The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s mission is to engage in a comprehensive effort on numerous levels aiming to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations to come. This goal is governed by two guiding principles: first is the acknowledgement of the unique diplomatic, economic and social environments in which Israel exists.  The second is the understanding that informed decisions must lean on a broad strategy that draws it insights from lessons of the past and aims its decisions to the very long term.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. The present installment of the Ideally series, IDSF HaBithonistim member, orientalist and expert on cyber terror Assaf Yishai explores Israel-Jordan relations and the ?? between their outward appearance and their true nature.

Disputes and interests: background of Israel-Jordan relations

To truly understand the relations between Israeli and Jordan, one must go back to 1921 – the year of the inception of the Kingdom of Jordan. The foundation of the Kingdon was put down already in 1916 when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the head of the royal Hashemite dynasty of Hejaz, led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This revolt was one of the catalysts of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the Middel East and the rise of the British occupation of the area, and the British promised to reward the Hashemite family for its part.

And reward the British did. Hussein’s sons were crowned over two new ??? entities created artificially by the British:  The Transjordan area was given to Abdullah bin Hussein while his brother Faisal received control of Iraq. This arrangement, dubbed “The Hashemite Arrangement”, served Britain well since it allowed it to control its territories through its Arab allies. However, the populations of those areas were loath to accept the ?? of rulers that were not kith and kin.

The Hashemite rule of Iraq was short-lived and ended within 36 years with a revolt and the assassination of the king. Many expected the fate of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan to be more of the same, and even then, Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion said in 1956 “Jordan is an artificial state with no future”.

But despite the somber forecasts, the Hashemite family was able to keep its place on the Jordanian throne for over 100 years now. Protecting the throne is paramount for the Hashemite royal family not only in terms of its own survival but also to ensure the longevity of the entire dynasty. Once the king falls in Jordan – it will spell the end of the Hashemite dynasty.

Milestones in Israel-Jordan relations

Some years after the foundation of the Kingdom of Jordan, the government began establishing relations with the Zionist leaders that were active in pre-state Israel.  After the establishment of the State of Israel, its leadership conveyed to King Abdullah not to wage war against the new state, however, he did not heed their warning and Jordan joined the coalition of Arab states that ganged up on Israel in the War of Independence.

In 1952, grandson of King Abdulla, Hussein, ascended the throne from which he ruled the Hashemite Kingdon for 46 years. During his reign, Hussien was able to maintain stability and prevent the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), which was ousted from Israel, to gain a stronghold in Jordan. Hussein cultivated relations with the US and the West and even had secret relations with the State of Israel. Ben Gurion, despite having doubts about the longevity of the Jordanian entity, thought the Hashemite Kingdom could be a strategic asset to Israel and had no problem openly saying so. Other Israeli leaders as well, such as Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, understood the importance of maintaining warm relations with the Jordanian administration, and diplomatic and security sources in Israel proposed viewing Jordan as Israel’s “little sister”.

However, despite the covert relations between Hussien and Israeli administrations, formally the two countries remained enemies and even fought each other in the Six Day War, in which Israel defeated the Jordanian military, and took the Temple Mount from Jordan. This cost the Hashemite family the last holy Muslim asset under its control.

It was only in 1994 that an official peace accord was signed between the two neighbors. As part of the agreement, the relations and the borders between the two were established, and Israel committed to supply Jordan with 50 million metric cubes of water annually. Over the years, Israel has doubled that quantity and to date it still provides 100 metric cubes of water a year to Jordan. Furthermore, both countries have various military and intelligence collaborations, most of which have been secretly established.

Since 1995, Jordan has been ruled by Hussien’s son, King Abdullah the Second. King Abdullah, like his father, maintained good relations with the US, the West and Israel. However, he cannot seem to gain the popularity and legitimacy in the same manner that his father had. He is perceived as disconnected from the people, and someone who lacks the historical roots to the land, being the son of a British mother, and educated in Britain with Western values. He commands the English language better than Arabic – not to mention the local Jordanian dialect, and the Jordanian public frown upon this. Abdullah’s rule once again raised doubts regarding the ability of the Hashemite dynasty to persevere.

Relations with Jordan since the outbreak of the Gaza War

The relations between Israel and Jordan have always been complicated, and the Jordanian public has always been hostile to Israel. After the October 7 attack and massacre, the already volatile relations have further deteriorated. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, there have been ongoing riots on the streets of Amman, and the Jordanian administration is overtly hostile towards Israel. Already in November 23 Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel – a move that was aimed – according to Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi “to emphasize Jordan’s opposition and condemnation of Israel’s war against Gaza, and the killing of innocents and the creation of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that could lead to a regional conflict”.

In Israel there was an expectation for Jordan to publicly condemn the massacre of October 7, but to no avail. Moreover, King Abdullah’s wife, Rania, had publicly attacked Israel on numerous occasions. The Jordanian administration also condemned Israel’s attack in Iran and said that it was “a violation of international law, an attack on Iran’s sovereignty and a dangerous escalation that further intensifies tensions in the region”. Jordan even called on the international community to take responsibility and take measures against Israel that “end Israel’s attacks against Gaza, the [West] Bank and Lebanon, as a first step to dial back the escalation”.

September 2024 saw further escalation in the relations of the two countries, when a Jordanian truck driver crossed the border illegally and murdered three Israelis working in the Alenbi border checkpoint. The Jordanian government appointed an inquiry committee to investigate the affair but the public – including members of parliament – celebrated the attack on the streets of Amman.

