Over the past decade, particularly in the past year since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s foreign policy has undergone dramatic change. Its involvement in current major geopolitical affairs and its vigorous activity across the international arena, leave little room for doubt – Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, is investing great efforts into cementing Russia’s influence as a superpower and an important key player in global politics, by disrupting the existing status-quo and creating a new and challenging balance of power with the United States and the West. Motivated by an imperialistic vision, complex strategic considerations and with the use of global resources, the head of the Kremlin is employing an active, assertive and defiant foreign policy. This policy is based on fusing a challenging attitude towards the US and the Western hegemony, with manipulative collaboration with Western countries and the international community such that to help to promote his own interests and realize Moscow’s broad interests.
Along these lines, Putin has been operating – particularly since 2012 – toward increasing Russia’s presence and influence in the Middle East as well as in Central Asia, East Europe, Caucasia and Africa, while stymying the US and blocking the expansion of NATO and the EU. However, already at this point in time, it is becoming apparent that the escalation of the war in Ukraine is bringing about a critical turning point on the map of Moscow’s relations and interests in the Middle East and that Iran emerges as the big winner of Russia’s military withdrawal from Syria. This move not only contributes to elevating Tehran’s power and status while increasing tensions with Israel, but the rollback of Russia’s involvement disrupts an already fragile balance of powers in a region considered one of the most charged and volatile in the world. There is little doubt that this strategic shift demands that Israel form a new and more pragmatic security architecture.
Assertive foreign policy
Russia’s foreign policy is the product of a long succession of crucial geo-strategic events in the 20th century – first and foremost the Soviet Revolution of 1917. These events shaped Russia’s strategy, its political culture and its long-term stratagem, which govern its policy. The Russian foreign policy, which emphasizes its territorial integrity and contiguity, is based on defense diplomacy that aims for expansion and annexation of neighboring territories, coupled with pacts with powerful allies such that allow it to secure its borders. These principles serve its strategic interests, as well as its imperialistic aspirations, manifested in the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and more so in its continuing efforts in Ukraine. Furthermore, the Russian leadership is acting to maintain remote buffer zones, thereby changing the regional status-quo and power balance – evident in its interference with the events in Georgia in 2008 to protect its interests in Caucasia, and its involvement in Syria in 2015, aiming to push back ISIS and assist the Assad regime – all while challenging the international coalition led by the US and endeavoring to curtail its scope of influence.
Russia tackles these objectives by combining hard power (the use of military measures alongside security support) with soft power (social engineering and diplomatic pressure). Through this prism of thought, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) – perceived by Putin as the single most detrimental event of the 20th century – forced Moscow to “recalculate the route”. Ever since stepping into office in 2000, Putin has been acting to ensure political stability and to cement Russia’s standing as a powerful global super-power, motivated by the perception of a multi-polar global diplomatic map and a distinct anti-West approach, which is fueled by concerns of the West’s incursion and expansion into the post-Soviet region i.e. Caucasia, Central Asia, East Europe. At the same time, Putin is acting towards the development and consolidation of relations with Middle East countries – namely Iran, Syria, Israel, Turkey and the Gulf states. However, notwithstanding Russia’s increasing military and naval presence in the region, its foreign policy is shrouded by ambiguity, inconsistency and multifacetedness that serve its various interests and commitments in the region.
Russia’s activity in the Middle East
The Middle East – one of the most prone regions to escalation in the international arena – is perceived by the Kremlin as a complex geopolitical area that bears significant strategic importance – due among others, to its accessibility to major sea lanes and trade routes, its proximity to energy sources and the supply lanes thereof to Europe, and to the opportunity the region can offer Russia to establish a defiant presence against NATO’s dominance. This region – a competition-cum-conflict zone for the superpowers, and a strategic intersection of various diplomatic, economic and security objectives, events and processes, also offers the synthesis of various regional and global interests. For these reasons, the Middle East is at the top of Russia’s foreign policy list of priorities.
From Russia’s standpoint, the Middle East poses an opportunity to protect its geo-strategic interests, cement its presence, and expand its circle of influence in the region, by means of arms supply and military assistance, alongside the development of relations and the upscaling of its collaboration with many of the region’s countries (e.g. the agreement for the construction of the nuclear reactor in Egypt and its attempts at becoming involved in the infighting in Libya). Moreover, the Middle East is a platform on which Russia can position itself as an international mediator and a leading player presiding over regional stability (such as its intervention in the civil war in Syria and in the Iranian nuclear program), and as a strong superpower that is stymying the US and other rivals – NATO and the EU – and constricting their scope of influence. These dynamics are manifested in Russia’s relations matrix with Iran, Syria and Israel.
Russia-Iran relations
Iran, Russia’s most important ally in the Middle East, attracts considerable attention from the international community, mainly around its nuclear program, and recently more so due to the massive civil protest sweeping across the country. At the same time, the war in Ukraine and especially Russia’s military shortcomings, is creating a turning point in the relations of the two countries, which is rippling through the entire Middle East region. This stems from the fact that Moscow and Tehran, who’ve never been the warmest of allies, have upgraded their relations to “full military cooperation” – the upscaling of their military partnership to “an unprecedented level”, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense. This includes among others, the supply of Sukhoi-35 fighter jets, expected to arrive in Iran in the next few weeks, and advanced air defense systems (S-400), missiles and attack helicopters due in Iran in the near future. This, in exchange for hundreds of ballistic missiles, thousands of advanced UAVs and suicide drones supplied by Iran to Russia over the past months, used by the latter for widespread destruction of vital infrastructures across Ukraine.
