Amid one of the most dramatic years for Israel’s security and future since its founding, the country’s third Security Conference convened under the banner “The Year of Opportunity.” The main message was clear: this is no time for hesitation – but a time for action.

The conference, organized annually by the IDSF movement, featured prominent figures from Israel’s political and defense leadership. Among the speakers were Minister of Economy and Industry Nir Barkat, Minister of Education Yoav Kisch, Gilad Erdan (Israel’s former Ambassador to the UN and the US), and David Friedman (former US Ambassador to Israel). President Isaac Herzog, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar, and Defense Minister Israel Katz addressed the conference via recorded messages.

True to the broad approach that characterizes the IDSF movement’s work since its establishment, the conference focused on Israel’s national security in the broadest sense. A significant portion of the event was devoted to ways to bolster national resilience, social cohesion, and education toward Zionist values, recognizing these as the foundation on which the nation’s military and diplomatic strength is built.

In addition to lectures and interviews, the conference offered three panel discussions addressing the main opportunities facing Israel at present:

• A diplomatic opportunity panel on “the day after Gaza,” alongside considerations regarding Judea and Samaria.

• A regional opportunity panel dealing with the Trump administration’s policies, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East.

• A social opportunity panel asking how best to seize the potential for victory through settlement efforts and by revitalizing the Gaza border region and Israel’s north.

Participants on these panels included former senior security officials who are also members of IDSF, leading academic researchers and think-tank directors, high-ranking government and local authority officials, social entrepreneurs, and civic activists.

President Herzog: “We Must Emerge from the War Stronger”

President Isaac “Buzi” Herzog welcomed conference attendees, stating:

“We are in a critical period that calls for in-depth rethinking of the security frameworks we have relied upon and the security paradigms that we urgently need to adopt. As part of that, we must also delve into the current state of our society and nation and figure out how to emerge from this war stronger – not only in terms of security and diplomacy, but above all as a stronger Israeli society.”

Herzog also stressed the importance of turning the war imposed on Israel into an “opportunity not only to decisively repel threats posed by Iran and its proxies, but also to develop alliances and agreements across the region – particularly moving toward normalization with Saudi Arabia and extending relationships as far as India – thus reshaping realities for generations to come, integrating us further into the region. Not naively or blindly, but as a cornerstone of fortifying our security.”

He then praised IDSF’s contribution to public dialogue: “We do need not agree on everything – and indeed, I do not always agree with all positions – but I believe it is crucial to have a voice that acknowledges and speaks to Israel’s diversity. And unlike many in the TV studios, that voice is presented with statesmanship and respect, seeking to speak, to engage in discussion, to unite rather than to polarize.”

Defense Minister: “We Will Keep Striking Hard Anyone Who Threatens Us”

Defense Minister Israel Katz summed up a year and a half of sustained fighting on multiple fronts: “There is no doubt our adversaries now receive a loud and clear message: whoever raises a hand against Israel will have that hand cut off.”

Katz reiterated that the IDF and the Israeli defense establishment have inflicted substantial damage on Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian “axis of evil,” thereby undermining Assad’s regime in Syria. He added that they would also deal a decisive blow to the Houthi terror organization in Yemen, “just as we have done in Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and other arenas.”

Katz informed the audience that the defense establishment is currently creating a directorate responsible for facilitating voluntary emigration for Gaza residents who wish to leave, in line with the vision of President Trump. Katz concluded his remarks by expressing appreciation for the IDSF movement.

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, Chair of the IDSF movement, began his talk with a forceful statement: “We are living in a historic, almost biblical era of immense opportunities. Let’s start talking about a vision for the day after the war, and make the most of these wartime opportunities to create a better future for Israel.”

He argued that in the coming months, Israel has an opportunity to secure a clear victory on all fronts – bringing down Hamas’ regime in Gaza, recovering the hostages, and striking a decisive blow (in tandem with the United States) against Iran’s nuclear program.

Avivi also warned about the growth of a radical Sunni axis – Turkey, Qatar, and ISIS – amid Iran’s potential weakening. He believes the solution lies in forming an American–Israeli–Sunni front that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, and other countries. “We want to see Russia and China drawn closer to the West and to us – not to Iran’s side.”

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila: From Collapse to Growth

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila, CEO of IDSF, opened his remarks by quoting from “In the City of Slaughter,” a poem by Haim Nahman Bialik depicting the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, and drawing parallels to the massacre on October 7.

He noted the crucial difference between the two tragedies was our collective reaction:

“We are no longer the same Jews, no longer a persecuted people hiding behind barrels of oil. We are a people who enlist in an army, who band together, who overcome adversity and gather the strength to fight for our land. We are a people who go to battle to bring back our hostages, and we are also sovereign in our land – free to decide to pay a price for their liberation. Yes, friends, we face problems – but these are the problems of a nation within its homeland. They are the trials and hardships of a growing, developing people – one that argues, but ultimately prevails.”

Or Yissachar: “Israelis no longer chase illusions of a quick fix – they demand action”

Or Yissachar, Deputy Director for Research and Content at IDSF, presented the “IDSF Index” for the first quarter of 2025. The survey explored what the public sees as the top priorities for the nation, comparing the results to a similar poll carried out by the movement’s research department in 2022.

The findings reveal that 51% of Israelis view the Iranian threat as the most urgent challenge today – a sharp increase from 35% in 2022. Only 10% of Jewish Israelis consider peace with the Palestinians feasible, with 80% of Israel’s Jewish population and 68% of the general public opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital. On the other hand, a significant majority – 78% – favor expanding the Abraham Accords and bolstering ties between Israel and other moderate states in the region.

“These numbers,” Yissachar concluded, “reflect not just a shift in public opinion but also a deeper change in mindset: Israelis are no longer chasing illusions of easy solutions – they want action, stability, strength, and security.”

Merav Leshem Gonen: “National resilience is built when it is allowed to hear other opinions”

The conference included panel discussions, lectures, and one-on-one interviews covering a range of topics, with emphasis on the security, diplomatic, and social opportunities that Israel can pursue in the wake of the devastating events of October 7.

Particularly emotional moments came when Merav Leshem Gonen, mother of Romi Gonen – released after 471 days in Hamas captivity – took the stage, alongside entrepreneur and media professional Orit Mark Ettinger, who lost many family members to terror attacks and in the current war over the years, yet in her grief never abandoned hope and faith.

The participants’ personal accounts and expert commentary merged into an overarching vision resting on one core insight: this is the historic moment in which Israel can solidify its position as a regional and global power, deepen its national resilience, and carve from the shock and turmoil of war not only new strength – but genuine hope.

A “Year of Opportunity”: “The nation of Israel needs a rebirth narrative”

Israel’s Third Security Conference differed from its predecessors. The first conference, held several months before October 7, spotlighted IDSF’s clear warning that multiple fronts – stretching from Gaza to Iran – were coalescing against Israel. The second conference took place under the shadow of the war that followed, triggered in part by ignoring IDSF’s alerts about the approaching conflict. The current conference has begun to glimpse rays of light and hope at the end of war.

“It’s no coincidence that we titled this conference ‘The Year of Opportunity.’ Yes, we took severe hits on October 7, and the war continues more than a year and a half later. But we can also see achievements,” noted Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi at the conference’s conclusion. “I keep saying we stand at a historic juncture – ranging from fully dismantling the Iranian threat, through broad regional peace agreements, to the prosperity that lies ahead once Israel takes firm hold of itself. The scale of these opportunities is still hard for us to fathom.”

The conference closed with the singing of Hatikvah – “The Hope”, Israel’s anthem – which perfectly captured the spirit of the event: a profound belief that soon we will see the hostages return home, and that Israeli society will reunite around a shared vision that will propel it into a new and brighter future.

Photo credits: Omri Abuhatzira, Channel 14

הפוסט From Crisis to Opportunity: Israel’s Third Security Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On Saturday morning, October 7, the last day of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot when thousands of terrorists breached the parameter fence around the Gaza Strip and broke into the Gaza envelope communities – they encountered probably the last thing they expected – police men and women of the Israel Police. These police officers, whose daily jobs encompass traffic enforcement, investigations of criminal activity, and handling civilian complaints, found themselves unexpectedly at the forefront of a war against terrorists, armed only with their personal side arms, risking their lives to stem a massive flow of terrorist armed to the teeth with automatic rifles, hand grenades and RPGs.

“Policemen and policewomen alike – ran into the fire without hesitation, risked their lives fighting the terrorists and contained their advance towards additional communities in the area”, says retired Sub-Superintendent Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Uri Engelhard, member of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “Police officers, who are not so young anymore and hardly participate in firearm and physical training, demonstrated unbelievable courage under fire. At their side, the brave fighters of the Special Operations Units, the Special Undercover Unit, the Special Patrol Unit and the Border Police – all who ran headfirst to the fighting in all arenas. The police leadership commanded in an effective level-headed manner, delegated command to fighters in the field and led by example and with remarkable determination”.

However, it is exactly those inspiring moments, when the Israel Police spearheaded the battle against the thousands of terrorists, that brings into the limelight the paradox with which the organization has to contend these days: it is the last organization that can be the target of accusations regarding the systemic failure that led to the October 7 massacre, yet it has to contend with difficult and complex issues of national security that far exceed the accepted scope of police work – this without the required tools and resources. This is a state of affairs that Engelhard, who has a rich past in Israel’s national security establishment as well as with international high-tech companies – seeks to change.

High-Tech, law and this week’s Torah portion

As one who had a prolific career in the high-tech industry, served in the IDF operational technology units, and headed successful technology firms – Engelhard’s decision to join the police force at the height of the second Intifada raised quite a few eyebrows.

“I felt it was a mission of a Zionism”, he explains. “I saw that the Police not only suffered from a severe shortage of officers and personnel, but also from poor communications systems, insufficient computer systems and the lack of advanced technologies – all this in a time when Israel was under a horrible deluge of terror attacks, which claimed a large number of victims and sewed fear in the hearts of Israel’s civilians”.

Thus, Engelhard chose to leave a promising and lucrative career behind and step up to the flag to lead a technological revolution in the Israel Police. He established the technology administration in the Police, now a technology division, which he currently heads. Through this division, Engelhard unified all of the Police’s technology activity, that was decentralized and suffered from a lack of a central coordinating body, and marched the entire organization into the 21st century. This was done by successfully implementing over one hundred large and complex simultaneous technology projects, Maj. Gen. Yitzhak (Khaki) Harel, Head of the IDF ICT Directorate, referred to this overhaul in the Israel Police in 2003: “Take for example the technological revolution in the Israel Police – this is something of which I could only dream”.

I’ve rejected out of hand more than a few very attractive offers from leading companies to be part of the sale of amazing proprietary technologies we’ve developed at the Police to foreign states

After retiring from the police, did you – like many former senior members of the defense establishment – capitalize on your expertise in security technologies abroad?

“Absolutely not. I’ve rejected out of hand more than a few very attractive offers from leading companies to be part – even passively – of the sale of amazing proprietary technologies we’ve developed at the Police to foreign states. I strongly opposed this, among other reasons, because these technologies make their way into the hands of Israel’s enemies and directly hurt Israel. Israel’s Department of Production and Procurement in the Defense Ministry must establish a new policy on this matter”.

Rather, Engelhard decided to seek his fortune elsewhere and pursued a life-long dream – to become an attorney and notary dealing in intergenerational transference, i.e. wills, estates and durable power of attorney. In stark contrast to his former positions, where he managed thousands of employees and budgets in the billions of shekels, here he can take a personal approach to help people, and deal with issues pertinent to their future. “I feel a sense of purpose with every case I conclude successfully”’ he says. Since the October 7 attack, he has been helping, among others, in dealing with the digital assets left behind by the casualties of the Gaza War.

In addition to serving on various boards of directors, Engelhard taught management and decision making at the Tel-Aviv University. His experience led him to write “The Secrets of Management in The Torah Weekly Portion”, which sought to fill a void in the area of management in the academia, which exclusively relies on foreign speakers, and shed light on management principles that can be found in the most ancient book the Jewish people gave the world – the bible.

The Jewish and Zionistic ideological motivation for Engelhard throughout his professional career propelled him to join the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “Through research, connections in the government, media and education, the Movement is able to contribute to the advancement of the Jewish nation’s liberty and sovereignty in its land, for generations to come”, he says. “Joining the Movement adds meaning to my life, as a partner – albeit one with a small role – to the strengthening of Israel’s national security”.

The complexity of the national security challenge

Engelhard’s rich and unique background, that spans the fields of management security, technology, law and Judaism, affords him a perspective that is multi-dimensional, fresh, and original, and allows him to offer out-of-the-box solutions, that are not restricted by the normative paradigms in the world of policing.

“National security is not measured only in the context of wars against other countries and terror”, he stresses. “It includes the security of the individual, economy and industry. The Police deals with criminal and security threats in tandem: from the war on accidents – which had caused Israel more casualties since its establishment than all its wars put together – through the rife agricultural crime that is threatening national security – to the elimination of organized crime, that costs billions in damages each year”.

The fact that Israel’s national security spans many varied areas and places immense responsibility on the shoulders of Israel Police that stretcher way beyond its capabilities and resources. The most prominent example is the war against the assassinations in the Arab society, which have ballooned into a national security threat for all intents and purposes.

“The Israel Police has excellent officers and commanders”, explains Engelhard, “who do their duty with a sense of purpose, for the people and the State of Israel. These police men and women labor around the clock without extra pay for their significant overtime, with thankless work, come sun or rain, while having to contend with harsh scenes. The force has people who’ve developed incredible technologies that have won international awards; however, the police force is way too small to deal with the magnitude of missions with which it is tasked. And at the end of the day, it is the Israel Police that has to contend with Israel’s systemic shortfalls; When the welfare system fails to do its job in helping the needy, when the Transportation Ministry’s Road maintenance is poor, when security forces fail to identify a terrorist – it all funnels down to the Israel Police, which finds itself out of its traditional policing depth”.

The solution: reenforcing the blue police and the border patrol

Engelhard proposes a list of practical solutions that could reinforce the Police and enable it to carry out its complex tasks to their fullest. “The key here is a bigger budget and human resources”, he asserts. “Any bill or massive development plan that lay extra work loads on the police must be conditioned on additional job placements and the additional budget their enforcement and execution demand”.

For the Israel Police to be able to respond to the growing challenges it is facing, says Engelhard, it needs young blood. For this end, he suggests a reform in the ranks of mandatory service police i.e. military recruits who are sent to serve in blue uniforms instead of the IDF.

What would you do to change the existing state of affairs, where mandatory service police comprises mainly recruits that the IDF is willing to transfer to Israel Police just to become dispatchers or patrol officers?

“The number of 18-year-old recruits in the police should be increased dramatically”, he explains. “The Police should be able to select its candidates, rather than being dependent on the recruits the IDF sends it, and allow new recruits to choose themselves whether they prefer to serve in the blue police, the border patrol – or even in the IDF. Quality mandatory police officers who serve in the police’s various units would markedly improve the operational performance of the Israel Police”.

In addition, Engelhard believes that Israel Police should reenforce itself with retired policemen and policewomen, who can greatly contribute to the organization with their knowledge, experience and soaring motivation.

“With that said”, Engelhard stresses, “a state of ongoing preparedness should be ensured for all members of the police force to face the enemy, ensuring that each policeman and policewoman be at a sufficient combat level. This requires more training, advanced equipment, and technological means and abilities currently only in the hands of the General Security Service, and better preparedness for emergency situations. The commanding spirit that should pervade all ranks of the police is that of integrity, professionalism, and commitment to the mission. This is the ethos that should be the guiding principle for the organization”.

The changes proposed by Engelhard are not aimed at the Israel Police alone. “The Israel Border Patrol needs a significant boost to its ranks, an upgrade of equipment and systems, and it must be present in every single spark point with the Arab population”, he claims. “The Border Patrol is the most professionally skilled force for security policing, and it should spearhead the effort to ensure ongoing security, thereby freeing the IDF’s other units to focus on their main purpose, which is to be prepared to respond to any attack and vanquish the enemy”.

From Reaction to Initiative

The plan presented by Engelhard for the reinforcement of the Israel Police and its ability to deal with criminal and security challenges is in fact part of a deep and comprehensive perceptional overhaul, that aims to take the Israel Police from an organization that is caught up in a race of trouble shooting to one that is charged with the long-term responsibility over the national security of Israel.

What should Israel do to ensure its ability to deal with threats on many fronts at the same time?

“Israel’s leadership must do what it takes to ensure the existence of a thriving nation in the Land of Israel for posterity and eliminate any emerging threat – from within and without the country, and not put on hold what must be done today just for the sake of an appearance of quiet”.

Among the steps that would affect this change, Engelhard mentions the formulation of a relevant national security strategy, based among others on a change of the response doctrine to initiative, and on the acknowledgement of the enemy’s proven capabilities and not on its posited intentions; the encouragement of social values like military enlistment and the ethos of “a nation which is a front”; and an educational and ideological reform that reenforces the commitment to the group over individualism and will instill the spiritual, Zionist and cultural values that unify us as a nation.

“Rather of espousing a diaspora Jewish attitude of appeasement, Israel must adopt a Zionist mentality – acting in a spirit of proud nationalism such that exercises Israel’s sovereignty”, says Engelhard. “Instead of always being reactive, Israel must initiate. This is the only way it can stronghold its national security for future generations and ensure that another October 7 can ever occur once more”.

הפוסט Israel Police – Last Line of Defense הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A mysterious stone circle believed to be the tomb of Og, King of the Giants; Hebrew warriors bravely confronting Roman legions and Syrian tanks; and some of the world’s oldest synagogues – these are part of the rich tapestry of the Golan Heights. This beautiful and historically significant region is far more than just a vital strategic asset.

Jewish settlement in the Golan has existed almost continuously since biblical times – spanning more than two millennia. Moses conquered it from Og, king of Bashan; the fighters of Gamla sacrificed their lives defending it against the Romans during the Great Revolt; and Avigdor Kahalani led a heroic tank battle crucial to Israel’s victory over Syria during the Yom Kippur War. The Golan is deeply woven into Jewish history, not merely a region of strategic and security value.

Here are some of the pivotal chapters in its story.

Kingdom of Israel and a Thriving Jewish Center

One of Israel’s most enigmatic sites lies in the Golan – Rujm el-Hiri (“Gilgal Refaim”), an enormous stone-circle structure from about 5,000 years ago, visible clearly only from the air. Although its purpose – perhaps a calendar or place of worship or burial – remains unclear, Jewish tradition identifies it as the tomb of the biblical giant Goliath or Og, king of Bashan.

Indeed, the Bible itself links Og, the last of the giants, to the Golan Heights. The Book of Numbers recounts how the Israelites, journeying to the Promised Land after the Exodus from Egypt, decisively defeated Og, his sons, and his people, subsequently allocating the land to the tribe of Manasseh. During the united kingdom of Israel, King Solomon appointed regional governors in the Golan, integrating it fully into his realm.

For centuries afterward, control of the Golan was fiercely contested. The Arameans controlled it for extended periods, their conflicts with Israel echoing in biblical narratives. Under King Ahab, Israelite forces decisively defeated the Arameans near the city of Aphek.

In Roman times, the Golan became a vibrant Jewish center, with numerous settlements and communities. Ancient synagogues uncovered at Gamla, Katzrin, Ein Nashut, and Ein Keshatot (Umm el-Kanatir) attest to a thriving Jewish life, prosperous economy, and flourishing culture.

Gamla: A Symbol of Heroism and Sacrifice

During the Great Revolt against Rome (66–73 CE), the city of Gamla, perched on a camel-shaped mountain ridge (hence its name), became a symbol of Jewish resilience and courage.

The Mishnah mentions Gamla as a fortified city dating to Joshua ben Nun’s time. Its strategic location, accessible only via a narrow path, led Josephus Flavius – then commander of Galilee during the revolt and later a noted historian – to fortify Gamla as a rebel stronghold in the Golan.

Besieged by Roman legions commanded by the future emperor Vespasian, Gamla resisted heroically despite shortages of food and water, thanks to its natural defenses and sturdy walls. Eventually, the Romans breached the walls, yet in a dramatic reversal, Jewish defenders pushed them back, inflicting heavy casualties. However, the Romans reorganized and, in a subsequent assault, ultimately overcame the city.

According to Josephus, about 5,000 inhabitants chose death by leaping from the cliffs rather than fall into Roman hands. Today, visitors can explore Gamla’s impressive ruins, site of one of Jewish history’s greatest stories of heroism. The ancient synagogue discovered there is among the world’s earliest, tangible evidence of a rich and enduring Jewish presence.

Six Days That Changed History

After Gamla’s fall, nearly two millennia passed before Jewish sovereignty returned. In 1948, Syria seized the Golan Heights, using it as a platform for aggression against Israel, regularly shelling communities in the Hula Valley and eastern Galilee.

In the 1967 Six-Day War, after years of Syrian provocations, the IDF launched a daring assault to reclaim the Golan. Syrian defenses – featuring fortified anti-tank and machine-gun positions amid steep terrain – posed immense challenges. Intense, fierce battles ensued; Golani Brigade famously stormed Tel Faher, among one of the war’s toughest confrontations. Simultaneously, armored divisions commanded by Generals Avraham Yoffe and Elad Peled penetrated Syrian defenses, rapidly advancing northward. On June 10, Quneitra fell, completing the Golan’s liberation.

Valley of Tears: The Battle That Saved Israel

The ultimate test came six years later, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. On October 6, Syria launched a massive surprise assault on the Golan, simultaneously with Egypt’s attack in Sinai – a moment of existential peril for Israel.

Facing the Syrian onslaught stood a tiny Israeli defense force – around 170 tanks against approximately 1,200–1,400 Syrian tanks. IDF units under Northern Command’s General Yitzhak Hofi endured relentless waves of Syrian armored forces. Lieutenant Colonel Avigdor Kahalani led a small tank battalion against vastly superior numbers, battling extreme conditions: poor visibility, exhaustion, ammunition shortages, and overwhelming enemy assaults.

Despite severe numerical inferiority, Israeli tank crews skillfully utilized terrain advantages and tactical maneuvers, destroying hundreds of enemy tanks. Understanding that failure meant existential threat, they fought to their last shells, ultimately halting the Syrian advance. After initial defense, the IDF launched a successful counteroffensive, pushing Syrian forces back nearly 40 kilometers from Damascus. The Valley of Tears battle remains an iconic testament to the Golan’s critical strategic value.

Sovereignty Affirmed: International Recognition

In 1981, Israel’s Knesset enacted the Golan Heights Law, applying Israeli sovereignty to the area, recognizing it not only as strategic asset but also as an integral to Israel’s heritage. In March 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a historic proclamation officially recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan – the first global power to do so. Acknowledging its strategic importance for Israel’s security and regional stability, the community of Ramat Trump was established in the Golan to honor his courageous support.

New Security Challenges After Assad’s Fall

Syria’s civil war, erupting in 2011, created new security challenges. Chaos allowed extremist groups, including ISIS and Iran-backed Hezbollah, to seek footholds near Israel’s border. Israel responded by providing humanitarian aid (“Operation Good Neighbor”) while executing military actions to prevent Iranian entrenchment and arms transfers to Hezbollah.

The fall of Assad’s regime in late 2024 renewed regional volatility, compelling Israel to intensify diplomatic and military activities to ensure border stability and thwart emerging threats.

Strategic and National Importance

Repeated battles underscore the Golan’s irreplaceable strategic significance – overlooking northern Israel, forming a natural defense barrier against Syria. Control of the Golan has consistently proven vital for safeguarding northern Israeli communities and national security, especially amid growing regional threats from Iran expansionism and other terror groups.

Thriving Israeli Settlement Today

Modern Israeli settlement began soon after 1967. Kibbutz Merom Golan was established first, followed by many communities, notably Katzrin. Since 1981, development accelerated. Today, about 53,000 residents live across 33 Israeli communities and four Druze villages (Majdal Shams, Buqata, Mas’ade, and Ein Qiniyye).

Under Israeli sovereignty, the Golan has blossomed agriculturally – producing renowned wines like Golan Heights Winery and Pelter Winery, international destinations for wine enthusiasts. Tourism thrives amid spectacular waterfalls, nature reserves, archaeological sites, and scenic trails.

A Mosaic of Nature, Heritage, and Security

The Golan transcends mere strategic value. Beyond breathtaking landscapes, celebrated wineries, and remarkable tourist attractions, it symbolizes Jewish courage, determination, and historic roots. History teaches unequivocally that Israel lacks the luxury of relinquishing the Golan – not merely due to its security and strategic importance, but primarily due to our profound historical connection since our nation’s earliest days.

As Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared in the Knesset in 1981 when the Golan was annexed: “No serious person in Israel could deny that the Golan Heights has always been an integral part of the Land of Israel.”

הפוסט The Golan: From the Roots of Jewish Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The current political echelon in Israel is perceived as trying to shirk its responsibility for the events of October 7th. There is a lot of truth in this. The “congratulations” that government officials bestowed upon the resigning IDF Chief of the General Staff, along the lines of “well done, we salute him”, without mentioning in the same breath the great shame and humility that should encompass their every move during this period – are shameful. But the discussion around this issue is not on point.

There is a tendency to divide responsibility for the events of October 7, and also for what happened afterwards – the successes and failures – into military and political domains. But the truth is that the mutual influence the two ecehlons have on each other is too great to separate. The dichotomous separation is the real shirking of responsibility.

Who is responsible for the misconception?

There are too many causes to count for what led to the October 7th misconception. The intelligence responsibility of the Military Intelligence Directorate and the other intelligence agencies is clear and undisputed. But what caused this intelligence failure is the lack of a true critical culture. The responsibility of the IDF, and of the intelligence community in general, is to examine the veracity of their perceptions, which ultimately lead to the intelligence assessments that reach the political echelon. It’s enough to listen to Brigadier General (res.) Itay Baron, who was previously Head of the Research and Analysis Division at the Military Intelligence Directorate and who returned to the position after October 7, to understand that this is not the situation within the army: “If we have such information, and the information is of high quality, then it has greatly strengthened this culture of ‘we know because it’s impossible that we don’t'”^[1]. The professional assumption that it is possible to know and understand reality accurately, is what lies at the heart of the failure.

After the Yom Kippur War, the Audits Department, also known as Ipcha Mistabra (Aramaic for “The Devil’s Advocate”) was established at the Military Intelligence Directorate. This department’s role is to challenge the Military Intelligence Directorate and its concepts before they even reach the political echelon. But even this tool, and other tools such as red teams (teams whose job is to think through the enemy’s eyes), have proven ineffective in the face of a culture of arrogance, as evidenced by the IDF’s decision to expand the Audits Department and its authorities after the events of October 7 in light of its failure.

But intelligence responsibility does not stop with the IDF or other intelligence agencies. The political echelon has the responsibility to cast professional doubt on intelligence assessments. The political echelon has the authority and responsibility to demand additional expert opinions, and to place common sense into the mix of considerations. The professional echelons, on the other hand, have the responsibility to provide politicians with any information that may be relevant in order to enable them to make the right decisions, and they should present this information when it is processed from a professional aspect only and not from an ideological aspect.

Who is responsible for meeting the goals?

The political echelon must not only cast doubt on intelligence assessments, but also on everything that comes out of the military: strategic goals and plans of action to achieve these goals must also be put to the test. Statements made during this period by government ministers, accusing the army of trying to evade meeting clear goals, are nothing short of negligence. The political echelon has the duty to define clear goals according to which the military can plan its programs and mode of operation.

Let’s take, for example, the second goal of the Swords of Iron War, as defined by the political echelon: eliminating Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. It’s enough to read a little news to understand that this is not the situation in the Gaza Strip, even at a stage when a hostage deal is already taking place. The claim made by government members is that the military echelon fears control over the civilian population and is trying to avoid it, and as a result, Hamas is still the most powerful entity in Gaza. The failure of the uncontrolled humanitarian aid entering Gaza, and not taking the appropriate political steps to verify who is distributing the food in Gaza, are being blamed by the political echelon on the fact that “the army chiefs are not aggressive enough”, and are therefore demanding their resignation, hence their congratulations to the outgoing IDF Chief of the General Staff.

Who benefits from the current situation?

The truth is that it is the responsibility of the political echelon to audit the progress in achieving the goals it has set. And it has a host of other options to promote this, if the army does not succeed. So where is the gap?

1. In the current system structure, the political echelon does not have the professional tools to question what the military says. There is no civil body capable of giving the government alternative plans or additional intelligence assessments. Choosing from among different alternatives is a basic principle in proper decision-making processes, and it cannot exist in such a reality.
2. The definition of the term “national security” varies in its scope and content. Some include social domains due to the fact that they also indirectly affect national security, and some narrow the definition to purely security domains. But there is no denying that national security includes more than dealing with military threats. It is standard to view national security as also encompassing diplomatic, political, and economic issues, which have a direct and clear impact on national security. However, despite the complexity of the issue, the person considered to be the “national evaluator” is the Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, even though his considerations are limited to military ones. The monopoly of knowledge that exists in professional bodies pertaining to intelligence, planning, and more is not all that prevents the political echelon from casting doubt and choosing between alternatives, but also minimizes the engagement in national security to the military stratum alone. Even if political steps are taken, they are done so in isolation from military ones, and this is clearly evident in the current situation in the Gaza Strip, where the military actions have not provided leverage for significant political steps that would replace Hamas’ rule.
3. There is not enough synchronization between the various security and intelligence agencies. The structure of the Israeli defense establishment is complicated and dispersed. There are intelligence agencies in the IDF, the Israel Security Agency, and the Mossad. There are planning bodies in the Ministry of Defense and the IDF. There are research bodies in the IDF, the Foreign Ministry, and more. However, there is no effective body in Israel that will synchronize these bodies, and more importantly, there is no synchronization between the professional echelon and the political echelon that is responsible for making decisions. The person entrusted with this synchronization is the National Security Council, which has suffered from a lack of efficiency and real authority since its establishment. The separation in the day-to-day work between the profession and the decision-making has been the basis, for many years, for the deficiencies in the defense establishment’s work. Any cooperation is coincidental, circumstantial, and not the result of a well-oiled, efficient system.
4. There is an entire stratum, the one between the major goals set by the government (if any) and the military operational plans, which remains a void. The goals of the war, as they were defined, are somewhat amorphous. Cuasing the collapse of Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities is a major goal, the military aspect of which is only one step in achieving it. Although a decisive military victory is indeed a prerequisite for replacing the civil rule, history shows that even after a military defeat, a rapid move must be made to capture the sphere of civilian life without leaving a vacuum. This issue was not properly defined, and this vacuum left Hamas as the most powerful ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

   It is easy to attribute this failure to the raid method adopted by the IDF since March 2024, but this method stems from the lack of clarity of the war’s goals, of a lack of control over these goals, and of course of the absence of the political component of these goals. Without the political component, the military step can never achieve the ultimate goal.

5. Convenience. The disconnect between the echelons is convenient for everyone. It’s convenient for the government to have someone to blame, and it’s convenient for the army to set facts on the ground. The government can pride itself on setting goals for the war, even though they are partial, vague, and not enough efforts are made to achieve them. On the other hand, the army can take pride in military achievements, even if these correspond to its goals and not the goals set by the political echelon.

Convenience, in these situations, is the opposite of responsibility. The relationship between the military and political echelons has been structured in a crooked manner since the days of David Ben Gurion. The structure of the security system is inefficient, does not facilitate synchronization between bodies, grants a monopoly of knowledge and opinion to the professional ranks over policymakers, and above all, creates a culture of shirking responsibility. The IDF Chief of the General Staff and the Head of Southern Command did well to fulfill their responsibility, and the government would do well if at some point it also assumed its responsibility. However, responsibility is not a personal matter. Resignation is not the solution to the real problem, just as one or another appointment is not the solution. The real responsibility lies in leaving the defense establishment’s comfort zone, which is to dismantle the structure of the system and reassemble it.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

^[1] From an article in N12 – https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm “Former senior officialhttps://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm warns: “October 7 may happen to us again“

הפוסט So, who is responsible for national security? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The campaign for the eradication of the murderous Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip had placed the IDF in a humanitarian conundrum: on one hand, there are over a million displaced who are in need of aid and housing. On the other hand, Hamas pillaged the humanitarian aid and is fortifying itself in areas of dense population.

At present, Israel is facing a triple challenge: it is demanded to provide the population with humanitarian aid, but must do so without the unintended consequence of boosting Hamas in the Strip. Is there a way to ensure the population has a roof over its head without having to rehabilitate the stronghold of terror in the Strip? How can Israel install the future civil leadership that would replace Hamas and the Palestinian Authority?

The Humanitarian Islands Plan, authored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement research department, led by researchers Adv. Yifa Segal, Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid, and contributing researcher Mrs. Jennifer Thiel, provides an answer to all these questions, which could change the face of Gaza.

A dangerous problem – Hamas takes advantage of humanitarian aid

The humanitarian aid predicament is a direct result of the October 7 massacre, that had brought Israel to launch the war in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has instructed the civilian population to evacuate the areas of fighting to eliminate the risk of hurting innocents, and allow the army to conduct operational activities against terror infrastructures that Hamas operated from within these areas. As a result of this activity, large areas were left either razed to the ground or unfit for habitation. To date, there are over one million Gazans that are considered displaced after having evacuated the battle areas.

Naturally, these displace are in need of humanitarian aid. And indeed, since the outbreak of the war, large-scale aid has been continuously shipped into the Gaza Strip, totaling as of now some one million tons. However, the displaced also need proper housing as well.

With that said, there are two prominent obstacles for the supply of this aid and housing. The first is that Hamas pillages huge amounts of food and equipment that arrive into the Strip for its own survival, on the expense of the lives of its own people.  The other challenge is that the people cannot return to their homes and rehabilitate the pre-war centers of population because here too, Hamas – concerned solely with its own preservation at whatever cost – had established its terror network above and underground in these areas.

The question is: how may Israel help the displaced citizens of the Strip while refraining to indirectly aid the terrorists?

The humanitarian islands – no entrance for terrorism

In order to untangle this predicament, a solution is called for, such that will allow for the flow of aid to the citizens to prevent a full-fledged humanitarian crisis in the strip, while ensuring Hamas does not gain control over the population centers and the aid, and expediting its eradication.

The most effective manner of achieving the aforementioned is by the establishment of displaced cities only in the Strip’s open areas rather than in the populace centers controlled by Hamas. Each city would be under Israeli supervision, without access by UNRWA or Hamas. This can be instrumental in the eradication of the pernicious presence of these two organizations in the Strip. The authority to distribute the aid would be in the hands of a new body that would be established in the Gaza Strip – the Humanitarian Administration of the Gaza Strip.

The role of that body will be the close supervision over the distribution of aid and ensuring these cities are clean of Hamas – or any other organization – terrorist. The displaced cities and the aid they receive will be managed autonomously, with the involvement of local public and aid organizations, without Israeli intervention in their daily operation.

How does it work?

Each displaced city will collaborate with the General Humanitarian Coordination Administration. The Administration’s role will be to ensure that the IDF has cleared the area of underground and other terrorist infrastructures even before the establishment of the new cities, to supervise their construction and lists of eligible residents, to ensure they remain clean of Hamas members, and to coordinate the arrival of supplies.

Entry to cities will be possible only with biometric entry documents specific to each city, and through security checks and metal detectors, which will prevent terrorists or gangs from infiltrating the cities or bringing in weapons.

At the same time, the IDF’s perimeter security force in the area and a system of routes and crossings will enable Israel to dissect the Gaza Strip into separate units, and will increase Israel’s control over the Strip and its ability to prevent Hamas from regaining control of the territory.

The goal – creating an alternative government to Hamas

The proximity to the population and control over aid supply will make it easier for Israel to cultivate a positive and peace-oriented local leadership that will assume only civilian powers. This leadership will be an alternative to both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which has proved to be a weak, corrupt and terror-supporting body that must not rule Gaza again.

To ensure that the local administration does not undermine Israel, it will be given only civil and humanitarian powers – not political or policy-making authorities. Although the IDF will not have a role inside the cities, it will have the full freedom to operate within them when the need arises in order to cleanse them of terrorists and terrorist infrastructure.

The best solution – safe, efficient and cost-effective

The “Humanitarian Islands” program has distinct advantages over other solutions – it is based on a well-known international model of creating displaced persons cities, which has been successfully implemented many times over the years across the world, e.g. in Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as on the experience gathered from the creation of improvised displaced cities in the Gaza Strip today.

In light of the extensive and successful experience with similar initiatives, it is possible to implement the program already in an efficient and gradual manner. It is worthwhile to start by establishing displaced towns in the northern Gaza Strip, where Hamas has relatively little military and civilian control, and later to establish additional cities in other parts of the Strip.

Another significant advantage of this plan is that the cost will not fall on the Israeli taxpayer. As is already the case in Gaza today and in similar situations around the world, funding will come only from international sources and will be budgeted for the various aid agencies.

In contrast to military rule or any form of Israeli control, a temporary humanitarian administration, which will hold no political authority and is operated by the local population, will encourage cooperation and reduce resistance.

The bottom line: The Humanitarian Island Plan will allow Israel to isolate Hamas, deny it access to aid and population centers, and eradicate it as a governing force, while at the same time cultivating local representation in the cities as an alternative leadership for the day after the war. All of this makes its implementation a necessary condition for the Gaza War to end with a real and decisive victory for Israel over Hamas.

For the full study >>

הפוסט Aid Displace, Cripple Hamas: A Humanitarian Solution that Could Change the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

n the past years – and increasingly so during the Gaza War – Israel has been conducting targeted eliminations against arch-terrorists at the top of Hamas and Hezbollah. However, this is hardly a new modus operandi for Israe. 29 years ago, on January 5, 1996, Israel had staged one of its most iconic assassinations, in which it took out the arch-terrorists Yahya Abdul Latif Ayyash, a.k.a “The Engineer” or in Arabic “Al Muhandis”.

Ayyash was the chief architect at the time of the Hama’s first suicide bombings, and under his tutelage, the organization carried out dozens of deadly terror attacks that amounted in a total death count of some 100 Israeli civilians and the wounding of some 400. In the early 90s Ayyash was at the top of Israel’s most wanted list, and for a long time Israel’s security establishment tried to get its hands on him. It was only after long months of meticulous planning, and after a number of misses, that Israel was able to eliminate Ayyash in a daring operation the likes of which the country had never seen. The death of Al Muhandis became a longstanding symbol till this day – both for his followers and rivals.

The student who became an arch terrorist: Who is Yahya Ayyash?

Yahya Ayyash was born and raised in the township of Rafat, in western Samaria, and already at a young age found his way into the arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. As an adult, Ayyash enrolled in the Bir Zeit university, where he learned electric engineering.  As a student he was an active member of the university’s “Muslim Bloc” of student organizations.

In the early 90s, a short while after graduating, Ayyash became one of the founders of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam brigades (EQB) – the military wing of Hamas – then and today. Ayyash harnessed the knowledge he acquired at in engineering school to tailor improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for the organization’s terror attacks. By 1992, al Muhandis was already designing his first attacks in Israel. In 1993 he orchestrated Hamas’ debut suicide bombing at Mahula Junction in the Jordan Valley. Since that first attack and until his death, Ayyash churned out numerous deadly attacks, among them the car bomb in the northern city of Afula and the suicide bombing in the number 5 bus in Tel Aviv. He was actively involved in terror attacks, being not only the one who prepared the explosive devices – but actually attacked them to the bodies of the suicide bombers.

A long manhunt, one failed attempt, and stellar success: the road to the elimination of “The Engineer”

Israeli security forces understood pretty quickly that Yahya Ayyash is the name behind the Hamas’ deadly terror attacks, and he climbs to the top of Israel’s most wanted list. Over a long period of time, many attempts were made to capture him, however, Ayyash would never stay in one place for long and would even disguise himself, thus escaping Israel’s clutches time and time again.

Until 1994, the pursuit of Ayyash took place chiefly in the Palestinian cities of Judia and Samaria, but at that time he moved to the Gaza Strip and the security forces continued with the attempts to track him down there as well, and even made an attempt on his life at the end of 1995. Israel’s security forces worked for months to put together the operation. The governing principle was not to harm innocents in the surrounding area. At first, the plan was to kill Ayyash by rigging a fax machine. Eventually it was decided to use a much smaller device – a mobile phone.

The General Security Service technology unit packed 11 grams of explosive material into a Motorola mobile device. The minute quantity of explosives meant that the success of the operation hinged on Ayyash holding the phone to his head long enough. To ensure this, the security forces had to devise a way to ensure Ayyash received – and used – the device. This was a real challenge as Ayyash would never stay in one place for long and would frequently change mobile phones.

Despite his unpredictable pattern of behavior, Ayyash had one constant – a phone call he would make religiously to his father every Friday. It was obvious to the security forces that his is the opportune moment in which the assassination would take place. In 1995, on the last Friday of the year, the rigged device was delivered to Ayyash though a collaborator within his inner circle. The collaborator, not knowing the purpose of the device, was also instructed to disconnect the landline phone in the apartment where Ayyash was staying, thus ensuring that Ayyash would use the deadly device.

Until that point, the operation was on track, with Ayyash receiving and using the mobile device to phone his father, however, the attempt to trigger the bombe failed, thus Ayyash was able to complete the phone call without harm, oblivious to the threat.

The device was recalled from Ayyash through the collaborator the very next day and sent to a lab to determine the cause of the malfunction, which was found to be a disconnected wire between the ear and mouth pieces. The detonation mechanism was swiftly repaired and on the following Friday, January 5, 1996, the collaborator returned the device returned to Ayyash.

As per planned, the collaborated handed Ayyash the phone to make his weekly call to his father. This time the detonator did not fail and Ayyash was killed on the spot.

The elimination of Ayyash was without doubt a stellar success, but those in the thick of the affair know to tell that immediately after Ayyash was killed, many high-level commanders from the Hamas arrived on the scene, among them head of the organization’s military wing – Muhammed Deif, and could have been eliminated on the spot. However, the government cabinet did not give the green light and that opportunity was missed.

From revenge terror attacks to memorials: the aftermath of the assassination

The elimination of “al Muhandis” was a major affair – for Israel, that wanted him off the map, and for his followers that mourned his death. For Israel this was a milestone operational achievement, as not only had one of the leaders of the deadly terrorist organization been taken out of its roster, but it also denied the organization a huge trove of technical knowledge. Granted, Ayyash was able to train additional Hamas terrorist in the preparation of IEDs, but none had the knowledge and experience he had.

Another crucial outcome of the assassination was the message it conveyed to other Hamas leaders and other terror organizations that they are well within the reach of Israel.

Yahya Ayyash was buried in Gaza in a mass funeral, and retaliations did not wait for long. Later that year, a number of retaliatory attacks occurred in Israel, including the attack on bus No. 18 in Jerusalem and the attack at Dizengoff Center in Tel Aviv, killing a total of 59 people. Beyond this severe reaction, Ayyash had become an icon for Hamas supporters. Armed cells of the organization began to boast nicknames such as “The Engineer’s Students” or “The Yahya Ayyash Cells,” and various sites and locales throughout the Gaza Strip were dedicated to him. The Ayyash memorial project continued for many more years – in 2010 it was decided to name the Palestinian Authority compound in Ramallah after the engineer, and about a decade later, Hamas produced a long-range rocket that was given the name “Ayyash 250.” This rocket was used in Operation Guardian of the Walls, and also during the Gaza War.

The Hamas rocket was not the only reminder of Yahya Ayyash of the Gaza War. In December 2023, Abd al-Fattah Ma’ali, once considered Ayyash’s right-hand man, was assassinated. Another reminder also came in September 2024 with the pager attack against Hezbollah operatives, which was somewhat reminiscent of the method in which the notorious engineer was killed, as the widespread use of pagers by the Hezbollah that allowed for the targeting of so many terrorists, was prompted by the attack on Ayyash by mobile phone after which Hezbollah instructed its members to opt for beepers instead of the mobile devices.

The story of the assassination of Yahya Ayyash is testament to the capabilities and perseverance of Israel’s security forces. But more than all, it shows that targeted eliminations are much more than operations against one individual or another – they bring a message that echoes decades later to those who choose to follow in the target’s path.

הפוסט 29 Years Ago: Architect of Hamas Deadly Attacks, Yahya Ayyash, the “Engineer” – Eliminated הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the last three months, the center of gravity of the Swords of Iron war has shifted northward, but according to journalist Yair Kraus, the story of the northern sector began unfolding as early as October 7, 2023. As someone who lives in Acre and covers the northern region for Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, he discerned from the beginning that his region was an integral part of the war.

“When we saw the terrible attack on the southern communities, we realized that such an attack could have happened here too, and in much more monstrous proportions,” he relates. “This completely changed our perception of security as residents of the north. It created a deep crisis in our trust for the state and the IDF. Today, when we hear statements like ‘Hezbollah is deterred,’ for us it’s a warning that the situation on the ground is probably the opposite.”

The days of a “sense of security” are over

Yair Kraus lives in Acre, so he and his family were not evacuated. But they certainly felt the echoes of the war. His eldest daughter, for example, had to leave home for an entire month to go to school in the center of the country, and his three younger children had no educational framework for about three months. Kraus also personally knows many families who were displaced from their homes, and has seen firsthand the difficulties they faced and are still facing. He is aware of many residents – mainly elderly – who are waiting for the moment when they can return home. Moreover, there are quite a few others who are not at all sure they wish to return, and some have already decided to leave the north for good. The trend toward relocating permanently is especially noticeable among young families whose children have already settled into new frameworks in central Israel. Those families do not want to uproot them again.