Despite the open hostility and condemnations, many claim that the situation behind the scenes is quite different. Various sources report that Jordan actually helped Israel intercept both Iranian missile attacks in April and October 2024. Some sources close to the matter claim that King Abdullah’s remarks in public are in stark contrast to what he says behind closed doors.

This discrepancy reflects the complex relations Israel has had with Jordan from the onset. On the one hand, the two countries have deep ideological disputes and clashes. On the other hand, both share common interests. When viewing the relations between both countries over the past decades and its frequent changes, it would appear that this duality is the only constant in these relations.

Assaf Yishai: A Vision for Israeli-Jordanian Relations

Aid in maintaining the stability of the Jordanian government

Current situation:

Since its inception, the Jordanian administration has been plagued by instability stemming, among others, from the varied demographic composition of the Jordanian people. Only a minority of these are loyal to King Abdullah II, while the majority perceives the king as a foreign element who does not belong in Jordan in the first place.

Furthermore, Jordan is plagued by a slew of internal problems – predominantly a serious water shortage – that threaten its internal stability. If that were not enough, the king has recently reformed the method of elections aiming to benefit his own interests but in reality, this played out against him. The reform, the purpose of which was to block the election of local leaders that serve only the interests of their clans, had resulted in a rise in the power of the Muslim Brotherhood movement which poses a major threat to the Hashemite rule.

The recent regional changes have also influenced Jordan’s internal stability. The Gaza War, which ostensibly has no relation to Jordan, caused a 40% decline in tourism to the Kingdom – a main engine of the country’s economy. The revolt in Syria, which toppled the Assad regime, is a Damocles sword hanging over the head of King Abdullah, who fears a similar outcome for his own country.

In light of the above mentioned, the main interest of the King is to ensure that he and the entire Hashemite dynasty survive. A king in a survival state of mind is willing to take irrational measures, like a drowning person grasping at straws. For Israel, this makes him an unpredictable leader and places a question mark on any possibility of stability of the Jordanian government.

Ideal situation:

• Placing more focus on Jordan: Israel must not become complacent and think that simply because it has a peace agreement with Jordan, it can enjoy quiet and stability on its eastern border. Already in the immediate term, Israel must allocate intelligence resources toward the Jordanian issue and keep its finger on the pulse to identify any change that could threaten Israel’s interests in the area.

• Continued support of King Abdullah – to a point: Israel should continue aiding the King, as it has always done, out of the understanding that any alternative regime would be far worse for Israel. At the same time, Israel should be clear about what it is willing to accept and what it is not. It cannot continue protecting the King at any cost, even if his regime no longer serves Israel’s interests.

• Prepare for the fall of the Jordanian regime: the State of Israel must prepare a contingency plan and formulate long-term strategies for the day after the fall of the Hashemite dynasty. These plans must be far-reaching, such as the seizure of the eastern face of the hills of Samaria bordering with Jordan, to prevent the capture by hostile Iranian and ISIS forces of this important strategic asset.

Securing the border with Jordan

Current situation:

The border with Jordan is Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country, stretching over 309 kilometers (192 miles). Due to the peace accord between the two countries and the relative quiet between them, the border is ostensibly calm – but in reality, it is far from it. The border with Jordan had always been troublesome, among others due to the lack of a regular security force. Throughout the years, this border has become a hotbed of drug and weapon-smuggling as well as infiltration of terrorist into the territory of Israel – much of this under the auspices of Iran, and ever since the smuggling routes through Syria were closed in the wake of the revolt, the incidents on the Jordanian border are increasing. Furthermore, the closing of the border with Egypt due to the Gaza War, places more criminal and terror demand on the Jordanian border, which remains one of Israel’s last unsecured borders.

Over the past years dozens of arms-smuggling attempts into Israel have been made on this border. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 2023, when a Jordanian MK attempted to smuggle 200 guns into Israel. Aside from the rife smuggling activity, the terror incidents are on the rise as well – the Jordanian truck driver, who crossed the border and murdered three Israelis and a month later – two other terrorists crossed the border illegally in the Dead Sea area and shot and wounded two Israeli soldiers.

To date, Israel’s border with Jordan is full of breaches and not sufficiently secured. Part of the border is fenced but other areas, such as the Negev Desert valley – have no physical barrier. Furthermore, Israel does not allocate sufficient forces to secure the border. It is possible that this laxity stems from complacency and a false trust of the Jordanian peacekeeping abilities and willingness, or it may be pure negligence. Whatever the reason, the current strategy represents a real strategic threat to Israel. Even if most of the illegal activity across the border is criminal, it is important to remember that terror characteristically rides on criminal activity to achieve its ends.

Ideal situation:

• Hermetically sealing the border: The Israel-Jordan border must be hermetically sealed for its entire length to ensure zero breaches. Furthermore, electronic surveillance should not be seen as the only security solution, rather the border must have a physical barrier such as a fence or a wall.

• Reinforcement of the border forces: the IDF should deploy a division to act as a security force on the Jordanian border, creating large-scale surveillance and establishing quick response capabilities.  Naturally, the IDF will have to considerably boost its ranks in order to have the manpower for said division.

Keeping Iran out of Jordan

Current situation:

One of Iran’s common stratagems in the Middle East in service of its global-Islamic vision, is to meddle in the affairs of other countries – especially the unstable among them – and identify the cracks through which it can cause chaos and wield its influence. This is what it had done until recently in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. This is what it had done in the Gaza Strip. Now, having lost most of its hold in the area, it may very well try to reclaim it by taking over Jordan.

