In the current, and final, chapter of the series, we will review the emerging “Battalions” phenomena, uncontrollable Palestinian militant groups, as a parable of the PA’s loss of control over large sections of Judea and Samaria, which are supposed to be under its security control – particularly in important cities such as Jenin and Nablus. I will present the exclusive testimony of a Palestinian security forces officer, who attests to the plummeting moral and escalating disobedience among Palestinian police officers, which also leads to many of them joining the “Battalions” who are rebelling against their employer, the Palestinian Authority. Internal sources also attest to the growing status of the armed resistance group  – “Lion’s Den”. In addition, Israel should be concerned about the increasing cooperation between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front under the guidance of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which might create a new and coordinated type of terrorist threat in Judea and Samaria, on the backdrop  of a disintegrating Palestinian Authority.

The PA, which has incited against Israel and encouraged perpetrators of terror attacks from the outset, has adopted an “if you can’t beat them, join them” policy encouraging the Battalions in light of its incompetence to deal with these rebel militants. This policy makes some contribution in easing tensions between it and the challenging factions, and in closing ranks among Palestinians. One this policy’s main expressions is in the decision to halt security coordination with Israel following the IDF counterterrorism raid in Jenin which led to the killing of 9 terrorists. In the PA’s perspective, it is better off escalating tensions with Israel – which is interested in its stability and survival – than confronting terrorist factions that can threaten its integrity. This is a highly problematic development for Israel.

During the recent period, against the backdrop of the PA’s incompetence and inability to deal with the focal points of terrorism and violence in Samaria, a momentum is gathering which is posing a serious threat to the Palestinian Authority – the establishment of the “Battalions”: armed groups that are forming into actual militias, first germinating in Jenin (called the “Wasp Nest” battalion) and already reaching Nablus, where the “Lion’s Den” militant group has been formed. This process was set into motion when Mahmoud Abbas announced a large-scale operation in Jenin – a teeming center of resistance to the PA’s government – lasting only a day and a half and ending with the dismissal of the entire top command of the Palestinian security forces in the district.

Speaking about the situation on the ground, one officer in the Jenin Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS) service told us: “The situation in Jenin points to the loss of control, and especially to a complete disconnect between the reality on the ground and the statements made by senior Palestinian Authority officials who believe that they will be able to gain control of the territory, and those made by  senior IDF officials, claiming that another operation would break the militants”. He adds: “The militants in Jenin are highly motivated and far from ready to surrender. Your military operations are not going in the direction you want.”

Now, the “Battalions” phenomenon in Samaria is accelerating and posing a real threat to a weak, bankrupt, corrupt PA, which is rife with infighting due to the succession struggles. Against this backdrop, it is important to mention the unrest in the universities against the PA, the growing social protests – especially since the killing of social activist Nizar Banat by Palestinian security officers in Hebron during an investigation – and, above all, the cancellation of the elections.

While Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) calls for “unity of the ranks” – as it dubbed the IDF’s Operation Breaking Dawn in the Gaza Strip in August 2022, the terrorist organizations in northern Samaria have already united into groups operating under the name “Jenin Battalions” or “Nablus Battalions” – violent umbrella associations shared by Fatah, Hamas, the PFLP, and Islamic Jihad (PIJ). At the same time, institutionalized organizations continue to promote terror attacks independetly, such as the planned PIJ terror attack whose thwarting led to the killing of 9 terrorists and serves as a pretext for the following terror attacks.

The close ties between Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP with Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards should concern Israel, which may find itself facing Iranian “proxy” organizations in Samaria that unite a number of rival Palestinian factions for the purpose of the armed struggle against it.

The Nablus “Battalions” Declare Civil Mutiny and Grow Closer to Iran

Mahmoud al-Banna, a resident of Nablus, is currently in command of the “al-Aqsa Martyrs” group in the city. He is referred to by his comrades  as “Hawk” (“Saqer”), a tribute to the violent “Fatah Hawks” group that operated under Fatah during the first intifada, and alongside the “Martyrs” in the second intifada.

Al-Banna’s partners are PFLP operative Muhammad Tabanja and senior Hamas figure Mus’ab Shtayyeh, who has been detained for months in the PA prison in Jericho. Both of them, along with Ibrahim Nabulsi, who was recently assassinated in Nablus (al-Banna had attended his funeral already as commander of the Nablus Battalions) were in contact with Bassam Sa’adi, a senior Islamic Jihad figure, who was arrested by Israel before Operation Breaking Dawn – an arrest that sparked a significant escalation between Israel and the Palestinians. When Sa’adi was arrested, the ISA – Shin Bet issued a statement according to which “Sa’adi was engaged in building a significant military force in Samaria”. A few weeks later, Hossein Salami, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, shed light on the affair, saying in interviews: “We are arming Samaria just as we armed the Gaza Strip”.

In fact, a few days before Sa’adi’s arrest, he was scheduled to meet with the three and was saved from an operation in which their terrorist squad comrades were eliminated. All these targets are at the top of Israel’s terrorist list and are considered targets for elimination, like their predecessors.

Convening with parallel resistance groups is nothing new: in the past, senior “al-Aqsa martyrs” figures had been convicted of ties to Hezbollah and sentenced to prison for the transgression.

Al Bana – “Hawk” – is living on borrowed time; A few months ago, when the Shin Bet coordinator in Nablus spoke with al-Banna and offered him to turn himself in before he was assassinated, al-Bana replied, “Come deal with me face to face” and refused the generous offer. The Shin Bet is putting heavy pressure on his family to turn him in, and as part of this effort, his brother, Muhammad, was arrested in a special units’ raid on the Halat al-Amud neighborhood in Nablus.

**

While al-Bana commands the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs”, Muhammad Tabanja, a released prisoner, heads “Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades” – the PFLP’s military wing, which already several years ago had joined forces with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza and became a very important element in the opposition against the Palestinian Authority. The front command squadis complemented by Hamas’ Masaab Shtayeh, who is also a released prisoner from the village of Salem, east of Nablus.

Shtayeh and his family have a long history of terrorism activity: he himself was wounded in the operation to assassinate Ibrahim Nabulsi; One of his relatives was formerly a close aide to Hamas engineer Yahya Ayash, who was killed with the remotely detonated phone smuggled into the Gaza Strip in 1996; His brother, Akaf, also a Hamas operative, was detained and sent to prison by Mahmoud Abbas’ Preventive Security service.

**

In Nablus, the terrorist activity is concentrated around Joseph’s Tomb, in an attempt to harm worshippers and IDF soldiers, and in the checkpoints around the city. Palestinian sources claim that the “Nablus Battalions” had begun operating a few months after the battalions have initiated operation in Jenin. Ibrahim Nabulsi and his squad mates were the ones who drew the inspiration from Jenin – from  senior PIJ official Sa’adi – and translated it into an action in Jabal al-Nar, “the mountain of fire,” as Nablus is nicknamed.

It can be assumed that it was Sa’adi who was their “source of authority”, as described in the Shin Bet’s arrest announcement, and this is concurrent with assessments on part of Palestinian sources.

In September 2021, when six Palestinian prisoners escaped from Gilboa Prison, the unsurprising collaboration was already evident between the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs”, represented by Zakaria Zubeidi, and “Islamic Jihad”, which was represented by five of its members in the escape operation. This breakout rekindled the resistance movement in Jenin, a movement that is now migrating south to Nablus, and some would say to even to Ramallah.

The members of the “Battalions”, all with long beards, dressed in black baseball caps, military uniforms, and sporting white, black, green or red headbands (depending on the mother organization),  mostly originate from the Nablus Kasbah (bazar), the neighborhoods of Al-Yasmina and Makhalat al-Amud, and from the refugee camps of Balata and Askar. In Jenin, they are mostly from the refugee camp, which during the second intifada became the symbol of resistance. These are all places where the “Oslo achievements”, which are noticeable on every street in Ramallah, are literally unfelt.

**

The Palestinian Authority is all but helpless in the face of the “Nablus Battalions”, which defy it and declare open military struggle against Israel. One phenomenon currently worrying Ramallah is the fact that many of the “Battalions” members are the sons or relatives of officers in the Palestinian Authority itself. The most prominent of these was Ra’ad Hazem, the perpetrator of the attack in Dizengoff, who was the son of a colonel in the Palestinian security forces, and Ala Nabulsi, the father of the assassinated commander of the “Martyrs”, and colonel-ranking officer in the Preventive Security and a released prisoner.

Yet this should come as no surprise, as many of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs” – including members of the “Al-Asafa” and “Fatah Hawks” – were integrated into the Palestinian security apparatuses, while others, under the tutelage of senior Fatah figures who were spurned by Mahmoud Abbas and the PA leadership, continued to be members of semi-organized groups and waited for the opportune moment to take revenge on the PA. Palestinian sources estimate that the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs”, who in the past operated under the leadership of Fatah and the PA and enjoy high-level connections, are the leading force behind the “Battalions” in Nablus.

**

The members of the Nablus and Jenin “Battalions” are mostly young men between the ages of 19 and 30, who have long since disengaged from Fatah and are actively working against the crumbling PA. Against them, Mahmoud Abbas declared a “large-scale military operation” in Jenin, but the operation lasted barely two days and ended with the heads of Palestinian security admitting a scathing defeat and the entire top command of the security mechanism was axed by Mahmoud Abbas overnight.

The Kasbah in Nablus is one of the power strongholds of the ”Martyrs” – a place that already a few years ago had become an ex-territory for the Palestinian Authority, which preferred to steer clear of its neighborhoods. It is no coincidence that many of them also come from universities, which in recent months have become hotbeds of political unrest against the Palestinian Authority.

**

After the “Battalions” began to operate and claimed casualties in Israel, the IDF launched Operation Wave Breaker, in which many of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs” commanders in Nablus were eliminated. The most prominent of these are Adham Mabruka, nicknamed  “The Chechen”; Muhammad Dakhil; Ashraf Mabaslet; Bashar Azazi; Abed Rahman Sobh; Islam Sabah; Hussein Taha; Ibrahim Nabulsi and others. However, despite Israel’s military efforts, Nablus is once again at the spearpoint of terrorism, as it was on the eve of the first intifada and at the beginning of the second intifada, when the IDF considered the town the “capital of terrorism”.

In the Gaza Strip, the operatives of these groups have become an integral part of the terrorist organizations operating under Hamas and under the joint operations room, and it can be assumed that if the activities of the Battalions in northern Samaria expand as a united force of Jihad, Hamas and the PFLP, their operatives will become another “Iranian proxy” a stone’s throw from Jewish Afula or an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv.