However, even if we focus on residents who are waiting to return – and even on exceptional individuals who decide to move to the north of the country now of all times – there is still a serious problem in that most of them are not yet able to do so.

According to Kraus, who has been covering the northern region since the Second Lebanon War, several conditions must be met before the north can be repopulated. The first involves security and survival. “The residents in the north, especially the evacuees, will carefully examine what conditions the state and the army want to return them to,” he says. “I hear from many friends that they will not return to a situation where they will see Hezbollah terrorists and their families settling again in the villages where attacks were launched, or go back to being on the front line with the army behind them.”

The residents of the north have had enough of promises, Kraus adds, and they will now demand to see changes on the ground. “The security establishment’s usual boasting and lying will no longer work, and there’s no use for more of their statements that have repeatedly turned out to be unfounded,” he concludes. “The days of ‘a sense of security’ are also over. The issue here is no longer what people feel. It’s what people see with their own eyes – and when you see the villages where attacks were launched being rebuilt, and when there’s no buffer zone, it doesn’t look like security. Remember, we didn’t defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. And Hezbollah’s stated goal is still to conquer the northern settlements. It’s time for us to start believing Hezbollah and stop underestimating its buildup. We also need to wean ourselves from the addiction to respite – and from methods of action such as the kind we used in the so-called war between the wars. There is a major lesson here for the leadership, the army officers, and the northern residents, and it is that the peace and quiet we long for can be bought only with determination and the force of arms.”

So what will security on the northern border look like?

“We constantly hear about weapons being seized and terrorist infrastructure being destroyed, even now during the ceasefire, but what will change the reality the day after the war is not how many weapons we removed, but whether the weapons will return to those places. As long as the army and government show no willingness to hold on to the areas where Hezbollah operated, we should be worried. It’s clear to me and many other residents that for security in the north, we must create a buffer zone like the ones at the Gaza border and the Syrian border. Besides keeping security threats away from the communities at the fence, a buffer zone would also deliver humiliation. The Lebanese will see abandoned villages standing as monuments that proclaim what happens to those who try to harm us.”

Don’t say “rehabilitation,” say “development”

Besides restoring security, another condition that must be met in order to return the residents of the north to their homes is the restoration of the damaged infrastructure, including the ruined drainage systems, the destroyed roads, the wrecked buildings, and the many homes that suffer from abandonment. Of course, we also need repairs at public institutions such as health funds and schools, and at businesses, because they are all integral to a reasonable lifestyle.

However, alongside physical restoration, there is another aspect, less talked about, which is the development aspect. “We hear all the time about ‘rehabilitating the north,’ but in my opinion, rehabilitation is the wrong concept because it implies restoring the conditions of October 6,” says Yair Kraus. The situation in the north has been shaky for many years, and it is impossible to prop something back up that has long been falling apart. There is an issue of attitude here, and it is time for us to replace the term ‘rehabilitation’ with the terms ‘momentum’ and ‘development.'”

Kraus expresses a feeling that many northern residents share – especially now, after they have glimpsed the lifestyle of the center’s residents. “Exposure to life in the center of the country made the residents of the north realize how far behind they were. The rift strongly affected their perception,” he explains. “After a few months of living in the center, residents of the north began to get used to conditions that residents of the center have long taken for granted, such as accessible public transportation, advanced health services, well-paying jobs, and a variety of leisure activities. It’s enough to notice how many movie theaters an average city has in central Israel and then look at the Upper Galilee. There isn’t a single movie theater in that entire region. But the problem is much deeper than that, of course. Such gaps exist in every field and influence every aspect of the residents’ daily lives. So if the state wants those residents to return to the north, it cannot be satisfied with merely restoring what they had before. It must assure them that they will receive the same conditions that exist in the center. People say that you don’t cry out for what you don’t notice the lack of – but now the residents of the north know what they lack and they will cry out.”

What should the development plan for the north include?

“We need to start improving public transportation and expanding railroad lines, build advanced medical centers, and place an emphasis on employment, education, and leisure. Beyond that, we need to work on reducing land prices in the decaying rural communities at the heart of the Galilee – because currently the prices are exorbitant, to the point where they harm the entire Jewish settlement enterprise in the Galilee. But above all, a new point of view is needed. Currently the state treats the north as an unwelcome assignment and not as an asset. For that reason, it develops the north according to economic and administrative considerations, and not considerations of Zionism and societal values.”

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north.

The people of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem aren’t wiser than we are

It is impossible discuss the rehabilitation and development of the north without addressing the question of responsibility. Currently there are various bodies trying to drive the process, and they are roughly divided into two groups – outsiders and insiders. The first group includes mainly government bodies and regulatory officials. The second group includes local leaders, residents, and private associations. Synchronization among the various bodies is not always successful, and sometimes it does not exist at all. Currently the reins are held by those external offices.

According to Yair Kraus, this trend is not new. “For years, the people in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem decided what was right for us, and how we should live, and even now there is a feeling that do-gooders are coming from outside again to save and heal us,” he says. “This criminal policy may derive from good intentions, but in practice it weakens the local leadership and the community’s resilience. It sends the message that the residents can’t take care of themselves.”

Kraus compares the situation in the north to national disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes. In such disasters too, we see delegations from elsewhere arriving to save the locals. The missions operate out of good will, and their assistance is indeed needed, but when they operate without the cooperation of the local population, their benefit is only partial.

“All the studies in the world prove that sustainable reconstruction after a national disaster is possible only when the community is part of the reconstruction and part of the action,” he explains. “We need to create a situation where we exert ourselves not merely for the community but together with it. Not only do the locals know best what they need. In addition, by taking responsibility for themselves they can achieve a sense of triumph and restore their own resilience, which is no less important than physical rehabilitation.”

Why, in your opinion, are the people of the north excluded from the reconstruction and development processes?

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north. Billions have been invested in the region over the years and have given back almost no profit. In my opinion, a solution needs to be found that will provide for supervision but also give the north a certain freedom of action. I don’t know what the solution is, but I know we must try to find it.”

No “state,” no “army,” only people

One of the clearest conclusions that Yair Kraus draws from the last year of the war is that we need to discard amorphous terms like “state” and “army,” and instead start talking about the people who make up these bodies.

He harks back to the period when he covered Operation Guardian of the Walls and many media outlets reported on various decisions made by the court. He, as a journalist, opposed that unspecific term and made sure to mention the name of the judge who made each decision. In today’s context, Kraus emphasizes that there is no army, but rather a Chief of Staff, a head of the Northern Command, a divisional commander, and so on. Similarly, there is no state. There are ministers, there are members of Knesset, there are advisors. “This precision is important because when you attribute the responsibility to the body, then no one is responsible,” he explains. “In contrast, when you say who has the authority, by name and position, and indicate what decision or what action that person took – then immediately an individual is responsible.”

His hope is that those in authority, from the most senior to the most junior, will take responsibility and truly fulfill their roles. Only in this way, he believes, will it be possible to influence the future of the country and its development.

Another conclusion that Kraus has retained is that we must no longer be captivated by promises. “In the last year and a quarter, we have received a very big lesson in realism, and I can no longer look at the future through a prism,” he says. “In my lifetime, I’ve heard enough exciting announcements that ultimately led to nothing. I hope that now, with the reality of the north finally on the public agenda, we will see real change. It’s a very harsh thing to say, but this terrible war could be a blessing for the north. If it weren’t for a game-changing event of this magnitude, I doubt we would be talking about the importance of the north and recognizing how acute the need is to take care of this region of the country and improve its conditions. In my view, we must leverage this event into development, so that out of the fearsome comes forth sweetness.”

הפוסט The North Needs a New Story: An Interview with Journalist Yair Kraus הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. In formulating the national vision, the IDSF HaBithonistim research department examines the security threats on Israel through a magnifying glass, to obtain a comprehensive understanding thereof and yield recommendations for the most effective method of addressing them. Recently an IDSF HaBithonistim research team spoke before the Nagel Commission on Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Building, and presented a detailed opinion paper to the decision makers.

This paper was written with the assistance of six key researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik, Lt. Col. (res.) Shosh Raban, Dr. Yaakov Rimmer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Or Issachar. They elaborate on the current challenges and perceptions that govern the IDF, and detail the steps that must be taken to ensure that the IDF’s force buildup fully responds to the reference scenarios facing the State of Israel.

Reference scenarios as the basis for the IDF’s force buildup

Israel is a small country with little strategic depth, surrounded by a choke ring of enemies and a slew of threats. Many of these threats have existed from the very first moment of Israel’s existence. However, the past decades have seen processes and changes that had bred new trends. If the formative years of Israel saw the young state surrounded by enemy countries, then today, after 75 years of fighting against many of them for its mere existence, Israel is now contending with a pernicious remote enemy in the form of Iran, and with terror militias operating on its borders and in its very midst. Nowadays, Israel is contending with a convergence of theaters, meaning that any conflagration of one almost inevitably sparks a flare-up in another. In this current map of challenges, Israel exists in a permanent state of security volatility that may see unexpected attacks from foreign entities and from hostile elements from within.

In order to optimally deal with such threats, as well as with many others, the IDF’s force buildup must be carefully designed and executed. Traditionally, the Israeli army’s force buildup had stood on six pillars: doctrine, armaments, training, professional advancement, organization and infrastructure. Force buildup has long-term implications on Israel’s military readiness, and demands careful consideration of the current reference scenarios and threats, as well as projections thereof for the future.

Paramount security threats:

• Iran: although almost 1,000 miles from Israel, Tehran operates a vast proxy-terror mechanism across the Middle East, and has succeeded in sending its tentacles into the heart of Israel, into the Palestinian arena. Iran sits on a huge stockpile of missile and drones, developed and dedicated solely to target the civilian heart of Israel. And on top of it all – Iran is now a nuclear threshold state that is dedicated to the development of weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with Iran’s aspirations for instilling global Shi’ite Islam, this places it not only as a major threat to Israel, but indeed a threat to the rest of the world.

• Syria and Lebanon: the conflict on Israel’s northern border is a clear and present danger to Israel as Syria and Lebanon, its neighbors to the north, are enemy states. Syria had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war, and its outcome is not yet clear in terms of the new regime’s stability or long-term intentions towards Israel. Lebanon is for all intents and purposes, ruled by Hezbollah and by proxy – Iran. This state of affairs renders Israel’s northern border highly volatile and demands the constant presence of Israeli forces along that border and a high level of military readiness.

• Egypt and Jordan: the State of Israel does have peace agreements with these two countries. However, they are extremely precarious, and with more than a few inherent vulnerabilities. One is the fact that these accords do not really render redundant the IDF’s activity along the borders with these countries. But they do limit it to a great extent, simply due to the fact that one country cannot operate militarily against an ally in the same manner it can against an enemy. Furthermore, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan do not reflect the current sentiment on the streets of Cairo and Amman. Most of their citizens are openly hostile towards Israel. In the event of a change of governments – a very plausible scenario in both highly unstable countries – their relations with Israel may in all likelihood be impacted. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a reversal of alliances wherein either or both countries become once again enemies of Israel.

• Gaza: the destiny of Gaza in the day after the Gaza War is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, Israel must be prepared for a long period of instability in the Strip. Once the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia of Gaza is completed, the IDF will have to remain deployed in the area to act as a bulwark and ensure the safety of the population along the Gaza border, while crushing further attempts from within the Strip to reignite terror activity against Israe.

• Terror militias: during the past several years, due mainly to misguided concepts, Israel had allowed the terror organizations on its borders to build up their force and stockpile weapons to staggering levels, with the help of Iran. Thus, these organizations – namely Hezbollah and Hamas – have grown to become highly trained and armed terror militaries. The October 7 massacre had made it clear beyond any shred of doubt that Israel cannot allow terror and terror militias to germinate on its borders or anywhere near them, and it must adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards any such attempts.

• The Palestinian arena: this is a pressing challenge for Israel. the Stability achieved by the security forces in Judea and Samaria in the wake of Operation Defensive Shield is wearing thin, and the area has become a hornet’s nest of renewed terror activity, inspired by the October 7 events. The Palestinian Authority is failing – if indeed it even wishes to – conduct effective counter-terror activity in the area against the mounting Islamic terror in its jurisdiction, forcing Israeli security forces to undertake this task in these areas as well.

• Internal arena: the multi-front conflagration is pouring over into the Israeli Arab population. Since the outset of the Gaza War, there has been an awakening of terror activity among the Arab population living within the Green Line and holding a full Israeli citizenship. To contend with this problem without further drawing on the already buckling IDF, Israel must form a national guard to reenforce the civil guard system.

The sad truth of the matter is that the IDF does not have the numbers to address the entire spectrum of threats and reference scenarios with which Israel is currently contending. Therefore, the IDF must build up its force in terms of manpower as well as its operational and firepower capabilities. Some of these changes, such as higher recruitment rates must be executed on a systemic level while others, such as the buildup of new divisions or the incorporation of advance technologies that better enable the designated units to achieve their mission, should be delivered in a manner tailored to the specific needs of each of these units, as detailed below.

The Vision for IDF Force Buildup – A Systemic Point of View

Upscaling manpower

Over the past decades, certain processes have been put in place to downscale the IDF’s manpower, mainly in the ground forces. This led among others to the mustering out of entire divisions, the reduction of mandatory service duration, and increased cuts in mandatory and reserves personnel. These processes were undertaken with the notion that the “army of the people”, as the IDF is perceived in Israel, could be downsized and shaped into a “small and smart army”. However, the outbreak of the Gaza War proved the fallacy of this approach, and has led to the detrimental shortage of regular and reserve manpower with which the IDF is currently struggling.

An additional manpower crisis, dubbed “The Captain Crisis”, referring to the phenomenon in which low raking officers opt to end their military career at the rank of captain, mostly due to better conditions waiting for them in the civilian labor market. This creates a shortage of officers that could have been designated to be the next generation of the IDF’s leadership.

The personnel shortage in the IDF consequent of these cuts, is a significant operational constraint for the IDF, in particular when it must juggle a number of fronts at the same time. Compounding this problem, is the erosion of those of the forces that bear most of the operational brunt due to an unbalanced assignment of the operational load.

Ideal situation:

• Extension of service: in June 2015, the length of the men’s mandatory service – and some of the women’s – was cut from 36 to 12 months. The mandatory three-year term must be reinstated as was the standard for decades – a move that will boost the ranks of the regular army.

• Extension of the reserve service: the increase in the number of reservists is an indispensable element of the buildup of the IDF, such that responds effectively to the current security realities. Recently, the age of discharge from reserves duty was upped by a year, and it may have to be further extended, at least until the army’s manpower had sufficiently been boosted and service exemption policies tightened.
• Expansion of mandatory service to additional demographics: for decades, there have been in Israel’s society entire demographics, which for numerous reasons are automatically exempt from military service – some under the dictates of law and policy, while others slip “under the radar”. This means that there are tens of thousands of able individuals, who are not part of the IDF’s service cycle. In order to address this issue, there are steps that the army can adopt, such as expansion of female induction and the extension of the mandatory induction to “special” demographics such as the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab populations. An additional course of action would be to have soldiers sign on for a short – salaried – extension of their service once their mandatory term is done.

• Improved officer retention: The army must improve the retention of its officers and boost the attractivity of the military careers it can offer young officers, with the aim of keeping them in the system for long-term careers. For this end the military must overhaul and modernize its HR practices and offer terms and conditions of service that can parallel with comparable jobs on the civilian labor market.

• Modernization of the organizational operation: As a hierarchal structure, the IDF is weighted down by a uniformity of approach and thought and its resistance to creative ways of thought that challenge deep seated conceptions. The IDF must adopt organizational cultures that accept diverse ways of thought and are open to a diversity of opinions and concepts.
• Establishment of an auxiliary national guard force: in tandem with the expansion of the military ranks, the IDF’s areas of responsibility must be streamlined. Currently, beyond its border security and defense of the country, the army is also burdened with the task of internal security, which hinders its capacity to prioritize missions and assign sufficient manpower to this and other tasks. To alleviate this burden and allow the army to focus on the missions for which it exists, a national guard that is subordinate to Israel Police should be formed, responsible for all matters pertaining to internal security threats and sharing the army’s workload.

Optimization of logistic readiness

Current situation:

The IDF’s logistic readiness is part and parcel of its operational readiness, but sadly, it is plagued by various problems mainly in the areas of armaments, maintenance and infrastructure.

In terms of armaments, Israel has been developing an increasing dependance on the import of technology and weapons from foreign countries, mainly the US. The Gaza War made it clear to what extent Israel’s deep dependance on foreign munition supplies is to the detriment of the IDF’s operational flexibility and its freedom of action.

In terms of maintenance, many of the army’s bases and headquarters are in dilapidated condition, and are not fully prepared for internal threats and ballistic attacks. This state of affairs poses a risk factor to IDF’s operational capability. Furthermore, most of the IDF’s infrastructures are above ground, and exposed to threats in scenarios of surface-to-surface rocket and missile attacks.

Ideal situation:

• Upscaling inventory and supervising its integrity: Inventories should be assigned minimal stock threshold as per standardized operational requirements, with mechanisms of timely restocking in times of emergency. Furthermore, munitions and weapons should be inspected regularly to maintain integrity and immediate usability.

• Reinforcement of the security industry: Israel’s security industry must be allotted further investment and developed to reduce Israel’s dependance on imported weapons, lower costs of ammunition, and develop dedicated technologies and systems, while allowing for fast restocking in times of war. A positive by-product of this kind of policy would be the creation of new jobs and a boost to the economy.

• Expansion of international arms supply relations: Alongside the development of a more robust local industry, Israel must establish procurement deals with as many countries as possible, to free it from the shackles of dependency on a handful of leading countries for weapons and ammunitions supply.

• Upscaling and optimization of military infrastructures: The IDSF bases and headquarters are a strategic asset for the State of Israel, and as such they must be maintained and secured to the highest level. The bases should be inspected to determine their level of regular operation and their readiness for a state of war.

• Introduction of underground infrastructures: Important strategic assets must be relocated to underground premises to ensure their protection in the event of missile and rocket attack. Additionally, Israel must be prepared for a contingency wherein it must use underground routes to deploy forces. Alongside the planning of dedicated underground spaces, it is advisable to turn existing civilian infrastructures such as tunnels and public parking lots into dual-use infrastructures that can serve military purposes in emergency times.

Technology & Cyber

Current situation:

Alongside the traditional battlefield exists an emerging crucial theater of battle – the technological arena. Over the past several decades, technology – and war technology – has advanced by leaps and bounds, introducing new weapons and widely used cyber warfare.  Recently, with the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), new, highly sophisticated systems have been introduced that pose even a greater challenge for Israel security establishment.

Israel’s security technology and cyber warfare are some of the most advanced in the world, but there are still significant barriers to the incorporation of these technologies on the battlefield. These are related, among others, to the organization’s resistance to changes, the need to work exclusively with large vendors and the limited access to such technologies for commanders in the field.

Even though technology is by no means a complete substitute for human capabilities and for the value of the national contribution of a people’s army, Israel must ensure technological superiority over its enemies, and remain at the forefront of technological development and progress.

Ideal situation:

• After-action review: the shortcomings that arose during the Gaza War must be studied, such as the shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and uncrewed vehicles, the lack of technologies that would allow the forces to deal with the Hamas tunnels and shortcomings in quick and effective responses to anti-tank rockets.

• Investment in technology: Israel must allocate considerable budgets and manpower for the development of defense technology while at the same time boost existing local industry, with an emphasis on dedicated weapons and systems for the use specified by the IDF.

• Incorporation of robotics: robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive motorboats, can bring a significant advantage on the battle field and considerably reduce the cost in human lives. Therefore, robotics should be incorporated in all of the IDF branches.

• Cyber warfare and AI: the cyber arena is getting more sophisticated by the moment, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is on the increase, posing yet new security threats. In order to ensure it maintains the upper hand in this arena, Israel must continue to invest in research and development of offensive and defensive cyber, and begin incorporating AI in its security needs.

• Tech training: The forces in the field must be trained to use the advanced tech tools that are and will become available to them. This calls for the installation of a whole new training array across all IDF branches and units, and the professional training of all the professional personnel allocated to this end.

• Diversification of tech acquisition portfolio: Israel’s security establishment currently deals with only a handful of large tech vendors, with which it has trade relations for decades. In order to introduce sophisticated tech systems, it must be open to doing business with smaller tech vendors and entrepreneurs.

The Vision of IDF Force Buildup According to Branches and Corps

Ground forces

Current situation:

The State of Israel is often forced to engage in multiple combat arenas, wherein the escalation in one often leads immediately to a domino effect conflagration of others. As demonstrated throughout the Gaza War, the battle of order of the IDF’s ground forces proved too short to cover more than one broad campaign in a single arena, while holding a defensive position in others. This also means that in the event of unexpected developments, the army does not have enough reserves to deploy.

In light of existing and projected threats outlined by reference scenarios, the State of Israel must boost its capabilities such that it can engage in high intensity combat in at least two fronts simultaneously, while assuming a broad defensive position in others.

Ideal situation:

• Overhaul of readiness protocols: the IDF must ensure that regular and reserve forces incorporate improved readiness protocols –in terms of quantity and quality of combat gear and weaponry, and in terms of the professional and physical operational readiness of troops and commanders, in order to allow short response times in a reality where surprise terror attacks have become part and parcel of daily life.

• Augmentation of forces by one regular service division and several reserves’ divisions: The IDF should add at least one more regular army division and two more reserves maneuver enhancement divisions to its personnel headcount. These divisions will include a full divisional structure and auxiliary units including tanks, artillery, engineering and logistics. One should be deployed at Israel’s northern border and the other in the Jordan Valley. This is a necessity in order to deal with the operative shortcomings in some arenas, and will additionally serve as reserve forces when needed.

• Establishment of a dedicated standalone combat auxiliary force: a reserve force at the level of at least a division, under the command of General HQ, should be formed to provide operational flexibility and provide relief to forces in the event of unexpected or prolonged events. The reserve force may be kept at a lower level of readiness and mid-level operational fitness, ensuring that these can be brought up to par quickly in times of need.

• Formation of a tunnel capture-and-destroy combat unit: In light of the growing tunnel warfare threat on Israel’s borders, the security establishment must seriously consider the formation of a new dedicated army corps specializing in the detection and destruction of tunnels and subterranean warfare.

• General internal audit of IDF units: The IDF must conduct an in-depth audit of relevant units to asses manpower, equipment and armament needs and shortages. For example, it has become clear in the current conflict that there is a pressing need to increase the numbers of tank in the armored units. Also, in the current climate in Israel’s multiple arena reality, special units such as the Oketz canine unit and the Yahalom combat engineering unit, must be augmented.

• Improvement of mobilization and deployment mechanisms and procedures: The convergence and interconnectivity of arenas in Israel demand that the army install a streamlined mobilization and deployment system and procedures to enable the swift reallocation of forces from one front to another. For this purpose, the army would have to create a dedicated road and rail infrastructure as an alternative to the congested civilian routes, and upscale its fleet of heavy carriers to included armored vehicles. To streamline quick force deployment and movement, civilian infrastructure, such as railways, should be considered for use as supplementary systems.

The Air Force: Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles

Current situation:

The Israeli Air Force is charged with three main missions: The protection of Israel’s areal space, offensives in enemy territories, and the support of ground campaigns. In order to accomplish these missions to their fullest, the IAF is required to have extremely complex and resource-intensive capabilities. It must be understood that no matter how supreme an army’s air force is – it cannot compensate for inadequate ground forces. It can, however, provide operational flexibility to its counterparts on the ground and in the ocean. This can be further boosted by newer advanced drone technology, which aside from expanding military capabilities, help reduce the cost in human lives.

Over the past years, significant changes have been occurring in the map of the areal threats. Israel’s enemies on its borders and remotely understand that they cannot contend with the superiority of Israel’s Air Force and thus abandoned the use of fighter jets, instead opting for the development of ballistic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, steep trajectory surface-to-surface missiles, and low-tech warfare i.e. glider terror attacks, and improvised explosive kites and balloons. These new threats demand the IAF to recalculate its offensive and defensive tactics and set in place procedures for force and resource deployment and means and weapons it uses.

Ideal situation:

• Increase of drone warfare: The most important objective for the use of UMAVs is the protection of the lives of soldiers. Even in the event that the use of human forces is unavoidable, drones can support IAF’s strikes in the heart of enemy territory. UMAV’s can assist in the protection of ground sectors and lend significant aid to ground campaigns. It is highly recommended that the IDF invest resources in increasing the use of this means of war.

• Incorporation of a steep trajectory array: the IDF should examine the incorporation of a steep trajectory array with rocket and attack glider capabilities.

• Streamlining Israel’s air defense system: In order to ensure the protection of the Home Front, the IDF’s air defense must undergo a comprehensive inspection to ensure it is able to contend with scenarios of attacks of thousands of rockets and missiles a day. Furthermore, Israel should consider forging regional alliances for the protection of Israel’s areal space.

Navy: Defense as a Priority

Current situation:

Israel’s naval arena is important on a number of levels: security-wise, Israel has expansive maritime borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Egypt. Economically, Israel has prolific maritime trade activities; strategically, the most substantial source of energy in the country comes from the natural gas fields within the country’s territorial waters.

Therefore, the State of Israel must maintain superiority in all naval arenas, securing its maritime supply routes, protect its shores, protect free passage of vessels and maritime trade, and protect its gas fields. However, as the most pressing threats are ground-based and since the military is struggling with manpower deficits, coupled with traditionally high costs of maintaining and operating naval vessels, the IDF must plan how to prioritize the Navy’s needs.

Ideal situation:

• Prioritization of defensive capabilities: Controlling the maritime territory demands superior offensive capabilities from the Navy, however, due to current constraints abovementioned the focus on the IDF’s Navy must be the development of defensive capabilities.

• Integration of unmanned platforms: It is possible, and necessary, to integrate unmanned surface and underwater vessels, which would be deployed primarily for patrolling, guarding Israel’s maritime borders, routine security, allowing the IDF forces to deal with more complex threats.

Home Front Command: Delegating responsibilities effectively

Current situation:

The Home Front plays a crucial role in the protection of the citizens of Israel, but the delegation of responsibilities between the body and the civil defense and rescue forces remains unclear. This unclarity leads to overlapping of responsibilities in some cases, and in others – tasks that fall between the cracks and remain unattended.

Furthermore, the Home Front Command has been red flagging its personnel shortage for some time. Over the recent years this demanded the allocation of IDF combat forces to supplement the Home Front’s search and rescue activities – forces that should have been serving in other critical ground-force missions. This demands the rethinking of the allocation of resources between the Home Front Command and the IDF operational units.

Another issue that demands attention is the auxiliary Territorial Defense array. Nowadays the territorial defense’s main area of operation is centered around the defense against external threats and search and rescue missions. The area of territorial defense that deals with internal threats such as terror attacks remains nearly untreated by the Home Front Command and this requires revisiting to consider including this task in the Home Front’s responsibilities.

Ideal situation:

• Assignation of areas of responsibilities: The responsibilities of the Home Front and the civil rescue bodies must be assigned and delineated in a clear manner, with consideration of the capabilities each body brings to the table, to allow for the most effective fulfillment of each responsibility.

• Improvement of protection of civil structures: In order to improve the protection of the civil Home Front and reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the wake of attacks against civilians, the Home Front must identify the public structures which lack protective areas and spaces, especially those near and in conflict areas.

• Balanced distribution of recruits: Since there are certain units in the Home Front Command that are in need of recruits with the same profile as the IDF’s other ground force units, the assignment of recruits must be based on considerations of operational priorities of each of the units.

• Reinforcement of the territorial defense array: In light of the terror threats against Israel from within the Arab-Israeli population, it is worth examining the integration of Home Front forces in the protection of the communities in conflict areas and border zones.

The Intelligence Directorate: Collaboration with Civil Bodies

Current situation:

The security intelligence establishment is a critical component in Israel’s security, strategically and tactically. However, Israel had developed over the recent years a dangerous dependence on its intelligence deterrence – the full implication of which was revealed in the October 7 disaster.

Therefore, the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence establishment must be further expanded and maintained but at the same time the security establishment’s other capabilities – especially in the operational field – must be boosted. Furthermore, the intelligence apparatus is currently plagued with some deeply engrained problems that pose a challenge to Israel’ superiority in the field, such as inadequate investment in diverse fields of intelligence, and the brain drain of the system due to much more economically gratifying jobs in the civilian job market.

The ideal:

• Recruitment of speakers of foreign languages: In order to respond to the current operational needs, the Intelligence Corps must augment the ranks of its foreign language speakers through a specially tailored recruitment and training program.

• Reinstatement of an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) array: The Israeli Intelligence OSINT array plays a critical role in the understanding of the broad political landscape in Israel and is indispensable for monitoring unforeseen sudden events, identifying information leaks, producing projections and for influencing public opinion. Therefore, the OSINT array in the intelligence establishment must be rehabilitated and further cultivated.

• Social networks as a viable source of intelligence (SOCMINT): Intelligence gathering from social networks should be increased as it is an indispensable source of intel yielding platform.

• Collaboration with civilian market: It is worth examining the integration of capabilities from Israeli high-tech and local industry. This kind of collaboration can allow the IDF Intelligence Corps to adopt advanced civilian technologies to maintain superiority in the field. Furthermore, it is worth considering opening some of the career military jobs in the Intelligence Corp to the civilian job market to obtain additional professional expert manpower from outside of the military system.

IDF Force Buildup Vision – Decision Making Processes

Improvement of decision-making processes

Current situation:

The security and strategic decision-making processes, including those that pertain to the IDF force buildup and budget allocation, mostly happen in the military executive branch, and are not always transparent to the relevant political and public factors. The limited number of participants in these processes often lead to perceptual shortcomings in the absence of broad perspectives and different points of view.

Another issue regarding decision making processes is related to control and monitoring processes. Currently, most if the control and monitoring of the Israel’s security establishment and the IDF’s activity are internal and are not transparent to the political system, not to mention to the public, which subjects them to a risk of partiality and bias.

Ideal situation:

• Transparent decision-making: The IDF must incorporate non-military professionals, such as public representatives and suitable professionals from each relevant field in its strategic decision-making processes, such that allows for decision-making that is based on multiple opinions and perspectives through organizational processes such as brainstorming sessions.

• Introduction of “red teams”: The intelligence analysis process often uses “red teams” – which simulates hostile attacks with the aim of detecting vulnerabilities and flaws in existing systems and responses. Many times, these teams comprise non-military professionals who bring knowledge and perspectives from outside of the military system. To improve decision-making across the entire security system, red teams should be incorporated in every branch and arm of the IDF.

• Bi-annual Cabinet updates: The Cabinet should hold bi-annual briefings focusing on various aspects of the IDF’s force buildup – including threat assessments, manpower allocations, operational readiness, procurement and armament. These meetings should be anchored in appropriate legislation, and the consequent decisions should be shared with the public. Furthermore, the security establishment should be required to present to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee all information pertaining to changes in the IDF force buildup.

• Establishment of independent supervisory committees: Independent supervisory committees comprising public and civilian representatives are needed to examine the IDF force buildup and report to the government and official control bodies. The government’s security cabinet will be obligated to discuss the committee’s findings and include civilian representatives to partake in discussions on unclassified findings.

Thought on Israel’s security: conclusion

The dynamic map of the security challenges characteristic to Israel and the Middle East region demands constant scrutiny of the present and future threats. Only with a broad understanding of the reference scenarios Israel faces, its military force can be built up in a proper and informed manner.

Nowadays, Israel is forced to contend with a long list of threats, spearheaded by Iran, which can turn into a nuclear state at any moment. Additionally, the current reference scenarios point to a multi-arena war placing Israel on several fronts at the same time, as well as a surprise attack that could be launched by any one of the terror organizations operating on Israel’s borders.

The Gaza War has proven that Israel and its security establishment must recalculate its route forward and methodically and skillfully plan the force buildup across the system. This is the only way to ensure a strong army that could protect Israel security now and in the future.

הפוסט Ideally – IDSF HaBithonistim National Security Vision. The Force buildup of the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The crises around the recruitment, or lack thereof, of Haredi – ultra-orthodox – men, the imperative to secure Israel’s military needs, the economic crises, and the declining support of Israel in the international community – how can all these converge to a golden opportunity for Israel that would allow it to cross several hurdles with one leap?

Four hurdles, to be precise. The solution on the table is the foundation of local Israeli arms production, with manufacturing and operational personnel recruited from the Haredi community, who would be employed under conditions of military or national service. Israel’s government had already agreed on the imperative to increase Israel’s self-production of arms and munitions in light of growing dependance mainly on the US, and other countries, for the supply of arms and munitions, which significantly increased since the onset of the war. This project would afford Israel critical independence, while diminishing its dependence on the good will and political motivations of other countries and one administration or other. The military salaries paid to the recruits employed in this project would ensure its economic viability. Moreover, the global shortages in inventory and growing demand for ammunition will enable Israel to enjoy another source of revenue and a geopolitical status of an arms exporter, rather than an importer.

The crises of the military service objection in the ultra-orthodox community

Much can – and should – be said about the issue of the recruitment of young men from the ultra-orthodox community to the IDF, and an overview consisting of a handful of sentences cannot begin to touch upon the complexity of the issue. But it must be said that the solution above mentioned does not seek to serve as an overall response for the demand for equal participation of the ultra-orthodox sector in civic duties, nor can it create sufficient placements for the entire group. Rather, it offers a partial solution, such that could respond to the genuine concerns regarding the ability of Haredi recruits to aptly preserve their way of life – be it gender separation, kosher food, and daily religious studies – all obstacles to the recruitment of Haredis to the IDF today.

These munitions employees would have to be manned exclusively by male recruits, including professional positions such as managers and engineers, among others, whom also can be recruited from the Haredi community, but not necessarily. The operational workers can be recruited from special recruitment rounds of young men from the ultra-orthodox community. As part of their service, the recruits would be provided with kosher meals, communal prayer services either in the barracks or in a synagogue specially built for that purpose, and even religios studies in their downtime. This model can address many of the concerns of potential recruits from the Haredi community while at the same time provide a solution for a pressing strategic military need in Israel.

Economy of munitions

There is no doubt that Israel has been required to adhere to a well calculated munitions economy since the outbreak of the Gaza war. Although there is no doubt as regards to Israel’s military capabilities – especially thanks to the American supply train that provided Israel with hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment since the war began. However, there are numerous variables in this economy that Israel has to consider, and it cannot always trust that this supply effort will endure. Over the past months the government had held frequent discussions on the issue, with recommendations from the military and political echelons to put into action plans to cut Israel’s dependence on foreign supply and increase the capacity of its independent arms production. This is in the face of high risks of embargo against Israel, or the conditioned or delayed shipments Israel is currently contending with. Furthermore, the arrival of these shipments is subjected to the positions and interests of the various administrations with which Israel has weapons trade agreements. This is compounded by the growing global demand for weapons and ammunition, driven among others by the war in Ukraine which has no conclusion on the horizon, and many countries are now in a race to build up and improve their military power, both in Europe and in Asia, where many countries are concerned about China and North Korea, and of course in the Middle East too. Production is falling short of the growing demand and serious backlogs and delays are becoming a matter of routine. Thus, the decision to increase local production and ensure self-sufficiency is hardly exclusive to Israel. For instance, in March the European Commission presented a plan to cut arms imports from outside the EU and increase production on the continent.

Israel’s economic crisis

There is no doubt that the Gaza war has served Israel with a steep bill and is expected to continue exacting huge costs from the Israeli economy. The military technology is a relatively lucrative endeavor for Israel’s economy and it represents a significant portion of Israel’s exports with trail-blazing Israeli technologies demanded globally at considerable costs. The abovementioned proposal departs from the usual focus of the technology-intensive defense industry by broadening its portfolio to “low-tech” munitions manufacturing, and it offers the potential for a historic turning point in the industry, which could expedite the military and economic advantages for the country and pave the way into new markets where Israel’s reputation in the field of defense production would surely serve to lend credibility to and create demand for its new munitions products.

Israel’s international status

A point to consider is that Israel’s dependence on imported weapons and ammunition might compromise its foreign relations with other countries. This places political power over Israel in the hands of the suppliers and oftentimes is leveraged to dictate preconditions for the supply of weapons to Israel – even to the point of influencing Israel’s policies and decision-making processes, particularly in critical time such as wars. Israel, however, has a golden opportunity at present to turn the tables and gain exactly that kind of influence vis a vis other countries, when they come knocking at the door, wishing to purchase Israeli munitions. This potential says something about the influence Israel wields in the field of advanced military technology exports.

In conclusion, this type of munitions industry could manufacture a wide range of arms and ammunition. Naturally, the feasibility and requirements for each plant and assembly line would have to be established. It may be that certain factories would demand more unprofessional manpower while others may be technology-intensive and demand skilled employees. Differences in the cost of salaries might be significant. The State would of course determine whether it would subsidize these factories and recruit manpower at market salaries, even if it means financial losses. But the proposed model provides a cost-effective solution which is highly competitive, and can create attractive export opportunities, not only in regards to the quality of the output but also in prices.

Lastly, an additional important point is the potential abundance of unskilled manpower for this purpose, in a country where there is a shortage of this type of worker, especially in a sensitive military industry. Case in point – in other industries that are mainly based on manual labor such as agriculture and construction, it is hard and even impossible to find Israeli workers, and manpower there almost exclusively comprises of foreign workers. The situation is marginally better in the manufacturing sector. However, when considering the fact that military industry is highly sensitive, it is clear that the benefits of relying on the Haredi community for manpower may create opportunities and remove hurdles that are currently hard to clear.

This article was originally published in Now 14

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Two Hurdles with One Leap? A Proposal for the Recruitment of Haredim to New Arms Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Assistant Commissioner, Brigadier General Betty Lahat served in the Israel Prison Service for 35 years, during which she filled senior positions and headed several prisons, among them the Neveh Tirtza women’s prison, the Sharon Prison and the Hadarim detention center which has been housing many high-profile Palestinian security prisoners. Her last position with the IPS was head of the Service’s intelligence department, in the capacity of which she had met many of the Palestinian security prisoners, Yahya Sinwar among them.

During her years in various positions, Lahat had worked with inmates from many demographics – from youths and women to heads of crime and arch-terrorists. “I’ve experienced a fair share of heartache during my career, and witnessed time and time again our inability to break the cycles of crime and terror”, she says. “I’ve raised generations of inmates – I had female inmates that gave birth while serving prison sentences, and later met their children in juvenile prisons, some of which even remembered me, and how I would throw them birthday parties in the prison cafeteria when they would visit their mothers. I would look at them and think to myself – they’re my children’s age, why did they have to end up in a place like this? It’s a huge heartache. On the other extreme, I have met some of the bloodiest terrorists and had to watch them as they walk around the prison yard, chatting away, laughing and enjoying themselves, while I  had to ensure they received appropriate care. There were times when I would get home and say to myself ‘good lord, what kind of a world am I living in?’”

We knew that his word was the law: the prisoner Yahya Sinwar

Over the years, Betty Lahat had seen some of the most dangerous prisoners Israel’s prisons had known. She had met murderers and heads of crime, and she had met some of the highest profile terrorists. Under her wardenship she had seen the likes of Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin, head of the Hamas military wing Salah Shehade, and head of izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria Ibrahim Hamed, who orchestrated most of the terror attacks during the Second Intifada. However, one of the most memorable inmates for Lahat – mainly due to his nefarious intelligence and shocking cruelty – is Yahya Sinwar.

What was your impression of Sinwar?

“I remember him as a very dominant figure who was very cruel. The prisoners elected him time after time as their prison leader. As such, he put together inmate terror cells and a telecommunications reconnaissance team that was tasked with gathering intel within and outside of the prison. He also commanded special units that interrogated new prisoners. Any prisoner suspected of collaborating with Israel was cruelly tortured. Naturally, Sinwar never did any of the dirty work himself, but it was clear that he was the one pulling the strings. He also took under his wing the most murderous terrorist that would arrive at the prison, and promoted them up the ranks. For example, he took under his wing Abdel-Aziz Salha, a West Bank Hamas militant jailed for life for his part in the lynching of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah, famously depicted standing at a window holding up blood-stained hands, and made him head of the telecommunications units in the prison.  He also added to his ranks the murderers of the Fogel family and the perpetrator of the deadly bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya. Later, during negotiations for the release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Sinwar was involved in the selection of the terrorists to be released. He made sure that he and his cronies were on the list, and left out prisoners that were at odds with him. That was the kind of power he had”.

Would you have believed that Sinwar was able to orchestrate an attack on the scale of the October 7 massacre?

“Absolutely. Sinwar had no interest in coexistence and had always proclaimed he would never be resigned to the ‘Zionist settlers’ living on what he saw as the land of Palestine. I listened to him a lot, both in direct conversations I had with him as well as conversations with his prison associates we tapped. I had never witnessed him stray from his way of thought and staunch ideology. He had grand schemes and he truly believed that by 2027, he would lead a brutal attack that would result in the victory of Hamas over Israel – so whoever tries to claim that Sinwar held a pragmatic approach toward Israel has no idea what he is talking about”.

To what extent was Sinwar involved in events outside of prison?

“In my time, we had designated Sinwar as a national target prisoner, in other words, a prisoner that demands constant surveillance, as his sphere of influence extended beyond prison walls. He was extremely involved with what was happening in other security prisons and was very knowledgeable about current affairs in Israel. You must understand that Sinwar was deviously intelligent. He got to know Israeli society like the back of his hand and could analyze it brilliantly. It was clear from an early stage that he had set his mind on fragmenting Israeli society from within, and he knew just how to do it. His objective of fomenting discord in Israel was clearly evident even during the Gaza war, and it is clear to me that when he emerged from the tunnels and saw Gaza in ruins, he got the tailwind to carry on his fight from seeing the discord in Israel’s society  and he believed he would eventually prevail”.

You participated in the discussions on the list of terrorists to be released as part of the Shalit deal. Where did you stand on the release of Sinwar?

“I had a very hard time with Sinwar’s release, and I had warned them that this is not a terrorist that should be set free. At one point, one of the negotiation team members asked me ‘what do you have against Sinwar? He didn’t kill any Jews, he only killed Palestinian collaborators’, to which I responded – ‘Just wait. He’ll have plenty of Jewish blood on his hands’. I don’t know  exactly what I meant when I said this, but it was clear to me that once he sees an opportunity to commit heinous attacks against Jews – he’ll seize it. Whoever gets to know terrorists like Sinwar, and spends so much time with them as I did, knows what they’re capable of. And whoever was surprised by the sheer cruelty of the terrorist in the October 7 attack didn’t really know them at all”.

It is not a prison. It is summer camp for terrorists

Betty Lahat is very familiar with the situation in Israeli prisons and knows the conditions under which various classes of prisoners are held. She has a hard time accepting the manner in which prisoners – particularly security prisoners – manipulate public opinion in Israel and its justice system to gain unjustified amenities.

“The Palestinian security prisoners know that the Israeli justice system will always take care of them and that the doors of the High Court of Justice are always open to them”, says Lahat. “We are under the impression that when the prisons are quiet, and we give them what they want, we can rehabilitate them and change their ways. But what we fail to understand is that this humane approach is to our detriment. The better the conditions we give them are, the more they perceive us as weak. Even saving their lives has no effect on them. I spoke to Sinwar after he underwent surgery to remove a malignant tumor from his brain in an Israeli hospital. I asked him whether he now has some gratitude toward Israel, to which he replied that he has nothing to be grateful for as we simply did our job. We need to forgo this illusion that if we give them favorable conditions in prison, we can remove them from the path of terror. In all my years with the Israeli Prison Service, I’ve not once encountered a Hamas prisoner that had forsaken his ideology. It just doesn’t happen”.

What does the life of a security inmate look like?

“Each inmate must participate in a mandatory educational program. They also get to study for academic degrees through the Open University. In fact, the Palestinian Authority actually encourages them to earn an education in prison. The higher their academic achievement – the more money they get. In addition, they have a large library and there is not one book that reaches the book stores in Israel that is not added to their library immediately. I’ve seen with my own eyes Palestinian inmates reading canonic Jewish literature such as Jabotinsky’s ‘Iron Wall’ and Yehuda Ha’Levi’s ‘Kuzari’. They also regularly receive Israeli newspapers, their favorite being Ha’aretz – they have a permanent subscription and have a fit when it fails to arrive. In addition to the enrichment programs they’re entitled to from the system, the terror cells within the prisons cultivate education among their members – every member is required to learn Hebrew and serve a period as their spokesman.  They are also taught to gather intel, follow their guards, and follow commentary on Israeli news. They listen to the news and read the papers, and then they sit together and analyze the news and commentary. In particular they pay close attention to the social discord in Israel, to assess how fatigued Israeli society is and thus willing to make concessions. You have to understand that the Palestinian security inmate lives under iron discipline – especially those of them who are members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They waste no time and utilize their prison time to acquire education and skills that will come in handy for their terror activity and long-term plan execution”.

What is your opinion on the criticism on the living conditions of the security inmates?

