The survey touches upon issues pertaining, among others, to the subject matter taught in Israeli schools, the scope of responsibility that Israel’s education establishment is charged with, and to the role of the education system, and its role in the shaping of the individual and collective identities in Israel.

In the next two papers, we will explore the results of the survey and the insights they offer. The present paper focuses on the values that should be instilled in Israel’s generation of school students, on the educational curriculum, and on the manner in which the educational system prepares its students for their future professional and civilian lives. The following paper explores the correlation between education and security, and the role of high school education in the preparation for military service.

The survey was conducted during September 2024 under the academic guidance of Dr. Ronen Itzik and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,611 respondents from the adult population in Israel (18+) who use the Internet, and was monitored to ensure appropriate representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religiosity, and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,611 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.5% with a probability of 95%; For the Jewish sample (1,354 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (257 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±6.2% with a probability of 95%.

What next after high school? Preparing students for adult life

Even a cursory glance shows one clear conclusion in regards to the public’s view of Israel’s education system: It is in urgent need of reform. The overwhelming majority of Israeli public thinks that the educational system fails to prepare its students for adult life, professionally and civically.

Results show that 80% of all respondents stated that the educational system does not provide students with sufficient vocational preparation and tools to allow them to join the job market, or that it provides minimal preparation – 75% thought that the educational system fails to prepare students for civilian life in Israel, or prepares them inadequately.

An additional aspect that indicated the imperative to reform the educational system is the declining numbers of vocational and agricultural schools, which have been disappearing from Israel’s educational map. 85% of the respondents support the establishment of vocational schools that would train students to join the manufacturing sector, and 70% support the establishment of agricultural schools. It seems that the public deeply understands that in the wake of the October 7 attack, Israel must chart a new list of priorities, wherein it achieves greater independence in the manufacturing of arms and ammunition, and greater agricultural self-sufficiency.

“The connection between industry and agriculture and Israel’s national security was clear even before the foundation of Israel. Jewish historical icon, Joseph Trumpeldor had already determined that Israel’s security line must be akin to the furrow line in the plowed field,” says chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi. “We in the movement also believe in this close connection, and therefore believe that the vocational and agricultural high schools that were popular in the formative years of Israel should be restored. Such high schools would also enable many students, who cannot get through the formal education system, to complete their schooling with professional qualifications and, will also inject high-quality manpower into the Israeli labor market reducing Israel’s dependence on foreign workers and imports, and will also strengthen the ideological connection between citizens and their country.”

Questioning values: the ideological role of the education system

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement believes that one of the roles of the educational system is to instill values rather than just knowledge. This notion had never been more significant as after October 7th, when it became clear that in order to survive, Israeli society must unite, and step up to the flag to serve in the army. As part of the survey, participants were asked to answer a number of questions pertaining to the ideological role of the educational system in Israel, both in Jewish and Arab societies.

According to the results of the combined sample, 65% of all respondents believe that the educational system places too much emphasis on grades, while 77% believe that the system does not place enough emphasis on values. In addition, when asked to choose from given options what the main goal of the educational system is, 48% of the respondents stated that the goal is to promote values of personal development, compared to 52% who stated that the system’s ultimate goal is to promote values of group affiliation and cooperation.

“The absolute importance of grades and personal achievement – particularly in STEM subjects – indicates that the educational system concentrates its efforts in priming its students for higher academic education, thereby tying youth development to the required standard of academic performance in high education institutes, as a personal objective that must be achieved”, says Colonel (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik. “In and of itself, this is not wrong, but it clearly comes at the expense of the time and resources that the educational system could be devoting to instilling values and building a national ethos that is consistent with the uniqueness of the State of Israel. The findings show a disturbing imbalance that is expressed by the preference of the value of individualism over the collective – something that does not correspond to the demands of the reality in Israeli society with its complex challenges.”

The participants were also asked to select the values they thought are most important to instill in students in Israel. The leading value was that of personal responsibility, which was selected by 68% of the respondents. That was immediately followed by the values of tolerance (64%), patriotism (60%), Zionism (51%), and connection to tradition (48%). At the bottom of the table appeared the values of helping the weak (41%) and the service to the state (37%).

It is worth mentioning that with regard to certain values, there were significant discrepancies between Jews and Arabs. For example, 66% of the Jews chose the value of patriotism, compared to 28% of the Arab respondents.

A look at a segmentation according to political ideology also reveals several significant discrepancies:

• 68% of the right-wing respondents chose instillation of Zionism, compared to 43% on the left;

• 74% of the respondents on the right chose the value of patriotism, compared to 45% on the left;

• 47% of respondents on the right of the political map chose tolerance, compared to 91% on the left;

• 31% of the right-wing respondents chose critical thinking, compared to 75% on the left.

The most significant discrepancy was recorded around the value “Connection to Tradition”, which was chosen by 70% from the right but only 9% from the left.

“It’s pleasing to see that the values of patriotism and connection to Zionism are at the top of the chart, and that most of Israel’s public understands that it is important to instill these values in the students of Israel’s educational system”, stresses Avivi. “However, the ideological differences in relation to these values is worrying, and prove what we at the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have been saying all along – Zionism has become essential to politics, and these findings represent a great threat to the justness of our path and to our existence here”.

The educational system as an identity shaping agent

With the understanding that the educational system plays an important role in shaping students’ personal and national identity, some of the survey’s questions were directed at the Jewish respondents while other – at the Arab respondents.

Thus, for example, the Jewish participants were asked what they thought were the most important subject to emphasize in the pedagogical curriculum in order to connect students to their Jewish identity and heritage. The subject that was cited the most was the history of the Jewish nation and the Holocaust, which was selected by 62% of the Jewish participants, followed by the history of the Land of Israel (47%), holidays and tradition (40%), the geography of Israel (40%) and the history of Zionism (33%).

A look at the ideological segmentation between right, center, and left on the political map shows that there are almost identical findings on the topics of the history of the Jewish people, as well as the history of Zionism. However, there were marked differences regarding other areas of knowledge. For example, 53% of the right-wing respondents chose holidays and tradition, compared to 12% on the left; 7% on the right chose Israeli literature and culture, compared to 37% on the left.

It seems that there is a broad consensus in Israel’s public in regard to most fields of knowledge that should be on the educational curriculum. However, these are still discrepancies regarding other fields of knowledge, especially those pertaining to religious subjects. Generally speaking, the right-wing traditionally tends to have a stronger affiliation to religion, which may explain why those respondents placed the subject of holidays and tradition higher. As oppose to them, the left traditionally is more connected with humanities and non-religious philosophy which is why those respondents preferred the subjects of literature and culture.

Over the years, voices have been rising from within the Arab population criticizing the Arab education in Israel, and suggesting various reforms aimed at bringing it up to par. To gauge the sentiment in Arab society the Arab participants were asked to respond to a number of questions tailored to them. Two of these questions pertained to the body that should be in charge of formal education programs for Israeli Arabs. The first question focused on general subjects such as math, English and sciences. The second question focused on the subjects that are tightly connected with the national ethos, such as history, literature and civic studies.

The results clearly indicate that the majority of the Arab public prefers leaving the state of affairs as it is – i.e. responsibility for the curriculum for Arab students under the Education Department of the Arab Society in the Israeli Ministry of Education (58% and 49% support this, respectively). Some of the participants noted that they would like the curriculum to be transferred to the responsibility of an Arab pedagogical council, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, similar to the pedagogical councils of the state-religious and ultra-Orthodox schools (37% and 41%, respectively). Only a minority of the respondents indicated that they would like to see the Arab sector’s curriculum transferred to the responsibility of a body appointed by the educational system in the Palestinian Authority (5% and 10%, respectively).

In addition to the separate questions, both demographics were asked whether they would send their children to a mixed Jewish-Arab school. The results are almost completely opposite, with 68% of the Jewish respondents said they wouldn’t send their children to a mixed school, and only 32% agreed, whereas among the Arab respondents, 29% objected and 71% agreed.

These findings may stem from the distrust of the Arab society on part of the Jewish society in the wake of October 7, and therefore most Jews are not interested in having their children learn with their Arab counterparts. Also, it may stem from the discrepancy between the Jewish and Arab educational systems, and perhaps Arab parents believe that their children could acquire better education in Jewish schools. Another cause may be greater solidarity with Jews among the Israeli Arab population after October 7.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement sees education as a cornerstone in shaping Israel’s future citizens, preserving the national ethos, and strengthening national security, and therefore takes the results of this survey very seriously.

Above all, it seems that the majority of the public – regardless of sectoral or political affiliation – believes that the educational system in Israel is failing to prepare students for life. Moreover, most participants believe that schools should place less emphasis on grades and more emphasis on values, and promote teamwork and cooperation among students.

הפוסט IDSF Index: Education and Security – fundamental Aspects הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The previous survey touched upon the values that the public believed should be instilled in Israel’s school students in Israeli schools, their pedagogical content, and the manner in which the education system prepares students for their professional and civic lives. The present survey explores the correlation between education and security and the role of Israeli high schools in preparing their students for military service.

The survey was conducted during September 2024 under the academic guidance of Dr. Ronen Itzik and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,611 respondents from the adult population in Israel (18+) who use the Internet, and was monitored to ensure appropriate representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religious and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,611 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.5% with a probability of 95%; For the Jewish sample (1,354 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (257 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±6.2% with a probability of 95%.

To teach or not to teach? Topics of national security in pedagogical curriculums

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement strongly believes that education is a fundamental building block in a robust national security and a crucial element in the shared ethos of Israeli society – both of which are vital for Israel’s existence in the Land of Israel. This part of the survey aims to examine whether Israeli public also identifies the correlation between education and security.

According to the results, 93% of the Jewish respondents, and 86% of all respondents, agree with the statement that education is a cornerstone of Israel’s national security. Furthermore, 90% of Jewish respondents and 83% of all respondents agree with the statement that the education system plays a decisive role in shaping the national ethos.

With the belief in the tight relationship between education and security, and on the backdrop of the imperative to build an ethos of a society that steps up to the flag and all walks of life serve in the army and honor those who serve in the security forces – the IDSF HaBithonistim movement believes that it is the duty of Israel’s educational system to provide its students with knowledge regarding the strategic threats and other issues of national security. These are explored as well in the present study.

The respondents were asked to what extent they thought the Israel’s educational system deals with the current security threats. 62% of the respondents thought that the educational system does not deal at all or deals to a small extent with the security threats Israel is facing. 26% thought that the system does deal with this subject to a reasonable extent, 5% thought that the topic is addressed to a satisfactory extent while only 2% thought that the educational system deals with the topic of security threats to a great extent.

The respondents were also asked whether they thought it was important for the educational system to add to the educational program lessons on critical issues to Israel’s national security such as the multi-arena threats Israel is facing, the Iranian threat and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 86% of the respondents – Arab and Israeli participants all together – thought it was important to add this subject matter to the curriculum, while 40% of them thought this was crucial.

“The findings of the survey cast a very scathing light on the inadequacy of the preparation Israel youth receives in school for the unique life challenges that life in Israel presents, and in particular, the critical life-stage most of them are expecting – service in the Israeli Defense Forces”, argues Colonel (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik. “The lack of knowledge in regard with the security challenges that ring Israel inherently impedes the understanding of the significance of military service, and at that enlistment into combat service. This is not congruent with the existing reality in Israel, in which only half of Israeli youth complete their mandatory military service, especially in the current reality with which Israel is dealing”.

In the State of Israel, most high school graduates enlist in military service in a very short while after finishing school. This means that the only reasonable time to prepare them for their military service is during high school. This survey explored public opinion on whether high schools should indeed be tasked with this undertaking, and what would be the most effective preparatory programs.

Results show that 95% of the Jewish participants thought that high schools should offer to some extent preparatory content and only 5% thought they shouldn’t. Of those who supported this idea, nearly 50% thought that high schools should deal with this matter to a large extent.

The participants were then asked to select which activities they deemed most appropriate for inclusion in preparatory programs. Most respondents thought that excursion and history and heritage tours were most important – selected by 70%. This was followed by meetings with serving school graduates (47%); youth movement activities (39%); one-week military youth (GADNA) program (35%) and lectures and talks by security and military personnel (34%).

“Preparation for meaningful military service begins in high school, and schools that shirk this responsibility are first and foremost hurting their students by not letting them gain the knowledge and tools that are crucial for the next phase of their life”, says chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim Brigadier General Amir Avivi. “We in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement try to help with this and prepare young men and women for their military service, and hold seminars on security issues and history and heritage excursions tailored for youth”.

Education is indeed a cornerstone of security: conclusions

In order to ensure the security of Israel, Israeli society must be one that serves in the army. However, this notion is not a call to focus on the collective and security concerns alone. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s aspiration is for a society that is “between Athens and Sparta”. In other words, a society with a rich culture that promotes education on one hand, and on the other – an ideological society that is willing to make personal sacrifices for the sake of the collective.

Since the educational system is the agent that shapes the future generation of Israeli citizens, it should also be responsible for providing knowledge and instilling values. However, the survey shows that oftentimes, it falls short of fulfilling this duty.

This understanding had led the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to add education to its list of activities.  Members of the movement frequently meet with high school students and students in pre-military preparatory programs, conduct heritage tours for youth, and give lectures and meetings on issues of national identity and security. The movement is also currently working on establishing a new pre-military preparatory school called “Tekuma,” which will be established in the settlement of Tekuma in the Gaza envelope, and will focus on Zionist values, connection to the Land of Israel, and the instillation of a national Zionist ethos.

הפוסט The IDSF HaBithonistim movement Index: Education and Values – Education as A Basis for National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As part of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index project, an ongoing survey of Israeli society on questions of security, military and society, this month’s report explores an issue that has become the focus of attention in Israel following the events of October 7: the role of Israel’s civilians in the country’s national security strategy.

In the next reports, we continue to review the survey findings and the insights they offer. Whereas the previous report focused on public opinion in regards to the civilian role in national security in times of quiet and at war, and explored the public’s opinion on expanding the compulsory military service to the ultra-orthodox (Haredi) community and the role of the youth in the country’s security, the present report deals with public opinion on the contribution of settlement, agriculture and industry to Israel’s national security strategy.

The survey was conducted on May 2024, under the statistical direction of Dr. Hagai Elyakim. It included 1,453 participants from Israel’s internet-using adult population (18+) and was sampled in a manner that ensured its representativeness in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,453 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.6% with a 95% probability; For the Jewish sample (1,079 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (374 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±5.1% with a probability of 95%.

Instrumental or detrimental? Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, Gaza and in border areas

The participants were posed with a series of questions that explore their opinions on Jewish settlement along the borders of the country and the border envelope communities and the extent of the contribution thereof to national security. On the question whether settlement along the country’s borders contributes to boosting national security – 70% of all the respondents and 83% of the Jewish respondents replied affirmatively. An ideological segmentation reveals a considerable variance: 92% of the respondents on the right of the political map thought that settlement along and in the border areas of the country contributes to the security of the Israel; in the center – 72% and the political left – 65%.

The respondents were then asked whether the Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria contributes to the national security. 53% of all the respondents and 65% of the Jewish respondents replied positively. The distribution by political ideology shows even a larger variance than the previous question, with 88% of the right-wing respondents believing this to be true, as oppose to 42% in the center and only 17% in the left.

The participants were further asked if they thought that the Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria contributes to the security of the Tel-Aviv metropolis area in central Israel. 58% of the respondents replied positively as compared with 70% of the Jewish respondents.

The issue of the Jewish settlement within the Gaza Strip was also explored: the results show that 49% of the respondents and 58% of the Jewish respondents believe that Jewish settlement of the Gaza Strip will boost the security of Israel’s southern communities. An ideological segmentation shows variance among the political ideology groups: on the right of the political map, 81% of the respondents thought this was true; in the center 32% supported this statement and on the left – only 14%.

As part of the section exploring opinions on Jewish settlement in Israel, the participants were asked whether Israel should arm Jewish communities situated along conflict lines. 85% of all participants answered affirmatively, yet a segmentation by ethnic group shows a large variance with 95% of the Jewish respondents feeling that the government should arm conflict-line communities as oppose to 57% of the Arab respondents.

All colors of the rainbow: broad support of agriculture

The survey also explored the public’s opinion of the extent to which the agricultural sector contributes to national security.

The results show that Israeli-Jews see a strong correlation between agriculture, Israel’s independence and the protection of their country: 82% of all the respondents feel that Israeli agriculture is vital for the connection between the people of Israel and their land; 79%  thought that Israel should reduce its dependence on imports and increase local production of food; 75% believe that agriculture is vital for the protection of the country. Similarly, 78% of the respondents noted that Israel should encourage young people to choose a career in agriculture and 77% thought that the country should facilitate the foundation of agricultural vocational schools.

The various statements yielded similar variances among right-wing, center and left-wing respondents, but a distribution according to nationality shows marked differences. Apparently, 86% of the Jewish respondents believe that agriculture connects people to their land, as oppose to 63% of the Arab-Israeli respondents. Furthermore, 83% of the Jewish respondents thought that agriculture contributes to the protection of the country’s borders, as oppose to 53% of the Arab-Israeli respondents.

From vocational schools to high-tech: the contribution of Israeli industry to the country’s security

Lastly, the survey explored the Israeli public’s opinion on Israeli industry and its contribution to Israel’s national security. Industry, similarly to agriculture, received high support rates: 90% of all the respondents believe that Israel should invest in the development of high-tech and AI technologies for security purposes, with 83% maintaining that the country should develop self-manufacturing of missiles and ammunition.

It is likely that the high rates of support for the development of technology and industry are a direct outcome of the Gaza war. This war has revealed just how much Israel’s dependance on the import of munitions from other countries is an encumbrance. It seems that the public now understands that Israel must aspire for independence in terms of development and production as well.

Similarly, it seems that the public understands that a stepping stone to such independence is the cultivation of professional, skilled manpower. The results show that 84% of all the respondents maintain that the country should encourage the foundation of  vocational schools for the training of industrial workers. 81% think that the country should encourage young people to pursue a career in the construction industry to reduce its dependance on foreign workers. Interestingly, support for the foundation of more vocational schools and encouragement of young people to choose a career in the construction sector was almost equal between the Jewish and Arab respondents, thus it would appear that this is an interest that serves both demographics.

Security is much more than an army: conclusions

The present IDSF HaBithonistim index aims to explore the extent to which the country’s civilian population could contribute to Israel’s security, with the understanding that security involves many areas of life, aside from military aspects. To create a broad perspective, three main civil sectors that may have an impact on national security were examined: settlement, agriculture and industry.

Following the October 7 disaster, it seems that Israeli public realizes that Israel must reduce its dependence on other countries. For this end – the public mostly agrees – Israel should boost its agriculture, industry and construction sectors and establish the means to provide the manpower to do so.