Iran may do so with force, for example with pro-Iranian militias operating in neighboring Iraq. However, the King himself might opt to cooperate with Iran, if he believes that Iran would be more conducive to the survival of his reign more than Israel. The connection between Jordan and Iran is not self-evident to say the least, but even Saudia Arabia, Iran’s bitter enemy, chose to sign in March 2023 an agreement for the renewal of diplomatic relations, once it realized that the western axis is growing weak.

Ideal situation:

• Display of power and military prowess: The Middle East is a place that sets great store by strength; hence it behooves the State of Israel to demonstrate its military prowess and impress upon the King of Jordan that he can lean on Israel. If the King feels that Israel cannot guarantee his safety, he might seek another ally to do so, which most likely would be Iran.

• Preparation for an Iranian takeover of Jordan: Israel must prepare for any scenario wherein Iran will try to install its control in Jordan and summarily and decisively thwart any threat on part of pro-Iranian elements in Jordan.

Settlement of the Jordan Valley

Current situation:

The Jordan Valley is a territory under dispute in terms of international law. Many in Israel and the world see the area as an integral part of Israel while others claim it to be an occupied territory that is not part of Israel’s sovereign state.

The Jordan Valley has great security and strategic importance as it is the only stretch of land that protects Israel’s eastern border. Since the establishment of the State, most of Israel’s leadership acknowledged its significance, and even late PM Yitzhak Rabin in his last speech before the Knesset declared that the security protective border of Israel will be charted in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of the term.

Beyond its significance to Israel’s security, the Valley also has a geographic and economic importance, as it is a large swath of land that can be populated and developed. Furthermore, it carries great historic and cultural significance as it is home to numerous Jewish heritage sites.

Currently, the Jordan Valley is not included in Israel sovereign territory, thus Israeli law does not apply in the area as it does in the rest of the country. This sets an obstacle to the settlement and development of the Valley area, and ties Israel’s hands in dealing with violations in the area such as illegal Palestinian construction.

Ideal situation:

• Encouragement of Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley: Over the years Israel has proven that anywhere it creates Jewish settlements – security is higher, whereas areas with no or sparse Jewish population terror hotbeds germinate. Hence, the Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley is a sine qua none for ensuring the security in that area. Beyond that, the development of the Valley could serve as a response to high housing demands that many families in Israel are contending with, and can deepen the connection of Israelis to some of the most important Jewish heritage sites that are in that locale. For this end, Israel must encourage young people and new immigrants to make their homes in the Jordan Valley, among others by way of favorable terms for land acquisition and housing, and the development of local communities.

• Action towards securing Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley: For years there have been many attempts by Israel to gain sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, similarly to what it had achieved in the Golan Hights. This move first and foremost sends out a clear message that Israel is here to stay. Furthermore, once Israel gains sovereignty over the area it will be able to develop it as it sees fit, and establish institutes and infrastructures. Gaining sovereignty may pose a diplomatic issue for Israel, mainly vis a vis Europe, however as it has been proven time and time again – when Israel presents a united and unyielding front, the world remains silent. If Israel can gain consensus in Israeli society for such a move, making it clear that this is a security imperative and not occupation for the sake of occupation, it is highly likely that the international community will fall into line as well.

Condemnation of the Condemnations

Current situation:

Despite the Israel-Jordan peace accord, many people in Jordan openly condemn Israel. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, this state of affairs has only grown worse, until now, there are many anti-Israel protests throughout Jordan.

Even the Jordanian administration, despite its cooperation with Israel and its dependance on its neighbor to the west, exhibits an anti-Israeli front. The King failed to condemn the October 7 massacre, and his wife Rania even disputed it had even truly happened and attacked Israel from every global platform. In an interview to CNN, she spoke of the pain of the babies and children of Gaza, not once mentioning the dozens of innocent Jewish children Hamas heinously butchered. In another interview to CNN she insinuated that the massacre was not on the scale Israel and the US claim, saying that “President Biden did not witness with his own eyes the harsh things that had occurred in Israel, as he himself said”.

A short while after the Gaza War broke out, King Abdullah II sent two air shipments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. He also sent a third plane, whose cargo was deployed by his daughter, Princess Salma of Jordan, as a symbolic gesture to the children of Gaza.

Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, a close associate of the King, has also attacked Israel more than once since the outbreak of the war. Safadi also tried to promote anti-Israel measures at the United Nations, and recommended that Jordan join in the prosecution of Israel at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Even though the Jordanian King’s statements are merely lip service, as apparently, he sings a completely different tune behind closed doors –nevertheless, his statements and those of his family influence the mood on the streets of Jordan as well as the relations between the two countries.

Ideal situation:

• Demand the King moderate his rhetoric: although it is understandable to an extent that the ruler of an Arab state would have to display animosity toward Israel, his current condemnations are beyond the pale. The State of Israel must use the leverages it has on the King and the Jordanian administration – e.g. water supply and military aid – and demand he moderate his and his family’s statements, and halt the anti-Israel measure undertaken and the UN.

There is a lot more than meets the eye: conclusions

The relations between Israel and Jordan can be sketched with a single word: contrast. Contrast between the attitude of the Jordanian administration and the public; contrast between its public statements and what it says behind closed doors; and most importantly – contrast between the quiet on the surface and the threats brewing underneath. Israel must understand that its border with Jordan is not secure and the stability of the government there is not ensured. In the immediate-term, Israel must employ whatever leverages it has on the Jordanian administration – namely the water supply and military aid – to solidify its relations with the Kingdom. In the long term, Israel must create a contingency plan that charts courses of action for possible scenarios such as the ousting of the ruling Hashemite family and a takeover of Jordan by radical elements such as extremist Sunni militias or pro-Iranian forces.