“Security prisoners are not supposed to have the same conditions that criminal prisoners have, and this is also supported by international law. Whoever murders Jews just for being Jews should be held under completely different conditions. But in practice, the security prisons have long become a summer camp for terrorists. This happens, among others because of the justice system and the High Court of Justice, that hand down phantasmagoric rulings that are utterly out of touch with the reality in the prisons. One day, we were told that we cannot search under the prisoners’ prayer mats because it is disrespectful to their faith – do they even know what prisoners can hide or dig under their mats? As a matter of fact, there are Palestinian security prisoners whose sole job is to sit and compose petitions to the High Court of Justice. That is their job, to send petition after petition, and drive the system crazy. And if that were not enough, they also use lawyers and politicians to help them send out messages to associates on the outside and coordinate plans, and the General Security Service and the Attorney General’s office allow this to happen. If you ask me, the responsibility for the living conditions of security inmates should rest solely in the hands of the IPS, which is the suitable professional body for this, and my vast experience with the IPS teaches me that it would ensure that the security prisoners are treated according to what is stipulated by international law – no more, no less”.

“Every intelligence agency thinks they have a monopoly on brains”

Having climbed to key positions in the Israel Prison Service, Brigadier General Lahat has deep insights not only into the reality within prison walls but also on the fashion in which Israel’s entire security and intelligence apparatus works. One of the most material issues that she points to is the lack of collaboration among the various intelligence agencies. “Each agency thinks it has a monopoly on brains and that it knows better”, she says. “There is a lot of patronizing going around in these agencies, especially on part of the GSS and certain units within IDF Intelligence, and they don’t really strive to cooperate with the police and the prison service. When I was head of the IPS intelligence department, I literally begged them to collaborate with us because I knew we at the prison service, engaging with these prisoners on a daily basis, have valuable input. At that time some improvement was made in the relations between the IP and the intelligence agencies, but I think it pretty much went back to what it used to be. Even today, when I look at what is happening  in the Israeli intelligence community, I see nothing has changed”.

What about the deals for the release of prisoners – are they made without the IPS input?

“When they signed the Jibril prisoner exchange agreement (in 1985, when Israel had released 1,500 Palestinian prisoners – some of them very high profile – in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured in the First Lebanon War), we were not consulted at all, and in the Shalit deal – our involvement was just for appearances. Only after insisting on the presence of the Prison Service in the negotiations on the release of the terrorists, I was invited to the meetings. But even then, my role amounted to presenting background information on the terrorists. After all, the GSS is sure it knows everything, so why should it consult in the IPS?”

Sounds like you have a bellyful of grievances on the GSS. What is your opinion on its work in the past year?

“There are outstanding people in the GSS who do invaluable work, but personally I think that the GSS is a body that takes on responsibilities that are not within its scope of duty  – and often this comes at the expense of tasks that are”.

Generally speaking, do you get the impression that the policy of releasing prisoners in exchange for hostages influences the state of mind of the Palestinian prisoners?

“Very much so. The Palestinian prisoners truly believe that it’s only a matter of time till they are released and this keeps their spirits high. They don’t care how many years they’re sentenced to. Even prisoners who are sentenced to 60 years will say ‘Walla Ishi – “that’s nothing” – because they know that at one point or another, Israelis will be kidnapped and they’ll just be released in an exchange deal. Factually, they are not wrong”.

Are there any prisoners that will never be released with any deal?

“Aside from Yigal Amir (who is serving a life sentence for the assassination of PM Yitzhak Rabin) I know of no such prisoner. In the Jibreal deal and the Shalit deal we’ve released the worst of the terrorists, and I see the names of the terrorist that are on the table for release in the current exchange negotiations  for the Israeli hostages in Gaza and I’m absolutely appalled. When it comes to security prisoners, sooner or later they all get a chance to be released in an exchange deal”.

My family and I received threats, but I was never afraid

Retired Assistant Commissioner Betty Lahat is not just a former senior officer of the Israeli Prison Service – she is one of the first women in the organization to have scaled the ranks and chalk up such an impressive track record. “I don’t wave a feminist banner, but I have opened the doors to many women that followed in my footsteps and I’ve proved that we are every bit as good as the men in the IPS”, she admits. “I was a strong woman in a masculine environment and that wasn’t easy. When I was appointed head of the Sharon Prison,  which is one of Israel’s highest security prisons, there was big drama. Some had a hard time accepting a woman at the head of a men’s prison. When I first arrived, I was the target of scorning looks and remarks. But I didn’t let it affect me. I gathered everyone and proclaimed that I will not apologize for being a woman. Very soon, they all came to see my vast knowledge and experience, coupled with a deep familiarity with the brass tacks. They also saw how motivated I was and the important changes I effected, and no one dared act behind my back or try to sabotage me”.

Your job entailed daily dealings with the most dangerous prisoners in Israel. Weren’t you afraid?

“I had sat in the same room as heads of crime; I’ve sent terrorists to solitary confinement, and there was even a time when I would travel to Gaza by myself – I never felt scared. Even when our intelligence department notified me that there is intel about threats against me, I insisted to go into the wards and meet the prisoners. My family had also received dozens of threats. Marwan Barghouti’s people, for example, threatened to come after me for months because I took away some of their amenities in prison. I had to have a police detail on my house, but even then, I was not afraid. That was my job and that was part of the risk I had assumed with the job”.

What have you learned after 35 years with the IPS?

“One of the most painful insights that I’ve gained from my years with the IPS is that we cannot eradicate the incitement of terror in Palestinian society, and in truth – we really aren’t trying. Many of the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs are weaned from a very young age on hatred toward Jews, and then they go to school – some of them funded by the State of Israel – and are fed yet more false narratives. And if that weren’t enough, young boys are offered incentives for committing terror attacks. There are adolescents that are at the fringe of society, but after committing attacks against Israel, they are suddenly accepted, their families are provided for and they receive a salary. Also, in Israeli prisons, they are required to get their high school diploma, which is something that they could never have hoped to achieve on the outside. So what interest do they have to change their ways?  From what I saw, we do not really have the wherewithal to prevent these boys from becoming heinous terrorists in the future. Just like we cannot prevent the released terrorists from returning  to terrorism, nor from female prisoners from raising future generations of terrorists. These are unbreakable cycles”.

How had your career shape your outlook today as a citizen of Israel?

“I think my work taught me that there is no such thing as black and white. The reality in Israel is very complex and it is about time we stop trying to pull the country to one extreme or another. This is also one of the reasons I had joined the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. To me it is a hate-free movement that comes from a pragmatic stand point. The movement places the well-being of Israel above all and gives serious consideration to every issue related to the country’s security. This gives me the hope that it can lead us and the country to a better place”.

הפוסט “Whoever Was Surprised By the Cruelty of The Terrorists – Did not Really Know Them”, Interview with former Israel Prison Service Assistant Commissioner Brigadier General Betty Lahat הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey touches upon issues pertaining, among others, to the subject matter taught in Israeli schools, the scope of responsibility that Israel’s education establishment is charged with, and to the role of the education system, and its role in the shaping of the individual and collective identities in Israel.

In the next two papers, we will explore the results of the survey and the insights they offer. The present paper focuses on the values that should be instilled in Israel’s generation of school students, on the educational curriculum, and on the manner in which the educational system prepares its students for their future professional and civilian lives. The following paper explores the correlation between education and security, and the role of high school education in the preparation for military service.

The survey was conducted during September 2024 under the academic guidance of Dr. Ronen Itzik and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,611 respondents from the adult population in Israel (18+) who use the Internet, and was monitored to ensure appropriate representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religiosity, and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,611 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.5% with a probability of 95%; For the Jewish sample (1,354 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (257 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±6.2% with a probability of 95%.

What next after high school? Preparing students for adult life

Even a cursory glance shows one clear conclusion in regards to the public’s view of Israel’s education system: It is in urgent need of reform. The overwhelming majority of Israeli public thinks that the educational system fails to prepare its students for adult life, professionally and civically.

Results show that 80% of all respondents stated that the educational system does not provide students with sufficient vocational preparation and tools to allow them to join the job market, or that it provides minimal preparation – 75% thought that the educational system fails to prepare students for civilian life in Israel, or prepares them inadequately.

An additional aspect that indicated the imperative to reform the educational system is the declining numbers of vocational and agricultural schools, which have been disappearing from Israel’s educational map. 85% of the respondents support the establishment of vocational schools that would train students to join the manufacturing sector, and 70% support the establishment of agricultural schools. It seems that the public deeply understands that in the wake of the October 7 attack, Israel must chart a new list of priorities, wherein it achieves greater independence in the manufacturing of arms and ammunition, and greater agricultural self-sufficiency.

“The connection between industry and agriculture and Israel’s national security was clear even before the foundation of Israel. Jewish historical icon, Joseph Trumpeldor had already determined that Israel’s security line must be akin to the furrow line in the plowed field,” says chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi. “We in the movement also believe in this close connection, and therefore believe that the vocational and agricultural high schools that were popular in the formative years of Israel should be restored. Such high schools would also enable many students, who cannot get through the formal education system, to complete their schooling with professional qualifications and, will also inject high-quality manpower into the Israeli labor market reducing Israel’s dependence on foreign workers and imports, and will also strengthen the ideological connection between citizens and their country.”

Questioning values: the ideological role of the education system

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement believes that one of the roles of the educational system is to instill values rather than just knowledge. This notion had never been more significant as after October 7th, when it became clear that in order to survive, Israeli society must unite, and step up to the flag to serve in the army. As part of the survey, participants were asked to answer a number of questions pertaining to the ideological role of the educational system in Israel, both in Jewish and Arab societies.

According to the results of the combined sample, 65% of all respondents believe that the educational system places too much emphasis on grades, while 77% believe that the system does not place enough emphasis on values. In addition, when asked to choose from given options what the main goal of the educational system is, 48% of the respondents stated that the goal is to promote values of personal development, compared to 52% who stated that the system’s ultimate goal is to promote values of group affiliation and cooperation.

“The absolute importance of grades and personal achievement – particularly in STEM subjects – indicates that the educational system concentrates its efforts in priming its students for higher academic education, thereby tying youth development to the required standard of academic performance in high education institutes, as a personal objective that must be achieved”, says Colonel (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik. “In and of itself, this is not wrong, but it clearly comes at the expense of the time and resources that the educational system could be devoting to instilling values and building a national ethos that is consistent with the uniqueness of the State of Israel. The findings show a disturbing imbalance that is expressed by the preference of the value of individualism over the collective – something that does not correspond to the demands of the reality in Israeli society with its complex challenges.”

The participants were also asked to select the values they thought are most important to instill in students in Israel. The leading value was that of personal responsibility, which was selected by 68% of the respondents. That was immediately followed by the values of tolerance (64%), patriotism (60%), Zionism (51%), and connection to tradition (48%). At the bottom of the table appeared the values of helping the weak (41%) and the service to the state (37%).

It is worth mentioning that with regard to certain values, there were significant discrepancies between Jews and Arabs. For example, 66% of the Jews chose the value of patriotism, compared to 28% of the Arab respondents.

A look at a segmentation according to political ideology also reveals several significant discrepancies:

• 68% of the right-wing respondents chose instillation of Zionism, compared to 43% on the left;

• 74% of the respondents on the right chose the value of patriotism, compared to 45% on the left;

• 47% of respondents on the right of the political map chose tolerance, compared to 91% on the left;

• 31% of the right-wing respondents chose critical thinking, compared to 75% on the left.

The most significant discrepancy was recorded around the value “Connection to Tradition”, which was chosen by 70% from the right but only 9% from the left.

“It’s pleasing to see that the values of patriotism and connection to Zionism are at the top of the chart, and that most of Israel’s public understands that it is important to instill these values in the students of Israel’s educational system”, stresses Avivi. “However, the ideological differences in relation to these values is worrying, and prove what we at the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have been saying all along – Zionism has become essential to politics, and these findings represent a great threat to the justness of our path and to our existence here”.

The educational system as an identity shaping agent

With the understanding that the educational system plays an important role in shaping students’ personal and national identity, some of the survey’s questions were directed at the Jewish respondents while other – at the Arab respondents.

Thus, for example, the Jewish participants were asked what they thought were the most important subject to emphasize in the pedagogical curriculum in order to connect students to their Jewish identity and heritage. The subject that was cited the most was the history of the Jewish nation and the Holocaust, which was selected by 62% of the Jewish participants, followed by the history of the Land of Israel (47%), holidays and tradition (40%), the geography of Israel (40%) and the history of Zionism (33%).

A look at the ideological segmentation between right, center, and left on the political map shows that there are almost identical findings on the topics of the history of the Jewish people, as well as the history of Zionism. However, there were marked differences regarding other areas of knowledge. For example, 53% of the right-wing respondents chose holidays and tradition, compared to 12% on the left; 7% on the right chose Israeli literature and culture, compared to 37% on the left.

It seems that there is a broad consensus in Israel’s public in regard to most fields of knowledge that should be on the educational curriculum. However, these are still discrepancies regarding other fields of knowledge, especially those pertaining to religious subjects. Generally speaking, the right-wing traditionally tends to have a stronger affiliation to religion, which may explain why those respondents placed the subject of holidays and tradition higher. As oppose to them, the left traditionally is more connected with humanities and non-religious philosophy which is why those respondents preferred the subjects of literature and culture.

Over the years, voices have been rising from within the Arab population criticizing the Arab education in Israel, and suggesting various reforms aimed at bringing it up to par. To gauge the sentiment in Arab society the Arab participants were asked to respond to a number of questions tailored to them. Two of these questions pertained to the body that should be in charge of formal education programs for Israeli Arabs. The first question focused on general subjects such as math, English and sciences. The second question focused on the subjects that are tightly connected with the national ethos, such as history, literature and civic studies.

The results clearly indicate that the majority of the Arab public prefers leaving the state of affairs as it is – i.e. responsibility for the curriculum for Arab students under the Education Department of the Arab Society in the Israeli Ministry of Education (58% and 49% support this, respectively). Some of the participants noted that they would like the curriculum to be transferred to the responsibility of an Arab pedagogical council, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, similar to the pedagogical councils of the state-religious and ultra-Orthodox schools (37% and 41%, respectively). Only a minority of the respondents indicated that they would like to see the Arab sector’s curriculum transferred to the responsibility of a body appointed by the educational system in the Palestinian Authority (5% and 10%, respectively).

In addition to the separate questions, both demographics were asked whether they would send their children to a mixed Jewish-Arab school. The results are almost completely opposite, with 68% of the Jewish respondents said they wouldn’t send their children to a mixed school, and only 32% agreed, whereas among the Arab respondents, 29% objected and 71% agreed.

These findings may stem from the distrust of the Arab society on part of the Jewish society in the wake of October 7, and therefore most Jews are not interested in having their children learn with their Arab counterparts. Also, it may stem from the discrepancy between the Jewish and Arab educational systems, and perhaps Arab parents believe that their children could acquire better education in Jewish schools. Another cause may be greater solidarity with Jews among the Israeli Arab population after October 7.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement sees education as a cornerstone in shaping Israel’s future citizens, preserving the national ethos, and strengthening national security, and therefore takes the results of this survey very seriously.

Above all, it seems that the majority of the public – regardless of sectoral or political affiliation – believes that the educational system in Israel is failing to prepare students for life. Moreover, most participants believe that schools should place less emphasis on grades and more emphasis on values, and promote teamwork and cooperation among students.

הפוסט IDSF Index: Education and Security – fundamental Aspects הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The previous survey touched upon the values that the public believed should be instilled in Israel’s school students in Israeli schools, their pedagogical content, and the manner in which the education system prepares students for their professional and civic lives. The present survey explores the correlation between education and security and the role of Israeli high schools in preparing their students for military service.

The survey was conducted during September 2024 under the academic guidance of Dr. Ronen Itzik and with the statistical guidance of Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,611 respondents from the adult population in Israel (18+) who use the Internet, and was monitored to ensure appropriate representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religious and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,611 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.5% with a probability of 95%; For the Jewish sample (1,354 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a probability of 95%; For the Arab sample (257 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±6.2% with a probability of 95%.

To teach or not to teach? Topics of national security in pedagogical curriculums

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement strongly believes that education is a fundamental building block in a robust national security and a crucial element in the shared ethos of Israeli society – both of which are vital for Israel’s existence in the Land of Israel. This part of the survey aims to examine whether Israeli public also identifies the correlation between education and security.

According to the results, 93% of the Jewish respondents, and 86% of all respondents, agree with the statement that education is a cornerstone of Israel’s national security. Furthermore, 90% of Jewish respondents and 83% of all respondents agree with the statement that the education system plays a decisive role in shaping the national ethos.

With the belief in the tight relationship between education and security, and on the backdrop of the imperative to build an ethos of a society that steps up to the flag and all walks of life serve in the army and honor those who serve in the security forces – the IDSF HaBithonistim movement believes that it is the duty of Israel’s educational system to provide its students with knowledge regarding the strategic threats and other issues of national security. These are explored as well in the present study.

The respondents were asked to what extent they thought the Israel’s educational system deals with the current security threats. 62% of the respondents thought that the educational system does not deal at all or deals to a small extent with the security threats Israel is facing. 26% thought that the system does deal with this subject to a reasonable extent, 5% thought that the topic is addressed to a satisfactory extent while only 2% thought that the educational system deals with the topic of security threats to a great extent.

The respondents were also asked whether they thought it was important for the educational system to add to the educational program lessons on critical issues to Israel’s national security such as the multi-arena threats Israel is facing, the Iranian threat and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 86% of the respondents – Arab and Israeli participants all together – thought it was important to add this subject matter to the curriculum, while 40% of them thought this was crucial.

“The findings of the survey cast a very scathing light on the inadequacy of the preparation Israel youth receives in school for the unique life challenges that life in Israel presents, and in particular, the critical life-stage most of them are expecting – service in the Israeli Defense Forces”, argues Colonel (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik. “The lack of knowledge in regard with the security challenges that ring Israel inherently impedes the understanding of the significance of military service, and at that enlistment into combat service. This is not congruent with the existing reality in Israel, in which only half of Israeli youth complete their mandatory military service, especially in the current reality with which Israel is dealing”.

In the State of Israel, most high school graduates enlist in military service in a very short while after finishing school. This means that the only reasonable time to prepare them for their military service is during high school. This survey explored public opinion on whether high schools should indeed be tasked with this undertaking, and what would be the most effective preparatory programs.

Results show that 95% of the Jewish participants thought that high schools should offer to some extent preparatory content and only 5% thought they shouldn’t. Of those who supported this idea, nearly 50% thought that high schools should deal with this matter to a large extent.

The participants were then asked to select which activities they deemed most appropriate for inclusion in preparatory programs. Most respondents thought that excursion and history and heritage tours were most important – selected by 70%. This was followed by meetings with serving school graduates (47%); youth movement activities (39%); one-week military youth (GADNA) program (35%) and lectures and talks by security and military personnel (34%).

“Preparation for meaningful military service begins in high school, and schools that shirk this responsibility are first and foremost hurting their students by not letting them gain the knowledge and tools that are crucial for the next phase of their life”, says chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim Brigadier General Amir Avivi. “We in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement try to help with this and prepare young men and women for their military service, and hold seminars on security issues and history and heritage excursions tailored for youth”.

Education is indeed a cornerstone of security: conclusions

In order to ensure the security of Israel, Israeli society must be one that serves in the army. However, this notion is not a call to focus on the collective and security concerns alone. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s aspiration is for a society that is “between Athens and Sparta”. In other words, a society with a rich culture that promotes education on one hand, and on the other – an ideological society that is willing to make personal sacrifices for the sake of the collective.

Since the educational system is the agent that shapes the future generation of Israeli citizens, it should also be responsible for providing knowledge and instilling values. However, the survey shows that oftentimes, it falls short of fulfilling this duty.

This understanding had led the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to add education to its list of activities.  Members of the movement frequently meet with high school students and students in pre-military preparatory programs, conduct heritage tours for youth, and give lectures and meetings on issues of national identity and security. The movement is also currently working on establishing a new pre-military preparatory school called “Tekuma,” which will be established in the settlement of Tekuma in the Gaza envelope, and will focus on Zionist values, connection to the Land of Israel, and the instillation of a national Zionist ethos.

הפוסט The IDSF HaBithonistim movement Index: Education and Values – Education as A Basis for National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, is turning 89 this month. Even before the open and pressing question of his successor as the chairman of the PA, his rule is already leaving the Authority in disarray. “The PA is in a state of collapse and dilapidation,” says Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid. “It doesn’t pay salaries to its employees; the entire Samaria region is no longer under its control; it doesn’t manage to operate as a political entity, and in regards to the Authority’s future – that’s the big question”.

The Lost Generation of the PA

Baruch, in an article you published last April, you mention a survey according to which most Palestinians view the PA as dead weight and demand its dismantling. Is that still true?

“True. But not a single survey – but a series of poles that found that a significantly high number of Palestinians – sometimes as high as 60 or 80 percent of them – view the Authority as a burden and do not perceive it as a historical achievement. They understand that aside from security coordination that serves mainly the IDF – the Palestinian Authority does not serve the Palestinian dream. It is on the background of this unrest that Hamas was able to garner such widespread sympathy”.

Even today, after the war, the organization enjoys such broad support?

“It’s hard and perhaps even impossible to know how much support Hamas currently has in Gaza, however, in Judea and Samaria it is very well supported. The buildup of Hamas in Judea and Samaria on the expense of the PA is a trend that was evident in all of the surveys on the topic from the past five-six years, although one must take Palestinian surveys with a grain of salt as they often distort the data. At any rate, these surveys clearly show what the world already knows: the Palestinian public harshly criticizes Abu Mazen, who originally was elected for a term of only five years, but after nearly 20 years is still in power, without ever having held elections for the presidency of the PA or its parliament”.

Who will step in to fill the vacuum left by the PA?

“At the present, there are some 40 organizations of Hamas, PIJ and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, particularly in the Samaria region and further north. These are young people, the group of 15–30-year-olds, which in regards to the PA are a lost generation. They were born after the Oslo Accords and hate the Authority because nothing in their lives had improved. They view Hamas and the military path as the realization of their ideological aspirations. Add to that the money that Hamas and Hezbollah pour into the region”.

How can the PA restore the public’s trust?

“Fatah members as well as Abu Mazen know that that in the 2006 elections, Fatah got more votes than Hamas, but the votes were distributed among the factions that comprise Fatah – nowadays it has three and a half leaders and several organizations and this is its greatest problem and the reason Hamas won the elections at the time with a landslide. So the solution is a reform, and everyone is pressuring Abu Mazen to introduce reforms; The Egyptians and Saudis also demanded that the PA undergo reform, but Abu Mazen has not complied due to fatigue and conservatism and his unwillingness to open the government to additional players”.

Why has he not complied with the demands?

“Most likely he hasn’t the energy to make reforms and open up the system and prefers to lean of the current situation. He prefers to preserve the current state rather than take risks. Everyone surrounding him is waiting for him to leave. He is more a token leader that a leader in effect. However, it is unclear what the day after will bring in the PA – whether he will be succeeded by another element in Fatah, if his moderate line will remain, or whether his successor will be Marwan Barghouti, who is very close to Hamas and very militant, or another leader that would collaborate with Hamas, and if elections will be held – in the event that Hamas takes over the Authority”.

The Return of the Saudis to the Abraham Accords

So many open questions. And what are the implications for Israel?

“The conclusion is that, in my opinion, Israel cannot rely on the PA as a viable factor.  I believe that the Egyptians and Saudis also realize this. Everyone – including the Americans and Emiratis – are demanding that Abbas carry out the reforms in order to prepare the ground for his successor, and after he steps down, everything will be open to a new reality,  and not necessarily a positive one.”

How should Israel act at the moment?

“It should maintain full security control of Judea and Samaria and Gaza, while at the same time cultivating a Palestinian civilian apparatus that will undertake the care of the population. For the time, under Abbas, this is happening, but there is no guarantee that it will be so in the future, and certainly there is no guarantee that it will be so in the long term. Israel should also try to expand the Abraham Accords, including interim agreements regarding the Palestinian Authority.”

That means agreeing to a Palestinian State, right?

“It will be necessary to give the Sunni states a horizon of some two-state solution, but this doesn’t have to happen at this moment, and is the biggest political challenge, since the Saudis, for example, declare morning, noon and night that without a Palestinian state, there will be no normalization. Although the messages Israel is receiving are different, this is the general direction”.

“At this stage, the model should be one in which Israel does not forgo the two-state option – i.e. does not annex Judea and Samaria and does not dismantle the Palestinian Authority. This would allow Saudi Arabia to enter an agreement. But the implementation of the solution itself will depend on a long-term agreement and will also be subject to changes. We’re talking about a period of 10 to 20 years, during which the Palestinian street will have to undergo significant change, and it also depends on the decline of Iran’s influence. Some sources in the Gulf states say it’s possible.”

Will the PA Return to Gaza?

In  order to understand the relations between the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, we need to go back to 2007, when Hamas deposed Fatah and seized control of Gaza in a series of violent clashes. Until that point, the PA had a bureaucratic apparatus set up in Gaza with its own officials. “Until today the PA claims it still has 18 thousand civil servants and 18 thousand security personnel in the Gaza Strip. In other words – over 30 thousand people that have remained in their positions, even under Hamas rule”.

Is this true?

“It’s unclear, and it is highly unlikely in the case of the security apparatus. Hamas did keep some Fatah members in professional positions withing Gaza’s civil service, and in many cases chose to place its own people in executive positions alone. However, it remains unclear how many Fatah members have actually remained in Gaza after Hamas’ takeover”.

And now the PA is planning its return to Gaza?

“As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned – and this it had stated even before the outbreak of the war – it is still the boss in Gaza. The Authority views its demand for a return to control in Gaza as only natural, thus it endeavored dozens of reconciliation attempts with Hamas. Two months ago, the Authority sent the Americans a 101-page document, in which it claims that it is the governing body of Gaza and that it has a plan for the reinstatement of its governance, such as reopening the hospitals, schools, government offices, and more. The Americans – it must be said – were not convinced”.

What is the position of the Arab states?

“Here things start getting complicated. Naturally the Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis all publicly support the control of the PA in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, as it serves the two-state vision. But under the surface the Egyptians and Saudis have a lot of criticism against the Authority and they are appalled by the corruption and its dysfunction and from the fact that Abu Mazen hasn’t held elections for the chairmanship of the Authority and for its parliament for nearly 20 years. But this is under the surface, and the Saudis still continue to transfer broad financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Only recently Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with the Saudi ambassador to Jodan, who transferred him aid money”.

In other words – the Arab world does not publicly criticize the PA?

“Public criticism of the Palestinian Authority is heard mainly in the Emirates. Two months ago, a proposal was made according to which the UAE undertakes financial support to the Authority, but the UAE rejected the suggestion out of hand, because they object to Abu Mazen heading the PA. This is why in an interview to The New York Times,  Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan proclaimed ‘no Abbas and no Hamas’. I’ve encountered this position on part of many sources in the Authority even before Dahlan. There are other sources that would like to see a governing body in Gaza as well as Judea and Samaria that is neither Abu Mazen nor Hamas”.

Abu Mazen’s Condition: Hamas Acknowledges the Oslo Accords

What is the position of the Sunni Arab states on Gaza?

“Egypt, Jordan and Saudia view Hamas as a terror organization. The UAE has plans for Gaza which designates as Chairman of the PA Dr. Salam Fayyad, former PM of the Authority under Abu Mazen more than a decade ago. Dr. Fayyad is not a member of Fatah or the PLO. He is an expert on economics. The moderate Arab world and the US wish to see him as head of the Palestinian Authority. However, Qatar has a long-standing vision of political Islam, which they hoped Hamas would realize. Already in 2019, the Qataris met with Hamas in Judea and Samaria and offered to fund them in the elections, but they would rather see Khaled Mashal as head of Hamas, They don’t favor Sinwar, who had detested and insulted them. There was no love lost between them– Qatar and Sinwar. Some claim that now the Qataris have the opportunity to try and reassert their influence with the Hamas leadership that resides overseas, but the Iranian’s and Hezbollah also want to maintain close ties with Hamas”.

What kind of relations would Qatar have between Hamas and the PA?

“Qatar would like to see Hamas as part of the PLO, as it would legitimize Hamas, and make it less militant. But Abu Mazen set a condition for this: if you want to be part of the PLO – you have to accept the Oslo Accords, which means the implied recognition in the State of Israel.  Meanwhile, Hamas is led by a council in lieu of a new leader, and it there appears to be a power struggle between the more moderate camp – the Muslim Brotherhood supported by Qatar – and the militant camp, which is close to Iran”.

In April you wrote that Mohammad Dahlan – the Fata leader living in Abu Dabi – is promoting a plan for leadership of the Gaza Strip, with the backing of a Arab Sunni force. Is this still true?

“Yes, he’s still working on it. But he also understands that forming the Arab force he’s talking about can only happen as part of a diplomatic process, and he understands that for the time being, Israel is not seeking any diplomatic arrangement, He understands that he’ll be forced to find a solution in collaboration with the Palestinian Authority. According to my sources, Dahlan’s people have recently  spoke on numerous occasions with Abu Mazen’s people to find a path to reconciliation and unite the forces in Gaza,. Also Israeli Defense Minister Galant’s ‘Security Island Plan’ for concentrating Gaza’s population in ‘humanitarian bubbles’ with a civil apparatus for each such bubble comprising locals that will be armed with light arms – is very acceptable on part of the Emiratis”.

הפוסט Lt. Col. (Res.) Baruch Yedid: “The Palestinian Authority Is In A State Of Collapse” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the days of gloom that followed October 7, 2023, it was unclear exactly how we would manage to win the war. Now, with Hamas already shattered as a military organization and with Hezbollah being heavily hit, not only can an Israeli victory be glimpsed on the horizon but a time of thriving, initiated upon the Day After, can be dreamt of.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

Most decisions were right: The war in retrospect

The October 7 disaster wrought great confusion and uncertainty, but one thing was certain from the start: This war will take time. There were two main reasons — first, that the Gaza Strip was full of tunnels and that the Hamas infrastructure there would require a complex, systematic effort of dismantling; and second, that among the ground forces the level of strength and armament was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. In recent decades, the IDF had closed down a number of reserve battalions and the army had a relatively small stock of weaponry at hand. Israel had to resolve itself to mount a counterattack in Gaza while mounting nothing more than a defense on the other fronts. Because of that gradation of fighting, it was only after 11 months that the State of Israel shifted the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

From examination of the circumstances in which we entered the war, it appears that the fighting was handled successfully for the most part and that most of the decisions were correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to act differently.

First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. The military dismissed large numbers of reservists relatively early, and it may be that if it had not done so, we would have been able to pressure Hamas more strongly and shorten the fighting in Gaza.

Second, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Hamas long enjoyed an oxygen supply in the form of control over the Corridor, which enabled it to fortify itself through the Sinai. If we had cut off that oxygen supply in the first days of the war, the entire course of fighting would have looked different.

The third point, which to this day has not been properly addressed, is the control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives and thus it enables Hamas both to strengthen itself and to preserve its standing as the authority governing the Gazan populace.

Shock and awe: The current state of the war

The southern front

At the start of the war, the Southern Command estimated that it would need a year to dismantle Hamas as a military organization. Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity, as shown by its markedly reduced ability to launch rockets into Israeli territory.

The nature of the fighting in Gaza today differs from what we saw at the war’s beginning. In the first months, the IDF was obliged to operate at great intensity, with a large deployment and with coordinated attacks. In addition, it needed to operate systematically — that is to say, street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood — in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy the infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks together with air force personnel. At the same time we see systematic elimination of senior Hamas officials. Most senior officials of the organization, including Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif, have already been eliminated. The loss of senior officials weakens the organization not only militarily but in terms of governance as well, and it is an important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. We see a method of operation in the north that is reminiscent of the military doctrine developed by the USA in the late 1990s, known as “Shock and Awe.” The idea behind the doctrine is to frighten and weaken the enemy until it loses the will to fight. In that spirit, almost all the senior officials of Hezbollah, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, were already eliminated early in the fighting.

Furthermore, the IDF is undermining Hezbollah with a series of unusual operations. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. Over and above the physical harm to the terrorists, the operation also spread powerful intimidation and proved how penetrable the organization was. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force, which battered the Hezbollah infrastructures and deprived the organization of some significant capabilities.

Israel hoped that such a sequence of operations would compel Hezbollah to retreat completely from southern Lebanon and to stop firing at Israel — thus enabling the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Still, Israel took into account that Hezbollah might continue fighting nonetheless, in which case a ground operation in Lebanon would be necessary.

That operation, if it goes forward, will differ from the operation that we saw in Gaza. On the one hand, southern Lebanon is significantly less densely populated than Gaza and most of its residents have already fled, so that there will be less friction with the locals. On the other hand, southern Lebanon’s landscape is liable to present a greater challenge, with its many hills and abundant foliage. It must be stressed that Hezbollah, like Hamas, has upgraded its subterranean capabilities; and we know that many of the organization’s strategic assets — including arms factories and bases — are underground. Thus southern Lebanon too portends difficult fighting, at least some of it in tunnels.

You can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon: Important conclusions from the war’s first year

On October 7 last year, we suffered a catastrophe. But that catastrophe awakened Israel from a long sleep and made Israel aware of what sizeable threats it faces. With time, that awareness has eroded among some of the leadership and public; and today there are those who call upon us to return to a policy of keeping our eyes closed.

In order that Israel remain secure over the coming generations, the State of Israel — leaders and society alike — must take action at a number of levels:

• Strictly preserving external security: First of all, we must confront the immediate threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But there’s more to the story. We must revise our outdated national security doctrine and understand that “deterring, alerting, and defeating” does not sum up the essentials. Israel’s security doctrine must include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders, and of nipping any terrorist force in the bud. It is unthinkable that we tolerate a situation where 50 thousand armed terrorists are located 100 meters from our border fence. That is a tsunami, and you can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon. Or a tablespoon.
• Strengthening governability and internal security: In the shadow of the external threats, we must not forget that the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has dogged us for 100 years now, is still alive domestically. The State of Israel must deal with the matter of governance within the country and ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel may feel safe in their country.
• Battling delegitimization and anti-Semitism: For years we have been confronted with inciteful attempts to delegitimize Israel and stir up anti-Semitism all over the world, and since the outbreak of war the campaign has only intensified. The State of Israel must subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague, encouraging demonstrations, and bringing anti-Semitism into the streets and universities — forces led by the Palestinian Authority. To our regret, the State of Israel has not yet formulated a strategy for concrete action in the face of this severe problem.
• Instilling a common national ethos: We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. Solidarity is not a luxury but a requirement for ensuring our security and survival, because without a set of values and an ethos, no tanks or airplanes will avail.
• Establishing an enlisted society— In the State of Israel, not serving is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate. At the same time, it must be stressed that this does not mean turning into Sparta. Israel is not a nation that glorifies power and violence. On the contrary, this nation lionizes culture and innovation. The balance is an important one, which we must all practice as individuals and as a society.

As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the pathway is a long one. Today, after the many drubbings we’ve delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts.

We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Our view is that the more greatly Israel triumphs in the war, the more greatly it will thrive after the war. When the states of the world, including our enemies’ states, see our strength displayed, they will be spurred to sign peace agreements and establish strong coalitions with us. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon. There will be mass immigration to Israel and we will also see the birthrate surge as it generally does after wartime.

In order to reach those optimal days, we must maintain patience, determination, and solidarity, and not ease off the gas pedal until we have passed successfully through all the challenges that lie before us.

הפוסט The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges: Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The principal goal of the IDSF movement is to safeguard the security of Israel for the coming generations, but the movement understands that security and economics advance hand in hand. In this article, Dr. Zvi Marom will detail what the State of Israel must do in order to develop its industrial sector and maintain its standing as a “start-up nation.”

Dr. Marom is one of the best-known and most experienced figures in Israel’s technological sector. As an academic, he holds degrees in electronic engineering and industrial electronics as well as a doctorate in dentistry from Tel Aviv University. As a businessman, he founded BATM Ltd. and managed it until December 2022; and for years he chaired the board of directors at the Israeli High-Tech Association (part of the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel). Dr. Marom is also the recipient of important awards including techMARK Personality of the Year and the 2021 Industry Prize from the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel. In March 2024 he was even awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit of Hungary.

Background — Hi-tech and other advanced industries in Israel today

Israelis have come to consider their country a “hi-tech nation,” but in fact it is primarily a “start-up nation.” Israeli entrepreneurs excel at forming small and medium-size companies based on innovation and creativity, but in many cases those companies are sold to large enterprises, or are floated on the stock exchange, so that control passes to new shareholders — primarily American. Figures show that the number of start-ups in Israel is high even in comparison much larger countries, and the reason lies in two factors:

• In the past, the country aided start-ups with government guarantees and conditional grants, for example under the “Yozma” program, and thus the start-ups were better able to raise funds for the critical fledgling stage.
• Israel has skilled and talented workers in the engineering and computer fields. It owes that workforce to a number of factors: immigration of experienced professionals from the former Soviet Union, the release of trained engineering workers upon the halt of the Lavie project, and demobilized soldiers who bring training and experience from the IDF’s technological units.
• The hi-tech sector has gained in strength worldwide, and it set many private venture capital funds scouting in Israel. Those funds established channels of nongovernmental funding and presented start-ups with further opportunities for growth.
• The large number of start-up companies produced an accumulation of managerial knowhow that contributed to the growth of further start-ups, so that a self-nourishing cycle emerged here.

Today we are witness to a new process in which Israel is changing from a “start-up nation” into an “innovation nation.” That is to say, Israel’s economy rests on creative, innovative workers at the forefront of their fields. The objective is to advance Israeli innovativeness while continuing to support the founding of start-ups.

Aside from hi-tech companies and start-ups, the technology sector in Israel also includes advanced industries and security industries that are also considered world leaders in their fields. Those companies have the potential to contribute enormously to Israel’s economy and security, and they can also help by leveraging projects of international cooperation.

However, we must not rest on our laurels. The hi-tech and other advanced industrial sectors, however successful they may be, must constantly innovate in order to retain Israel’s technological advantage in the world. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that those sectors are already suffering today from more than a few difficulties that threaten not only themselves but also the overall Israeli economy and security services, which depend on innovations and technological developments from Israeli industries.

Dr. Zvi Marom: The Economic Vision for the Hi-Tech and Other Advanced Technology Sectors

Advancing education and professional training

The current situation:

Like all other fields, hi-tech and other advanced industries depend strongly on their workforce. Among the measures of a workforce’s quality are education and professional skills — two aspects that require improvement.

Where education is concerned, academia in Israel and worldwide is deteriorating. A portion has turned into a trade guild, and a portion has surrendered to the progressive agenda that prevents it from impartially promoting academic learning. In addition, many universities have become diploma mills where the demands on students — and especially on those considered “less privileged” — constantly decline.

Where professionalism is concerned, certain jobs in technological industry are unjustly considered inferior. Technology in all its aspects is an intrinsic part of industry as a whole, and jobs such as operating industrial machinery, which require higher education, should be properly rewarded.

Ideally:

• Investment in technological education: Technological education in Israel needs to be dramatically strengthened, and young people need to be encouraged to study technical subjects. In that connection, the universities must adapt themselves to the technological demand from the marketplace, update their curricula, and expand the relevant departments such as computer engineering. The students from underprivileged backgrounds should be supported with scholarships and benefits but not by means of academic concessions that reduce their level of education.
• Professional training: Technological workers must be trained, with an emphasis on industrial workers who will command the technological knowledge necessary for operating heavy machinery and for undertaking advanced manufacturing processes. Appropriate education and high standards should be expected from those workers, and at the same time they should be rewarded with good conditions and suitable salaries.

Encouraging competition in the defense industry

The current situation:

Our defense industry is outstanding, but because of excessive bureaucracy and regulatory difficulties, small companies are not managing to enter the defense industry. Thus a situation has evolved in which the defense industry rests primarily on three companies: Elbit, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael. They have become a near-monopoly. Such a situation violates the principle of business competition and brings harm to Israel’s standing as a hi-tech nation.

Furthermore, whereas in the past Israel’s armaments industry was highly developed, over time it has shrunk and today we rely primarily on importing materiel from the USA — thus harming our economy and our self-reliance.

Ideally:

• Total war against monopolies: Entrepreneurship and competition must be nurtured, especially in the defense industries, and small companies must be encouraged to grow alongside the three giant defense corporations.
• Enlarging the armaments industries: A well-developed armaments industry will be very profitable to Israel, in contrast to today when we are paying more for American materiel than we would pay to manufacture our own. Moreover, a well-developed armaments industry will also give Israeli security more independence.

Fighting bureaucracy and wastefulness

The current situation:

Israel’s governmental services are mostly inefficient and rife with obstacles, resulting in delays and in improper usage of workers and of resources. Regrettably, many of the difficulties that the governmental services present are deliberate. The jobs are intended to inflate the staff of one manager or another, and their usefulness is nil.

Similarly, the military suffers from inefficiency and has slipped heavily into wastefulness in terms of resources and staff. Waste in the military takes various forms: Many units, such as the Army Radio, make no contribution to security but use up money and personnel; many bases, including the Kirya in Tel Aviv, are tying up some of Israel’s most valuable real estate; soldiers in the regular army receive outsized financial benefits; IDF delegations travelling overseas are overstaffed; and the list goes on and on.

Both in the civil service and in the security establishment, the wastefulness peaks toward the end of the fiscal year on the understanding that any money remaining unspent will be lost and possibly even excluded from the next year’s budget. Thus as each calendar year nears its end, we witness voluminous unnecessary spending.

The problem of wastefulness is well recognized, but budget cutting is greatly opposed at the highest levels of government. Among the reasons for that opposition is the overly close relationship between security and politics. After all, many security figures in Israel continue almost immediately into a political career — so instead of considering the good of the military, they’re considering mainly their professional future.

Ideally:

• Tackle the government bureaucracy: Israel’s public services must be made more efficient in order to prevent wastage of time, resources, and staff. To that purpose, the way of management at the ministries must be comprehensively improved, from the point of budgeting to the point of implementation.
• Fight wastefulness: Wastefulness, in the public services and in the IDF, must be attacked with full force. First, budget-cutting options must be examined — such as closing departments and units and relocating offices and bases to locations in the periphery. Second, the budget must be managed transparently and there must be certainty that outlays contribute to the nation and to its security.
• Separating security from politics: In order to make budget-cutting possible, the political and military systems must be separated. More precisely, there must be an end to the cycle of Chiefs of Staff who become Ministers of Defense. It was clear to David Ben-Gurion, back in his day, that the army must not be its own regulator. And even the Romans asked: Who will stand watch over the watchmen?

Grant tax relief

The current situation:

A liberal policy of taxation is fundamental to the development of entrepreneurship. If burdened by taxes from the outset, an entrepreneur will have great difficulty achieving growth and may fail to reach take-off. The State must understand that it has an economic interest in encouraging business growth and success. Successful entrepreneurs contribute in due course to increasing the treasury’s tax revenues.

However, as of today Israel’s state support for its growing businesses is insufficient, imposing difficulty on entrepreneurs and harming economic growth.

Ideally:

• Tax benefits: The government must provide significant tax benefits to growing businesses so that they may consolidate a foothold in the early stages of business development.

The defense industry: Two sides of the same coin — Summation and conclusions

It is pleasant and easy to keep viewing Israel as a start-up nation or hi-tech nation, but it is necessary to understand that technology moves ceaselessly forward and if we become complacent we will no longer deserve those titles. For the sake of its economy and security, Israel must strengthen its hi-tech sector and other advanced industrial sectors, with an emphasis on military industry.

To that end, we must examine the existing difficulties — including bureaucratic restrictions, wastage of resources, and insufficiently trained students — and find a way to overcome those difficulties and make Israel not merely a start-up nation worthy of the name but also a nation of innovation one step ahead of all others.

It must be understood that the necessary changes will not come about at a single stroke. Long-term processes must be put into place encompassing all the relevant fields in order to return Israel’s hi-tech and other industries to a stable leading position in the international arena.

הפוסט Ideally — The Economic Vision of the IDSF Movement Featuring: Hi-tech and Other Advanced Industries הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building—Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, on the erosion of demilitarization.

The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered. Shimon Peres Tomorrow is Now, 1978.

We don’t need to issue a daily report to Israel on the operation [in Sinai] as it is a matter of sovereignty and national security—Egyptian Military, Reuters, August 21, 2012.

As the war rages on unabated in Gaza, the idea of demilitarization has once again taken center stage in the debate on how the fighting is to end. However, its proponents seem blissfully unaware of the fact that Gaza is already supposed to be demilitarized right now under the terms of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords.

A unique context?

The stunning failure of demilitarization in Gaza as a means for attaining peace makes a thorough probe into the notion—its theoretical rationale, its practical feasibility, an analysis of its past practice, and an assessment of its future prospects for success—both timely and apt.

As a cautionary aside, it should be noted that this paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all examples of demilitarization across the globe (such as the Solomon Islands and Costa Rica); or a comprehensive study of the history of demilitarization since the initial implementation of the notion (arguably from the 1856 Treaty of Paris).

Rather, it is meant to be confined to instances where demilitarization arrangements are likely to have policy relevance for Israel, making examples such as the demilitarization of Japan or in the Korean peninsula beyond the scope examined.