On the topic of settlement – there is a noticeable perceptional change in Israel’s society. Despite disputes on political matters, is seems that most of the Jewish public supports Jewish settlement across the country – particularly in Gaza and the Judea and Samaria region – and views this as an inseparable component of Israel’ national security strategy.

“The idea of incorporating Israel’s civilians in the military effort might seem unnatural and even jarring to some, however, Israel’ security reality deems this a necessary marriage”, says Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “It’s important to understand that this approach is not new. The founding fathers of Israel’s Labor party in the State’s formative years – led by Ben Gurion – understood the importance of Jewish settlement across Israel. Similarly, it was clear to the leaders of the young state that the presence of the Israeli farmer plays a material role in establishing the country’s borders and sovereignty. As regards to industry – this, too, is a matter that was discussed years ago. In the past, the State of Israel had invested considerably in civil and security industry, with the understanding that the less the country depends on foreign aid the more independent it would be. However, over the years the country has been departing from that perception and Israel’s industry became increasingly dependent on import.  The present war in Gaza has made it all too clear that Israel must strive to develop self-manufacturing – particularly of weapons and defense systems. The public has come to fully understand this and now the State’s decision-makers must as well and act accordingly”

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: Settlement, Agriculture & Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As part of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index project, an ongoing survey of Israeli society on questions of security, military and society, this month’s report explores an issue that has become the focus of attention in Israel following the events of October 7: the role of Israel’s civilians in the country’s national security strategy.

The results of the survey and analysis thereof will be shared in a three-part report. The present part focuses on the perception of Israel’ society regarding its role in the national security, in times of quiet and during military emergencies. It further explores the public opinion as regards to the conscription of Haredi (ultra-orthodox) Israelis and the role of Israel’s youth in contributing to the country’s security. The next sections of the report take a closer look at Israel’s settlement, agriculture and industry enterprises and their contribution to the national security.

The survey was conducted on May 2024, under the statistical direction of Dr. Hagai Elyakim. It included 1,453 participants from Israel’s internet-using adult population (18+) and was sampled in a manner that ensured its representativeness in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,453 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.6% with a 95% probability; For the Jewish sample (1,079 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (374 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±5.1% with a probability of 95%.

Would you risk your life for the country? Most citizens are willing to do so

In the first part of the survey, the participants were presented with a series of questions aiming to determine the extent to which they thought Israel’s civilian population should take an active part in the protection of the country’s security. 81% of the respondents thought that in security emergency times the civilian population should play an active role in the protection of the country; 58% thought that the civilian population should do so as a matter of routine. A distribution of the responses according to nationality and ideology shows significant variance: 91% of the respondents affiliated with the political right thought that civilians must partake in the protection of the nation’s security in times of war while 66% of that group thought that this should extend to times of quiet as well; Of the respondents in the center of the political map, 82% maintained that civilians should be involved in national security in times of war while 53% supported this for times of quiet as well; On the left of the political map, 70% of the respondents thought civilians  should be actively involved in national security in times of war while only 37% thought this should extend to times of quiet as well. As for the Israeli-Arab respondents – 68% thought that civilians should be involved in national security during war and 61% maintained this involvement should include times of quiet.

A marked variance is evident when comparing the perception among the Jewish and the Arab respondents regarding civilian involvement in national security in times of war as compared with times of quiet, as the survey shows that Israeli-Arabs place more importance on this role as compared to the political center and left-wing Jewish respondents.

The participants were also asked whether they would be willing to risk their lives protecting the country. 71% of the respondents replied affirmatively, yet here too, there are noticeable differences between the ideological groups – 86% of the right-wing respondents would risk their lives for their country as oppose to 70% from the political center and 60% of the left-wing respondents.

The participants were then asked whether they thought Israel should instate a national guard comprised of army veterans for the purpose of maintaining Israel’s internal security. 63% of the respondents responded positively to the idea, again, with significant variance between ideological affiliation: 86% of the political right supported the idea as oppose to 50% of the center and 31% of the left.

From studying Torah to military reserves service: the activities that contribute to Israel’s security

The survey participants were asked to tick any activities on a list that they thought contribute to Israel security. The leading choice was “military reserves service” with an overall 88% support, followed closely by “volunteering in community security teams” at 86% and by “regular compulsory military service” at 84%. Further down the list were “police volunteering” at 73%, “possession of a licensed firearm” at 62% and “National Service” (voluntary alternative to army service) – at 58%. At the bottom of the table was “studying the Torah” with only 35% of the respondents thinking this is material for the security of Israel.

A segmentation according to religious affiliation shows a broad consensus regarding the first three items. Non-religious, Conservative, orthodox and ultra-orthodox (Haredi) respondents all thought that military reserves service, volunteering in security teams, and regular compulsory military service are vital to the security of Israel. However, regarding the studying of the Torah, there were considerable variances among the religious affiliation segments: among the non-religious respondents, only 12% thought that the studying of the Torah is material for Israel’s security; among the Conservative respondents 48% thought so; among the orthodox – 73% and among the Haredi – 96% supported this claim.

The majority of the public would like to see a more Zionistic and involved youth

The present IDSF HaBithonistim index explores the perception in the Israeli public in of the role the youth should play in national security. 56% of the respondents thought that young adults in Israel should take an active role in the protection of the country’s security – both in times of war and quiet. A distribution of the replies shows an interesting picture: while Jews and Arabs hold similar positions of the subject – 56% and 57% respectively, an ideological distribution shows a significant variance: 69% of the right-wing respondents supported this statement as oppose to 44% of the respondents from the center and 28% of the left of the political map.

The respondents were asked whether they thought there should be leadership groups comprised of reservists and youths within Israel’s border communities. 67% of the respondents responded positively but here, too, there was a notable variance between the ideological groups: 82% of the right-wing respondents supported this idea, while 58% of the center and 42% of the left-wing respondents supported this.

In the context of Israeli youth, the respondents were posed with questions concerning school education. For example, they were asked whether the educational curriculum should include more Zionism studies and ideological encouragement to serve the country. 77% of the Jewish respondents supported this notion as oppose to 32% of the Israeli-Arab respondents. A distribution of the Jewish respondents by ideology and religion shows that those agreeing most with this statement were the Conservative and orthodox right-wing respondents. The respondents who tended not to agree with this statement were from the non-religious, Haredi and left-wing segments of the participants.

the participants were further asked whether they thought Israel needs a new youth movement that will be founded on the values of Zionism and national security. 54% of the Jewish respondents supported this idea, as compared with only 28% of the Israeli-Arab respondents. Of the right-wing respondents, 69% supported this idea whereas 36% of the center and 27% of the left-wing respondents thought so. All in all, 48% of all the participants supported the idea of founding a new youth movement that promotes Zionism and security.

Drafting of ultra-orthodox – first and foremost a security imperative

What about the brewing  controversy over the conscription of Haredi (ultra-orthodox) men into the IDF? 56% of the respondents thought that the solution for the need to increase recruitment rates lies within Haredi society, however, 59% state that the conscription of Haredi men must be done in tandem with the recruitment of additional demographic groups that do not serve in the IDF.

The Jewish and Arab participants differ in their standing on these two issues – 52% of the Jewish respondents agreed that the need to increase the rate of enrollment in the army must find its solution in the Haredi community; 62% of the Jews and 47% of the Arab respondents thought that the recruitment of Haredi men must come in tandem with the recruitment of other non-serving populations. The variance between the two groups probably stems from the fact that as a whole, the Arab population in Israel does not serve in the IDF.

Ideologically, there is a variance among the groups: among the right-wing respondents, 40% thought that the army should recruit from the Haredi community; among the center affiliated respondents, 63% thought so, and among the left-wing respondents – 78% supported this statement. The question whether other non-serving population should be drafted yielded similar results. Hence, it appears that the majority of the Jewish population in Israel believes that non-serving groups should be recruited to the army.

Finally, the participants were asked to choose one of two options to the question whether the conscription of Haredi men is a social imperative or a security necessity. The results were very close, however, most of the public (54%) thought it was a security necessity. The variance of the political and religious distribution is within the statistical margin of error.

The bottom line: the public wants to be more involved in Israel’s security

Despite the variances among the different ideological and religious groups, it seems that as a whole, the Israeli public maintains that citizens have a great importance in the national security strategy, predominantly in times of emergency but also in times of quiet. Israel’s public believes that the country’s youth should be given an active role in the protection of the State, and agrees that this should be incorporated into the formal and non-formal education.

As regards to the question of the conscription of ultra-orthodox (Haredi) men, the survey found variances among the various groups of Israeli society. It appears that most of the public supports the conscription of Haredi men but maintains that this conscription should extent to other non-serving groups as well.

“Already from the inception of Zionism, the need was clear for the involvement of the civil population in Israel’s national security, alongside the compulsory military service”, says IDSF HaBithonistim Director, Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi. “In the past, the civil guards were part and parcel of the State’s reality, however, throughout the years this has fallen by the wayside. In the wake of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, and in full force since the October 7 attacks, the public has been revisiting the importance of civilian involvement in the country’s protection – a fact that is clearly reflected in the security squads every town and community in Israel now have. The findings of this survey show that we are returning to the basic values that were a given in the State’s formative years, and reflect to what extent the public in Israel can, must and is willing to contribute and sacrifice for the national security and the protection of our national home”.

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: The Civilian Role in National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Among the many endeavors and projects undertaken by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, it prides itself on a prolific research department and its professional academic research team, which conducts ongoing research and surveys of Israel’s society, among them the IDSF HaBithonistim Index. The survey is published every quarter and is monitored to ensure it includes a representative sample of respondents from all walks of Israeli society. The index reports the findings on public opinion on various national security and social issues in Israel. Thus far, seven indices have been published, each exploring a specific topic but also including repeat questions aiming to gauge changes in public opinion over time against the background of current affairs.

Among the topics explored, the surveys sought to determine the extent to which Israeli public has faith in the country’s authorities, its sense of personal safety and concerns over the future of the State.

The present survey report provides a longitudinal review of these topics and explores the changes over the past two years.

Support of the police on the rise, of the IDF in decline – the public’s trust in State institutions

All the IDSF HaBithonistim surveys included questions aiming to gauge the participants’ trust in the IDF, Israel Police and the government. The rationale behind these reoccurring questions is that a vital element of the national security is the social resilience of the nation, of which one derivative is the level of trust the public has for the State authorities.

In the first survey, held on March 2022, 20% of the respondents said they had faith in the police; 28% trusted the government and 63% said they had faith in the IDF.

However, in the last survey, held in May 2024, 33% of the respondents said they trusted the police; 27% said they had faith in the government and 54% expressed their trust in the IDF.

A comparison between these two end surveys shows a-13% rise in the public’s trust in the police; a 9% decline in its trust of the IDF and a nearly unchanged level of trust in the government.  However, a longitudinal examination of the findings over time reveals fluctuations in how the public responded to current events in Israel. The present report follows the trend over time in the public’s trust towards the three bodies – the IDF, Israel Police and the Israeli government.

The IDF

The IDF is the only of the three bodies that consistently gains the highest levels of trust on part of the Israeli public, leaving the other two bodies well behind. However, of the three institutions surveyed, the IDF also recorded the steepest drop in the level of public trust. The watershed moment is obvious: October 7.  Up to the July 2023 survey, the level of public trust in the IDF was 63%-72%; however, on November 2023 – the first of the surveys following the October 7 events – that trust dropped to 59% and in May 2024 had further dropped to 54% – almost a 20% drop from its peak level.

Even before October 7, there were fluctuations in the levels of public trust in the IDF. Thus for example, in the wake of Operation Breaking Dawn in August 2022, the level of public trust in the IDF was on the rise. Operation Breaking Dawn was a concerted three-day operation in the Gaza Strip during which the security forces located and eliminated 25 known terrorists, many of them senior ranking – in the Islamic Jihad and Hamas with blood on their hands. The IDF had also succeeded in shooting down 96% of the rockets launched at Israel from the Gaza Strip during the operation. No casualties were suffered on the Israeli side hence the operation was chalked up as a great success, which would explain the rise in the public’s trust in the IDF.

However, as oppose to that operation, the following Operation Shield and Arrow on February 2023 actually caused a slight dip in the levels of public trust in the IDF. Although deemed a considerable military success, with six high-ranking Jihad members and another 20 terrorists eliminated in addition to hundreds of military targets destroyed by the IDF,  the civilian population suffered more casualties  as compared with Operation Breaking Dawn – during the week leading up to Operation Sheild and Arrow, 102 rockets were fired at the Gaza border envelope communities and adjacent towns, causing the death of one foreign worker and the injury of six Israeli citizens. During the operation itself, hundreds more rockets, anti-tank grenades and mortar shells were fired at Israel, reaching as far as the center of the country. Most were intercepted by Israeli defense systems,  but  an 82-year-old woman was killed when her house in Rehovot took a direct hit. Moreover, during the operation, all schools were suspended in the Gaza envelop communities, public gatherings and events were prohibited and main roads were blocked in southern Israel. It is possible that the fact that the IDF responded only a week into the Islamic Jihad’s rocket attacks and the price that the civilian front paid may be the reason for the drop in public trust of the army.

The Police

The public’s trust in the Israel Police is consistently the lowest of all three institutions throughout the surveys. However, it is the police that has recorded the largest increase in trust levels throughout the seven surveys of the index. Similarly to the IDF, the turning point was the October 7 events – only in this case, the trend was reversed. Up to the July 2023 survey, the public’s trust level in the police was at a relatively low 20%-23%, on November 2023, it leapt to 39%. On May 2024, the level of public trust in the police slightly dipped and is now at 33%. It appears that the performance of the police,  from the onset of the “Parash Pleshet” alert code announced on the morning of the October 7 attack, and the steep price in the form of dozens of casualties from the police forces, had greatly contributed to the public’s trust in the body – at least temporarily. It will be interesting to examine the findings of the next survey.

The Government

An examination of the first of the seven surveys against the recent poll shows that trust levels in the government are nearly unchanged between those two points in time. However, following the trend throughout the seven surveys of the Index reveals significant fluctuations. At its peak, public-trust levels of the government reached 43%, but at its lowest plummeted to only 22%.  It is likely that the fluctuations stem from the political instability that characterized Israel’s politics over the past several years and the consequent series of frequent elections. Thus for example, there is a correlation between the decision to dissolve the 24th Knesset on June 6, 2022 and the ensuing early elections, with July’s drop in the public’s trust of the government. On the other hand, on October, Israel was on the verge of elections, and it is possible that Israeli society felt that political stability is at hand. Even in the survey held on February 2023,  after those elections, the level of trust in the government held at 43% – despite the social protests against the judicial reform.

Political shifts and social protests aside, the events of October 7 had an effect on the public’s trust of the government, albeit less markedly than the IDF and the police. After the October 7 massacre, the public’s trust in the government dropped from 40% to 35%, later further dropping to 27%. It should be noted that the decrease in trust of the government and increase in the public’s trust of the police following the outbreak of the Gaza war turned the tables and it was now the government that had become the least trusted body of the three.

“The changing tide after October 7 is hardly surprising”, says Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “This horrible day is a terrible failure of the IDF in terms of intel and an operational failure as well, and it is not surprising that the public’s trust in the army was hurt. I would actually expect it to drop even more. On the other hand, the police displayed outstanding resourcefulness that day and took command of sectors that are under military responsibility. The police officers – many paying with their lives – were able to stop the terrorists from advancing to Ashkelon and other areas deeper within Israel, so it is clear why the public hold the police in high regard”.

According to Avivi, the fact that the public’s trust in the government has not changed significantly following October 7 is also a built-in insight. “The public mostly believed that the government was not made aware of the intel and was not privy to the decisions that led to the disaster”, he explained. “We can see by the other questions in the IDSF HaBithonistim Index’s survey that the IDF command is held more responsible [for October 7] than the political leadership”.

Concerned mostly about the country: the sense of security among Israel’s public

In all the surveys in this series, the participants were asked about the extent to which they had concerns over their personal safety and the future of Israel.

In March 2022, 64% of participants indicated that they feared for their personal safety, and 61% said that they were concerned over the future of the country. In May 2024, 60% said they feared for their own safety, and 70% said they were concerned over the future of the country. Thus, the  public’s sense of personal security increased slightly, but its concern over the future of the country was even higher.

Here, too, we will try to understand how the security and political events in Israel affected the results of the survey.

Concerns over personal safety

A longitudinal analysis of the surveys shows that a large percent of Israel’s population fears for its personal safety. The highest level of concern was recorded on July 2022 at 46%, and the lowest – 30% – was recorded in February 23.  In the poll from May 24 – 42% of the respondents said they feared for their personal safety in Israel.

At first glance, it may seem surprising that people were more concerned about their personal safety in July 2022 as compared to the present, when Israel is at war, and when it was only recently attacked in an unprecedented missile strike by Iran. However, July 2022 was the peak of a massive wave of terror attacks across Israel, resulting in the murder of 21 people.

According to Amir Avivi, this low in the public sense of personal safety has an additional cause. “Prior to the war, the public felt that the government was tolerating the situation, was unresponsive and was not taking appropriate action”, he says. “Only following October 7 the country woke up, understood what it was facing and went to war. The shift from a passive and helpless position to a proactive engagement that is standing up for its own, gives the public a stronger sense of security, even on the background of a complex and difficult reality”.

Fears for the fate of Israel

The survey results reveal that  Israel’s civilians are in a perpetual state of concern over the future of the country. On February 2023, the public’s concern was at its lowest of all the surveys but still considered rather high, at 58%. The two most recent polls, held after the outbreak of the Gaza war,  recorded the highest levels of concern and it is easy to understand how the surprise attack on the Gaza border, the raging war in the south, and imminent war in the north of the country caused a spike in the public’s concerns over the fate of their country.

Avivi, too, was hardly surprised by the public’s growing concerns for the future of the country, but at the same time is convinced that under a skilled guiding hand, the public’s sense of personal safety could be restored. “We need a national vision that has clear vectors of operation, and we must mediate the reality to the public even if it is complex, and make it absolutely clear – not only by words but in actions – that Israel places its security before anything else”, he says. “This connects me to one of Britain’s most difficult and dramatic moments in World War Two, when its army was surrounded by the enemy and could not see how the German war machine could be stopped. At that moment of strife, Winston Churchill said candidly: ‘I can offer nothing but blood, toil, tears and sweat’, but at the same time stated that there is one aim: ‘…victory, victory at all costs’. This speech galvanized the British nation and led it to victory in the war – and precisely this spirit is what is demanded of Israel’s leadership”.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement is fully committed to continuing gauging and reporting on the sentiments and trends of public opinion in Israel, with the understanding that the public’s trust in the State institutions, and its sense of personal and national security have a direct impact on Israel’ social resilience and in turn – its national security.

