associates we tapped. I had never witnessed him stray from his way of thought and staunch ideology. He had grand schemes and he truly believed that by 2027, he would lead a brutal attack that would result in the victory of Hamas over Israel – so whoever tries to claim that Sinwar held a pragmatic approach toward Israel has no idea what he is talking about”.

To what extent was Sinwar involved in events outside of prison?

“In my time, we had designated Sinwar as a national target prisoner, in other words, a prisoner that demands constant surveillance, as his sphere of influence extended beyond prison walls. He was extremely involved with what was happening in other security prisons and was very knowledgeable about current affairs in Israel. You must understand that Sinwar was deviously intelligent. He got to know Israeli society like the back of his hand and could analyze it brilliantly. It was clear from an early stage that he had set his mind on fragmenting Israeli society from within, and he knew just how to do it. His objective of fomenting discord in Israel was clearly evident even during the Gaza war, and it is clear to me that when he emerged from the tunnels and saw Gaza in ruins, he got the tailwind to carry on his fight from seeing the discord in Israel’s society  and he believed he would eventually prevail”.

You participated in the discussions on the list of terrorists to be released as part of the Shalit deal. Where did you stand on the release of Sinwar?

“I had a very hard time with Sinwar’s release, and I had warned them that this is not a terrorist that should be set free. At one point, one of the negotiation team members asked me ‘what do you have against Sinwar? He didn’t kill any Jews, he only killed Palestinian collaborators’, to which I responded – ‘Just wait. He’ll have plenty of Jewish blood on his hands’. I don’t know  exactly what I meant when I said this, but it was clear to me that once he sees an opportunity to commit heinous attacks against Jews – he’ll seize it. Whoever gets to know terrorists like Sinwar, and spends so much time with them as I did, knows what they’re capable of. And whoever was surprised by the sheer cruelty of the terrorist in the October 7 attack didn’t really know them at all”.

It is not a prison. It is summer camp for terrorists

Betty Lahat is very familiar with the situation in Israeli prisons and knows the conditions under which various classes of prisoners are held. She has a hard time accepting the manner in which prisoners – particularly security prisoners – manipulate public opinion in Israel and its justice system to gain unjustified amenities.

“The Palestinian security prisoners know that the Israeli justice system will always take care of them and that the doors of the High Court of Justice are always open to them”, says Lahat. “We are under the impression that when the prisons are quiet, and we give them what they want, we can rehabilitate them and change their ways. But what we fail to understand is that this humane approach is to our detriment. The better the conditions we give them are, the more they perceive us as weak. Even saving their lives has no effect on them. I spoke to Sinwar after he underwent surgery to remove a malignant tumor from his brain in an Israeli hospital. I asked him whether he now has some gratitude toward Israel, to which he replied that he has nothing to be grateful for as we simply did our job. We need to forgo this illusion that if we give them favorable conditions in prison, we can remove them from the path of terror. In all my years with the Israeli Prison Service, I’ve not once encountered a Hamas prisoner that had forsaken his ideology. It just doesn’t happen”.

What does the life of a security inmate look like?

“Each inmate must participate in a mandatory educational program. They also get to study for academic degrees through the Open University. In fact, the Palestinian Authority actually encourages them to earn an education in prison. The higher their academic achievement – the more money they get. In addition, they have a large library and there is not one book that reaches the book stores in Israel that is not added to their library immediately. I’ve seen with my own eyes Palestinian inmates reading canonic Jewish literature such as Jabotinsky’s ‘Iron Wall’ and Yehuda Ha’Levi’s ‘Kuzari’. They also regularly receive Israeli newspapers, their favorite being Ha’aretz – they have a permanent subscription and have a fit when it fails to arrive. In addition to the enrichment programs they’re entitled to from the system, the terror cells within the prisons cultivate education among their members – every member is required to learn Hebrew and serve a period as their spokesman.  They are also taught to gather intel, follow their guards, and follow commentary on Israeli news. They listen to the news and read the papers, and then they sit together and analyze the news and commentary. In particular they pay close attention to the social discord in Israel, to assess how fatigued Israeli society is and thus willing to make concessions. You have to understand that the Palestinian security inmate lives under iron discipline – especially those of them who are members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They waste no time and utilize their prison time to acquire education and skills that will come in handy for their terror activity and long-term plan execution”.

What is your opinion on the criticism on the living conditions of the security inmates?

“Security prisoners are not supposed to have the same conditions that criminal prisoners have, and this is also supported by international law. Whoever murders Jews just for being Jews should be held under completely different conditions. But in practice, the security prisons have long become a summer camp for terrorists. This happens, among others because of the justice system and the High Court of Justice, that hand down phantasmagoric rulings that are utterly out of touch with the reality in the prisons. One day, we were told that we cannot search under the prisoners’ prayer mats because it is disrespectful to their faith – do they even know what prisoners can hide or dig under their mats? As a matter of fact, there are Palestinian security prisoners whose sole job is to sit and compose petitions to the High Court of Justice. That is their job, to send petition after petition, and drive the system crazy. And if that were not enough, they also use lawyers and politicians to help them send out messages to associates on the outside and coordinate plans, and the General Security Service and the Attorney General’s office allow this to happen. If you ask me, the responsibility for the living conditions of security inmates should rest solely in the hands of the IPS, which is the suitable professional body for this, and my vast experience with the IPS teaches me that it would ensure that the security prisoners are treated according to what is stipulated by international law – no more, no less”.