The PA and the Battalions – A Fight for Control Over Samaria

Since the establishment of the Battalions, the PA has been waging a battle for survival in Samaria and is fighting for its future. Violent incidents that broke out in Nablus with the arrest of a Hamas operative – a member of one of the networks – escalated to become some of the most serious clashes between the Palestinian Authority and armed groups in Judea and Samaria since the PA was established almost 30 years ago.

Employing violence, the militants demanded the release of the Hamas member, and representatives from the city had begun to mediate between the militants and the PA. According to a Palestinian security official “All scenarios are on the table and we are even preparing for a contingency of street battles”. The Palestinian Authority understood that this was not just a test of governance, but a test of survival in the face of what appeared to be the development of violent civil uprising after the “Lion’s Den” declared civil disobedience. The implication of this was closed businesses, road blocks with burning tires, etc. The armed groups also threatened that any police officer who ventured outside while wearing a uniform might be attacked. Sources in Nablus reported that “police officers took off their uniforms, blended in with the demonstrators and participated themselves in the defacing of public property. Store owners have been ordered to close under duress…”

The PA grabbed and arrested in the city center a Hamas member Mus’ab Shtayyeh alongside another member of the armed group, Amid Tabileh for reasons of its own – the PA explained that Shtayyeh was detained for security reasons that “will soon be made clear”,  but sources indicate that he was involved in purchasing weapons and recruiting operatives who were also designated for action against the PA itself.

The escalation in Nablus led a situation wherein, for the first time, the PA in its own territory, was forced to face on the one hand a coalition of armed groups on the ground, and on the other – a political opposition in the form of Hamas and PIJ.

The PA’s Proposal to the Nablus Battalions

The PA became acutely aware of the threats to its very existence after it had lost control of Jenin. However, in Nablus it is still trying to curtail the armed groups, but with little success. As part of its efforts it offered the militants to lay down their arms and sell them to the PA in exchange for amnesty, a hefty financial compensation and an opportunity to join the ranks of its security forces. The militants on their part, rejected the offer out of hand. Referring to these events, a Palestinian security official said: “The Palestinian Authority is waking up very late”.

At a recent meeting with Mahmoud Abbas, several heads of the Palestinian security forces proposed purchasing the weapons of the armed groups in Nablus. A Palestinian source reports that the meeting was fraught by grave concern over the spillover of the organized armed groups into central and southern Judea and Samaria. During the meeting, Mahmoud Abbas demanded that the law be enforced and that political contacts with Israel be given another chance, however, some of the top command feel little faith in that regard and some even voiced their concerns that he would not be able to guarantee and secure the peace on the ground.

The heads of the Palestinian security establishment are still trying to isolate the armed groups, which have turned the Nablus Kasbah and the refugee camps into their strongholds. Palestinian Interior Minister Ziad Hab Rih, commented  along those lines, saying that the PA was putting into gear a series of important moves in Nablus and Jenin.

Exclusive Testimony from the Heart of the “The Lion’s Den”

A former senior “al-Aqsa Martyrs” member, who collaborated with Hezbollah and spent many years in Israeli jails, and who is now very close to the Nablus “Lion’s Den”, reveals new details about the terrorist group that plagues Israel and the PA.

The senior official, a member of the “Martyrs” and a resident of Nablus who operated in early 2000 and was one of the generators of the armed intifada, has so far refused interviews to foreign media, demanding to remain anonymous. Here he provides a rare glimpse into the “Lion’s Den” group, which was formed after the assassination of Ibrahim al-Nabulsi, one of the heads of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades”.

The operative says that the establishment of the “Lion’s Den” group was the birth of a new national revolutionary movement that had pulled the rug from under the feet of the Palestinian Authority and shattered the doctrine of American General Dayton, who sought to build a significant Palestinian military force to fight terrorism. General Keith Dayton served as the American security coordinator between Israel and the Palestinian Authority from 2005 to 2010, helping the PA build security apparatuses popularly known as the “Dayton Forces”, which form the backbone of Palestinian security coordination with Israel.

The operative says that the “Lion’s Den” members are establishing local headquarters in all the Palestinian cities with the aim of establishing themselves in every village and refugee camp and to become a new revolutionary national organization that operates with great force while opposing the PA.

He said that while the headquarters are currently being set up separately from each other, they all adopt the name “Lion’s Den”, and that they are not just a few dozen in Nablus, as is commonly thought in Israel. This he asserts, is because “The ‘Lion’s Den’ groups are a national phenomenon and not a local one”. He adds: “The ‘Lions’ managed to escape the watchful eye of the Israeli Shin Bet and proved that both the Palestinian Authority, the Americans, and the Israeli Shin Bet cannot stand up to the new spirit of resistance.”

Moreover, the operative claims that the “Lions” were supported by Hamas and operated under the direction of the organization’s leadership and even received special funding from Hamas. Most of the young commanders in the new network are Hamas members. “The Hamas is the mind and the Fatah is the arms”, he asserts.

The heads of the “Lions” are Fatah activists who although still subscribing to the organization’s ideology, have chosen to operate in the “spirit of Hamas and Islamic Jihad”. “The members of the network are desperate young people who, in practice, have left the central Fatah leadership and are now accepting and adopting the spirit of Hamas’ resistance,” said the Palestinian activist, adding, “This is an improved model of the ‘al-Aqsa Martyrs’ organization – these are Fatah activists operating under Hamas”.

“In 2000, the ‘al-Aqsa Martyrs’ operated in coordination with Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and also in coordination with Hamas, but today the situation is different and Hamas has a much more significant role in establishing the armed buildup of the organization”,  he said. But “it is impossible to reveal everything and the extent of Hamas’s involvement”,  concluded the source from Nablus.

The Test of Security Coordination: Terrorist Operatives within The PA’s Security Forces, Disobedience And Low Morale

Since the beginning of the IDF’s Operation Wave Breaker in Judea and Samaria, Palestinian sources have been reporting severe incidents of refusal among police officers and security  junior officers to comply with PA directives to act against Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas as part of its security coordination with Israel.

The sources report severe morale problems in the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatuses, which explains among others, the enlisting of more than 20 Palestinians – members of the security forces, or the sons of senior members of the security apparatuses – to the ranks of terrorism, which on the one hand acts against Israel but at the same time defies the Palestinian Authority.

Testimony to this are the dozens of shooting incidents at the Jenin governor’s building, the provocation of violence between Palestinian police officers and youths in the refugee camps – particularly in Balata or the Nablus Kasbah, and the declaration on part of the “Lion’s Den” in Nablus of civil disobedience against the Palestinian Authority as a result of the arrest of one of their members.

A point in case: one of the two terrorists who carried out the attack in Jenin, in which IDF Major Bar Pelech was killed, was a member of Palestinian military intelligence. The number of PA police officers involved in recent terrorist acts is already approaching 20. One mid-level officer from the security forces shares unknown exclusive information that raises the concern that the PA’s security apparatuses suffer from low morale, and it is doubtful whether they would be able to contain the mounting terrorism in their jurisdiction.

The officer added that there is significant unrest within the security apparatuses, with a growing number of police officers refusing to obey the “security coordination” with Israel, the political arrests, on behalf of the corrupt and disintegrating PA. He spoke of a degenerate PA, whose heads enjoy an abundance of amenities and privileges while the junior police officers barely manage to get 80 percent of their salary. On the other hand, the officer says, the fast-growing terrorist organizations offer a respectable status to their members and perhaps even more appropriate wages… and are considered the heroes of the day on the Palestinian street, as opposed to police officers who are accused of treason.

In Conclusion

As mentioned at the beginning of this series, the PA’s medical chart is a mile long with endless ailments – and the so called “lack of diplomatic horizon” is far from the worst of them. The testimonies presented here by officers from the within the PA security forces, “Battalions” operatives sources close to the “Lion’s Den”, alongside a review of a series of cases in which senior Fatah figures display increasing unease from the disintegration of the institutions to which they belong – even appealing to elements in Jordan and Egypt – and a series of testimonies to Hamas’ stellar ascent in the face of an ebbing Fatah, create a disturbing and compelling picture according to which the PA is rapidly losing altitude both in terms of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public and in its security control in key Palestinian cities, such as Jenin and Nablus. Senior Palestinian officials strongly question the PA’s power, status, and chances of survival, and now all that remains is to examine Palestinian politics and the dynamics between Israel and the PA in light of these facts, in order to establish a more realistic assessment of the status of the body, which is considered Israel’s partner in Ramallah.

The PA, which has incited against Israel and encouraged perpetrators of terror attacks from the outset, has adopted an “if you can’t beat them, join them” policy encouraging the Battalions in light of its incompetence to deal with these rebel militants. This policy makes some contribution in easing tensions between it and the challenging factions, and in closing ranks among Palestinians. One this policy’s main expressions is in the decision to halt security coordination with Israel following the IDF counterterrorism raid in Jenin which led to the killing of 9 terrorists. In the PA’s perspective, it is better off escalating tensions with Israel – which is interested in its stability and survival – than confronting terrorist factions that can threaten its integrity. This is a highly problematic development for Israel.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

הפוסט Chapter 3: The Palestinian Authority’s Gradual Loss of Security Controls הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This chapter – the second in a series of three – takes a look at the ebbing status of Fatah on the Palestinian street against the soaring status of the Hamas, evident particularly in the events of Operation Guardian of the Walls, wherein the rival movement seized the opportunity to flex its muscles and win over the Palestinian street. As Senior Hamas official Muhammad Dief declared: “If not through the ballot box – then through Jerusalem”. This adverse blow to the Fatah’s foothold in Ramallah is further exacerbated by a slew of other troubles, not the least of which are infighting within the movement, score settling among leadership members, the publication of secret – often embarrassing – recordings of members, and tumultuous leadership meetings and meetings with Jordanian and Egyptian senior officials on the future of the PA.

The author of this article is Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid, former commander and advisor to the Civil Administration and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories  Unit (COGAT), and currently a commentator for Channel 14. Lt. Col. Baruch Yadid speaks fluent Arabic and his written work draws on his extensive experience in the Palestinian arena, including ongoing contact with sources on the ground as well as with senior Palestinian officials.

A source within the PA security mechanism points to another – rather interesting – telltale sign of the sentiment on the Palestinian street that attests to the advance of Hamas and the weakness of the PA: four funerals, which have been held in the past year. According to the source, “the four funerals showcased the power of Hamas and the weakness of the PA”:

1. The funeral of Omar Barghouti, a senior Hamas figure from the village of Kobar in Ramallah – the most significant event in recent years to display the power of Hamas;
2. The funeral of Nizar Banat, the political activist who died during his interrogation in the hands of the security forces in Hebron – an event which swept the Palestinian streets against the PA;
3. The funeral in Jenin of Wafi Qabaha, Hamas Minister of Prisoner Affairs, during which masked Fatah activists were spotted;
4. The funeral of Jamil Kiel in Nablus (a youngster killed during exchange of fire with the IDF), after which security officers “demanded reviewing the orders” given by the PA to dissolve riots by youngsters and Hamas members, indicating a change among PA security officers in Nablus..