Indeed, the policy-pertinence of demilitarization regarding the Middle East conflict, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, has its own unique characteristics and exigencies. Accordingly, inferences valid in numerous other instances may not be readily transferable for application in this case. Indeed, as a Foreign Policy article correctly underlines:

“None of the existing states and territories without armed forces compare to the uniquely difficult circumstances faced by Israelis and Palestinians, and none offers a model that can simply be adopted to resolve one of the most intractable conflicts in one of the world’s most restive regions.”

The sovereignty imperative

According to Oxford Public International Law:

“The concept of demilitarization denotes the reduction or even total abolishment of armaments…and military presence in a specific geographic area. In operational terms, it implies the dismantlement of arms, ammunition, and armed forces in order to put them beyond military use. Demilitarization also connotes the process of sustained reductions in the influence of the military in a given State and society”.

For the purposes of this analysis, we distinguish between “Demilitarization,” an externally imposed arrangement (see below), and “Demobilization,” which refers to the voluntary reduction in the size of the demobilizing party’s army.

As such, demilitarization cuts against the grain of the overarching organizing concept of the international system—that of sovereign nation-states existing in an anarchic system in which there is no recognized hierarchical order. It is, thus, a process that is antithetical to the existential nature of a sovereign political organism. Indeed, one might say that it runs directly counter to the “primal DNA” of the nation-state.

Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the political landscape is littered with the burnt-out wrecks of demilitarization agreements that have failed—more often than not, with disastrous results. Indeed, in an analysis of the “special challenges” demilitarization poses, the late Professor David Bederman warns that such attempts are often doomed to failure. He elaborates:

“…the chief reason for the failure of demilitarization is the weakness of institutional mechanisms to effectively encourage and monitor compliance, as well as to punish transgressions.”

Significantly, the same malaise can, to a large degree, be discerned in the events leading up to October 7.

Demilitarization: A violation of the sovereignty imperative?

In essence, “sovereignty” is the supreme authority within a defined territory. As such, it does not recognize the legitimacy of any other source of authority in that territory as superior to it.

Now, any demilitarization arrangement effectively annuls the right of the demilitarizing country to determine what weapons it can deploy, how many it can deploy, and where they can be deployed.

Thus, by its very nature, demilitarization entails a violation—or at least, constriction—of the sovereign rights of the demilitarizing country.

Clearly, there are only two ways such an arrangement can be maintained. Either by the imposition on the demilitarizing country by a more powerful external force (such as an alien state or a coalition of such states); or by the willing acquiescence of the demilitarizing state to refrain from—or limit—the deployment of military forces in that state—or in a portion of the state.

Accordingly, demilitarization, as a stable reality, can prevail only as long as the demilitarizing party continues to agree to be demilitarized. For, if such agreement is revoked, it will either lead to the restrictions previously consented to being thrown off and militarization reinstated, or to their forcible reimposition by external parties.

The history of the past hundred years has included several major demilitarization agreements, few of which instill great confidence in the idea as an effective remedy for conflict.

Arguably, the most significant example—and the one whose collapse precipitated the gravest consequences—was the demilitarization of the Rhineland after WWI and whose violation precipitated WWII.

Demilitarization as a harbinger of war

The gory battles of WWI ended with the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed complex and comprehensive constraints—both quantitative and qualitative—on the German military with the purpose of stripping it of the ability to instigate future offensive action. These also included the demilitarization of the Rhineland, with the demolition of existing fortification 50 km east of the Rhine River, and a prohibition on the construction of new ones.

Germany was severely limited as to the kind and amount of weapons it could possess, manufacture, or store and was even forbidden completely with regard to others, such as submarines (Article 181) and an air force (Article 198).

However, as Germany rebuilt its national capabilities—and the resolve of the Europeans waned—the demilitarization arrangement fell apart.

Indeed, it was Winston Churchill, in his epic chronicle of the history of the outbreak of WWII, The Gathering Storm, who vividly described how the demilitarization conditions were eroded out of existence. He wrote:

“Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building; the Berlin- Rome Axis established; Austria devoured and digested by the Reich; Czechoslovakia deserted and ruined by the Munich Pact, its fortress line in German hands, its mighty arsenal of Skoda henceforward making munitions for the German armies… the services of thirty five Czech divisions against the still unripened German Army cast away… all gone with the wind.”

Indeed, as demilitarization disintegrated, an increasingly confident Germany with its arsenal replenished unleashed a wave of aggression that culminated in the bloodiest war in the history of humanity, in which an estimated total of 70–85 million people perished, or about 3% of the estimated global population of 2.3 billion in 1940.

Sinai: A fraying accord

Another example of a demilitarization agreement, signed to bring hostilities between Egypt and Israel to an end following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was included in the 1979 Camp David Accords.

In recent years, this agreement is also showing signs of strain and is beginning to “fray around the edges.”

For well over a decade, Egypt has been champing at the bit to shake off the restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the Sinai,

Annex 1 of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accords established a system of security arrangements intended to allow Israel to withdraw from Sinai without incurring serious risk. Unequivocal constraints were placed on Egyptian military activities and deployments in the area. The rationale was clear: Should Cairo’s disposition toward Israel change for the worse, Sinai would continue to comprise a buffer between Egyptian forces and the Israeli border. If Cairo deployed any sizeable ground forces or armed aircraft into the peninsula, it would comprise a clear violation of the Accords and provide a warning of aggressive intentions. Thus, should war break out, Egypt’s long lines of supply in Sinai would be vulnerable, particularly to Israel’s powerful air force.

However, with the passage of time and the deteriorating internal situation in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula—given the dilution of military power (due to demilitarization) and the commensurate decline of Cairo’s ability to impose its will in the remote region—became a tempting target of Islamist insurgency.

Insurgency as justification for remilitarization

This provided Egypt with grounds to claim that the demilitarization clauses in the peace accords with Israel denied it sufficient forces to impose law and order in the peninsula.

Indeed, as early as 2007, Israel allowed the Egyptians to deploy additional troops into Sinai to fight weapons smuggling particularly to Jihadi elements.

Since then, at least two processes have fueled the attrition of the demilitarization of Sinai.

The one is the ongoing modernization and acquisition of offensive arms by the Egyptian military; the other is the deeply ingrained animus towards Israel and affiliation with Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. Indeed, as an analysis from the American University in Cairo underscores:

“Even after three decades of formal peace, most Egyptians still view Israel as a threat to national security and as an enemy, not only of Palestinians but of all Arabs.”

As the years passed, Jihadi attacks on Egyptian forces in Sinai intensified. This provided Cairo with grounds for demanding forces beyond those specified in the 1979 peace agreement. Gradually these violations increased—enabled either by ex-ante Israeli approval, or` ex-post Israeli approval, or despite no Israeli approval at all. When Egypt, in 2023, ` eventually managed to rein in the jihadi insurgency, the post-October 7th fighting in Gaza–particularly close to the Southern border of Rafa, gave Egypt fuel for continued allegations to bolster its forces in violation of the treaty.

Thus, in a Foreign Policy analysis, entitled Egypt’s Remilitarized Sinai Is a Future Powder Keg, the Washington Institute’s David Schenker provided a cautionary critique of the developments in the Peninsula up to mid-2022:

“…Israel also allowed Cairo to flood Sinai with troops and heavy equipment substantially in excess of the treaty’s limits…The longer Egypt’s additional forces remain in Sinai, especially now that the Islamic State appears to be under control, the more challenging it will become to revert to the limits imposed by the treaty”.

A poor bulkhead against war

Sadly, Israel’s history provides ample testimony as to the inadequacy of demilitarization as an effective barrier to war—or even as a device for reining in violence.

Indeed, immediately following its inception in 1948, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) established on the Golan as a means to separate Israeli and Syrian forces failed to prevent periodic clashes between the two militaries, which—among other things—eventually led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War.

But quite apart from the manifest difficulty sustaining demilitarization in an area such as Gaza, there are, perversely, no less acute difficulties that could arise if, in fact, it was achieved. Indeed, the possibilities for unintended—and undesired—consequences seem boundless.

After all, if, Israel were somehow to compel the rulers of Gaza to disarm and to deny them the capacity to rearm, this would inevitably undermine, not only their ability to impose law and order internally in the Strip, but externally against more radical opponents from within the adjacent Sinai Peninsula. Indeed, if some future disarmed successor regime were faced with a significant challenge to its rule, whether from domestic or foreign sources, who—would be called upon to defend it?

If some foreign military force, this would imply the remilitarization of Gaza—leaving open the question of to whom such a force would be answerable.

If Israel, it is difficult to conceive of a more absurd scenario than one in which IDF forces need to be mobilized to prop up an Arab regime, so “unsavory” that cannot be trusted with the wherewithal needed to defend itself.

The preceding discussion—both of the political-scientific theory and the empirical case studies—ought to provide Israeli policymakers with sufficient caveats against succumbing to the temptation of a repeat attempt at adopting the failed and fatally flawed formula of demilitarization as a means of inducing—if not peace, them at least stable and durable non-belligerence. This is particularly true when the demilitarizing party is governed by an authoritarian regime that, on the one hand, places considerable stock on martial might and, on the other, has scant regard for implications violation of the demilitarization may have for its own citizenry, (Emmanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 1799).

There appears, therefore, little option but to embrace the dire warning against demilitarization as a prudent policy prescription, once forcefully articulated by the very person who later endorsed it—with calamitous consequences.

This was Shimon Peres, who counseled:

“ …the idea of demilitarization…seems to me a dubious remedy, The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Demilitarization: Policy pertinent parameters הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the year that has passed since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, the State of Israel has been grappling with an historic challenge requiring total national mobilization. Without such a mobilization, we are not going to be able to share the burden properly over time, and we are bound to burn out the few servicemen and women who are currently doing reserve military service.

The solution to this crisis within the reserve military lies in two main areas: the first is augmenting the pool of servicemen and women through measures such as recruitment of additional populations, extending the retirement age from reserve military service, and granting substantial benefits to servicemen and women, including in housing.

However before we get down to the solutions, one must first understand how this severe crisis arose in the first place – a crisis in the State of Israel’s most important defensive apparatus.

The military reserve force: Problems

A small, smart army? Not in Israel’s circumstances

In the early 1990s, with the fall of the Iron Curtain. there was a feeling the world was heading into an agreement-oriented reality, in which there will be no more large-scale world wars. This optimism filtered down to Israel as well, where it drove various political processes like the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan, and later on the signing of the Oslo Accords.

Along with these moves, the conviction that there are not going to be any more large-scale wars brought about a change in the nature of the IDF. The Israeli military began focusing on localized operations and, as a consequence, it placed its main emphasis on developing the Air Force and the special forces, and on procurement of precision weapons. At the same time, more and more commanders that got promoted to key positions in the IDF came from the special forces. This served to reinforce the concepts of reliance on special operations.

Besides the intra-military processes, various politicians promoted the notion of a “small, smart military” – meaning an army less reliant on manpower and more reliant on technology. According to this concept, the regular army and the reserve army got substantially downsized over the years. This gave rise to two significant vulnerabilities: the first is the functional capabilities of the Israel security forces – the trimmed-down order of battle led to a reality in which nowadays only a small percentage of the entire Israeli population serves an active reserve military service, which creates a burden disparity and at the same time prevents the security forces from waging large-scale warfare on multiple fronts. This is the reason why the Swords of Iron War is taking so long. The second impact is hardly ever mentioned, since it is a creeping impact. However to my mind it is more severe than the first: erosion of the ethos of the mobilized nation – an ethos that has been with us since the inception of the State, which recognized the importance of the contribution to be made by each and every citizen.

In this context it is worth mentioning that the downsizing of the IDF manpower and the defensive organs within the settlements and communities is not the sole factor that erodes the mobilized society ethos and the ethic of service, on which the State of Israel had been based in the past. In recent years we have been witnessing an alarming process of politization of the security forces. One such example was evident a mere year and a half ago, when as part of the conflict over the judicial reform, many reservists, including senior Air Force pilots, refused to show up for duty. As a society, we have got to understand that the security of the State of Israel supersedes all else. Security issues must not be mingled with political considerations.

The military reserve force: Solutions

Comprehensive national mobilization

As mentioned, nowadays only a small percentage of Israeli society does active reserve military service. This disparity cannot be sustained for long. We must recall what had been so clearly obvious in the early days of the State – that in order to sustain the State of Israel, the entire Israeli society has got to do its share.

The goal is to see a mobilized nation – whether in conscription service or in the reserves, whether in a civilian national guard, which is an issue in and of itself. If there will indeed be a comprehensive national mobilization, including within populations that currently do not serve, then each citizen will be required to do reserve military service for two to three weeks every year and the burden, when distributed equitably across the board, will be relatively lighter. It is important to emphasize that the burden sharing is vital not merely for practical reasons, but also for ethical reasons. Such sharing constitutes a degree of social justice – signaling that we are all equal and that we are all working together for a common goal.

Genuine support for those who serve

The Israeli public, for the most part, is deeply appreciative of the reservists. However it is also important that the State should prove its appreciation of their contribution by compensating them accordingly. To make it clear just how important the reserve military service is, the State has got to work in two main thrusts.

The first is the ethical thrust – this is a long-term process that begins in the earliest stages of the education system. It is intended to institute the service ethos. A comprehensive study in the field of education, conducted by the IDSF among hundreds of teachers and schoolchildren in Israel shows that the education system barely deals with the national ethos and with matters concerning Israeli society, knowledge of the land and preparation for military service.

The second is the practical thrust – the State has got to prove, through its actions here and now, that it is appreciative of the reservists and that it supports them.

Already now the State and the IDF grant the reservists benefits in accordance with the number of days served, however due to cumbersome processes and communication problems, the serving reservists are not always aware of their entitlements and they are not always able to benefit fully from them. Besides these impediments, there is also scope for improving the benefits given to the reservists and to offer them opportunities transcending the financial benefits. Thus for example, the families of the servicemen, which pay a heavy toll as well, ought to be given support – one thing would be to make sure that the spouses, who stay at home and need to care for the household and children receive assistance, another thing would be to provide the servicemen’s children subsidized psychological therapy as needed, and even to offer the spouses themselves marital counseling to help them get through these challenging times.

Another important benefit should be concessions in housing and land in areas of strategic importance. This idea, as will be shown in the next section, represents a clear convergence of interests both of the reserve military servicemen and women and of the State.

Housing solutions in areas of strategic importance

We have got to place the reserve military servicemen and women at the top of the list of priorities when it comes to housing while leveraging the State of Israel’s strategic interests. The point is to grant them substantial discounts for the purchase of land and housing in the Negev and Galilee – areas of great strategic importance for Israel. Additionally, in these areas, neighborhoods dedicated to the reserve military servicemen and women should be built, just as special neighborhoods get built for ultra-Orthodox Jews or for new immigrants.

Such an initiative will also be of value to the servicemen and women themselves, helping them achieve decent housing solutions. It will also increase the motivation to serve, and it will advance Israel’s interests of populating those regions with a high-quality, robust people. Obviously the State must also work to develop the infrastructures in these areas with special emphasis on opening employment centers and on developing a high-quality education system.

This idea has already been put on the table and the State has even declared that it would grant substantial discounts for the reserve servicemen and women for the purchase of lands in the Negev and in the Galilee, however there is an insufficient supply of land and apartments, and there is no clear communication between the State and the servicemen and women, resulting in most of them not knowing how to exercise their entitlements.

We at the IDSF regard affordable housing for the reservists in the Negev and Galilee to be a national mission of the first order. We have therefore decided to actively promote this idea. To this end we are conducting registration of reservists interested in living in the Negev and Galilee, in order to prove that there is indeed demand and to build a purchase group. At the same time we are in touch with the government ministries and with mayors in the Negev and Galilee to advance land allocation and the construction of neighborhoods for reserve military servicemen and women.

Summary and conclusions

The solution for the profound reserve military service crisis begins with a return to the seminal ethos that has been with us since the establishment of the State – the ethos of the mobilized nation. First and foremost there has to be equitable sharing of the burden, and populations need to be recruited into the conscription and reserve army, which so far have not been recruited.

Beyond distributing the burden, the State must support the reservists and their families. They must be granted financial benefits, including sizable discounts in the purchase of land in the Negev and Galilee. Such an initiative would signal to the reservists that their service is being appreciated, it will increase the motivation to serve, and it will also make a positive contribution toward the settlement and security interests of the State of Israel.

הפוסט The solution to the reserve military service crisis:   Realization of the “Mobilized Nation” Vision הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik will discuss the future of the Israeli educational system and the responsibility it bears regarding the generations yet to come.

Israel’s educational system – Grades instead of Zionism

The education system meets the citizens of Israel during the most formative years of their lives, and has a decisive role in instilling national values, creating a sense of belonging, and forging the fortitude of each person as an individual and of all of us as a society and a nation.

However, from in-depth studies conducted among parents, teachers and students, including a comprehensive study conducted by the IDSF, it appears that everything in Israel’s education system that is related to instilling values, and in particular in instilling the values ​​of heritage, Jewish identity and the national ethos, is steadily eroding. In addition, due to a fear of public pressure and parental criticism, the education system avoids dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, does not discuss in any significant way the security incidents that have taken place here over recent years, and almost never touches on the significance of IDF service and the importance of personal sacrifice for the common good. Furthermore, the system has become a “grades factory” that emphasizes only individual achievements while ignoring the principles of teamwork and cooperation, and with no desire to prepare the male and female students for life in the State of Israel in all its unique characteristics.

Some of the problems mentioned are the product of global social trends that emphasize individualism over collectivism and preach political correctness at any cost and in any situation. Other problems arise from a process of alienation from the heritage of the Jewish people and the history of the State of Israel. In addition, there are also problems related to systemic issues such as inefficiency, the lack of appropriate staff, and the use of outdated educational methodologies.

Below, Dr. Ronen Itzik will lay out his ideas for the future of the education system in Israel, so that it can fulfill its deepest purpose.

Dr. Ronen Itzik: The Vision for the Future of the Israeli Education

The importance of the group and looking at the individual in a group context

Current state: Throughout the Western world, there has been a trend of individualism in recent years that glorifies the individual at the expense of the group. Israel is also affected by this trend, and it can also be seen in its education system, which almost completely neglects its responsibility towards the collective. The system mainly puts an emphasis on individual accomplishments and is busy with incessantly testing the individual student while ignoring group achievements and products of cooperative efforts.

The individual is undoubtedly the cornerstone of the Western world as well as the Jewish one, but Israeli reality, in which the group is a condition for the existence of the individual, dictates a different and more balanced approach.

Ideally:

Besides developing the individual’s abilities and aspirations, the education system should also deal with the responsibility of the individual towards the group, strengthen the students in the group, and instill in them the understanding that what will lead to achievements, national as well as private, is the group and not the individual. The way to accomplish this change is by focusing on two levels:

• Operational: Significant reduction of the weight given to personal achievements while encouraging group achievements, and measuring the individual’s achievements within the group and in connection to it.

• Values: Already in elementary school, the values, shared history, shared Jewish identity and traditions that accompany us as a nation should be instilled in the children, and a common national and group identity should be created for them.

Deliberate and structured engagement in the history of the regional conflict

Current state: The struggle between the State of Israel and the countries that surround it, which includes the national-Palestinian conflict, affects the existence of us all, and we do not have the luxury of not understanding its roots, the reasons why we are here in Israel, and the values that form the basis of our belief in the righteousness of our path. And yet, the education system systematically avoids dealing with the national struggle and political matters. This avoidance leaves the students with completely unreasonable gaps in their knowledge of the security reality and the national challenges connected to the State of Israel. So, for example, according to an IDSF survey, 45% of young adults in Israel do not know anything about Operation Defensive Shield– a significant and formative military campaign that took place only some twenty years ago.

As long as the education system continues to avoid discussing these important topics, we are exposed to two fundamental problems: The first is that many students will not understand Israeli reality at all and will lose their attachment to the land and the values of protecting the homeland. The second – and much more serious one – is that some of the students will search for information in other, unreliable and biased places, and will construct a world view that is far from their national and self-identity.

Ideally:

• The education system should strengthen the curriculum on the subject of the history of the Jewish people in general and the roots of the regional conflict in particular. To preserve balance and prevent a situation in which deviations of one kind or another occur, it is advisable to combine the contents in one organized and approved set of lesson plans that will be created by a representatives of diverse sectors of Israeli society and focus first and foremost on research, facts, and knowledge.

• The education system should outline a way to put the history of the national struggle onto the agenda, and convey politically complex ideas to the students by providing time for open discussions in the classrooms and their conducting guided research work, among other ways. The basic concept required to achieve this is that “Zionism” is not a political issue.

Changing teaching methodologies

Current state: The prevailing methodologies in most schools are outdated and do not lead to the full exploitation of students’ learning potential. According to an IDSF survey, most teachers claim that working in groups is more effective than the “teacher-centered” method, where the students sit and listen to the teacher speak. Nevertheless, most concede that they practically never allow learning in groups due to the lack of time, the difficulty in controlling the class, and the lack of cooperation both on the part of the students and the staff.

Moreover, there is almost no learning taking place outside the classroom, even though during the COVID-19 epidemic we saw that classes held out of doors provide students with experiential learning, and help them maintain concentration and interest. Similarly, there are almost no extracurricular activities such as tours and tutorials, which reinforce the social aspect of education, give students an opportunity to broaden their horizons, and connect them to sites in the country.

Another problem is that every subject is learned separately, as a discipline unto itself, and there is no understanding of its broader context. Thus most students do not know how to connect topics they have studied in the Bible, for example, with topics they have studied in other fields, such as history and geography.

Ideally:

• Teachers should be encouraged to minimize the “teacher-centered” educational method, and incorporate during the lesson as much group work as possible, which encourages the students to be active and cooperate with each other.

• Time should be dedicated to extra-curricular activities and teachers’ private initiatives to teach outside the classroom walls and even outside the school building should be supported.

• We should strive for integrative and multidisciplinary learning that enables creative connections between several subjects and thus contributes to understanding the whole picture.

Preparation for life, not for academia

Current state: The education system regards higher education as an anchor, and busies itself with preparing students for academia rather than preparing them for life. This approach leads to the system putting the main emphasis on the high schools, and tends to neglect the elementary schools that actually play a more central role in shaping the students’ personalities. On top of that, the system is engaged in the non-stop calculation of subject-oriented grades.

Another product of the academic-oriented approach is that in most schools the curriculum includes only theoretical subjects and does not integrate practical subjects at all. Furthermore, the vocational schools, which were prevalent in Israel until the Nineties, have been almost completely erased from the educational landscape.

This is how the sad situation was created in which students in Israel finish 12 years of study without being ready for life or having any professional training. Many of the students who are not suited for academia but rather for other professions, lose interest in their studies and even drop out of the system.

Ideally:

• The education system must change its approach and understand that academia is not the be-all and end-all, and that it is much more important to prepare the students for life. To this end, it must shift the center of gravity away from high schools and recognize the importance of the elementary school years as those that are the most formative.

• Evaluation methods must be found that are not based on dry grades alone, but rather look at all of the students’ abilities. Such methods will enable more students to express their abilities, and will save a great deal of frustration for those who do not manage to attain high grades.

• Along with the theoretical studies, subjects and majors that will give students practical tools and life skills must be integrated into the educational system. In addition, it is worthwhile rebuilding vocational schools and allowing students interested in acquiring a profession already during their school years to do so. It is worth noting that vocational training will not only help the students but also the country, which will gain a skilled workforce that will contribute to the development of local industry.

The education system should take on the task of preparing students for meaningful service

Current state: Just as the schools in Israel do not prepare the students for life, they also do not prepare them for service in the IDF. According to IDSF research, 65% of teachers believe that it is very important to deal with the subject. However, fewer than 30% of them believe that this involvement is taking place at the required level.

Since the students – and as a result, the teachers and administrators as well – are measured by their grade scores, the interest of the system is to devote as much time as possible to augmenting study and preparation for the matriculation exams, and not “waste” it on other activities, such as preparation for the IDF. We have seen in recent years that fewer and fewer schools are sending students out for the week of “Gadna” (where teens experience military training on army bases), and other preparatory activities for IDF service, such as lectures and tours of bases, have also been reduced and downgraded.

Since preparation for IDF service in high schools is lacking, many young men and women feel the need to enroll in a year-long preparatory program. From the point of view of the education system, this is a wonderful solution because there is an alternate body that is dealing with getting ready for the IDF, but it does not make sense that students should be required to use a year of their lives to compensate for the fact that their schools did not prepare them properly for military service.

Ideally:

• The education system has a responsibility to prepare both male and female students for the military service that awaits them immediately upon graduation from high school. To this end, it should recognize the importance of integrating contents related to IDF service, and encourage collaborations with nonprofits and organizations that specialize in this subject.

• The education system should devote time dedicated to activities that will prepare their students for army duty. One option is to allocate time slots during grades 11-12 that will be devoted exclusively to such activities. Another option is to shorten twelfth grade by several months and devote the remaining time until the end of the school year to focused preparation for military service.

Longer classes, shorter days

Current state: The way in which the school day is structured is fundamentally wrong. In many schools, the day lasts from 8AM until 4PM. Many studies in education and psychology show that it is impossible to keep children and youth for so many hours and expect them to be focused.

Another problem is linked to the length of the class. We are stuck to the idea that a lesson should be 45 minutes long, but when looking at it from a practical point of view, we see that it is impossible to teach almost anything in such a short amount of time. It is certainly impossible to conduct any in-depth discussions in a classroom situation.

Ideally:

• The length of the school day should be re-evaluated and verified that it conforms to the capabilities of the students. We recommend that the school day should end no later than 1PM, and then the students should be released to their homes or provided with extracurricular activities within the class setting.

• We must free ourselves of the concept that a lesson has to be an academic hour long, and extend its duration from 45 minutes to a full hour. Only in this way will the teachers be able to convey the material effectively, and encourage the students to take an active part in the lesson.

Improving the education system

Current state: It is accepted to claim that the education system is not functioning properly because of a lack of money, but in practice this system receives a huge annual budget of approximately NIS75 billion. The problem, then, is not the money but what is done with it.

Ideally:

• The education budget should be managed in an intelligent and transparent manner, and the financial investment should focus on the school and the teachers – where the education actually takes place.

Excellence and innovation above all else

Current state: Leaders are needed for any process of change, but in the State of Israel there are almost no visionary leaders anymore who would be willing to push the education system forward. This is related, among other things, to the fact that the role of education in Israel is not important enough. In addition, the teachers’ organizations are very powerful bodies that stick spokes in the wheels of any process that seeks to optimize the system, thereby weaking the hands of the few who try to bring about change.

Moreover, the staff – including teachers, coordinators, and administrators – are not always qualified enough to fulfill their roles properly. Today, almost anyone who wants to obtain a teaching certificate can do so, since the threshold requirements are very low.

Thus, when the educational leadership does not come from a place of vision and lacks the ability to lead, when teachers’ unions do not cooperate with processes of change, and when many educators do not possess the required abilities, the results are predictable.

Ideally:

• The status of the education system should be improved, both in the eyes of the government and those of the public. If the Minister of Education is perceived as one of the three most important ministers in government, the entire system will attract visionary leaders.

• In order to carry out in-depth processes and bring about real changes, the teachers’ organizations must be put in their place and we cannot succumb to their whims and threats.

• The minimum requirements for issuing a teaching certificate should be raised, and quality personnel with a sense of mission should be recruited. At the same time, the teachers and administrators must be rewarded with an adequate salary, and they should be provided with working conditions that will allow them to feel professional satisfaction, and encourage them to choose the profession and persevere in it.

Evolution, not Revolution: Summary and Conclusions

From the dawn of history Israeli society has lived under threat. In order to survive and thrive here, we must recognize what the local reality is, understand what dangers and challenges face us, and learn how to deal with them. All these things, as a concept, simply do not exist in the education system. We tend to look to Western and European countries and try to adopt educational models that are successful in other parts of the world, but do are not suitable for the nature of the State of Israel and Israeli society. If we continue to look for solutions in foreign places, it will only lead to frustration. The State of Israel has unique cultural elements, and the challenges of the education system must be derived from our national challenges.

Unfortunately, the results on the ground prove again and again that the education system – despite enjoying a very high budget – is not run effectively. It uses outdated and uncreative teaching methodologies, prefers high grade scores over any other value, and neglects all involvement with the national ethos. As a result, the system fails to prepare the younger generation for life in the State of Israel.

One thing is clear about the education system and that is that the situation as it is cannot continue. A fundamental, vision-based reform is required here, which includes a change in personnel, educational methodologies and contents. However, it is important to understand that processes of this type take time, and therefore we must forget about a revolution and prepare for a long evolutionary process. The goal is not to dismantle the framework and rebuild it, but to bring about measured and intelligent changes that will gradually and persistently improve the system.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Future of Israeli Education הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Colonel (Res.) Ilan Dikstein focuses on establishing a national guard – an idea that has been around for a long time but which has not yet materialized.

Background – From Ordinary Criminality to Governability Issues

The State of Israel has for many years now been coping with internal security issues. These include criminal activity, terrorism, agricultural terrorism and so forth. Officialdom has shied away from naming it explicitly, for political correctness reasons, but it is common knowledge that it is the Arab and Bedouin population that has been at the heart of these activities. Quite often the motives are purely of a terrorist nature.

This trend saw a major uptick, which the country endured painfully in the events that preceded Operation Guardian of the Walls. In May 2021, riots broke out in hundreds of locations nationwide. These included arson, stone-throwing and public order violations. Three people lost their lives in these riots. Hundreds were injured and property damage was estimated at tens of millions of Shekels. According to the security authorities, some 90% of those involved in the riots were Israeli citizens from the Arab community.

These riots shook the establishment, which realized that there is a severe governability issue – that this was a security issue for all intents and purposes requiring a targeted response. This is when the idea was raised of setting up a national guard, which would be based primarily on volunteer citizens, and which would serve as an additional defensive layer on a regular basis and in emergencies.

Since 2021, this notion of a national guard has been taking shape, but it has not yet been acted upon. The delay is due, among other things, to various disagreements as to the exact nature of the guard. Such questions as: will the guard be comprised primarily of volunteers or will it be based on serving personnel? Will the guard replace the Border Police or will it operate alongside it? Will the guard be accountable to the Israel Police or to the Minister of the Interior? And also: where will it operate? What will be its mandate? How much authority will it be given?

Despite the disagreements, most decision-makers are already convinced that one way or another, such a national guard has to be established to be charged with internal security with special emphasis on incidents of a terrorist nature. Should another outbreak like Guardian of the Walls occur, and in particular these days when we are engaged in a war on our southern border and also on our northern border – we might find ourselves facing a scenario for which we are simply unprepared.

Colonel (Res.) Ilan Dikstein: The Vision for a National Guard

Stare the Problem in the Eye

Current state:

The State of Israel and the police balk at outlining the root of the problem, even though it is common knowledge that there is one sector here that systematically harms another sector of the population. In many cases, cases of theft, harassment or sabotage are committed not purely in the criminal realm. They frequently have a terrorist dimension, reinforced by a Jihadist ideology. Moreover, the perpetrators of the criminal activities could subsequently, just as easily, repurpose their acts in support of terrorist objectives. Similarly, the weapons used in criminal offenses can be redirected toward the Jewish population in a terrorist incident, meaning there is a dangerous escalatory trajectory here.

We have got to realize that Israel’s Arabs are living inside our country without a fence to restrict their movements, while among them there are many groups which identify with the Palestinian nationalist ideology and are hostile toward the Zionist endeavor. Our enemies from outside are fully aware of this and are therefore supporting these groups materially and financially in an effort to subvert them against Israel. Thus, a new battle front has formed in Israel – only this time the front is internal. Whether in peaceful times or in emergencies, this front could transform into an active battlefront in its own right, as was the case in Operation Guardian of the Walls, and during wartime it could also become yet another theater of combat in addition to the rest of the battlefronts. Despite these dangers, we still persist in skirting the issue rather than seeking a real solution for it.

Ideally:

• Define the issue: The time has come to stop hiding behind political correctness and state outright that there is a serious problem of criminality and terrorism coming from substantial groups within the Israeli Arab population. This being said, we are fully aware that a large proportion of Israel’s Arabs are loyal, productive citizens. These activities cause an acute governability issue across large swathes of the country.
• Define the specific attack scenarios: the homeland front within the State of Israel is a battle front for all intents and purposes and has to be treated that way. These specific attack scenarios along this front have to be outlined, and the threats we are facing have to be understood. These threats include sabotaging bases deep inside the country, loss of governance within the Arab sector, sabotaging of national infrastructures, blocking of critical traffic arteries, attacks against Jewish settlements, rioting inside mixed-population cities, and more. Besides this, one must take into consideration that this front can heat up on its own or concurrent with other fronts as part of a multi-theater war.
• Operate during peaceful times, prepare for emergencies: The national guard has got to prepare itself and maintain readiness for a wartime scenario, although the bulk of its work would be done during peaceful times. This routine work serves two important goals: training the forces for an emergency or for war, such that when needed they can be called upon and will be sufficiently well-trained. The second goal is to nip in the bud the threats in the field, thereby reducing and even preventing the problems that might erupt in emergencies or during a war.

Establish a professional, specially-trained force

Current state:

Internal Security is currently assigned to the Israel Police, however in emergencies the police is not always prepared in terms of capabilities and manpower, in which case the IDF has to intervene as well. An IDF intervention in internal security issues raises two main issues. First of all, this is an immense burden on the IDF, which in any case has multiple fronts to attend to. Secondly, if the IDF fights against our own citizens, a complicated balance is struck, which might jeopardize our democracy.

It is worth noting that IDF intervention in matters of internal security is due not only to the need to protect public security, it is also due to the need to facilitate the continued proper functioning of the military itself. Israel is a small country with a small army. Therefore the very same forces are needed for operations along various sectors. Redeployment of IDF forces from one theater to another is done along internal routes in the country’s heartland. Should there be civil unrest leading to routes being blocked or barricaded, or should access to military bases be obstructed – as was the case with the Nevatim base during Operation Guardian of the Walls – the IDF will have difficulties in carrying out its missions. This reality is a major concern for the IDF. It forces the IDF to allocate forces and resources for dealing with a situation that should not be part of its responsibilities.

Ideally:

• Free the IDF of internal security: the IDF should be freed from any involvement in internal security so as to enable it to focus on its other responsibilities and to prevent friction between the military and the civilians.
• Find a proper solution for all internal security issues: in order to enable the IDF to completely disengage from dealing with homeland front issues, organs need to be created, which will be ready, both in terms of capabilities and in terms of order of battle, for any criminal or terrorist scenario that might destabilize the home front.
• Professional national guard: since the Israel Police alone cannot cope with all of the internal security specific attack scenarios, a professional national guard must be established, which will be comprised of skilled soldiers in the regular army and reservists. It is important to understand that the original suggestion to set up a volunteer-based guard is inadequate. First of all, professionalism and commitment are better when an organization is not based on volunteer manpower. And since this is a highly-sensitive arena, in which any miscalculation could result in injury, one cannot compromise on unskilled forces. Secondly, in an emergency, most of the volunteers would be going to their army units, leaving the National Guard short-staffed.

The Border Police as a National Guard – Redefining the mission, the sector and the nature of its work

Current state:

Besides the IDF and Israel Police, the Border Police is also a force operating inside the country. On the one hand this is a semi-military force but on the other hand it is under the command of the police and its main occupations are on issues of internal security. The Border Police’s status makes it a reserve force, operating in a “twilight zone”, where it is called in to help with a wide range of missions without having a clear zone of authority and without specializing in any particular sector or in any specific mission.

Ideally:

One of the ways in which the issue can be dealt with efficiently is to turn the Border Police into a National Guard. Such a move would require a few changes:

• Rename the Border Police: the name this force has been given – Border Police – is antiquated, since it has long ago ceased to reflect this organization’s role. The IDF is the force that effectively polices our borders. For this reason, the name “National Guard” is more appropriate.
• Define responsibilities: A national guard force needs to have clearly-defined responsibilities with a list of missions and goals according to which it is measured. According to the job description, the Guard would attend to matters of internal security, focusing on terrorist crime and criminality committed within Arabic society. Among its occupations would be counter-terrorism, weapons smuggling, agricultural terrorism and racketeering. This definition would also be significant in the fight against crime within the Arab sector. This is an issue the State of Israel is committed to dealing with, first and foremost for the sake of the well-being of the Arab sector itself.
• Define a clear sphere of activity: The new Guard’s operations would be confined only to the territory of the State of Israel, leaving the Judea and Samaria or Gaza territories completely out of scope. Furthermore, the forces should be trained in accordance with specific regions of activity. The division into regions, or sectors, will serve as a force multiplier, since the moment the forces specialize in a specific sector and in a specific type of activity, they will be much better prepared for dealing with the challenges as they arise, with a smaller order of battle.
• Proactive rather than reactive: The Israel Police is mostly reactive – a problem arises, it steps in to solve it. The IDF, on the other hand, engages more in proactive and preventive action so as to strengthen deterrence and prevent escalation. The National Guard will also have to adopt this practice and it will need to take proactive measures to strengthen internal governability.

Solving the issue of the National Guard’s allegiance

Current state:

One of the factors delaying the establishment of a national guard is the issue of whom it will belong to. Some believe the national guard should come under the Israel Police just as the Border Police is today. Others believe it should operate as a separate entity answerable directly to the Minister of Public Security. Both approaches have their merits, however so long as this issue is not resolved, it is impossible to move ahead and set it up.

Ideally:

• In the beginning – place the National Guard under the Israel Police: at least in the first few years, the National Guard would best function under the police the way the Border Police does at the moment. This would avoid political pushback and would expedite the setting up of the Guard. It would also make sure the police remains in charge of internal security issues.
• Hedging and differentiating the National Guard: despite its assignment to the police, the National Guard ought also to be hedged in terms of its missions and in terms of the manpower and resources allocated to it. Such hedging would prevent the police from using it as a reserve force that can be deployed at the police’s discretion. It would enable the Guard to operate freely within its purview.
• Later on – consider reassigning the Guard to the Ministry of Public Security: after several years, it will be possible to re-evaluate the situation and consider whether to break the National Guard away from the Police and place it under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security. It is important to emphasize that also in such a situation, the Israel Police would remain in charge of internal security.

Force-building – gradually and wisely

Current state:

Considering the Border Police, the force out of which the National Guard would probably be coming – one can see several problems. First of all the Border Police staff is short on power, its intelligence capabilities are inadequate, and it lacks a recruitment organization commensurate with its needs. Secondly, the Border Police operates in company formations. It is unaccustomed to working in battalions or brigades. Thirdly, manpower utilization in the Border Police is not optimal – this applies both to the regular force and to its reservists: nowadays there are many Border Police reserve companies, but these hardly ever show up for reserve military service days and are therefore inadequately trained. Moreover, the Reserve Military Service Law is not applied to the Border Police reserve force the same way it is applied to the IDF reserve military service force.

Ideally:

• Strengthening the staff: The goal is to turn the Border Police headquarters – which will eventually become the National Guard headquarters – into a body that is not only a force builder, it should also apply the force. In other words, it should be a body with clear responsibilities and it should be amply capable of carrying out its missions. To achieve this, the Guard’s headquarters should be reinforced through allocation of resources such as information systems and Command & Control systems; its intelligence gathering capabilities must be improved, including through arranging collaboration with the GSS, and a recruitment organization must be set up to enable large-scale recruitment of high-quality manpower.
• Scaling up the order of battle: manpower is the most important resource. It will take a cross-system thinking process to scale up the order of battle serving in the National Guard. For example: to extend conscript service back to three full years, thereby enabling allocation of more soldiers to the National Guard. Another measure could be to recruit populations that are currently outside the circles of recruitment for various reasons – for example the Haredi community, assuming they would be more comfortable serving in a Border Police-styled force, and in a force that would make it easier for them to maintain their specific lifestyle. Besides that, reservists from IDF combat units could be brought in for service in the National Guard. Besides these measures, it is also important to ramp up the National Guard’s image among the general public, to offer preferential terms for their service so as to attract high-quality, highly-motivated manpower.
• Planning for force multipliers: besides scaling up the order of battle, the brigades and battalions that will make up the National Guard must also have additional force multipliers, which would enable even a relatively small force to achieve a lot. Part of the force multipliers have already been mentioned here. These include recruitment of high-quality manpower, a comprehensive training program, specialization in a specific sector, improvement of the surveillance capabilities and of the Command & Control capabilities, strengthening of the intelligence network etc.
• Stepwise progression: this force must be built up gradually, in three main phases – short-term (one year), intermediate-term (three years) and long-term (five to seven years). It is advisable to begin with a single region, to settle in and only then to expand to the rest of the regions. The intention is that at the end of the process, each region will have its own specialized brigade made up of a regular-army battalion and several reserve battalions.
• Optimal utilization of the manpower: the Border Police reserve companies should be converted into reserve companies of the National Guard. Besides that, the Border Police’s reserve companies should be consolidated, they should be armed and trained, exactly the way this is done in the IDF.
• Volunteer layer: the regular units and the reserve units in the National Guard can be augmented by volunteer civilians, who will be able to reinforce the units during peacetime and in emergencies. The volunteers must also be organized in proper units and they have to be well-trained. It should also be possible to place the volunteers by their residential address, such that they will be positioned to promptly respond to a call within their region. This being said, one should bear in mind that in an emergency and also in wartime, most of the volunteers will contact the regular units to which they are assigned, such that this force can only be regarded as a complementary force. When setting up the volunteer network, one can rely on existing networks such as the alert squads that defend settlements, intervention units and various urban battalions.

Set up an interministerial committee

Current state:

As mentioned earlier, the idea of setting up a national guard arose already in 2021 and, since 2023 it has been worked on in government committees – however the force has yet to materialize. Currently the idea is under discussion mainly in the Ministry of Public Security although it is important to understand that this is a cross-systemic issue requiring a multidisciplinary policy.

Ideally:

• An interministerial committee should be set up, which would include representatives of the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Minister of Justice and any other relevant stakeholder. This is the only way to form a holistic policy and to succeed in realizing this plan.

Don’t ignore, take action: summary and conclusions

Internal Security is officially the responsibility of the Israel Police, however as we often see, the actual solution is provided by the IDF. This is because there are criminal activities taking place which are of a terrorist nature, requiring a military-style response. This is not something the Israel Police can provide.

The current state of affairs, in which the IDF is virtually the only executive body in Israel, is untenable. It is wrong from the operational standpoint, from the legal standpoint and from a democracy standpoint. Ideally, the IDF should be unburdened of any responsibilities related to solving internal domestic problems. Responsibility for this should be assigned to the police and the National Guard, for which the appropriate resources and tools should be provided. Such a move would relieve the IDF of a considerable load and would enable the IDF to focus on its real mission – coping with enemies from beyond our borders.

The most effective, most efficient way to set up a national guard is to base it on an already-existing Border Police force, which is structured similarly, but to upgrade it and fine-tune its missions. As opposed to the Border Police, which currently serves as a reserve force for the police and for the IDF, the National Guard would have clear authorities with clearly-demarcated sector boundaries. Its mission will be to deal with terrorist-based criminality while focusing on the Arab sector, which is the source of the majority of such criminality.

Also, as opposed to the Border Police, the National Guard will operate within geographic regions, it will be trained to combat in large orders of battle – battalions and brigades – and it will maintain a well-formed, well-trained reserve force. Besides the regular soldiers and the reservists, volunteers can also be included in the National Guard. These will help reinforce the units on an as-needed basis. As mentioned earlier, initially the National Guard will come under the Israel Police, however over time it will be possible to split it off as a separate organization with a clear identity and with its own unique capabilities.

The concept of setting up a national guard has been around for many years but now, with Israel in the midst of a war on multiple fronts, it has taken on an added urgency to the extent that it is imperative that it be implemented without any further delay.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Establishing of a National Guard הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“Israel’s economic policy over the past 15 years has been endangering the nation’s security. When I said so in the past, people answered back “Think you’re so wise?” says Prof. Yaron Zelekha, former Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance. “By now it’s no stroke of genius to propose that such an economic policy contributed to the situation on October 7, but there were indications far earlier.”

Zelekha is currently a professor of accountancy and economics and he heads the School of Accountancy, Economics, and Financial Management at Ono Academic College. He served as Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance between 2003 and 2007, when Benjamin Netanyahu was Finance Minister. In this interview, he speaks about the destructive influence of the many years of reductions in the defense budget, and about the inefficiency of the public sector — including the security services. But he begins by explaining how Israel reached its current pass in the first place.

“The GDP in Israel — the gross domestic product — comes to something like 2 trillion shekels and it’s built from 5 factors: private consumption, private investment, government outlays, exports, and imports. In a normal situation, exports and imports more or less balance out and the rest are responsible for the level of the GDP. But in Israel today, private consumption amounts to about 50 percent of the pie, and that’s very low as compared to a country like the USA where it’s 68 percent, or the UK where it’s 63 percent, or as compared to Israel in the past.”

What about other countries in Europe, where private consumption is relatively low?

“It’s true that in countries like Germany and Sweden, private consumption is lower than in the USA and the UK, but their governments are very efficient so that the factor of government outlays compensates for the limited private consumption. In contrast, Israel falls short on both counts. On the one hand, private consumption isn’t allowed to grow into an engine big enough to propel the GDP. And on the other hand we don’t have a government of Germans and Swedes to propel the economy. We lose on the swings and lose on the roundabouts. No private consumption and no governmental efficiency.”

So the main problem is simply low consumption?