“Every intelligence agency thinks they have a monopoly on brains”

Having climbed to key positions in the Israel Prison Service, Brigadier General Lahat has deep insights not only into the reality within prison walls but also on the fashion in which Israel’s entire security and intelligence apparatus works. One of the most material issues that she points to is the lack of collaboration among the various intelligence agencies. “Each agency thinks it has a monopoly on brains and that it knows better”, she says. “There is a lot of patronizing going around in these agencies, especially on part of the GSS and certain units within IDF Intelligence, and they don’t really strive to cooperate with the police and the prison service. When I was head of the IPS intelligence department, I literally begged them to collaborate with us because I knew we at the prison service, engaging with these prisoners on a daily basis, have valuable input. At that time some improvement was made in the relations between the IP and the intelligence agencies, but I think it pretty much went back to what it used to be. Even today, when I look at what is happening  in the Israeli intelligence community, I see nothing has changed”.

What about the deals for the release of prisoners – are they made without the IPS input?

“When they signed the Jibril prisoner exchange agreement (in 1985, when Israel had released 1,500 Palestinian prisoners – some of them very high profile – in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured in the First Lebanon War), we were not consulted at all, and in the Shalit deal – our involvement was just for appearances. Only after insisting on the presence of the Prison Service in the negotiations on the release of the terrorists, I was invited to the meetings. But even then, my role amounted to presenting background information on the terrorists. After all, the GSS is sure it knows everything, so why should it consult in the IPS?”

Sounds like you have a bellyful of grievances on the GSS. What is your opinion on its work in the past year?

“There are outstanding people in the GSS who do invaluable work, but personally I think that the GSS is a body that takes on responsibilities that are not within its scope of duty  – and often this comes at the expense of tasks that are”.

Generally speaking, do you get the impression that the policy of releasing prisoners in exchange for hostages influences the state of mind of the Palestinian prisoners?

“Very much so. The Palestinian prisoners truly believe that it’s only a matter of time till they are released and this keeps their spirits high. They don’t care how many years they’re sentenced to. Even prisoners who are sentenced to 60 years will say ‘Walla Ishi – “that’s nothing” – because they know that at one point or another, Israelis will be kidnapped and they’ll just be released in an exchange deal. Factually, they are not wrong”.

Are there any prisoners that will never be released with any deal?

“Aside from Yigal Amir (who is serving a life sentence for the assassination of PM Yitzhak Rabin) I know of no such prisoner. In the Jibreal deal and the Shalit deal we’ve released the worst of the terrorists, and I see the names of the terrorist that are on the table for release in the current exchange negotiations  for the Israeli hostages in Gaza and I’m absolutely appalled. When it comes to security prisoners, sooner or later they all get a chance to be released in an exchange deal”.

My family and I received threats, but I was never afraid

Retired Assistant Commissioner Betty Lahat is not just a former senior officer of the Israeli Prison Service – she is one of the first women in the organization to have scaled the ranks and chalk up such an impressive track record. “I don’t wave a feminist banner, but I have opened the doors to many women that followed in my footsteps and I’ve proved that we are every bit as good as the men in the IPS”, she admits. “I was a strong woman in a masculine environment and that wasn’t easy. When I was appointed head of the Sharon Prison,  which is one of Israel’s highest security prisons, there was big drama. Some had a hard time accepting a woman at the head of a men’s prison. When I first arrived, I was the target of scorning looks and remarks. But I didn’t let it affect me. I gathered everyone and proclaimed that I will not apologize for being a woman. Very soon, they all came to see my vast knowledge and experience, coupled with a deep familiarity with the brass tacks. They also saw how motivated I was and the important changes I effected, and no one dared act behind my back or try to sabotage me”.

Your job entailed daily dealings with the most dangerous prisoners in Israel. Weren’t you afraid?

“I had sat in the same room as heads of crime; I’ve sent terrorists to solitary confinement, and there was even a time when I would travel to Gaza by myself – I never felt scared. Even when our intelligence department notified me that there is intel about threats against me, I insisted to go into the wards and meet the prisoners. My family had also received dozens of threats. Marwan Barghouti’s people, for example, threatened to come after me for months because I took away some of their amenities in prison. I had to have a police detail on my house, but even then, I was not afraid. That was my job and that was part of the risk I had assumed with the job”.

What have you learned after 35 years with the IPS?

“One of the most painful insights that I’ve gained from my years with the IPS is that we cannot eradicate the incitement of terror in Palestinian society, and in truth – we really aren’t trying. Many of the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs are weaned from a very young age on hatred toward Jews, and then they go to school – some of them funded by the State of Israel – and are fed yet more false narratives. And if that weren’t enough, young boys are offered incentives for committing terror attacks. There are adolescents that are at the fringe of society, but after committing attacks against Israel, they are suddenly accepted, their families are provided for and they receive a salary. Also, in Israeli prisons, they are required to get their high school diploma, which is something that they could never have hoped to achieve on the outside. So what interest do they have to change their ways?  From what I saw, we do not really have the wherewithal to prevent these boys from becoming heinous terrorists in the future. Just like we cannot prevent the released terrorists from returning  to terrorism, nor from female prisoners from raising future generations of terrorists. These are unbreakable cycles”.

How had your career shape your outlook today as a citizen of Israel?

“I think my work taught me that there is no such thing as black and white. The reality in Israel is very complex and it is about time we stop trying to pull the country to one extreme or another. This is also one of the reasons I had joined the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. To me it is a hate-free movement that comes from a pragmatic stand point. The movement places the well-being of Israel above all and gives serious consideration to every issue related to the country’s security. This gives me the hope that it can lead us and the country to a better place”.