It may be noted that this also comes alongside the arrest of Hamas squads in Ramallah, the arrest of hundreds of Hamas officials in Universities around Judea and Samaria in order to restrain the Hamas annual events in December 2022, and the prolonged arrest of Masaab Shtayeh in Nablus in September 2022 by the PA’s security mechanism. All of the above may signal the PA’s abilities to enforce its rule in certain areas and enclaves, in particular in and around Ramallah rather than in Nablus or Jenin.

“Guardian of the Walls” Events – the Succession Battles in Fatah; Hamas Lifts its head

The Fatah – battles over the “lost inheritance” and cancellation of the elections

“Under Abu Mazen, Fatah’s Central Committee has become a slaughterhouse”, a senior Fatah official told us, “The ousting of Dahlan, the overthrowing of Nasser Qadwa and the injustice toward Marwan Barghouti – and the members of the [Central] Committee testify to this,” he asserts. “First it was the role of the Palestinian prime minister – and anyone who recognized him yet was not a Fatah member – was politically eliminated and kicked out. This is how Salam Fayyad and Rami Hamdallah found themselves ousted by senior Fatah figures, falling victim to the conspiracies of senior members of the Central Committee…”

One of the most prominent and current signs to the Fatah’s disintegration was in 2021, when Abu Mazen announced the elections, after his previous elections announcement in 2019 was rescinded.

Toward the elections it became clear just how divided the Palestinians are. Alongside far-reaching demands on part of the Hamas, Abu Mazen was forced to deal with the fragmentation of the Fatah into rival factions. Many saw Muhammad Dahlan’s separate list of candidates as inevitable, but nonetheless hoped that the senior Fatah member, Marwan Barghouti,  will accept the movements decisions.

The PA invested great efforts into swaying Marwan Barghouti, who is serving a life sentence in an Israeli prison, not to run on a separate ticket, to no avail, and even the visit of Hussein al-Sheikh – with Israel’s permission – to Barghouti in prison, failed to yield the desired result and Barghouti founded a separate list.

And as if that were not enough, another player joined the race creating yet another separate list in direct violation of orders from the leadership – Nasse Qadwa, a nephew of Yasser Arafat, formed a list of his own and even forged a political alliance with Marwan Barghouti.

Operating under these pressures, Abu Mazen resorted to calling off the elections, not before hearing foreboding assessments from his own intelligence apparatus, alongside assessments from Egypt, the Jordanians and the US. His decision played a crucial role in the move on part of Hamas – which had just elected its new leadership – to fire rockets on Jerusalem, which ultimately led to Operation Guardian of the Walls.

The “Guardian of the Walls” Events – an Opportunity for Hamas to Flex its Muscles in the Face of a Floundering PA

Already in mid-April 2021, right before the PA elections were called off, it became evident that the rocket launching from Gaza into Israel (in April), signaled that East Jerusalem was to soon become the main arena of the next battle of attrition between Israel and Hamas. Throughout the international community the misimpression spreading that Operation “Guardian of the Walls” was sparked predominantly by what the Hamas chose to show it: the Jewish annual March of Flags on Jerusalem Day – and event that had been taking place each year, during the past years; or the Israel court’s ordering Palestinian families to evict homes that are owned by Jews in the Sheik Jarrah neighborhood. But the bigger picture is much deeper and revolves around the clash of two giants – Fatah and the Hamas – vying for the hearts of the Palestinian people.

In fact, in February that same year, 3 months before Operation Guardian of the Walls, elections were due to be held in all five Hamas contingencies – overseas, prisons, Gaza, and the General Political Bureau – but they were not held in Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank”). It took Yihya Sinwar four grueling rounds to finally win the elections. The newly elected Hamas leadership made a simple calculation; in the words of senior Hamas figure and Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades commander Muhammad Deif: “If we can’t get in throughout the ballots – we’ll get in through Jerusalem”.  The lack of long-term arrangement with Israel in the Gaza Strip, and the cancellation of the elections in Judea and Samaria by Abu Mazen and Fatah (a roadblock in the Hamas’ way to taking control of Judea and Samaria, in addition to its hold on Gaza), Hamas made a calculated evaluation of the situation and prevailed: the issue of the holy sites and Jerusalem will pave its rise to dominance.

Thus, as from April Hamas begun calling on its operatives and on the residents of East Jerusalem to increase their presence in the city and in the al-Aqsa mosque, and even encouraged them to hold public prayers in front of the police barricades, with the aim of ensuring mass participation towards the 28^th Ramadan day, which happened to fall on May 9 – the date of Israel’s Jerusalem Day.

That was also the date of the Muslim Qadr Night – the most religiously profound– and as such the most sensitive – night of the Ramadan, in which according to the Muslim faith, the Angel Gabriel bought the world the Quran and in which the heavens open to prayer. Hamas depicted the sensitive date as “the definitive moment in the fight against the (Jewish) settlers and the occupation of Jerusalem”.

Khaled Mashaal, who was elected to head the Hamas leadership oversees, said in an interview: “We are facing a widespread battle in the face of the attempts to control Jerusalem and make it Jewish and to divide the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and May 9 is the definitive moment in the history of the Intifada in the city”.

“We have no future,  no state and no self-determination without Jerusalem”, said the Hamas leader, adding: “Israel made a mistake in 2017 when it placed electronic gates (magnometers) and it’ll fail to achieve its plans to conquer Bab Al-Amud – the Damascus Gate (East-Jerusalem entrance to the Old City). The enemy was taken by surprise by the people of Jerusalem who have risen to thwart their designs to Jewify the city, and we must turn the city into the heart of the conflict and to an arena of national unity”, he said.

Hamas called on East Jerusalem residents to form night patrol squads in the East Jerusalem neighborhoods and to prevent the entrance of “Jewish settlers” into their area.  Sheikh Akrama Sabri, head of the High Muslim Council, whose movement have been restricted by the Jerusalem police, also called for the formation of defense committees throughout East Jerusalem.

The firing of rockets into Israel (April) was aimed, on part of Hamas, to convey a message to the Palestinian Authority as well, according to which if Abu Mazen postpones the elections, Hamas will act towards the destabilization of the PA territories by fomenting religious unrest in Jerusalem. In reference to the elections, Mashaal said that the Hamas wants to hold elections in all Palestinian departments – Jerusalem included – and therefore there is no justification for withdrawing the demand to hold them, rather, an alternative must be devised in light of Israel’s ban on holding elections in Jerusalem.

Hamas officials declared that Fatah’ intent on postponing the elections is unacceptable. And furthermore, that the issue of  ballot boxes in East Jerusalem is nothing but an excuse for Abu Mazen  and an escape route for him from the crises in Fatah – ultimately leading to the unintended consolidation of Israel’s position. “We ask to be part of the political race and the elections should not be hanging in the air”’ says Mashaal. “Putting the Palestinian house in order is a necessity for reinforcing the resistance to the occupation and the rebuilding of the national project upon new foundations”.

Hamas was pleased with the predicament in which the Fatah found itself, and said that its struggle shoulder to shoulder with the Jerusalem residents boosts their image in the Palestinian street and that its willingness to engage in conflict with Israel will ultimately lead to the movement’s victory at the expense of Fatah and the PA. “This is a victory that even the Intelligence in Tel Aviv understands is expected to affect Israel’s security and political considerations, and is an unfavorable outcome for Israel”, wrote Hamas commentators.

Lebanese newspaper, Al Akhbar, which has sources within the Hamas, reported talks between Egypt and the UN aiming at “containing the situation”, however, at the same time, Hamas had rejected the détente as long as Israel sticks to its policy in Jerusalem, and the movement has committed to “prevent the settlers from storming Al Aqsa”.

Thus, the Hamas has demonstrated its clear intention to lock horns with Israel and flex its muscles, thereby chalking up a twofold gain: the cementing of its status on the Palestinian street as the protector of the holy sites and as the warrior on the front against Israel – all on the expense of an ebbing PA and the Israeli security forces, which were forced to deal with widespread riots in a number of arenas at the same time, during Operation Guardian of the Walls.

Tensions In Fatah: Elimination of Rivals, Infighting Over Abu Mazen Succession, Talks with Jordan and Egypt

Means that justify the end – elimination of rivals withing Fatah

The Tawfiq Tarawi affair – The “Arafat Assassination” case

Finger-pointing for the murder of Yasar Arafat, leaking fake news, exploiting the intelligence system for settling political scores, exposure of sex and financial embezzlement scandals – all these are means deemed legitimate in the infighting within the Fatah, as has become apparent over the past years.

Tawfiq Tarawi, senior Fatah figure and former head of General Intelligence, recently denied remarks attributed to him regarding the conclusions in the “Yasar Arafat Assassination” case, which he has been conducting since 2016. Tarawi made it clear that the information that was spread on networks, attributed to him, regarding the identity of Arafat’s murderer are fake, and emphasized that “the investigation is ongoing and the results shall soon be presented to Fatah’s Central Committee and to Abu Mazen”.

Already a few years ago, the investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of Arafat has become a means for political elimination in the Palestinian political top echelon. Ten years ago, Abu Mazen appointed a committee to investigate the murder of Yasar Arafat after rumors and allegations were spread regarding the connection of Israeli and Palestinian elements with his death.

However,  there were those within Fatah who did not wait until the source of these rumors on Arafat’s death  was discovered and revealed, and sources within the organization claimed that the probability of Tarawi’s removal from the Fatah Central Committee is growing, having become the target of Abu Mazen’s cohorts, among them Hussein al-Sheik – Palestinian minister of civil affairs and secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, and Majid Faraj –  who heads the Palestinian intelligence.

The tensions among the senior Fatah officials arise in the wake of recent exposures of recordings in which Tarawi was heard vehemently slamming Hussein al-Sheik, who is considered the closest person to Abu Mazen. Tarawi was recorded claiming that al-Sheik is involved of financial and moral corruption scandals, from which he was pulled out by means of hush money paid with the help of his friend Faraj. Tarawi also alleged that al-Sheik pocketed money  he charged for arranging entrance permits into Israel for Palestinian businessmen.