Furthermore, US intelligence discovered that last November, a secret agreement had been signed between Moscow and Tehran for the construction of an Iranian UAV production facility in Russia. Having such a production capability would allow Russia to dramatically upscale its lower costing – yet lethal – weapons arsenal, the use of which had changed the strategy and course of the war in Europe in the past weeks. Under the agreement, estimated at a value of about one billion dollars for Iran, Tehran even agreed to supply Moscow with relevant know-how and experts in the field. In light of all this, it is hard to overlook the growing regional and global threat and its changing nature and scope, which is expected to lead to the tightening of the economic sanctions against Iran and Russia.
The ever-deepening relations between Moscow and Tehran is based on a wide range of long-term diplomatic, economic and security interests, which feed this strategic alliance aimed at curtailing the American hegemony in the region. These relations exist on a complex “love-hate” scale, cooperations and deep-seated mistrust that stem from each country’s different political culture, world view, and ideology.
The relations between the two, which have had seen more than their fair share of difficulties over the years – among others due to Russia’s investment in the construction of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure while at the same time joining the international sanctions against Tehran – have grown stronger since the outbreak of the war, despite Iran outwardly displaying a neutral position on this issue. This is due to the fact that over the past decade, Tehran, which acted towards consolidating its power-base in Syria, was doing so under the auspices of Russia. This activity, conducted “under the radar”, enabled Iran to seize critical systems in Syria, such as the religious, social, educational and economic infrastructures.
From a systemic point of view, this activity undermines any prospect of political reform that could aid Syria’s recovery, make things even worse. Paring back Russia’s presence in Syria, after it had served as a buffer and stabilizer in the volatile fabric of relations, and especially the constriction of its daily involvement in the country – implies tuning down security cooperation with Israel while increasing the Iranian influence, control and motivation. This would entail boosting Tehran’s confidence more than ever before, not in the least in light of Moscow’s dependance on its UAVs. Furthermore, Russia’s withdrawal allows Iran to expand its areas of control towards Iraq and Lebanon as well, thereby bolstering the Shiite axis of power. Granted, Iran is contending with harsh social and economic adversity, but it seems that nevertheless – and perhaps exactly for that reason – chances are growing that the Ayatollah regime will take drastic steps against Israel, with Moscow’s tacit consent.
Russia-Syria relations
An examination of the relations between Moscow and Damascus shows that the former’s presence in Syria – established in the 1970s and growing after Putin came to power – has radically changed in nature, substantially impacting the Middle East. This stems from the fact that the outbreak of the civil war, tensions over the collapse of the Assad regime, and more importantly – the disintegration of the pro-Iranian anti-western axis, have all led since 2015 to Russia’s massive intervention in the country. Thus, viewing Syria as a strategic military target for consolidating its foothold in the Middle East and undermining the US presence and influence in the region, Moscow took upon itself to assist with the revitalization of the Syrian army and the stabilization of the Alawite regime. It is doing so by means of establishing a military array that includes attack helicopters and jet fighters, as well as missiles and defense systems, and deploying thousands of troops across Syria to assist with repelling the rebel forces, pacify the military fighting and the internal power struggles. Additionally, its involvement in Syria allowed Russia to ensure its maritime and aerial freedom of movement in the Mediterranean basin, and even provided it with proximity and access to sea lanes and trade routes in warm water ports and to Syrian oil and gas fields. And if that were not enough, Syria had become an advanced testing grounds of sorts for Russia, where it could test the lessons learned from the war in Georgia (2008), and conduct trials for its latest weapon systems, and even tie Syria to it with long-term agreements.
Yet it is becoming apparent that the restriction of Russia’s presence, although already a relatively small military force, is carrying considerable ramifications in terms of the relation dynamics in Syria and the entire region, as the matter pertains chiefly to strategic significance rather than scope. The transfer of defense systems (S-300) to Ukraine, along with thousands of troops, high ranking generals and mercenaries, mostly from south-west Syria – an area of top strategic importance for Israel – creates a vacuum, which Iran and the Hezbollah can seize and consolidate their military presence. These changes – predominantly the buildup and expansion of the Iranian influence, might send tremors throughout Syria, and possible even throw it back into civil war. Thus, similarly to outcome of the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, Russia’s withdrawal might reignite internal power struggles as well as terrorist activity on part of Shiite organizations, or radical Suni groups and factions, which could take advantage of the situation to bring about uncontrollable chaos that might spill over to neighboring countries.
Moreover, the combination of the growing mass protest in Iran with the chaos and civil war in Syria, might send shock-waves that would gravely destabilize the entire Middle East, the likes of the Arab Spring and even worse. Therefore, is seems that not only are the Kremlin’s moves disrupting the fragile status quo in Syria, tipping the scales there in favor of Iran, and deepening tensions between Moscow and Jerusalem, but are also intensifying the security risk posed by Iran, which affects the entire Middle East, and the power balance and inter-bloc rivalry in the international arena.
All this is occurring mainly on the backdrop of the failure of the nuclear negotiations with Iran and the downscaling of US presence in the region on the one hand, and the strategic alliance between Iran and China and the increasing involvement of the latter in the Middle East – expected to further grow – on the other.
In conclusion
In light of the above mentioned, there can be no doubt that the deployment of Russian forces to Ukraine, is an indication to the dire condition of the Russian army, and especially to the importance that the Kremlin attributes to the conflict in Europe as oppose to its view on the rehabilitation of the Assad regime and the maintaining of the status quo in the Middle East. However, the increase in Iran’s aid to its war efforts draws the international community’s attention away from the war in Eastern Europe back to the Middle East, effectively burying the Iranian nuclear program. At the same time, the shift in the Russian leaderships’ map of relations and interests requires Israel to regroup and form a new – more level and pragmatic – security policy and architecture, such that could provide an effective response to the multitude of processes and challenges that relate to national and international security affairs in which it is involved.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.