הפוסט “Whoever Was Surprised By the Cruelty of The Terrorists – Did not Really Know Them”, Interview with former Israel Prison Service Assistant Commissioner Brigadier General Betty Lahat הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Analysis: US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon face hurdles as Hezbollah de facto controls Lebanon; Israel must choose between a limited agreement or continued warfare, balancing military success with the need for regional security and international support

The contacts between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States, illustrate the main difficulty of a settlement reality in an era in which a sub-state terrorist organization controls a supposedly sovereign state de facto. The American-mediated contacts are supposed to lead to understandings on the basis of which quiet will be maintained on the border between Israel and Lebanon, but in a situation in which Lebanon is de facto controlled by a terrorist organization whose fingerprints are evident in the negotiations, not to mention the escalation process it led, it is difficult to understand how such an agreement can last, for how long and if at all.

The alternatives available for Israel on the Lebanese border are divided between two options – a local arrangement that does not fundamentally change the geostrategic situation, or the continuation of the war to destroy the Hezbollah terrorist organization. The reality that Israel reached after a year of fighting in the Gaza Strip, while fighting defensively on the Lebanese border, led it to a significant operational achievement vis-à-vis the terrorist organization, both in terms of damage to infrastructure, damage to the top command and control leadership, damage to weapons stockpiles and harm to fighters. Above all, neutralizing Hezbollah’s operative ability to implement the plan it has been working on for years, which is a ground-intensive operation to conquer the Galilee – Hezbollah has lost this capability.

If Israel reaches an arrangement vis-à-vis Lebanon, and assuming that Iran, which controls Hezbollah and indirectly Lebanon, where the radical ideology of the Ayatollahs’ “umbrella” will not change, under this assumption it can be assumed that such an arrangement will last for a short period of time, and certainly will not prevent the strengthening of the terrorist organization, a clear Iranian proxy in Lebanon.

In fact, as far as Israel is concerned, and certainly in today’s public opinion, expects Hezbollah not to regain strength, and certainly not to cross the geographical border of the Litani River, in order to prevent the reestablishment of the option of occupying the Galilee, as well as removing the communities in northern Israel from the direct threat of anti-tank weapons.

The alternative, from the Israelis’ perspective, and among a wide Israeli consensus, even a preferred alternative, is for the IDF to enforce the agreement, i.e., the IDF to prevent Hezbollah’s renewed buildup in the area south of the Litani River. This demand is fraught with a paradox, since Lebanon is a sovereign state, and there is no bilateral rationale whatsoever for a neighboring country to operate on the territory of a sovereign state defined as an enemy, this is a violation of sovereignty and Lebanon will not accept it, certainly not the Iranians.

Hence, the two real alternatives are a limited liability arrangement, or ongoing warfare. With the understanding that Israel will not be able to impose military control of the IDF on the ground on Lebanon, and assuming that Iran will not accept this under any circumstances either, Israel must demand two critical dimensions in the arrangement agreement: first, freedom of action in order to prevent Hezbollah’s buildup, which includes neutralization the smuggling routes – such an action also requires intelligence coverage, and this must be demanded by Israel, even if the visual intelligence is transmitted through an American intermediary, At the CENTCOM level.

On the operational level, Israel must demand a buffer zone into which no weapons will enter, just as defined in the separation of forces agreement between Syria and Israel after the Yom Kippur War (1974). The combination of a buffer zone, legitimacy to act against the axes of buildup, and an informed security assessment on the Lebanese border, which is also based on quality intelligence – are the best guarantee Israel can receive, and this guarantee will also be limited.

There should also be an understanding among the international community that agreements between a democratic state and a state ruled by a terrorist state such as Iran cannot be trusted. As long as Iran seeks to expand in the Middle East, it will find a way to strengthen its destructive arms in the region, including Lebanon. Therefore, the arrangement between Israel and Lebanon is a very likely short-term operation, and no more than a few years until something significant happens in Iran – if it continues its radical strategy, all the peoples of the region, and certainly Israel, will suffer from this.

Therefore, the international community, and certainly Israel, must act immediately for a strategic change vis-à-vis Iran – its different conduct can provide a more realistic guarantee of agreements, especially when the Russian axis, which has a clear interest in the northeastern Mediterranean basin, is integrated into this story.

Can Israel afford to wait for a change of government in the United States?

In general, Israel can suspend negotiations with Lebanon and wait for the Trump administration, which appears to be clearly pro-Israel compared to the Biden administration and in general. At the same time, it is worth being realistic – such a wait means continuing the fighting for at least another year in Lebanon, which means: increasing the burden on IDF reserve duty, continuing the lives of those evacuated from northern communities in the existing format, i.e., another year away from home, which has deep and problematic consequences.

The fighting as it stands these days is characterized mainly by “counter fire,” i.e., the firing of missiles and rockets, combined with unmanned aerial vehicles that violate the security of Israel’s civilian home front several times a day. The IDF, on the other hand, continues to “clear” the Lebanese territory, destroying additional Hezbollah capabilities. On the face of it, time seems to be working against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena – the Israeli home front is showing greater resilience than the Iranians thought, and with each passing day Hezbollah is getting closer and closer to breaking. It is possible that from this perspective, it is convenient for Israel to actually “play the game” according to the current rules, and in this way bring Iran, Hezbollah and Lebanon to an arrangement that is much better for Israel in a few months, certainly under the auspices of a sympathetic American administration – Reaching an arrangement when the terrorist organization is defeated is infinitely more credible than the agreement currently proposed.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Arrangement or escalation: Security alternatives on the Lebanese border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, is turning 89 this month. Even before the open and pressing question of his successor as the chairman of the PA, his rule is already leaving the Authority in disarray. “The PA is in a state of collapse and dilapidation,” says Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid. “It doesn’t pay salaries to its employees; the entire Samaria region is no longer under its control; it doesn’t manage to operate as a political entity, and in regards to the Authority’s future – that’s the big question”.