Against Tarawi are also his harsh remarks against Jibril Rajoub and Mahmoud al-Aloul, Mahmoud Abbas’ deputy in Fatah. Among other things he said against his rivals, Tarawi accused Rajoub of lying and attempts to hide the fact that he was embroiled in inner conspiracies in the Fatah. Tarawi claimed that Rajoub himself accused Faraj of being a British agent and received a monthly pay of £3,000 in the past for these services. There are those in the Central Committee who attribute the leak of information on Arafat’s murder to Tarawi himself – an allegation Tarawi immediately denied– and regard Tarawi’s allegations as an implicit threat towards Abu Mazen.

Tarawi was extremely close to Yasar Arafat, however, ever since Abu Mazen was elected to head the PA and Fatah, he was ousted from the inner circle of the decision-makers in the Palestinian leadership and recently, was even dismissed as chairman of the board of trustees of the Military Academy in Jericho, “Al Istiqlal” (The Independence).

Palestinian sources claim that this was a heavy blow to Tarawi, who’s lost an income of over $73,000 from his chairmanship of the board. Senior level sources – most probably from the top tier of Fatah – had even leaked a “secret report” to a Saudi media site, in which they expose embezzlement of the military academy’s money,  nepotism, and the use thereof to acquire real estate on part of Tarawi.

On the other side of the divide, the opposition to the Abu Mazen camp raises claims of grave happenings involving people close to the Palestinian Chairman, including sizzling affairs in Jordan, payment of hush money and even testimonies of alleged rape cases.

The Hussein al-Sheik Affair: The “Prince” Seeks to Get Rid of Abu Mazen

While the Palestinian Authority is struggling on the political level against Israel and at the same time is plagued by a long list of internal strife, it is Hussein al-Sheik, a close confidant to Abu Mazen’s, who promoted him to Secretary General of the PLO Central Committee, who is taking a stand against the PA chairman.

The succession battles have come to light recently in full force through recordings, in which Al Sheik was caught in a rare instance of critizing Abu Mazen. These recordings were released by the Shihab news agency which is aligned with the Hamas. In the recordings, al-Sheik is heard attacking the Palestinian leader and accusing him of the anarchy which we are reviewing here, and even cursing him. Although al-Sheik denies this to his inner circle of acquaintances – it will be hard for him to refute the evidence.

The recordings reveal  difficult and complex relationships in the Fatah leadership, against the backdrop  of the battles over the succession of Abu Mazen, as well as the – mostly hushed – internal criticism within the  Fatah Central Committee  against Abu Mazen. In the opinion of some in Ramallah, al-Sheik is revealed in the recordings as someone who is seeking a way of ousting Abu Mazen, and his remarks indeed indicate that he is in fact in the process of planning this move.

“I’m telling you that Abu Mazen is partner to the present anarchy. He’s partner to the anarchy and has an interest in perpetuating it”, says al-Sheik. “. I’m sorry to say this, but today the process of succession is totally different than it was after Arafat’s death. Abu Mazen’s has lost grip of his senses. How can we operate properly when he informs us of the decisions without sharing the reasons behind them?”

“Not everything he wants – we want to give him. I know the workings of his brain; anyone riding Abu Mazen’s brain, one, two, three, four” says al-Sheik. He adds that Abu Mazen “caused the fight over the throne, involving  Jibril Rajoub, Azzam al-Ahmad, Tawfiq Tirawi and Mahmoud al-Aloul, and this is going to bring about the end of the game…Hamas is taking advantage of the PA’s lack of decisiveness, and it’s clear that Hamas is capitalizing on the current situation”. In these words, he corroborates this analysis of the decline of Fatah in face of a rising Hamas.

Al-Sheik himself described the events in Fatah as “the battle over the succession of Abu Mazen”, saying that the battle involved many contenders. From his remarks it could be understood that “there is a set plan” for these battles. Al‑Sheik admits in his own words: “the security mechanisms and part of the Fatah leadership are involved in the Abu Mazen succession battles and are partaking in this game”.

Al-Sheik attacks other contenders to the throne, saying even that for his part, Majed Faraj, head of PA General Intelligence – with whom he shares exclusively close ties with Abu Mazen – could go “f**k himself”. Al-Sheik further inquired “why did he even open a dialogue with the Egyptians in Gaza?” He was also incensed over Abu Mazen’s decision to take Faraj along on his private jet to one of his foreign visits. “When I learned that he’s planning to take Majed along on the plane – I decided not to go, to tell you the truth. Why and for what reason would he bring Majed Faraj along?”

Al-Sheikh also spoke out against Mahmoud Abbas’ deputy in Fatah – the sole deputy Chairman, who wears three different hats– saying that “Abbas intends to appoint Mahmoud al-Aloul as his successor in the Fatah movement” adding that “on the issue of Fatah, he (Abbas) is leaning towards Mahmoud al-Aloul.”

Efforts to Boost Fatah Against its Loss of Control – Convening the Council and Talks with Jordan and Egypt

Concurrently with its efforts in the security area, now the PA is trying to bolster the Fatah movement and its governing institutions. Senior officials in the organization have been demanding for a while now to convene the eighth conference of the movement leadership, and a senior source within the PA said: “there is pressure on Abu Mazen to in this direction and give a chance to in-house peacemaking efforts, in light of the grave crises on the ground”.

Abbas Zaki, one of the Fatah leaders, told the Palestinian media: “The eighth conference will be held soon so that we can formulate a strategy that corresponds with Mahmoud Abbas’ speech at the UN – according to which there is no Israeli partner for continuing diplomatic negotiations – and to allow us to act towards international protection of the Palestinians.”

In an effort to return Fatah to the playing field, the first conference was held last month in the Jenin district, as part of a move intended to establish regional movement councils that would strengthen the connection between the Palestinian street and Fatah.

These struggles among the rival camps, namely  Marwan Barghouti’s camp on one hand, and Muhammad Dahlan’s camp and on the other, and even withing the “Abu Mazen camp” or the Fatah Central Committee – is pushing the PA towards the abyss. The various rivals are scurrying to secure alliances and cement positions of power in preparation for the day after Abu Mazen. However, at the same time, Hamas is positioning itself toward fulfilling its vision of seizing control of Judea and Samaria once Abu Mazen’s gone.

A member of the Revolutionary Council told us that there are pressures from the concerned field operatives to convene the Eighth Assembly in order to act to heal the organization.

At the same time, Lebanese al-Akhbar quotes sources from within Fatah, who claim that over the past several months, a number of meetings were held between Palestinian officials and senior Jordanian and Egyptian officials, aimed at “settling the future of the PA and Fatah”, the sources say.

The newspaper reports that Palestinian officials led by Hussein al-Sheik met with representatives of the Jordanian royal court and the Jordanian intelligence to discuss possible contingencies in the PA territories once Mahmoud Abbas passes away. The discussion mainly focused on the relations between Fatah –from which the PA is constituted – and the rest of the Palestinian political factions, especially the Hamas, as well as on the relations among the Fatah leaders themselves – mainly those engaged in the succession battles.

A similar meeting was held in Egypt, wherein the Palestinians demanded the Egypt help to prevent the PA’s collapse and the damage to the legitimacy of Fatah and the seizure of that legitimacy by rival movements – especially Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PFLP.

Palestinian sources also appealed to Egypt and Jordan for help in controlling the rival factions within Fatah after Abbas’s death and recognize them as “representatives of the Palestinian people” while controlling the funding sources and salaries of more than 150,000 PA employees.

Al-Akhbar’s sources added: “Those who were present at the meetings came to the conclusion that the collapse of government after Abu Mazen’s departure must be prevented, and that Arab support for one Fatah leader must be ensured, once he is elected with the consent of the movement’s leadership, which will convene the day after Mahmoud Abbas’ departure to agree on  its internal terms”. It was further agreed that the rift in Fatah should be ended by accepting back into the fold officials who have defected from the movement, the likes of Muhammad Dahlan, Nasser al-Qadwa, and Marwan Barghouti, and hold an internal reconciliation conference and appoint roles by consensus.

Al-Aloul on his part is endeavoring to reinstate all the members of the Fatah’s inner opposition faction and the distribution of offices among the various leaders, while al-Sheik is aiming for perpetuating Abu Mazen’s modus operandi , i.e controlling all of the movement’s positions. Against this background claims al-Akhbar, al-Sheik has been especially active recently, holding meetings with US government officials, among them the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack Sullivan, discussing options for the reinforcement of the PA and the risk of its collapse.

The following – and last – chapter reviews the Palestinian Authority’s loss of control over the security in wide swaths of the Judea and Samaria region, and how this affects its status on the Palestinian street and among the political factions, and accelerates its disintegration.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

הפוסט Chapter 2: the Ebb of Fatah; the Surge of Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Indeed, the PA’s medical chart is a mile long with endless ailments – and the so called “lack of diplomatic horizon” is far from the worst among them. Senior Palestinian officials highly doubt the efficacy of the PA, its status and its mere survivability. This lack of trust stems from various causes, chief among them recent developments and trends on the Palestinian street, the rise of Hamas, the loss of the PA institutions’ credibility with  the Palestinian public, and political infighting.

It is therefore clear that the PA is not a stable entity, and it has in fact been in decline for years. In light of this understanding Israel stands before two undisputable principles:

1. Israel continues to maintain the PA economically, but is unable to act towards reinforcing it politically, simply because the PA has long lost its credibility on the Palestinian street and its influence over the Palestinian people;
2. Moreover, Israel must neither buttress nor legitimize the PA, as any diplomatic asset deposited in the hands of the current Palestinian leadership is sure to fall into unintended hands, be it today, tomorrow or at any point in the future. In the same manner that diplomatic and strategic assets were to be withheld from the disintegrating Afghan government, that was plucked like a ripe fruit by the Taliban in the wake of the US’s withdrawal; or from the Syrian regime, which fragmented into cells of control, similarly to the current state of affairs in Judea and Samaria, it is imperative that any assets – be they financial, professional, international legitimization, weapons and military buildup – be withheld from the PA, which is already fragmenting into factions and areas of control. Any such assets will instantly and effortlessly be seized by either the Hamas, extreme factions or any player in the arena who might have fundamentalist intentions, which could overthrow the Palestinian Authority at any given time.

Granted, despite the clear signs of disintegration, the PA still survives, for a number of reasons, first and foremost thanks to its being the manifestation of the Palestinian’s greatest achievement to boot: the establishment of control over the lions’ share of the Palestinian people living within the 67’ territories; the commitment by the international system and the Arab world to preserve the PA and view it as a state in the making; and finally, Israel’s commitment to maintain the status quo and cement the PA’s standing. Israel has chosen for many years to skirt any measures and steps that would impart to the PA that its policies are unacceptable and that its support of terrorism would come with a steep price tag. The Israeli government failed to exact a toll on the PA’s unilateral actions and violations of agreements. At times, Israel even avoided enforcing the “Offset Law” (the 2018 Law on Freezing Terror Funds)  and granted loans to support the Authority – at the behest of senior officials in the Israeli security establishment.

