The End of the Sherman: Do It Yourself

The Armored Corps is currently considered one of the main and most important forces in the IDF, but this was not always the case. During the War of Independence, the State of Israel relied mainly on infantry forces and possessed only 15 tanks. Over the years, the number of tanks gradually increased, and with it the scope of involvement of the armored forces in the IDF’s operational activities. In Operation Kadesh (the 1956 Sinai War), Israel already operated 200 tanks, in the Six Day War (1967) it operated about 1,000 tanks, and in the Yom Kippur War (1973) the number of tanks in use had already risen to 2,000.

Despite the quantitative increase, the quality of the tanks at Israel’s disposal barely improved. Due to various diplomatic motives, countries around the world refused to sell Israel new tanks, and the fledgling country was forced to rely on old and incompetent tanks such as the Shermans from World War II and the British Centurions that had become obsolete. The IDF and the Israeli defense industry made great efforts to rehabilitate and improve those old tanks, but it was clearly impossible to rely on such improvisations in the long run.

During the 1960s, two turning point events occurred that pushed the State of Israel to find a solution to the tank crisis. The first event was the news that Arab countries were expected to receive T-62 tanks from the Soviet Union, which were considered the most advanced tanks in the world at the time. The second event was the Chieftain tank affair, when England withdrew at the last minute from its commitment to sell advanced tanks to Israel. These two events made Israel realize that it had to catch up in the armor race vis-a-vis enemy countries, and that it had no choice but to do this on its own.

Getting the caterpillars moving: The development process begins

In 1969, subsequent to the collapse of the deal to purchase tanks from England, the possibility of Israel producing tanks itself was first considered. To examine the feasibility of this, a committee was formed, comprised of professionals and security experts, headed by Major General Israel Tal, later nicknamed the “Father of the Merkava.” The committee was required to examine both the State of Israel’s technological and infrastructural capabilities, as well as the economic viability of the move. The committee’s conclusions were that the State of Israel is capable of establishing a tank industry and that such an industry would provide a solution to its military needs, reduce dependence on other countries, and even benefit the country economically. A few months later, in August 1970, the official decision was made, and the State of Israel embarked on this ambitious project.

In order to promote the project, the Merkava Tank Planning Directorate was established, which bore overall responsibility for development, and the Tank Development Authority (TDA), which dealt with engineering planning. To save time and costs, it was decided to rely as much as possible on infrastructure that already existed in the IDF and the defense establishment. This is how the IDF Tank Rehabilitation and Maintenance Center (RMC), which until then had been used to improve tanks, became the assembly plant for the new tank. Similarly, the IDF’s Equipment and Spare Parts Center and the Procurement and Production Directorate were modified in order to meet the needs of the project. Another decision made was to make tank production a nationwide project, and for this purpose about 200 factories in the defense and civilian industries were converted into factories to manufacture tank parts. The Ardan foundry, for example, began producing heavy armor castings that were used for the turret and the chassis (the bottom portion of the tank), and the IMI factories began producing tank cannons.

The Israeli tank production process lasted a total of about nine years, and on February 20, 1979, the long-awaited moment arrived and the first Merkava tank entered operational use in the 7th Armored Corps Brigade.

Improving and perfecting the Merkava

The first Merkava tank, known as the Merkava Mark 1, was considered a modern and advanced tank at the time. It boasted unprecedented defense capabilities and high survivability, made possible in part by the revolutionary decision to move the engine to the front of the tank.

Since then, the Merkava tank has undergone a series of modifications, which improved both its defense and performance on the battlefield. The Merkava tanks were equipped with fire control systems, night vision devices, and improved firepower systems. Over the years, more advanced models were also developed, and the most advanced – the Merkava Mark 4 – entered IDF service in 2003. Today, the improved models of the Merkava Mark 4 tank benefit from advanced command and control systems, and are equipped with the Wind Jacket active defense system that facilitates maximum protection for the soldiers inside the tank.

Over the years, the State of Israel has produced thousands of Merkava tanks, and these have been used in all the campaigns and wars that have erupted since: In the First Lebanon War, the Merkava Mark 1 tank was used against Syrian armored forces; during the Second Intifada, the Merkava Mark 2 and 3 tanks were used for patrols in dangerous areas and to support infantry forces; during the Second Lebanon War, three armored divisions entered Lebanese territory; and during the Sword of Iron War, the tanks – mainly the Merkava Mark 3 and Mark 4 models – played a central combat role and greatly assisted in ground operations in Gaza and Lebanon.