הפוסט Citizen-State Relations – A Longitudinal Survey of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the first article in the series we dealt with the various reasons that led to the October 7 catastrophe. In this article we deal with the second part of the survey: the current state of affairs given the Swords of Iron War, including the war’s objectives, global public opinion, and concepts within the Arab public in Israel.

The survey was conducted during January 2024 with statistical support from Dr. Hagay Elkayam. 1,156 respondents were surveyed – adult (over 18 years of age) Internet users in Israel, and has been reviewed to ensure fair representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion, and political affiliation.

For the Jewish combined sample (1,156 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3% with a 95%; probability. For the Jewish sample (919 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.5% with a 95 probability; for the Arabic survey (237 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.5% with a probability of 95%.

Freeing the hostages versus defeating Hamas: Public opinion on the war’s objectives

At the very outset of the war, the State of Israel declared its two main goals: to return the Israeli hostages and to topple the Hamas regime. One of the key dilemmas occupying Israeli public opinion is which of these objectives takes precedence. Or in other words, if the State of Israel reaches a situation in which it can only achieve one of these two objectives, which one will it be?

Accordingly, we asked the respondents to provide a dichotomic ruling between the following two statements: (1) The hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas; (2) the hostages should be freed only provided their release will not impair the ability to topple Hamas.

The result is unequivocal: 68% of the respondents chose the statement in which defeating Hamas is the main objective, while 32% placed freeing the hostages as the main objective. Breaking down the results by nationality shows a significant difference between the Jewish public and the Israeli Arab public. 78% of the Jewish public  believe the hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas; among the Arabs the situation is reversed: 72% believe the hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas.

Ideological segmentation of the Jewish public shows substantial differences between the right, left, and center. 89% of the respondents identifying themselves as right-wingers chose the statement according to which the hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas and 69% of the centrists also chose this statement. Among the respondents identifying themselves as left-wingers, only 44% chose this statement. The rest chose the statement according to which the hostages should be freed at any cost.

Israel versus the world: Anti-Israelism, anti-Semitism, and the allegations of war crimes

The Swords of Iron War is being fought in the Gaza Strip, but is not confined to it. Ever since the outbreak of the war, the international arena is in tumult. Anti-Israel demonstrations are a daily occurrence in various countries, anti-Semitic slogans are being heard in the most prestigious university campuses, and at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, the question of whether or not Israel is committing war crimes is still being debated.

The respondents were asked to state their opinion on the way the world perceives Israel. They were also asked about their position regarding international law when it comes up against the needs of the IDF in the field.

Regarding the anti-Israeli sentiments in Europe, when asked whether they believe these are due to anti-Semitism, 84% of the respondents in the integrated sample gave a positive answer. When examining the ideological segmentation between right, center and left, there is a consensus: 97% of all Jews believe the anti-Israeli opinions are due to anti-Semitism. However when segmented by nationality, only 48% of all Israeli Arabs agree with this statement.

The question of international law also produced some interesting results. The respondents were asked to state to what extent, in their opinion, should the IDF adhere to the international rules of war in its activities. 13% of the Jewish respondents believe the IDF should comply with the rules of war in any situation, however 78% think otherwise. Those 78% can be divided into two groups: 29% believe the IDF should conduct itself according to the most stringent interpretation of the international rules of war – as long as this does not endanger our forces. 49% believe the IDF should accomplish its goals with minimum risk to our forces – even if to do so would mean failure to comply with the rules of war.

In favor or not in favor? What Israelis think about the Arab public opinion in Israel, in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza

Following the Hamas terrorist onslaught on October 7, many Israelis began wondering what Arab public opinion about the onslaught was in Judea and Samaria, in Gaza and also inside Israel. In the survey, we asked the respondents whether or not they think the Arabic public identifies with the onslaught. The Arab population was divided into three regions: Gaza, Judea and Samaria and the Israeli Arabs.

The results show that 84% of all Israelis believe that the Arabs in Gaza and also the Arabs in Judea and Samaria identify with the terrorist onslaught. Regarding the Israeli Arabs, 49% of the respondents believe that they too identify with the onslaught.

The survey also examined the question of whether a terrorist onslaught of the type perpetrated on October 7 could occur in a situation in which the Palestinian Authority ruled the Gaza Strip instead of Hamas. 70% of the respondents in the integrated sample believe that such an onslaught could indeed occur also under Palestinian Authority rule in the Strip.

The respondents were also asked whether they believe the Palestinian Authority would be capable of committing, in the center of the country, what Hamas committed in the western Negev. Here the results were unequivocal: 79% of all respondents, and 91% of the Jewish respondents, believe the Palestinian Authority would be able to act the same way Hamas had acted, given the opportunity.

These data show that the Israeli public perceives the Palestinian Authority as an enemy no different than Hamas in all matters concerning aggressive intentions against Israel.

“The survey results prove that the Israeli public understands the objectives of the war very well and regards the toppling of Hamas to be the overriding objective”, says Brigadier-General (Res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF. “The public also realizes that the Palestinian Authority is part of the problem, not part of the solution. Allowing the Authority to function as a governing entity means a return to October 6.”

In our next article, we shall continue to examine the survey results, we will examine what the public thinks about the day after the war, and how it believes the future Gaza Strip should be governed.

הפוסט IDSF Index: What, According to Israeli Public Opinion, is the Main Goal of the War? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This time, the IDSF Index examines the Israeli public’s attitude toward the Swords of Iron War with reference to the past, present, and future. First we looked at what the public thinks of the circumstances and attitudes that brought about the October 7 disaster. Then we looked at what the public thinks of the present situation and the objectives of the war. And finally, we examined what lessons the public believes must be drawn from October 7 and what it believes should be done when the war ends.

In this article, we will deal with the first part of the survey: The day before the Swords of Iron War.

The survey was held during January 2024 on behalf of the IDSF research department, with statistical supervision from Dr. Haggai Elkayam. Responding were 1,156 adults (18+) in Israel, users of the Internet, confirmed as a representative sample according to age, gender, nationality, religious observance, and political self-identification.

For the total sample (1,156 respondents) the maximum margin for error in sampling is ±3%, at a probability of 95%. For the Jewish sample (919 respondents) the maximum margin for error in sampling is ±3.5%, at a probability of 95%. For the Arab sample (237 respondents) the maximum margin for error in sampling is ±6.5%, at a probability of 95%.

The failures that led to the disaster:
Erroneous intelligence analysis and faulty real-time behavior

The lapses that made the events of October 7 possible will yet be probed thoroughly in the future, and years may pass before the public can be sure of the reasons and of the guilty parties. In the meantime, we asked the public who they believe bears primary responsibility for the great disaster that struck the Israeli populace — the military, or the political echelon. The answer: both. But there was broader agreement regarding the role of the military in the lapse: 89% of respondents believed that the military was guilty, and 76% believed that the political echelon was.

In addition, we checked which military failures influenced public opinion regarding the disaster. 91% of the respondents believe that the crucial failure was the misinterpretation of existing intelligence, whereas only 67% of the respondents believe that intelligence information was lacking at the IDF. As to whether the misunderstanding of the situation in real time influenced the disaster, 89% answered that it did, and 86% noted that insufficient routine preparation by the IDF at the border with Gaza also influenced the events of October 7.

Another point of interest that arose in the survey is that the index of trust in the Israel Police rose by 14%. In the present survey, 39% expressed trust in the police, as against only 25% in the previous survey. The increased trust in the police may derive from its worthy and significant contribution to halting the October 7 invasion.

The conception collapsed. But what conception exactly?

One point of unanimity among the public: “The conception collapsed.” The question remaining is what exactly the conception was. Our survey asked about the extent to which the various attitudes held by the State of Israel enabled the terror attack to occur.

In first place is the belief that Hamas was deterred, mentioned by 84% of the respondents. Immediately behind are the attitude that Israeli security can be preserved while Hamas controls the Gaza Strip (82%) and the attitude that intelligence and technology can substitute for a significant military presence (81%). Two more attitudes that influenced the events of October 7, according to the respondents, are the attitude that granting territory, internal independence, and money to the Palestinian administration in Gaza will mitigate their intent to attack Israel (79%) and the attitude that Hamas should be strengthened in the Gaza Strip in order to weaken the Palestinian Authority (75%).

Another attitude presented to the survey’s respondents was that separation from the Palestinians, as carried out in the Disengagement, would strengthen the moderate forces in the Gaza Strip and calm the security situation. The results from the total sample showed 73% of the respondents marking that attitude as a possible factor in the security lapse. Broken down by nationality, 80% of the Jewish respondents saw that attitude as influencing the lapse, as against 48% of the Arab Israeli respondents. Even within the Jewish public, opinions differed. With the Jewish public broken down by ideology, it emerges that 92% of the respondents who consider themselves on the right marked that attitude as affecting the disaster as against 69% and 66% for the self-described centrists and leftists respectively.

Back to 2005: Did the Disengagement influence October 7?

One of the questions that re-emerged into discussion because of the Swords of Iron War is that of the Disengagement. Did it influence the disaster of October 7?

In the survey, we asked the respondents whether they considered the Disengagement plan a mistake. 60% of them believe that the Disengagement was a mistake, as against 35% who believe it was not a mistake and 15% who are undecided.

A breakdown by nationality shows large gaps. 68% of the Jews believed that the Disengagement was a mistake, but only 31% of the Arab Israelis believe so. An even greater gap is visible in the ideological breakdown among the Jewish respondents. On the right, 86% of the respondents believe that the Disengagement was a mistake, and on the left only 29%.

The respondents to the survey were also asked whether their opinion on the Disengagement had changed following the October 7 events. 79% of the respondents answered that their opinion had not changed, 19% answered that in the past they had considered the Disengagement correct but they now believed it was a mistake, and only 2% chose the opposite answer — that in the past they had considered the Disengagement a mistake but now they considered that it was justified.

The disputes and the refusals

The period just prior to the Swords of Iron War was very challenging for Israeli society. In the preceding years, many social and political protests were mounted and they continually intensified around the issue of judicial reform. In the shadow of those protests, calls were also heard from some reservists to refuse to report for duty.

The survey’s participants were asked about the extent to which, in their opinion, the disputes in Israeli society and the call for refusal to serve influenced Israeli deterrence of Hamas.

The results show that 84% of the total sample (and 91% of the Jews asked) believe that the disputes in Israeli society harmed Israel’s deterrent ability against Hamas. A breakdown of the Jewish population by ideological self-identification showed no significant gaps separating left, center, and right.

In contrast, on the matter of refusing or not reporting to serve, significant differences were detected in an ideological breakdown. On the right, 93% believe that refusals harmed Israel’s deterrent ability, in the center 74% believed so, and on the left only 51%.

The bottom line

The first part of the survey was intended to discern what the public thinks about the circumstances that made the October 7 disaster possible. Alongside clear disagreements among the Jews and Arabs of Israel, and between the right and left, a number of points of agreement were discovered that suggest certain important conclusions.

“We find Israeli society in broad agreement that the disputes among the people and the calls for refusal to serve harmed Israel’s deterrent abilities. This demonstrates that solidarity among the people is vital to preserving our fortitude and that the IDF must remain outside the political debate,” says Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, chair of the IDSF. “We also saw that it’s not one conception that collapsed, but an entire line of thinking that wasn’t in line with reality. To ensure Israel’s safety, the entire national security strategy needs to be rethought — just as the IDSF movement was warning long in advance of the war.”

In the next article, we will continue examining the survey results and see what the public thinks about the present situation — in both the national and the international arenas.

הפוסט The IDSF Index: Swords of Iron War — The Day Before הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the first article we focused on the reasons that brought this war about. In the second article we dealt with current issues relating to the progression of the war, and in this article we shall deal with the third and final part of the survey: the day after the Swords of Iron War.

The survey was conducted during January 2024 with statistical support from Dr. Hagay Elkayam. 1,156 respondents were surveyed – adult (over 18 years of age) Internet users in Israel, and has been reviewed to ensure fair representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion, and political affiliation.

For the Jewish combined sample (1,156 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (919 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.5% with a 95% probability; for the Arabic survey (237 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.5% with a probability of 95%.

Israel, Saudi Arabia or the PA? The question of ruling over the Gaza Strip after the war

The October 7 attack cracked, not to say shattered, the Israeli public’s sense of security. It is therefore perfectly understandable why many citizens want to know how it will be possible to guarantee Israel’s security when the Swords of Iron War is over, and how will be make sure we do not repeat past mistakes. One of the ways to ensure Israel’s security is to ensure that we remain in charge of our own security. We therefore asked whether the Israeli public believes the IDF should be given a free hand to operate in the Strip after the war has ended. The result is unequivocal: 79% of those polled in the integrated sample, and 94% of the Jewish individuals polled, responded that the IDF must be given a free hand to operate in the Strip after the war as well.

On the other hand, the respondents were asked also whether they think international or American policing forces will be above to prevent a resurgence of terrorism from the Strip. Here too, the answer is clear: only 26% of the respondents, with no real difference between the Jewish or Arabic population, believe international forces will be able to prevent a resurgence of terrorism.

And what about the civilian aspect? There is no single specific solution that the Israeli public supports, but it definitely is against the solution of assigning the control to the Palestinian Authority.

Thus for example, 25% of the respondents believe the State of Israel should manage the civil aspect of the lives of the Palestinians in the Strip after the war. 21% of the respondents believe the civilians in the Strip should be governed by a body sponsored by Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. 10% of the respondents answered that this management should be assigned to local Palestinian officials. 8% said an international body should be appointed and only 5% of the respondents believe governing of the Strip should be transferred to the Palestinian Authority.

The respondents were also asked whether they think that, should the Palestinian Authority be the one to return to Gaza and govern it, Hamas will be capable of launching another coup d’etat and retake control. 81% of the respondents gave a positive answer.

Never again: the lessons to be learned following October 7

There is no doubt the Israeli government and the IDF will have to do some profound soul-searching, to understand how such a terrorist attack could have taken place on October 7, and – most importantly – how can we prevent a situation that will enable a similar attack to take place. The respondents were asked about their opinion as to what are the most important lessons to be learned following October 7 and the Swords of Iron War.

The main lesson, agreed by 89% of the total respondents, is that there must be no return to the policy of containment, and even a situation in which a single missile or rocket being fired toward Israeli territory – cannot be tolerated. This lesson is agreed both on the Israeli Arabs and the Jewish public. The second most important lesson, according to 84% of the respondents, is that the alert squads in the settlements must be reinforced and strengthened.

As part of the examination of the lessons, the respondents were asked whether they think additional populations, that have so far not been recruited, ought to be added to the recruitment lists of the IDF. 81% of the secular respondents, 79% of the traditional and 59% of the religious respondents gave a positive answer to this question. Among the ultra-orthodox there was an opposite trend – only 29% responded that additional populations ought to be recruited. Among Israel’s Arabs, 34% supported this idea.

Among the questions relating to the drawing of conclusions from the war, the respondents were asked whether they believe Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, the Galilee and the Negev should be strengthened. On these questions, the Jewish respondents provided high percentages of positive answers, while among the Israeli Arabs the percentage was lower. 96% of the Jewish respondents agree that Jewish settlement in the Negev and Galilee should be strengthened, as opposed to 21% of the Arabs. Similarly, 73% of the Jewish respondents agree that Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria should be strengthened, as opposed to 17% of the Arabs.

The question whether it would be right to re-establish a Jewish population inside the Gaza Strip when the war ends – was also examined. 62% of the Jewish respondents supported this idea, 22% of  the Arabs supported it.

“The survey proves that the Israelis, despite all the disputes, are in agreement with one another when it comes to fundamental issues”, says Brigadier-General (Res.) Amir Avivi. “Most Israelis, including Israel’s Arabs, realize that the IDF has to be able to operate freely within the Strip after the war. Most Israelis also realize that the Palestinian Authority must not be allowed to rule in Gaza, and that under no circumstances must the policy of containment, which tolerated rocket and missile fire into Israel, be resumed. The survey shows also that most Jews realize now what we at the IDSF have always claimed – that the Jewish settlement in all parts of the country, including Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, is vital to ensuring Israel’s long-term security”.

הפוסט IDSF Index: Swords of Iron War – The Day After הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Although in military terms Israel’s victory in the Yom Kippur war is undisputable, Israeli media at the time and in the wake of the war was preoccupied with the failures that positioned Israel at a disadvantage at the break of the war, rather then on the victory Israel achieve by its end. Had this unbalanced coverage breed a misconception of the war in Israel’s society and decades later – even compromised Israel security?

In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur war, the IDSF HaBithonistim  research department conducted a survey aiming to explore the public position in Israel regarding various aspects of the Yum Kippur war, such as who holds responsibility for its failures, the heritage of that war and its impact and the manner it shaped today’s Israeli public security perception.

This survey was conducted with the statistical consultation of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. It was held among 1,057 respondents who are adults (age 18+) internet users, and vetted for a balanced distribution of age, gender, nationality, religious affiliation and political affiliation. For the combined sample (1,057 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.01% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (858 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.35% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (199 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±6.95% with a probability of 95%.

Victory of Failure: The Distance from Cairo and Damascus

As mentioned earlier, the outcome on the ground of the om Kippur war clearly testify to Israel’s victory. A country whose Jewish population was a mere three million people valiantly faced a formidable enemy force that has been built up for years, including not only the militaries of Egypt and Syria but also expeditionary forces from Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Morocco, all backed with massive soviet support. The proportion of the IDF’s victory can be somewhat be grasped upon reading the words by the then Egyptian General Chief of Staff, Saad al-Shazli, who in his autobiography wrote that a force which is larger than NATO, disintegrated in the face of the Israeli forces.

Shazli was not exaggerating. 370,000 Israeli soldiers stood against 785,000 enemy soldiers –a ratio of 2:1; Israel had a measly 476 fighter planes against 1,342 enemy planes, and 2,100 tanks against 5,382 enemy tanks – indeed David facing a Goliath, with the heavy cost on part of Israel – nearly 2,700 Israeli casualties, and 800 tanks and 102 planes lost. In comparison, the enemy forces lost a culminative 20,000 soldiers, 2,250 tanks, and 555 plans. What began as a surprise invasion into Israel ended with Israel’s forces positioned at a stone’s throw from the capitals of Syria and Egypt.

Does the Israeli public perceive the Yom Kippur war as the victory that it was, of rather the endless preoccupation with the failures of that war have formed a different opinion?

We posed a seemingly simple question to the public: “Did Israel win the Yom Kippur war?” As the chart below shows, only 62% of the Israeli public believes that the State of Israel won the Yom Kippur war; 22% disagrees with that statement, and 16% are undecided.

Has the State of Israel Win the Yom Kippur War?