Precisely for that reason, it appears that the telltale signs of disintegration are pushing the Authority to a more extreme position, such as its entrenched position towards salaries for terrorists, the encouragement of anti-Israel incitement, the excessive expansion of illegal construction in C areas under the Fayad Plan, and additional extreme steps on the international level such as appealing to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, driving actions in the UN, such as assembling the Security Council to adopt resolutions against Israel.

The shift in the current government’s policy on this matter manifests not as an objective of dismantling the PA framework itself, but rather to bring about a change of its policy by adopting measures that aim to impress upon the Authority that Israel’ support is not to be taken for granted. Among the means designed toward this end are the implementation of the “Offset Law”, forfeiture of part of the money deducted from the PA for the purpose of implementing legal rulings regarding compensations to terrorism victim families; increased enforcement of construction restrictions in C Area, and the revocation of entrance permits to Israel from PA senior officials involved in the appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and those who have visited the released terrorist Karim Younis to welcome him on his return home.

This paper reviews the causes for the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority, in three sections:

1. Civil and social protest on the Palestinian streets;
2. The withdrawal of Fatah in the face of a rapidly rising Hamas;
3. The erosion of the PA’s scope of control in its territories. .

Introduction: The Telltale Signs of the PA’s Decline

The current sentiment on the Palestinian street is testament to how weak the Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) government and the Fatah’s hold in fact is. The person who “lost” Gaza, dismantled the Fatah, called off the elections, bled dry the very legitimacy of his own existence, paralyzed the civil institutions, allowed political corruption to soar to record highs, imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip, lost control over the Judea and Samaria peripheries; the man under whose rule the Palestinian problem was relegated to the bottom of the international community’s agenda – is responsible for turning the PA – either by design or out of his own weakness – into a relic of the past.

In a military conference last September, IDF Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi said : “part of the increase in terrorism stems from the incompetence of the Palestinian security mechanism, leading to loss of governance in sections of Judea and Samaria – areas which serve as fertile grounds for the rise of terrorism hotbeds.”

Still, it is unclear from Lieutenant General Kochavi’s remarks whether it is a lack of efficacy on part of the Authority – leading, for example, to the resounding failure of the “governance operation” announced by Abu Mazen in late 2021, ultimately causing the dismissal of the entire top command of his security mechanism– or lack of motivation, despite the existential threat to the “Palestinian dream”. Developments in recent days – such as Palestinian efforts to thwart armed groups in Nablus even at the cost of acquiring arms for the security forces, indicate that the most likely problem is incompetence rather than lack of desire to regain control of the area.

One way or another, these recent events raise the following question: in the twilight of Abu Mazen’s chairmanship over the PA, will the Authority cease to exist as we know it?  This question emerges for numerous reasons, among them pressure from within his own government to withdraw from agreements with Israel, the splintering of Fatah into rival factions, the rise of Hamas’ power, and the trust crises on the Palestinian street?

The day after Abu Mazen

Recent developments in the PA areas are but a prologue to the post Abu Mazen era. The current 87-year-old PA chairman is “included in a long list of health risk-groups” – says a source in Ramallah.

Many in the PA and Fatah alike are convinced that we are witnessing the demise of the “Ra’is” Mahmoud Abbas. Further signs of the shape of things to come are:

1. Civil-social unrest
   • The government institutions are degenerated and plagued with rampant corruption – there is no parliament, government budgets are emaciated and corruption reigns throughout the Authority.
   • The Palestinian people express their distaste towards the manner in which Abu Mazen and the Authority are running things, and is calling on them to step down. In a survey conducted in December 2022 – 80% of the Palestinian public thought that the PA is a corrupt body, and 77% demand that Abu Mazen step down. Additionally, it was found that were elections to be held now – Abu Mazen would gain the support of only 33% of the Palestinian public while his opponent – Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh – would enjoy the support of 55% of that public.[1]
2. A declining Fatah against a rising Hamas
   • The Fatah Movement has for all intents and purposes, split into three and a half large blocs, with the Central committee still under the control of Abu Mazen, Mohammed Dahlan’s Fatah offshoot was ousted from the movement, and other factions pledge their allegiance to Marwan Barghouti, who even though he is a member of the Central Committee, is perceived as an oppositional factor against Abu Mazen.
   • Recent rifts in Fatah testify to the deep running animosity among the claimants to the crown: Hussein al-Sheikh and Majed Faraj – from Abu Mazen’s supporting camp, on one hand, and on the other – Jibril Rajoub, Tawfiq Tirawi, who faces possible removal from Abu Mazen’s inner circle, Mahmoud Aloul – currently Abu Mazen’s Fatah deputy is debating on his next steps, and others.
   • Even within the Central Committee there’s growing resentment towards Hussein Al-Sheikh, who is endorsed by Abu Mazen and was promoted by him to key positions, and appointed by him secretary of the PLO’s executive committee.
   • Within the PLO itself, pressure is mounting against Abu Mazen to unilaterally withdraw from the agreements he had signed with Israel, and rescind Palestinian recognition of Israel. According to sources, Abu Mazen on his part is feeling pressure to withdraw from the agreements and now, as a last resort, he has appealed to the UN to recognize the PA as a full member, despite pressure from the US and Israel against this move.
   • Alongside the internal rifts in Fatah, the Hamas is gaining momentum on the Palestinian street. Thus, for example, during the events leading to Operation Guardian of the Walls, and following the cancellation of the elections, Hamas displayed its willingness to butt heads with Israel and flex its muscles, thereby gaining a twofold advantage: the bolstering of its status in the eyes of the Palestinian public as the protector of the holy sites and as the spearhead of the battle against Israel – both at the expense of a weakening PA and of the Israeli security forces, which had to deal with widespread uprising of Arab civilians in multiple arenas at the same time.
3. The erosion of the reach of the PA’s security controls
   • Entire swaths of Judea and Samaria are increasingly slipping away from under the PA’s  scope of control. What germinated in Jenin (the “Battalions” phenomenon, militia groups that have split from the dominance and authority of the PA and do not adhere to its orders) has already spread its roots to Nablus, and some Palestinian security officials fear that this phenomenon has even reached Ramallah, pinpointing in particular the Hamas’ stronghold in the area – the Silwad township.
   • The refugee camps, mainly those in Samaria and central neighborhoods of Nablus, have become areas over which the PA no longer holds jurisdiction.
   • The PA failed to enforce law and order in the Jenin region, and is gradually being driven southward, leaving the IDF to operate within the northern cities and villages (e.g. “Operation Break The Wave” for the apprehending of terrorists).
   • The Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades are reentering the cycle of terrorism, in collaboration with sources in the Palestinian security mechanism, mostly low-ranking officers. However, several terrorists who perpetrated attacks against the IDF are sons of high-ranking officers in the Palestinian security forces.
   • The Hebron region is displaying overt hostility towards the PA, and many local issues are resolved by the heads of the family-clans (Hamoula). In Hebron – as in many other areas – the Palestinian Authority is not viewed as a legitimate governing body and is openly challenged by heads of family-clans.

All the above causes are eroding the legitimacy of the Abu Mazen government, and alongside the fragmentation of the Fatah and the succession battles, there is a bottom-up trend of severing loyalties to the PA and the forging of alternative alliances be they to the neighborhood, refugee camp, or to the local armed groups, who have become bona fide terrorist groups.

Many raise questions regarding the security deterioration and the decline of the PA at this specific point in time, and try to pinpoint the cause for this. In an attempt to give a plausible explanation to this state of affairs, is should be mentioned that it is a consequence of the wave of terrorism that emanated from Jenin, a grave attack that forced the IDF to undertake a prolonged campaign – “Operation Break The Wave” – in light of the PA’s incapability to deal with the epicenters of terrorism in the city. The unrest that was sparked in the wake of the Gilboa Prison break (of six Palestinian prisoners), had grown to become a long list of terrorist attacks, under the auspices of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and possibly under sponsorship of Iran. At the same time, the Hamas channeled its efforts into Judea and Samaria while maintaining a “calm” in the Gaza Strip. Testament to the organization’s force buildup  was the apprehension over the past year of more than 50 Hamas operatives from its growing headcount in the Judea and Samaria terrorism network and the efforts by the Turkish branch of the Hamas to establish presence in East Jerusalem.

In light of all this, according to senior official sources within the PA, the most crucial accelerant of the destabilization in the Palestinian arena are the succession battles, and senior sources in Ramallah concur with this view to a great extent, further claiming that we are witnessing the twilight of the last days of the Abu Mazen era. These views also resonate the recent remarks of IDF Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, in which he asserted that “in regard to the Palestinian arena, it is more advisable to look to a further future – to the day after Abu Mazen and the ensuing battles of succession.”

Chapter 1: Civil-Social Unrest

Negative Sentiments

Repeated surveys of the Palestinian public over recent years – including the recent survey from December 2022, attest clearly and unequivocally to the rapid decline in the PA’s status:[2]

• Some 80% of the respondents repeatedly claim the PA is a corrupt entity;
• Over 60% call on Abu Mazen to step down;
• Some 70% think that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and is no longer perceived as a national achievement.

The surveys also indicate a power-balance “seesaw” between the Hamas and the Fatah, wherein many times the Hamas wins the upper hand, as does Ismail Haniyeh over Abu Mazen.

The polls indicate another, interesting, phenomena that is the cause of worry in the top echelon of Fatah: when examining the surveys on rates of support for Marwan Barghouti, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh – the former gains a rate of support of more than 70%, leaving mere scraps for the head of the PA and for the Hamas leader, demonstrating the sentiments prevailing on the Palestinian street.

The recent survey held last June by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that the rate of satisfaction with the work of Abu Mazen is a an unprecedented low of 23%, as oppose to a large majority of 73% that had voiced its dissatisfaction from his government. The survey found that 77% of the residents of the PA territories demand the Chairman’s resignation, while only 18% preferred he remain in office.

Furthermore, 54% of the respondents said they do not believe that elections for the Parliament and presidency will be held anytime soon. Additionally, the survey shows that were the elections to be held now, Abu Mazen would have garnered a 33%support rate, as oppose to a 55% support rate for his rival, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

When asked who they would support in the event that Marwan Barghouti – a senior member of Fatah serving a lifetime sentence in Israel – joins the race, 61% said they would support Barghouti, as oppose to only 34% who said they would support Hamas leader Haniyeh. Marwan Barghouti is also a favorite to win if Abu Mazen opts out of the race – with a support rate of 39% in such a contingency, while Ismail Haniyeh follows with only 17%.