The Lost Generation of the PA

Baruch, in an article you published last April, you mention a survey according to which most Palestinians view the PA as dead weight and demand its dismantling. Is that still true?

“True. But not a single survey – but a series of poles that found that a significantly high number of Palestinians – sometimes as high as 60 or 80 percent of them – view the Authority as a burden and do not perceive it as a historical achievement. They understand that aside from security coordination that serves mainly the IDF – the Palestinian Authority does not serve the Palestinian dream. It is on the background of this unrest that Hamas was able to garner such widespread sympathy”.

Even today, after the war, the organization enjoys such broad support?

“It’s hard and perhaps even impossible to know how much support Hamas currently has in Gaza, however, in Judea and Samaria it is very well supported. The buildup of Hamas in Judea and Samaria on the expense of the PA is a trend that was evident in all of the surveys on the topic from the past five-six years, although one must take Palestinian surveys with a grain of salt as they often distort the data. At any rate, these surveys clearly show what the world already knows: the Palestinian public harshly criticizes Abu Mazen, who originally was elected for a term of only five years, but after nearly 20 years is still in power, without ever having held elections for the presidency of the PA or its parliament”.

Who will step in to fill the vacuum left by the PA?

“At the present, there are some 40 organizations of Hamas, PIJ and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, particularly in the Samaria region and further north. These are young people, the group of 15–30-year-olds, which in regards to the PA are a lost generation. They were born after the Oslo Accords and hate the Authority because nothing in their lives had improved. They view Hamas and the military path as the realization of their ideological aspirations. Add to that the money that Hamas and Hezbollah pour into the region”.

How can the PA restore the public’s trust?

“Fatah members as well as Abu Mazen know that that in the 2006 elections, Fatah got more votes than Hamas, but the votes were distributed among the factions that comprise Fatah – nowadays it has three and a half leaders and several organizations and this is its greatest problem and the reason Hamas won the elections at the time with a landslide. So the solution is a reform, and everyone is pressuring Abu Mazen to introduce reforms; The Egyptians and Saudis also demanded that the PA undergo reform, but Abu Mazen has not complied due to fatigue and conservatism and his unwillingness to open the government to additional players”.

Why has he not complied with the demands?

“Most likely he hasn’t the energy to make reforms and open up the system and prefers to lean of the current situation. He prefers to preserve the current state rather than take risks. Everyone surrounding him is waiting for him to leave. He is more a token leader that a leader in effect. However, it is unclear what the day after will bring in the PA – whether he will be succeeded by another element in Fatah, if his moderate line will remain, or whether his successor will be Marwan Barghouti, who is very close to Hamas and very militant, or another leader that would collaborate with Hamas, and if elections will be held – in the event that Hamas takes over the Authority”.

The Return of the Saudis to the Abraham Accords

So many open questions. And what are the implications for Israel?

“The conclusion is that, in my opinion, Israel cannot rely on the PA as a viable factor.  I believe that the Egyptians and Saudis also realize this. Everyone – including the Americans and Emiratis – are demanding that Abbas carry out the reforms in order to prepare the ground for his successor, and after he steps down, everything will be open to a new reality,  and not necessarily a positive one.”

How should Israel act at the moment?

“It should maintain full security control of Judea and Samaria and Gaza, while at the same time cultivating a Palestinian civilian apparatus that will undertake the care of the population. For the time, under Abbas, this is happening, but there is no guarantee that it will be so in the future, and certainly there is no guarantee that it will be so in the long term. Israel should also try to expand the Abraham Accords, including interim agreements regarding the Palestinian Authority.”

That means agreeing to a Palestinian State, right?

“It will be necessary to give the Sunni states a horizon of some two-state solution, but this doesn’t have to happen at this moment, and is the biggest political challenge, since the Saudis, for example, declare morning, noon and night that without a Palestinian state, there will be no normalization. Although the messages Israel is receiving are different, this is the general direction”.

“At this stage, the model should be one in which Israel does not forgo the two-state option – i.e. does not annex Judea and Samaria and does not dismantle the Palestinian Authority. This would allow Saudi Arabia to enter an agreement. But the implementation of the solution itself will depend on a long-term agreement and will also be subject to changes. We’re talking about a period of 10 to 20 years, during which the Palestinian street will have to undergo significant change, and it also depends on the decline of Iran’s influence. Some sources in the Gulf states say it’s possible.”

Will the PA Return to Gaza?

In  order to understand the relations between the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, we need to go back to 2007, when Hamas deposed Fatah and seized control of Gaza in a series of violent clashes. Until that point, the PA had a bureaucratic apparatus set up in Gaza with its own officials. “Until today the PA claims it still has 18 thousand civil servants and 18 thousand security personnel in the Gaza Strip. In other words – over 30 thousand people that have remained in their positions, even under Hamas rule”.

Is this true?

“It’s unclear, and it is highly unlikely in the case of the security apparatus. Hamas did keep some Fatah members in professional positions withing Gaza’s civil service, and in many cases chose to place its own people in executive positions alone. However, it remains unclear how many Fatah members have actually remained in Gaza after Hamas’ takeover”.