62% Yes

Right – 74%

Center – 71%

Left – 54%

No 22%

Undecided 16%

IDSF HaBithonistim

A segmentation by nationality reveals significant discrepancies between Jews and Israeli Arabs: while 71% of the Jewish respondents maintain that the State of Israel won the war, only 29% of Israeli Arabs hold this opinion. A segmentation by ideological political affiliation of the Jewish respondents also reveals differences between those defining themselves as  political right, center or left: 74% of the right claim we won the war; 71% of the center also think so, but among the Israeli left, only 54% think we won the war.

The Children of the Winter of 73 Are the Adults of Winter 23

Another question posed to the respondents, in order to discern the extent to which the public views the outcome as a clear victory on part of Israel,  shows that only 19% of the public view the Yom Kippur war outcome as a clear victory. A segmentation by nationality shows that among the Jewish respondents, 22% thought Israel gained a clear victory in that war.

Is age a determining factor in the perception of the war? According to the survey the answer is yes. Among the respondents up to the age of 50, 18% view the Yom Kippur war outcome as a clear victory, as oppose to nearly twice of respondents over 66 (34%), who were at least 16 at the outbreak of the war, and surely remember its events.

“The Yom Kippur War is a Clear Victory On Part of Israel”

Born before the war

Over 16 at the time of the war 34%

Under 16 at the time of the war 24%

Born post-war 18%

These significant discrepancies have several possible causes. One may be the lens through which the media addresses that war. Those who lived through the war experienced first hand its failures and successes, and have a sentiment of victory which is significantly stronger as compared to those who were born postwar and thus draw most of their knowledge of the war from the narrative in Israeli society, the media and those special edition supplements mentioned above, which have become a symbol of Israel’s perpetual picking at the wounds of that war.

Perpetual Picking at the Wounds of the Past or Lessons Learned?

Ruminating on past wounds can be important, mainly for drawing lessons for the future. The question is whether perpetually doing so can come at the high cost, and whether the conclusions have value for Israel’s current and future security.

Let’s address the second question: does the perpetual analyzing of the failure of the Yom Kippur war diminishes the chances of repeating them? A series of questions posed to the survey participants found that the Israeli public does not believe so.

Thus for example, we asked the respondents what they thought the chances are for an unexpected attack like the Yom Kippur war reoccurring today. 66% of the public thought that such a surprise attack can reoccur today, as oppose to 21% who maintain that the chances of such a scenario are low. (13% are undecided). Interestingly, Arab Israelis less agree (48%) with the statement that such a surprise attack may reoccur, as oppose to Israeli Jews (71%).

This sentiment – believing that a surprise attack might reoccur – does not testify to the public’s confidence that the lessons of the Yom Kippur war were learned and applied. This is also evident from a question we posed to the participants: Do you believe that the lessons of the war are being applied to the present security establishment? Results show that only 43% of the public feel so. On this issue we did not find any significant statistic discrepancies relating to nationality or political affiliation.

Israeli Public 50 Years After the Yom Kippur War

“The surprise attack of that war can reoccur today” 66%

“The lessons of the war have been applied in Israel’s security establishment” 43%

“We can rely on the USA to aid Israel in a war over its existence” 43%

IDSF HaBithonistim

With regards to the rumination about the past – part of the cost of this tendency was reflected in the responses of the participants who were born in 1973 and later, who tend to view the outcome less in terms of victory. An additional outcome is the perception of the heroism of the fighters in the war: 48% of the public feel that the soldiers who fought the Yom Kippur war are not sufficiently acknowledged in Israel’s legacy of heroism and commemoration of its soldiers. Respondents affiliated with the political right tended to believe so more strongly (56%) than their counterparts on the left (33%).

“Are Israel’s Soldiers Sufficiently Acknowledged in Israel’s Legacy of Heroism and Commemoration?”

No 53%

Yes 30%

Undecided 17%

The data presents a clear depiction of the incessant rumination on the failures of the Yom Kippur war and the aversion to discussion of the heroic victory that came at a heavy cost. After 50 years of picking at this sore, it is evident that the public still does not feel that the lessons thereof are applied, or that the chances of reoccurrence of a surprise attack is low. Furthermore, the perception of the victorious outcome has lost its luster. The soldiers who shouldered the victorious outcome and paid the ultimate price are not sufficiently recognized as such and the outcome of the war is not viewed at the clear military victory that it was.

The significance of the Yom Kippur War Victory as a Building Block in Israel’s Next Victory

The State of Israel is in a perpetual state of threat, and the Israeli public is well aware of this. Israel’s public also understand that Israel can rely for most part only on itself and its own military might. This is reflected by the fact that only 43% of the public believes that in the event that Israel will have to face a war over its existence, the US would fully support the country, including with weapons and ammunition.

In other words, in the next war Israel will have to be self-sufficient because losing any  war is not an option. How does this pertain to the perception of victory and acknowledgment of the fighters’ heroism in the Yom Kippur War? According to Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, chairman and founder of the IDSF HaBithonistim, the answer lies in the values absorbed by the next generation: “We in the IDSF HaBithonistim  believe and know that what will win the next war are the people of Israel and the spirit that prevails in them. The IDF’s heritage, fighting spirit, Zionism and the belief in the righteousness of the path are what motivated the Yom Kippur War fighters to give all they could, which led to a clear victory even in difficult opening conditions. We must impart to future generations the legacy of these fighters, the understanding that it is the spirit of the fighters and their values that gave us a clear victory, as well as the understanding that only we can defend ourselves. This is the only way we can to preserve Israel’s security for generations.”

הפוסט The IDSF HaBithonistim Index: 50 Years for the Yom Kippur War הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As an organization that deals in applied research, we do not only reflect the analysis of past data, bit also derive the conclusions, the significance thereof and their likely implications for the future. In this case, we wanted to discern what the Israeli public views as plausible foundations and terms for any future negotiations for peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

The survey was conducted by the IDSF HaBithonistim  research department and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The sample was conducted among 1,057 respondents from internet-using adult population (18+) in Israel monitored to ensure a proper distribution in terms of age, gender, nationality, religious affinity and political affiliation. For the combined sample (1,057 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.01% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (858 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.35% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (199 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±6.95% with a probability of 95%.

It should be noted that both parts of the survey were conducted before the October 7 terrorist attack against Israel, wherein 3000 Hamas terrorists breached the Gaza border and swept the Gaza environ community in a bloody rampage of massacre, slaughtering over 1,400 Israelis, Arabs and Bedouins and taking over 200 hostages. It is highly likely that in the wake of this attack, opinions have shifted in Israeli society and corroborate even more emphatically the sentiments reflected herein.

A Peace Agreement with the Palestinians and Its Correlation with Israel’s Security

A fundamental question which begs discussion when formulating the terms for negotiations for future peace, is an issue nearly never addressed: Why?

We posed the “why” question to the Israeli public asking whether it thinks that Israel should strive at any cost to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians, or do so only if signing such an agreement would be material to Israel’s security. In other words, is such a peace agreement a means with which to ensure Israel’s security or an end in itself. The results are unequivocal: 80% of the Israeli public believe that Israel should sing a peace agreement with the Palestinians only on the condition that it contributes to the country’s security.

A distribution according to nationality reflects significant differences between Jews and Arabs, with 92% of the Jewish respondents believing that a peace agreement should be obtained as a means of attaining peace and not as an end in itself. Only 33% of the Arab respondents thought so.

A Peace Accord with The Palestinians: At Any Cost?

A peace agreement should be obtained only if it contributes to Israel’s security 80%

A peace agreement should be obtained even if it puts Israel at a security disadvantage 20%

This means that most of Israel’s public is united in the opinion that a peace agreement with the Palestinian is not an end in itself, but a means with which to bolster Israel’s security. Strategically, the significance of these findings is that the securing of defensible borders is sin qua non to any future peace accord.

Core Issues Should not be Left for Last

The Oslo Accords was meant as an interim agreement on the way to a permanent arrangement. The thought process at the base of this interim agreement was that a peace process should be put in motion, and leave the more volatile issues for a later point, otherwise no progress could be made at all. Reality shows that this tactic does not hold true.

Indeed, when we asked the Israeli public how the core issues should be solved, we got a conclusive answer: 75% of the Israelis agree that a future peace agreement with the Palestinian must provide solutions to core issues such as the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugee, and not leave them to a later resolution.

A distribution by national and political ideology shows no marked discrepancies between the Arab and right-wing, left-wing and political center respondents in regard to this statement.

The Day After Mahmud Abbass and Impact on the Peace Negotiations

81% of the Israelis Agree: “the body representing the Palestinians in the peace process must represent the Palestinian majority and be a stable governing body”

Who represents the Judea and Samaria Palestinians? This is a rather complex issue, particularly in light of the fact that the days of Mahmud Abbas as head of the Palestinian Authority are numbered. The uncertainty around this bears upon the prospects of future peace negotiations. We asked the Israeli public if a prerequisite for future peace negotiations would be a stable governing body to represent the Palestinians. Here too, the response was straightforward: 81% of the Israelis agree with the statement that says that any party with which Israel will negotiate a future peace agreement must be a bona fide representative of the Palestinian majority and be a stable governing body.

Then we presented the respondents with an additional fact: at this point in time, no stable governing body representing the Palestinian majority exists. When presented with a list of potential replacement for PA chairman Mahmud Abbas, and asked the respondents whether they thought any one of this is a suitable representative of the Palestinian public, we found a wide distribution of responses. The Palestinian Authority – in effect the formal representative of the Palestinians – ranked last with the support of only 30% of the respondents. The Hamas ranked first with 58%.

It is no wonder, then , that the question regarding the Palestinian partner to a peace process, found that only 13% of the respondents – Jewish and Arab together – feel that there is a viable partner on part of the Palestinians for a peace process.

Negotiations Under Fire: The Israeli Public Says No

Would You Accept a Situation Wherein Israelis are Hurt by Terrorist Attacks During Peace Negotiations?

No 83%

Jews 86%

Israeli Arabs 70%

Yes 11%

Undecided 6%

The expressions “victims of peace”, describing the casualties of Palestinian terror attacks during/after the signing of the Accords was coined during the signing of the Oslo Accords. We now examined whether the Israeli public would be willing accept this state of affairs wherein Palestinian terror attacks persist even during a peace process. Results show that a large majority of 83% of the Israeli public will not accept this state of affair. This majority held true for the left-wing as well as the Israeli Arab respondents.

This data shows that the Israeli public had come to understand a simple truth: a situation in which innocent civilians are hurt due to terror attacks, while a process is underway to bring peace to the area is unacceptable. In this respect, the lessons of the Oslo Accords seem to have been well internalized by the public in Israel.

Another precondition for conducting peace negotiations set by the Israeli public is the silencing of the incitement against Israel. 77% of the respondents pose the silencing of the incitement as a stipulation for peace negotiations . A distribution of the responses by nationality, shows that among the Jewish respondents the figure is even more significant (85%), but among Israeli Arabs only 43% agreed that stopping the incitement would be a precondition for holding peace talks. Even when distributed by political distribution, differences are evident regarding the end of the incitement as a precondition: 96% of those identified with the  political right support this as compared to 75% of the center and 52% of the left.

The data indicate that in the eyes of most of the public, even before any peace talks address the content of the agreements – which include various compromises, conditions and commitments – we must agree to change the sentiment against the State of Israel currently prevalent in Palestinian society.

Referendum: A Precondition for a Peace Agreement

Should Israel Hold a Referendum Prior To Signing A Peace Agreement with The Palestinians?

Yes 71%

Jews 76%

Israeli Arabs 51%

No 20%

Undecided  9%

The transfer of land to another side of an agreement is a momentous and nearly irreversible matter, that demands an overwhelming majority. However, as is known, the Oslo Accords were voted in by a small and questionable majority in the Knesset.

When we asked the Israeli public whether a referendum should be held before a move that would entail handing over territories, 71% answered yes. In the distribution of Jewish respondents by political affiliation, it emerged that the right (88%) advocates this significantly more than the center (63%) and the left (41%). In fact, the Jewish left in Israel believes in the necessity of a referendum in such a case less than Israeli Arabs (51%).

One way or another, it seems that most of the Israeli public understands that the decision on a peace agreement exceeds the scope of routine decisions of its representative in the Knesset, and must be presented for direct decision by the people, albeit with varying degrees of agreement according to different segmentation of the respondants.

Conditions for Peace with the Palestinians

80% An agreement should be sought only under the condition that it contributes to Israel’s security.

75% An agreement must provide the resolution of core issues (e.g. the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees).

71% A referendum must be held prior to signing a peace agreement.

77% The agreement is contingent on the cessation of the incitement against Israel.

83% Terror attacks against Israel during efforts to reach an agreement are not acceptable.

81% The Palestinian representative to the peace talks must represent the majority of the Palestinians and be a stable governing body.

* The sample was conducted in July 2023 among 1,057 respondents from internet-using adult population in Israel, and was monitored to ensure proper distribution in terms of age, gender, nationality, religious affinity, and political affiliation. For the combined sample (1,057 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.01% with a 95% probability

In conclusion, the Israeli public sets unconditional terms for continuing any peace process with the Palestinians: any future agreement is acceptable only on the condition that it contributes to Israel’s security, it is signed with a stable Palestinian governing body, it must include the resolution of core issues, and it must receive a “stamp of approval” by the Israeli public. Lastly, the survey shows beyond doubt that the public in Israel is not willing to accept the continuation of terror attacks against, or  “peace victims”, and incitement against Israel on part of the Palestinians.

At the bottom line: any future agreement cannot recreate the mistakes of Oslo: Israelis want a peace agreement – but not at all costs wherein the end justifies the means.

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: The Israeli Public Sets Clear Terms for A Future Peace Agreement הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey was conducted by the IDSF HaBithonistim  research department and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The sample was conducted among 1,057 respondents from internet-using adult population (18+) in Israel monitored to ensure a proper distribution in terms of age, gender, nationality, religious and political affiliation. For the combined sample (1,057 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.01% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (858 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.35% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (199 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±6.95% with a probability of 95%.

Measures: Security, Economy and Society

The Oslo Accords were related to as interim agreements, and the rationale behind them was to serve as a platform for agreement on part of the issues and to ensure the application thereof, laying the foundations for agreements of further issues.

Thirty years have passed since the signing of that interim agreement, and we set out to determine whether the public in Israel believes that the Accords have achieved their purpose, i.e. advanced the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.

We started off by asking the participants whether in hindsight, do they think that the Oslo Accord contributed to the security of Israel. Most of the public replied negatively: 64% of the Israelis thought that the Oslo Accords actually harmed Israel’s security, with a majority maintaining that they did so “to a large extent”. An ideological distribution of the Jewish participants shows a large discrepancy between right-wing voters, of which 97% believe that the Accords compromise Israel’s security, and the left-wing voters, of which only 9% thought so. A distribution according to nationality reveals a smaller difference: 73% of the Jewish respondents thought that the Accords compromised Israel’s security, while 28% of The Arab participants thought so as well. This indicates that the portion of Israeli Arabs who think that the Accords compromised Israel’s security was higher than the share of left-wing voters: 28% as compared with 9% respectively.

How do the Israelis perceive the effects of the Oslo Accords on the broader geopolitical environment of the Middle East? It turns out that only 19% of the Israelis thought that the Accords contributed to the political stability and economic growth in the Middle East. A distribution by ideology of the Jewish respondents shows large gaps between the left and right: while only 4% of right-wing voters think the Accords benefited regional stability and economic prosperity, among the left no less than 59% thought so. When we segment the results by nationality, we found that here, too, Israeli Arabs are closer to the right than to the left: only about 26% of Israeli Arabs believe that the Oslo Accords benefited the geopolitical region.

“Do You Think That the Oslo Accords Brought Israelis and Arabs Closer?”

No 80%

Yes 11%

Undecided 9%

Next, we sought to examine the effects of the Oslo Accords on the relations between Israelis and the Palestinians – whether they contributed to bringing them closer. The overwhelming majority of Israelis (79%) believe that the Accords did not bring the Israelis and Palestinians closer. An distribution of the Jewish respondents by political ideology shows that this is indicated more significantly on the political right: 96% of the right-wing voters among the respondents thought that they Accords did nothing to tighten relations between Israelis and Palestinians as oppose to 41% among the left-wing participants. Here too, a comparison between the left-wing participants and Israeli Arabs reveals a large majority among the Arab respondents (70%) who feel that the Accords did nothing the tighten relations between Israelis and Palestinians, which is almost twice as many as the Jewish left-wing voters.

A Palestinian state: security cooperation or security risk?

One claim often heard in regards with the Oslo Accords is that despite their shortcomings, at the very least they facilitate the collaboration between Israel and the Palestinian Authority security apparatus and Israel. Those in support of this stance believe that the cooperation between Israel and the PA, was material in preventing terror attacks in the years since the Accords were signed.

The survey found that only 36% of the Israeli respondents were convinced that the Oslo Accords did actually contribute to better security collaboration between the Israeli security forces and the PA such that prevented terror attacks. A distribution by ideology among the Jewish respondents shows a significant gap between the left- and right-wing participants: Only 13% of the right maintained that the Oslo Accords contributed to better security collaboration, compared to 84% of the left. The discrepancy is also reflected in the distribution of votes within the Arab public: 51% of Israeli Arabs believe that the agreements contributed to better collaboration and thwarted terrorist attacks, while 49% disagreed or were undecided.

Signed by Israel and the PA: Responsibility, Trust and Intention

The Sencerity of the Parties’ Intentions in the Oslo Accords

“Israel’s intentions were sincere”

Jews 78%

Israeli Arabs 21%

“The Palestinian Authority’s intentions were sincere”

Jews 10%

Israeli Arabs 56%

In the next part of the survey, we asked the respondents who thought that the Accords diminished the prospects of a diplomatic settlement, who in their opinion bears responsibility for the failure of the Oslo Accords.

Who Is Responsible for The Failure of the Accords to Yield an Arrangement

The Palestinian Authority 91%

Palestinian terror organizations 89%

The International community establishment 79%

The Palestinian public 78%

The Israeli political echelon 58%

The Israeli military command 37%

The Israeli public 30%

The settlers in Judea and Samaria & Gaza 20%

*Among the 63% of the Israeli public who thought that the Accords diminished the prospects of a diplomatic arrangement

The respondents placed the Palestinian Authority at the top of the list of whom they thought was responsible for the failure of the Accords:  91% believe that the PA is primarily responsible for the fact that the Oslo Accords harmed the prospects of a diplomatic settlement, followed in descending order by the Palestinian terrorist organizations (89%), the international community establishment (79%), the Palestinian public (78%), the Israeli political echelon (58%), the Israeli military command (37%), the Israeli public (30%), and closing the list are the settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, whom only 20% of respondents believe are responsible for the fact that the Oslo Accords did not contribute to a diplomatic arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians

Next, we sought to determine the positions of the Israeli public in regards to how sincere the parties were in their desire to achieve lasting conclusive peace. A significant majority of the Israeli public (66%) thought that the State of Israel was sincerely aiming to gain conclusive and lasting peace with the Palestinians through the Oslo Accords.  This position was not only evident among the right-wing participants (85%) but also among the left-wing respondents (63%) and the political center (68%) – all whom believe that Israel came to the table to sing the Accords with the aim of achieving peace. On the other hand, the respondents differed in their perception according to nationality: while 78% of the Jewish respondents have faith in the sincere intentions of Israel to achieve conclusive and lasting peace, only 21% of the Arab respondents thought so.