Above all – Israel must populate the Jordan Valley and place it on par with the rest of its geographic strategic assets, both in terms of national security and development.

The state of affairs between Israel and Jordan, wherein the two are at loggerheads on the one hand, but cooperate on the other, can hold only to a certain point. What with the recent changes washing over the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder whether this point has now been reached, and if so – what is in store from now on.

הפוסט Ideally – Vision of the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A New World Order. These grand words take on a new meaning these days, with President Donald Trump stepping into office for his second term.

Having driven a spoke in Tehran’s wheels as well as those of its vassals to an unprecedented level – complemented by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria – Israel has left the Shi’ite axis all but paralyzed. Were it the US’s current administration’s wish to topple the Ayatullah regime, it could deliver a coup de grace in the form of a quick, targeted air strike to crush the skull of the Iranian snake, and in the same breath, take care of the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

Time to conclude the tale of Iran’s nuclear program

This rare and favorable window of opportunity represents a historic moment in which a coalition of the West, Israel, and moderate Sunni states, led by the US can and must bring a decisive end to the Iranian threat. However, one of the largest obstacles on the US’s way to green-lighting an overseas campaign is the public opinion on its streets.

The American public is weary and wary at any prospect of an overseas war, especially in light of the accumulative high death toll of the wars and engagements in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the staggering resources they drained. However, in this instance, the US would not actually be forced to initiate war – but to end it. The Israeli blitz airstrikes left a devastated Iranian air force, shattered many of the Republic’s strategic assets and delivered a crippling blow to its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Ayatullah reign is now more exposed than ever.

Hence, all that is required is a swift targeted move – a devastating airstrike on Iran’s nuclear sites, missile sites and military facilities, delivered by strategic bombers, without the need for boots on the ground, similarly to Israel’s attack last October. A campaign of mere days could bring the Shi’ite axis to its knees, and change the political map and balance of powers in the entire Middle East.

That same coalition should also launch a campaign against the reign of Houthi terror in Yemen, in collaboration with Saudia Arabia and the country’s internal opposition forces. The Houthis, as a proxy of Iran, have made themselves into an all-global nuisance with their disruptive attacks on international trade vessels in the Red Sea. If the US indeed does decide to exercise its full military might – it will have effected dramatic changes in that area within a very short period of time.

The attack against Iran is not only advisable – it is a sine qua non. Because Iran understands that it had lost significant assets such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, it will in all likelihood try to compensate and attempt by all means at hand to break out to a nuclear weapon. If the West cherishes its survival – it behooves it to prevent this at all costs.

Trump understands: the key to peace is might

The election of Trump to the presidency could not have come at a better time for Israel.

Over the past years, , the US has been gradually paring down its presence and involvement in the Middle East, leaving a vacuum into which Russia and China were all too happy to step. As a result of America’s wanning status in the region, an increasing number of countries are aligning themselves with the East. China, the main trade partner of the KSA and Iran, had already brokered an agreement between the two. China’s trade agreements in the Middle East have ballooned to seven times the current volume of the US’s – after it had cut its trade activity and reduced its dependance on Arab oil. The one thing the US can offer Middle East countries in order to reinstate its status as a dominant player in the region is military might.

Trump understands this all too well. He knows that peace and stability can come about only in the presence of military might and not appeasement. The mere fact that even before taking up residence in the White House, Trump declared  that he was interested in making Canada the 51st state of the US, and that he is interested in taking over Greenland and the Panama Canal, indicate that he views the United States as a super power that bears the task of reshaping the global map – and has no qualms about using the necessary force to make America great again.

An opportunity for new world order

Israel is quite literally handing the Middle East to the US on a silver platter.  After pulling the rug of hegemony in the Shi’ite axis from under Tehran’s feet and incapacitating its allies, the US can now step into the frame and reestablish its dominance on the chessboard with a move that would entail minimal effort, restoring its deterrence against the Chinese-Iranian-Russian syndicate.

Admittedly, it would be unwise of the US to ignite a direct military confrontation with the China-Russia sisterhood in the eastern theater. On the other hand – the weakest link in the chain, i.e. Iran, can be flicked off the gameboard almost effortlessly, thereby creating a strong deterrent for US’s adversaries in the region, and bulwarking the Middle East from China’s overtures.

This tactic would pave the road to broad regional peace accords, from Saudia to Indonesia, churning a tailwind for positive moves in the Middle East such as the formation of a moderate Sunni coalition with Israel in partnership with UAE and KSA.

Such a coalition, alongside Israel, moderate Sunni powerful countries and the West led by the US, coupled with normalization with the rest of the Sunni world, can stem the spread of the radical Shi’ite axis, including Turkey, Qatar, Afghanistan, and terror organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaida. The western coalition would prevent the Shi’ite axis from toppling the governments in countries such as Egypt and Jordan and seizing control thereof, and can form a new balance of power in the Middle East region.

This moderate alliance can potentially attract unaligned countries, such as Lebanon, which is controlled at present by Iran through Hezbollah; Iraq, which is partially controlled by Iran, and Libia, Egypt and Saudia. Taking Tehran out of the equation will leave the US alone at the top of the Middle East totem pole, which will in turn bring the unaligned countries – and perhaps more – to choose to align themselves with the moderate coalition, and perhaps even in a year or two, Lebanon will come around and sign – under the influence of Saudia – a peace accord with Israel.