Only in Israel: Sales prohibited to foreign countries

The Israeli Merkava tank is currently considered the most advanced tank in the world, and few tanks manage to come close to its capabilities. One might expect that the State of Israel would want to exploit the inherent economic advantage of this and export the tank to other countries, but from the very beginning of Merkava tank production, its sale to foreign countries was prohibited in order to maintain the Israeli Armored Corps’ unique advantage.

It was only in 2010 that the Ministry of Defense decided to permit, in principle, the sale of the Merkava Mark 4 tank to “select customers”. In 2014, the Ministry of Defense signed the first Merkava export deal with a foreign country, whose name is prohibited from publication. In 2023, negotiations were held to sell Merkava Mark 2 and Merkava Mark 3 tanks, which are retired from IDF service, to a European country and a South American country whose names were also not disclosed, but these plans were halted due to the Swords of Iron War. So, to date, the State of Israel is probably the only country in the world, or one of the few, in possession of the Merkava tank.

Besides its uniqueness, another source of pride lies in the fact that approximately 80% of the tank’s components are manufactured in Israel, so the project provides a source of livelihood for tens of thousands of Israelis in more than 200 factories nationwide. Nowadays, when there is much talk about the importance of self-development of weapons and combat equipment, it is good to remember the strength of the Israeli defense industry and the immense potential of domestic production.

הפוסט 46 years ago today: The Merkava tank entered operational use in the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On June 27, 1976, an Air France flight with 248 passengers – mainly Israeli and Jewish – and 12 crew members departed from Ben-Gurion airport in Israel to Paris. The plane landed for a stopover in Athens, where four terrorists – a male and female German nationals and two Palestinian men, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) – boarded the flight. Shortly after takeoff, the  terrorists hijacked the airplane and ordered the captain to change the flight’s course to  Benghazi in Libya, where the plane was held on the ground for several hours for refueling and joined by an additional three terrorists. Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi refused to allow the plane to remain on Libyan soil and the plane took off towards Uganda, there it landed in the Entebbe International Airport on June 28. In Entebbe, the hijackers were joined by yet another six, armed Palestinians to assist in guarding the hostages as well as some 100 Ugandan troops, under the auspices of Uganda ruler Idi Amin. The hijackers barricaded themselves and the hostages in one of the old unused terminals of the airport and stated that they rigged the entire area with explosives. Later, the terrorists singled out the Jewish and Israeli passengers and isolated them in a separate room in the terminal.

Two days after the hijacking, most of the non-Jewish and non-Israeli passengers were released. They offered the captain and crew to join the released hostages, but they chose to remain with their passengers that were kept in Uganda, bringing the headcount of hostages to 117: 105 passengers and 12 crew members.

Ugandan President, Idi Amin, lent his support to the hijackers and allowed them to use the Entebbe terminal to hold the hostages. The terrorists gave the State of Israel an ultimatum wherein they demanded the release of 53 terrorists – so called “freedom fighters”, most of which were held in Israeli prisons – by July 1, otherwise they would commence with the execution of all the hostages. The terrorists further demanded a $5 million ransom from the French government for the return of the Air France airplane. The demands of the hijackers were publicized in Israel and the families of the hostages sent a letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, imploring he give in to the demands of the terrorist, claiming that “human life is more important than ideals”.

Albeit the sympathy on part of the government to the families’ cause, it was reluctant to accept the terrorists’ demand in the concerns that such a move would encourage more terror hijackings in the future. Eventually, the voices demanding military intervention were heeded and Rabin ordered a military operation to release the hostages.

With precious little time and intel: preparing for the operation

In order to buy some time, Israel agreed to negotiate with the terrorist on the release of the hostages, thus the ultimatum was extended to July 4.

During that time, IDF Intelligence Corps scrambled to gather and analyze the necessary intel. Since Uganda did not have diplomatic relations with Israel at the time, but was not considered a terror-supporting state, Israel was short of intel on the country.

To gather as much detailed information as possible on Uganda, Intelligence consulted with Baruch Bar-Lev, who was the last Israeli military attaché to the country and was known to have warm relations with Idi Amin. The Israeli Mossad sent an undercover operative on a civilian airplane to take air photos of the Entebbe airport and the terminal where the hostages were held. Additionally, crucial intel came from one of the released passengers – an Israeli with a duel British citizenship – who feigned having a miscarriage and was released by the terrorists. Upon arriving in England, she shared initial intel on the hijackers with the British Intelligence, reporting what the terrorists stated to the hostages and describing the atmosphere in the airplane at the time of the hijacking. MI6 delivered this information to Israeli Intelligence, which was now able to determine that the hijackers were members of the organization of Wadi’ Haddad, former operations officer of the PFLP.