“The low private consumption is a result of unsuccessful policy. One of the main factors restraining private consumption in Israel is that the trillion shekels of private consumption are channeled into our own country of thievery, where competition suffers from many problems. If I let you choose where to shop with a trillion shekels, you wouldn’t shop here. You’d shop somewhere much cheaper, in Europe or in the USA. But we’re forced to spend the trillion shekels here in our beloved land of robbers. As a result, the consumers’ money — instead of driving the economy — lines the pockets of monopolists, sole licensed importers. bankers, and an inefficient government.”

It’s no wonder, then, that so many Israelis make purchases overseas for shipment to Israel.

“Israel is under-importing. When consumption rises, imports should rise. But in Israel, that doesn’t happen. Although everything you might want is priced lower by tens of percent a few hours away by plane, imports are blocked. Ideally when exports rise there are more dollars circulating, the dollar weakens, and imports become cheaper, raising the consumers’ standard of living. But in Israel the surplus from exports doesn’t trickle down to raise the consumers’ standard of living. In our lopsided economy, it’s impossible to extract the full benefit from the export engine. Our economy is repressing private consumption by means of distorted prices and high taxation, while the government is large and dysfunctional.”

So what economic policy would help Israel out of this predicament?

“The main point is to liberate the consumers and enable them to freely drive the wheels of the economy, without having the banks and the big importers slice themselves an unnecessarily large share at the expense of the consumers and small businesses. When I came to the Finance Ministry at the start of 2003, the national debt had reached almost 100% of the GDP, the deficit was 10% of the GDP, and the income per capita in real terms had sunk to 49% of the income per capita in the USA — a drop that put us back at the 1960s level — while the price of housing had risen to 96 monthly salaries for an average apartment. That situation was an all-time low for our economy, worse even then 1985. But after 5 years of a policy that stopped repressing private consumption, the real income per capita had risen to 62% of the income per capita in the USA. In 2007 prices were 5% to 10% lower than in the USA, and housing prices dropped to a level of 80 monthly salaries for an average apartment. And prices could have dropped farther if the policy that I’d set out had continued. Today apartment prices have risen to 170 monthly salaries on the average and prices overall are higher by 35% than in the USA.”

What are the implications of that economic predicament for our security?

“The powerful growth during my term enabled us to channel 7% of the GDP to security. But in the 15 years since then, the economic policy has been entirely different under Netanyahu, Gantz, Bennett, and Lapid. As a result, the economy was in trouble even before the war. Real income per capita in Israel, with purchasing power factored in, dropped to less than 50% of the income per capita in the USA. In that situation, it’s impossible to keep channeling 7% of the GDP to security as we’d been doing before, and so all those prime ministers and ministers of defense and finance were forced to cut back on security. Before the war hit, the defense budget stood at 5% of the GDP as against the former 7% that I mentioned. The difference amounts to 40 billion shekels per year. But that’s not all. The defense budget includes two elements: salaries and operations. The salary part has increased in the meantime, meaning that the part for operations — that is, the money available for weaponry, training, and so on — suffers twice over. There’s a smaller pie to divide up, and operations receives a smaller fraction of it.”

You’re saying that economics is the key to security.

“Yes. Everyone knows about the Battle of Waterloo, where the British and Prussian armies fought Napoleon to his final defeat and ended the Napoleonic Wars. Who was the most important participant in the battle? None of the commanders. It was Rothschild, the funder of that carnival, and without him the British and the Prussians couldn’t have advanced a single step toward the enemy. In Israel, our distorted economy is unable to support the army and therefore downsizes it. Divisions and air squadrons are closed down, training is reduced, and less ammunition is manufactured. The 40 billion shekels missing from the budget make a dent that the security services feel strongly — not to mention the similar effect on health, education, and infrastructure.”

Fighting against monopolies just as against the (not comparable) Hamas terrorists

Zelekha believes that the core crisis in Israel’s economy is the cost of living and the government’s unwillingness to deal with it. The high cost of living is caused by the hampering of free competition, by corruption and intermingling of the power of capital and the power of government through the agency of public servants and politicians who favor the wealthy, and by the monopolies, sole importers, and banks that dominate the economy. Under that banner, Zelekha founded the New Economic Party, which ran in two elections — for the 24th and 25th Knessets — but did not pass the electoral threshold.

The million-dollar question is how to fight the cost of living and the housing crisis.

“In fighting the cost of living, there are three fronts to address. The first is against the monopolies and the sole importers, and most of it is rather easy to tackle. Cancel all the customs duties and all the local standards, and most importantly ֮— break up the interlocking ownership of the import companies. If you’re sole importer for a big international player, you shouldn’t also be the sole importer for a competing international player, because then you’re fixing prices for them both. If you’re a local monopoly manufacturing some product, you shouldn’t also be the main importer of the same product because then you’re blocking competition against yourself.”

Is it really that simple to stop the monopolies?

“It won’t be an instant cure. Battling against the tycoons’ practice of centralization, and against their attempts to control the economy, is a ceaseless job because capital always wishes to create centralization. But the government must fight back. Just as it fights terrorism — although those two enemies are obviously not comparable. Even a small change will bring a plentiful return.”

So that’s the first battlefront against the cost of living. What’s the second?

“The second front is our lopsided taxation. Among other things, it adds to the burden not only on consumers, as I mentioned, but also on small businesses. It prevents them from competing properly with large businesses. The tax benefits for large businesses should be cancelled and the small businesses should be free to compete with them on the basis of equal taxation.”

Isn’t there added value for the local economy in the economic activity that big multinationals bring to Israel?

“Yes, there is added value, but there is a price as well and the price outweighs the benefit. In my opinion, they would come to Israel even after cancellation of the benefits — which they don’t receive in the West anyway.”

Let’s go on to the third battlefront against the cost of living.

“The third battlefront concerns the budget. Both the size of the budget and the quality of governmental services. When government services in infrastructure, education, and health are inefficient, it doesn’t help to increase the budget. For example, if you add hours to the school day instead of investing your money in reducing class sizes, you’re cultivating an absurdity. We have many more class hours than are customary in Europe, but we also have many more children in each classroom. So an hour of school isn’t worth much, because it’s impossible to teach in those conditions. When there are 40 children in the classroom, more hours won’t benefit you because zero plus zero plus another zero is still zero. But progress on the three fronts that I’ve mentioned will reduce housing prices even with no other intervention.”

“I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers.”

After the attack of October 2023, you said no more Palestinian laborers should be admitted into Israel from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza because they come to envy the Israelis and they impede the self-reliance of the Palestinian Authority. Aren’t you worried for the many Palestinian families who depend on work opportunities in Israel?

“First and foremost, I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers because of the distortion caused to the Palestinian economy and to the Israeli construction sector. The Palestinians do receive lots of jobs at better pay than they could earn in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, but they work in low-productivity sectors so we’re actually diverting labor from places where in the long run the productivity could be higher. For example, when a factory opens in the Judea and Samaria area and offers wages lower than in the Israeli construction sector, the best workers will go to Israel instead of to the factory even though the factory has the potential of eventually offering higher wages. So working in Israel raises the standard of living for the Judea and Samaria area in the short run, but it freezes the standard of living at a relatively low level over the long run.”

Don’t you think that letting Palestinian laborers work here promotes peace and quiet on the ground?

“On the contrary, I think that the Palestinian economy’s dependence on the Israeli economy made the intifadas and other confrontations possible. Confrontations like those do wreck the economy, but if you have no local economy anyway, you have nothing to lose. Furthermore, it aggravates the conflict when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians come and see what our own standard of living is. They envy us. Envy is human. They can be replaced by Chinese, Thai, and Indian workers. Is it hard to find laborers whose families don’t live two meters from us?”

Then what about the Israeli construction sector? It depends on cheap labor.

“But the problem is that if you bring cheap labor in, the contractors have no reason to invest in automation and in modern working methods. What should be replacing the laborers is, above all, equipment and technology. Technology will enable the sector to do well with fewer workers. I mean not only the technology underlying equipment, but also methods of construction and also advanced knowhow. In Israel, the construction methods are labor-intensive whereas elsewhere in the world much more advanced methods are used.”

Let’s move on to agriculture. You said that you believe direct support for the farmers is preferable to raising customs duties on imports. Why?

“Because it’s cheaper and more efficient. Currently we’re trying to help the farmers by impeding imports. We’re paying for the world’s most expensive fruits and vegetables, and how much of the retail price reaches the farmers? Zilch and zero. It’s simpler to give the money directly to the farmers while importing freely and cheaply.”

How vital are the farmers economically?

“There are many reasons for well-developed agriculture. Food security, retention of the border areas, distribution of the populace, environmental quality, and more. But economics isn’t one of them. It would be wrong to say that agriculture is vital to the economy. But not everything is about the economy. The economy needs to be strong enough to support our values.”

In conclusion — if you were appointed Minister of Finance, what would you do first?

“Ultimately, economic policy is intended to affect the public’s expectations. As soon as it starts improving their expectations, it starts to achieve benefits — even before any material change occurs. So the first target is expectations. In taxation, benefits should be cancelled for large companies and VAT should be reduced. For pricing, it’s enough to grab 4 or 5 big monopolies and wipe the floor with them (pardon the expression) to send a clear message that policy toward monopolies and importers has changed. Visibility is an inseparable part of economic policy, because if we want the public to consume more, it needs to believe that we’re going to reduce the cost of living. Then we need to deal with the three biggest gougers, and as soon as the public sees we’re serious, consumption will be spurred.”

הפוסט Prof. Yaron Zelekha: “Israel’s economic policy contributed to October 7.” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, we will be focusing — with the help of Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen — on the topic of settlement. With Hacohen’s remarks as our guidelines, we will examine the geographical traits of the country’s various regions, expand on the connection between settlement and national security, and detail the settlement vision that the State of Israel must adopt in order to ensure its security for generations to come.

Background: From the Crusaders to Yitzhak Rabin — The Land of Israel as a strategic asset

The Land of Israel connects Asia to Africa and is linked to Europe by the Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of its location, it has served since ancient times as an important passageway between continents and between great powers, and for that reason many nations have tried to take control of it.

The various conquerors, and the Crusaders above all others, understood that the Land of Israel cannot be conquered and defended by occupying its coastal plain alone. So the Crusaders deployed a network of fortresses not only in the coastal cities but also in Sinai and on the ridges east of the Jordan, such as the Ajloun Castle in the land of Gilead.

Unfortunately, that important concept of breadth is not expressed in the distribution of communities today. On the contrary, more than 60% of Israel’s Jewish residents live on the coastal plain, a strip no more than 15 km wide. Furthermore, most of Israel’s strategic assets — including Ben Gurion Airport, the power stations, Ashdod Port, an office for supervision of banking, and the national headquarters of the various armed services — are all in that same tight space.

Besides being narrow and crowded, the coastal plain is dominated by the Judean Hills and by the Samarian slopes that overlook it from the east along its entire length. Those hills provide a direct view of the plain — and a convenient base for attacking it, whether by short-range rocket fire or by a ground incursion. Thus whoever controls the hills of Samaria and Judea is, for practical purposes, in control of the entire coastal plain.

Many leaders from across the political spectrum have well understood the connection between control of that area and preservation of security, and they have recognized the importance of maintaining defensible borders. That understanding underlay the “Allon Plan,” which Yigal Allon first presented to Levi Eshkol’s government immediately after the Six Day War. And the same understanding was also embodied in Yitzhak Rabin’s policy approach. Rabin’s last speech to the Knesset, in October 1995, outlined his national security policy and put forward four principles of settlement that he saw as vital:

• The first principle stipulated that in order to ensure Israel’s existence as the Jewish state, its population must be 80% Jewish. That was one of the reasons that Rabin placed all the Palestinian population of Gaza and of areas A and B under the Palestinian Authority.
• Rabin’s second principle was that Jerusalem, with Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev, must be kept united under Israeli sovereignty.
• The third principle stipulates that the Jordan Valley, in the most comprehensive sense, will be the Israeli side of the security border. That is to say, Israel must maintain possession of the Jewish settlements in every part of the Jordan Valley — from Route 90 westward to the line of ridges.
• According to the fourth principle, a Palestinian entity should be created which is “less than a state.” One practical implication of that principle is that Israel must retain control over the airspace of Judea and Samaria.

It should be emphasized that those principles were set out not by some right-wing faction but by leaders of the Labor movement; and they were expressing a broad national consensus. That fact alone reflects the importance of Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel and it makes clear that before settlements became a political issue, they were already a necessity for survival.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen: The settlement vision of the State of Israel

Jerusalem: A metropolis, not a border town

The current situation:

The historical, religious, and cultural importance of Jerusalem is clear, but the city also carries critical strategic importance. Jerusalem sits among hills, dominates central traffic arteries, and is also the only place with a Jewish majority on the watershed.

Possession of the Jerusalem area is essential both for ensuring that Jerusalem remains Israel’s capital and a central Israeli metropolis, and for operational and strategic reasons. Because it is close to a large portion of the sources of terrorism, Jerusalem makes a convenient base for dispatching security forces and a hub for intelligence activities.

Moreover, possession of the Jerusalem area is vital for keeping control over the central traffic arteries and over additional areas. It is Jerusalem that makes possible the retention of the Jordan Valley as a buffer zone between the coastal plain and the threats from the east. And the possession of hillside communities such as Na’aleh and Beit Arieh is what provides for control of the central traffic arteries and the strategic assets of the country’s interior, including Ben Gurion Airport. Thanks to possession of the ridge and of the Yatir region’s communities, the valley lands of Beersheba and Arad can be defended, as can the Nevatim airbase.

Furthermore, any territorial concessions in Jerusalem would be considered an Israeli surrender and would only encourage Arab and Muslim extremists to continue gnawing away at the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and in the rest of Israel.

Ideally:

• Strengthening Jerusalem’s standing as a metropolis: Before the Six Day War, Jerusalem was a remove border town, a marginal satellite of Tel Aviv. But since then, it has become an important metropolis. Jerusalem in the form of a metropolis is key to controlling the Land of Israel, and Jerusalem must retain that form. In order to remain a metropolis, Jerusalem requires all its surrounding communities — the Etzion Bloc to the south, Maale Adumim and Mishor Adumim to the east, and the Benjamin district to the north.
• Ruling out the partitioning of Jerusalem: Partitioning Jerusalem would not only endanger its standing as Israel’s capital but also critically harm Israel’s national security. There is no guarantee that partitioning the city would actually end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Apparently terrorism would still continue, and partitioning would merely provide it with far more dangerous opportunities for action. And all that aside, nowhere else in the world has such a large city been divided. Even on paper, the idea is simply not feasible.

Judea and Samaria: To become Israel’s backbone to the east

The current situation:

In the Oslo Accords, Rabin divided the Judea and Samaria area into areas A. B. and C. Only Area C is fully under the civil and security authority of the State of Israel. Area C currently includes some 120 Jewish communities, with more than 500 thousand residents in all. There are also some 500 Arab communities with roughly 200 to 300 thousand residents.

Although Israeli control over Area C is anchored in the Oslo Accords, many voices around the world are raised against Jewish settlement in that territory. Much is said about the “illegal settlements,” and about the wildcat outposts in Area C, but illegal construction by Palestinians in that territory is in fact immeasurably greater than Jewish construction. As of December 2023, Area C contains roughly 90,000 illegal Palestinian structures; and there is no attempt at removing them.

Another accusation leveled against the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria is that the Jews there burden the Israeli security forces. That accusation is fundamentally erroneous. Above and beyond not being a burden, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria is what provides the IDF with freedom of operation in those territories. The size of the IDF’s deployment in Judea and Samaria is not sufficient in itself to preserve stability in such a complex area. Stability persists only thanks to the weight of half a million Jews who live there.

Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria also provide the security forces with convenient access to areas A and B — a benefit that has served the IDF well in various operations such as the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield.

Furthermore, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria also demonstrates to the Palestinians that our presence there is stable and dominant and that they are obliged to cooperate with us. An Israeli withdrawal of any size would indicate weakness and encourage our enemies’ thoughts of seizing the area and even expanding beyond it.

The settlements in Judea and Samaria also deserve to be credited with contributing to objectives mentioned in the previous section (which dealt with the Jerusalem area), including turning Jerusalem into a metropolis, retaining control over the Jordan Valley, defending the coastal plain and Ben Gurion Airport, defending the valleys of Beersheba and Arad, and keeping constant control over the main traffic arteries. Every settlement and outpost in the Judea and Samaria area is serving at least one of those objectives, and therefore they all are justified on grounds of security.

Ideally:

• World opinion cannot dictate our policy: As even David Ben Gurion understood in his day, Israeli policy cannot address all the objections raised around the world. Cooperating in response to the various rulings handed down by the international court in the Hague would mean a death sentence for all the Jews in Israel, because if we try to survive only inside the Green Line we will not survive at all.
• Driving home the perspective on settlements: As demonstrated, all the territory of Area C is vital to security and must remain in Israel’s hands forever. That understanding must be made clear to all the decision-makers, and preferably to all the country’s residents.
• Development of the settlements in Judea and Samaria: Not only is settlement in Judea and Samaria less than extensive; it is in fact too limited. A backbone of 3–4 million residents is necessary between Arad and the Gilboa, in order to relieve Israel of the crowding in the Dan Bloc. To make that possible, the existing settlements must be enlarged, new ones established, and the system of roadways and trains expanded to connect all those communities to the country’s center.

The Jordan Valley: Apply Israeli sovereignty

The current situation:

The Jordan Valley is Israel’s security border to the east. As of today, the Jordan Valley is under Israeli control but is not officially considered part of the State of Israel. In January 2020, the USA published its “Deal of the Century” peace plan, which gave Israel a historic opportunity to assert its sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and to fully annex the valley and the northern Dead Sea. Unfortunately, Israeli politicians torpedoed the plan and the Jordan Valley remains in a precarious status, exposed to both domestic and international criticism.

To understand the Jordan Valley’s strategic importance, it is first necessary to understand the geography. The Jordan Valley is located 250–400 meters below sea level, while the hills of Samaria and of Hebron rise to an altitude of up to 1,000 meters above sea level. Thus as long as the Jordan Valley remains in Israeli hands, an invasion of Israel from the east is very difficult because there is no easy way to move massive military forces across such steep territory.

Granted, we are at peace with Jordan today and no invasion from there is expected soon. But we must not forget that our eastern border is the most important one for Israel’s defense, both because it is our longest border and because it is the closest to the triangle — defined by Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa — where most of the country’s Jewish residents and its most important infrastructures are located. Moreover, even if relations with Jordan remain stable, it must be understood that without Israeli possession of the Jordan Valley, Iranian militias can quickly move into Qalqilya and Tulkarm to fire artillery at the Dan Bloc. It is not lightly that Rabin called the Jordan Valley, in its most comprehensive sense, the security border of the State of Israel.

Above and beyond its strategic importance, the Jordan Valley also possesses no little residential value. It is a very extensive territory that can, and should, accommodate millions of dwellers. By settling the Jordan Valley, we can balance the geographical distribution of Israel’s citizenry and ease the currently worsening population density of the coastal plain.

Ideally:

• Applying sovereignty to the Jordan Valley: Not only must possession of the Jordan Valley not be waived, but action must be taken to fully annex the area and apply Israeli sovereignty to the valley. Only such action will enable wide-ranging governmental plans to be established, and the valley’s standing as Israel’s security border at the east to be ensured for the long term.
• Expanding the settlements in the Jordan Valley: In order to solve the problem of crowding in central Israel and provide for better geographical distribution of the populace, the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley should be expanded. In addition, new immigrants should be encouraged to settle in the valley rather than in the already crowded coastal cities.

The Galilee: Expand the Jewish communities

The current situation:

In 2005 the Israeli government approved National Master Plan 35, known as Tama 35. In accordance with that plan, it was decided to limit construction and settlement in open areas because of the importance of preserving green spaces. In practice, the plan limited only Jewish settlement and was not applied to Arab communities. In many parts of the country, including the Galilee, it has been impossible to establish new Jewish settlements since the plan’s approval. And it has been very difficult to expand existing communities, because of quotas limiting the number of residents.

Tama 35 created an absurd situation in which Arab communities such as Sakhnin can expand with approval and even double their population whereas a Jewish community such as Yodfat is not allowed to expand beyond the 400 households that it already includes. Furthermore, the land sold to Jews and the land sold to Arabs differ dramatically in valuation. In Karmiel, for example, plots of 350 sq m were marketed in 2021 for 1.2 million shekels. But five minutes’ drive from there, at Deir al-Assad, similar plots were marketed the same year for only 20,000 shekels; and moreover the land development there was subsidized.

Because of those conditions, the Galilean heartland (leaving aside the cities of Nahariya, Safed, Tiberias, and Afula) is only 15% Jewish.

Ideally:

• Change the National Master Plan: The National Master Plan must be promptly changed and a new plan approved that is based on the understanding that an extensive network of Jewish villages must be developed. Thus the Jewish communities must be freed from the limitations imposed only on them and become the basis for an approved expansion.
• Encourage young people to settle in the Galilee: Jewish residents, and especially young families, should be encouraged to settle in the Galilee. To that purpose, they must be offered land at worthwhile prices and with economic benefits; and the vicinity must be developed with convenient roadways, public transportation, workplaces, etc.

The Golan — Hoping for a hundred thousand Jewish residents

The current situation:

The State of Israel wrested the Golan from the Syrians in 1967, and the area has been controversial since then. Many countries around the world see it as “occupied territory,” but most Israelis see it as an integral part of their country. In December 1981 the State of Israel decided to apply Israeli law in the Golan Heights, and that decision remains in force today.

In 1994, in the spirit of the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government took steps toward returning the Golan to Syrian hands as part of an attempt to reach a peace agreement with Syria. The Barak and Olmert governments weighed a similar idea but did not proceed to carry it out.

Meanwhile, over time, the Golan’s standing as Israeli won a degree of acknowledgement in the world; and in 2019 US President Donald Trump signed an executive order declaring that the USA officially recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. However, most of the world’s nations still do not officially consider the Golan a part of the State of Israel, and Israel’s hold on the area is still under threat.

Ideally:

• Quash the idea of retreating from the Golan: International pressures must be withstood, because giving up the Golan Heights would bring terrible consequences. First of all, without the Golan Heights we have no chance of living securely. We would be vulnerable to threats from Syria and Lebanon. Also, giving up the Golan Heights would cost the State of Israel heavily in terms of culture and tourism because the Golan is a beautiful area and one of the country’s few green lungs.
• Enlarge the Jewish population in the Golan: Currently the Golan is home to 23 thousand Jews. In order to anchor our presence in that area, as well as relieving Israel’s overcrowdedness elsewhere, the hope is to settle 100 thousand Jews in the Golan over the next five years. With suitable conditions and proper incentives, such an undertaking is certainly feasible.

The Negev: Extensive rural Jewish settlement

The current situation:

The Negev covers approximately 60% of the State of Israel but it remains one of the country’s least populated regions. David Ben Gurion is remembered as recognizing the importance of developing and settling the Negev. He even called it “a great Zionist asset, with no substitute anywhere in the country.”

Unfortunately, Ben Gurion’s vision has not yet been carried out fully and the Negev still suffers from slow development and scanty Jewish settlement. The volume of settlement no longer depends only on how well motivated the settlers are to move south. It is now also subject to governmental limitations — first and foremost Tama 35, which makes establishing new Jewish communities and expanding existing ones difficult.

The few Jews who already live in the Negev are concentrated in Beersheba and in urban settlements such as Ofakim and Sderot, where they live in apartment buildings. Thus we have no truly extensive presence in the area and consequently no control over the main traffic arteries. The Bedouin population, in contrast, is distributed over broad tracts of land and thus enjoys control over the grounds and over the traffic arteries.

The Negev, it must be understood, is important to the State of Israel not only because of its size. It is home to a number of critical military and strategic assets, including the Nevatim airbase. Because control over the area was lacking, Bedouin rioters during Operation Guardian of the Walls, in 2019, managed to block access to the airbase and thus interfered with the IDF’s freedom of action. That was a severe security incident, and lessons must be learned.

Ideally:

• Extensive rural Jewish settlement: Development of Jewish settlements in the Negev must be encouraged, with an emphasis on rural settlements with single-family houses, in order to cover broad tracts. That is the only way to create balance in the area and ensure security along the traffic arteries. To that purpose, settlement planning in the Negev must be revolutionized to reduce land prices, create proper conditions for settling, and provide incentives for those who will come settle the Negev.

The Gaza Strip: Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities

The current situation:

The Gaza Strip has known many vicissitudes in recent decades. In the 1970s, Israel’s government established Jewish communities inside the Gaza Strip under the “Five Fingers Plan” put forward by Ariel Sharon. However, in 1982, Israel withdrew from the Yamit district and later the Oslo Accords obliged Israel to abandon further implementation of the Five Fingers Plan and waive control over the Philadelphi Corridor as well. In 2005, it will be recalled, the Jewish communities of the Katif Bloc were all evacuated under the Disengagement plan — and thus Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip came to an end.

Aside from the settlements inside the Gaza Strip itself, the Gaza Envelope communities and those surrounding the Gaza Strip in the northern Negev must be borne in mind. Following the Disengagement, those communities became the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from central Israel; and as such, they suffered many attacks — which climaxed on October 7, 2023.

As of this writing, there is no end yet to the Swords of Iron war that was engendered by that disaster; and most of the Gaza Envelope communities have not yet been repaired and fully repopulated. Despite the security threats, the State of Israel must repopulate the area bordering the Gaza Strip. Some of the veteran residents may not wish to return, but there are enough ideologically motivated citizens who understand the area’s importance and will agree to replace them there.

Ideally:

• Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities: The Gaza Envelope communities must be repopulated, whether by returning residents or by newcomers. The area is vital to Israel’s security and must not be abandoned. Even leaving aside Zionist pioneering ideology, it is a beautiful area suitable for a balanced lifestyle close to the land. The Gaza Envelope communities are actually not far from the center of Israel. Most are an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv and are well connected to public transportation, so that life there is definitely convenient.
• Jewish settlement in Gaza: Although valid in principle, this idea must be weighed against other national priorities and it may be that efforts should concentrate not on settling inside the Gaza Strip but on settling other areas in the Land of Israel.

There is no security without settlements: Summation and conclusions

The country’s first leaders, foremost among them Ben Gurion, appreciated the close connection between possessing and settling the land on the one hand and national strategy and security on the other hand. Subsequent leaders across the political spectrum, including leaders of the left such as Rabin, also understood that territory may be conceded only up to a certain point.

In practice, under cover of “green” programs, a National Master Plan has been adopted that prevents the plan of settlement from being fulfilled. Tama 35 limits the development of the State of Israel and weakens its security. The Master Plan must be revised. Among other things, Judea and Samaria must be regarded as strategic, economic, and security assets for Israel, and their development should be given consideration accordingly. In addition, the Jerusalem metropolis should continue being built extensively; the Jordan Valley, Galilee, and Golan should be settled; and the intolerable concentration of most of Israel’s assets and residents in a certain narrow district.

The drawing of Israel’s boundaries is a decision of concern to future generations, and so it must reflect more than the current situation. Our responsibility is to draw secure boundaries for the State of Israel — borders that can withstand the political upheavals of the Middle East and the changes in technology. Any policy that fails to consider possible threats to Israel’s future security is a policy of irresponsibility toward the nation.

And finally, it must be remembered that programs at the national level are carried out by the citizenry. At the cutting edge of any settlement plan stand the settlers who build the houses, plant the trees, bond with the land and the location, and are ready to fight for them as necessary.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Settlement and Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Declaration of Independence is first and foremost the most seminal document in Israel’s history. It lays out succinctly and clearly the blueprint and justification for the newly founded State of Israel and tells the story of the Jewish people.

The declaration opens with the assertion of the Jewish people’s historical right to the land of Israel and points to the thousand years of Jewish life in the Land before the Jews were taken into exile. It cites the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate as international confirmation of the  legal right of the Jews to the Land of Israel, and refers to the Holocaust as testament to the urgency in which the Jewish State must become a reality. The Declaration also establishes the values on which the State shall be founded, and calls upon all diaspora Jews to congregate in the Land of Israel and together bring the vision of the redemption of the land to life.

It tells a story of the Jewish nation which is historically accurate as it is conclusive. Unfortunately, over the past decades there are those who strive to diminish that narrative’s internal cohesiveness by using groundless narratives to pick at the justifications presented in the seminal document, and many of the Jews in Israel are losing sight and conviction of the justness of the Jewish nation’s cause.

This loss of conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause is one of the most dangerous phenomena manifesting recently in Israel’s society; without deep faith in the absolute right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, we have little reason to exist in that land. Without that conviction, we cannot ensure a conclusive and long-standing victory in the current war and we surely will not be able to guarantee peace for our future generations.

“Accordingly we are here assembled”: the factors laying the groundwork for the establishment of the State of Israel

Historical right

The Declaration of Independence was penned only three years after World Ward 2 and the atrocities of the Holocaust. Nonetheless, the document does not open on the story of the six million Jews who perished in Europe, but with the assertion: “Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel] is the  birthplace of the Jewish people, where its spiritual, religious and political identity was forged”. In other words, the Declaration’s point of departure is the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, stating: this is the place from which the Jewish people had arisen as a nation; here we lived as sovereigns of our land for generations, and here we created our national cultural inalienable assets. The Declaration underscores the “forcible” exile of the Jews from their land, and asserts that despite this, even in its exile, the Jewish people had staunchly kept its allegiance to the Land of Israel, yearningly praying for the return to the Jewish homeland and the renewal of its national liberty.

The Declaration addresses the Zionist enterprise, mentioning the pioneers who came to the Land of Israel to cultivate its soil and revive the Hebrew language, as well as the speech in the  first Zionist Congress (1897) by the founding father of the Zionist movement, Theodor Hertzel, stating the Jewish nation’s right to be reinstated in its land as a nation.

Legal justification

Furthermore, the Declaration addresses the legal right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel. It draws on the Balfour Declaration from 1917, which acknowledges the right of the Jewish people to establish their national home in the Land of Israel. The Balfour Declaration was the basis for the British Mandate in Israel. The Mandate document states: “…the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917 by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers [the Allied Powers], in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people…”

The Mandate, conferred upon Britain by the League of Nations (predecessor of the United Nations) is the most binding legal document pertaining to international recognition of the Jewish people’s right to the Land of Israel, in which the British have accepted the responsibility of acting to put this right into effect. It should be mentioned that Arthur James Balfour’s original intention was to establish a national home for the Jewish people on the entirety of the land of biblical Israel, including the Transjordan territories – Greater Eretz Israel.

However, history shows that the British Mandate in effect acted in contradiction to the mandate they were given, and rather than facilitating the establishment of the Jewish State as agreed upon in the Mandate document, the British administration prevented the immigration of Jews to Israel and moreover – allowed scores of Arabs from the entire Middle East to pour into the area. Furthermore, the British issued the White Paper (policy paper), which blatantly flouted the terms agreed upon in the Mandate. And if that were not enough, the British excluded the Transjordan territories from the historic territory of Greater Israel and of the Jewish national homeland, and allowed the creation of a new sovereign entity unorganic to the area under the Hashemite rule, named Jordan, in the Transjordan area.

Despite the British violation of the Mandate conferred upon then, and their commitment to the League of Nations, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate remained legal binding documents that stated beyond doubt that the Jewish people have national rights to the Land of Israel.

The Holocaust imperative

It is only after the declaration asserts the historical and legal right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel, that it addresses the Holocaust, citing that “The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people – the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe” as a “clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State”. The Declaration states that the State of Israel would be open for Jewish immigration from all exiles of the Jewish nation, thereby laying the foundations for the Law of Return, which grants people of Jewish descent the automatic right to live in Israel and gain citizenship.

The fashion in which the case for the Jewish right to the Land of Israel is laid out aimed to ensure that the Holocaust would not be taken as the framework of – and surely not the sole justification for – the Jewish entitlement to their national homeland. The authors of the Declaration single out the Holocaust as testimony to the urgency of an immediate solution, such that is deeply engrained in the historical and legal right of the Jews to the Land of Israel – far predating the events of the Holocaust.

Fast forward to present day Israel.

Sadly, over the recent decades, a growing number of Israelis have been forgetting this right, and have come to see the Holocaust as the driving factor justifying the existence of Israel.

It behooves us to understand that albeit a deeply painful reminder of the importance of a Jewish homeland, the Holocaust is not the pretext for the establishment of Israel, and that the Jews live in Israel by right and not by the grace of others.

The Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly

The first part of the Declaration ends with the mention  of the UN resolution for the establishment of a Jewish State in the land of Israel, on November 29, 1947.  The Declaration underscores that this recognition is “irrevocable”, and emphasizes that the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel is “… the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State”.

This takes us to the most historic and iconic declaration in the document: “We, members of the people’s council…declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel”

As envisioned by the ancient profits of Israel: the bedrock values of the Declaration of Independence

The values of the state to be

The last portion of the Declaration addresses the nature and values of the new State, and chiefly the assertion that the State “shall be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles”, in effect designating the State as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Later are mentioned additional values such as liberty, peace, equality and the freedom of religion, as envisioned by the biblical profits of Israel, thereby indicating, again, a return to the historic and religious anchor that defines the Jews as a nation.

Today, they are voices that accuse Israel of failing in its commitment to afford equal rights to all its citizens. These claims are with no foundation as every eligible citizen of the State of Israel has the right to vote, and all votes are equal; Evey civil body – including all bodies of government, Knesset and the Judiciary – have representatives from every demographic in the State of Israel; All Israeli citizens are equal before the law, regardless of their ethnicity, and since its very inception the State never had separate systems of laws for Jews and Arabs. The State’s education system and employment market have equal opportunities for all, and the increasing rate of Arab students in the country’s education institutions year on year – reflect almost their portion in the country’s population – all these stand as testimony that refutes such claims. Moreover, since 2020, nearly half of the new doctors in Israel come from the Arab and Druze sectors. This is the shape of a society based on equal rights.

Extending a hand to peace

The latter part of the Declaration also addresses the complex security demands of the Jewish state vis a vis the Arab population therein and the surrounding Muslim countries. It opens with inviting the Arab population to partake in the building of the State as fully equal nationals. Then the Declaration addresses the Middle East countries, stating “We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness”, and expresses the commitment of the new State to “do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East”, thereby clearly establishing the peaceful nature of the State of Israel.

The redemption of Israel

The Declaration ends with an appeal to the Jewish people of the diaspora, calling on the world Jewry to come to Israel and together realize the dream of generations of Jews of the redemption of Israel.

The last line of the Declaration is a return to that which unites the Jewish people as a nation, and mentions that the Declaration was signed with “Trust in the ‘Rock of Israel’”, i.e God.

Refraining from determining the form of government and borders: what is not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence

A Jewish egalitarian state

The authors of the Declaration were deliberate in selecting each word in the document and no less – that which was not mentioned. Nowadays it is a matter of fact that the State of Israel is Jewish and democratic; however, it is interesting to see that while the words “Jew” and “Jews” appear 20 times in the Declaration, the word “Democracy” does not appear even once. This is no coincidence.

The Declaration of Independence refrains from specifying the new state’s form of government simply as at the time it was not a given that Israel would become a democracy. In fact, the majority of the leadership was deeply connected to communist Russia and held the ideology of the kibbutzim – agricultural coop communities – in the highest regard, hence many among them supported the installation of a communist, rather than a democratic, form of government.

On the other hand, the Declaration proclaims a statehood that upholds such values that are congruent with those underpinning the democratic ideology i.e. equality, justice and liberty, thereby establishing the balance which is much addressed by Israeli society, of a national homeland for the Jewish people on the one hand, and a democratic state, on the other. Fully understanding the Declaration of Independence shows that the two are compatible and not contradicting.

Without demarcation of borders

Another topic that the Declaration of Independence does not address – and justly so – is that of the borders of the state-to-be. The authors of the Declaration refrained from mentioning the Partition Plan, voted on by the UN General Assembly on November 29. This stems from the understanding that the borders of the State of Israel are yet to be formed.

And indeed, no sooner was the Declaration signed, seven neighboring hostile armies rose against Israel, which found itself in a fight for its survival in the War of Independence. Not only was that war won by Israel – it redefined the country’s borders. Since that war, Israel had found itself in numerous confrontations that led to the reshaping of its borders, and there are large parts of Israel’s society that would see Israel regain its historic biblical borders of “Greater Eretz Israel”.

Between politics and security: the Declaration of Independence and the reality today

The politicization of the Declaration

The Declaration of Independence had become the defining document of the State of Israel. Sadly, in recent years – particularly on the background of the loaded debate on the judicial reform – it has become a battering ram of sorts, for all stakeholders.

Many groups in Israel resort to the Declaration of Independence to buttress their claims. As welcome as this renewed interest and discourse may be – as it reflects a wide recognition in the seminal importance of the Declaration – it also misuses the document by cleaving from it a narrow political interpretation that defies the full meaning of the Jewish nation’s most important document in modern history. It is imperative to understand that the Declaration of Independence represents an organic concept that cannot be partially accepted or rejected, no more than the story of the Jewish people can be partially acknowledged.

One of the most dangerous things Israeli society can do is turning the document that is the foundation for its existence in the Land of Israel, into a means to political gain.

The loss of an ethos

Without understanding the Declaration of Independence with all of its articles, we allow subversive elements to undermine not only the entire national ethos of Israel but also the conviction in the  right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel.

Over the past several years, we are witnessing the proliferation of lies attempting to show Israel as a colonialist force scheming to occupy a land with which it has no legitimate connection. These lies wish to expunge the story of the Jewish people and the State of Israel and as such should be  vehemently rejected, not only by Jews but also by any truth seeking individual.

It is imperative that the Israeli public knows to differentiate between essence and practice – firstly, it must understand and embrace the narrative of a Jewish people, returning to its lost land, and rising again as a nation in the comity of nations. Only on the foundation of this inalienable document can true and long-term solutions be had. Thus, even when compromises are necessary – as painful as they might be – they will stem from a practical vantage point that clearly sees the dictates of reality, rather than from a position that turns its back on the values that define the Jewish people.

Protecting ourselves, by ourselves

Sadly, the current debate on issues of security and defense in Israel have been derailed to the realm of shallow, political sloganism. In order to truly address this topic with all the seriousness and reverence it deserves, we must look to the Declaration of Independence as a guiding light.

The Declaration states that the Jewish nation had never stopped demanding its natural right to live as a free, respected nation in its birthright land. Implied in the narrative of the document is the imperative of the Jewish nation to establish the ability to protect its land, by itself, thereby laying the ideological and ethical foundation on which the new state should stand.

The DNA of the Jewish nation: the eternal importance of the Declaration of Independence

The current “iron Swords” war in Gaza and its counterpart in Lebanon underscore the importance of the conviction in the justness of the Jewish claim to its land. The prime entity that is the driving force behind this war is Iran – a country with which Israel has no common borders and no territorial disputes whatsoever. The Iranian Republic and its global and regional network of proxies are fueled by a single-minded desire to eradicate the State of Israel, stoked by Teheran’s zealous hatred of Israel. Hence, the real struggle of the State of Israel is not for land – it is ideological.

In this respect, Israel has a long way to go. Its enemies are well skilled at preserving and instilling their own ethos, while the infighting that is tearing at the very fabric of Israeli society only weakens its ethos as a nation and alienates it from the values that have been the bedrock of the Jewish nation for thousands of years, akin to a tree, whose roots are rotting and can no longer sustain itself, destined to eventually collapse.

To sustain the tree that is the Jewish nation and the State of Israel, and prevail in this ideological war, we must reconnect to the Declaration of Independence and to the defining narrative of the Jewish people. It is the spirit – not only the size of the army and the superiority of its weapons – that will win the present struggle and ensure the security of Israel for generations to come. It is the spirit that derives from the conviction in the justness of the Jewish nation and its historic and present right to the Land of Israel.

הפוסט Understanding the Declaration of Independence – Understanding the Jewish Right to The Land of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Ahiram Levi, a 30-year-old combat engineering soldier, opens our interview with an apology. He has much to say, he explains, but he isn’t quite sure how to phrase his opinions.

And indeed, as we embark on our discussion, the words come tumbling out with passion and pain. However, as the interview progresses, Ahiram gets a better handle on his thoughts and he presents structured and concise messages – sentiments shared by himself and his comrades in the field; messages that must be heard by every decision-maker in Israel.

“I speak for many reservists, all who sanctify life – regardless of their political leanings”, he wishes to clarify. “When I talk about the leadership, I mean all of Israel’s leadership – political, judiciary, military, media. As far as I’m concerned, they all should shoulder the responsibility”.

“No one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to reserves’ service”

Ahiram was summoned to report to duty at the outbreak of the October 7 attack, just eight months after his wedding, and a month after he quit his job. During the long months of fighting he also had to move and found himself contending with a complex series of personal difficulties. Added to this were the challenges from the battle field: the uncertainty, the constant fear, and the loss of comrades, which breaks the heart each and every time.

Ahiram is well aware that he’s not alone in this story. All of his comrade reservists are dealing with similar difficulties. “The reservists in particular are paying a dear price in this war, and this does not receive the attention it deserves”, he says. “I still have a hard time finding a job since no one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to duty. I have friends that because of their [prolonged] reserves’ duty have gotten divorced or have lost their jobs.  There are even some reservists who have committed suicide between tours. And the public – try as it may to be supportive – doesn’t really understand how difficult things are for us”.

Despite the mounting difficulties, and personal costs, Ahiram states that if summoned again he would immediately report, no questions asked. He only has two requests, both of which he wishes to convey to Israel’s decision-makers and to the citizens of the country: respect our lives by giving us your support and letting us win, and take responsibility for the unity of the public in Israel”.

“No more back-and-forth raids”: the reservists want to win

Since October 7, uncertainty has become part and parcel of the daily lives of the Israeli public. But there are those who deal with more uncertainty than the rest. Putting aside uncertainties that are products of being a combat soldier in war, there is the uncertainty that arises from the reservist’ constant transition lately between civilian and military life. “There is a large measure of unclarity regarding the reserves’ service”’ says Ahiram. “It starts already at the moment we get our summons. I’ve repeatedly received summons that were either postponed or called off all together. You must understand that when we receive a call to report for duty, our entire life circles around the upcoming tour. We stop everything, change plans. When we receive a summons out of the blue – it makes us feel that we – and our time – are being taken for granted, because they know that whenever called – we will step up to protect the country”, he shares candidly. “But the lack of clarity doesn’t end here. During fighting we usually are not informed of the objective of our missions. We’re told to go in, get out, fight, desist. This is has become even more prevalent in the recent months of the fighting”.

Can you see any difference between the fighting at the onset of the war as oppose to now?

“Absolutely. When the war began, the troops fought intensively and aggressively, however, lately, the soldiers feel that we’re bogged down in the Gaza mire instead of driving the fighting towards victory. The leadership and the public must understand that the longer we’re in Gaza – the more soldiers die. The troops in the field want to see a return to continuous intensive fighting, coupled with heavy artillery, mopping-up operations, a concerted military effort and a broad seizure of territory; no more back-and-forth raids; no more tours. [we want] warfare that means business and says to us: ‘we brought you here from home to win this war’”.

What in your opinion, is holding back the IDF from victory?

“I don’t intend to address the bringing of politics into the military; however, I would like to touch upon the considerations of international pressure. I understand that this is an important issue – but it’s not more important than our lives. The lives of the soldiers should be treated with reverence. Beyond that, there is a gap between the mindset of the troops in the field and the messages that are sent out by the leadership. As common soldiers we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that our army has everything it takes to tackle a terrorist organization – as complex is it might be – and to crush it. But without the conviction in the imperative of victory on part of the leadership, we can stay entrenched in this fight for another three years with no conclusion in sight.”

What is you view on the possible cessation of the war before all its objectives have been reached?

“As a civilian I would comment on the issue, but as a soldier it is not my place to voice an opinion. The army’s job is to execute decisions and we, as soldiers, are committed to carrying out in the field any decision coming down from the top. The problem is that we see mainly foot-dragging. It’s frustrating. We get up and leave everything – our families, our work, our businesses, and report to duty, but then have to face indecision. I say – if you don’t want to win, then don’t call us in. End the war and let it go at that. But if you do wish to win – let us fight until we do.”

“The lives of the reservists are not even on the public agenda”

On July 1st, Sergeant Major (res.) Nadav Elchanan Noller, an old and good friend of Ahiram’s, fell in battle. This is not the first friend he has lost since the beginning of the war, but Elhanan’s death had rattled him in particular.

“Every person killed is a world onto its own. But seeing such high numbers of casualties leads to indifference. The fallen march by in a long line and most of us aren’t even familiar with their names, don’t know who they are, hurt for their loss for one moment. Unfortunately, it is only when grief comes knocking at your own door you understand its meaning”, he says. “This indifference is displayed by the public as well as by the leadership”.

Ahiram says that as citizens of Israel, it is our duty to take pause to hear and honor every single name of a fallen soldier. But this is only one side of the story. “I want us to be honored and respected while we’re still alive”, he stresses. “We risk our lives and souls for the country and the public, and you don’t have to see the epitaph ‘Rest in Peace’ near our names to call us heroes. We don’t need to be loved as dead heroes”.

How would you have the leadership treat the soldiers and reservists differently?