Israel is the key

In a new regional alliance that would deepen and grow stronger with time, Israel would play a central role. Israel is the key that connects West to East, and is the crossroads in which new trade routes can be charted to provide land and maritime trade routes among India, the UAE, KSA and Israel. Israel has already set in place a network of mega-harbors, each under different supervision (The Sinai, Indian, European and Israeli) in preparation for this eventuality, with the aim of creating a global interest in using that network for trade and shipping activity. Making Israel into a global Singapore – a world trade center – is well within the country’s reach.

With new trade routes, regional peace and commercial cooperation with Saudia and other countries in the Middle East, coupled with the security and diplomatic support on part of the US, Israel would be able, for the first time in its history, to do what it has to do in order to ensure the future existence of the State for generations.

Fundamental dictate: maintaining sovereignty

After dealing with the Shi’ite axis and signing regional peace and normalization agreements, Israel will be required to present to the US administration a definitive resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, that must include the crucial elements that will ensure the long-lasting security of Israel.

Such a plan must include Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and most of the C areas in Judia and Samaria, cleared of Palestinian presence that might compromise the Jewish demographic hegemony in the State of Israel. It should outline a definitive solution of the conflict, such that does not allow for a Palestinian state and surely removes any possibility for the rule of terror organizations such as is the situation currently with Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah.

This is an opportunity to snuff out the Oslo Accords, dismantle the Palestinian Authority – a body that is in effect governed by a murderous terror organization that is actively pushing for the global delegitimization of Israel – and adopt an alternative model, to mention a few are: cantonization; emirate-style decentralized “Hamula” (family) government; a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or a Palestinian autonomy in the Sinai Peninsula under Egyptian supervision. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has presented to the Israeli governments various blueprints for this end. The choice of each specific model would depend on shifting circumstances. For example, a future scenario of the collapse of the Jordanian regime would push toward a Jordanian-Palestinian solution, whereas a willingness on part of Egyptian President el-Sisi to play an instrumental role in the stabilization of the Middle East would allow for a Palestinian autonomy in northern Sinai and Gaza.

The common ground for all these prospective solutions is the governing principle that the Zionist claim to the right of the Jewish people to the State of Israel and sovereignty thereof are non-negotiable. Cementing Israel’s right over the State of Israel is crucial spiritually and for its security – both aspects indivisibly interlinked. Israel cannot be completely secure without the spiritual conviction in the justness of this cause, and there is no understanding the security of cities in the heart of Israel without acknowledging the importance of settlements in Judia and Samaria.

Learning the lessons of October 7

A new plan to resolve the conflict would be different than that ideated by President Trump in his previous term. Trump’s Peace for Prosperity demanded painful concessions on part of Israel. But the October 7 attack made it clear that there is no room for such concessions. Any new plan must acknowledge Israel’s overall responsibility for the security of the entire area of the State of Israel. In the past round, Israel abstained from exercising sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and C areas, at Trum’s behest. Today, the public in Israel is more than ever ready for this step, that would anchor the eastern border belt as an integral part of the land of Israel, similarly to the southern and northern envelope areas. Trump’s current presidency is a historic opportunity to right this wrong and proclaim Israeli sovereignty – even unilaterally – in the territories over which the US acknowledges Israel’s right.

At the same time, Israel must present an exhaustive long-term plan for Gaza and Judia and Samaria. After learning the hard way over the past twenty years that the terror and Gaza cannot be eliminated solely with air strikes, precise as they may be, it is now clear that the Gaza Strip must have the presence of Israeli security forces – this is a unnegotiable condition if Israel wishes to see the objectives of the Gaza War materialize, among others affording Israel the freedom of immediate action in the event that terror – in any form whatsoever – lifts its head once again in the Gaza Strip.

It also must be acknowledged that a threat of territorial losses is a strong deterrent for organizations such as Hamas, since the loss of lives – even in the tens of thousands – and destruction have no meaning to the proponents of such ideologies. To ensure a long-lasting deterrence in the Gaza Strip, a portion of its territory must remain under Israel’s control. One such possibility that would gain wide support among Israeli public, is a militarized security zone along the parameter of Gaza under the control of Israel. These swaths of land can be used for cultivating agriculture by the communities that were the victims of the Hamas October 7 attack and breath life where Hamas has strewn death. This not only makes sense in terms of Israel’s security – it brings with it the much-needed historic justice.

Optimism is not enough

Trump’s reelection is a rare historic opportunity for Israel. With the support of a strong, realistic leader that had proven himself a true friend to the Jewish people, can the picture of the Middle East be radically changed, from which both Israel and the US can gain considerable – and crucial – advantages.

In order to ensure this historic opportunity is not missed, Israel must do two things. The first – enhance the cooperation with the US in a joint aim of eliminating the Iranian nuclear program.

The second is the formulation of a clear and definite long-term solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict that cements Israel’s security and diplomatic status in the Middle East region, and has zero tolerance for any approach that does not acknowledge Israel’s inalienable right over the land of Israel and its uncompromising right to maintain the security of the State and its citizens, ensuring the Trump administration’s full support of this aim.