More crucial information came from another released hostage – a passenger with dual Israeli-French citizenship and a military background, who was able to impart impressively accurate information on the weapons held by the hijackers. Furthermore, Israeli construction firm Solel-Boneh, which built the Entebbe terminal on the 60s – was instrumental in building a replica of the terminal on which the commando forces trained.

Thanks to these efforts and more, the Israeli Intelligence was able to form an accurate picture within a relatively short time and gather enough intel for a military operation to release the hostages.

The decoy Black Mercedes: the unfolding of the operation

On noon July 3, the day before the expiration of the new ultimatum, four IAF Lockheed C-130 Hercules planes took off from the southern Sinai city of Sharme-el-Sheik towards Entebbe airport. Onboard were 176 elite Matkal recon commandos, and paratrooper and Golani troops. Due to the urgency of the operation, the planes took off before the government’s final green light, which came when the force was already airborne. Due to the long flight-rout, Israel had with great effort, obtained the permission of Kenya to land the planes in Nairobi, for refueling.  In a sheer stroke of luck, despite intel on the imminent attack leaking from Kenya’s air force to the Ugandan military and to Idi Amin – the latter did not take the news seriously and rejected it as mere rumors.

On the night of July 4, the planes landed at Entebbe International Airport. For the purpose of deception, the forces unloaded jeeps and a Mercedes car identical to the one driven by Idi Amin, who would visit the hostages daily, and thus were able to drive towards the building where the hostages were being held, posing as the Ugandan president’s convoy and security force.

According to the plan, the force was to drive directly to the hostage terminal, however, on the way encountered two Ugandan soldiers, whose suspicions arose as they were informed that Amin had swapped his famous Black Mercedes for a new white model.  Head of the commando force, Lieutenant Colonel Yoni Netanyahu, ordered them shot. The noise from the firing eliminated the element of surprise for the Israeli force and they had to make the rest of the way to the terminal under fire.

Despite these disruptions, the force successfully reached the terminal, eliminated the terrorists and freed the hostages.

Almost all home: outcome of the Operation

Within 24 hours, the seven hijackers and some 20 Ugandan soldiers were killed, and the hostages were transferred to an evacuation plane and flown to Israel. Despite the impressive success, the Israeli force did not emerge unscathed – commander of the commando force, Yoni Netanyahu – older brother of who was to become Israel’s Prime Minister,  Benjamin Netanyahu – was killed in the exchange of fire, and it was later decided to name the operation after him – “Operation Yonatan”. Four Israeli hostages were also killed: Jean-Jacques Maimoni, Pasco Cohen, and Ida Borochovitch, who were killed in the crossfire during the operation, and another– 74-year-old Israeli Dorah Bloch, who was murdered as an act of cruel revenge at the local hospital where she was sent prior to the operation.

The rest of the fighters, rescuers and hostages safely arrived in Israel, and were received at Ben-Gurion Airport with a moving reception. The operation, which was conducted under pressure of time and with very little intelligence, made a strong impression around the world, proving once again the strength and prowess of the Israel’s defense and security forces and the unwavering fortitude of the Israeli spirit. The daring operation eventually became part of Israel’s popular culture with the release in 1977 of the Israeli film “Operation Entebbe” starring famous Israeli singer and actor Yehoram Gaon as Yoni Netanyahu. In that same year, NBC released the television film, “Raid on Entebbe” and the heroic tale was later adapted in 2018 to a film titled “7 Days in Entebbe”.

הפוסט 48 Years Ago: Operation Entebbe (Yonatan) Releases Palestinian Terror Hostages from Entebbe הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Of all the blood-soaked months of the second Intifada, March 2002 was the deadliest of them all. In fact, this was the deadliest month in the entire history of Palestinian terrorism until October 2023, with the lives of 105 civilians and 26 soldiers lost. Barely a day went by that month with out a terrorist attack, culminating in the attack on the Park Hotel in Netanya on the Passover Eve, which claimed the lives of 30 victims and injured 160 more.

Following this brutal attack, in which many family members and elderly people were murdered, some of whom were Holocaust survivors, the Government decided, in a meeting the day after the holiday, to embark on a comprehensive operation to eradicate terrorism in Judea and Samaria. This began immediately on the morning following that meeting, on March 29, 2002.