However, when we posed the same question about the Palestinian Authority, we got opposite results – only 19% of the Israelis thought that the Authority had sincere intentions to achieve conclusive and lasting peace with the State of Israel through the Oslo Accords. A distribution by political ideology did not change the picture – only 37% of the left-wing respondents, 18% of the political center, and 1% of the right-wing respondents attributed sincerity to the Palestinian Authority in signing the Oslo Accords and its desire to achieve conclusive and lasting peace.  In contrast, a distribution by nationality shows that only a small majority of Israeli Arabs (56%) believed that the Palestinian Authority sincerely aimed for a conclusive peace agreement when signing the Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Accords Were Only a Tactical Step in the Campaign Against the Existence of Israel

Right 92%

Center 49%

Left 13%

Israeli Arabs 32%

For the Jewish sample the maximum margin of error is ±3.35% with a 95% probability.

For the Arab sample the maximum margin of error is ±6.95% with a 95% probability.

Not only do many in the Israeli public not trust the sincerity of the Palestinian Authority’s proclaimed desire for peace – most believe that from the get go the Accords were simply a ruse to conceal the Authority’s true aim of war against Israel.  71% of the Jews in Israel believe this. The respondents identifying as political right, supported this statement by a vast majority (92%); the center had mixed responses (49%), and among the left-wing participants only 13% supported this statement. Among the Israeli Arab respondents 32% supported this statement – more than 2.5 times of the left-wing Israelis.

Forward Looking: Prospects of a Future Oslo-Like Agreement

What Are the Prospects of a Permanent Arrangement Between Israeli and the Palestinian in the Near Future?

No prospects 47%

Slim 38%

High 4%

Medium 11%

When we asked the participants how they thought the Oslo Accords contributed to a permanent agreement between Israeli and the Palestinians within the next generation, a majority of 63% of the Israeli respondents maintained that the Accords in fact harmed the prospects of reaching a future permanent diplomatic solution. This majority held also in a distribution by nationality – 52% of the Arab Israelis – as 65% of the Jewish respondents – believe the Oslo Accords hurt the prospects of a diplomatic arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians.

When asked about the general prospects of reaching some form of arrangement between the Palestinians and Israel in the foreseeable future, it turns out that almost half of the Israelis (47%) believed that no form of arrangement with the Palestinians is plausible; 38% saw few prospects of one, 11% thought there was some chance of an arrangement and only 4% saw strong prospects for a peace agreement between Israeli and the Palestinians. In other words, 85% of the Israelis feel that there are no real prospects of attaining a permanent arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians within the next generation.

Interim Summary: There Are Solutions, It Is Important To Keep an Open Mind

Amir Avivi, chairman and founder of the IDSF HaBithonistim  Movement, summarizes the findings so far and says that the survey indicates that a clear majority of the Israeli public understands that the Oslo Accords were a failed political move, moreover harming both Israel’s security and the prospects of a future agreement.

Should we relinquish hope for any political settlement? According to Avivi the answer is no. “Israel’s approach has become very fossilized:  currently the only acceptable schools of thought are either a two-state solution, which both common sense and reality itself have taught us is not a viable solution, or leaving things as they are, without a political settlement, which by default spells a binational state. But the truth of the matter is that there are many intermediate solutions.”

Avivi concludes: “Our survey shows that only 53% of Israelis believe that there are mid-ground solutions between the extremes of a “two states for two peoples” solution and a binational state. It should be noted that around the world there are at least 60 various models of autonomies and entities. The research department of the IDSF HaBithonistim studied these models in depth and it is our firm belief that is no acceptable reason why the State of Israel cannot also draw from these models and bring about the end of the conflict while uncompromisingly protecting the security interests of the State of Israel.”

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: 30 Years to the Oslo Accords – A Sober Retrospect הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey was conducted by the IDSF research department and with statistical guidance from Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The sample was conducted among 1,191 respondents from the adult population (18+) in Israel who use the Internet. For the Jewish sample (956 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.17% with a probability of 95%; For the combined sample (1,191 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.84% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (235 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±6.39% with a probability of 95%.

A National Asset: The Righteousness of the Path of the People of Zion

We started the survey with an exploration of the emotional-perceptional views of the Israeli public regarding Judea and Samaria. We first set out to examine through varied types of questions, whether the Israeli public perceives Judea and Samaria as an area that contributes to or compromises the security of the State of Israel.

The responses show that 71% of the Jewish public in Israel think that whomever controls Judea and Samaria invariably holds the strategic-security advantage over Israel’s coastal plain as well. In other words, the perception according to which Israel’s control over Judea and Samaria is crucial for maintaining normal life in the Dan metropolis is dominant in Israel’s public. As to the question whether the control over Judea and Samaria compromises Israel’s safety and security – only 22% of the Jewish public thought so.

The following questions were in the same vein: a polar question – “do you view Judea and Samaria as an asset or a liability?” – shows that the majority of Israel’s public (61%) believes that the Judea and Samaria region is an asset, as oppose to only 39%, who believe the region is a liability. In a segmentation of the answers according to nationality, the disparity between Jews and Arabs is evident: a clear majority of the Jewish public perceives Judea and Samaria as an asset, as compared with 26% of that group, who view the region as a liability. As oppose to them – 87% of the Israeli Arabs think that Judea and Samaria are a liability, while only 13% view the region as an asset to the State of Israel.

A segmentation by ideology of the Jewish participants’ responses, shows that an overwhelming majority (98%) of the respondents affiliated with the political right perceive Judea and Samaria as an asset, as compared with 47% of the respondents from the political center and only 12% of those affiliated with the left. Interestingly, a segmentation by gender shows that 82% of the Jewish female respondents thought that Judea and Samaria are an asset to the State, as compared with a lower rate of 65% among the Jewish male respondents. A possible explanation could be the military service in the region, which might be perceived as a personal liability on part of the Jewish male participants.

Terminology of Transfer: Relinquishing or Returning?

With the understanding that broad swaths of the Israeli public perceive Judea and Samaria as an asset to the State of Israel, we sought to examine whether this affects the public’s perception that these areas belong to the people of Israel. The answer is yes.

We asked the Jewish public if it would perceive a peace agreement that entails the transfer of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinian Authority – either as (a) the relinquishing of territories that rightfully belong to Israel or (b) the returning of territories Israel had occupied. The data shows that 71% of the Jewish public thinks that the transfer of the territory to the Palestinian Authority as part of a peace agreement constitutes the relinquishing of land that rightfully belongs to Israel (agreed by 6% of the Arab public).

A segmentation according to ideology shows marked differences between political left and right among the respondents: 95% of the respondents affiliated with the political right thought that transferring territories in Judea and Samaria to the PA would be relinquishing territories rightfully belonging to Israel, whereas less than 1% thought this would constitute a return of territories occupied by Israel to their rightful owners (4% responded that they didn’t know). In contrast, 13% of the left thought that the return of those territories to the PA would be relinquishing territories rightfully belonging to Israel, whereas 64% maintained that the transfer of Judea and Samaria to the PA constitutes the return of occupied territories to their rightful owners, and no less than 23% responded that they did not know – nearly six times the number of right-wing respondents who chose that option.

The data shows the Judea and Samaria are perceived by most of the Jewish public in Israel as territories that rightfully belong to Israel, and are assets for the country – particularly strategic-security assets. In other words: the foundation for the righteousness of the Jewish State’s path is deeply engrained in the Israeli public’s mind, albeit different in those affiliated with the political right and center, as compared with the left.

Who Is Discriminated Against? Depends on Who You Ask

It did not escape our attention that while large portions of the public view Judea and Samaria as an asset – there are others in society who think the region is in fact a liability for the State – namely a moral one. In this context, a prevalent argument often voiced in the debate on the Israel-Palestinian issue is that Israel’s control over Judea and Samaria creates in effect a state of oppression and discrimination, fosters terrorism and is even evocative of Apartheid regimes. One of the more complex issues occasionally discussed in the media is the illegal construction in Judea and Samaria. We explored public opinion on the matter asking the participants whether they feel there is selective enforcement against illegal building in the region, and if so – which group of the region’s population is more discriminated against.

Some 82% of the Israeli public thought that there indeed is selective enforcement against illegal construction in Judea and Samaria. However, 54% thought that the Jewish population is discriminated against while 28% thought the Arab population suffers more discrimination, (4% did not think selective enforcement exists at all in the region while 14% said they did not know).

Ideological affiliation was found to sway opinions on the matter – 90% of the respondents affiliated with the political right thought that the region’s Jewish population suffers more discrimination, while only 9% of the left leaning respondents agreed with this statement. In contrast, only 2% of the right thought that it is the Arab population that suffers most discrimination, while 71% of the left agreed with this statement.

A segmentation according to nationality shows that 62% of Israeli Arabs believe that the Arab population in the region is the target of discrimination, while 9% of those respondents thought that discrimination targets mostly the Jewish population. Of the Jewish respondents, 19% thought that the Arab population is discriminated against while 65% thought that discriminative enforcement against illegal building was aimed predominantly at the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria.

The findings indicate that the perception of discrimination is subjective. Determining which population gets the short end of the discrimination stick is tricky, if at all possible. Each side feels it is discriminated against on part of the law enforcement authorities. Moreover, for each study that shows discrimination against the Arab population in Judea and Samaria – there are studies that claim the contrary – that often the Arab population enjoys leniencies that their Jewish counterparts in the region do not receive.

We further examined the issue of enforcement discrimination in Judea and Samaria, and asked the public if it thought that the Israeli administration in the region creates laws that benefit the Jewish population more than the Arab citizens (a state of affairs that is the basis for allegations of an apartheid regime in the region). Of the Jewish respondents, 29% thought this was true, as oppose to 79% of the Israeli Arabs. We further posed the direct question: “Is Israel, in general, an apartheid state?”. 12% of the Jewish respondents replied “yes”, and 66% of the Israeli Arabs also thought Israel is an apartheid regime.

This indicated that at least in the Jewish public there is a majority that does not maintain that there is selective enforcement against the Arab population in Judea and Samaria, and that the State of Israel is not an apartheid regime. In the Arab public, in contrast, the perception of Israel as an apartheid regime is strong. We explored this perception from another angle.

Is Zionist “Apartheid” Better Than Palestinian Democracy?

As mentioned earlier, a significant majority of 79% of Israel Arabs believe that the Israel administration in Judea and Samaria creates discriminating laws in favor of the Jews living in the region, as compared with its Arabs (which constitutes apartheid). Moreover, 66% of Israel’s Arabs noted that in their opinion, Israel as a state is an apartheid regime.

We checked whether these answers could stand the test of reality. It appears not: we presented the Arab respondents with a scenario in which a Palestinian state will be established in Judea and Samaria, and asked them whether they would relocate their residence to the region and forgo their Israel citizenship in favor of a Palestinian one. 75% of the Arab respondents said they would not move to a Palestinian state and part with their Israeli citizenship; only 12% were willing to do so (13% responded that they did not know).

We further inquired whether the Israeli Arabs would support the annexation of Arab settlements adjacent to Judea and Samaria to a Palestinian state. Here too, 63% opposed such an option and 35% even claimed they would demonstrate against such a move. A mere 19% said they supported such a move, while 18% responded that they did not know.

To conclude the issue of Zionist apartheid, we asked what would Israel’s Arabs do in a situation in which Israel would decide to relinquish its sovereignty over their hometown, transferring control over to a Palestinian state government. Over half of the Arab responded (52%) that they would leave their homes and move to a town that is still under Israel’s rule.

In other words, despite their belief that Israel discriminates against the Arab population, and is in effect and apartheid state, most of them would not relinquish their Israeli citizenship or move from Israel to a Palestinian state, and would opt to leave such a Palestinian state to live in Israel.

It’s All About the Narrative: Palestinization Trends in Arab Society

The data presents a contradiction: on the one hand, most of Israeli Arabs maintain that Israel is an apartheid and displays racism in its treatment of Judea and Samaria’s Arab population. On the other hand, when inquired what course of action they would choose – their beliefs do not stand the test of reality, as the majority rather live under an Israeli “apartheid” than an ostensibly Palestinian democracy.

The contradiction may stem from the growing alignment of large sections of Israeli Arabs with the Palestinization processes and the adoption of the Palestinian narrative, according to which the Zionist entity is racist and the State of Israel applies a discriminatory and selective policy towards the Arab population, even if that narrative does not stand the test of reality.

In the next part of the survey, we explored Palestinization processes within the population of Israeli Arabs. We asked how Israeli Arabs define themselves – Israelis, Palestinians – or both. The data shows that more than a third of Israeli Arabs (36%), who hold an Israeli citizenship, feel more Palestinian than Israeli, and over half of these (19%) feel exclusively Palestinian. About a third (31%) feel equally Israeli and Palestinian, only 16% feel more Israeli than Palestinian and only 11% feel exclusively Israeli (6% replied that they do not know).

Additional data derived from the examination of the relationship between Israeli Arabs and the State of Israel, shows that even with protected rights, 31% of Israeli Arabs are not willing to live in a state with a Jewish majority. Furthermore, 36% of the Israeli Arabs do not acknowledge Israel’s sovereignty on all territories within the Green Line, including Jaffa, Acre, Haifa, West Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Only 14% of the Israeli Arabs believe that the official state symbols are justifiably Jewish.

What Does the Future Hold: The Day After Abu Mazen

What about the day after Abu Mazen? The stability of the PA following President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)’s retirement is a question that affects the security coordination between Israel and the PA, and naturally on the viability of future negotiation with the Authority. Instability would hold off any sustainable agreements.

Only a minority (9%) of the Israeli public thinks that after Mahmoud Abbas’s rule, the transfer of power will occur in an orderly manner. 35% think Hamas will take over the Palestinian Authority in effect; 28% predict anarchy in the Palestinian Authority, forcing the State of Israel to intervene militarily, and 28% did not answer as they felt they do not know what will happen in the Palestinian Authority with the end of Mahmoud Abbas’s rule.

A segmentation of the responses shows that the Jewish public as well is uncertain about what the day after Abu Mazen holds: 5% believes that the transfer of power will proceed in an orderly fashion; nearly a third (28%) maintain that anarchy will break out in the PA forcing Israel to intervene militarily; 20% think that Hamas in effect will take control; 21% predict a coup or military takeover of Judea and Samaria by Hamas, and 26% replied “I don’t know”.

The situation among Israeli Arabs does not paint a dramatically different picture: almost a third (28%) of Israeli Arabs foresee anarchy in the Palestinian Authority with the State of Israel forced to intervene militarily; 17% predict a transfer of power in effect to Hamas; 18% think that Hamas will affect a coup or military takeover of Judea and Samaria, and only 9% think there will be an orderly transfer of power (28% answered “I don’t know”).

In such a state of uncertainty characterizing the near future of the PA’s security and politics, it is to be expected that the State of Israel would be well prepared for what the future might bring. However, the Israeli public does not believe it is: over half (52%) of the public deem Israeli unprepared for the eventualities of the day after Abu Mazen; approximately a third (28%) of the respondent did not know, and only 20% was confident of Israeli preparedness.

Judea and Samaria Are Not the Problem, But the Solution

The overall object of the survey was to determine the status of Judea and Samaria in the public’s view, in a broad context and on different levels. The data indicates several significant conclusions, which have political, economic and security implications for the State of Israel. First, the survey establishes the understanding that the importance of Judea and Samaria cannot be overlooked as an inseparable thread in the fabric of life that is the State of Israel. The value inherent in the region manifests economically, socially and within the familial circle.

Moreover, the survey highlights the strong emotional and historical connection between the Jewish public and Judea and Samaria, which manifests, among others, in the public’s connection through its visits to the Jewish heritage sites of the region. In the bottom line: the Jewish public perceives Judea and Samaria as an asset – not a liability, predominantly in the security-strategic and planning context.

Does control over Judea and Samaria also have its downsides? It appears that the public does not perceive the current situation in the region as one that presents significant disadvantages as compared to alternatives scenarios. The calls by anti-Israeli organizations to boycott the country’s economy as a whole and products manufactured within Judea and Samaria in particular are not echoed in the Israeli public – neither in its Jewish component nor among Israeli Arabs. Furthermore, according to the perception of the Jewish public, Israel does not enforce an apartheid policy in the region. Among the Arab public there is a consensus that the administration in the region is akin to apartheid, but nonetheless, they would not consider moving to territories under the PA control and relinquish their Israeli citizenship, but opt to remain under the wing of the State of Israel. Interestingly – the survey further establishes that the historical and emotional affinity among Israeli Arabs to Judea and Samaria is significantly weaker than that of their Jewish counterparts.

And finally – the argument that Judea and Samaria are a barrier to peace is not perceived as valid among Israel’s public: strong currents of Palestinization are spreading through Israeli Arab society, and are cementing in that society a position according to which the struggle is not only for Judea and Samaria – but for the land of Israel in its entirety, thus nullifying claims that the key to peace with the Palestinians lies within any specific region, including Judea and Samaria at that. Another significant point found in the survey is that even if an agreement concerning the future of Judea and Samaria was a called for decision – there is no partner to sign it with: there is a clear perception in Israel that the Palestinian Authority is far from being stable.

הפוסט The IDSF Index 2023: Judea & Samaria – An Asset for All Israel’s People הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey was conducted by the IDSF research department and with professional statistics guidance from Dr. Haggai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,191 Jewish and Arab respondents from the adult age group (ages 18+) in Israel who use the internet. For the combined sample (of all 1,191 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.84% with a 95% probability; The Jewish respondent segmentation (including 956 respondents) has a maximum margin of error of ±3.17% with a probability of 95%; The Arab respondent segmentation (of 235 respondents) has a maximum margin of error of ±6.39% with a probability of 95%.

Connected: Affinity, Ties, and Differences

The findings of the survey are presented here in two parts: the first part, which you are reading now, focuses on the various aspects of the Israel public’s connection to Judea and Samaria, excluding perceptions on matters of security in the region. The second part focuses on political and security perceptions of Judea and Samaria.