Surveys also reflect the despondency and desire to immigrate in Palestinian society. Similarly to previous polls, the current survey reflects that 24% of the respondents wish to leave PA areas, with a 30% rate in Gaza.

Equally important was the respondents’ views on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – 66% expressed their opposition to a two-state solution, while only 25% supported it.

The Avalanche of the PA Legitimacy

After losing the legitimacy of his chairmanship, and becoming the target for scathing criticism from within Fatah, other organizations and particularly on the Palestinian street, and having led his rivals to found a confrontational coalition to his cabinet – the PA received another blow to its public and political status, when PA security personnel beat to death the social activists from Hebron, Nizar Banat ,during his interrogation.

The wave of protests that broke out in the immediate aftermath – corroborated by sources within the Israeli security system – were in effect the “turning point” of the legitimization for the PA government, and a definitive event rendering Abu Mazen’s chairmanship obsolete.

On top of these events comes the endless list of corrupt behaviors that were uncovered in the PA – including but not limited to unjustifiable nominations, nepotism, allegations regarding positions obtained through sexual bribery of top PA officials, and in particular in the diplomatic corps, embezzlement,  unlawful acquisition of land and real-estate – even by senior PA security personnel, alongside other revelations.

This corruption had become rampant to such an extent that the US and Britain were recently forced to demand that Abu Mazen installs in the PA a mechanism that is similar to the Israeli Department of Internal Police Investigations that would operate in complete transparency, with the overall aim of stemming the avalanche of the PA’s legitimacy.

The protest spread to the international diplomatic level; nearly one-hundred foreign diplomats visited the grieving family of Nizar Banat, thereby lending their voices to the protest against the violation of human rights in the PA territories.  Prior to that, the el-Kurt family from Sheikh Jarrah – whose daughter Muna has become a speaker against the evacuation of families and a Palestinian icon – was invited to an event in East Jerusalem, to which all the foreign diplomats and embassies were invited. However, not a single PA representative received an invitation. This allowed the speakers to voice their opinions more freely, as they lashed out against the PA and leveled – as one participant attested – “unprecedented”  criticism against Abu Mazen.

The “Leave, Abbas” Campaign

The criticism against the Palestinian leadership under Abu Mazen is mounting, but in Ramallah, claims are that the Hamas is behind the protest movement for political reasons. On the Palestinian street, people are already openly demanding the removal of Abu Mazen, as reflected by a campaign launched last August, demanding the resignation of the PA chairman.

The campaign, titled “Leave, Abbas” (ارحل_يا_عباس #), spread throughout the social media, and has already garnered tens of thousands of responses, many of them sharing pictures and videos in which they criticize Abu Mazen and attack his activity and decisions, which many view as harmful to the Palestinian people.

“He who spread chaos throughout the [Western] Bank, who shot professors in the university – he is the one that should get out” – was one of the Tweets on social media. Others were: “Leave. Al Quds is Arab and Islamic, and we need to unite and call on him to get out”; “He who has attached himself to the Presidency for 17 years, but has done nothing for the Palestinians – must disappear”; “He who has made war zones out of the Bank’s universities and mounted attacks on faculty and students – must get out”; He who has killed the activist Nizar Banat and the sons of the ‘al Aqsa Martyrs’ in Jenin prison – must get out”.

At the same time, the Palestinian Bar Association is escalating its protests against the Authority and its people are behind the campaign that is worrying the central government in Ramallah.  Over recent days, the PBA lawyers launched a series of protests and demonstrations in various cities, including Ramallah,  demanding the resignation of Abu Mazen, against the background of a list of decisions and laws, most of them in the area of legal proceedings, oppose by the lawyers.

The PBA has recently announced it would suspend work and representation in the courts. The Association demand to nullify the viability of decisions made by Abu Mazen, with the lack of a legal parliament.  The PBA demonstrations were held under heavy security due to concerns over possible violent outbreaks against Palestinian centers of government in Ramallah. The Association called on the citizens to actively participate in the protests in order to protect their rights and to right the wrongdoings stemming from Abu Mazen’s unlawful steps.

The voices calling for the resignation of the PA chairman have been growing louder in the past year, particularly since he has cancelled the elections in 2021, allowing him to continue to grasp on to his seat – as he has been doing for the past 17 years, without proper elections, employing “methods of dictatorship and suppression” as many claim on the Palestinian street.

The Search for Alternatives

Against the escalating state of affairs, voices in the Authority’s territories are now demanding a “national rescue front” of sorts: a group of 65 Palestinian leading figures from the national movement and social activists, who have joined forces under former Fatah Central Committee member Nasser al-Qudwa- Arafat’s nephew, who was fired by Abu Mazen when he put together a new elections roster and was fired from all his roles in the Yasser Arafat foundation. According to its leaders, this initiative is designed to heal from within the Palestinian home, end the rift between the PA and Gaza territories, and to rebuild the PLO.

The initiative presents a vision for change and intends to drive this change by means of rebuilding the Palestinian institutions, first and foremost the PLO, by appointing a new national council after the general elections. The mission statement includes the mending of fences among the factions, the reinstatement of Palestinian unity and the appointment of a new government.

The proponents of the new initiative  say that is will require broad national understanding  and a commitment to the rule of democracy and a solid foundation for government, and it demands undertaking what action may be needed to face the existing challenges with Israel, through engagement and dialogue on a national level that would lead to consensus.

According to a senior Palestinian source, many who operate within PA territories agree that the legitimacy of the Palestinian political system is deflating at a rapid pace in the absence of presidential elections since 2005 and parliamentary elections since 2006, alongside an alarming decline in the functioning of the PA institutions, displays of dictatorship on part of Abu Mazen, the absence of a proper rule of law and the increasing corruption.

The initiators of this new movement are calling for a regeneration of  the PLO in order to safeguard its role, and in their view, if the elections cannot be held in certain areas the likes of Gaza, which is under the control of the Hamas, there ought to be elections to nominate at least two thirds of the National Council members.

Fatah Revolutionary Council Member,‪ Abdel Fattah Hamayel, told the media that the national rescue front is an expression of the widespread demand on part of the Palestinian people and reflects a broad and comprehensive national sentiment which is calling for change. The demands for the establishment of the movement came after a series of discussions. Senior PFLP member, Maher Harb, supports the idea and says that action must be undertaken to swiftly create a broad front such that would revisit all aspects of the Palestinian issue – namely the role of the PLO.

All the signs reviewed in this article irrefutably indicate the deep, long-lasting, systemic degeneration in the status of the Palestinian Authority on the Palestinian street, and in the eyes of the political echelon and military factions. Indeed, it may be possible to keep this “walking corpse” alive with all means of life support, allowing it to yield control over Ramallah and a handful of additional territories, while it loses its grip on other areas and on the Palestinian people – across the political spectrum – as demonstrated by public surveys, the accelerating social protest, and as we shall see in the following chapters – detrimental political infighting within Fatah, the decline of Fatah against the rise of Hamas, and the buildup of the military factions on the ground.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

[1] “המרכז הפלסטיני למדיניות ולחקר סקרים”, סקר מדצמבר 2022, https://pcpsr.org/ar/node/927
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, a poll conducted in December 2022, https://pcpsr.org/ar/node/927
[2] https://pcpsr.org/ar/node/927.

הפוסט Exclusive: PA Senior Officials – The Palestinian Authority is Imploding הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A week later, then-US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement that the previous administration in Washington had signed with Iran, and US sanctions against Iran were reinstated.

The Research Department of Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF) decided to delve deeper into the Iranian matter in general, and into the Iranian nuclear threat in particular. In this article we will clarify for you what exactly Iran committed to in the agreement, what it is actually doing in its nuclear installations, why the agreement signed failed to prevent a nuclear Iran and how the State of Israel must prepare and act on this issue today, with the Iranian regime being so close to the nuclear point of no return while the global powers are negotiating with it, to reach the very same, problematic agreement.

The Dual Advantage of the Iranian Octopus

Iran is investing massive resources and budgets in the development of military nuclear capabilities, a game changing weapon that would give it a dual advantage: The first is a deterrent, a sort of “insurance policy” in the form of a nuclear umbrella in support of Iranian forces, which continue to take over large swaths of the Middle East in pursuit of Iran’s Shiite vision to become the sole influencer of the region. The second is an offensive weapon, which would constitute an unprecedented existential threat upon the state of Israel and the entire Zionist enterprise.

The “Iranian octopus” sends its tentacles throughout the Middle East: Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. The objective is clear: to weave a noose around Israel, one equipped with an infrastructure of missiles, rocket and drones intended to inflict massive damage upon the Israeli civilian population and adds significant weight to the deterrence equation faced by Israel.

We must understand: the race to build a nuclear bomb is not merely an armaments plan. A nuclear capability served as the ticket to a prestigious and limited club of nine nuclear-capable countries. For this reason, the development of a nuclear weapon is so important to the decision-makers in Tehran, that they are willing to endure sanctions from the Western World; a nuclear weapon would be the crown jewel in the Iranian regime’s efforts to attain the status of a global power.

Who Agreed, and to What: Key Points of the Nuclear Agreement

The “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, which is more commonly known as the “Iran Nuclear Deal”, is an international agreement signed between Iran on the one hand and the United States, Great Britain, China, France, Russia, Germany and the European Union on the other. According to the parties to the agreement, it imposed significant restrictions upon the Iranian nuclear program. Among other things, the agreement requires Iran to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium, install cameras in its nuclear installations, report its activities to the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) and more. In return, the countries that are party to the agreement will lift the diplomatic and economic sanctions that were imposed upon Iran since 2012.

As we stated, President Donald Trump announced in 2018 that the United States would be withdrawing from the agreement and would reimpose the sanctions that were lifted as part of the agreement. However, following the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States and the change in administrations, International diplomatic talks had resumed for the purpose of returning the United States to the agreement.

Facts and Violations: A Chronology of Deception

Supposedly, the State of Israel should have wholeheartedly accepted the agreement, which in practice greatly limited, delayed and prevented Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. However, a closer look at the terms of the agreement and a comparison with what actually occurred in the various nuclear installations in Iran paints a worrisome picture.