“I expect the leadership to back us up: in the battles in the field as well as in life outside the battlefield. At the moment the sentiment is that everything is on the table – international relations, the economic situation, the hostages, the evacuees. Everything but us. I’m not underestimating any of these issues; they’re all important. But it is not acceptable that the lives of the reservists are not on the public agenda as well. The day Nadav was killed, the sole issue on everyone’s mind was whether to reconnect Gaza to electricity or not. It feels like were getting stabbed in the back; it’s as if the lives of the Gazans are more important than those of the reservists. You have to understand that the attempts to appease the international community not only divert the limelight from us, but also lead to decision-making that impedes our ability to fight – reconnecting Gaza to the electricity helps Hamas and most of the humanitarian aid reaches the terrorists’ hands and reenforces them. Creative alternatives can be put in place that can protect our international interests but also allow us to engage in continuous aggressive operation. Furthermore, we also want to see an enveloping support system for us and our families. That means real financial aid and not occasional benefits of one sort or another, as the reservists cannot shoulder that burden on top of everything else.”

What do you expect of the Israeli public?

“There are amazing people who have been nonstop supporting the soldiers, the wounded and the families of the victims. Nonetheless, most of the public has returned to routine life, and this manifests in the levels of volunteering and emotional involvement on their part. It’s understandable. I didn’t expect the level of support at the beginning of the war to continue on such a scale, and at the end of the day – we’re out there fighting so that the public can live its routine life, but still, it’s hard for me to deal with the indifference in society now and the obliviousness to the difficulties that the reservists are experiencing”.

What can be done to help the reservists?

“People want to tell us ‘Well done’ and even reach into their pockets and donate. But when they encounter these difficulties in a challenging setting – they don’t really know how to help. I’m not saying that everyone needs to volunteer, but there are other ways to share the burden, like refraining from firing employees that are absent due to reserves duty, despite the difficulties. Similarly, employers should be patient with employees returning from reserves duty and have difficulties readjusting. Furthermore, the families of reservists should be supported, especially the wives, who are alone at home with the children. Generally speaking, society can – and should – be sensitive about seeing how it can help others, even if it’s not clear what difficulties they’re dealing with.”

“The TV studios are like kindergartens”

One of the most common expressions heard since the onslaught of the war is “unity”. We encounter it in almost every junction, on signs proclaim “Together We Shall Win”. We hear it repeatedly in politicians’ speeches. Commanders preach it to their soldiers. Social media posts are replete with it and it appears in musical releases – but as far as Ahiram is concerned, at the moment unity is little more than a catchy slogan.

“I watch what goes on in the TV studios – they’re like kindergartens now”, he says. “It’s hard to watch our leaders go at each other’s throats, and foment intrigue. We’ve reached a state in which the government is identified with the right and the army – with the left. This is unacceptable. I want to call on all levels of the political and military leadership – and to the media as well – be responsible. Think twice before you speak and ask yourself wither your cultivating love or stoking hate; promoting unity or fomenting  discord”.

According to Ahiram, there is a significant gap between the manner in which the Israeli leadership and society manage disputes and how the soldiers and reservists handle them. “There is a very high degree of cohesion among the reservists. We are able to conduct discussions bringing up opinions across the political spectrum and do so in a respectful manner. Sometimes I feel that we have parallel universes here – the universe in which the reservists exist and that of the outside world”.

Still, how can unity be promoted in the “outside world”?

“It is the leadership that must take the responsibility for promoting unity among the people – this should be the number one priority of the Knesset. It starts with the way the politicians themselves talk to each other and continues with the comments we hear in the media. We must shift the idea of unity from a slogan into practice and get it into our heads that if we continue to split into factions and camps, and if we don’t learn how to build a future for us all – we’ll simply no longer be here”.

“I’m needed, so I’m there”

As of now, Ahiram Levi is back at his civilian life, but he knows that at any moment he could be summoned back to reserves’ duty. And it is clear to him that if he is– he will report for duty. Meanwhile, as long as he is home, he is working on his fresh marriage, getting used to his new house, and trying to finally find a job. And in between it all, he visits the troops, but as a volunteer. Beyond Ahiram’s important contribution as a fighter, he has also recently founded the “Unity War Room” – an organization dedicated to helping soldiers, operating under the slogan “Because We Have No Other Country”. Ahiram and his volunteers travel the country, distributing food and gear to soldiers and mainly conveying to them: we see you.

How do you find the motivation to continue to serve and volunteer?

“What gives me the strength is the knowledge that the people of Israel have experienced difficulties throughout history, and prevailed. When you stick to a narrow view – it’s hard to get up in the morning. But adopting a perspective that sees us as a link in a long line of Jewish generations, allows me to rise above the hardships. I also understand that no one else is going to do it for me and my family. I’m needed – so I’m there.”

Now that you’ve expressed such painful thoughts, what is your message to Israel’s leadership?

“My first message is: take responsibility and show us we are important. Put our lives on the scales when you weigh your decisions and give us real support. The second message is: don’t toy with us. If you want to win the war – let us fight properly and bring about its conclusion. Don’t leave us in this limbo because we are sick of sacrificing our lives because of your indecision.”

הפוסט You Called Us to Serve. Now let Us Win הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As part of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index project, an ongoing survey of Israeli society on questions of security, military and society, this month’s report explores an issue that has become the focus of attention in Israel following the events of October 7: the role of Israel’s civilians in the country’s national security strategy.

In the next reports, we continue to review the survey findings and the insights they offer. Whereas the previous report focused on public opinion in regards to the civilian role in national security in times of quiet and at war, and explored the public’s opinion on expanding the compulsory military service to the ultra-orthodox (Haredi) community and the role of the youth in the country’s security, the present report deals with public opinion on the contribution of settlement, agriculture and industry to Israel’s national security strategy.

The survey was conducted on May 2024, under the statistical direction of Dr. Hagai Elyakim. It included 1,453 participants from Israel’s internet-using adult population (18+) and was sampled in a manner that ensured its representativeness in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,453 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.6% with a 95% probability; For the Jewish sample (1,079 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (374 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±5.1% with a probability of 95%.

Instrumental or detrimental? Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, Gaza and in border areas

The participants were posed with a series of questions that explore their opinions on Jewish settlement along the borders of the country and the border envelope communities and the extent of the contribution thereof to national security. On the question whether settlement along the country’s borders contributes to boosting national security – 70% of all the respondents and 83% of the Jewish respondents replied affirmatively. An ideological segmentation reveals a considerable variance: 92% of the respondents on the right of the political map thought that settlement along and in the border areas of the country contributes to the security of the Israel; in the center – 72% and the political left – 65%.

The respondents were then asked whether the Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria contributes to the national security. 53% of all the respondents and 65% of the Jewish respondents replied positively. The distribution by political ideology shows even a larger variance than the previous question, with 88% of the right-wing respondents believing this to be true, as oppose to 42% in the center and only 17% in the left.

The participants were further asked if they thought that the Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria contributes to the security of the Tel-Aviv metropolis area in central Israel. 58% of the respondents replied positively as compared with 70% of the Jewish respondents.

The issue of the Jewish settlement within the Gaza Strip was also explored: the results show that 49% of the respondents and 58% of the Jewish respondents believe that Jewish settlement of the Gaza Strip will boost the security of Israel’s southern communities. An ideological segmentation shows variance among the political ideology groups: on the right of the political map, 81% of the respondents thought this was true; in the center 32% supported this statement and on the left – only 14%.

As part of the section exploring opinions on Jewish settlement in Israel, the participants were asked whether Israel should arm Jewish communities situated along conflict lines. 85% of all participants answered affirmatively, yet a segmentation by ethnic group shows a large variance with 95% of the Jewish respondents feeling that the government should arm conflict-line communities as oppose to 57% of the Arab respondents.

All colors of the rainbow: broad support of agriculture

The survey also explored the public’s opinion of the extent to which the agricultural sector contributes to national security.

The results show that Israeli-Jews see a strong correlation between agriculture, Israel’s independence and the protection of their country: 82% of all the respondents feel that Israeli agriculture is vital for the connection between the people of Israel and their land; 79%  thought that Israel should reduce its dependence on imports and increase local production of food; 75% believe that agriculture is vital for the protection of the country. Similarly, 78% of the respondents noted that Israel should encourage young people to choose a career in agriculture and 77% thought that the country should facilitate the foundation of agricultural vocational schools.

The various statements yielded similar variances among right-wing, center and left-wing respondents, but a distribution according to nationality shows marked differences. Apparently, 86% of the Jewish respondents believe that agriculture connects people to their land, as oppose to 63% of the Arab-Israeli respondents. Furthermore, 83% of the Jewish respondents thought that agriculture contributes to the protection of the country’s borders, as oppose to 53% of the Arab-Israeli respondents.

From vocational schools to high-tech: the contribution of Israeli industry to the country’s security

Lastly, the survey explored the Israeli public’s opinion on Israeli industry and its contribution to Israel’s national security. Industry, similarly to agriculture, received high support rates: 90% of all the respondents believe that Israel should invest in the development of high-tech and AI technologies for security purposes, with 83% maintaining that the country should develop self-manufacturing of missiles and ammunition.

It is likely that the high rates of support for the development of technology and industry are a direct outcome of the Gaza war. This war has revealed just how much Israel’s dependance on the import of munitions from other countries is an encumbrance. It seems that the public now understands that Israel must aspire for independence in terms of development and production as well.

Similarly, it seems that the public understands that a stepping stone to such independence is the cultivation of professional, skilled manpower. The results show that 84% of all the respondents maintain that the country should encourage the foundation of  vocational schools for the training of industrial workers. 81% think that the country should encourage young people to pursue a career in the construction industry to reduce its dependance on foreign workers. Interestingly, support for the foundation of more vocational schools and encouragement of young people to choose a career in the construction sector was almost equal between the Jewish and Arab respondents, thus it would appear that this is an interest that serves both demographics.

Security is much more than an army: conclusions

The present IDSF HaBithonistim index aims to explore the extent to which the country’s civilian population could contribute to Israel’s security, with the understanding that security involves many areas of life, aside from military aspects. To create a broad perspective, three main civil sectors that may have an impact on national security were examined: settlement, agriculture and industry.

Following the October 7 disaster, it seems that Israeli public realizes that Israel must reduce its dependence on other countries. For this end – the public mostly agrees – Israel should boost its agriculture, industry and construction sectors and establish the means to provide the manpower to do so.

On the topic of settlement – there is a noticeable perceptional change in Israel’s society. Despite disputes on political matters, is seems that most of the Jewish public supports Jewish settlement across the country – particularly in Gaza and the Judea and Samaria region – and views this as an inseparable component of Israel’ national security strategy.

“The idea of incorporating Israel’s civilians in the military effort might seem unnatural and even jarring to some, however, Israel’ security reality deems this a necessary marriage”, says Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “It’s important to understand that this approach is not new. The founding fathers of Israel’s Labor party in the State’s formative years – led by Ben Gurion – understood the importance of Jewish settlement across Israel. Similarly, it was clear to the leaders of the young state that the presence of the Israeli farmer plays a material role in establishing the country’s borders and sovereignty. As regards to industry – this, too, is a matter that was discussed years ago. In the past, the State of Israel had invested considerably in civil and security industry, with the understanding that the less the country depends on foreign aid the more independent it would be. However, over the years the country has been departing from that perception and Israel’s industry became increasingly dependent on import.  The present war in Gaza has made it all too clear that Israel must strive to develop self-manufacturing – particularly of weapons and defense systems. The public has come to fully understand this and now the State’s decision-makers must as well and act accordingly”

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: Settlement, Agriculture & Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As part of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index project, an ongoing survey of Israeli society on questions of security, military and society, this month’s report explores an issue that has become the focus of attention in Israel following the events of October 7: the role of Israel’s civilians in the country’s national security strategy.

The results of the survey and analysis thereof will be shared in a three-part report. The present part focuses on the perception of Israel’ society regarding its role in the national security, in times of quiet and during military emergencies. It further explores the public opinion as regards to the conscription of Haredi (ultra-orthodox) Israelis and the role of Israel’s youth in contributing to the country’s security. The next sections of the report take a closer look at Israel’s settlement, agriculture and industry enterprises and their contribution to the national security.

The survey was conducted on May 2024, under the statistical direction of Dr. Hagai Elyakim. It included 1,453 participants from Israel’s internet-using adult population (18+) and was sampled in a manner that ensured its representativeness in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion and political affiliation.

For the combined sample (1,453 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.6% with a 95% probability; For the Jewish sample (1,079 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±3% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (374 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±5.1% with a probability of 95%.

Would you risk your life for the country? Most citizens are willing to do so

In the first part of the survey, the participants were presented with a series of questions aiming to determine the extent to which they thought Israel’s civilian population should take an active part in the protection of the country’s security. 81% of the respondents thought that in security emergency times the civilian population should play an active role in the protection of the country; 58% thought that the civilian population should do so as a matter of routine. A distribution of the responses according to nationality and ideology shows significant variance: 91% of the respondents affiliated with the political right thought that civilians must partake in the protection of the nation’s security in times of war while 66% of that group thought that this should extend to times of quiet as well; Of the respondents in the center of the political map, 82% maintained that civilians should be involved in national security in times of war while 53% supported this for times of quiet as well; On the left of the political map, 70% of the respondents thought civilians  should be actively involved in national security in times of war while only 37% thought this should extend to times of quiet as well. As for the Israeli-Arab respondents – 68% thought that civilians should be involved in national security during war and 61% maintained this involvement should include times of quiet.

A marked variance is evident when comparing the perception among the Jewish and the Arab respondents regarding civilian involvement in national security in times of war as compared with times of quiet, as the survey shows that Israeli-Arabs place more importance on this role as compared to the political center and left-wing Jewish respondents.

The participants were also asked whether they would be willing to risk their lives protecting the country. 71% of the respondents replied affirmatively, yet here too, there are noticeable differences between the ideological groups – 86% of the right-wing respondents would risk their lives for their country as oppose to 70% from the political center and 60% of the left-wing respondents.

The participants were then asked whether they thought Israel should instate a national guard comprised of army veterans for the purpose of maintaining Israel’s internal security. 63% of the respondents responded positively to the idea, again, with significant variance between ideological affiliation: 86% of the political right supported the idea as oppose to 50% of the center and 31% of the left.

From studying Torah to military reserves service: the activities that contribute to Israel’s security

The survey participants were asked to tick any activities on a list that they thought contribute to Israel security. The leading choice was “military reserves service” with an overall 88% support, followed closely by “volunteering in community security teams” at 86% and by “regular compulsory military service” at 84%. Further down the list were “police volunteering” at 73%, “possession of a licensed firearm” at 62% and “National Service” (voluntary alternative to army service) – at 58%. At the bottom of the table was “studying the Torah” with only 35% of the respondents thinking this is material for the security of Israel.

A segmentation according to religious affiliation shows a broad consensus regarding the first three items. Non-religious, Conservative, orthodox and ultra-orthodox (Haredi) respondents all thought that military reserves service, volunteering in security teams, and regular compulsory military service are vital to the security of Israel. However, regarding the studying of the Torah, there were considerable variances among the religious affiliation segments: among the non-religious respondents, only 12% thought that the studying of the Torah is material for Israel’s security; among the Conservative respondents 48% thought so; among the orthodox – 73% and among the Haredi – 96% supported this claim.

The majority of the public would like to see a more Zionistic and involved youth

The present IDSF HaBithonistim index explores the perception in the Israeli public in of the role the youth should play in national security. 56% of the respondents thought that young adults in Israel should take an active role in the protection of the country’s security – both in times of war and quiet. A distribution of the replies shows an interesting picture: while Jews and Arabs hold similar positions of the subject – 56% and 57% respectively, an ideological distribution shows a significant variance: 69% of the right-wing respondents supported this statement as oppose to 44% of the respondents from the center and 28% of the left of the political map.

The respondents were asked whether they thought there should be leadership groups comprised of reservists and youths within Israel’s border communities. 67% of the respondents responded positively but here, too, there was a notable variance between the ideological groups: 82% of the right-wing respondents supported this idea, while 58% of the center and 42% of the left-wing respondents supported this.

In the context of Israeli youth, the respondents were posed with questions concerning school education. For example, they were asked whether the educational curriculum should include more Zionism studies and ideological encouragement to serve the country. 77% of the Jewish respondents supported this notion as oppose to 32% of the Israeli-Arab respondents. A distribution of the Jewish respondents by ideology and religion shows that those agreeing most with this statement were the Conservative and orthodox right-wing respondents. The respondents who tended not to agree with this statement were from the non-religious, Haredi and left-wing segments of the participants.

the participants were further asked whether they thought Israel needs a new youth movement that will be founded on the values of Zionism and national security. 54% of the Jewish respondents supported this idea, as compared with only 28% of the Israeli-Arab respondents. Of the right-wing respondents, 69% supported this idea whereas 36% of the center and 27% of the left-wing respondents thought so. All in all, 48% of all the participants supported the idea of founding a new youth movement that promotes Zionism and security.

Drafting of ultra-orthodox – first and foremost a security imperative

What about the brewing  controversy over the conscription of Haredi (ultra-orthodox) men into the IDF? 56% of the respondents thought that the solution for the need to increase recruitment rates lies within Haredi society, however, 59% state that the conscription of Haredi men must be done in tandem with the recruitment of additional demographic groups that do not serve in the IDF.

The Jewish and Arab participants differ in their standing on these two issues – 52% of the Jewish respondents agreed that the need to increase the rate of enrollment in the army must find its solution in the Haredi community; 62% of the Jews and 47% of the Arab respondents thought that the recruitment of Haredi men must come in tandem with the recruitment of other non-serving populations. The variance between the two groups probably stems from the fact that as a whole, the Arab population in Israel does not serve in the IDF.

Ideologically, there is a variance among the groups: among the right-wing respondents, 40% thought that the army should recruit from the Haredi community; among the center affiliated respondents, 63% thought so, and among the left-wing respondents – 78% supported this statement. The question whether other non-serving population should be drafted yielded similar results. Hence, it appears that the majority of the Jewish population in Israel believes that non-serving groups should be recruited to the army.

Finally, the participants were asked to choose one of two options to the question whether the conscription of Haredi men is a social imperative or a security necessity. The results were very close, however, most of the public (54%) thought it was a security necessity. The variance of the political and religious distribution is within the statistical margin of error.

The bottom line: the public wants to be more involved in Israel’s security

Despite the variances among the different ideological and religious groups, it seems that as a whole, the Israeli public maintains that citizens have a great importance in the national security strategy, predominantly in times of emergency but also in times of quiet. Israel’s public believes that the country’s youth should be given an active role in the protection of the State, and agrees that this should be incorporated into the formal and non-formal education.

As regards to the question of the conscription of ultra-orthodox (Haredi) men, the survey found variances among the various groups of Israeli society. It appears that most of the public supports the conscription of Haredi men but maintains that this conscription should extent to other non-serving groups as well.

“Already from the inception of Zionism, the need was clear for the involvement of the civil population in Israel’s national security, alongside the compulsory military service”, says IDSF HaBithonistim Director, Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi. “In the past, the civil guards were part and parcel of the State’s reality, however, throughout the years this has fallen by the wayside. In the wake of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, and in full force since the October 7 attacks, the public has been revisiting the importance of civilian involvement in the country’s protection – a fact that is clearly reflected in the security squads every town and community in Israel now have. The findings of this survey show that we are returning to the basic values that were a given in the State’s formative years, and reflect to what extent the public in Israel can, must and is willing to contribute and sacrifice for the national security and the protection of our national home”.

הפוסט IDSF HaBithonistim Index: The Civilian Role in National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Among the many endeavors and projects undertaken by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, it prides itself on a prolific research department and its professional academic research team, which conducts ongoing research and surveys of Israel’s society, among them the IDSF HaBithonistim Index. The survey is published every quarter and is monitored to ensure it includes a representative sample of respondents from all walks of Israeli society. The index reports the findings on public opinion on various national security and social issues in Israel. Thus far, seven indices have been published, each exploring a specific topic but also including repeat questions aiming to gauge changes in public opinion over time against the background of current affairs.

Among the topics explored, the surveys sought to determine the extent to which Israeli public has faith in the country’s authorities, its sense of personal safety and concerns over the future of the State.

The present survey report provides a longitudinal review of these topics and explores the changes over the past two years.

Support of the police on the rise, of the IDF in decline – the public’s trust in State institutions

All the IDSF HaBithonistim surveys included questions aiming to gauge the participants’ trust in the IDF, Israel Police and the government. The rationale behind these reoccurring questions is that a vital element of the national security is the social resilience of the nation, of which one derivative is the level of trust the public has for the State authorities.

In the first survey, held on March 2022, 20% of the respondents said they had faith in the police; 28% trusted the government and 63% said they had faith in the IDF.

However, in the last survey, held in May 2024, 33% of the respondents said they trusted the police; 27% said they had faith in the government and 54% expressed their trust in the IDF.

A comparison between these two end surveys shows a-13% rise in the public’s trust in the police; a 9% decline in its trust of the IDF and a nearly unchanged level of trust in the government.  However, a longitudinal examination of the findings over time reveals fluctuations in how the public responded to current events in Israel. The present report follows the trend over time in the public’s trust towards the three bodies – the IDF, Israel Police and the Israeli government.

The IDF

The IDF is the only of the three bodies that consistently gains the highest levels of trust on part of the Israeli public, leaving the other two bodies well behind. However, of the three institutions surveyed, the IDF also recorded the steepest drop in the level of public trust. The watershed moment is obvious: October 7.  Up to the July 2023 survey, the level of public trust in the IDF was 63%-72%; however, on November 2023 – the first of the surveys following the October 7 events – that trust dropped to 59% and in May 2024 had further dropped to 54% – almost a 20% drop from its peak level.

Even before October 7, there were fluctuations in the levels of public trust in the IDF. Thus for example, in the wake of Operation Breaking Dawn in August 2022, the level of public trust in the IDF was on the rise. Operation Breaking Dawn was a concerted three-day operation in the Gaza Strip during which the security forces located and eliminated 25 known terrorists, many of them senior ranking – in the Islamic Jihad and Hamas with blood on their hands. The IDF had also succeeded in shooting down 96% of the rockets launched at Israel from the Gaza Strip during the operation. No casualties were suffered on the Israeli side hence the operation was chalked up as a great success, which would explain the rise in the public’s trust in the IDF.

However, as oppose to that operation, the following Operation Shield and Arrow on February 2023 actually caused a slight dip in the levels of public trust in the IDF. Although deemed a considerable military success, with six high-ranking Jihad members and another 20 terrorists eliminated in addition to hundreds of military targets destroyed by the IDF,  the civilian population suffered more casualties  as compared with Operation Breaking Dawn – during the week leading up to Operation Sheild and Arrow, 102 rockets were fired at the Gaza border envelope communities and adjacent towns, causing the death of one foreign worker and the injury of six Israeli citizens. During the operation itself, hundreds more rockets, anti-tank grenades and mortar shells were fired at Israel, reaching as far as the center of the country. Most were intercepted by Israeli defense systems,  but  an 82-year-old woman was killed when her house in Rehovot took a direct hit. Moreover, during the operation, all schools were suspended in the Gaza envelop communities, public gatherings and events were prohibited and main roads were blocked in southern Israel. It is possible that the fact that the IDF responded only a week into the Islamic Jihad’s rocket attacks and the price that the civilian front paid may be the reason for the drop in public trust of the army.

The Police

The public’s trust in the Israel Police is consistently the lowest of all three institutions throughout the surveys. However, it is the police that has recorded the largest increase in trust levels throughout the seven surveys of the index. Similarly to the IDF, the turning point was the October 7 events – only in this case, the trend was reversed. Up to the July 2023 survey, the public’s trust level in the police was at a relatively low 20%-23%, on November 2023, it leapt to 39%. On May 2024, the level of public trust in the police slightly dipped and is now at 33%. It appears that the performance of the police,  from the onset of the “Parash Pleshet” alert code announced on the morning of the October 7 attack, and the steep price in the form of dozens of casualties from the police forces, had greatly contributed to the public’s trust in the body – at least temporarily. It will be interesting to examine the findings of the next survey.

The Government

An examination of the first of the seven surveys against the recent poll shows that trust levels in the government are nearly unchanged between those two points in time. However, following the trend throughout the seven surveys of the Index reveals significant fluctuations. At its peak, public-trust levels of the government reached 43%, but at its lowest plummeted to only 22%.  It is likely that the fluctuations stem from the political instability that characterized Israel’s politics over the past several years and the consequent series of frequent elections. Thus for example, there is a correlation between the decision to dissolve the 24th Knesset on June 6, 2022 and the ensuing early elections, with July’s drop in the public’s trust of the government. On the other hand, on October, Israel was on the verge of elections, and it is possible that Israeli society felt that political stability is at hand. Even in the survey held on February 2023,  after those elections, the level of trust in the government held at 43% – despite the social protests against the judicial reform.

Political shifts and social protests aside, the events of October 7 had an effect on the public’s trust of the government, albeit less markedly than the IDF and the police. After the October 7 massacre, the public’s trust in the government dropped from 40% to 35%, later further dropping to 27%. It should be noted that the decrease in trust of the government and increase in the public’s trust of the police following the outbreak of the Gaza war turned the tables and it was now the government that had become the least trusted body of the three.

“The changing tide after October 7 is hardly surprising”, says Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. “This horrible day is a terrible failure of the IDF in terms of intel and an operational failure as well, and it is not surprising that the public’s trust in the army was hurt. I would actually expect it to drop even more. On the other hand, the police displayed outstanding resourcefulness that day and took command of sectors that are under military responsibility. The police officers – many paying with their lives – were able to stop the terrorists from advancing to Ashkelon and other areas deeper within Israel, so it is clear why the public hold the police in high regard”.

According to Avivi, the fact that the public’s trust in the government has not changed significantly following October 7 is also a built-in insight. “The public mostly believed that the government was not made aware of the intel and was not privy to the decisions that led to the disaster”, he explained. “We can see by the other questions in the IDSF HaBithonistim Index’s survey that the IDF command is held more responsible [for October 7] than the political leadership”.

Concerned mostly about the country: the sense of security among Israel’s public

In all the surveys in this series, the participants were asked about the extent to which they had concerns over their personal safety and the future of Israel.

In March 2022, 64% of participants indicated that they feared for their personal safety, and 61% said that they were concerned over the future of the country. In May 2024, 60% said they feared for their own safety, and 70% said they were concerned over the future of the country. Thus, the  public’s sense of personal security increased slightly, but its concern over the future of the country was even higher.

Here, too, we will try to understand how the security and political events in Israel affected the results of the survey.

Concerns over personal safety

A longitudinal analysis of the surveys shows that a large percent of Israel’s population fears for its personal safety. The highest level of concern was recorded on July 2022 at 46%, and the lowest – 30% – was recorded in February 23.  In the poll from May 24 – 42% of the respondents said they feared for their personal safety in Israel.

At first glance, it may seem surprising that people were more concerned about their personal safety in July 2022 as compared to the present, when Israel is at war, and when it was only recently attacked in an unprecedented missile strike by Iran. However, July 2022 was the peak of a massive wave of terror attacks across Israel, resulting in the murder of 21 people.

According to Amir Avivi, this low in the public sense of personal safety has an additional cause. “Prior to the war, the public felt that the government was tolerating the situation, was unresponsive and was not taking appropriate action”, he says. “Only following October 7 the country woke up, understood what it was facing and went to war. The shift from a passive and helpless position to a proactive engagement that is standing up for its own, gives the public a stronger sense of security, even on the background of a complex and difficult reality”.

Fears for the fate of Israel

The survey results reveal that  Israel’s civilians are in a perpetual state of concern over the future of the country. On February 2023, the public’s concern was at its lowest of all the surveys but still considered rather high, at 58%. The two most recent polls, held after the outbreak of the Gaza war,  recorded the highest levels of concern and it is easy to understand how the surprise attack on the Gaza border, the raging war in the south, and imminent war in the north of the country caused a spike in the public’s concerns over the fate of their country.

Avivi, too, was hardly surprised by the public’s growing concerns for the future of the country, but at the same time is convinced that under a skilled guiding hand, the public’s sense of personal safety could be restored. “We need a national vision that has clear vectors of operation, and we must mediate the reality to the public even if it is complex, and make it absolutely clear – not only by words but in actions – that Israel places its security before anything else”, he says. “This connects me to one of Britain’s most difficult and dramatic moments in World War Two, when its army was surrounded by the enemy and could not see how the German war machine could be stopped. At that moment of strife, Winston Churchill said candidly: ‘I can offer nothing but blood, toil, tears and sweat’, but at the same time stated that there is one aim: ‘…victory, victory at all costs’. This speech galvanized the British nation and led it to victory in the war – and precisely this spirit is what is demanded of Israel’s leadership”.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement is fully committed to continuing gauging and reporting on the sentiments and trends of public opinion in Israel, with the understanding that the public’s trust in the State institutions, and its sense of personal and national security have a direct impact on Israel’ social resilience and in turn – its national security.

הפוסט Citizen-State Relations – A Longitudinal Survey of the IDSF HaBithonistim Index הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Is Israel fated to eternal war over its protection and existence? Sadly, the answer is yes. This is the cold, harsh truth and indeed, the only truth. The sooner Israel understands and accepts this, it will better be able to address its security concerns.

In this paper, I would like to discuss this axiom on three levels: religious, national and historic.

On a religious level, the hostility towards Israel in all its forms and manifestations in the Middle East falls under the umbrella of a war of religion. The end goal of the Islamic religious war is the establishment of world-wide rule of Islam. This fight comprises two parts: “Dar Al-Islam” (house of Islam) and “Dar Al-Harb” (house of sword). Dar Al-Islam refers to the regions held or conquered in the past by Islam, whereas Dar Al-Harb pertains to those regions that have not yet been taken over by Islam. According to Islam, one of the duties of the observant Muslim is to liberate the Dal Al-Islam areas that are controlled by non-Muslims (heretics or others). Israel, having been for a certain period under Islam rule, must be “liberated” and returned to Muslim control, as the per Dar Al-Islam doctrine.

Furthermore,  Muslims buck against the very idea of being under the rule of Jews, and living as a minority under Jewish rule in the State of Israel is an insult added to the injury that is the Jewish control over the many biblical Jewish heritage sites across Israel that throughout history have taken on religious significance to Islam, such as the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron and the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Put all this together in one small land and you have all the ingredients for a holy Jihad. It was not incidental that Hamas dubbed the October 7 massacre “The Al-Aqsa flood” – all Muslim believers, whether Shia or Suni , subscribe to the principles above mentioned. This is also the reason why Muslims around the world – Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and more – closely follow what is happening in Israel, and are even mobilizing to send forces to join their Muslim brethren in the current war. Any expectation that this would – and indeed could – change, is absurd and has no leg to stand on.

Peace with Egypt – Why is the Egyptian army building up its forces?

Some may wonder how, then, in light of the Dar Al-Islam and the pan-Islamic solidarity could Egypt and Jordan sign a peace agreement with Israel. This is explained by the approach in Islam that commands Muslims to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad, who preached that peace with an enemy is acceptable when a Muslim is in a disadvantage, but once the Muslim is strong enough to uphold the Islam rules of war the agreement may be broken. When understanding this way of thought, who can guarantee that these peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan will last for long? Over the recent years, the Egyptian army has been undergoing a rapid and significant buildup of force, including the construction of infrastructures under the Suez Canal and in the Sinai Peninsula on the border with Israel. It is true that Egypt has its own threats and conflicts within the African continent (Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia), but these conflicts are not on a scale that could justify this buildup of force. Why, then, are the Egyptians doing this? Isreal has a track record of warm relations with Muslim states that have soured and turned hostile – Iran and Turkey to name but two. Is there really anyone who truly believes that the same cannot happen with Egypt?

The State of Israel was established on the territories of a decaying Ottoman empire. At the time, the territory was considered part of what was called the Greater-Syria region, as were the territories of Jordan and Lebanon. Modern Syria has never disguised its ambition to regain control over Lebanon – a state that was artificially created in the 20^th century by the French and British mandates over territories in the Middle East. The same is true of Jordan, that continues to exist in the past decades thanks to Israel’s close attention. Can we truly say that Syria had gave up its desire to regain control of the Land of Israel?

A Palestinian state has never existed, and inasmuch as it depends on Israel – one will never come to be. The October 7 massacre helped many understand this. Furthermore, all public opinion polls taken in the past year among the Judea and Samaria Arabs show that the overwhelming majority would commit such a massacre of Jews if given the opportunity. It takes a great degree of naiveté to believe that there would come a time when the entire Arab population from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea would forsake their collective aspirations to be the sole lords of the entirety of the Land of Israel.

Moving on to the historical level. Several years ago I spent the day with my children at an amusement park in the Netherlands. Looking around and seeing all the happy faces of the children, I thought to myself how wonderful it must be to be able to live life without being under constant threat. However, this, apparently, is not the lot of generations of Jewish children. History shows time and time again, that no matter where Jews live there will always be those who persecute them, whether for religious causes, xenophobia or – mostly- pure antisemitism. Anyone with even a general knowledge of history cannot but acknowledge this simple yet sad fact. Whether Jews staunchly uphold their religious believes and traditions or try as they might to assimilate into the society they live, whether we live in Europe, America or Israel – this is the truth. Do the images from university campuses across the United States leave any doubt that this is not something that will change in the foreseeable future?

I do not know of one Jew who does not wish to live a peaceful threat-free life; I do not know of any Jew who lives in a place that allows this. To put it succinctly, nothing has really changed since founder of the Revisionist Zionist movement Zeev Jabotinsky wrote in his seminal essay “About the Iron Wall” from 1923, that we can live in the State of Israel only through military might that would deter Israel’s enemies from without and within.

And those of us who still choose to leave Israel and try their luck elsewhere, all we can do is wish them the best of luck and remind them that the State of Israel will always be here to welcome them back when the next pogrom sends them back home.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Shall The Sword Devour Forever? For Israel the Answer Is Yes הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

If you read IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s statement of beliefs you will find among other the following principle: “The IDSF HaBithonistim is not a political movement. It is open to any person who believes in its founding principles”. And what are these principles? The principles of the movement’s activity are exclusively anchored in Israel’s security concerns. Why then is the movement occasionally pegged as a “right-wing” movement? Because nowadays in Israel, Zionism has become a political concept. But it is precisely with the aim of debunking this misconception that the movement was founded.

The ideology tier vs. the action tier: do not mix them

The principle of neutrality is an important factor for the IDSF HaBithonistim movement in its dealing with the most important question of all: how to safeguard Israel’s security for generations to come. This type of issue cannot be pegged as politics, simply as it is an existential question that has a bearing on the lives of all Israelis and Jews across the globe.

According to the movement’s approach, the rationale at the basis of the question of Israel’s security is the fundamental belief in the rightful claim of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. In other words, this fundamental belief has no affiliation or leanings neither to the left nor to the right of the political map.

The politicization of Zionism stems from the unfortunate marriage in recent decades of these two tiers that ought to have remained separate – ideology and action. the ideology level may absolutely subscribe to the notion that the Jewish people are entitled to the entirety of the land of Israel whereas the action level may offer pragmatic solutions such as the withdrawal from parts of that land, so long as such a measure is deemed material for the long-term security of the State. However, once the notion of parting with sections of Israel rests on the fundamental assumption that the Jewish people had no right over that land to begin with, Zionism begins to disintegrate.

An illuminating example of the disparity between ideology and action is the story of the destruction of the Second Temple. Raban Yohanan Ben Zakai upon viewing the ruins of the temple chose to leave Jerusalem and in its stead, set the city of Yavneh as the Jewish spiritual center. Some sixty years later, Rabbi Akiva viewed those same ruins and as oppose to Raban Ben Zakai, concluded that in the face of such a reality of oppression, the Jews must revolt.

Looking at these two historic giants, can any one of them truly be accused of non-Zionism? The answer of course is no. Both Raban Ben Zakai and Rabbi Akiva had no qualms as to who has the rightful claim to the land of Israel, but each chose to respond and act in a different fashion.

This lesson is applicable to Israel today. We can uphold Zionism as our common cause as a people yet still support different diplomatic and security solutions. Once we come to realize that there is no contradiction between Zionism and opposing politics, and understand that Zionism is an ideology and not a political statement, we can bridge the gaps that are tearing us apart.

Leave politics at the door: the politicization of Zionism

At its inception, Zionism bred many approaches, the most prominent of which were the spiritual Zionism, diplomatic Zionism and religious Zionism. However, despite the differences among the various approaches, they were all driven by a common cause: the foundation of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel.

In the formative years of the State of Israel, Zionism was at the consensus of the nation, and any opposition to this notion, if at all, was at the fringe of the discourse. It was only during the seventies and eighties of the 20^th century that politics were attributed to Zionism and claims were voiced that it is not an ideology but a political statement.

The Politicization of Zionism also forced a shift in the public’s perception of the Israeli Defense Forces. If until this change the IDF was seen as a liberating army, once politics were attributed to Zionism many had begun to view the army as an occupying military. It is important to understand that this shift is not just semantic, but a deep perceptional shift with regard to the legitimacy of the Jewish people’s claim over the land of Israel.

If there is one thing that the opposition to Zionism had succeeded in doing was to put the notion that Zionism is not a fundamental ideology but a political stand in the minds of Jews themselves. This notion is an existential threat to the State of Israel for the simple reason that when the Israeli nation forgets why it is in the land of Israel, it can not muster the strength it needs to sacrifice and fight for its country.

That notion also drives wedges among the diaspora Jews. Presently, there are thousands of Jews around the world that are turning their backs on the State of Israel and its fundamental values. Zionism must return to center stage and the global Jewish community must be made to understand that they do not have to reject their Jewish identity in order to see a resolution of problems In fact, they must not do so.

No such thing as half an ideology: Zionism is a complete narrative

Many citizens of Israel attests that they “are Zionist, but…” Reservations are perfectly acceptable, and there is room for a variety of opinions on core issues pertaining to Israel and the Jewish diaspora. However, one cannot be half Zionist. Zionism is an acknowledgement of the rightful claim of the Jewish people over the land of Israel. One may either support this notion or oppose it – there is no middle ground here.

When there is an understanding that Zionism is a complete narrative, then it cannot be argued that the core of the land of Israel, which was the setting for the Jewish people’s ancient history, is an occupied territory over which Israel has no legitimate claim. This approach is dangerous ideologically and security-wise. Ideologically, it is a threat to the Zionist notion since how can it be claimed that only part of the land of Israel belongs to the Jews, whereas another part of it does not? In terms of Israel’s security, an immediate withdrawal from entire crucial swaths of land would leave Israel exposed without maneuvering space and the ability to undertake actions to ensure the country’s security and existence.

Is it rational to assume that Tel Aviv is rightfully a part of Israel whereas Shiloh in Judea and Samaria does not belong to it? A point to ponder for those who would uphold a partial view of Zionism – what difference should it make it the former was taken by Israel in 1948 while the latter – in 1967? The post-war borders of Israel are nothing but arbitrary. Would the claims regarding Judea and Samaria be any different if Israel would have taken over the area in 1948 as it did Tel Aviv? Or alternatively – what would be the claims if Israel had taken Tel-Aviv – and Jaffa at that – only in 1967? Would the bustling Israeli metropolis be considered an occupied territory as well? This notion is a fallacy.

As oppose to Zionism, which is a complete and sound ideology, anti-Zionism is full of holes; a flawed unmarketable product.

The question of Israel’s security is not political – it is existential

The perception according to which we are demanded to separate between our identity and values and the problems at hand and the solutions thereof is the bedrock of the IDSF HaBithonistim’s existence. This is the reason behind the movement’s non-political nature. This fundamental principle is also manifested legally, otherwise the movement could not have been registered as a non-profit foundation.

In order to comply with its stated political neutrality, the members of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, although no longer in active military service, use their expertise that won them their ranks solely to comment on matters of national security without digressing to politics. We expect the same from Israel’s security establishment, whose task it is to ensure the security of Israel and the safety of its citizens, and thus must cleanse its hands of the political discourse. Sadly, many still choose to attribute questions of national security to left or right-wing politics, thus, rather than engaging in a true and sincere debate, a shallow and cliché-ridden exchange is forced upon us without any real solution. Rather than considering the structured and research-supported security approach as presented by the IDSF HaBithonistim regarding the proper measures to safeguard Israel’s security, the conversation centers around whether the movement is affiliated to the political right or not. For this reason precisely, the movement takes pains to remain politically neutral.

In the name of said neutrality, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement does not welcome into its ranks people who hold positions in the civil service. Granted, two members of the movement were recently appointed to important government roles – Maj. Gen. Yiftach Ron-Tal was appointed as project manager for the rehabilitation of the north, and Maj. Gen. Eli Marom (Cheney) was appointed as project manager for the rehabilitation of the south. Accordingly to the movement’s nature, the two are no longer active members of the movement.

Further proof of the movement’s neutrality can be found in the military security principles that guide it. Albeit at first glance these principles may seem as if they resound those of the political right, a review of public opinion shows that they in fact reflect the sentiments of the majority of the Israelis. Moreover – these same principles were upheld by more than a few past leaders of the political left.

Furthermore, as the IDSF HaBithonistim movement deals only in matters of security and does not engage in social, economic or legal issues, it is open to members of the public from the entire political gamut and as such may have members who identify with the movement’s national security agenda while at the same time subscribe to left or right wing social and economic beliefs. This diversity allows for a pluralistic movement.

Being the heroes and not the villains: conclusion

The Zionist ethos is a story, and every story has a hero and a villain. What our enemies are systematically trying to do is to change the narrative wherein the Jews are the heroes of our story, and make them the villains. Sadly, there are those among us who are beginning to adopt that narrative and view Israel as the villain. Who would wish to be part of such a narrative?

The people of Israel must remember that they are the heroes and not the villains. Israel is the liberator – not the occupier. Once we truly and fully understand this, we can be free to engage in pragmatic matters from a healthier point of departure and explore what must be done to contend with Israel’s challenges and produce true coexistence. But if we begin to doubt ourselves and our rightful claim over the land of Israel in its entirety, once we start seeing ourselves as occupiers – not only does our foundational ideology of Zionism begin to disintegrate, but Israeli society – and the Jewish people as a whole – begin to loss their common ties.

It is our hope that the Jewish people in Israel and the diaspora will come to understand what is crystal clear for the IDSF HaBithonistim movement: Zionism is a value and not an opinion; Israel’s security is an existential – not a political – matter. We can feel a through and through connection with the land of Israel and its people and still uphold pragmatism and an approach that at times may lead to compromises such as the one chosen by Raban Ben Zakai, while in other occasions – to resistance, such as the path chosen by Rabi Akiva.

הפוסט “Zionism Must Stop Being Treated as a Political Issue” – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi on the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement and Unconditional Zionism הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDF’s current military operation to eliminate the remaining terror cells in Shejaiya neighborhood in Gaza City is part of Phase III of the war. This phase involves raids by IDF forces into specific centers and compounds identified by the Israeli intelligence for various reasons, including the presence of hostages, senior Hamas military and governmental officials, field terrorists, and remaining Hamas terror infrastructures that have yet to be addressed or have been reorganized after IDF forces went from the area.

The Shejaiya operation is a raid into the neighborhood after the IDF determined that Hamas had re-established itself there both militarily and governmentally. Additionally, the IDF appears to be planning an operation in Khan Yunis, as it recently called for residents there to evacuate.

Previously, the IDF completed a similar operation in Jabalia, in northern Gaza, where Hamas had reorganized and turned civilian areas into combat zones while restoring terrorist infrastructure above and below ground. This operation lasted about three weeks, during which IDF forces eliminated hundreds of terrorists, destroyed numerous terror infrastructures and combat complexes, and located hundreds of weapons.

It is vital to note that the IDF has conducted operations in these locations multiple times since the war began, including during the extensive ground maneuver phase.

Reality repeatedly shows that Hamas forces return to these and other locations in the Gaza Strip after the IDF withdraws at the end of operations. In a raid, the army gains tactical control and inflicts casualties on the enemy before retreating, unlike an attack where the army conquers and holds the area.

The raid strategy has its advantages, such as deception operations. For instance, the IDF might withdraw from a location to lure back the terrorists, then launch a swift and decisive attack when the terrorists are unprepared. However, raids should be part of a comprehensive attack strategy, where the IDF has the capability to stay and hold strategic areas and focal points in Gaza.

Without a strategic shift, the IDF will continue to revisit and reoperate in the same places. During each raid, some Hamas terrorists manage to escape or hide, only to return after the operation ends, recruit more members, and restore their organizational and infrastructural strength.

Only a military occupation and sustained control by the IDF, especially in Hamas strongholds like Jabalia and Shejaiya, can prevent Hamas from regrouping and lead to relative stability in the area.

Regarding aid entering Gaza, most of it is currently seized by Hamas members who take control of the goods. The solution is for the IDF to oversee aid distribution by establishing a temporary civilian administration, in cooperation with international organizations and regional countries, to ensure the welfare of the civilian population (without Israeli funding, but with Israeli leadership and management).

In any post-war scenario, it is clear that Israel cannot transfer civilian control of the territory to any party until the IDF has established control and militarily defeated Hamas.

The IDF must learn from the developments in northern Gaza to inform its actions in the south. It is crucial to maintain a continuous presence of IDF forces in the Rafah area, along with the Philadelphi Corridor. As the operation in Rafah began, many terrorists fled or hid in the city. So far, the IDF has eliminated only a few hundred terrorists out of an estimated 3,000-strong Hamas brigade. Therefore, it is likely that once the IDF announces the end of the operation and withdraws, most of the terrorists will re-emerge to assert Hamas’s dominance both civilly and militarily.