The first topic we reviewed was the intensity of the connection Israel’s public has to Judea and Samaria. Often, the Judea and Samaria region is seen as connected to the religious sector, therefore we specified three forms of connection: historical, emotional and religious.

The results show that 70% of the Jewish population feels an historical connection to Judea and Samaria; 63% feels an emotional connection to the region and 48% have a religious connection with it. The overall significance of these results is that an overwhelming majority of the Israelis have a profound connection to Judea and Samaria – at least on an historical level.

Among the Israeli Arabs asked about their connection to the “West Bank” (as they refer to Judea and Samaria) – only 37% feel an historical connection to the region; 33% said they felt an emotional connection to it, and 32% feel a religious connection to Judea and Samaria. In other words: the study shows a much stronger connection to Judea and Samaria among the Jewish public as compared with the Arab public, religiously, emotionally, and in particular – historically.

A less intense connection to Judea and Samaria also characterizes Jews who identified themselves as left-wing politically: only 27% of the respondents from the left feel connected, at least historically, to the region, which is indisputably the cradle of the history and culture of the Jewish people. This is compared with 90% of those identified with the right, who feel historically connected to Judea and Samaria, and with 46% of the respondents affiliated with the political center.

In terms of the intensity of the connection to Judea and Samaria and the perceived right over the area, disparities were evident between the right and the left: 89% of the respondents affiliated with the right felt that the connection of the Jewish people to Judea and Samaria is the foundation for its right to the entirety of Israel, while only 10% of the left agreed with this view.

IDSF sees a fundamental danger in the lack of connection in parts of the Israeli public to the places that are the cradle of the Jewish culture, and in their lack of knowledge regarding the area’s crucial significance and role in establishing the justness of the Jewish people’s path. For this reason, IDSF invests considerable efforts in the cultivation of knowledge in Israel’s Jewish public, by means of educational activities in pre-military preparatory programs, high schools and more.

Visiting Judea and Samaria: Ideological and Religious Influence

Beyond feelings, connections and opinions, we sought to determine how Israelis actually view Judea and Samaria and whether the region is a part of the daily life of the Israeli public. First, we wished to discern how often the Israeli public actually visits Judea and Samaria, and for what purposes.

According to the survey’s findings, 9% of the Israeli public had frequented Judea and Samaria on a weekly basis in the past three years; 17% visited the area on a monthly basis; 41% rarely visited it, and 20% say they have not visited Judea and Samaria at all in the past three years (13% of Israel’s Jewish public lives in Judea and Samaria).

According to another of the survey’s question, 80% of the Israeli public feels that driving through Judea and Samaria is more dangerous as compared to other areas of Israel. This figure raises the question of whether the public would visit Judea and Samaria more frequently were the travel to the area not perceived as dangerous.

A segmentation by ideology of the group of respondents who have not visited Judea and Samaria at all in the past three years reveals a marked difference: whereas only 18% of the respondents who identified with the right have not visited Judea and Samaria in the past three years, 43% of the left-wing respondents have not visited the area in said period.

An interesting picture emerges when segmenting family visits to Judea and Samaria by ideological affiliation: 48% of right-wing Jews frequent Judea and Samaria for the purpose of family visits, compared to only 20% of left-wing Jews. In other words, the family circle largely determines whether one visits Judea and Samaria. As we shall see later in this survey, this has an impact on the perception of Judea and Samaria.

Family & Economics: Visits to Judea and Samaria and National Differences

In the next stage of the survey, we sought to determine whether there are differences between Israeli Jews and Arabs in term of the frequency of visits to Judea and Samaria, and the reasons for Jews and Arabs to visit the region.

The data shows that among the Jewish public that does not live in Judea and Samaria, 9% visit the region on a weekly basis; 17% visit on a monthly basis (in total, at least 26% visit the region on a monthly basis); 47% rarely come to the area, and 27% have not visited Judea and Samaria at all (15% indicated that they live there).

What are the reasons for visiting Judea and Samaria? The most common answer for visiting Judea and Samaria was mainly family visits (42%), followed by visits to heritage sites (36%), field trips (31%), work and business (28%), military and security service (27%), and finally extreme sports (6%).

Among Israeli Arabs, 13% visit Judea and Samaria on a weekly basis; 25% visit on a monthly basis; 49% rarely visit and 10% have never visited Judea and Samaria (3% of Israeli Arabs live there). Compared with the findings relating to the Jewish public, the purpose of visits by Israeli Arabs to Judea and Samaria follows a different set of priorities. First and foremost, Israeli Arabs visit Judea and Samaria for work and business purposes (63%); followed only by family visits (29%). Other purposes, such as travel or extreme sports, appeared at a very low percentage.

One insight from these findings may be that while the connection of Israeli Arabs to Judea and Samaria is first and foremost economic, the connection of Israeli Jews to Judea and Samaria is based on family and social ties. One way or another, the findings as a whole clearly present an inseparable fabric of life that exists between the Israeli public and Judea and Samaria: family, social and economic.

Order of the Day: Heritage Sites in Judea and Samaria

When the Jewish public was asked which of the two following statements would best describe a peace agreement that includes the transfer of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinian Authority –either relinquishing territories that by right belong to Israel or returning territories Israel had occupied – significant differences were found between those who visited Judea and Samaria and those who did not.

Out of those who have visited Judea and Samaria – 71% viewed such an arrangement as the relinquishing of territories belonging to Israel, while 16% viewed it as the returning of territories. Out of the respondents who have never visited Judea and Samaria – only 54% thought that such an arraignment means relinquishing territories, whereas 27% deemed it the returning of territories. Even among respondents who replied they did not know, there is a clear disparity: Among those who visited Judea and Samaria, 13% said they did not know, compared to 19% among those who did not visit the region. One way or another, the data shows that visits to Judea and Samaria have a significant impact on the public’s attitude toward the region.

Next, we inquired which heritage sites in Judea and Samaria Israeli Jews visited most. The data shows that 47% visited the Cave of the Patriarchs; 37% visited Rachel’s Tomb; 27% visited the Tomb of Samuel the Prophet (Nabi Samuel); 25% visited ancient Shiloh; 12% visited Joseph’s Tomb and 12% visited the altar of Mount Ebal.

An ideological segmentation reveals significant differences between respondents from the right and left: 46% of respondents identified with the right compared to 25% identified with the left have visited Rachel’s Tomb; The tomb of the prophet Samuel (Nabi Samuel) was visited by 33% of those identified with the right compared to 18% of those identified with the left; Ancient Shiloh was visited by 31% of the right compared to 10% of the left; Joseph’s Tomb was visited by 15% of the right and only 6% of the left; The altar of Mount Ebal was visited by 14% of the right and 8% of the left.

The data paints a rather bleak picture of the status of Judea and Samaria heritage sites among the Jewish public. Some of these heritage sites are of paramount importance in the history of the Jewish people, and are anchors of archaeological evidence for the history of the Jewish people.

In addition, the data clearly indicates a direct correlation between visiting Judea and Samaria and the perception of the region. In other words: the public that reported visiting Judea and Samaria felt a stronger connection to the region.

BDS and the likes: To What Extent Do Boycott Organizations Affect the Israeli Consumer?

Part of the fabric of life that exists between the Israeli public and Judea and Samaria has economic manifestations as well: the Israeli consumer consumes many products made in factories located in Judea and Samaria. Many organizations, led by BDS, call to boycott products manufactured in Judea and Samaria. The next part of the survey dealt with the purchasing habits of the Israeli public with regard to products from manufacturers in Judea and Samaria. In other words, it sets out to examine whether the boycott called by anti-Israeli organizations affect the reality on the ground.

The simple answer is no: only 4% of the Jewish respondents and 19% of the Israeli Arab respondents boycott products manufactured in Judea and Samaria. As oppose to these, 71% of Jews have no problem purchasing products manufactured in Judea and Samaria, and more than half of them (37%) not only do not perceive this as a problem, but even prefer to buy Judea and Samaria products to begin with. 5% are willing to buy products from Judea and Samaria, but opt for alternatives when available, and as mentioned, only 4% completely boycott such products (20% of the respondents said that they are indifferent to the place of production and do not check where the products are manufactured).

A segmentation of the findings by ideology shows that political affiliation is a strong predictor of a respondent’s willingness to purchase Judea and Samaria-made products: 41% of the respondents affiliated with the left as oppose to 1% of the respondents affiliated with the right, will either try not purchase, or completely avoid purchasing, products made in Judea and Samaria.

Among Israeli Arabs, 53% have no issue with purchasing products manufactured in Judea and Samaria (of which 21% even prefer to buy such products); 13% are willing to buy these products but will refrain from doing so when there are alternatives, and as mentioned – 19% will fully boycott products manufactured in Judea and Samaria (15% are indifferent and do not check where products are manufactured).

It was interesting to find that while 41% of the Jews affiliated with the left try not to buy – of fully boycott – products made in Judea and Samaria, only 32% of the Israeli Arabs do so.

Willingness to Live in Judea and Samaria: Not At All Costs

Judea and Samaria constitute approximately 25% of Israel’s total area. This figure begs the question whether the Israeli public views the region as a possible solution to the country’s housing crisis. The survey found that 66% of the Israeli public thinks that the land reserves in Judea and Samaria can be a plausible solution to the crisis. A segmentation by ideology shows that 90% of the respondents affiliated with the right, and 38% of the respondents from the political center view the land reserves in the region as a plausible solution to the housing crisis, as oppose to only 8% of the left-wing respondents.

In the next part of the survey, we asked whether the Israeli public would consider living in Judea and Samaria if it were economically worthwhile. 47% of the Jewish public would positively consider moving to the region, with 8% conditioning doing so only if they could move to towns located on the Israeli side of the separation fence, and 12% conditioned living in the region on moving only to large towns or cities. (43% would not consider moving there at all and 10% currently reside in the region).

Among Israeli Arabs, 73% would not consider moving to Judea and Samaria at all. Among the 24% who would consider living there, only 11% would consider moving without prior conditions; 7% would move only to cities or large towns in the region, and 6% would consider moving to the region only to communities located on the Israeli side of the separation fence (2% currently live there).

One possible explanation for the unwillingness of parts of the Israeli public to consider living in Judea and Samaria is the political status of Judea and Samaria. For this reason we asked the respondents who said they would not consider living in Judea and Samaria if they would change their minds if the State of Israel applied Israeli law and sovereignty over Area C in Judea and Samaria. Indeed, about a third of them replied that they might change their minds or at least reconsider (29%).

Interim Summary: Judea and Samaria – the Heart of the State

“The survey clearly indicates two key findings: First, indeed, most of the Israeli public today has a special and deep connection to Judea and Samaria. Second, today it is impossible to separate the Israeli public from Judea and Samaria, because there is a deep intricate connection between them, economically, geographically and socially. This is true for both the Jewish public and the Israeli Arab public. In addition, the survey shows that a clear majority of the Jewish public sees Judea and Samaria as a possible solution to the housing crisis, with a high degree of willingness to move there. All this before even addressing the natural resources and strategic advantages of this region,” IDSF founder and chairman Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi concludes the first part of the survey analysis.

“Sadly, the survey also shows a sad state of visits by the Israeli public to the most important heritage sites for the Jewish people: only 12% of the public had ever visited Mount Ebal, perhaps the most important archaeological site for the Jewish people. The survey indicates that one of the reasons for this is the lack of visits by parts of the Israeli public to Judea and Samaria: if there are no family or friends to visit there, they are not exposed to this beautiful region, and there is no desire to go on trips and visit heritage sites, and this directly affects the most basic connection of a people to its land – the historical and national connection to a region that is deeply rooted in the history of our people. IDSF movement understands the importance of this connection to Israel’s national security strategy, and therefore operates in pre-military preparatory programs, in the education system and in field trips, and works through a variety of channels to promote the region of Judea and Samaria among the Israeli public.”

The next part of the survey report will focus on political and security perceptions regarding Judea and Samaria: peace arrangements, the Palestinian Authority post the Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) era, and how Israeli Arabs perceive the State of Israel.

הפוסט The IDSF Index 2023: Judea & Samaria – A Resilient Fabric of Life הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF Index survey was conducted by the Research Department with statistical support from Dr. Hagay Elkayam. 1,059 respondents were sampled – adult (over 18 years of age) Internet users in Israel, and has been reviewed to ensure fair representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion, and political affiliation. For the integrated sample (1,059 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.01% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (802 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.46% with a 95% probability. For the Arabic survey (258 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.1% with a probability of 95%.

The Bone of Contention: Jerusalem

A claim often heard regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict is that the only way to put an end to the conflict is the two-state solution. This is why we began our survey by drilling down into this claim. We divided the questions into two parts: inquiry into attitudes within the Israeli public regarding a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, and inquiry into their attitudes regarding a Palestinian state where Jerusalem remains under Israeli sovereignty.

In order to fine-tune the question and eliminate any bias, we worded the question as follows: “Would you support a peace agreement with the Palestinians, backed by security arrangements, which includes the establishment of a Palestinian state on the majority of the Judea and Samaria territories, with Jerusalem as its capital? 60% of the Israeli public object to such an agreement, 28% are in favor (12% responded “Don’t know”).

When segmented by nationality, the differences come into clearer relief: among the Jews, 72% object to such an agreement and 17% are in favor, as opposed to 67% of the Arabs being in favor of such an agreement and 17% who oppose it (the rest responded “Don’t know”). Ideologically segmented, 92% of the respondents that identify with the right oppose such an agreement while only 2% are in favor, while 60% of the left supports such an agreement and 25% oppose it (the rest responded “Don’t know”).

Next, we asked the exact same question, with only the ending being changed: “Would you support a peace agreement with the Palestinians, backed by security arrangements, which includes the establishment of a Palestinian state on the majority of the Judea and Samaria territories, with East Jerusalem remaining under Israeli sovereignty”?

The data shows that 52% of the Israeli public object to such an agreement, while 30% are in favor (the rest responded “Don’t know”). When segmented by nationality, The data shows that 54% of the Israeli public object to such an agreement, while 29% are in favor. Among the Arabs, on the other hand, 45% object to such an agreement and 32% are in favor (the rest responded “Don’t know”). Ideologically segmented, while 76% of the right object to such an agreement and 12% are in favor, 16% of the left oppose such an agreement and 63% are in favor.

The first insight from the data is that among the Israeli public, there is no support for the two-state solution. such a solution is not supported where Jerusalem remains under Israeli sovereignty, and all the more so does the Israeli public object to an agreement in which Jerusalem comes under the sovereignty of a Palestinian state.

Another insight is that when approaching the two-state solution, it is important to understand that Jerusalem is the main stumbling block. There is no way – as the data shows – to “leave Jerusalem for the final phase of the talks”, as the two-state solution supporters sometimes claim.

However perhaps the most significant insight is, that even when Israeli Arabs were asked about a settlement that includes handing Jerusalem over to Palestinian rule, only 67% came out in favor. In other words, even in an agreement in which the Jewish population is theoretically prepared to accede to all of the Palestinians’ demands, one third of Israel’s Arabs have reservations regarding this solution.

Managing the conflict: A change in the situation will only make things worse

Ruling out a solution is easier than suggesting a new one. But perhaps the current situation is preferable to a new solution? We asked the Israeli public whether Israel is more secure in its current state compared with a situation in which a peace agreement is signed with the Palestinians, which includes withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.

Only 34% of the Israeli population believe Israel will be more secure if a peace agreement would be signed to include withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, as opposed to 49% who believe Israel is more secure in its current state (the rest responded “Don’t know”).

Segmentation by nationality shows that among the Jews, 58% believe Israel is more secure in its current state, as opposed to 19% among Arabs that think so. In other words, the majority of Jews prefer to continue with what is termed “conflict management”.

When segmented ideologically, there were no surprises. 84% of all right-wing respondents prefer to keep the current situation while only 7% believe Israel would be more secure if a peace treaty were signed, which includes withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. Among the left-wing respondents, the data shows an almost perfect mirror picture: 82% favor an agreement that includes withdrawal from Judea and Samaria while 7% are in favor of maintaining the current situation (the rest responded “Don’t know”).

If a peace treaty is signed – will there be peace?

The May 2021 riots have left a profound impression on Israeli public opinion: the concept of coexistence got undermined even among the diehard optimists. A widespread string of violent attacks, perhaps even unprecedented, on the part of a large proportion of Israel’s Arabs, overwhelmed the streets in Israel’s mixed cities, catching the police unprepared for such severe public disorder.

In the next part of the survey we examined whether a peace treaty might have an effect on riots of the kind we witnessed in May 2021. 57% of the Israeli public believe a peace treaty with the Palestinians will not prevent or reduce incidents of violence on the part of Israel’s Arabs. Among the Jews, 64% agree with this statement and among the Arabs, 35% agree.

When segmented ideologically, 84% of the right wing believe a peace treaty with the Palestinians will not prevent or reduce incidents of violence among Israel’s Arabs, compared with only 20% on the left that believe so. This data indicates a conceptual divergence of opinion between the way those identified with the left wing perceive the Israeli Arabs, and the way the Israeli Arabs portray reality: while only 20% of left-wingers believe a peace treaty with the Palestinians is not going to prevent or reduce the incidence of violence among Israel’s Arabs, 35% of Israel’s Arabs believe violent incidents will not be prevented or reduced following a peace treaty.

In other words, even if a peace treaty will be signed, more than one out of three Israeli Arabs doubt this will dampen violent outbursts of the kind we witnessed in May 2021. This reinforces the belief that solving the 1967 conflict will not solve the 1948 conflict.

Yes partner, no partner: and what will happen after a peace treaty has been signed?

The person in charge of the Palestinian Authority at the moment is Abu Mazen. Therefore any effort to work toward a peace treaty with the Palestinian Authority means negotiating with him. We asked the Israeli public whether Abu Mazen is a credible partner for peace talks with the Palestinians. The results were literally astounding: only 10% of all Jews and 24% of all Arabs in Israel believe that Abu Mazen is a credible partner. And what about the moral and ethical aspects of an agreement with the Palestinian Authority? We asked the Israeli public whether the Palestinian Authority takes care of the well-being of its residents. The data shows that only 11% of Israeli Arabs and 4% of the Jewish population believe the Palestinian Authority takes care of its residents’ well-being. In other words, an agreement with the Palestinian Authority is not going to mean an improvement of its residents’ well-being.

Moreover, even if a peace treaty will be signed with the Palestinian Authority, its viability is in doubt, since Palestinian Authority residents do not feel the Authority is looking out for their well-being, therefore the Authority’s stability is in doubt. To read more about the Palestinian Authority’s stability, look here.

There are two conclusions one can draw from these data: One is that Israeli public opinion, both Jewish and Arab, is globally convinced that currently there is no partner; the second is that even if there was a partner, the stability of such an agreement, not to mention its moral validity – would be highly dubious.