For example, the agreement requires Iran to remove the heavy water reactor core, which is used to produce fissionable material and render it unusable in the future by filling it with concrete, and indeed Iran reported to the IAEA that it filled the reactor core as required. However, during an interview the Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency and a member of its negotiating team slipped up and revealed that this was a deception: it was not the core rods that were filled with concrete but rather other rods. Moreover, Iran had purchased in secret rods that would replace those that were filled with concrete. In other cases, Israeli intelligence proved to the world and to the IAEA that Iran is enriching uranium in secret, at new sites that have yet to be reported, but was met with a weak response from the world, which preferred to focus upon celebrations over the diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue.

Examples of Iran’s repeated violations of the agreement are many, but the bottom line is that Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium at a level of 60% to shorten the threshold to a “zero-time breakthrough”. In other words, the time required from the moment the Iranian regime makes a decision until the production of the first nuclear weapon is two to three weeks. After about three months, the Ayatollah regime will be in possession of four nuclear bombs.

To download the full position paper

הפוסט A Nuclear Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Ridiculous, right? Well, this does not amuse us and therefore we decided to examine this issue in depth, in order to understand why this is happening and what can be changed.

The phenomenon of people throwing stones and Molotov cocktails throughout Judea and Samaria has long since become a strategic challenge that undermines the sense of security of the civilian population and contributes to the stability and continuity of the Palestinian terror routine.

The dimensions of this phenomenon leave no room for the misperception that these are “individual attackers”. The data indicates an entirely different picture: these phenomena are the final expression of an organized system of institutional incitement to commit terrorist operations against Israel on the part of the Palestinian Authority.

Despite this being a dangerous strategic phenomenon that harms human life, in practice the civil and military courts are lenient with the terrorists and avoid implementing the full measure of the law upon them. In addition, very few terrorists are actually brought to justice and many complaints are closed by the police on the grounds of “unknown felon”.

Why is all this happening? Our Research Department examined this issue in depth and reached some interesting insights.

Cost Versus Benefit, Opportunity Versus Deterrence

The flourishing of this form of terrorism was made possible by a convergence of five key reasons:

1. Cost: It is easy, simple and cheap to carry out attacks of this type, whether due to the availability of rocks and stones in the area and that they do not require significant preliminary organization, or due to the relative ease of preparing a Molotov cocktail.
2. Benefit: A rock or Molotov cocktail that hit a vehicle can easily start a chain reaction that ends with many casualties. In other words, the potential casualty index for both injuries and death as a result of such an attack, alongside the psychological effect of a declining sense of security when traveling along roads, are impressive. In addition to this, stone throwing is perceived as less threatening than use of firearms or knife, and therefore it is easier to carry out attacks of this type without being exposed to significant media scrutiny.
3. Opportunity: As a result of the daily friction between the Palestinian population and the Israeli population and security forces, the attackers have plenty of opportunities to carry out attacks of this type.
4. The Absence of Operational Deterrence: The security forces preferred, at least until recently, to avoid friction over attacks that are considered lighter, and focused upon thwarting and arresting attackers who planned or carried out shooting, kidnapping, bombing and other types of attacks.
5. The Absence of Legal Deterrence: the military and civilian courts prefer to be lenient with terrorists who make use of rocks and Molotov cocktails and avoid implementing the full measure of the law upon those attackers. Despite the dimensions of the phenomenon of stone throwing, in practice very few terrorists are brought to justice, and the penalties that are actually imposed upon them do not deter at all.

Thousands of Attacks, Dozens of Injured

At present, there are about 20 hotspots that are known for stone throwing throughout Judea and Samaria, mostly along transportation routes and at locations near the separation fence. Those involved are mostly young men ages 10-20 facing off against IDF forces, sometimes with the encouragement of local agitators and far left organizations.

For example, 1,884 stone throwing attacks and 496 Molotov cocktail attacks have been reported in 2020, which led to the injury of 154 civilians and soldiers. On average, 2021 saw an increase of 210% in rock throwing attacks and 156% in Molotov cocktail attacks relative to the previous year.

The IDF and police are operating against this threat by deploying ambushes and making arrests. However, the primary operational challenges include the density of the areas in which the attacks are carried out, internal assistance in the escape of the terrorists, multiple scenes of attacks vis-à-vis the limited security forces, the operational ineffectiveness of the means the IDF deploys against this phenomenon, release or non-continuation of incarceration of those apprehended, cumbersome rules of engagement and a legal proceeding that ends with a lenient penalty.

An increase of 156% in Molotov cocktail attacks and 210% in rock throwing attacks in the years 2020-2021*

*A comparison between the monthly average according to annual figures in 2021 and monthly figures from December 2022

Legal Helplessness: Cases Closed, Lenient Penalties

As stated, one of the challenges of dealing with the rock throwing phenomenon is the lack of deterrence stemming from a legal proceeding that ends with a lenient punishment. From an examination of all the cases opened against those accused of throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails in years 2019-2020, a harsh picture emerges of significant lenience on the part of the civil and military courts in actual penalties compared with the penalties stipulated by law up to prison sentences that are 95% shorter than that stipulated by law, at times merely a few days or months. In 11% of the rock throwing cases no prison sentences were set, despite the circumstances of the failure to set prison sentences not being known and requiring an individual examination of the cases.

The average penalties stand at only 8.3 months in prison for throwing rocks and only 13 months prison for throwing Molotov cocktails, compared with the maximum sentence of 10-25 years as stipulated by law, subject to the circumstances. Moreover, comparative examination revealed that a significant percentage of the reported events do not end with indictments: In the first half of 2020 only 21% of the reported rock throwing events and 33% of the reported Molotov Cocktail throwing events Ended with an indictment.

“Words of the Investigator”

The insights that emerged from the comprehensive study we conducted were examined by senior members of the IDSF, who formulated concrete recommendations for changing the situation. These recommendations include defining certain areas as high risk for loss of life as a result of rock throwing and defining Molotov cocktail throwing as a life endangering attack, which justifies taking defensive measures such as firing in order to neutralize; a concentrated effort to arrest those who recruit, encourage and direct the attackers; setting up a computer system with a database for synchronization; and formulating legislation that would enable imposing appropriate and harsher penalties upon those involved in terrorist activities.

“This position paper was written by the Research Department in preparation for a debate in the Knesset’s Interior and Security Committee on the issue of implementing the full measure of the law upon rock throwers in Judea and Samaria”, says Yaron Buskila, Lt. Col. (res.) and IDSF Director of Operations, who is signed on the study. “The reason for writing the document was to legislate minimum penalties in the law imposed upon throwers of rocks and Molotov cocktails in a manner that does not allow judges to be significantly lenient in penalties, as is the case today. The document was written in conjunction with litigators specializing in the laws of war, experts on the issue of Judea and Samaria, researchers entrusted with collecting data and senior commanders who serve as regional commanders in Judea and Samaria. The document was presented in a committee meeting in which ministers, MKs, senior police officers, IDF officers from Judea and Samaria and representatives of the Judge Advocate General and the state Attorney’s Office were present. Following the issues that were presented in the Movement’s document, at the end of the meeting, the Knesset having instructed the state Attorney’s Office to present the meanings of establishing minimum penalties and scheduled an additional hearing in order to promote a change in the law.”

To download the full position paper

הפוסט “Touchstone”: Bring the Throwers of Stones and Molotov Cocktail to Justice הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Surprisingly, when it comes to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Israel repeatedly tries to insert a cube into a triangular opening: attempting the “two states for two peoples solution” and experiencing its incompatibility anew every time, as if there are no other solutions that could better fit the problem.

We believe otherwise. There are other, viable solutions that could lead to prosperity and growth throughout the region. We do not pretend to present the Israeli-Palestinian issue in a simplistic light, and it is not our intention to create spins that ignore the “tough nuts” to crack on issues of religion, narratives, demographics and citizenship. However, there is need for fresh thinking that sees before it the wall of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and attempts to cross it in creative ways, rather than slamming the square cube into a triangular opening.

Between “Managing” and “Ending”: The Two-State Solution

The discourse for resolving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict in the internal Israeli discourse primarily focuses upon managing the conflict, without a long-term strategic purpose that could constitute a compass for possible directions of action that would lead to ending the conflict. At the same time, a significant portion of the international discourse focuses upon criticizing the policy that Israel operates under in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

The two-state solution has therefore become the dominant pattern of thinking, and has indirectly helped in fixing a series of concepts, the most astounding of which claims that the Israeli- Palestinian conflict began in 1967 and does not derive from two contradictory religious and national narratives pertaining to the same land. The two-state solution has also contributed to the distorted idea that the Jewish people are a foreign occupier in their historical homeland, merely because of that Jordanian occupation that lasted 19 years, which hardly any country had recognized.

This narrow perspective of the conflict has yet to lead to any results, and has inflicted great damage up on both sides, primarily due to a lack of thinking on the red lines that are so clear: the State of Israel cannot accept a withdrawal to borders that are not defensible or abandon the holy sites in Jerusalem and the “Bible Belt” in Judea and Samaria. It also has no reason to do so.

1. Israel as the eternal homeland of the Jewish people: The basic assumption is that the Land of Israel, including Judea and Samaria and the holy sites, is the historical and eternal homeland of the Jewish people, a place that is inseparable from the Jewish identity as a religion and
a nation.

2. Striving towards a practicable settlement: Recognition of the practical need to strive towards a practicable settlement vis-à-vis the Palestinians, in order to enable them to govern their civil affairs. An arrangement of this type shall be a direct continuation of the route that has already been agreed to, prepared and executed within the framework of the Oslo Agreements, which are still currently in effect. It provided the Palestinians full civil control over their population centers, presenting a vision of a demilitarized Palestinian entity alongside the Jewish and democratic State of Israel.

3. Permanent borders: The basic assumption is that Israel shall only rely upon itself and defend itself on its own, and cannot afford to rely upon foreign or international military forces in order to ensure its existence. For this purpose, the permanent borders of Israel after any political settlement must be defensible and viable.

• Jerusalem shall remain the unified capital of the State of Israel. Various arrangements can be found for those periphery communities beyond the separation fence, which are still considered at present to be part of the city.
• Israel shall apply full sovereignty over the Jordan Valley in the broadest meaning, in a manner that ensures a defensible eastern border vis-à-vis threats such as Iran and regional instability.
• Israel shall maintain full security and military control over Judea and Samaria, based upon strong Jewish settlements along key routes and areas and at locations that are important to the Jewish people as a force multiplier. The Israeli security control shall also include the electromagnetic space, the airspace and border control.

4. Encouraging prosperity: Although Israel is not responsible for the welfare of the Palestinians, it should encourage the empowerment of the local population, erect joint industrial zones, promote an economic peace and enable regular daily life for the benefit of all parties.