The Goal: “Hit anyone that takes up arms”

The then-Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, defined the operation’s goals:

“To enter the towns and villages that have become terrorist safe havens; to capture and arrest terrorists and in particular those who send them and those financing them and providing them  with cover; to capture and seize weapons and munitions aimed at attacking Israel; to expose and destroy terrorist infrastructures, bomb-making labs, weapon-making facilities and hide-outs. The orders are clear: to hit anyone taking up arms and to neutralize whoever attempts to resist the forces in their tasks and put them in harm’s way, and to avoid harm to the civilian population.”

The operation was given its name by Colonel Gal Hirsch, who was then the Operations Officer in the Central Command. It was taken from a poem by Poet Haim Heffer, “Between Boundaries”: “To the Poor and the Aged / we are a Defensive Shield”. Some 25 thousand soldiers were called up under “Order 8”, and the response rate exceeded 100% with soldiers competing for rides to the rallying centers.

How Marwan Barghouthi was Captured

Where did the IDF wage battle? In all the Judea and Samaria cities with the exception of Jericho and Hebron.

In Ramallah the IDF laid siege to the Mukataa complex – the government complex and official residence of the Head of the Palestinian Authority – which resulted in Yasser Arafat barricading himself within the compound along with a few wanted men. When the forces combed the building, they found a large arms cache and documents indicating Arafat himself had approved terrorist attacks. Among the documents was also a document which became known as the Shobaki Document – an invoice written out by the Authority’s financial official, Fouad Shobaki and signed by Arafat himself, containing direct payments made for launching terrorist attacks and also financial support for shahid families. The document was one of many found, which were indicative of the deep involvement of the Palestinian Authority in terrorism.

Following the IDF siege, the Americans intervened and an arrangement was reached according to which those wanted for the murder of Minister Rehavam Zeevi would be turned in and transferred to a prison in Jericho. Besides that the entire fighting apparatus of the terrorist organizations in Ramallah collapsed and, toward the end of the operation Marwan Barghouthi was also captured. Barghouthi had been leader of the Tanzim – the military wing of the Fatah organization – an organization that had orchestrated many terrorist attacks within Israeli territory. Barghouthi is still imprisoned in Israel after having been sentenced to five life sentences.

“Walking through walls”

In Nablus, the IDF purposely began operations belatedly, on April 5, so as to attract to it terrorists who thought the IDF was avoiding operations in the city. To deal woth the threat of snipers and ambushes in the crowded narrow alleys in the Nablus kasbah, the IDF developed a new strategy of “walking through walls”. This involved breaking through house walls using cold means (sledgehammers, for example) and hot means (explosives), thereby advancing through the homes rather than through the streets and alleys. The bulk of the fighting in Nablus was conducted this way. The operation ended with a decisive IDF victory with dozens of dead terrorists, dozens more in custody and large quantities of weapons and munitions captured.

In Jenin, on the other hand, the bitterest of battles took place. The terrorist organizations had booby-trapped the camp with IEDs and had prepared ambushes in the town’s narrow alleys. The IDF suffered many casualties and progress was slow. Following a deadly ambush on April 9, which cost the lives of 13 reserve soldiers from the Nahshon battalion, a decision was made that when a home was suspected of harboring terrorists, warning would be given to enable the terrorists to turn themselves in. Following that the house would be demolished using armored D9 bulldozers. This tactic smoked out dozens of terrorists, including some senior ones, who turned themselves in to the IDF forces.

In Bethlehem, after the city was captured and many wanted men were arrested, a group of 38 wanted men barricaded themselves inside the Church of the Nativity which, according to Christian tradition is located above the manger in which Jesus was born. The armed men took with them as hostages dozens of monks and some 200 civilians, including children. The world issued condemnations and warnings to Israel not to harm the site, which is one of Christianity’s holiest. Following a stand-off that lasted more than a month agreement was reached in which the 13 senior wanted men would be exiled, the 26 others would be banished to Gaza and the hostages would be released.

The achievement: restoring the IDF’s freedom of operation

The operation lasted six weeks until May 10, 2002. It resulted in the destruction of the operational infrastructure of the Tanzim and the Hamas in Judea and Samaria. Additionally, the Palestinian Authority was disarmed and the symbols of its authority, including the Mukataa, were demolished. The main accomplishment, nevertheless, was the restoration of the IDF’s freedom to operate throughout the entire area of Judea and Samaria and improvement of the intelligence grip on the ground.

After the operation, the members of the Tanzim told their Shabak interrogators that they had no idea of the true force of the IDF until they confronted its soldiers face-to-face. Until then aerial bombing was proof to them that the Israelis were too scared to fight them (from: Ofer Shelach, Maariv, December 26, 2008).