Brigadier-general (Res.) Amir Avivi: “The majority of public opinion is opposed to a Palestinian State in Judea and Samaria”

“The two-state solution has become the dominant pattern of thinking. It precludes the possibility of any other solutions”, says the Movement’s Founder-Chairman, Brigadier-General (Res.) Amir Avivi, “so first of all – other solutions do exist. Secondly, the index shows that in any case, the majority opposes such a solution. The public is no fool – the public is aware that establishing a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria means a de-facto Gaza reincarnate on steroids right in the country’s heartland”.

“Besides that, the index unequivocally shows there is no partner”, Avivi adds. “Abu Mazen is perceived as unreliable – to Israeli Arabs and certainly among the Jewish population. The Palestinian Authority is perceived – categorically and across all sectors – as one that neglects its residents’ well-being. Let those that seek to make peace with the Palestinian Authority from a position of enlightenment and for the sake of human rights ask themselves whether this is how we will assure the well-being of the Authority’s residents”.

הפוסט “IDSF Index” 2022: “Peace” – Pipe Dream or Practical Agreement? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey was conducted by the Research Department with statistical support from Dr. Hagay Elkayam. 1,059 respondents were sampled – adult (over 18 years of age) Internet users in Israel, and has been reviewed to ensure fair representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion, and political affiliation. For the integrated sample (1,059 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.01% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (802 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.46% with a 95% probability. For the Arabic survey (258 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.1% with a probability of 95%.

The Key Challenges: Governance, Personal Security and Homeland Security

Following a three-year political stalemate, the public sentiment is that now the time has come for action. The question is – where would the public most want to see real change.

The answers indicate that the top priority is governance, personal security and homeland security (66%). This is followed by the cost of living and housing costs (62%), improvement of the education system (34%), Israel’s security vis-à-vis external threats (32%), the schisms tearing Israeli society apart (30%), improving the transport infrastructure in Israel (22%), State versus Religion (21%), improving the health system (16%), Israel’s foreign relations (7%), and finally – strengthening of the ties with the diaspora Jews with only 2%.

Segmented by nationality, governance and homeland security top the list among the Jews with 71%, while among the Arabs this issue receives only 48%. For Arab society, the most burning issue is surprisingly the cost of living and real estate prices, which chalked up 84%, as opposed to only 57% among Jewish respondents.

On top of that, one must wonder why strengthening ties with Diaspora Jewry, which throughout history has proven indispensable to our national resilience, has landed at the bottom of the list. This fact is a concern to us as a movement, since there is a dramatic campaign rolling out worldwide, which affects millions of Jews whose existence is now at risk due to incidents of anti-Semitism and assimilation, and we would like to remind our policymakers just how important it is to revamp the conversion system, to strengthen the Zionist ethos, to stimulate Aliya, to combat delegitimization in the media and to deal with anti-Semitism.

The Biggest Threats: From the Closest to the Remotest

One of the most significant conclusions arising from the ranking of the national challenges is that homeland security is at the top of the Israeli public’s list of priorities with 66%, whereas state security vis-à-vis foreign threats totaled less than half of that – 32%.

We drilled down and asked which aspect of security is most important to the Israeli public. Topping the list is governance in mixed cities and the war against terrorism (61%), then comes the IDF’s preparedness against Syria, Lebanon and Gaza (43%), the Iranian nuclear threat (35%), the home front’s preparedness for a missile attack (25%), Israel’s delegitimization worldwide (21%), reinforcement of Zionist values in Israel (16%), and at the bottom of the list – anti-Semitism targeting Jews around the world (7%).

One of the insights from this ranking is that the Israeli public, quite naturally, ranks the threats to be dealt with from the closest to the remotest. In other words, first of all the most pressing, most urgent threats must be dealt with – those which are in our midst and which we sense on a daily basis. We then need to deal with the direct enemies surrounding us, and then we will also be able to deal with the Iranian threat. Reality, however, is more complicated since the threats are interconnected. Clearly, however, the public expects personal security first and foremost.

A New Middle East: The Thing That Hath Been, is Not That Which Shall Be

A recurring claim is that without peace with the Palestinians – our closest neighbors – there is no way to make progress and achieve peace with the Arab countries in the Middle East, our more remote neighbors. This claim was debunked when the State of Israel signed normalization pacts with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in 2020, followed by Sudan and Morocco. With this state of affairs in mind, we asked the Israeli public what is more important – to pursue peace with the Palestinians – or perhaps to seek peace with other Middle Eastern countries.

55% of the Israeli public believe it is more important to pursue peace with Middle Eastern countries, compared with only 35% that believe we have got to make peace with the Palestinians first (the rest responded “Don’t know”). When segmenting the answers by nationality, the differences between Jews and Arabs come into clear relief: whereas among Jews 66% prefer peace treaties with Middle Eastern countries and 24% believe we ought to make peace with the Palestinians, within Arab society 16% believe it is more important to pursue peace with Middle Eastern countries compared with 72% that believe the Palestinian peace should take precedence.

Judea and Samaria: The Majority Favors Annexation of Area C

After the Six-Day War, the Israeli government decided not to apply Israeli law on Judea and Samaria. The implications of this decision have had mixed consequences. One of the greatest controversies about Judea and Samaria is whether Israeli law ought to be applied there.

In our survey, we examined to what extent Israeli public opinion supports the application of Israeli sovereignty over Area C, in other words – in territories under Israeli civil and security control, totaling approximately 60% of Judea and Samaria (for further reading on the differences between Area A, Area B and Area C, look here). The responses show that 58% of the Israeli public supports application of Israeli sovereignty over Area C. When segmenting by nationality, 67% of all Jews support such a move and no less than 26% of Israeli Arabs also support extending Israeli sovereignty over Area C.

In other words, most Jews regard Area C in Judea and Samaria to be an integral part of the State of Israel, where Israeli law ought to be applied to all intents and purposes. It is noteworthy that no less than a quarter of Israel’s Arabs also support this move.

The Message from the Public: Deal With Homeland Security Issues

“The issue of governance and homeland security has been on the backburner for way too long, a fact that has exacted a heavy price in the real world: the level of governance in the country is scandalous and the public feels this” – so sums it up the Founder-Chairman of the IDSF, Brigadier-General (Res.) Amir Avivi. “The Israeli public is smart. Governance and homeland security is indeed critical to Israel’s resiliency. As we saw in May 2021, when the homeland security vector intersects with the vector of foreign war, the results can be disastrous. In this sense, individual security and national security are inseparable.

The undisputable conclusion is that we have got to rearrange our national priorities and place homeland security substantially higher on the list than where it has been so far. The IDSF is hard at work to make this happen”.

הפוסט “IDSF Index” 2022: Israel’s Key Tasks הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF survey is conducted by the IDSF research division, with the statistical support of Dr. Haggai Elkayam. The survey included 1,232 participants from among Israel’s internet-using adult population. The survey’s Jewish participants sample (1,032 respondents) has a maximum margin error of ±3.05%, with a 95% probability; the Arab participants sample (200 respondents) has a maximum margin error of ±6.93% with a 95% probability; the combined sample (1,232 respondents), has a maximum margin error of ±2.79% with a probability of 95%.

Is Israel Prepared for a large-scale military engagement? Disconcerting responses

One needn’t be a military expert to acknowledge the fact that Israel’s next military engagement will involve concerted attacks on its battlefront and home front. We’ve had a small taste of this scenario in May 2021, when Israel was attacked from the Gaza borders as well as from within mixed cities. A confrontation that involves Lebanon, Syria and Iran is expected to be tenfold more challenging for the country.

Does Israel’s public feel that the country is well prepared to deal with a challenge of this magnitude? The responses we have received were less than encouraging, to say the least: only 50% of the population in Israel feel that the battlefront is properly prepared for a comprehensive military engagement, while in terms of the level of preparedness of the home front – the statistics are even more dismal with only 30% of the population believing that the home front is adequately prepared for a comprehensive military engagement.

A segmentation of the above data by ideological affiliation reveals that with regard to the public’s perceived preparedness of the home front, there is a cohesiveness across the political map; however, in terms of preparedness of the battlefront – respondents who were on the left and center of the political map were more convinced of Israel’s preparedness (65%) as compared with right-wing respondents (47%) who hold that opinion.

Professional arguments regarding the IDF and Home Front Command’s preparedness for a large-scale military engagement could be voiced, and the point can be made that the Israeli public lacks the necessary tools to appreciate the real picture as it is fully disclosed to decision-makers. Nonetheless, the indisputable public sentiment is that Israel is not fully prepared for a military confrontation – both on its battlefront and particularly on its home front.

Our research department will explore this issue in-depth during the upcoming year and will examine the state of preparedness de facto within the country’s local municipalities and of its security forces.

The public perception of Israel’s resilience: chasm between right and left

Throughout its existence, the State of Israel has known wars, military engagements, and covert operations within and outside its borders. Its military prowess depends not only on the ability of its security forces to operate in the field, but also on the resilience of Israeli society as a whole. Has this crucial resilience been eroded or does it still stand strong?

The survey shows that 55% of the Israelis view a decline in the country’s social resilience, while 25% believe it remains as strong as ever, and 12% of respondents thought that it has grown stronger (8% of respondents provided a “don’t know” response).

A national-level segmentation of the responses does not indicate notable disparities between Jews and Arabs on this issue; however, a segmentation according to political affiliation reveals significant differences: while 66% of right-wing respondents felt there is a decline in the national resilience, only 40% of left-wing respondents agreed with this statement. Another major disparity between the left and right was the response to the statement “There must not be a restriction on waving the Israeli flag around the country, even at the price of offending sensibilities of certain groups within Israeli society”: 95% of the respondents affiliated with the political right agreed with the statement while only 57% from the left agreed with it.

The disparities between right and left are also evident insofar as the respondents’ inclination of leaving the country. According to the survey, 70% of Israelis have never considered leaving, while 29% have considered doing so in the past or are presently considering leaving.  An ideological segmentation reveals that while 81% of the respondents affiliated with the political right have never considered leaving Israel (with 19% having considered in the past or are currently considering doing so) – only 58% of the respondents affiliated with the left have never considered leaving the country (with 42% having considered in the past or are currently considering doing so).

Another statement that demonstrates the chasm between the political right and left is evident in the perception of media coverage of military operations – 91% of the respondents affiliated with the right agreed with the statement “whenever possible, and if doing so does not create misinformation – the media should report on military engagements from a favorable standpoint towards Israel and its security forces”; however, only 44% of the respondents affiliated with the political left agreed with the statement.

Whatever the causes of these disparities between left and right, we believe that a state of affairs wherein crucial portions of Israeli society do not feel a strong connection with the country and its symbols, and lack basic conviction in the justness of Israel’s cause – directly compromises the security of the State.

The Iranian Threat and the Israeli Arabs: Alarming Situation

The west knows: a nuclear Iran is a threat not only to Israel – but to the entire world. But what is the perception among Israel’s public on this issue? The findings of the IDSF survey reveal significant disparities between Israel’s Jewish and Arab populations.

Among the Jewish population, public opinion is unequivocal – across religious persuasion, gender and political affiliation – and in line with the Western world: 91% of Israeli Jews agree with the statement “The world will be a less safe place if Iran has a nuclear weapon”.

However, only 50% of the Israeli Arabs believe that the world will become less safe in the event that Iran obtains a nuclear bomb. In other words, there are over one million citizens of Israel who do not acknowledge the threat presented by a country that holds nuclear capabilities and openly calls for the annihilation of the State of Israel. It goes without saying that this disparity impacts our national and social resilience against threats to Israel’s security.

The Nation Is Signaling to its Leaders: There is a Problem that Demands Addressing

The above findings clearly show that the Israeli public does not feel that the country is well-prepared for the next large-scale war – neither in its battlefront nor its home front. Furthermore, the public feels that Israel’s resilience has declined in comparison to the past – a trend that is reflected, among others, in the higher rates of people who have considered or are considering leaving the country.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF, is concerned about the results of the survey, but is determined to act in order to change the situation: “Without a sense of national cohesiveness, and high national and social resilience, we will not be able to win the next military campaigns. That is why we invest a considerable effort in strengthening national consciousness and cohesion by sounding a clear Zionist voice in the media, by promoting values of solidarity and resilience in the education system, and by working alongside decision makers. I believe in the people of Israel, and I am confident that the situation can be changed.”

הפוסט The IDSF Index 2022: The National Resilience Index הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In this paper we shall summarize the first part of the IDSF Index survey, which was conduced during Q2, 2022. It dealt with the factors Israel must take into consideration during a military conflict and also with the influence the political echelons have on the military echelon.

The survey was conducted by the Research Department, with the statistical support of Dr. Haggai Elkayam. The sample was conducted among 1,232 respondents – adult Internet users in Israel. For the integrated sample (1,232 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±2.79% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (1,032 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.05% with a 95% probability. For the Arabic survey (200 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.93% with a probability of 95%.

From Victory to Image: Factors in Military Combat

When conducting military battle, a variety of factors and goals come into play, sometimes conflicting with one another. These factors need to be prioritized. We began the survey by finding out which factors the Israeli public perceives as being the most important during a military conflict with a terrorist organization or with an enemy state.

The results are interesting: whereas the media and some of the policy makers voice opinions downplaying the possibility of a decisive military outcome in the battlefield while preferring a “Victory Image”, the Israeli public thinks otherwise. The factor which came out on top in the survey is – “decisive military outcome” with 70%. This is followed by minimal harm to the Israeli home-front (63%), a psychological accomplishment vis-à-vis the enemy (48%), the number of casualties among our forces (42%), safeguarding Israel’s image abroad (21%) and at the bottom of the list was minimal harm to the enemy home-front (17%).

Interestingly, there are differences in the way the Arabs and the Jews prioritized the factors. Whereas 78% of Jews believe a clear military battlefield victory is the most important factor in a military conflict, only 41% of the Arab respondents think so. Moreover, whereas only 12% of the Jewish respondents believe minimal harm to enemy non-combatants is a decisive factor to be taken into consideration during a conflict, no less than 34% of the Arab respondents believe so.

When segmenting the respondents ideologically, differences emerge within Israeli public regarding the factors perceived as being of the highest importance. Thus, for example, whereas the right believes the most important factor is achieving a decisive military outcome in the field (89%), followed by minimal harm to the Israeli home front (65%), the Israeli left had the reverse idea – minimal harm to the Israeli home front was first (72%), with a decisive military outcome in the field coming in second (58%).

One way or the other, a decisive military outcome in the field occupies a high place in the set of factors important to the overall Israeli public, far ahead of the other factors. In other words: the Israeli public wants to see a clear decisive outcome in the field when it comes to military conflict.

License to Kill: Limits and Ethics

What, actually, is a clear decisive outcome? This is an abstract concept. It is complicated to achieve, there might even be more than one way of accomplishing it and apparently the consensus is that aggressive measures have to be taken to achieve it.

One of these aggressive measures, which surfaces frequently on the public agenda, is the Open-Fire Regulations. Is the result of these regulations that our security forces are trigger-shy, or perhaps trigger-happy? In other words: should these regulations be revised such that soldiers and policemen will be less fearful of using their firearms to neutralize threats?

The survey shows that 72% of the public believes the open-fire regulations indeed should be revised. An interesting finding is that when segmenting by nationality, 81% of the Jews believe the regulations should be revised while only 35% of the Arabs think so. Furthermore, a political segmentation finds that 96% of the right-wing public, and 43% of the left-wing public believes the open-fire regulations should be revised such that soldiers and policemen will be less fearful of using live ammunition to neutralize threats.

Next we investigated an ethical issue which often comes up during military campaigns in Gaza: in case of security forces coming under fire from within a civilian target (school, hospital) – should the security forces neutralize the threat even at the cost of harming non-combatants? Despite the responses here being less unequivocal, the answer is clear: 65% of the public says yes and 26% says no (9% are neutral). Here too, the ideological divide indicates significant differences over this issue: 87% of right-wingers believe such fire must be neutralized even at the cost of harming non-combatants, whereas among the left the figure is 44%.

Left, Right, Left: Military perspectives through the political lens

The IDF, which is the military echelon in the State of Israel, reports directly to the political echelon. This being said, it is no secret there is a two-way relationship between them, where one influences the other. Thus for example, 14 of the 22 Chiefs of Staff became involved in politics following their discharge. Some of them were members of the security cabinet, some were Ministers of Defense and some even became Prime Ministers. This interplay between the echelons has pervaded all of Israel’s wars ever since the War of Independence. In this review we sought to find out the Israeli public’s opinion regarding the extent to which the political echelon influences the degree of the IDF’s battlefield success.

The answers show that 72% believe the political echelon is extremely influential when it comes to the IDF’s measure of battlefield success. 14% believe the influence is medium and only 9% believe it is low (5% responded “Don’t know”).

Profound differences emerge when segmenting by nationality: 78% of the Jews believe the influence is high while only 12% of the Arabs thought so. The findings go on to indicate that 13% of the Jews believe the influence is medium compared with 4% believing it is low. In contrast, 47% of the Arabs believe the influence is medium and 18% believe it is low (the rest responded “Don’t Know”).

In any case, the conclusion is clear: the vast majority of Israeli public believes the political echelon has a decisive influence on the IDF’s battlefield successes.

How much influence does an Arab party have on the security forces’ capabilities?

Last year, for the first time in Israel’s history, an Arabic party (RAAM) joined a governing coalition. You can read about the effects of RAAM’s presence in the coalition here. One way or the other, if indeed the political echelon is highly influential when it comes to the military’s battlefield success as shown in the data, it would be interesting to find out whether the presence of an Arabic party in the government or in the coalition has an impact on the security forces’ ability to achieve their goals.

51% of the Israeli public believe so, 30% believe not, and only 7% believe that an Arabic party’s presence in the government or in the coalition strengthens the security forces’ ability to achieve their goals (12% responded that they “Don’t Know”).

Ideologically, there are drastic differences between right-wing respondents and left-wing respondents. Whereas 88% on the right believe an Arabic party in the coalition has a detrimental effect on the security forces’ ability to function in a military conflict, only 12% on the left thought so. Moreover, among right-wingers, only 7% believe an Arabic party has no effect on the security forces’ capabilities and only 1% believes an Arabic party actually strengthens them. In the left-wing camp, though, 63% believe an Arabic party has no effect on the security forces’ capabilities while 13% believe such a party actually strengthens the security forces’ capabilities.

The People’s Signal to Their Leaders: In Military Conflicts, a Decisive Victory is Essential

The findings above, following analysis, clearly indicate that the Israeli public finds it important that in a military conflict, the State of Israel must emerge with a clear decisive outcome on the battlefield. The public allows the IDF the space to operate, including harming non-combatants, when fired upon from within a civilian target. Regarding the Open-Fire Regulations, too, a majority of the public is in favor of minimizing our armed forces’ hesitancy when it comes to using their firearms against threats.