And now the PA is planning its return to Gaza?

“As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned – and this it had stated even before the outbreak of the war – it is still the boss in Gaza. The Authority views its demand for a return to control in Gaza as only natural, thus it endeavored dozens of reconciliation attempts with Hamas. Two months ago, the Authority sent the Americans a 101-page document, in which it claims that it is the governing body of Gaza and that it has a plan for the reinstatement of its governance, such as reopening the hospitals, schools, government offices, and more. The Americans – it must be said – were not convinced”.

What is the position of the Arab states?

“Here things start getting complicated. Naturally the Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis all publicly support the control of the PA in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, as it serves the two-state vision. But under the surface the Egyptians and Saudis have a lot of criticism against the Authority and they are appalled by the corruption and its dysfunction and from the fact that Abu Mazen hasn’t held elections for the chairmanship of the Authority and for its parliament for nearly 20 years. But this is under the surface, and the Saudis still continue to transfer broad financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Only recently Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with the Saudi ambassador to Jodan, who transferred him aid money”.

In other words – the Arab world does not publicly criticize the PA?

“Public criticism of the Palestinian Authority is heard mainly in the Emirates. Two months ago, a proposal was made according to which the UAE undertakes financial support to the Authority, but the UAE rejected the suggestion out of hand, because they object to Abu Mazen heading the PA. This is why in an interview to The New York Times,  Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan proclaimed ‘no Abbas and no Hamas’. I’ve encountered this position on part of many sources in the Authority even before Dahlan. There are other sources that would like to see a governing body in Gaza as well as Judea and Samaria that is neither Abu Mazen nor Hamas”.

Abu Mazen’s Condition: Hamas Acknowledges the Oslo Accords

What is the position of the Sunni Arab states on Gaza?

“Egypt, Jordan and Saudia view Hamas as a terror organization. The UAE has plans for Gaza which designates as Chairman of the PA Dr. Salam Fayyad, former PM of the Authority under Abu Mazen more than a decade ago. Dr. Fayyad is not a member of Fatah or the PLO. He is an expert on economics. The moderate Arab world and the US wish to see him as head of the Palestinian Authority. However, Qatar has a long-standing vision of political Islam, which they hoped Hamas would realize. Already in 2019, the Qataris met with Hamas in Judea and Samaria and offered to fund them in the elections, but they would rather see Khaled Mashal as head of Hamas, They don’t favor Sinwar, who had detested and insulted them. There was no love lost between them– Qatar and Sinwar. Some claim that now the Qataris have the opportunity to try and reassert their influence with the Hamas leadership that resides overseas, but the Iranian’s and Hezbollah also want to maintain close ties with Hamas”.

What kind of relations would Qatar have between Hamas and the PA?

“Qatar would like to see Hamas as part of the PLO, as it would legitimize Hamas, and make it less militant. But Abu Mazen set a condition for this: if you want to be part of the PLO – you have to accept the Oslo Accords, which means the implied recognition in the State of Israel.  Meanwhile, Hamas is led by a council in lieu of a new leader, and it there appears to be a power struggle between the more moderate camp – the Muslim Brotherhood supported by Qatar – and the militant camp, which is close to Iran”.

In April you wrote that Mohammad Dahlan – the Fata leader living in Abu Dabi – is promoting a plan for leadership of the Gaza Strip, with the backing of a Arab Sunni force. Is this still true?

“Yes, he’s still working on it. But he also understands that forming the Arab force he’s talking about can only happen as part of a diplomatic process, and he understands that for the time being, Israel is not seeking any diplomatic arrangement, He understands that he’ll be forced to find a solution in collaboration with the Palestinian Authority. According to my sources, Dahlan’s people have recently  spoke on numerous occasions with Abu Mazen’s people to find a path to reconciliation and unite the forces in Gaza,. Also Israeli Defense Minister Galant’s ‘Security Island Plan’ for concentrating Gaza’s population in ‘humanitarian bubbles’ with a civil apparatus for each such bubble comprising locals that will be armed with light arms – is very acceptable on part of the Emiratis”.

הפוסט Lt. Col. (Res.) Baruch Yedid: “The Palestinian Authority Is In A State Of Collapse” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For years now, there are voices which would have the world view some of the most bloodthirsty and cruel terror organizations the world has ever known, i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah, not as the terrorists they are, but as “freedom fighters”. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, this bias has been pushed even further. They are being chanted in pro-Palestinian rallies, openly declared on banners on campuses of the most prestigious universities of the world, and are even heard in certain Israeli circles.

This paper reviews the goals that govern these organizations and their methods of operation and shows beyond doubt that equating terrorists and their organizations with freedom fighters is nothing short of fallacious. Aside from being a falsehood, this is a grave claim that harbors very dangerous consequences. When terrorist perpetrating war crimes are called freedom fighters, they are in effect gaining license to commit criminal activities and even immunity from the consequences thereof, and moreover, such claims breed further problematic misconceptions that view terror organizations as legitimate resistance movements, and the acts of terror themselves – as brutal and bloody as they might be – as legitimate means of popular struggle.

Therefore, any claims to that effect should be categorically denounced. At the same time, a comprehensive endeavor should be undertaken to debunk this narrative and reinforce the true understanding of terrorism and its overall end, for which any means are exploited: the annihilation of the Jewish state and its Jewish citizens.

In the name of enlightenment: how have terrorists become to be known as “liberators”?