The operation cost the lives of 28 soldiers and members of the security forces in Judea and Samaria. Three more were killed in the Gaza Strip. 185 were injured, seven severely. Some 200 Palestinians were killed, 56 wanted men were captured, ten potential suicide bombers and thousands more suspects were arrested. 50 bomb-making labs were destroyed and large quantities of ammunition were seized.

הפוסט 22 Years Ago Today: Operation Defensive Shields Begins הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Before we try to understand what makes this essay so important, fundamentally influencing the Zionist movement in its entirety, let us go back a few thousand years, to ancient Troy.

The impenetrable fortifications of ancient Troy protected the city from invasion during long decades of raging war. The city fell not because its stone walls failed, but because the Greek enemy devised a stratagem by which it feigned capitulation, retreating in the middle of the night but leaving outside the city gates a “tribute” for the Trojans in the form of a giant horse in which Greek soldiers were concealed.

This story is widely used as an allegory for trickery and stratagem. But the focus on its Greek narrative obscures a no less important question from the Trojan perspective, which is: why did the Trojans open the gate?

Jabotinsky’s “The Iron Wall” may possibly lend us an interesting perspective on this question.

The Problem: A Clash of Interests with No Practical Solution

The essay “The Iron Wall”, or in its full name “The Iron Wall (Us and The Arabs)” was published for the first time in Russian, Jabotinsky’s mother-tongue, on November 4, 1923. It appeared in the Jewish bulletin Razaveit. The first translation into Hebrew was published only two years later in the Hebrew paper Ha’aretz. The essay was written by Jabotinsky after resigning from the Zionist Organization against the backdrop of the dispute regarding the nature of the government that should be established in the Land of Israel.

In his essay, Jabotinsky lays out his Zionistic policy which stands on two main pillars: The first, is the notion that the Arabs cannot be ejected from Palestine (the name for the land of Israel at the time). The second is the assertion of the principle of equality as a right to which all nationalities are entitled. However,  these two principles cannot be reconciled, as the basis for relations between two nationalities is conflict, as is in the case of the Jews returning to their homeland and the Arabs living in that homeland – the land of Israel. Only once the Arabs acknowledge Zionism, they will enjoy full political and cultural rights.  This state of affairs, claims Jabotinsky – qualifying his claims with quotes from publications by Israeli Arabs – is that this is an impossibility as Israeli Arabs have no intention of acknowledging the Jewish right of return and right to settle in their homeland, as this in effect means a Jewish majority in the land of Israel.

The Iron Wall: First Might and Determination – Then Peace

After Jabotinsky rules out other solutions, such as the acknowledgment of non-Israeli Arabs in the Jews’ right of settling the land of Israel, he asks his readers a probing question:  given the overwhelming rejection on part of the Arabs, to which point are the Jews to be dependent on the tolerance and goodwill of the Arabs toward the Jewish settlement? Thus, writes Jabotinsky, “our settlement enterprise can only proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach”.

In the last part of his essay, Jabotinsky deals with the ethics of his proposed solution. He replies what he replies, but ends with an important insight: the Iron Wall is what will bring peace, as only once Israel’s Arabs come to terms with its existence, they will be more inclined to make concessions:

“…And when a living people yields in matters of such a vital character it is only when there is no longer any hope of getting rid of us, because they can make no breach in the iron wall. Not till then will they drop their extremist leaders, whose watchword is “Never!” …And the leadership will pass to the moderate groups, who will approach us with a proposal that we should both agree to mutual concessions …the only way to obtain such an agreement, is the iron wall”

What Constitutes the Iron Wall? We Decide!

When Ze’ev Jabotinsky wrote “The Iron Wall” essay, he did not delineate what the Iron Wall would comprise. Rather, he put forth an approach, or policy. Jabotinsky, a journalist and publicist, does not lay out a blueprint for such a wall nor does he leave instructions for its future maintenance. He left it to us to tinker with the nuts and bolts of his notion.

And indeed, over the decades, the expression “Iron Wall” was extensively interpretated to different views, of which the most widely accepted is that Jabotinsky is in fact inferring that the Arabs can only by subjugated by means of military might. But other interpretations relate to geographic borders and deduce that Jabotinsky is expressing an unwillingness to consent to the division of the land of Israel.

And perhaps he is trying to convey a whole other message – the Trojan lesson.

Going back to Troy, many a historian scratched their heads trying to understand why the Trojans would open the city gates. As impressive as the gigantic wooden horse might be, the Trojan wall was an unparalleled feat of engineering in the Mediterranean region of that time. Did the Trojans fatal mistake stem from over confidence in the face of the supposedly retreating Greek? Or perhaps it can be attributed to battle fatigue after years of fighting? Or perhaps in fact, it came from a “conception” that was convenient to adopt – that the Greek abandoned the idea of conquering their city? However we view the issue, the Trojan “iron wall” fell not due to the might of the aggressors, but because of a failure in the determination of the defenders.