Will Trump move the first piece on the board and launch an attack against Iran? Trump is a well-seasoned business mogul, who is very adept at identifying opportunities. However, at the end of the day, it is up to him and Israel to put forth proof of intent. In light of what is known about his previous term in the Oval Office, his recent appointments, and his guiding world views, it is likely that he will give Israel his security and diplomatic support and spearhead an attack on Iran.

One way or another, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement leads a steady clear line:

Israel’s national security leans on the State’s national ethos, the justness of the cause and its ability to protect its own security by itself with defensible borders and the understanding that the long-term security and the prosperity of Israel lies only in Israe’s hands.

This understanding must first and foremost stem from a common faith in the justness of Israel’s path, remembering the truth that has been at the foundation of Zionism since its inception – that if Israel does not take care of itself, no one else will.

Not even Donald Trump.

הפוסט Trump’s Second Presidency: A Critical Opportunity on a Silver Platter הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Days away from President-Elect Trump’s inauguration, a clear foreign policy vision is shaping around who used to be considered as a supposed isolationist-in-chief. In spite of his clear domestic priorities on the economy and mass migration, Trump wisely realized what his predecessor and ideological forebear, President Reagan, did: keeping the American people safe means maintaining a “margin of safety” for America. This, in a nutshell, is the doctrine of Peace Through Strength: muscling up American effort abroad to keep peace at home.

There is no greater arena where this margin has been gradually waning than the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis, that I would dare to refer to as CRIN. As Trump is calling out China for its malicious trade practices and grave danger to the US national security; vowing to end the Russian invasion to Ukraine; and threatening to take military control over the Panama Canal and Greenland “for national security purposes”, as he did during this week’s press conference. Trump is certainly not signaling he is only introspective as 2025 begins.

Yet one weak link is standing out in this axis, an opportunity to make good on Trump’s pledge to “stop the chaos” in the Middle East that ensued the Hamas horrific October 7 attacks on Israel: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran with its nuclear weapons program has become the number one destabilizing force in the Middle East, rendering Trump’s much-sought-after stability and prosperity so elusive. Its Leader Ali Khamenei is committed to destroy Israel, a major US ally, openly marking it in his crosshairs as a “cancerous tumor that needs to be removed”. Khamenei envisions bringing Israel’s unceremonious end while destabilizing the Sunni regimes in the Arab countries that neighbor Iran, uniting the Middle East under his rule. And he laid out a multi-billion-dollar plan to do just that.

Yet now, as Israel is methodically toppling the Iranian domino stones, Khamenei’s vision and aggression are backfiring. That represents an unprecedented opportunity to take a limited, pre-emptive military action against the Iranian nuclear danger, taking it off the table for good – with a relatively low cost. One of the very first decisions the newly-elected President will have to make is how to finally bring stability to the Middle East, and the key lies not in Gaza, but in Tehran.

The nuclear gun on the table

There are two main reasons why this crossroads represents a viable opportunity to take action against Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

First, Iran is more dangerous than ever before. Iran has been fast-tracking its nuclear weapons program over the course of Biden’s presidency with little international scrutiny. According to the recent report by the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Iran is a mere nod away from acquiring a sufficient amount of weapon-grade enriched uranium for a dozen nuclear devices. The only thing standing in its way is a green light by Khamenei and his cronies – and the Middle East and the world will face red alert.

Secondly, however, is that Iran is less ominous and more vulnerable than it is ready to admit. Its regional proxy strategy to checkmate Israel has gone on a downward spiral since the horrific October 7 atrocities. Its protégés Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen – all suffered heavy blows by Israel’s military efforts. Meanwhile, Assad fled Syria, leaving it at the mercy of HTS’ jihadists. This frontal defense has collapsed, and can no longer protect the Iranian homeland.

That, while Israel’s first-ever retaliation on Iranian soil in October reportedly eliminated much of Tehran’s much-dreaded air defense systems. It highlighted Tehran’s cluelessness in thwarting attacks on its well-protected, most-valued strategic assets.

Finally, even as Tehran was determined to avenge Israel for the series of humiliating blows it was inflicted by, it failed. In both April and October, Iran launched hundreds of missiles and attack drones, only to be mostly derailed by Israel’s tip-of-the-spear air defense and F-35 squadrons. That, on top of regional cooperation under MEAD (Middle East Air Defense) by stealthily supportive Arab countries, that shared critical intelligence, under the auspices of the United States Military’s Central Command.

Removing the Iranian cloud, gaining regional cooperation

The real tie-breaking Iranian gun on the table is the one with nuclear bullets. Especially now, as the Assad regime fell, Iran might conclude it has no other choice to secure its regime but to break out to a bomb, to compensate for its perceived weakness after all the blows it has suffered.

Trump, much like Reagan, despises the idea of nuclear proliferation. His continuous alerts again a possible Russian use of nukes against Ukraine and his graphic, somber descriptions of the terrible human tragedy that might ensue teaches that he considers global security much more ominous than the way he is usually described.

Removing the Iranian shady cloud over the Middle East will also obtain large-scale regional shifts: Saudi Arabia, and many other pragmatic countries in the Arab world, preferred to sit on the sidelines at best, or alienate themselves from the United States and warm up relations with Iran at worst. Iran’s threats on their sovereignty were well received, and short of any meaningful support from Washington, they preferred to equip themselves with an insurance policy, and side with the regional bully. Without this threat, the path for Israeli-Arab normalization and for long-term stability in the Middle East will be wide-open.