The fictitious claim according to which terrorists are freedom fighters draws on an anti-Zionism narrative, according to which the Jews are colonialists that have seized control of a country called Palestine, with the aim of taking over a land with which they have no connection whatsoever. This contrived narrative is wrong on two accounts: the so-called state of Palestine had never existed, and secondly, the connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is undisputable and is established both historically and legally. The people of Israel are not foreign colonizers – they are a people returning to their rightful land after 2,000 years of unjust exile, which forced upon them an existence as mostly unwanted foreign elements in their hosting countries.

It follows that anyone who supports the Palestinian narrative is refuting the national rights of the Jewish people and disputing major legal rulings made by the international community, such as the British Mandate, granted by the League of Nations and the Partition Plan by the UN from 1947.

Although such claims have been voiced since the establishment of the State of Israel, they have been regaining tailwind under the auspices of radical progressive movements that had risen from the radical left in the Unites States such as the WOKE movement. WOKE and its counterparts are governed by the undiscerning principle that the weak are invariably in the right and victimized, and tend to turn what it perceives as the victim into the hero of the story. As part of this paradigm, the so-called struggle of the Islamic terror organizations for the “liberation” of “oppressed” minorities and the right to self-determination is perceived in some circles as a valiant post-modern struggle, and from there only a short leap was needed to view such terrorists as would-be freedom fighters.

The question of goals: what really motivates terrorists?

The raison d’etre of true freedom fighters is the liberation of their people and land from foreign conquerors that have invaded and seized it by force. A prime example of this is Mahatma Gandhi, who led a peaceful struggle against the British Empire’s rule in India and for national independence. In stark contrast, even a cursory examination of the stated objectives of some terror organizations clearly yields a completely different picture.

A quick look at the Hamas charter, for example, reveals that the organization makes no qualms about stating its overall goal – the all-out, end-justifying “Holy War” (Jihad) against the State of Israel, and the absolute rejection of any agreement or arrangement that would recognize the right of Israel to exist. The charter even quotes Hasan al-Banna ,the founder of its ally movement, The Muslim Brotherhood, who said: “Israel will rise and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it”.

As for Hezbollah, it too does not march under any banner of liberation – neither of people nor of country. It operates out of Lebanon – an independent state with no permanent Israeli  presence within its sovereign borders, and with no land dispute whatsoever with its southern neighbor such that calls for an irridentist agreement. Moreover, Hezbollah operates in Lebanon as a proxy and under the auspices and military support of another sovereign country, Iran, which resides 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Israel, and non-democratically forces its presence on the Lebanese people solely for its proclaimed purpose of annihilating the State of Israel and its citizens.

Another manifestation of the true non-peaceful intentions of terror organizations the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah – and indeed even official Arab organizations such as  the Palestinian Authority – is the fact that for decades, they have been rejecting out of hand nearly every solution or offer that Israel and Western administrations have brought to the table to bring the conflict to a resolution, thus proving that they are not motivated by the desire for emancipation. The underlying reason they have not accepted any diplomatic solution thus far is that all of these recognize the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. In other words – they strive only for a resolution that ensures the eradication of Israel from the map.

The question of operating method: how do terrorists differ from freedom fighters?

In 1984, acclaimed historian, Professor Benzion Netanyahu spoke at the second international conference of the Jonathan Institute for the study of terror. He spoke of the urgent need to fight the misconception regarding the true nature of terrorism, and in particular the perception of terrorists as “freedom fighters” or “protectors” of oppressed people. Professor Netanyahu addresses the manner in which freedom fighters operate and how it vastly differs from that of terrorists. He mentions three points of comparison that still hold true today, even after forty years:

Operating against civilians

Professor Netanyahu points to the fact that freedom fighters wage their struggle for a political or social end, with a fundamental respect to human rights of innocents. In stark contrast, terrorist make it a point to target innocent civilians as a means with which to foment fear and achieve their self-serving political interests.

Looking at the long list of terrorist attacks that have plagued Israel through recent decades – including the October 7 massacre in 2023, it is clear that terrorist organizations are systematically and deliberately targeting the civilian population as well, including the elderly, children and babies.

The installation of totalitarian regimes

Freedom fighters are committed to ensuring universal liberties and rights, says Prof. Netanyahu, which terrorists habitually ignore and violate – even the most basic of human rights – and propagate oppression in territories under their control. In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, it is common knowledge that they use their own people as human shields and ensconce themselves in densely populated areas, often causing intentional harm to innocent people on their side in self-protection or as a means of swaying public opinion with publicized propaganda. Furthermore, terrorist organizations violently oppress weak groups within their own population  such as women, minorities and members of the LGBTQ community. Hence, it would be absurd to present these organizations as champions of human rights and liberties.

Relations with dictatorships, oppressive regimes and organizations

The third point mentioned by Prof. Netanyahu relates to the connection frequently seen between terror organizations and violent groups and oppressive regimes. He explains that the aid terrorist often receive from these sources underscores their affinity to aims of oppression rather than values of liberty.

This connection is particularly evident with those terror organizations that operate on Israel’s borders. Hezbollah is an arm of the Shi’ite Iranian regime – a totalitarian state that had set its sights on orchestrating a world-wide Islamic revolution, and openly proclaims its intention of annihilating the State of Israel.   Interestingly, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), although members of the historically rival Islamic Sunni stream, are willing to benefit from Iran’s sponsorship just to further their cause against Israel, and view themselves as an affiliate of another extremist group – the Muslim Brotherhood – a  fundamentalist Sunni Islamist movement that calls for the eradication of the State of Israel, and is designated as a terrorist group in many countries.