This interpretation makes Jabotinsky’s message so pertinent to our present-day situation. He believed that the Arabs will be willing to accept the notion of a Jewish state only when they have no other choice, which follows that they will continue resisting us so long as they can and therefore, we must ensure the complete debilitation of our enemies’ capabilities. However, this in itself is not enough. In order to maintain an Iron Wall, we need fortitude, which can only derive from conviction in the justness of our path. We have no control over the enemy’s intentions no more than the Trojans could control the intentions of the Greeks, but our determination in the face of our enemies is crucial for our survival.

The Iron Wall is a symbol of uncompromising unity that is based on the understanding that this is the only way to survive here and enable a future resolution. The understanding that the Arabs within and without the State of Israel still hold on to their objections to Jewish presence in Israel and deny the right of the State of Israel to exist, demands we continue to bolster our iron wall and ensure it is never breached. If, like the Trojans, we show weakness for even one moment, the smallest breach in our unity and determination – whether in our military might or vis a vis their demands – we will never see the day of peace after the war.

הפוסט This Day In History – Jabotinsky Publishes “The Iron Wall” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Sixteen years ago today, on August 19, 2006, Emmanuel fell in battle in the Baalbek region in Lebanon. He was awarded the Head of Regional Command Citation for his life’s work. To this day, his legacy, his love of country and his Zionist spirit inspire youths in high schools, in the Pre-Military Academies and in the IDF’s command and leadership courses.

From Paris to Jerusalem

Emmanuel was born in Paris, France. When he was one year old, he arrived in Israel with his parents, Ilan and Sylvia. They settled in the Sanhedria Neighborhood in Jerusalem, where Moreno was a member of the Bnei Akiva Youth Movement. Emmanuel went to school at the Himmelfarb and Hartmann High School in the city, following which he went to the second class of the Bnei David  Pre-Military Academy at Eli. He married Maya and raised their three children – Aviya, Neria and Noam Yisrael. The family took up residence in Tlamim in the Lachish District.

Sayeret Matkal and two operations we can talk about

In August 1990 Emmanuel was conscripted into Sayeret Matkal where he served as a soldier. Among his crew mates was Naftali Bennett, who went on to become Israel’s 13th Prime Minister and Matan Kahana, who went on to become Minister of Religions and a member of the Yamina Party. After his discharge from the army, he studied law at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya while at the same time working for the GSS (General Security Services). Upon graduation he returned to the IDF, serving as a professional soldier in Sayeret Matkal.

Not much is known about Moreno’s exploits in the Unit. What the public is allowed to know is that he commanded a team which acquired combat knowledge and skills previously unknown in the IDF. In the course of his duty, he reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, which is identical to that of the Unit Commander.

Of the many operations Emmanuel led and took part in, two have been declassified: in 1994 he took part in Operation Poisonous Sting, in which IDF forces – with Emmanuel among them – abducted the man that held Ron Arad captive – an IAF navigator. The man was Mustafa Dirani and he was abducted from his home in Lebanon. The second operation was in 2003, where Emmanuel commanded the rescue operation of taxi driver Eliahu Gurel, who had been abducted by Palestinians and held in a cellar in Beitunia in the Ramallah Region.

Disguised as a Lebanese Soldier: The Last Operation

In 2006, after the second ceasefire in the Second Lebanon War came into effect, Moreno led some one hundred soldiers on an operation in the Baalbek area disguised as Lebanese Army soldiers. Despite the fact that the operation had been leaked to enemy media outlets, the senior echelons on the Israeli side decided to follow through with the operation, which indeed was successfully completed. On their way back Emmanuel’s force encountered a Hezbollah ambush and Emmanuel, who was seated in a jeep, sustained injuries and died of his wounds shortly afterwards. His security service, including the operation in which he lost his life, has been kept a closely-guarded secret.

Shema Israel: What would you do in the five final seconds of your life?

“His courage and determination were an example to the Unit’s soldiers as he led them through enemy territory. Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Moreno led and participated in dozens of covert operations aimed at bolstering the State of Israel’s security”. So wrote Amos Yadlin, Military Intelligence Commander, posthumously.