The principles above go far beyond the technical security arrangements that may be met in another way, as was proposed in plans such as the Alan Plan. The central working assumption of Israel is that it would always rely only upon itself and defend itself on its own, and that it cannot afford to rely upon foreign or international military forces in order to ensure its existence. Moreover, these points are not a vision that has only been adopted by the national camp in Israel, but also constitute a consensus that was adopted by the Rabin Government as the foundation of the Oslo Agreements.

Better Solutions Than the Two States: A Reservoir of Alternative Plans

The plans that we specify below are intended to create applicable alternatives vis-à-vis various scenarios that may be created in the near and distant future. We are not recommending any specific plan, but rather encourage a debate on solutions that are more applicable than two states for two peoples.

1. The Palestinian Emirates Plan: The only loyalty in the Middle East is to one’s family, religion and tribe, rather than to artificial nation states. Accordingly, this plan is based upon the recognition of the tribe-clan disbursement of the Palestinian population, which is not monolithic. There are very few ties and very little trust between the various clans in Jenin, Bethlehem, Ramallah and Nablus. The western-colonialist attempt to impose the Westphalian nation state model upon the region has failed miserably. Therefore, we should establish eight Emirates throughout Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which are based upon city-states under the control of the local clans.
2. The Palestinian-Jordanian Confederacy: 70%-80% of the citizens of Jordan are Palestinian. In the event the Jordanian royal family collapses, it would be reasonable to establish a Palestinian state instead of today’s Kingdom of Jordan, with enclaves in Palestinian population centers in Judea and Samaria, or alternatively, to establish a confederacy or a joint Jordanian-Palestinian federation between the Kingdom of Jordan and the enclaves in Judea and Samaria. Thus, the national aspirations of the Palestinians will be met in the form of the establishment of a Palestinian state in conjunction with Jordan.
3. The new state solution in the Gaza Strip: The new state plan remains faithful to the international position that promotes negotiations towards two states, one Israeli and one Palestinian, living side-by-side in peace and security, and would satisfy Palestinian national aspirations. Therefore, we must establish an independent and sovereign Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel in the Gaza Strip, with territorial contiguity into the northern Sinai region.
4. The deal of the century: A realistic two-state solution in which a safe and prosperous Palestine exists in peace alongside a safe and prosperous State of Israel within a safe and prosperous region. This is a holistic and security-focused vision, which provides self-determination to the Palestinians, security to Israel, and significant economic opportunities for both parties and for countries in the region. The State of Palestine shall be completely demilitarized and shall remain so. In addition, Israel shall agree to significant territorial concessions in order to enable the Palestinians to have a viable state. Territorial swaps shall provide the State of Palestine an area roughly equal to that of Judea, Samaria and Gaza on the eve of the Six-Day War in 1967. The Jordan valley, which plays a critical role in Israel’s security, shall remain under Israeli sovereignty.

It is time to leave behind the failed outline of “two states for two peoples” in its current form and move on to new ideas, while moving the spotlight of the discourse to alternative solutions to end the conflict. It is quite possible that the Israeli-Palestinian question shall be in an entirely different place if only Israel moves from paralysis to initiative and strives towards maximum utilization of the many opportunities that are already available.

“The purpose of the position paper is to create order”, said Or Yissachar, the Head of the Research Department of the IDSF. “We present all the alternatives to the two-state solution, with their advantages and disadvantages, in a concentrated and unprecedented fashion. ‘Reimagining an old conflict’ presents a vision that is separate from the current two-state vision. The position paper presents the central pillars upon which the Government of Israel must place any future political settlement concerning Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley. These central pillars are essential for the continued preservation of the security of the State of Israel. Therefore, the IDSF is not adopting a single settlement as the sole solution for the conflict, but rather presenting various plans whose execution is contingent upon their meeting the various central pillars that are critical to the security of Israel.”

To download the full position paper

הפוסט Reconsidering an Old Conflict: Is There a Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This incentives mechanism is not concealed, swept under the rug or whispered in backrooms. This is the avowed and clear policy of the Palestinian Authority, which leave a trail of Jewish blood behind it. In order to assess the scope of this phenomenon, we decided to research and construct, for the first time, the full picture of the Palestinian terror financing mechanism. We did this by reviewing the Palestinian law, analyzing the economic conditions in the Palestinian Authority and translating the declarations and speeches of senior Palestinian officials.

A Billion Shekels Per Year: This Is What an Official Policy for Murdering Jews Looks Like

Under Palestinian law, imprisoned terrorists receive remunerations in accordance with the number of years they serve in prison, with salaries reaching NIS 12,000 per month from the 30^th year and onward. This is a level of wages that is equivalent to that of the President of the Palestinian Supreme Court, eight times higher than the average minimum wages in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and four times higher than the monthly income per capita for an average Palestinian.

Additional payments are added to the salaries paid to terrorists while serving their sentences. For instance, imprisoned terrorists who have been released after serving over five years of actual prison time continue to receive wages even after their release, this in addition to a one-time release grant between $5,000 and $25,000. As stated, the Authority is also required by law to employ released terrorists in its ranks in order to grant them economic and job security for the rest of their lives, including fully subsidized health insurance and education, as well as prioritizing them in the annual assignments for positions in all government institutions.

In practice, the Authority expends on average over NIS 1 billion per year as payment to terrorists and their families, an amount that is equivalent in most of the years surveyed in the study to about 7% of its budget, and almost half of all the foreign aid that it receives from other countries and donors.

Thus, for instance, in 2018 the total budget for payments to imprisoned terrorists, released terrorists and the families of the “Shahids” and injured stood at NIS 1.237 billion, which was about 7.4% of the Authority’s budget, or about 44% of the total foreign aid budget it was supposed to receive from other contributing countries and entities.

The numbers leave no room for doubt: this is an official and widely extensive mechanism of terrorism, which constitutes an important and central pillar of the Palestinian Authority’s general activities. This mechanism of bloodshed creates a reality in which it is worthwhile for the Palestinian citizen to choose terrorism as a route for action that not only wins him honor and appreciation, but also rewards him generously – much more than the average Palestinian citizen. Not only does this constitute an incentive for murder (since the money is promised in advance) and a gross violation of the Oslo Accords, but it is also a systemic standardization of the Palestinian armed conflict. Unfortunately, this mechanism is also showing results in the field: at present, 5,000 prisoners and 7,200 released prisoners are enjoying these payments, in addition to the 37,500 families of the “Shahids” and the injured.

Murder as a Preferred Profession: The Shahids are at the Top of the Palestinian List of Priorities

The Palestinian Authority enjoys the image of a civil, moderate and pragmatic Palestinian government, especially when compared to the competing Palestinian organization Hamas. But the numbers tell a different story, one where the Palestinian Authority takes an active and deliberate part in the armed struggle against Israel in many ways, including by way of operating a well-oiled and heavily budgeted mechanism intended to incentivize popular organized terrorism against innocent Israelis. This mechanism can be called Pay for Slay – payment for the killing of Jews or, put another way: murder as a preferred profession.

It is important to remember that terrorism is considered a central and legitimate tool in the realization of the PLO’s and the Palestinian Authority’s ultimate goal: The establishment of a Palestinian state with the destruction of the State of Israel. Within this framework, the salaries and employment mechanism is viewed by the Authority as an important strategic pillar in preserving terrorist operations and transforming the Palestinian armed struggle into an institutionalized policy.

This mechanism may not be prominently visible to the outside observer, but if one listens to the Authority’s senior officials, they learn that this is an avowed and clear policy spoken loudly and clearly, and published in the media and on openly available sources.

Thus, for instance, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, who had called the “Shahids” the “Stars in the sky of the Palestinian people struggle” who are at “the top of the Palestinian list of priorities”, emphasized repeatedly, including from the podium of the UN, that “even if we only had one cent in our hands, we would pay it to the families of the Shahids and the prisoners.”

By engaging in this activity, the Palestinian Authority meets the Israeli and global definition of a “terrorist organization”: not only does it incentivize terrorism and finances terrorism through prisoners, released prisoners and the families of the “Shahids” and the injured, but it also employs many of them as public servants – including, absurdly enough, in the ranks of its own security forces who are supposed to be fighting terrorism.

How do Israel and the world respond?

Israel, as well as the United States, have passed laws against this phenomenon. In Israel, a law was passed to freeze funds that the Palestinian Authority transfers to terrorists out of the taxes that are collected for it by Israel, while in the United States the law prohibits the transfer of certain economic aid to the Authority as long as this policy persists.

But in the greater scheme of things, the international community for the most part, has responded to this phenomenon with language that is weak and accepting of the Palestinian Authority’s victimhood narrative, even though the Authority’s policy completely contradicts the global struggle against terrorism. Transferring the funds of the contributing countries to the terrorists also contradicts the laws of the contributing countries themselves, as well as international conventions pertaining to terrorist financing. Indirectly, this aid money constitutes a significant injection of oxygen into the Authority’s terrorist mechanism against innocent Israelis under the cover of humanitarian aid.

The Goal: Knesset Members, Diplomats and the American Congress

The study was accompanied by Brigadier General (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, the former Head of the Research Division in IDF Intelligence Corp. and Colonel (res.) Maurice Hirsch, the former IDF Chief Prosecutor in Judea and Samaria. “The research we conducted assembles, for the first time, the full picture of the Palestinian terrorist financing mechanism”, says Or Yissachar, Head of the Research Department of the IDSF and the person who prepared this report. “The data clearly shows the Palestinian Authority’s commitment to the armed campaign against the State of Israel.”

So, what can be done? A lot. First, on the economic level: we can define the Palestinian Authority as a terror financing entity, including the freezing of economic aid and cooperation on the part of the international community and shutting down its consulates. We can also enforce the Offset Law in Israel in order to force the Authority to choose between complete economic collapse and the salary mechanism for terrorists and their employment. On the political level, we must make it clear to the Authority that any progress towards a final political settlement is contingent upon the immediate and permanent termination of this policy on the part of the Authority. Finally, we must encourage a fact-based discussion that puts the true nature of the Authority as an organization that employs terrorism against Israelis on the center stage, irrespective of the political position regarding negotiations with it or with any other Palestinian entity.

The key points of the research have been formulated into an official position paper of the IDSF and have enjoyed broad media attention. The position paper was even submitted to all members of the Knesset, as well as to foreign diplomats in Israel.

“We continue to act”, Or Yissachar clarifies. “We continue to follow the report’s impact among the decision makers and continue to distribute it among American Congressmen.”

To download the full position paper

https://idsf.org.il/en/position-papers/terrorists-in-the-civil-service/

הפוסט The Official Policy of the Palestinian Authority: Murder of Jews as a Profession הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.