On the global level, this heavy blow to Iran will also significantly weaken its superpower patrons, Russia and China. Those continue to support Iran, whether its Russia’s continued purchasing of military equipment like drones and missiles that fuel the war in Ukraine, or China’s circumvention of American sanctions in buying massive amounts of oil barrels from the Ayatollahs, saving the Iranian petro-state from economic collapse.

Only inches away from clinching nuclear weapons, Iran does not stop threatening the US and its allies. Especially since October 7, Israel and the world have learned the hard way that their enemies should be taken at their word. Should not be taken lightly. The disastrous results of allowing Iran to nuclearize cannot be overstressed.

Trump is now facing a golden opportunity to take the Iranian gun off the table, and deny Khamenei of his radical vision. The new reality in the Middle East renders limited pre-emptive military action – no boots on the ground – much more realistic. This option used to be considered risking regional war, yet the Iranian gates of hell have already broken on the region, and backfired. Iran’s newfound weakness invites American leadership, not against the regime – but against its capabilities to threaten the region and the world.

Recently Trump declared he was looking to establish “long-lasting peace” in the region. Now it is his time to greenlight the strike that will close the Iranian nuclear program and open the door for this very peace. Weakened proxies and air defenses, a readier-than-ever region, and gains that clearly trump the cost. Checkmate.

The article was originally published on the Jerusalem Post

הפוסט Trump’s Golden Opportunity to Checkmate Iran and Stabilize the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 27, 2024, the day the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect, the Syrian rebels took advantage of the opportunity and launched an attack against Bashar al-Assad’s army. After only 11 days, their forces had taken control of Damascus and completed the conquest of Syria. Assad himself fled to Russia.

Many were amazed at the dizzying speed with which the Syrian regime fell, and at the depth of hatred among the enraged crowd that wrecked the statue of the elder Assad and dragged it through Damascus.

The person least surprised was Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a member of the IDSF movement and one of the leading experts in Middle East studies. His analysis seems to imply that the Baath regime in Syria could have come to no different end.

Greater infidels than Jews and Christians

“The rebels succeeded in taking control of Syria so quickly because Syria is a hollow country. The people don’t believe in it and the army isn’t willing to die for it,” Kedar said in a special conversation with Or Yissachar, head of the IDSF research department, after the dramatic developments in Syria. “My book ‘Assad in Search of Legitimacy’ (2005) proves what other Orientalists have tried to deny or ignore,” claims Kedar, “which is that Hafez Assad, and later his son Bashar, tried in vain all these years to become legitimate rulers in the eyes of the public. They never succeeded. They didn’t have a nickel’s worth of legitimacy. Nothing, zero, nada. They ruled by force. Everything was phony, and that’s why it fell apart so quickly.”

Kedar explains that this is a chronicle of a collapse foretold. “Syria’s biggest problem is that in 1966 it was taken over by members of the Alawite religion, a minority who are considered by the country’s Sunni Muslim majority to be infidels – idolaters whose fate is to either convert to Islam or be slaughtered. The renowned medieval Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyyah called the Alawites ‘greater infidels than the Jews and Christians.’ Therefore, from the perspective of Muslims, an Alawite cannot be a ruler.”

Brutal repression and strategic surprise

“To deal with the hostility of the Muslim majority towards them,” says Kedar, “the Alawite leaders from the Marxist faction of the Baath Party – the secular nationalist party that has ruled Syria since taking over in 1966 – established a terrible dictatorial regime. It suppressed rebellions brutally. In 1976, the Muslim Brotherhood mounted an uprising in Syria and thousands of Sunni rebels fought against the government. The uprising ended in February 1982 with the Great Hama Massacre, where between 20,000 and 40,000 people were murdered. Military forces under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother, blew up houses with the residents inside – including old people, women, and children – and they killed other victims with gas. About 20,000 more people, who were taken into custody, were murdered in Palmyra prison.

“The next round began in March 2011, with a wave of anti-government protests that erupted as part of what was then called the ‘Arab Spring.’ Then too, in various regions, the rebellion was suppressed with deadly force. Many Syrian Muslims fled north to the Idlib region, close to Turkiye. The Turks helped them arm and equip themselves, organize, train, and prepare for the great day when they would break out and liberate the country from the rule of the Assad family.”

For 14 years, the rebels in the Idlib region waited, gathered strength, armed themselves, and watched for the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow to the Assad regime. “The turning point,” explains Kedar, “came with the end of Hezbollah’s war against Israel, which left the regime especially weakened.”

How did the rebels mount their surprise attack?

“Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – an Islamist organization formerly called Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated with al-Qaeda – was the first to attack, under the command of Muhammad al-Julani. The other rebel organizations quickly followed suit, to take advantage of the strategic surprise that wound up costing the Assad regime its life.”

Kedar describes the course of the battles: “First the rebel forces attacked in Aleppo, and a few days later they proceeded south to Hama and later to Homs. After that area was conquered, the Druze in As-Suwayda and the Bedouin in Daraa also joined the rebellion against the government. Then it was a short path to the conquest of Damascus and the final defeat of Assad.”

We will have won when Israeli flags are hoisted over former Iranian embassies

Although the rebels fought as a single front in the recent campaign, in reality they are a variety of organizations and their agendas differ and sometimes clash. “In the Idlib region, refugees from Daesh, Al Qaeda, and other organizations have accumulated over the years, especially after 2018. In contrast, there were also secular and multi-ethnic organizations without any religious agenda. They included Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawites, and members of other groups. These organizations appear more moderate and pragmatic, and at least two of them accept Israel. I know this because I’m in contact with their leaders,” Kedar reveals.