The IDF has also yet to take decisive action in central Gaza. Even though Israel may soon declare the end of the “intense” phase of the war in Gaza, it is clear that the IDF still faces a significant amount of work. This work, expected to last at least two more years, involves continuing to cleanse Gaza of Hamas and other terrorist organizations, including locating and destroying tunnels, rescuing hostages, and eliminating Hamas leadership.

Therefore, the IDF must prepare for a prolonged stay in Gaza, which includes taking control over civilian mechanisms to prevent Hamas from regaining power or threatening civilians, as well as blocking the return of the Palestinian Authority to control Gaza. This should be done in cooperation with local leadership in Gaza, which should be organized into districts with separate local leaders for each region.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The IDF must achieve a permanent presence in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The October 7 failure is not rooted in technology. Rather, it occurred despite technology. The failure on that fateful day was the performance of the high-command in the IDF and the Shabak – Israel’s General Security Services, who were bogged down by a dated security concept and thus failed to put the advanced military technology in their hands to the full use for which it was developed. Recent allegations claim that the military debacle of October 7 was caused by the overreliance on technology, and those who subscribe to this notion are demanding that the IDF roll back its methodology and invest more in boots on the ground and less in futuristic weapons and systems.

The author of this document aims to show that these claims are misguided and to assert Israel’s imperative to maintain technological superiority in dealing with its enemies.  This in fact, is nonnegotiable. Indeed, is there really anyone who would contend that Israel can prevail in the fight for its existence without technological prowess in the air, cutting edge drone technology, superior intelligence capabilities, advanced tunnel-detection systems, and a decisive advantage on the ground campaign, to name but a few?

We will begin with a review of some of the misguided applications of the technology, that had led to the October 7 failure, and how this is related to the mistaken concept that is prevalent among Israel’s security apparatus’s command. All the information henceforth has been publicized even before official inquiries have been ordered.

We will then suggest several causes for these failures and explore them. Finally, the article will present suggestions for avoiding these kinds of failures in the future.

A. The Misguided Use of Technology During the Events of October 7

Over the past decades, Israel’s strategy for dealing with Gaza focused mainly on containment. The decision makers did not view the Strip as any kind of significant threat, but rather a persistent nuisance, a pebble in Israel’s shoe. The captains of Israel’s security establishment were bound by the misconception that Israel could actually live alongside Hamas, the power that has been controlling Gaza since its violent takeover of the Strip in 2007. These captains preached a gospel according to which if Israel simply extended Hamas economic and financial gifts, complemented by diplomatic pressure, the next confrontation could be held off indefinitely. Puzzling, as it was common knowledge that regardless of these efforts, Hamas is continuing to build up its force and acquire new and alarmingly advanced capabilities in the hiatus between confrontations.

As part of this containment paradigm and the shadowing of Hamas’s advancements with ever increasing technological capabilities on part of the IDF,  Israel had diligently added to its hailed “Iron Dome” aerial rocket-interception system a cutting- edge and staggeringly costly underground barrier to prevent the tunneling into Israeli territory. To that it added a highly  sophisticated border fence that was armed with some of the world’s most advanced surveillance systems to alert in the event of breach attempts.

Tragically, we have all witnessed on October 7 the crushing failure of this advanced and supposedly unbreachable barrier, when Hamas terrorists were able all too easily to cut through it with the use of rudimentary methods such as explosives, bulldozers and planks of wood, after using simple cheap drones to take out the state-of-the-art surveillance system in a matter of minutes.

Indeed the Iron Dome system is an impressive achievement on a global scale, and has save hundreds, if not thousands of lives, since it was put into use. Yet, on the downside, it also facilitated a growing adoption of the containment concept in the decision-making echelons of security and government.  The capabilities in Israel’s hands with the Iron Dome had also tipped public opinion in Israel and the world against the need  for measures against Hamas and The Islamic Jihad on the ground, the general consensus being “If you have Iron Dome to minimize the damage, why risk losses among the IDF soldiers and the innocent in Gaza?”.

Alongside the colossal failure of the underground barrier and the military forces in the protection of the Gaza envelop communities, we have witnessed an utter failure on part of the IDF Intelligence Directorate and the General Security Service to raise a red flag in the days before the October 7 attack – including blatantly ignoring the plethora of alarming developments on October 6. For decades the Intelligence Directorate has been the most technology-intensive branch of the IDF, alongside the Air Force. In recent years, the intel collecting network of the IDF Intelligence and General Security have become increasingly reliant on advanced technology, and there are many who claim that this came at the expense of classic indispensable human intelligence, or HUMINT.

Moreover,  the IDF intelligence unit 8200, had completely forgone the gathering of electronic intelligence – SIGINT- such as radio interception for the sake of the latest technological “hit” – collection by cyber technology. Thus, 8200 had stopped altogether intercepting the Hamas tactical radio transmission. Albeit the undisputable value of cyber collection, it cannot remain a single tactic. A tragic proof was the failure of these sophisticated means employed by the IDF to provide the security establishment and the Israeli nation with the critical warning before October 7.

The aforementioned would ostensibly  indicate that the October 7 attack was a result of technological failure, but this article aims to disprove that claim.

B. Possible Causes for the Failure

The misconceptions and overconfidence of the senior command

October 7 did not come to pass because of technology, rather, it happened in spite of technology. The surveillance system along the border fence functioned appropriately, timely transmitting warnings to the system operators. However, what is the use of all the costly sophisticated technology if the chiefs of intelligence and the  General Command blatantly choose to ignore its input?

For over an extensive period of time, a number of analysts in the Intelligence Directorate raised the alarm regarding Hamas’s intentions. Several of these warning attempts have been made public in the wake of the attack, and it seems that those were just the tip of the iceberg in the body of evidence that was collected and presented to the commanders. One staggering example of the overconfidence and inaptitude of the IDF and GSS senior command, was the intel showing that dozens of Israeli SIM cards were activated at once from within the Gaza Strip. Even the most low-ranking intelligence analyst knows that this is a clear red flag that demands alerting the entire Gaza region command. The intel was based on the most advanced monitoring technology that can intercept such irregularities and alert the system. But again – similarly to the surveillance soldiers at the border fence – although the technology performed as it was designed to do, its was the senior Intelligence and GSS command that chose not to heed the unequivocal and  resounding  warning.

These responses can only be explained by an over confident leadership that is bound by unrealistic concepts  according to which:

1. The Hamas is deterred and cannot breach the physical border fence.[i]
2. The Gaza economy is more important to Hamas than fighting Israel and the organization has no intentions on engaging in a conflict for the foreseeable future.[ii]
3. Israel’s intelligence capabilities are superior and can not be taken by surprise such as what happened in the Yom Kippur War in 73.[iii]
4. All the indications observed ahead of October 7 were simply Hamas’s military exercises.[iv]

All the questionable statements above were made by heads of Israel’s security establishment, present and past, in the months leading to the October 7 massacre.

Even the most advanced technology does not stand alone. The more the failures are uncovered in the wake of the attack, the more it seems that the operation of the border fence surveillance system left much to be desired. If the system’s maintenance is poor, it cannot come as a surprise when it does not operate as designed in real-time. Moreover, the designers of the particular system on the Gaza border fence underestimated Hamas’ capabilities, and failed to thoroughly address the need for critical operational systems that could withstand attempts to destroy them, i.e.  alert, command and control systems. One example is the alert system, which was designed without any protection from drone attacks. Moreover, the alert systems in the 8200 unit, which designed the system, were not online in the hours before the attack. Furthermore, another no less critical system did not produce critical data ahead of the attack because it was shut down due to the Sukkot holiday.

At the end of the day, any physical security barrier, sophisticated as it may be, requires protection by an adequate military force. However, the misguided concept and a large measure of complacency on part of commanders provided an extremely small force to protect the border fence. Clearly even a state-of-the-art fence cannot stave off an assault by thousands of Hamas terrorists, particularly when the chiefs of military and security brush aside all the preliminary clear warnings that the technology provided in abundance, to the extent that they failed to demand even the lowest level of alertness from the border forces.

Overly reliant on technology; understaffed in the field

Those who point the blaming finger at the shortcomings of technology, use what was dubbed after  the Second Lebanon War “the plasma screen failure”( wherein commanders chose to command the forces from their plasma screens in the headquarters rather than from the field) to illustrate their point. This is nonsense. Are monitors the cause for the military failure of that war? Obviously not. The failure was the lack of planning, and the misguided belief that commanders can control their forces without actually being in the battle arena.

The problem is not the technology. It is the human misuse thereof.

In recent years the IDF has greatly improved the  cooperation  between its intelligence gathering elements and the combat units in the field. This is an important step in the right direction, proof of which is the outstanding results in the continuous fighting in Gaza and in Lebanon. This synergy is possible thanks to skillful use of the technological means.

However, in recent years, the IDF Intelligence Directorate has unfortunately become out of touch with the enemy – its intentions and modes of thought and even its language. Just to illustrate: there is an increasing reliance on automatic translation technology to understand the intel. Although this is a good solution what with the lack of soldiers who speak the Arabic language, it is a double-edged sword that hinders the Intelligence’s ability to have an in-depth understanding of the enemy.  Every soldier dealing with intelligence from Israel’s Arab enemies must have a profound understanding of them and their culture – language included. At least at a fundamental level. Thus, means such as automatic translation may play an instrumental role in intel gathering, but cannot be the main pillar of any SIGINT collection effort.

A love story with technology

Many times, the issue is not the over reliance on technology but rather the excessive passion towards it,  often regardless of the actual benefits it may or may not offer. This is largely prevalent in the army’s technological units, where the young soldiers prefer to work with the latest and “coolest” technology, even when it has no evident operational value. This is evocative of NASA, which developed impressive technology to produce a  pen that can write in zero gravity and be used in space. The Russians simply used a pencil.

There are more of such examples in the IDF that are classified and thus cannot be discussed in the present paper, however one example that should be mentioned due to its relevance to the current conflict is the Trophy, aka Windbreaker, armored vehicle protection system. This is a very advanced and highly demanded technology, no question about it. But the IDF neglected to provide the technology to protect tanks against armed drones, although the ongoing conflict both in Syria and the Ukraine prove that this is a prevalent and significant threat on tank maneuverability.  Could it be that this consideration was swept aside because the easy solution of mounting an awning on the tank turret is simply not technologically “sexy” enough?

C. The imperative to maintain technological superiority

The pages of history prove that he who holds technological superiority on the field – be it war elephants in the ancient world or advanced weapons in modern times – controls the battle arena. This has been true since the Iron Age and throughout all mankind’s wars. However, technological superiority did not always guarantee victory. Trained fighters, suitable doctrine and stratagem have always been necessary to complement technology, and in fact on many occasions, were instrumental in prevailing over the enemy’s technological advantage. Such was the case of Alexander the Great’s famous victory  in the  Battle of Gaugamela against a far superior numbered  Persian army and the Persian scythed chariots, due to the Macedonian leader’s clever tactics.

Unfortunately, Hamas was able to marginalize some of the IDF’s technological advantages by employing primitive means such as planks of wood to breech the border fence. But as we have seen above, this was possible due to the unskilled use of the border-fence technology and the insufficient deployment of troops to guard the border. This in no way suggests that technological superiority is unimportant – it was and still remains a crucial component in the IDF’s ability to deal with the vast armies of Israel’s enemies.

Even after the shock of October 7, many cases illustrate this. The superiority of the IDF in the air, on land, at sea and in intelligence gathering is a crucial factor in its ability to deal with many simultaneous arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Anyone with a modicum of sense understands that no significant achievement can be made in these arenas without aerial superiority  (especially against anti-air systems) sophisticated  drones, advanced intelligence capabilities, tunnel detection technology, and clear technological superiority on the battle field. Yet technological superiority – as crucial as it may be – is not enough on its own and must be complemented with a fighting spirit, ever-adapting doctrine, leadership on the battle field, and human intelligence and creativity. This is what wins a war – not technology alone.

D. Recommendations for the future

As stated, the IDF must maintain technological superiority in the conflict against our enemies. Thus it would be gravely misguided to reduce investments in technology; however, at the same time, the IDF is required to instill in all technological units the perception that technology is a means and not an end. Technological developments must always adapt to the needs of the units for which they are developed. IDF commanders must be educated on the technologies placed in their hands – how to use them to their maximum capabilities,  and no less – about its limitations. This requires more extensive technological training for all senior commanders, including those in the field units.

Moreover, it is imperative to develop the right doctrine for the use of technology. If offensive technology is used, it is imperative to formulate a doctrine that implements the technology such that it becomes instrumental in defeating the enemy. And if defensive technology is involved, it is necessary to ensure that a doctrine is put in place that complements the technology with appropriate human forces and decision-making procedures.

In recent years, the use of artificial intelligence for evaluation and decision-making processes on various intelligence issues has also been examined. For example, the use of large language models (LLM). This field is still in its infancy, and for now there is no sufficient substitute for a skilled intelligence analyst. However, already there is great value  in using artificial intelligence to challenge the conclusions and decisions of intelligence analysts and commanders. This measure may help prevent the future misguided and detrimentally limiting conceptions, and in turn – another tragic outcome such as October 7.

The article was originally published on “Maariv”.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

[i] https://www.mako.co.il/news-columns/2023_q2/Article-c822771c6c90881026.htm
[ii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4Vj8vI4TJQ
[iii] https://dyoma.co.il/military/2364
[iv] https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/sk931aez6

הפוסט The October 7 Failure – Not Because of Technology; Despite It הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In 2000, the IDF withdrew its forces entirely from Lebanon, ending an 18-year engagement in the security zone. The hasty exit left a vulnerable Lebanese military force in south Lebanon, leading to the disbanding of the south Lebanese army and creating a vacuum into which Hezbollah stepped, having risen to power during the war, making its driving doctrine the elimination of the State of Israel by any means available to it. While this goal was impeded for several years during the Second Lebanon War and the civil war in Syria, where the organization was preoccupied temporarily with assisting the Assad regime fight the rebel forces, the war against Hamas in Gaza was a signal for the terror movement that the conditions had ripened for an active offensive against Israel.

To date, Israel has been refraining from officially declaring war in its northern border. Some hoped for recourse in the form of diplomatic pressure to push Hezbollah away from the border with Israel and out of southern Lebanon, in accordance to UN resolution 1701 issued after the end of the Second Lebanon War. This resolution charged the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the task of peacekeeping in south Lebanon. However, despite the resolution, Hezbollah was able to rebuild its force and regained control of the area. Today, the prospects of Hezbollah complying with the resolution and withdraw from south Lebanon are slim, as it had never accepted it to begin with and is currently under no significant pressure to do so. Hezbollah and Iran clearly see the laxness of the international community on this matter, and support from the American administration is lagging as well. Seeing that the majority of the diplomatic pressure on part of the international community is actually aimed at Israel and not on it, Hezbollah sees no deterrence that could force it to hold its fire, or to withdraw.

In the absence of any diplomatic solution that would prevent Hezbollah from establishing its presence on the border and operating there against Israel, and such that can allow the evacuated residents of the northern communities to return to their homes and live their lives safely – the war on the northern arena is not a fanciful notion but a sine qua non. It is nothing short of a moral duty towards the tens of thousands of people who had been living for decades under Hezbollah’s sword of Damocles, and eventually were driven out of their homes and lives by the terror organization’s unrelenting attacks, living for over a year as refugees in their own land and continuing to pay a heavy price for that organization’s bloodthirsty ideology. The time has come for Israel’s war Cabinet to draw the line in the sand and fully advocate a decisive solution on the northern border with the understanding that without an all-out campaign against Hezbollah, the north will never know quiet and the conflict will not see an end – certainly not a victorious one.

South and north: different players, different theaters

The Gaza War is playing out both on Israel’s southern and northern borders. However, while the campaign in Gaza on the southern border is an official offensive action, the campaign on the northern border has yet to be declared an all-out war against Hezbollah, and Israel’s forces have been operating mainly within a mostly defensive position.

The main reason that Israel had refrained from officially declaring war on both fronts out of the gate is related to the size of the IDF’s personnel. Over the years, the army has been downsizing its numbers, creating a situation wherein it cannot undertake a wide scope of operation in both areas at the same time. Thus, it is forced to operate in stages – first completing most of its mission in Gaza, thus allowing it to leave a smaller peacekeeping force in the area, and only then deploying what forces it has to deal with the northern theater, with the intention of making this happen as soon as possible, as with every passing day that Israel is forced to engage with Hamas, it is prevented from taking care of the Hezbollah problem.

In viewing the southern arena against its northern counterpart, it is important to keep in mind that Hamas and Hezbollah are two very different types of enemies. In certain aspects, Hezbollah’s capabilities significantly outweigh those of Hamas, but the Lebanon-based terror organization contends with more than a few Achilles heels.

Operationally, there is no dispute regarding Hezbollah’s superiority over Hamas, with an army of highly trained combat soldiers, huge stockpiles of precision-guided missile, and a vast fleet of attack drones, all supplied by Iran, which is not only the sponsor of the organization but in effect its true handler.

But despite its operational shortcoming in comparison to Hezbollah, Hamas does enjoy a significant advantage that its northern counterpart lacks, and that is overwhelming regional support. Up to the war, Hamas controlled the entirety of the Gaza Strip, militarily and civically. The majority of the residents in Gaza supported Hamas and even mobilized to assist the terror organization. This was made unquestionably apparent with the advent of the war and the daily discoveries by Israeli security forces of tunnel-entrances, military posts, and stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions cached in almost every other house. Contrarily, Hezbollah is ensconced within a hostile arena, surrounded by a host of enemy factions such as the Christians, the Druze and the Suni Muslims. The Lebanese not only do not support Hezbollah, but they point the blaming finger at the terror organization – as well as at its Iranian mentor – for Lebanon’s dire situation which has brought the once vibrant and developed Land of Ceders to the brink of collapse.

Hezbollah’s precarious position in Lebanon means that its war with Israel carries potential critical risks for the organization, as it is well aware that if Israel is able to sufficiently compromise its capabilities, it will affect a shift in Lebanon’s internal politics and enable the rival factions in the country to change the balance of powers such that would prove detrimental to Hezbollah’s position.

The discrepancies between the two theaters and the nature of the enemies naturally sets different objective for each front. While in Gaza the declared goal is the total upending the rule of Hamas’ in Gaza, in the north Israel has no designs of toppling Hezbollah, as it knows that when all else fails, Hezbollah could always resort to withdrawing solely to Beirut or even to Syria. And anyhow the organization is a proxy of the Iranian Ayatullah regime, which supports and assists it and views it as a more important player than Hamas, thus the total eradication of Hezbollah is highly unlikely within one limited campaign.

Therefore, Israel’s objectives in the northern war theater are to push Hezbollah northward to upper Lebanon, destroy its infrastructure on the border with Israel and debilitate its leadership and ultimately create the conditions for the residents of the north to return safely to their homes.

These are three crucial objectives. All three are within Israel’s reach.

Beyond the red line; time for declaring the objective of the war in the north

The State of Israel has of yet to officially declare war up north. This despite the fact that the IDF has been operating in that sector since October 7. In the time that has passed, the IDF had targeted Hezbollah’s areal defense systems thereby restoring Israel’s freedom of operation in Lebanon’s aerial space. At the same time, it had also taken out a considerable portion of the command of Hezbollah’s special ops unit in south Lebanon, Radwan Force, and had destroyed many of the organization’s infrastructures and had pushed part of Hezbollah’s forces several kilometers northward into Lebanon.

All the above have created probably what would be the best conditions Israel can hope for to launch a broad offensive against Hezbollah. Yet there are many voices calling for the suspension of such a move due to considerations of personnel and ammunition shortages and battle fatigue of the forces, among others. However, anyone calling for suspension lacks a clear understanding of the reality on the ground and the severe consequences such a decision could have.

The first issue with this approach is the indefinite delay in the safe return of families to their homes, which aside from the humanitarian issue also constitutes a consequential ideological crisis that could truly jeopardize the Zionist enterprise. The longer the residents of the north remain in their substitute homes, chances of their full return home to live yet again under threat grow slimmer, thus the vital continuity of settlement along a border with a major security importance unravels, and decades of achievements gained by the Zionist enterprise of settling the entire historic land of Israel are rolled back, not to mention the gaping loss of productivity that the region contributes to Israel’s GDP – these are but a few of the prices a delay in a resolution on the norther border will exact on Israel.

The second outcome of such a delay is akin to gifting one of Israel’s largest enemies with the time it direly needs to lick its wounds, regroup and regain its malicious power. If Iran and Hezbollah know that Israel will declare an all-out war only in a year, or possibly two, the immediate action they would undertake is to pour their entire network of militias in the Middle East into south Lebanon, reequipping and retraining them, now with a better understanding and more experience in Israel’s military tactics and strategies, and use them against us, having had the time to prepare for Israel’s new order of battle.

It is also worth mentioning that beyond the above considerations, there is the toll that a war with Hezbollah will exact on the Israeli population. A crucial element in an army’s resilience is a strong civilian backbone, and a war against such an able enemy is sure to subject the civilian population of Israel to challenges such as advanced missile attacks wreaking destruction on vital infrastructures (roads, water, electricity) possibly even claiming lives, rising costs of living, and the disruption of daily life. These burdens are easier for civilians to bear when moral is high and they can get behind the leadership and army and support the cause. Israel has been at war for over a year, with the civilian population’s support and willingness to contribute whatever it takes to win and restore quiet and security. However, in a year or two, a new war might prove to be a very difficult sell to the jaded Israeli public.

A crucial element in an army’s resilience is a strong civilian backbone

Short and forceful: possible scenarios for a war in the north

Many in Israel fear a third Lebanon War that would drag on for years, as the collective memory still holds the pain of the first and second Lebanon wars that claimed a precipitous cost in lives and left the country in deep trauma that is still felt to this day. However, with lessons well-learnt and with the right command, a war in Lebanon now could be even shorter than the campaign in Gaza. The goal is to land a swift, decisive blow on Hezbollah, twisting the organization and Iran’s arm into seeking a mechanism that would provide them with a quick exit. Iran fears the loss of its most nurtured proxy, and a debilitating blow on part of Israel to Hezbollah could very likely leave Iran scurrying to end the war. Moreover, it can put into play another lever against Iran in the form of internal Lebanese forces that are hostile to Hezbollah and would be more than happy to get the organization’s back up against a wall.

But this might prove easier said than done, what with pro-Iranian support players the likes of Syrian militias, which would likely come to Hezbollah’s help, complicating things for Israel. A suitable preemptory action would be Israel informing the Syrian regime, that if it chooses to join the fray, a swift and decisive retaliation will follow.

Iran’s active involvement in such a war could actually play out to the advantage of Israel, as it would be a green light for America to join in, possibly putting in motion what might very well become a global war, with strong western militaries – and odds – stacked up against Iran. The Shi’ite Republic would be advised to weigh its steps carefully in such a scenario.

One way or another, Israel will have to ensure that south Lebanon remains a sterile, unpopulated area without any presence whatsoever of Hezbollah. Israel has no designs of annexing nor settling in south Lebanon, surely. Nonetheless, Israel must control the area at least for an initial interim period, meaning that all the Israeli forces positioned on the Lebanese border on the Israeli side will have to be moved into Lebanon. Similarly to the IDF’s military buffer zone in Gaza, Israel will have to deploy its forces in the south Lebanon area, using the Litany River as a natural border. The short-term objective is to have the returned residents of northern Israel see the IDF when the look towards Lebanon, and not Hezbollah.

Alongside the deployment of forces, Israel must generate international pressure that would lead to the disbanding of Hezbollah, as the state of affairs in which a neighboring country is controlled by a terror organization hell-bent on the annihilation of Israel can no longer be acceptable. The international community must be harnessed to devise a long-term and sustainable solution, as Israel can no longer trust what until now was an ineffective UN peacekeeping force to ensure the quiet on its border, and expects a solution that includes the placement of a substantial international military force that could deal with Hezbollah if necessary.

The initiative must be in Israel’s hands: conditions for ending operations in Lebanon

As explained above, there are three conditions for ending Israel’s operations in south Lebanon – the scouring of that area of Hezbollah’s presence, the crippling of the organization and its infrastructures, and the securing of conditions for the northern residents to return safely to their homes. All of these are obtainable objectives, even perhaps in the near future. It requires creative thought and determination, and Israel must take the initiative to make this happen.

Finally, in response to the claims that Israel’s soldiers are already suffering from battle fatigue at this point of the war – it is important to remember the other side of that coin: the soldiers and commanders that will go to the northern front have immense battle experience and understand crucial lessons learnt in the past year. So rather than a fatigued army, the IDF is now a well-oiled and unstoppable fighting machine, so let us not stop it from doing its job.

הפוסט When to Begin and How We Should End: The Imparative of a Broad Military Campaign in South Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After functioning for more than half a year following the October 7^th Hamas invasion of southern Israel, the Israeli war cabinet has recently exhibited very vocal disagreements between its key members about the desired outcome of this war to end the existential threat that Gaza poses to the security and very survival of the State of Israel. Defense Minister Yoav Galant has made it clear that he does not favor a “military regime” to govern Gaza in the long run, citing the risks of having Israeli soldiers govern the daily affairs of Gazans. Prime Minister Netanyahu has insisted that he will not replace Hamas with the Palestinian Authority. Minister Benny Gantz has publicly called, among other things, for normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia and for the post-war arrangement to lay the foundations for a wider Israeli-Sunni rapprochement.

While internal discord during a time of war is never a good thing, least of all for the morale of the soldiers who are fighting at the front and are desperate to see a government united in commitment to victory and to meeting of the war’s objectives, the truth is that Israel is as unified as ever on the core, guiding principles of what it will take to end this conflict and permanently neutralize the threat from Gaza. Although disagreements have risen among Israeli government officials about the specific arrangement that is desired in Gaza once the IDF completes its objectives, it is clear that there is a wall-to-wall consensus across the Israeli political spectrum that Gaza must permanently remain under Israeli rule with respect to security and foreign policy. The devil may be in the details, but that does not take away from the unity of purpose and moral clarity exhibited by an overwhelming majority of the Israeli public as well as the Israeli government.

In mid-2023, the Israel Defense and Security Forum published a paper in which we identified over 60 special territories that are governed as dependencies or areas of special sovereignty. The unique diplomatic arrangements that apply to each such territory reflect the aim of the sovereign country to safeguard its own interests through a form of limited control over the foreign affairs, security, and immigration policy of the subordinate territory while allowing for a high measure of freedom in the governance of internal economic, cultural, and civil affairs. These special arrangements exist with the full consent of the international community and are completely within the scope of international law.

Each such special territory has certain characteristics of a separate country while other characteristics of a part of the sovereign country. To give one example, Curacao, a sovereign territory of the Netherlands, has its own currency but its citizens carry Dutch passports (although they are not allowed to legally reside in the European Netherlands or anywhere else in the EU). On the other hand, in American Samoa, the currency is the US Dollar but residents of that territory carry a different passport of “US National” rather than US citizen.

That there are disagreements among Israeli decision-makers about exactly which powers to keep for the government of Israel and which powers can be ceded to a local Gazan government in the “day after” arrangement should not come as a surprise. These are normal policy differences that exist in a democracy and do not change the overall picture – that Israelis of all political stripes and persuasions believe that, one way or another, Gaza must remain a sovereign or subordinate territory of the State of Israel. For far too long, mainstream Israel has been accused by the international community of opposing a Palestinian state while not proposing an alternative. The truth is, though, that Israel has been very clear about the voicing the overall contours of what it wants to see. The time has come for the world to simply listen.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט In Spite of Policy Differences, Israeli Leadership as United as Ever in the Goal of Eliminating Hamas and Maintaining Security Control of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Since the War of Iron Swords broke out, Israel’s construction sector has suffered severely. And recovery is nowhere in sight. Eran Rolls, chair of the Israel Construction Center, explains the coming impact of the sector’s difficulties on everybody’s pocket, but he also sends an optimistic message: “There’s a historic opportunity here to stop depending on Palestinian laborers.”

One of the first steps the IDF took on October 8 was to close off Judea and Samaria, meaning that Palestinian construction workers were prevented from entering Israel. At the same time, the Home Front Command issued guidelines that imposed restrictions on work at construction sites around the country — because of wartime directives regarding safe areas, among other things. The municipalities and local authorities also responded to the war, many deciding to suspend all construction initiatives in their territory. As a result, most construction sites in Israel were paralyzed for anywhere between several days and several weeks. Some have not yet returned to operation.

That response was appropriate and correct, but it dealt a severe blow to the Israeli construction sector. “What’s happening here at this moment is a major drama,” stresses the chair of the Israel Construction Center, Eran Rolls. “Projects all over the country are held up, and there are significant delays in transferring apartments to the buyers. It affects everyone, and the first to suffer is the state.”

No transactions, no taxes: The effect of the real-estate crisis on the national budget

In Israel’s construction sector, difficulties began long before the War of Iron Swords. Over the years, prices rose significantly for many items important to the sector. According to Rolls, land that once cost 70–80 thousand shekels costs 400 thousand shekels today. And on top of that, as if it weren’t enough, come VAT, land improvement tax, and the tax on foreign workers. All those taxes have risen significantly. The latest financial decree was the leap in interest rates, which reduced buying power and, as a result, also reduced the demand for homes. Under those challenging conditions, the war broke out and the construction sector, already staggering, suffered another jolt.

Eran Rolls stresses that the difficulties in the construction sector radiate into other sectors as well. “There are enormous industries that depend entirely on the construction sector, such as manufacturers of building materials, concrete blocks, flooring, kitchens — and they’ll all suffer,” he warns. “Of course the smaller companies and the individuals who deal with the sector, such as architects, engineers, and interior designers, also have their share of the price to pay now and in the future.” That collateral damage also affects Israel’s economy. “The country’s cash flow is headed for an abyss. A quarter of the national budget comes from takes on real-estate transactions, and without transactions there are no taxes. We’re talking about revenues of around 120 billion shekels a year, and in the coming year, by my estimate, we’ll see a shortfall of 40 to 60 billion shekels in the national budget from that accumulated damage alone. However you look at it, if the contractors have it bad, the country has it worse. I don’t know whether the leaders haven’t understood that, or whether they’ve chosen to keep it from the public.”

Reliance on Palestinian laborers: The historic opportunity to stop the plague

Before the War of Iron Swords, roughly 80 thousand laborers from Judea and Samaria were officially working in Israel, plus roughly 20 thousand from Gaza and roughly 40 thousand illegals. Some of the illegals returned to work in Israel, despite all the difficulty involved, but the workers with permits haven’t returned to Israel since October 7.

At the same time, many workers in the sector — including foremen and engineers — were called to duty immediately upon the outbreak of war, as foot soldiers and officers in combat reserve units. A considerable portion of them are still on active duty, further deepening the shortage of workers.

Various voices are calling for the simple solution: allowing the Palestinians back into Israel to work. According to Eran Rolls, such a thing must by no means be allowed to happen — not now, and not later on. “The State of Israel has developed a reliance on Palestinian laborers, and there’s a historic opportunity here to get rid of that reliance and cancel all the Palestinian laborers’ permits for entering Israel.”

Rolls explains that the Palestinian laborers create many problems for the construction sector and endanger Israel’s security. “Everyone in construction knows that the Palestinian workers do intentional damage for nationalistic reasons. And that damage adds up int the billions per year,” he says. “They sabotage the plumbing, they clog drainpipes with tar, they stream water into the circuit breaker boxes — you name it. Because the vandalism is so common and so well known, the contractors already include it in advance among the expenses that they roll onward to the customer.”

Moreover, many painful instances have demonstrated that some of the laborers are also involved in terrorism against Jews. Only recently, an unauthorized Palestinian laborer mounted a stabbing attack in Gan Yavne and a 17-year-old boy was seriously hurt. “Since October 7, we’ve been seeing an uptick in the Palestinians’ motivation for terrorism, and it doesn’t matter whether they’ve come from Gaza or from Judea and Samaria,” Rolls states. “I’ve always argued that those laborers are dangerous, and now I’m not willing at all for them to stroll around the streets here. I believe that every mayor who lets Palestinian laborers work at construction sites under his jurisdiction is an accessory to any further terror attack that happens.”

The labor shortage: We asked for 100 thousand laborers, we received 1,000

The chair of the Israel Construction Center firmly opposes allowing Palestinian laborers to return to work in Israel, but he also knows that without laborers, the contractors will be simply unable to meet their obligations.

He suggests two solutions that could fill the ranks. The first, and faster, is to bring foreign workers, and the second is to train Israeli laborers. He says that neither solution is being pursued at the required speed or scale. “We asked the state to allow a hundred thousand foreign workers in, and since the start of the war we’ve received only one thousand. That’s absurd, and it’s frustrating because thousands of laborers are just waiting to be permitted to come to Israel.”

Rolls notes that even if the state does admit the necessary quota, bringing all the laborers will still be a problem because there are no lodgings for them. “The Palestinian workers go home to sleep, but foreign workers need to be given a place to stay,” he explains. “In many countries of the world , it’s common to set up villages for them with hostel-like accommodations and with all the necessary everyday services such as a supermarket, clinic, and gym. We must set up four or five villages like that in Israel, and we certainly can, but like everything else in the country — it’s not getting planned and it’s not getting done.”

The second solution to the labor shortage is, as mentioned, to train Israeli workers. Here, in contrast, the state is trying to take action and has even inaugurated a program for encouraging employment in the construction and agricultural sectors, offering monetary grants to Israelis who undertake such jobs. According to Rolls, the incentive may do some good; but before significant change can be generated, Israelis must be re-educated about the construction sector.

“Israelis don’t like to work in construction. Apparently it’s not engrained in the Jewish DNA,” he says. “In my opinion, that’s a great shame because people don’t understand that there are different kinds of jobs in this sector. Besides building and plastering, there are interesting jobs you can make your way to, like planning air conditioning and like installing smart electrical systems. It’s also possible to earn big money. A talented person can become a foreman or a contractor and can establish a meaningful, profitable career. I’m always saying that training Israeli workers is the most important thing for the construction sector, and I try to convince young people to enter the workforce but, to my regret, there’s not enough response.”

Apartments at half price? That may be the way to thank reservists

Eran Rolls doesn’t try to hide the depth of the Israeli construction sector’s troubles, but he’s also prepared to point out some glimmers of light. The first is a marked improvement in enforcing safety. “In recent years we’ve seen cases where company owners went to jail because of work accidents at their building sites. That was certainly a deterrent,” he recounts. “Today every contracting company pays great attention to safety and makes sure to enforce all the procedures. I’m happy to say that the improvement is significant.” Another point of light has to do with the building methods, which are constantly becoming more sophisticated. Rolls stresses that although processes are more efficient under the new methods, and employees are safer, still the improvements are no substitute for workers.

There is also cause for hope, Rolls believes, in the new wave of Jewish immigration from the Diaspora. Although that wave is driven by a regrettable rise in ant-Semitism, still it does bring new residents here and they are an important market for real estate. “We’ve opened a counselling center for new immigrants who are looking for a home in Israel,” he reveals. “Of course, if we have no workers we can’t provide homes. But there definitely is potential here for growth in the construction sector.”

As the interview nears its end, Rolls asks to propose an idea that could help both the fighting forces and the Israeli economy. “I think that the reservists and the draftees who have fought in the current war deserve the privilege of buying an apartment in the periphery at a 50 percent discount,” he says. “The state wouldn’t need to put up a single shekel, it would merely receive less revenue from those transactions. I see it as a way of thanking the fighters. The nicest bonus we could give them. And I’d like to see it happen.”

הפוסט “If the contractors have it bad – the country has it worse”: an interview with the chair of the Israel Construction Center הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Americans have never excelled in creating the conditions for realizing their foreign policy. This is all the more true when it comes to the American attempt to influence the Israeli internal political ecosystem. The American failure to understand Israel’s political movements and the Israeli public opinion, results in a misguided, self-defeating policy.

Just recently the most senior of Democratic senators, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, who is renowned as a long-time friend of Israel, gave a speech. In his speech he created a distinction between the people in Israel and his commitment towards these people – on the one hand – and the Prime Minister of Israel – Benjamin Netanyahu – and his “radical government”, which is leading a policy harmful to Israel. Schumer and other pro-Israel Democrats like President Biden present themselves as being the real protectors of Israel, which means that there are occasions when Israel has to be protected against itself. This tone is clearly evident in speeches given by President Biden and his Vice President, Camala Harris. They make a distinction between Netanyahu and the Israelis themselves in order to be able to direct their anger at Netanyahu and his government.

An unequivocal expression of this lack of understanding of Israeli public opinion came in the form of Schumer’s call for Netanyahu to resign in order for elections to take place and for the Israeli leadership to be replaced. Schumer fails to understand that attempts at interfering in local Israeli politics from the outside is not something the Israelis take lightly. It is thus that we saw even Netanyahu’s most bitter opponents condemning this attempt by Schumer to interfere in Israeli politics. Not only does this not weaken Netanyahu, this is exactly what strengthens him and his political narrative. Netanya presents himself as the defender of Israel, guardian of its interests by deflecting international pressure to impose on Israel decisions contrary to its security interests. Schumer of course fails to understand this, He does not realize that these actions only strengthen Netanyahu.

American liberals equate Israeli public opinion with Netanyahu, and this is a gross misunderstanding of this public opinion. In the first place, there is no love lost between supporters of Israel and Netanyahu, to put it mildly. Within the broader American left, Netanyahu is synonymous with everything the American left despises – a leader that resembles a Republican, who is preventing peace, is a war monger, is corrupt, who violates human rights, an authoritarian in the image of other authoritarians like Orban and Putin. In these circles, Netanyahu is not just a politician, he is a metaphysical object embodying everything that is wrong with the world. He thereby has become a concept in his own right.

In such circles, Netanyahu is portrayed as a kind of omnipotent politician, a magnet for everything that is wrong with Israel, and he becomes the target for demonization, which is usually within the domain of Israel’s haters. Instead of saying “Israel”, they say “Netanyahu”. In more severe cases of toxic anti-Semitism, the anti-Semitic demonology is assigned directly to Netanyahu, rather than to the Jews in general in a more outright manner, like the cartoon in the Canadian newspaper depicting Netanyahu as a blood-thirsty vampire. Netanyahu is also radioactive within the Jewish American left and in the pro-Israeli left, in the spirit of the liberal Jewish columnist Thomas Friedman – who sometimes provides the most blatant reflection of this stream of thought. Over the years, Netanyahu has also become the object of anger and criticism from liberal Israel supporters who separate between their love for Israel itself and their distain for Israeli policy, which is a consequence of Netanyahu himself.

Whether or not it is through his actions, Netanyahu has in those circles become a barrier to regional peace and stability. Therefore, as far as they are concerned, only by removing him, will more pragmatic voices, more palatable to the Washington stomach (like Ehud Barak, Yair Lapid, Benny Gantz etc.) be able to ascent to power and lead to the changes the Administration is after, in the form of strengthening the Palestinian Authority in order to present a semblance of improvement in the situation.

Biden, Schumer, and other Democrats do not understand that the policies being pursued by Israeli government, under Netanyahu’s leadership, is not his own private whim or the whim of his “radical right-wing government”. Rather, it is a policy of fighting, which would be more or less identical for any other person that might be elected to be Israel’s Prime Minister. The desire to wipe out the Hamas battalions in Rafah and to topple the military and civilian regime in Gaza is an absolute consensus in Israel. Therefore, any attempt to create a distinction between the Israeli interests and those being led by the government with Netanyahu as its Prime Minister is doomed to failure and any policy which bases itself on this misunderstanding, is going to fail.

The distinction between Netanyahu and Israel is made not merely due to a fundamental misunderstanding of Israeli public opinion. It is also intended to strike a fine balance between criticizing Israel and defending Israel for the American domestic political arena. Biden and Schumer portray themselves as the beloved uncles from America who see in themselves the saviors of Israel from Netanyahu, who is leading it to oblivion with a misguided policy. This is a message that also addresses those parts of the left that would like to see Biden taking a tougher stance toward Israel, but not in such a way as to alienate the Israel lovers to the extent that they would abandon Biden.

This misunderstanding on the part of the Administration does not stop within the Israeli arena. It filters into the interpretations being given to their words by Israel’s enemies and other regional leaders. For weeks now Hezbollah and Hamas leaders have been following statements coming out of American Administration personnel, examining how the support for Israel is weakening. This is part of their long-term strategy. Any signal from a member of the Administration like Schumer, who in a speech claims American support for Israel is weakening serves to strengthen Israel’s enemies’ resolve not to compromise with Israel and to wait for the American pressure to do the work for them. Beliefs about the future are no less important than the reality on the ground. If Israel’s enemies will become convinced that in future their position will be better, they will be less amenable to compromise and more aggressive. If Israel’s enemies would know that Israel would always enjoy America’s backing, they would make the long-term calculation as to whether it is worth embarking on a prolonged conflict with Israel in the near future.

To maintain an effective policy, capable of changing reality in favor of a certain interest, the policy-makers must first of all gain an unbiased understanding of the current reality, whether or not it is consistent with the political narrative with which they feel comfortable. A hope-based policy and the imposition of beliefs as to the reality will not only defeat its own purpose, it is bound to cause virtually irreversible damage.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The White House Doesn’t Understand Israeli Domestic Politics הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Establishment of a provisional civil administration in the Gaza Strip at the end of the war is the State of Israel’s legal and ethical imperative. Without it, Gaza will descend into anarchy and we will all be paying the price.

At the end of World War 2, Germany surrendered to the Allies. Who governed Germany in the immediate aftermath? From the moment Germany surrendered in 1945 until 1949, Germany was under a civil administration imposed by the Allies. Japan, which surrendered shortly after Germany, was also governed by a United States civil administration. This lasted for six years. The civil administrations in these two countries managed all the civilian aspects and saw to the rehabilitation of the affected areas. This was not done out of the kindness of the hearts on the part of the Allies. It was done because this was the civil practice necessary in such situations.

When an army conquers land and topples the local regime, a vacuum is created in the leadership and the conquering country is ethically and legally responsible for managing the population within the conquered area. The civil administration is by its very nature a stopgap solution, the intention being that the conquering state will rule the area until a suitable local leadership will emerge.

A look at world history and regional history shows that most civil administrations did indeed end within a few years. The State of Israel also installed provisional civil administrations during several transitional periods. This is exactly what has to be done in the Gaza Strip following the toppling of Hamas.

This is what the provisional civil administration will look like in Gaza

The Swords of Iron war will only come to an end after the Hamas regime has been toppled. We will then have to examine who will rule the Gaza Strip in its place. From the security standpoint, there is no question – the State of Israel will have to continue ruling the Strip. Such a rule could last forever. From the civilian perspective, on the other hand, the goal is to gradually install a local government.

Anyone that thinks local rule can materialize out of thin air the day after Hamas has been vanquished is having a pipe dream. This is a lengthy process. It will take years and until this happens it will be the State of Israel that will have to take care of managing civilian affairs in Gaza.

The provisional civil administration in Gaza ought to be provided by Israel through cooperation between the Security Forces and the Operations, Intelligence and Civil Administration units in the IDF. The first order of the day for the administration that will be set up will be to provide basic humanitarian solutions. These will be delivered with assistance from local players and international organizations. Such organizations cannot be of the contrarian type like UNRWA. At the same time, the lengthy process of finding a local leadership will need to proceed one step at a time.

The concept of a civil administration is perceived mostly as a negative idea, however such an administration has many advantages and it can also be strategically beneficial for Israel. A provisional civil administration will allow the population to disengage from Hamas. It can promote deradicalization processes and it can provide accessibility to significant intelligence that will be helpful in dismantling the Hamas infrastructures. In addition, the State of Israel will be able to continue to use the funds and resources at its disposal as leverage in leading in-depth processes that will create a new reality in the Strip.

Israeli rule over Gaza will also be helpful in terms of the voluntary emigration issue. There are today hundreds of thousands of people who would like to emigrate from Gaza to other countries but are unable to do so. Since Israel would also prefer as few as possible inhabitants in the Strip, there is a clear convergence of interests here. Under the provisional civil administration, the State of Israel will be able to assist all those interested in emigrating from the Strip.

Is the civil administration going to violate the Palestinians’ rights? Quite the opposite

The advantages of a civil administration in the Strip are clear. This being said, there are those that cling to lame excuses in an attempt to portray this as a horrific idea. One claim being made is that such an administration will drain considerable funds from the State budget. One need not look far to see the flimsiness of this claim. When looking at the current state in Judea and Samaria, one can see that the money from the local population and the international aid payments cover all of the expenses. This is also going to be the case in the Gaza Strip.

Another claim is that a civil administration going to violate the rights of Palestinians living in the Strip. Here, too, this is a mistake. Before a civil administration was set up in Judea and Samaria, the region had not a single university. Now every city in the region has universities, hospitals and advanced infrastructures.

The Israeli administration in Judea and Samaria has contributed much more than the corrupt Palestinian Authority has to the local population, and certainly more than what entities the likes of Hamas and Islamic Jihad will. Similarly, while Israel installed a civil administration in Gaza, we witnessed an improvement in the standard of living, which consistently deteriorated under the Palestinian Authority and subsequently under Hamas. This being the case, not only would Gaza’s residents not be harmed by an Israeli-dominated provisional civil administration, they stand to gain from it.

De-Nazification, Gazan style: the change begins with education

Besides the humanitarian civilian aspects, the greatest challenge Israel will be facing with the provisional civil administration is managing education in the Strip.