It is evident that these terror groups enjoy the backing of powerful elements with a clear ideology of world dominance, and not only do they have no agenda of liberation – they are motivated by a desire to control and oppress.

Debunking a claim of equivalence: Jewish resistance vs. Islamic terror

There are those who would equate the terror organizations threatening Israel to the struggle of the pre-state Jewish resistance, such as the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and Etzel (the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel). They claim that the members of these groups were no less terrorists than the members of Hamas or Hezbollah today, or alternatively – that the terrorists of the latter two are no less freedom fighters than the members of the Jewish resistance.

However, this comparison disregards all the points mentioned above, and fails to consider that different nature of these resistance movements and the terror organization in terms of objectives and methods of operation.

As far as the objectives of the Jewish resistance – as oppose to the terror organizations, they indeed were committed to true liberation and independence. In 1922, the predecessor to the UN – the League of Nations – ratified the British mandate. This was an international accord standing on solid legal ground that cemented Britain’s commitment to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel. In effect, the British blatantly violated this accord and banned the entrance of Jews in to Israel while at the same time encouraging the settlement of Arabs in the area and transferring territories from Israel to the Emirate of Transjordan. Thus, the Jewish resistance movement did indeed fight for the legal right given to them, and more importantly – once this aim was achieved, the resistance was disbanded or assimilated into the new state’s formal military.

The terror organizations, as above demonstrated, demand independence for a state that does not exist and had never existed. And still, they had received numerous offers over the course of the past decades but rejected any compromise, calling for the destruction of the State of Israel – an objective that has nothing in common with those of the Jewish resistance movement or any other freedom fighting movement for that matter.

A comparison of the methods of operation shows fundamental differences between the two: as oppose to the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, the members of the Jewish militias targeted the British military personnel in the country and not civilians of any nationality. Furthermore, they did all in their power to protect the Jewish population, even at the price of their own lives. Moreover, the fighters of the Jewish resistance did not operate under the auspices or with the support of any state or global organization, and were not affiliated with dictatorships or totalitarian regimes.

The attempt at attributing any equivalence between the pre-state Jewish resistance and the terror organizations is nothing more than a populistic ruse motivated by the aim of creating a distorted picture of reality, or at the very least – it stems from pure ignorance.

A policy of zero tolerance: conclusion and insights

Equating murderous terrorists with freedom fighters is not only fallacious and indeed offensive on many levels – it is downright dangerous. This comparison awards terrorists with justification for their actions, including murder, rape, torture and kidnapping innocents. Statements in support of such actions cannot be accepted, not even in the name of tolerance and freedom of speech, as they legitimize violence against and the murder of Jews. When the equation of terrorists with freedom fighters is heard from sources within Israel itself – not to mention on part of  Israeli officials – they are tenfold graver.

Sadly, these terror organizations have learned and perfected the art of propaganda and disinformation, and their abilities in this area are boosted by the skillful use of internet and AI. They are also very adept at  exploiting Western values and ways of thought to sway public opinion in the West and even in Israel, citing duplicitous pretexts of “human rights”.

Hence, it behooves Israel and the Jewish nation to conduct a holding action and do their share in informing and shaping public opinion – in Israel and the world.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement was formed precisely out of the need to bring the truth and advocate Israel and Zionism to the public. Our organization believes in the imperative of educating on the Jewish national ethos as it is our believe that first and foremost – it is the bedrock of Israel’s national security.

For this end, the IDSF HaBithonistim conducts various activities such as excursions to historic heritage sites across Israel and talks and conferences on Zionism. Recently we have established the pre-military program “Ha’tkuma” that is situated in the Gaza envelop area and held in collaboration with the communities there.

The IDSF HaBithonistim website provides a wide range of content, from commentary on current affairs to opinion pieces and analyses – all with the aim of providing a broad perspective rooted in facts and truth, reinforcing the conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause and above all – to stand as a reminder that in the story of the Jewish people and Zionism – the Jewish nation and the miracle that is the State of Israel are the true heroes.

הפוסט “Freedom Fighters”? Hamas and Hezbollah Are Terrorist Organizations; Any Attempt to Claim Otherwise is Condemnable הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The organized pogrom perpetrated against the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, in which Jews were humiliated and assaulted on European soil, sounded alarm bells this week. It must be said, however, that these came on top of countless red lights indicating the growing radical Islamic threat germinating European soil. Painful motifs, such as the timing of this pogrom – just moments before the anniversary of the Kristallnacht, the brutal violence, the hurling of Jews into the gracht waters or the blind eye turned by the authorities, made this event all the more outstanding and horrific. In view of the surge in anti-Semitism in Europe throughout the war and the increasing frequency of demonstrations and violent disturbances, one arrives at an unmistakable conclusion: these are no isolated incidents. Rather, this is a new, undeniable reality on European soil. In extreme scenarios, it could amount to fundamentally alter Israeli-European diplomatic and defense relations.

This new reality poses us a clear mirror: the classical continent, which is portrayed as a peaceful Western territory filled with picturesque villages, Gothic cathedrals, steam trains and iconic tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, the Schoenbrunn Palace and London Tower, is gradually undergoing a transformation. The change in the demographics and in the civilization itself in Europe has been taking form over past decades and at an accelerated pace this past decade. Faced with this reality, Europe, for the most part is helpless, slow to respond, and has yet to fully realize the magnitude of the threat that has entered into the belly of the beast.