The data also show that in the State of Israel, the political echelon has considerable influence over the military echelon. This being so, the identity of whoever will be piecing together the coalition must be considered and decided with the utmost care, since when push comes to shove, outside interests might be involved in the decision-making processes which are intended to protect and safeguard Israel’s security, hampering the ability of the security forces to achieve a decisive outcome.

הפוסט “IDSF Index” 2022: And This Time – IDF, the Political Echelon and their Interplay הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the third and final part of the summary of the IDSF Index survey, we will present the half glass that is full, which is the faith in the righteousness of our path. In the previous parts, we analyzed the answers to the survey with an overall view that included the entire Israeli public (both Jews and Arabs). In the part before you, we will focus upon the Jewish public.

The survey was conducted by our Research Department, with the statistical support of Dr. Haggai Elkayam. The sample was taken from 1,068 respondents among the adult population in Israel that uses the Internet. For the Jewish sample (808 respondents) the sample’s maximum margin for error is ±3.45% with a probability of 95%.

Religion, History and Law: This is My Home, I was Born Here

The fact that most of the Arab sector believes that the Jewish people has no right to a sovereign state in the Land of Israel reflects well known trends that have existed for some time, although the scope had managed to surprise us. But where does the Jewish public stand with regards to faith in the Jewish people’s right to a sovereign state in the Land of Israel?

In a manner that crosses political sectors, genders and religious beliefs we believe in the righteousness of our path. 91% of the Jewish public believes that the Jewish people has a historic right to a sovereign state in the Land of Israel and 90% of the Jewish public believes that the Jewish people has a legal-international right to a Jewish state in the Land of Israel; 72% of the public believes that the Jewish people has a religious right to a sovereign state in the Land of Israel.

Nor did we stop there; rather we asked if the Jewish people’s right to a Jewish and democratic state in the Land of Israel supersedes the rights of other peoples, and even here we received an overwhelming response: 79% of the public believes that the Jewish people’s right to a sovereign state does indeed supersede the rights of other peoples. What is the place of such a state? Here too there is no dispute: 90% of the Jewish public believes that the State of Israel must reside specifically in the Land of Israel.

The data is encouraging. IA significant majority of the Jewish public, whether it belongs to the right wing or the left wing, believes that we need to be here. The justifications might be diverse and might come from differing perspectives, but the conclusion is clear: the place of the Jewish people is in the Land of Israel, in a sovereign, Jewish and democratic state.

The IDSF Index: If necessary, we will go out to protect our home

At the end of February 2022, the war between Russia and Ukraine broke out, with the invasion of Russian forces into Ukraine that invaded it from the north, east and south. Stories and testimonials coming from Eastern Europe describe Ukrainian citizens who were willing, sometimes quite literally, to grab a weapon and go out into the streets to fight against the Russian forces and protect their home.

It is somewhat difficult to avoid thinking about the question what would happen in such a situation in Israel. We therefore asked the public what they would do in the event a hostile state were to invade Israel, much like the situation in Ukraine. It turns out that faith in the righteousness of our path is not only theoretical: 86% of the Jewish public would join the war effort in any way possible in order to defend the state of Israel.

This figure correlates with the fact that 74% of the Jewish public believes that a National Guard should be established in Israel, and that 54% is willing to enlist in it in practice. This figure had greatly encouraged us when we began to operate in the field to establish a National Guard comprised of volunteers from the IDSF Movement, reservists and Magav soldiers. The results of the survey reflected the reality in the field: The response in the field was high, with thousands of volunteers having already contacted us with a request to be part of the National Guard.

But it is Not Enough: The desire to strengthen the national ethos

Brigadier General (Res.) Amir Avivi, the CEO and Founder of the IDSF, said it best: “Without a national ethos, that permeates throughout the general public, no army can prevail. An airplane, submarine or division of tanks cannot compensate for the absence of righteousness of the path, the absence of a national vision and the absence of national aspirations”.

So yes, the data does indicate that there is faith in the righteousness of our path, there is faith that the Jewish people’s national home must reside in the land of Israel and there is a great deal of willingness on the part of significant portions of the Jewish public to actively defend their home on a crucial day. But is this enough or is there more to be done?

It turns out that the Jewish public is thirsty for more. More Zionism, more national ethos and more substantiation of the righteousness of the path: 77% of the entire Jewish public believes that the Israeli educational system should integrate more lessons dealing with Zionism. Even in this area we are operating in the field, in lectures that we conduct in various educational institutions throughout Israel, and in the curriculum we have constructed for high schools: “Limits of Consent”.

We may summarize and say that the data before you raise a picture that can encourage us and ignite a spark of hope: while there is quite a lot of background noise from various directions, the foundation we are standing up on is firm and strong. This foundation is important, perhaps even the most important part, in order to withstand the currents that crash upon us from these or other external sources.

The following survey in “the IDSF Index” is already under way, and it deals with the issue of the national-social resilience of the Israeli public, both in terms of our forces on the front and in terms of the preparation of the home front.

Brigadier General (Res.) Amir Avivi: “We have a smart people who know what is right“

The CEO and founder of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, Brigadier General (Res.) Amir Avivi, summarizes the findings of the third part of the index as follows: “We have a smart people, with good senses, who are confident in the rightness of the way, and know how to read reality as it is. The data that emerges from the survey shows exactly that. At the same time, the data indicate that the Israeli education system does not deal sufficiently with the Zionist ethos, and the people demand more from it. The IDSF lends a hand in this area of education as well, with hundreds of lectures in the formal and informal education systems, and with a dedicated program for high schools, “Limits of Consent”, behind which stands Col. (Res.) Itzik Ronen.”

הפוסט The IDSF Index 2022: And Now – Faith in the Righteousness of our Path הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey was conducted by our Research Department, with the statistical support of Dr. Haggai Elkayam. The sample was taken from 1,068 respondents among the adult population in Israel that uses the Internet. For the Jewish sample (808 respondents) the sample’s maximum margin for error is ±3.45% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (260 respondents) the sample’s maximum margin for error is ±6.80% with a probability of 95%.

Lack of Governance: we are not on the map and the personal security is impaired

The words “lack of governance” are bandied about on social media and emerge more than once in the media in various contexts. Israeli citizens have suffered from instances of demands for protection money in the South and the north, Jews are attacked in Jerusalem at the points of friction between Jewish society and Arab society, illegal construction in the Arab sector continues unabated, and we all remember the events of May of last year in the mixed cities during Operation Guardian of the Walls.

To place the issue of governance at the center of the public discourse and at the top of the policy makers’ priorities, we decided to discover regularly what was the “governance index” throughout Israel, and to track the changes thereof every quarter.

We checked with Jews in the Israeli public how much they believed the State of Israel was asserting its sovereignty in various locations throughout the state on a scale of 1-7 and calculated the degree of governance in each region according to those who marked a degree of governance of 5-7.

The emerging picture is ugly. As you can see, the governance index is between 9% at worst and 46% at best. Thus, for instance, the sense of governance in the area of the Negev and East Jerusalem stands at only 9%. In other words: only one in ten of the respondents feel that Israel is asserting its sovereignty in these regions. The sense of governance in Judea and Samaria as well as in mixed cities such as Lod, Acre and Jaffa is not much higher: 19% and 21% respectively. Similarly, the sense of governance in the Galilee stands at 22%. The highest figure is also the most worrisome: the sense of governance is only 46% in the western part of Israel’s capital, Jerusalem.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the public’s faith in the police, the entity responsible for enforcing the law and maintaining public order, is quite low: 73% of the Israeli public attest that their faith in the Israeli Police is low, while only 18% have great faith in it (9% are neutral).

The general sense of a distinct lack of governance and a low faith in the police Directly reflects upon the sense of personal security of Israel’s citizens. In accordance with the findings of the survey, only 36% of the entire Israeli public feels personally secure.

As we can see, Israeli citizens believe that there are things that can be done to improve the situation, and that we will continue to have our finger on the pulse concerning the sense of governance and personal security in the next surveys as well.

The crime in the South: who’s protecting the residents?

As stated, only 9% of the Jewish respondents believe that the State of Israel is asserting its sovereignty in the Negev. If results are weighted together with the responses of Israeli Arabs , the situation does not improve much and stands only at 15%.

We decided to delve into an issue that became headline news about a year ago, when Aryeh Schiff, fired at felons from the Bedouin diaspora near his home when they attempted to steal his car. One of the felons later died of his injuries and a public debate broke out around the question of whether Schiff acted appropriately or should be put on trial for his actions.

We first sought to discover whether the Israeli public believed that the police is successfully contending with crime in southern Israel. A rather grim picture emerged from the data: 89% of the public believes that the Israeli police is unable to contend with crime in the south. Afterwards we sought to discover whether the Israeli public believes a citizen should be put on trial for defending his property with a firearm. 70% believe that this should not be done, a figure that is unsurprising considering the public’s lack of faith in the police and its handling of the situation.

This might be one of the reasons that 34% of all the survey’s respondents considered getting a weapon license over the last year for self-defense purposes.

The citizens are called to the flag: A National Guard – an immediate need

The data is grim, but what interests us is what can be done to repair the situation. The obvious insight, which arose within our movement during the events of May, is the need for a National Guard – an entity that is comprised of citizens who care about Israel’s internal security, which would offer aid during disasters, provide a response for violent disturbances and the like. Such a model is not our invention, and it exists in various countries around the world, including the United States.

Does Israeli society agree with this need? Turns out it certainly does. 75% of Jewish respondents believe that a National Guard should be established in Israel, as well as 44% of the Arab respondents. However, we know that there is a difference between a desire of the public to establish an entity such as a National Guard and an actual willingness to enlist to it. Therefore, our next question was whether the Israeli public was willing to enlist to it in practice: the survey indicated that over half of the Jewish public (54%) was willing to enlist in a National Guard, which is impressive and encouraging.

This figure encouraged us to actively assist in the establishment of the National Guard, and we have recently launched an initiative, in conjunction with Magav, to establish a National Guard comprised of volunteers of the IDSF Movement, reservists and Magav soldiers. The response in the field was highly positive, exactly as predicted by the survey, with thousands of volunteers contacting us with a request to be part of the National Guard.

Measures to Disperse Demonstrations: Which and how powerful?

The establishment of an entity that would ensure order and intrastate security is merely the first step on the path to achieving the goals of quiet and a sense of personal security for citizens of Israel. On the way there, we must give thought on how that entity would operate in the event of disturbances.

Most of the Israeli public is unwilling to accept violent disturbances: 80% of the Jewish respondents believe that violent, nationalistically motivated disturbances should be dealt with harshly, as do 74% of the Arab respondents.

Since the State of Israel is a Jewish and democratic state, even in the event of particularly violent disturbances, civil right must obviously be maintained and infringed upon to the absolute minimum, whether this is a physical infringement or the curtailments of rights.

Since the necessary balance between handling violent disturbances and civil rights is ultimately a matter of proportions, we examined what the public believes are actions that can be legitimately taken in the event of disturbances in which Israeli Arabs are involved. The gap between the Jews and the Arabs was much more significant in this question, and we will present the answers provided by the Jewish respondents to the survey below.

Use of measures for dispersing protestors received the most responses with 72%. This was followed by revocation of citizenship (70%), use of firearms (67%) and a similar percentage for harsher sentencing and fines, restraining orders for riot leaders (64%), municipal / local curfews (56%), the same percentage for a military seizure of territories (56%) and, finally, 49% of the public believes that administrative detentions are legitimate in the event of disturbances in which some Israeli Arabs are involved.

The data indicates that the Jewish public is tired of disturbances perpetrated by some Israeli Arabs and wishes to see the state restore its sovereignty in the locales where violent disturbances break out.

“Lack of governance is a real strategic threat”

“There is an inconceivable gap between the military, economic and technological power of the State of Israel and the power it projects outwards on the one hand, and the anarchy and lack of governance the state is experiencing internally on the other. It is similar to an apple that is shiny on the outside and rotting on the inside”, as Brigadier General (Res.) Amir Avivi, the founder of the IDSF Movement, describes his feelings regarding the findings of the survey.

“Israel is contending with a Palestinian Arab campaign that challenges its sovereignty and governance throughout the state, while illegally seizing control of lands at an increasing rate and with the financial support of the European Union, while using the same principles and methods initially employed by Zionism. Alongside this, there is a general campaign to undermine the personal security of Jews everywhere and infringe upon their basic right to a nation state. Against this comprehensive campaign, Israel is practically helpless”, he specifies and summarizes: “The status quo cannot continue. It is time for a resolute and comprehensive initiative that will return the Zionist train back on track by establishing settlements, seizing control of the open spaces, Judaizing the Negev and the Galilee and engaging in Kibbutz Galuyot (Gathering of Israel)”.

הפוסט The IDSF Index: And Now – The Lack of Governance and Sense of Personal Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey, which was conducted in the first quarter of 2022, dealt with a variety of security issues, and we will summarize the first part in this article, which dealt with concepts concerning Arab-Israelis on security issues and the Jewish people’s right to a sovereign state in Israel.

The survey was conducted by our Research Department, with the statistical support of Dr. Haggai Elkayam. The sample was taken from 1,068 respondents among the adult population in Israel that uses the Internet. For the Jewish sample (808 respondents) the sample’s maximum margin for error is ±3.45% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (260 respondents) the sample’s maximum margin for error is ±6.80% with a probability of 95%.

Not Historically, Not Religiously, Not Legally: We Have No Right to Exist Here

The first and most basic issue we examined was what Israelis thought of the source of our right to a Jewish sovereign state in Israel.

The Jewish majority in the State of Israel (79%) believes that the Jewish people have a basic right to a Jewish and democratic state in the Land of Israel, which supersedes the rights of other nations. In addition, an overwhelming majority (91%) believes that the Jewish people have a historical right to a sovereign state in the Land of Israel. 72% believe that the Jewish people have a religious right to a sovereign state in the Land of Israel while 90% believe that the Jewish people have a legal-international right to a Jewish state in the Land of Israel.

The picture that emerges among Arab-Israelis is completely different, which is worrisome. No matter what angle we used to ask this question, we received the same disturbing answer: most Israeli-Arabs believe that the Jewish state has no right to exist in the Land of Israel. Most Israeli-Arabs do not agree with statements over our right to a Jewish state in Israel: not historically, not religiously and not legally.

These figures should be very worrisome, both to the Jewish majority and to the Arab minority that does believe in the Jewish people’s right to exist in the Land of Israel. These figures should be a warning sign to the decision makers with regards to internal security, and particularly with regards to a situation in which an assault from without is combined with violent protests of Israeli Arabs from within. Without sovereignty and governance, which need to be expressed in the rapid imposition of order when violent riots break out, Israel’s security shall be significantly impaired. What are the measures that can be implemented in order to restore order, in the opinion of the Israeli public? We also asked this question and will elaborate upon it in the next article in the series.

Violent rioting of Israeli-Arabs: An economic or nationalistic background? The answer is conclusive

Another issue that was examined in this survey is what sends some Israeli-Arabs into the streets in armed demonstrations, calls for violence against Jews, carrying out deadly terrorist attacks in Jewish cities and violent riots in mixed cities as we witnessed in May of the previous year.

One claim that has received a great deal of traction in the media is that the background for it is socioeconomic discrimination and not the nationalist-religious issue. Our Research Department examined this in the field, and the figures that emerge from the survey  are unambiguous: the background for the riots is nationalist and religious.

An overwhelming majority (79%) of the Israeli population believes that the reasons for the riots is the nationalist background or identification with the Palestinian struggle over the Temple Mount, and that only 12% believe the reason to have a socioeconomic background (9% responded “I don’t know”). When the answers are segmented according to Jewish and Arab respondents, we discovered that only 8% of the Jews believed that the background for the riots was socio economic, but that even among Arab-Israelis the answer was unambiguous: only 22% believe that the background is socioeconomic.

What happens in a war between Israel and its enemies?

The third issue we chose to clarify is an issue that is not asked in other surveys, and which directly focuses upon the practical aspect: What happens in a war of survival between Israel and one or more of the Arab countries – who will the Israeli-Arabs support?

The answer should engender a great deal of concern: only 9% of the total population in Israel believe that most Israeli-Arabs will support the State of Israel. When segmenting according to Jewish and Arab respondents, we discovered that only 4% of the Jews in Israel believe that most Israeli-Arabs will support the State of Israel during a war of survival, and only 26% of the Arabs believe that most Israeli Arabs will support the state of Israel during a war of survival. This is the reality, and we should recognize it.

Another angle we examined, concerning a future war that would jeopardize the existence of Israel, is how the citizens would react to a threat. When Russia invaded Ukraine at the end of February 2022, many Ukrainian citizens were rallied to the flag and fought for their land against the power from the east. Would Israel citizens mobilize for the war effort in every way possible when an enemy nation invaded Israel? Here, the data is encouraging: 86% of the Jews responded in the affirmative.

Brigadier General Amir Avivi: ” on the one hand it’s surprising, on the other hand it was already known”

Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, Director-General and Founder of the IDSF, addressed the survey and its findings in various media outlets, and now summarizes his feelings: “The IDSF is building a long-term index that pertains to aspects related to governance, internal security and personal security. The findings of the survey are on the one hand surprising in their severity and on the other hand reflects emerging trends that we have known about for some time.”

Regarding the figure according to which 75% of Israeli-Arabs do not recognize the Jews’ right to a sovereign state in the Land of Israel, Avivi indicated that “This figure is consistent with the voting patterns of the Arab population, which votes for Islamist nationalist parties that declare that they do not recognize the Jewish state, but rather seek to create a country of all its citizens.”

Regarding the worrisome figure of the Arab-Israelis’ very low support during a war of survival, Avivi said: “the figures reflect processes that have been occurring in the Palestinian society: on one end of the spectrum there are Israelis-Arab who have integrated into society, on the other end there are activists prepared to act against the state and in between there is the majority that is ‘sitting on the fence’, and will decide who they will support in accordance with their estimation of the power of the state and its capabilities. For this exact reason, the strength and deterrent power of the State of Israel are of the greatest significance.”

We may summarize and say that all the data of the IDSF Index survey point to an unambiguous conclusion: We are burying our head in the sand, which is dangerous. The IDSF is acting to change the security concept of Israel to one that recognizes reality, is current and ensures that the State of Israel is prepared to defend itself on its own, both internally and externally, so that it can remain a Jewish and democratic state for generations to come. This includes the IDSF’s current work to establish a National Guard and to assist in recruiting these volunteers.

הפוסט “The IDSF Index” 2022: This Time Around – War Over Our Home, From Home הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.