It is said of Emmanuel that he was one of the greatest fighters ever to have served the People of Israel, and many name him the “World’s Best Soldier”. An exaggeration? Not really. Herzi Halevy, Deputy Chief of Staff and himself a former commander of Sayeret Matkal, explained why he was worthy of this moniker:

“If the IDF is the best army in the world, and if Sayeret Matkal is the best unit in the IDF, and Emmanuel is the best soldier in Sayeret Matkal – then that makes Emmanuel the best soldier in the world”.

This greatness was the result not only of outstanding physical and mental capabilities. A combination of the practical world and the spiritual world had a lot to do with it. Many stories have been written after Emmanuel fell in battle, reflecting the greatness of his soul. One of these stories is included in the compendium of short stories entitled “Silence Be Your Glory”, which describes his legacy.

About two weeks after an incident in which an IAF helicopter got hit in Lebanon at the cost of the lives of five soldiers, Emmanuel and his team mate sat and discussed what they would have done had they been sitting in a helicopter that got hit by a missile and they had only five more seconds to live. His mate answered that he would shut his eyes and hope it would all be over as quickly and painlessly as possible. Emmanuel responded that he would have recited the Shema Israel prayer. His mate wondered what good this or any other verse would have been in this situation – in any case he’d be dead in a matter of seconds. Emmanuel answered: “If a person has just five more seconds to live and there is still meaning to his life and to the hereafter in those five seconds, this would mean that his entire life has meaning. But on the other hand if a person has got just five more seconds to live and he doesn’t comprehend the importance of those five seconds, then that person’s whole life evidently is meaningless. Because we live not merely to satisfy our desires, or to enjoy ourselves and live for the moment. Our life is another step toward the step that follows”.

The Israel Defense and Security Forum bows its head in memory of Emmanuel and sends him its undying gratitude on behalf of the People of Israel.

הפוסט On This Day: Emmanuel Moreno, the World’s Best Soldier, Has Fallen in Battle הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Background: A Moment Before the British Leave

Operation Matateh took place 11 days before the Declaration of Independence, meaning it was in the first part of the War of Independence, in which the focus was on fighting against the local forces. One of the characteristics of early May 1948 was the knowledge that the British were supposed to be withdrawing from Israel shortly, and one of the most important parameters in their withdrawal was who controls the area. In other words: areas under Jewish control would, technically, be handed over to Jews, and vice versa. The knowledge that control of the localities and roads could significantly influence the boundaries of the state, to a large extent dictated the goals of the war in those days. One of the places where Jewish control was teetering was in the north, where the Arabs and Bedouins had cut off the Upper Galilee from the Lower Galilee and from the rest of Israel. This was done primarily by attacking Jewish transport.

Operation Goals: To Connect the Galilee to Israel

Yigal Alon, Palmach Commander until 1946 and the senior commander of the largest regular force in the War of Independence, recommended that the Upper Galilee be connected to the Lower Galilee, and that the northern boundary be conquered – from Metula down to the Kinneret. This operation was codenamed Operation Yiftach and its official goals were conquest of the Eastern Upper Galilee including the City of Safed, to purge the Eastern Upper Galilee of Arab forces and to block main invasion routes in anticipation of an invasion of Arab armies.

One of the first stages of Operation Yiftach was Operation Matateh, which was, in the words of the Order: “To eliminate enemy bases, which have been sabotaging and harassing transport in the Galilee, to destroy toeholds of forces invading from the East, to connect the Lower Galilee and the Upper Galilee in a broad, relatively safe strip”.

Operation Matateh: Psychological Warfare, Diplomacy and Cunning

One of the methods typical of Yigal Alon’s operations was psychological warfare. He met with the dignitaries from the Bedouin tribes in the area, warned them in advance against the penetration of military forces into the area, and as a result, with the first mortar bombardment of the area, some 2,000 Bedouins fled to Syria, saving the combat units a great deal of fighting.

Alon also knew how to tell friend from foe and to take advantage of common interests. He thus recruited into the Palmach part of the residents in the village of Tuba, the Arb-al-Heib tribesmen, who were friendly to the Jews and whose leader, Sheikh Abu Yousuf Hussein Mohammed, was at odds with the representatives of the Supreme Arab Council in Safed. Thus was established the Palheib – the Palmach’s Bedouin unit, which formed the nucleus of the IDF’s Minorities Unit.

Alon was also a brilliant military leader exercising planning and cunning in the field. Thus for example, in order to conquer Malqiyeh, a hard-to-conquer Arab village which put up stubborn resistance, Alon carried out a diversion and outflanking maneuver. He caused the villagers to believe the main assault would be on the front of the village, and when the Arabs diverted their forces toward the front, he did a motorized outflanking and surprised the defenders from the rear.