Aided and abetted by the authorities, millions of immigrants from the Islamic world have been arriving, reshaping the continent with their feet. It is not uncommon nowadays to walk around Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris, Barcelona or London and feel how these so closely-familiar cities, touted as tourism and culinary hotspots, are being enveloped with entire ghettos and filling with large immigrant communities that are tightening their grip on these places. Cultural artifacts like billboards in Arabic and mosque minarets are increasingly becoming a feature of everyday life. “We have become the Gaza of Europe”, lamented Dutch leader Geert Wilders bitterly. “I refuse to accept this.”

But the reality is that 30% of Birmingham’s population is Muslim, some half of Brussels’ is of non-Belgian descent, and the most commonly-given name to newborn children is Muhammad. All of this dovetails with the reality in many other European cities, yet are met with a deep culture of denial among Europeans.

The last time demographic data on Islam’s prevalence in Europe was released was in 2016. For some reason, in the past eight years there has been no release of updated figures. In a conference I attended, a senior European Union official voiced her surprise at the complaints voiced by the “radical right” regarding mass immigration into Europe. She made comparisons to the massive presence of Venezuelan refugees throughout South America, or Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon – to the situation in Europe, which according to her was negligible. Another speaker, a senior NATO official, insisted – mistakenly – that the immigrants were not responsible for even a single terrorist attack in Europe. None other than French President Emmanuel Macron spoke about “séparatisme”, but stressed that the terrorist attacks are perpetrated by French people – not by immigrants – since they are French citizens, totally sidestepping the issue of the civilizational shift underway in his own backyard.

Incidents like the Amsterdam pogrom ought to shake even nationalistic governments out of their doldrums in reaction to these “Wir schaffen das”-type policies of former Chancellor Angela Merkl, but they are slow to react. Laws allowing for revocation of citizenship and deportation of inciters and terrorists are being hollowed out. Thus is the extradition of the “Jihad Widow” in Brussels being delayed for years as the legal wrangling drags on, and the Hamas-sympathizing agitator Muhammad Hanoun in Italy is still leading anti-Semitic demonstrations without his citizenship being revoked or him being deported – even though the US State Department has imposed sanctions against him. The Meloni government in Italy is still working on its Albania Plan without any tangible results, and even the newly-installed right-wing governments in Austria and the Netherlands are slow in implementing an effective immigration policy.

Countries such as France or Switzerland prefer, on the one hand, to pass laws outlawing burkas or mosque minarets in the public space, while on the other hand allowing hundreds of thousands of immigrants to enter their countries and remain there permanently. The European Union’s 2020 counter-terrorism strategy included a pitiful few measures aimed at tightening border security or deportation of agitators. They included mainly measures for strengthening “community resilience” through sport, intelligence cooperation, and removal of youths from the path toward radicalization through soft means.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the only countries that refuse to go along with the family reunion policy and with the pro-immigration policies of the rest of Europe, policies that have seen the admission of millions of immigrants into the continent with the world’s lowest average birth rate. The results are plain to see – an almost total absence of anti-Semitic incidents, even in view of the war in the Middle East, in stark contrast to the surge in such incidents throughout the rest of Europe.

The Amsterdam events are consistent with the European attitude toward the war in Israel. This begins with a profound denial of the root cause of the problem and the preference for “band-aid” solutions – in Israel’s case, Europe’s failure to call out Iran’s hegemonistic motives and Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s anti-Semitism, while focusing on the territorial dispute with the Palestinians and on the “two-state solution”. In the Amsterdam case, this means “severely punishing” the culprits or “strengthening security” – instead of addressing the broader threat from radical Islam. This is also the case when it comes to media coverage – although for the most part it reflected the reality on the ground, it did blow out of proportion isolated incidents perpetrated by “Jewish hooligans”, who had rioted and were arrested, or “Maccabi fans tore down Palestinian flags and provoked riots”. This skewed view of reality is nothing new for Israelis in the context of the war here in the Middle East, where headlines decry “massacre of civilians” or the “catastrophic famine” within the Strip.

Europe is still deep in denial. Around half of the teachers in France avoid discussing certain issues for fear of provoking Muslim students, particularly after the appalling murder of teacher Samuel Pati. The terrorist attacks in Paris, Barcelona and London, the assassinations of artists critical of Islam, as in the case of Dutch director Theo Van Gogh, or the attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, all these still meet a complacent European public, where only 32% of surveyed citizens are prepared to fight to defend their country. The rest of those surveyed are more worried about climate change than security issues.

The first signs of change in the European political landscape have begun to appear – right-wing governments, sometimes radical right-wing, are ascending to power. There is a marked drop in voting for green parties in favor of nationalist parties, and many constraints that have been stifling public debate are now crumbling. This denial has ushered in an ambiance conducive to immigration and radical Islam. Its dismantling is the first step toward confronting these issues.

Absent a change in trajectory, this might force Israel to regard Europe as more of a threat than a partner. Europe might come to be considered a hostile Arab space, and travel there could be categorized at a risk level equal to that of travel to Arab countries. Israelis, who have so far made do with a few simple measures like avoiding speaking Hebrew in public or not wearing anything indicative of their Jewish identities, will be compelled to further recalculate their moves. They might choose to avoid traveling to Germany, the same way they avoid traveling to countries like Egypt. One can only imagine a worst-case scenario in which these elements seize the centers of power, and the political and security implications Israel will have to deal with regarding this nearby, powerful continent. The European states had better wake up and outright reject this shifting cultural orientation, before it is too late.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

הפוסט The Amsterdam Pogrom: Europe could eventually be considered hostile Arab territory for Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.