Israel has never made a significant difference in the Palestinian education system. Even in the education of the Israeli Arabs,, the State does not intervene. In Gaza, however, one must understand that the state of education is extremely problematic. Education in Gaza has been controlled by UNRWA, which blatantly incites and educates its public to annihilate Israel. This being the case, education there has got to undergo fundamental changes, exactly the way education in Nazi Germany was transformed in the process of denazification led by the Allies.

One must understand that if the State of Israel does not assume responsibility for education in the Strip, it will perpetuate the same cesspool that has produced such a catastrophic crop of terrorists. The change in the education has to be under our responsibility, however it is advisable to be assisted by external bodies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which understand the culture and the language and have already carried out a similar process. It is also advisable to make the funds coming in from these countries and the international aid moneys conditional on the actual roll-out of the new education programs. At the end of the day, it is only through controlling the money that the reality on the ground can be changed.

The day after the provisional civil administration: the future leadership in the Gaza Strip

After rehabilitating the Gaza Strip, civilian rule must be assigned to a competent body. To understand what kind of leadership will be established in the Gaza Strip going forward, one has to first understand what kind of leadership is not going to be established there – and this is the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. This is not an option because the Authority is no better than Hamas and  the State of Israel cannot afford to assume such a risk. Another possibility is to assign control to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This possibility might have been suitable but it is inapplicable because there is not a single Arab country that has any interest in taking over management of the Gaza Strip.

The desirable course therefore is for civil management to be assigned in full to local leaders, who will evidently be selected from among the leaders of the large clans. Hamas is extremely fearful of the clans since they pose a serious threat to its existence, especially now that they are once again coming to life and are beginning to assert themselves on the ground. As opposed to Hamas, the clans seek stability in the strip, they have an interest in developing the region, and they have legitimacy from the local population. Therefore they are the entity with which Israel can and should engage. In any case, transfer of civil rule will be gradual with Israel finding the most suitable course through a process of trial and error.

Either Civil Administration or Anarchy

Certain quarters regard the idea of a provisional civil administration in Gaza to be a malicious whim of the State of Israel, the occupier. In fact this is a legitimate, commonly-accepted military solution. It is even a moral obligation. Should Israel fail to put together a systematic, gradual plan for ruling the Gaza Strip, the situation there will very quickly descend into anarchy and the rest of the world will blame us. Anarchy will first and foremost be detrimental to the Strip’s population. It will also be fertile breeding ground for re-emerging terrorism, which in turn will pose a threat to the State of Israel.

Any way one looks at it, the establishment of a provisional Israeli civil administration is the moral, much-needed solution for restoration of the Strip and for restoring calm to the region. The time has come to jettison unfounded allegations and erroneous concepts, the time has come to stop fearing the concept of a “civil administration”.

הפוסט Who’s Afraid of a Provisional Civil Administration? The civilian solution in Gaza the day after toppling Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This interview with Yanir Melech, who was a special operations officer in the Judea and Samaria area in the days before Oslo and was known as “King of Manhunters in Judea and Samaria” (“Melech” means “King” in Hebrew), took place shortly after he finished another routine meeting with a business owner in a Galilee village.

Since leaving the Israel Security Agency (the ISA, or Shabak) in the 1990s, he has been working in security for businesses that are vulnerable to violence and other types of crime. This time, he says, the business owner had won a tender for constructing a building for a government institution and throughout the construction he was targeted for attack by those who lost the tender. Shots were fired at his trucks, his drivers were injured, his business itself came under fire, and when he persisted in the project, a grenade was thrown into his children’s bedroom and another into his brother’s living room.

“This isn’t an incident from Judea and Samaria, it’s from near Haifa, and it’s the same situation today all over the Arab sector in Israel. Gangs of masked men, armed to the teeth, are circulating freely in the Arab cities and towns, and the loss of control is nearly total. The police don’t have the resources for dealing with these attacks. If the ISA doesn’t enter the arena at full strength, the next ‘Guardian of the Walls’ will be a catastrophe.”

Melech, a military academy graduate, served in the Sayeret Matkal special reconnaissance unit and as a special operations officer in Lebanon and in the Judea and Samaria area, including Jenin. In view of his operations, he was described in the Kol Ha-Ir newspaper as “the West Bank Angel of Death.” After leaving the IDF, he served as a coordinator in the ISA; but a road accident contributed to his early retirement from there, shortly after the Oslo Accords — which had brought policy changes at the ISA that were significant and that ran counter to his security thinking.

Did you retire because of your injury or because of Oslo?

“Retiring made sense, because I didn’t believe in the Oslo Accords and I didn’t like the new instructions. One of them, for example, was to erase all members of Al-Fatah from the wanted list. When I was interviewed for work at the ISA, they asked me why I was applying and I said that I wasn’t willing for Jews to be killed for being Jews. But the new policy looked to me like letting Jews be killed and I had a problem with that. My retirement was welcome mutually, because my world view wasn’t compatible with theirs. In my opinion, the same kind of policy put the security forces off guard not just on October 7 but earlier as well — for the Yom Kippur War, the First Intifada, the Western Wall Tunnel confrontations in 1996, and the Second Intifada.”

Murder, kidnapping, and rape inside Israel

Besides his security work in the business sphere, he has also written a book, titled Crime Ltd. and published last Rosh Hashana, about organized violence in the business world and how that violence is linked to terrorist organizations. “The crime families are fed by the terrorist organizations and receive enormous quantities of weapons from them. That tells us what to expect in the next round of fighting. Sometimes they pull suspected collaborators out of their homes and kill them, kidnap them, rape their wives. There’s no law and no order. I’ve heard of cases where the victim is shot in the testicles to make sure that he won’t produce another generation. All this is happening today inside Israeli territory.”

How did we reach this point?

“The Jewish crime families suffered heavy damage from Case 512, where most of the heads of crime families in Israel were convicted. Then Arab crime families stepped into the vacuum. Jewish Israeli crime families usually include two or three brothers but the rest of the members aren’t relatives. Among the Arabs almost all the members of the crime family are also blood relatives and they hardly ever use subcontractors. For that reason it’s very hard for intelligence agents to penetrate Arab crime families. What’s more, many murders that have roots in crime become overlapped with vendettas and clan feuds. There’s also a connection with the change of generations in Arab society. Veteran criminals wouldn’t harm innocent people, women, or children; they had red lines. The young ones don’t. If they need to eliminate a father and he’s in a car with his son, they don’t hesitate. But if they kill a child, then a conflict between criminals changes into a vendetta, and as soon as that genie is out of the bottle, nobody can push it back in.”

Terrorist organizations trade weapons for intelligence

How did the crime families acquire so much weaponry?

“The weapons come from a number of sources. Some are smuggled from Lebanon, Jordan, and the Judea and Samaria area, and even from military bases, which are being broken into all the time. There’s also cooperation between the terrorist organizations and the criminals. The crime families receive weapons and they pay the terrorists with intelligence, with free entry into Israeli territory, and otherwise.”

How is Israel supposed to deal with this?

“The laws have to change. For carrying firearms, for extorting protection money, for membership in a crime family, and so on, the penalties should be much stronger. In the USA, just for belonging to a crime family you can receive a life sentence, and if you’re the head of the family you’ll serve it out. Here, the head of a crime family receives two to three years, or even less. Also, the laws of evidence need to allow more tools for the police, and the ISA needs to be brought in to deal with illegal weapons. Since the start of 2024, more than 70 Israeli Arabs have already been murdered. In 2023, there were 244 murdered, which averages more than one murder per two days. That problem can easily spread outward from the Arab sector.”

What happened after Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s car was stolen

The flow of weaponry to terrorist and criminal organizations can be attributed, says Yanir Melech, to the Oslo Accords. “Giving them guns was a mistake. Rabin said that if the barrels were ever swung back at us, we’d put an end to it. But those were empty words, because clearly you can’t retrieve 5,000 Kalashnikovs. And what’s more, as soon as the floodgates were open, thousands more weapons flowed into Judea and Samaria. When the suicide terror attacks began, we saw that with one hand the Palestinian Authority was abetting those attacks while with the other one it was shaking hands for peace. Also, the Oslo Accords included matters of general security such as suppressing auto theft. But from a shallow point of view, the state and the insurance companies profit from those thefts, while the harm is primarily to the individual’s wallet and personal security.”

Is the Palestinian Authority responsible for this?

“Certainly. I’ll tell you a story. One time, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s car was stolen. A message was passed to Jibril Rajoub, and he was able to get the car returned immediately. How does that happen? We simply accepted understandingly that the Palestinians were not going to stop their offenses of all kinds against Israelis — counterfeiting, theft, burglary. They broke into the Ministry of Health’s emergency stores and stole life-saving medicines. They broke into army camps and stole rifles. We tolerate it because it can be classified as ordinary crime, but it’s really part of their nationalist preparations for the day of reckoning.”

And all that weaponry wasn’t out there before the Oslo Accords?

“That’s right. When I left the security services, there were almost no weapons in Judea and Samaria. The Black Panther squad — the operational arm of Al-Fatah in Judea and Samaria in the 1980s — was armed with box cutters. The professionals got a commando knife. Here and there we saw firearms, but they made a point of hiding them well because anyone carrying a gun had no right to live. But under the Oslo Accords, we had to furnish the Palestinian security forces with firearms, and since then weaponry has flowed into every corner of their territory, with no supervision. Today the people from the Lion’s Den squad of Nablus are armed like Sayeret Matkal raiders, with all the tactical equipment. Our security services have lost all control over the quantity of weapons in Judea and Samaria, and inside Israel.”

Why doesn’t the IDF mount targeted operations against them?

“Until October 7, the IDF wasn’t using its abilities in Judea and Samaria. The largest recent operation in that period was Home and Garden, last July in Jenin, when 11 terrorists were killed. Since October 7, the IDF has killed 450 terrorists and arrested another 3,500. Matters weren’t supposed to reach that point. Now we should stop allowing the armed marches that are being held in Tulkarm and in the West Bank cities. And we haven’t even talked about the Disengagement and what happened in Gaza.”

Has Israel learned its lesson from the Oslo Accords?

The Oslo Accords, says Yanir Melech, are the root of all the evil, but the problem started earlier, with the protests urging an IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, and then from Gaza. “People were shouting ‘Why is a whole battalion of paratroops guarding the village of Netzarim in Gaza?’ So we withdrew from Lebanon and from Gaza and now instead of one battalion there are five divisions in Gaza and they’re not enough. In this neighborhood we live in, if you’re not using your fists every day, you don’t survive. The dream of reconciling with our enemies has to be shelved. In his time, Fuad Ben-Eliezer, who was a cabinet minister, said it’s possible to live with rockets fired at Netzarim but a Qassam rocket hitting Sderot is another story. Since then, more than 50,000 rockets have been fired into Israeli territory and in the attempt to appease the enemy, there was an agreement signed with Hamas that stopped targeted killings by Israel.”

And you’d say that the Disengagement was rooted in the existence of the Oslo Accords?

“We have to remember that the Oslo Accords were part of the PLO’s ‘Doctrine of Stages,’ which was not about the ‘Territories’ at all. To the Palestinians, Palestine is from the river to the sea, meaning above all else Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Acre, Ashkelon. In the first Palestinian National Charter, from January 1964, Article 24 says that the PLO will have no sovereignty over the West Bank, which Jordan controlled at the time, or over the Gaza Strip, which Egypt controlled, or over the Himmah area in the Golan Heights. So what liberating Palestine means is liberating it from the Jews. The ambitions of the Palestinians are focused on Israeli territory inside the Green Line. To the Palestinians, we are all settlers, wherever we are in the country. Including, most ironically, those of us living in Tel Aviv.”

Do you think supporters of the Oslo Accords are beginning to reconsider after October 7?

“Every week, I travel to the north or south to bring the soldiers something of home and whatever they need, and on one drive south I was joined by a kibbutz member who’d been evacuated from the north. When we entered Kfar Aza and Be’eri, he said to me: ‘You know, if Israel had gone to war on the evening of October 6, I’d have been the first one out to demonstrate against that war.’ Until we experienced October 7, there were those of us who didn’t understand that we need to eliminate Hamas.”

But now they’re beginning to understand, right?

“When Hamas set out on October 7, there were two things it left out of account: one is that despite all our internal conflicts, we Israelis would curl into one fist against attack. The other is that we really will follow through on our decision to pulverize Hamas.”

הפוסט Yanir Melech: The link between crime families and terrorists will turn the next “Guardian of the Walls” into a catastrophe הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Reality proves: Wars don’t die

With the fall of the World Trade Center towers in September 2001, Huntington’s theory was irrefutably proven to be right, and that religion-based and culture-based wars would continue to pitch civilizations against one another in new forms. Since then, we have been given more and more painful reminders that warfare anywhere around the world is nowhere near coming to its end, and might never end – and despite all this, many people persist in clinging to Fukuyama’s delusional theory.

Within Israeli society, too, there are groups that have for years been driven by religious-messianic thinking, according to which world peace will come within reach only if we subject ourselves to security and political concessions.

The unspeakable tragedy that engulfed us on October 7 has, admittedly, profoundly tarnished this concept; the majority among the populace have come to their senses and realized that the old doctrines are no longer realistic. At the same time there are still groups that are unwilling to let go of their naive concepts, and continue to believe that Israel must take the path of withdrawals and compromise instead of caring for its security. These groups, while not being very large, are part of the elites and wield considerable influence within Israeli society.

Leaders: Give the people some credit

The yearning to rest each man under his vine and under his fig tree is the most natural of human aspirations, however when it fails to resonate with reality, it can lead to dangerous decisions – as we saw in the early 1990s, with the signing of the Oslo Accords.

One of the reasons that drove the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to sign those accords and to commit to far-reaching concessions detrimental to Israel’s security to this day, was the belief that Israeli society was tired of fighting and was prepared to pay any price for peace.

Then, as now, this was a gross underestimation of just who the people of Israel really are. We see that the people are far more resilient and determined than its leaders. The Israeli public as a whole wants one thing – victory. Civilians and soldiers are also prepared to pay a heavy price to achieve this victory, provided the State of Israel makes no concessions, and this is something the leadership elites have got to understand. Thus for example, a recent IDSF Index survey found that 78% of those polled from within the Jewish population in Israel believe that defeating Hamas is the primary goal of the war, and that hostage releases should take place provided they do not interfere with this goal.

Regrettably, despite the strength and resiliency the people are exhibiting, some within the leadership elites still persist in sending contradictory, counterproductive messages. We are hearing calls for a compromise that will end the war, since Israel does not have any chance of winning. Some of our leaders believe there is no military solution to the problem. They suggest dangerous political solutions in the form of establishing a Palestinian state, or the handover of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority that is intent on annihilating us. Such statements imply feebleness, weakness, and pessimism, which are dispiriting to the public. Never has the chasm between the battlefield achievements and resoluteness on the ground – and the leadership – been so wide, so far removed from its people.

How can we preserve unity and lead Israel to victory?

The people’s unity depends on us. I am greatly encouraged by the way Israeli public has conducted itself these past months, however to achieve victory, the leadership and the media have to toe the line and project stability and resiliency.

Let’s start with the political leadership. The main, most pressing role for the government is to maintain unity, to lead the State of Israel toward victory. I take a very dim view of the calls for elections in the midst of the war. Political squabbles while sending our soldiers in harm’s way are irresponsible. Instead of taking the path of elections, all the Zionist parties should unite and join the war cabinet.

The army and its commanders also play a role in shaping the victory mindset. The army’s role is to continue to push for victory. It is important to understand that the government is influenced by the messages coming from the army. What we, in Israeli society, must do to strengthen the army is to set aside the preoccupation with investigating the October 7 military lapse, and stand behind the soldiers and their commanders. Once the war is over, the time will come for inquests and committees of inquiry, and those who have to will be subject to accountability for what went wrong, but now is the wrong time to deal with this. So long as the war continues, the people have to continue pushing the IDF forward, and the IDF, in turn, will push the government toward a clear victory in the war.

And this is where we come to the role the media must play. True, it is up to the media to ask questions and present a plurality of opinions, but these days, while we are fighting for our lives, the media have another role, which takes precedence over all their other roles. The media have got to mobilize in favor of the war effort, to highlight the soldiers’ heroism, and to strengthen the people’s spirit. This is not to say that we gloss over problems. It is not to say questions must not be asked. But the way this is done must be conducive to reinforcing, toward cautious optimism. The reality is that many media outlets choose to ask questions in a manner that projects cowardice. Some media organizations choose to highlight yesterday’s people, who have been left behind with the October 6 concepts, expressing agendas harmful to national morale, making defeatist statements playing into our enemies’ hands. So long as Israel is subjected to an existential threat, we – all of us – are all called upon to mobilize, at least in terms of the way we approach the conversation about the core issues.

Before reaching the boiling point: the frog jumped out of the cauldron

About two years ago we presented our IDSF strategic situation picture, in which we likened the State of Israel to the frog in the cauldron, swimming while the water is imperceptibly heating up and cooking it. The events of October 7 alerted the frog.

The horrific tragedy we endured on October 7 exacted an incredibly high price from Israeli society. This being said, it is possible that with a long-term historical perspective, we will find that this jolt has saved us from an even worse process of total annihilation.

We must not allow the frog to jump back in the cauldron. We have got to mend our ways and leverage this threat in order to emerge victorious against our enemies and guarantee the State of Israel’s security for generations to come. To get there, the road must pass through a sober look at reality, through realization that there are concepts that cannot be resurrected, and through admiration of our people, who are proving outstandingly resilient, which fills us all with great hope.

הפוסט The people are strong and the soldiers resolute – so why is the messaging from our leadership elites so feeble? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“Y.” arrives at 11:00 on the dot. His stride radiates confidence, but once he’s seated, he looks a little hesitant. Before all else, he wants us to agree on what we’ll discuss, and especially what we won’t. He isn’t accustomed to being interviewed, he explains. And in fact, simply by sitting here and speaking about his service, only two months after retiring from the Mossad, he is implying something about that organization as a whole.

“Once there was no way a senior Mossad official would sit down and be interviewed, but today the organization is much less secretive than it was,” Y. says. “Sometimes it seems that giving up on secrecy in certain areas not only hasn’t hurt but may have helped, but it’s important to understand that any gap in the secrecy can only widen.”

Secrecy isn’t the only aspect that’s different now. It turns out that the Mossad has been through more than a few big changes in recent years. Threats that didn’t exist before, technological advancements, globalization, economic changes, and new social attitudes — all those have influenced the behavior of Israel’s espionage authority, and they still do. “I came to the Mossad in the mid-1990s, and all that interested the personnel then was to serve the nation,” Y. recounts. “It was clear to them why they were there and what they were doing. But today that’s not always how it is.”

“For a new immigrant, nothing could fulfill the Zionist dream more concretely”

immigrated to Israel alone from Europe as a young man, motivated purely by Zionism. He enlisted in the IDF, served a term in the regular army and became an officer, and joined the Mossad as soon as he was discharged. He stayed in that organization for 30 years and retired only a few months ago. During his career, he filled various operational and supervisory positions, and in his final years he was part of the senior command, deputy to the head of a branch. “I did wonderful things that a person can only dream about,” Y. says, and he can’t help smiling. “I think that for a new immigrant, nothing could fulfill the Zionist dream more concretely.”

During his long service, Y. both took and gave field assignments. “I liked both worlds,” he attests. “When I was a field commander, I had a lot more freedom of action because there are decisions that need to be made in real time. On the other hand, there are decisions that only a headquarters officer can make, and that was also an interesting experience.”

“In order to win, hi-tech sometimes needs lo-tech”

As someone who switched among disciplines and held a variety of jobs, Y. deeply understands the way the Mossad works, and he also can identify how the organization has changed over time. He says that one of the most obvious changes has to do with the acceleration of technological advancement during the past few decades.

“The speed of change is enormous,” he says. “If in the past we could estimate developments ten years ahead, today we hardly know what’s going to happen an hour from now. That’s a very challenging position to be in for organizations that are required to work under secrecy.” According to Y. each technological development offers new capabilities but also creates new threats. “Israel is a technological superpower, and we very quickly exploit new capabilities and establish a lead over our enemies,” he continues. “The problem is that we belittle our opponents. We assume that they can’t catch up and achieve the same capabilities. As soon as we identify a new technological advance, we need to learn not only how to use it but also how to protect against it — and on that point, we’re always failing.” believes that such progress triggers another problem, which is overreliance on technological tools. “Without a doubt, we’re depending too much on technology,” he states. “Technology is an important tool, but as soon as it becomes our sole support, we’re in a bad position. We think that technology makes processes more efficient, but sometimes it actually interferes because its development effort consumes a lot of time and resources. Besides that, the technological solutions, however good they may be, don’t have the nimbleness and flexibility that humans have.”

Over recent years, in Y.’s opinion, we’ve become embroiled in a technological arms race, with each side trying to progress past the other. “Our tendency is to constantly push for advancements and sophistication, but the best solution is often to go less technological,” he explains. “If there’s one thing I learned from organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it’s that in order to deal with hi-tech, sometimes you need to use lo-tech.”

The State of Israel has lost its ability to pay a price

The new Mossad retiree mentions another key change, besides the technological changes, in his organization — the ability to manage risks. “The guiding principle in all Mossad missions is preserving the safety of the team. But in many cases that principle leads to cancelling the mission, or downsizing the objective to the point where the mission isn’t worthwhile,” Y. explains. “There are missions that only the Mossad can undertake, and we’ve completely failed in them because we were afraid of a challenge.”

According to Y., the Mossad’s reluctance to take risks is connected to a broader trend. “I think that over the years, not only the Mossad but the entire State of Israel has lost the ability to take a risk and pay a price,” he says. “In the fifties and sixties, the State of Israel carried out astonishing missions inside enemy territory. It sustained a lot of losses, but it had no choice. With time, and especially after the long occupation of the security zone in Lebanon, the state and the citizens couldn’t bear the grief any more. Then when the Oslo Accords were signed, the population developed a strong sense of hope and a desire for normalization. That hope diverted us from our ideology and our belief in the justice of our path. We began to ogle the countries of the West and to want to resemble them, but we’re in the Middle East — and in the Middle East, the rules of the game are different.”

As the streets hummed with the anticipation of a new kind of life, the decision-makers in the government and army succumbed to the influence. “For years we saw commanders and politicians searching for the path that would lead to the greatest of achievements at the lowest price while assuming the minimum of risk,” Y. says. “That’s no way to work. If a country isn’t willing to take a risk and — in, heaven forbid, the worst case — to pay whatever the price is for defending itself, then that country can’t continue to exist.”

The Iranian reactor and October 7: Can we put ourselves in the enemy’s shoes?

As viewed by Y., one of the areas where Israel paid a heavy price for its reluctance to take risks was the issue of the Iranian nuclear reactor. Responsibility for dealing with the reactor rested mostly with the Mossad, and the Mossad did go to great lengths to dispel the danger. However, according to the retired senior official, it could have done more. “The results that we obtained in the last twenty years, when you consider them, aren’t satisfactory,” he says. “We delayed the nuclear program but we didn’t halt it; and as years pass, it becomes harder and harder to close the gap.” adds that even Israel’s successes in connection with the Iranian reactor are, in retrospect, accompanied by problems. “We didn’t take the price of our successful operations into account, and we didn’t consider the implications on the Iranian side. Our enemy has learned very well from our successes, and I don’t think that we were clever enough to imagine ourselves in the enemy’s shoes and accurately understand how Iran analyzes the situation.”

The problem of the Iranian reactor is an important and worrisome one, but currently Israel is focused on the war of “Iron Swords.” The Israeli public, under the shadow of that war, is still demanding to know how the blunder of October 7 came about. Central targets of the trenchant questions are the government, the army, and the Israel Security Agency. The Mossad, in contrast, has been left largely outside that discourse. “The public has scarcely required any accounting from the Mossad, and the Mossad finds that convenient,” says Y. “I think that at the moment the organization is pretty successful at equivocating.”

Although the Mossad concentrates on threats that are far off geographically, it isn’t automatically excluded from responsibility for the fiasco. “Certainly someone needs to investigate whether there was an intelligence failure at the Mossad as well,” Y. emphasizes. “Did any player from the outer circle, such as Iran or Qatar, influence the events? If the Mossad could have uncovered activity far away that led to the disaster of October 7, then the Mossad failed.” cautions that his Mossad service hasn’t necessarily made his opinions more correct than an outsider’s, but he will try nonetheless to answer the gnawing question: Why doesn’t Israel eliminate the leaders of Hamas?

“I always claimed that targeted killings are the State of Israel’s national sport,” he says. “It suits us to channel our resources there because targeted killings make a good impression and bring press coverage. But for the most part they don’t really prove themselves. The results don’t meaningfully improve national security. Other solutions would be more effective, but we don’t favor them because they’re complicated and lengthy and, in the end, they don’t create the same big impression. There’s no denying we’ve fallen in love with the wrong practices.” emphasizes that in most cases targeted killings are the easy solution and that, in his opinion, Israel certainly could have eliminated the Hamas leaders as well: “The State of Israel can do anything. The Hamas leaders are alive only because the State of Israel, for various reasons, lets them live,” he avers. “But it has to be understood that in terms of politics and security, the story with Hamas is very complicated, particularly because the conflict is so close to home. Any assassination of a top figure, and certainly of Sinwar, will bring a response, and so it’s a heavy decision to take. What’s more, there’s no telling who will replace those top figures and what implications will come out of appointing them. Personally, I don’t think that eliminating one leader or another will make a significant difference. Hamas won’t collapse just because its leaders are eliminated. Its infrastructures need to be eliminated, and that’s already a much more complicated job.”

The government’s organizations have forgotten their purpose

served at the Mossad until only a few months ago, so he knows its current incarnation well. Despite his great love and appreciation for the organization where he learned and grew professionally, he finds much to criticize.

“When I came to the Mossad, there was much more humility. Nothing was a matter of ego. We came to serve the country and not to trumpet what we were doing,” he says. “Today secrecy doesn’t come so naturally.” explains that the wall of secrecy is cracked not only by the personnel but also by the organization itself. “The Mossad started to develop a brand for itself, deliberately and actively,” he says. “That branding is important, because ultimately the Mossad is competing with other security services to have staff positions authorized, filled, and equipped. The problem is that in the attempt to emphasize its importance, the Mossad is tempted to look for quick accomplishments. That’s a game that generates corruption, and it’s turned the Mossad from a patriotic organization into a bureaucracy that’s less concerned with serving the country than in nourishing itself.” is not sparing in his criticism of everything connected with the use of resources. “No government organization is an efficient organization. They all waste money and maintain superfluous jobs. Every organization is just trying to justify the salaries it was allocated and looking for ways to use up its entire budget, even if it means spending money inefficiently.”

He goes on to say that inefficiency is another indication that patriotism has been replaced by bureaucracy. “When you’re part of a government organization, you’re responsible to the citizens of the State of Israel, because you’re using the citizens’ money and taking resources that could have been used elsewhere,” he says. “I think that the government organizations are no longer conscious of that. Their work plans are tailored to their own needs and not necessarily to what has to be done. They’ve forgotten their purpose and forgotten who it is they’re serving.”

The solution to the problem, in Y.’s opinion, must include incentives for efficiency, and external inspection as well. “As of today, the Mossad has no incentives encouraging efficiency and economy. What it has is the opposite,” he says. “And in addition, it has no inspection from outside. With the excuse of secrecy, the Mossad answers primarily to itself — and regarding only those things that it doesn’t mind answering for. There’s no alternative to bringing in external inspectors who have the appropriate clearance and creating a balance between secrecy and transparency.”

“I was rewarded with a great life”

Although Y. was careful to arrive for the interview on time, he never checked how long it was taking. In his new life, he isn’t hurrying anywhere. That’s a situation very different from everything he experienced over the three decades before. “In organizations like the Mossad, the tendency is to work 24/7,” he says. “The job doesn’t really end when you leave the office, because there are tasks that you can’t set aside. As a commander, you carry a heavy responsibility; and a mistake can be very costly. At my busiest, I was required to make one or two hundred significant decisions a day. Besides that, the nature of our work means we travel abroad a lot. There were years when I was out of the country 150 days.” admits that the pressure and the travel interfered more than once with his personal life. “It’s no coincidence that I’m divorced,” he said, chuckling casually but quickly serious again. “My children remind me all the time how many important events in their lives I missed, and that’s painful. Today the Mossad makes quite an effort to narrow the gulf between work and family, but I don’t know whether that’s really possible. At the end of the day, whoever signs up at the organization has to know that the personal price will be heavy.”

In retrospect, Y. would have been glad to spend more time with his children. But he refuses to live in the past. “I don’t believe in regrets. There’s nothing useful about them,” he says. “The bottom line is I’d choose the same career again, without hesitating. It was a great privilege to serve at the Mossad. I did amazing things that only a few people have a chance to do, and I was rewarded with a great life in the Land of Israel.

Since leaving the Mossad, Y. has been concentrating on master’s degree studies; and he doesn’t rule out continuing for a doctorate. Besides being a student, he is a recently enrolled member of the IDSF. “I identify with the ideas the movement is based on, and I agree with most of its principles,” he says. “I found it important to join, because I believe there aren’t enough organizations that are able to counterbalance the opinions that appear in the mainstream media and the time has come to give a boost to the messages that come from other viewpoints too.”

הפוסט “Whoever signs up has to know that the personal price will be heavy” Interview with a former senior official of the Mossad הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the first article in the series we dealt with the various reasons that led to the October 7 catastrophe. In this article we deal with the second part of the survey: the current state of affairs given the Swords of Iron War, including the war’s objectives, global public opinion, and concepts within the Arab public in Israel.

The survey was conducted during January 2024 with statistical support from Dr. Hagay Elkayam. 1,156 respondents were surveyed – adult (over 18 years of age) Internet users in Israel, and has been reviewed to ensure fair representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion, and political affiliation.

For the Jewish combined sample (1,156 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3% with a 95%; probability. For the Jewish sample (919 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.5% with a 95 probability; for the Arabic survey (237 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.5% with a probability of 95%.

Freeing the hostages versus defeating Hamas: Public opinion on the war’s objectives

At the very outset of the war, the State of Israel declared its two main goals: to return the Israeli hostages and to topple the Hamas regime. One of the key dilemmas occupying Israeli public opinion is which of these objectives takes precedence. Or in other words, if the State of Israel reaches a situation in which it can only achieve one of these two objectives, which one will it be?

Accordingly, we asked the respondents to provide a dichotomic ruling between the following two statements: (1) The hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas; (2) the hostages should be freed only provided their release will not impair the ability to topple Hamas.

The result is unequivocal: 68% of the respondents chose the statement in which defeating Hamas is the main objective, while 32% placed freeing the hostages as the main objective. Breaking down the results by nationality shows a significant difference between the Jewish public and the Israeli Arab public. 78% of the Jewish public  believe the hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas; among the Arabs the situation is reversed: 72% believe the hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas.

Ideological segmentation of the Jewish public shows substantial differences between the right, left, and center. 89% of the respondents identifying themselves as right-wingers chose the statement according to which the hostages should be freed even at the price of not defeating Hamas and 69% of the centrists also chose this statement. Among the respondents identifying themselves as left-wingers, only 44% chose this statement. The rest chose the statement according to which the hostages should be freed at any cost.

Israel versus the world: Anti-Israelism, anti-Semitism, and the allegations of war crimes

The Swords of Iron War is being fought in the Gaza Strip, but is not confined to it. Ever since the outbreak of the war, the international arena is in tumult. Anti-Israel demonstrations are a daily occurrence in various countries, anti-Semitic slogans are being heard in the most prestigious university campuses, and at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, the question of whether or not Israel is committing war crimes is still being debated.

The respondents were asked to state their opinion on the way the world perceives Israel. They were also asked about their position regarding international law when it comes up against the needs of the IDF in the field.

Regarding the anti-Israeli sentiments in Europe, when asked whether they believe these are due to anti-Semitism, 84% of the respondents in the integrated sample gave a positive answer. When examining the ideological segmentation between right, center and left, there is a consensus: 97% of all Jews believe the anti-Israeli opinions are due to anti-Semitism. However when segmented by nationality, only 48% of all Israeli Arabs agree with this statement.

The question of international law also produced some interesting results. The respondents were asked to state to what extent, in their opinion, should the IDF adhere to the international rules of war in its activities. 13% of the Jewish respondents believe the IDF should comply with the rules of war in any situation, however 78% think otherwise. Those 78% can be divided into two groups: 29% believe the IDF should conduct itself according to the most stringent interpretation of the international rules of war – as long as this does not endanger our forces. 49% believe the IDF should accomplish its goals with minimum risk to our forces – even if to do so would mean failure to comply with the rules of war.

In favor or not in favor? What Israelis think about the Arab public opinion in Israel, in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza

Following the Hamas terrorist onslaught on October 7, many Israelis began wondering what Arab public opinion about the onslaught was in Judea and Samaria, in Gaza and also inside Israel. In the survey, we asked the respondents whether or not they think the Arabic public identifies with the onslaught. The Arab population was divided into three regions: Gaza, Judea and Samaria and the Israeli Arabs.

The results show that 84% of all Israelis believe that the Arabs in Gaza and also the Arabs in Judea and Samaria identify with the terrorist onslaught. Regarding the Israeli Arabs, 49% of the respondents believe that they too identify with the onslaught.

The survey also examined the question of whether a terrorist onslaught of the type perpetrated on October 7 could occur in a situation in which the Palestinian Authority ruled the Gaza Strip instead of Hamas. 70% of the respondents in the integrated sample believe that such an onslaught could indeed occur also under Palestinian Authority rule in the Strip.

The respondents were also asked whether they believe the Palestinian Authority would be capable of committing, in the center of the country, what Hamas committed in the western Negev. Here the results were unequivocal: 79% of all respondents, and 91% of the Jewish respondents, believe the Palestinian Authority would be able to act the same way Hamas had acted, given the opportunity.

These data show that the Israeli public perceives the Palestinian Authority as an enemy no different than Hamas in all matters concerning aggressive intentions against Israel.

“The survey results prove that the Israeli public understands the objectives of the war very well and regards the toppling of Hamas to be the overriding objective”, says Brigadier-General (Res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the IDSF. “The public also realizes that the Palestinian Authority is part of the problem, not part of the solution. Allowing the Authority to function as a governing entity means a return to October 6.”

In our next article, we shall continue to examine the survey results, we will examine what the public thinks about the day after the war, and how it believes the future Gaza Strip should be governed.

הפוסט IDSF Index: What, According to Israeli Public Opinion, is the Main Goal of the War? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This time, the IDSF Index examines the Israeli public’s attitude toward the Swords of Iron War with reference to the past, present, and future. First we looked at what the public thinks of the circumstances and attitudes that brought about the October 7 disaster. Then we looked at what the public thinks of the present situation and the objectives of the war. And finally, we examined what lessons the public believes must be drawn from October 7 and what it believes should be done when the war ends.

In this article, we will deal with the first part of the survey: The day before the Swords of Iron War.

The survey was held during January 2024 on behalf of the IDSF research department, with statistical supervision from Dr. Haggai Elkayam. Responding were 1,156 adults (18+) in Israel, users of the Internet, confirmed as a representative sample according to age, gender, nationality, religious observance, and political self-identification.

For the total sample (1,156 respondents) the maximum margin for error in sampling is ±3%, at a probability of 95%. For the Jewish sample (919 respondents) the maximum margin for error in sampling is ±3.5%, at a probability of 95%. For the Arab sample (237 respondents) the maximum margin for error in sampling is ±6.5%, at a probability of 95%.

The failures that led to the disaster:
Erroneous intelligence analysis and faulty real-time behavior

The lapses that made the events of October 7 possible will yet be probed thoroughly in the future, and years may pass before the public can be sure of the reasons and of the guilty parties. In the meantime, we asked the public who they believe bears primary responsibility for the great disaster that struck the Israeli populace — the military, or the political echelon. The answer: both. But there was broader agreement regarding the role of the military in the lapse: 89% of respondents believed that the military was guilty, and 76% believed that the political echelon was.

In addition, we checked which military failures influenced public opinion regarding the disaster. 91% of the respondents believe that the crucial failure was the misinterpretation of existing intelligence, whereas only 67% of the respondents believe that intelligence information was lacking at the IDF. As to whether the misunderstanding of the situation in real time influenced the disaster, 89% answered that it did, and 86% noted that insufficient routine preparation by the IDF at the border with Gaza also influenced the events of October 7.

Another point of interest that arose in the survey is that the index of trust in the Israel Police rose by 14%. In the present survey, 39% expressed trust in the police, as against only 25% in the previous survey. The increased trust in the police may derive from its worthy and significant contribution to halting the October 7 invasion.

The conception collapsed. But what conception exactly?

One point of unanimity among the public: “The conception collapsed.” The question remaining is what exactly the conception was. Our survey asked about the extent to which the various attitudes held by the State of Israel enabled the terror attack to occur.

In first place is the belief that Hamas was deterred, mentioned by 84% of the respondents. Immediately behind are the attitude that Israeli security can be preserved while Hamas controls the Gaza Strip (82%) and the attitude that intelligence and technology can substitute for a significant military presence (81%). Two more attitudes that influenced the events of October 7, according to the respondents, are the attitude that granting territory, internal independence, and money to the Palestinian administration in Gaza will mitigate their intent to attack Israel (79%) and the attitude that Hamas should be strengthened in the Gaza Strip in order to weaken the Palestinian Authority (75%).

Another attitude presented to the survey’s respondents was that separation from the Palestinians, as carried out in the Disengagement, would strengthen the moderate forces in the Gaza Strip and calm the security situation. The results from the total sample showed 73% of the respondents marking that attitude as a possible factor in the security lapse. Broken down by nationality, 80% of the Jewish respondents saw that attitude as influencing the lapse, as against 48% of the Arab Israeli respondents. Even within the Jewish public, opinions differed. With the Jewish public broken down by ideology, it emerges that 92% of the respondents who consider themselves on the right marked that attitude as affecting the disaster as against 69% and 66% for the self-described centrists and leftists respectively.

Back to 2005: Did the Disengagement influence October 7?

One of the questions that re-emerged into discussion because of the Swords of Iron War is that of the Disengagement. Did it influence the disaster of October 7?

In the survey, we asked the respondents whether they considered the Disengagement plan a mistake. 60% of them believe that the Disengagement was a mistake, as against 35% who believe it was not a mistake and 15% who are undecided.

A breakdown by nationality shows large gaps. 68% of the Jews believed that the Disengagement was a mistake, but only 31% of the Arab Israelis believe so. An even greater gap is visible in the ideological breakdown among the Jewish respondents. On the right, 86% of the respondents believe that the Disengagement was a mistake, and on the left only 29%.

The respondents to the survey were also asked whether their opinion on the Disengagement had changed following the October 7 events. 79% of the respondents answered that their opinion had not changed, 19% answered that in the past they had considered the Disengagement correct but they now believed it was a mistake, and only 2% chose the opposite answer — that in the past they had considered the Disengagement a mistake but now they considered that it was justified.

The disputes and the refusals

The period just prior to the Swords of Iron War was very challenging for Israeli society. In the preceding years, many social and political protests were mounted and they continually intensified around the issue of judicial reform. In the shadow of those protests, calls were also heard from some reservists to refuse to report for duty.

The survey’s participants were asked about the extent to which, in their opinion, the disputes in Israeli society and the call for refusal to serve influenced Israeli deterrence of Hamas.

The results show that 84% of the total sample (and 91% of the Jews asked) believe that the disputes in Israeli society harmed Israel’s deterrent ability against Hamas. A breakdown of the Jewish population by ideological self-identification showed no significant gaps separating left, center, and right.

In contrast, on the matter of refusing or not reporting to serve, significant differences were detected in an ideological breakdown. On the right, 93% believe that refusals harmed Israel’s deterrent ability, in the center 74% believed so, and on the left only 51%.

The bottom line

The first part of the survey was intended to discern what the public thinks about the circumstances that made the October 7 disaster possible. Alongside clear disagreements among the Jews and Arabs of Israel, and between the right and left, a number of points of agreement were discovered that suggest certain important conclusions.

“We find Israeli society in broad agreement that the disputes among the people and the calls for refusal to serve harmed Israel’s deterrent abilities. This demonstrates that solidarity among the people is vital to preserving our fortitude and that the IDF must remain outside the political debate,” says Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, chair of the IDSF. “We also saw that it’s not one conception that collapsed, but an entire line of thinking that wasn’t in line with reality. To ensure Israel’s safety, the entire national security strategy needs to be rethought — just as the IDSF movement was warning long in advance of the war.”

In the next article, we will continue examining the survey results and see what the public thinks about the present situation — in both the national and the international arenas.

הפוסט The IDSF Index: Swords of Iron War — The Day Before הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the first article we focused on the reasons that brought this war about. In the second article we dealt with current issues relating to the progression of the war, and in this article we shall deal with the third and final part of the survey: the day after the Swords of Iron War.

The survey was conducted during January 2024 with statistical support from Dr. Hagay Elkayam. 1,156 respondents were surveyed – adult (over 18 years of age) Internet users in Israel, and has been reviewed to ensure fair representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion, and political affiliation.

For the Jewish combined sample (1,156 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (919 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.5% with a 95% probability; for the Arabic survey (237 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.5% with a probability of 95%.

Israel, Saudi Arabia or the PA? The question of ruling over the Gaza Strip after the war

The October 7 attack cracked, not to say shattered, the Israeli public’s sense of security. It is therefore perfectly understandable why many citizens want to know how it will be possible to guarantee Israel’s security when the Swords of Iron War is over, and how will be make sure we do not repeat past mistakes. One of the ways to ensure Israel’s security is to ensure that we remain in charge of our own security. We therefore asked whether the Israeli public believes the IDF should be given a free hand to operate in the Strip after the war has ended. The result is unequivocal: 79% of those polled in the integrated sample, and 94% of the Jewish individuals polled, responded that the IDF must be given a free hand to operate in the Strip after the war as well.

On the other hand, the respondents were asked also whether they think international or American policing forces will be above to prevent a resurgence of terrorism from the Strip. Here too, the answer is clear: only 26% of the respondents, with no real difference between the Jewish or Arabic population, believe international forces will be able to prevent a resurgence of terrorism.

And what about the civilian aspect? There is no single specific solution that the Israeli public supports, but it definitely is against the solution of assigning the control to the Palestinian Authority.

Thus for example, 25% of the respondents believe the State of Israel should manage the civil aspect of the lives of the Palestinians in the Strip after the war. 21% of the respondents believe the civilians in the Strip should be governed by a body sponsored by Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. 10% of the respondents answered that this management should be assigned to local Palestinian officials. 8% said an international body should be appointed and only 5% of the respondents believe governing of the Strip should be transferred to the Palestinian Authority.

The respondents were also asked whether they think that, should the Palestinian Authority be the one to return to Gaza and govern it, Hamas will be capable of launching another coup d’etat and retake control. 81% of the respondents gave a positive answer.

Never again: the lessons to be learned following October 7

There is no doubt the Israeli government and the IDF will have to do some profound soul-searching, to understand how such a terrorist attack could have taken place on October 7, and – most importantly – how can we prevent a situation that will enable a similar attack to take place. The respondents were asked about their opinion as to what are the most important lessons to be learned following October 7 and the Swords of Iron War.

The main lesson, agreed by 89% of the total respondents, is that there must be no return to the policy of containment, and even a situation in which a single missile or rocket being fired toward Israeli territory – cannot be tolerated. This lesson is agreed both on the Israeli Arabs and the Jewish public. The second most important lesson, according to 84% of the respondents, is that the alert squads in the settlements must be reinforced and strengthened.

As part of the examination of the lessons, the respondents were asked whether they think additional populations, that have so far not been recruited, ought to be added to the recruitment lists of the IDF. 81% of the secular respondents, 79% of the traditional and 59% of the religious respondents gave a positive answer to this question. Among the ultra-orthodox there was an opposite trend – only 29% responded that additional populations ought to be recruited. Among Israel’s Arabs, 34% supported this idea.

Among the questions relating to the drawing of conclusions from the war, the respondents were asked whether they believe Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, the Galilee and the Negev should be strengthened. On these questions, the Jewish respondents provided high percentages of positive answers, while among the Israeli Arabs the percentage was lower. 96% of the Jewish respondents agree that Jewish settlement in the Negev and Galilee should be strengthened, as opposed to 21% of the Arabs. Similarly, 73% of the Jewish respondents agree that Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria should be strengthened, as opposed to 17% of the Arabs.

The question whether it would be right to re-establish a Jewish population inside the Gaza Strip when the war ends – was also examined. 62% of the Jewish respondents supported this idea, 22% of  the Arabs supported it.

“The survey proves that the Israelis, despite all the disputes, are in agreement with one another when it comes to fundamental issues”, says Brigadier-General (Res.) Amir Avivi. “Most Israelis, including Israel’s Arabs, realize that the IDF has to be able to operate freely within the Strip after the war. Most Israelis also realize that the Palestinian Authority must not be allowed to rule in Gaza, and that under no circumstances must the policy of containment, which tolerated rocket and missile fire into Israel, be resumed. The survey shows also that most Jews realize now what we at the IDSF have always claimed – that the Jewish settlement in all parts of the country, including Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, is vital to ensuring Israel’s long-term security”.

הפוסט IDSF Index: Swords of Iron War – The Day After הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.