Outcome of the operation

The operation resulted in the Upper Galilee being connected to the Lower Galilee and the rest of the country. It even enabled free transport to and from the region without the need for armored convoys. Yigal Alon said the operation had a “tremendous psychological effect” on the Arabs in Safed and the Hula Valley who had been cut off from Syria, and that this operation paved the way for their ultimate conquest.

הפוסט On This Day: Operation Matateh הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The operation was a success, having achieved its goals under difficult conditions. The operation destroyed terrorist command posts, killed 50–100 of them, including three senior leaders. Our forces lost two soldiers: Avida Schorr and Hagai Ma’ayan.

The background: from reactive to proactive

1972 was a bloody year. This was the year in which the massacre at Tel Aviv Airport took place (25 travelers were murdered and another 72 were injured); a bomb was discovered on an airplane that was en route from Rome to Israel; terrorists raided the Israeli embassy in Bangkok; hundreds of letter bombs were sent to Jews in Israel and around the world; and of course, that was the year of the brutal Munich Massacre of 11 athletes from the Israeli delegation to the Munich Olympics.

This wave of terror outrages, topped by the athletes’ massacre in Munich, brought about a change in the Israeli policy: instead of reactive measures, a policy of proactivity. Since the terrorist organizations began converging in Lebanon in general and Beirut in particular, this was chosen as the target where the IDF would attack the terrorists proactively.

Operation Order: Five Targets

The Operation Order listed five targets:

1. Aviva – the operation’s main target: two seven-story buildings in which three of the to Fatah leaders had taken up residence.

2. Gila – a seven-story building in which, according to intelligence, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine personnel had occupied all floors.

3. Zilla – a workshop in which landmine parts were being made.

4. Varda – two buildings, one of which was a rocket-building and marine mines workshop and the second served as the Gaza Strip headquarters.

5. Yehudit – a garage, which was used as a workshop in which weapons and ammunition repair work was done.

The Execution

The Israeli forces landed simultaneously on several Lebanese beaches, transported there on board missile boats. They made landfall in rubber dinghies assisted by Shayetet 13 commandos. On shore they were received by Mossad operatives driving cars they had rented the day before.

18 Sayeret Matkal commandos arrived by car at the Aviva target, which was the main target, driving to a spot close to the building. From there they continued on foot, some disguised as women and escorted by commandos clad in men’s clothes. Ehud Barak (disguised as a brunette) walked hand in hand with Muki Betzer, Dov Bar with Amiram Levine (disguised as a woman in a chestnut wig), and Yoni Netanyahu was also among the commandos. This way they managed to reach close to their destination without arousing suspicion.

The Gila target, which was the most heavily defended due to the many armed terrorists living there, cost the lives of two commandos: Avida Schorr and Hagai Ma’ayan.

At the rest of the targets also, the operation’s goals were achieved, and the bottom line was that targets were destroyed which had been used for manufacturing and repairing weapons, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine building was destroyed with dozens of their fighters buried under the rubble, and three top Fatah and Black September leaders were killed.

Clip from the feature film Munich, showing the early stages of the raid on the Aviva target.

The Background: The Power of Precision Intelligence

“I haven’t been on any operation with intelligence of this quality, providing even the finest details so expansively“ Gen. (Res.) Ehud Barak, Commander of Sayeret Matkal during the operation

To achieve such a high level of success behind enemy lines, one needs brilliant, pinpoint-precision planning in advance. And indeed, the intelligence obtained for Operation Spring of Youth was some of the most precise in IDF history thanks in part to Yael Mann, a Mossad operative who worked in Lebanon, photographed the areas where the targets to be liquidated were living and collected information about them. Sigint unit 848 also took part in the operation, continuously eavesdropping on the Lebanese communication networks. These intelligence outputs included precise diagrams of the targets, maps of the defensive positions and precision information as to the whereabouts of the senior terrorists. Almost all the operation commanders have spoken on various occasions along the lines of Ehud Barak’s above comment: they had never been given such precise intelligence.

Of course intelligence was not the only contributor to the success – planning and training was also part of it. Raffi Eyal, one of the commandos at the Gila target, tells: “The preparation for the rest of the parts of the operation was very thorough. We underwent training on guerilla warfare, using gas, firing with silencers, and maneuvering in civilian clothing. Most of the training took place in urban areas such as Ramat Aviv. We would do landing practice from the sea and then continue to advance into the city just as if it was Beirut“.

The Chief of Staff Citation was awarded to Ehud Barak, in part in recognition of his conduct during Operation Spring of Youth.

הפוסט On This Day: Operation Spring of Youth הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.