Does the agenda of most rebels actually appear to be relatively moderate?

“The statements that most organizations are issuing are quite positive. Some even say that Israel has nothing to fear. One of the organizations I’m in contact with wrote to me that for them the great victory over Assad, the Iranians, and Hezbollah will be when the Iranian embassies in Damascus and Amman have Israeli flags flying, meaning those buildings have become the Israeli embassies.”

It would be better for the rebels to establish a liberal regime

“There is no unified Syrian people,” explains Kedar. “Syria is an artificial state. It’s deeply divided ethnically, into Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Armenians – and religiously, into Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Alawites – and tribally, into powerful clans and extended families, many of them armed and valuing their internal loyalties and their own agendas. Those groups were together only because of the arbitrary border that France established when it concluded its mandate in the region. The gaps and tensions along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines have prevented a true Syrian people from forming.” According to Kedar, this is precisely the reason that it would be beneficial for al-Julani to establish a relatively liberal regime.

“If Syria becomes an Islamist state like Daesh or a dictatorship that tries to impose a unified national identity, it could fall apart – because the Druze, Kurds, and other minorities would not want to live in such a state.” On the other hand, if Syria were a pluralistic state as it was in the 1950s, intervening less harshly in the lives of its citizens, then all sorts of forces that want independence – such as the Alawites in the coastal region – could very possibly be content with what they have and not try to dismantle the country.”

If the alternative is Iran – I prefer Daesh

When asked whether the disintegration of countries like Iran or Syria will negatively affect stability in the Middle East, Kedar replies surprisingly that on the contrary, it will only improve stability.

“Only the Emirates, which are homogeneous countries, have remained stable over many years in this region. In contrast, countries made of several groups, heterogeneous countries, are very unstable. Consider, for example, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. They each include ethnic, religious, and tribal groups that don’t associate with each other, so why force them to live in a single framework?

If an extremist Islamist state like Daesh is established, is it still good for Israel that the Assad regime has fallen?

“Even the worst militias in Syria pose a threat that is primarily tactical – automatic weapons and heavy machine guns mounted on Toyotas. If I have to choose between that and a strategic threat from Iran in the form of ballistic missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons soon, then I prefer to deal with Daesh. Of course I really want to avoid that. But if the alternative is Iran, I prefer Daesh.”

Israel is ready for any scenario

Is uncertainty about the nature of Syria’s emerging regime the reason for the preventive measures that Israel has taken in recent weeks?

“Exactly. Israel is preparing for the worst-case scenario, in which extremist Islamists have control of Syria. That’s why we’re seeing a very large concentration of forces in the Golan. For the meantime, until it becomes clear where the new government is headed, the IDF has captured the Syrian side of Mount Hermon – which is higher than the Israeli side – and has also improved the Israeli positions on the Golan itself. These steps are important and it’s good that they were taken as a way of warding off danger and ensuring that we don’t relive October 7th – this time on the Golan – with military forces entering the State of Israel because it fell asleep on the watch.

“It’s impossible to know what will happen in Syria,” concludes Kedar. “It could be an Islamist terrorist state like Daesh, or an open, modern, liberal state like Syria was in the past. We have to wait and see. We can only hope that a reasonable, normal government will be established there that Israel can reach a dialogue with, so that we all can feel calmer about what’s happening across the border.”

הפוסט “Syria was always a fake – that’s why it fell apart so quickly” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the last three months, the center of gravity of the Swords of Iron war has shifted northward, but according to journalist Yair Kraus, the story of the northern sector began unfolding as early as October 7, 2023. As someone who lives in Acre and covers the northern region for Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, he discerned from the beginning that his region was an integral part of the war.

“When we saw the terrible attack on the southern communities, we realized that such an attack could have happened here too, and in much more monstrous proportions,” he relates. “This completely changed our perception of security as residents of the north. It created a deep crisis in our trust for the state and the IDF. Today, when we hear statements like ‘Hezbollah is deterred,’ for us it’s a warning that the situation on the ground is probably the opposite.”

The days of a “sense of security” are over

Yair Kraus lives in Acre, so he and his family were not evacuated. But they certainly felt the echoes of the war. His eldest daughter, for example, had to leave home for an entire month to go to school in the center of the country, and his three younger children had no educational framework for about three months. Kraus also personally knows many families who were displaced from their homes, and has seen firsthand the difficulties they faced and are still facing. He is aware of many residents – mainly elderly – who are waiting for the moment when they can return home. Moreover, there are quite a few others who are not at all sure they wish to return, and some have already decided to leave the north for good. The trend toward relocating permanently is especially noticeable among young families whose children have already settled into new frameworks in central Israel. Those families do not want to uproot them again.

However, even if we focus on residents who are waiting to return – and even on exceptional individuals who decide to move to the north of the country now of all times – there is still a serious problem in that most of them are not yet able to do so.

According to Kraus, who has been covering the northern region since the Second Lebanon War, several conditions must be met before the north can be repopulated. The first involves security and survival. “The residents in the north, especially the evacuees, will carefully examine what conditions the state and the army want to return them to,” he says. “I hear from many friends that they will not return to a situation where they will see Hezbollah terrorists and their families settling again in the villages where attacks were launched, or go back to being on the front line with the army behind them.”

The residents of the north have had enough of promises, Kraus adds, and they will now demand to see changes on the ground. “The security establishment’s usual boasting and lying will no longer work, and there’s no use for more of their statements that have repeatedly turned out to be unfounded,” he concludes. “The days of ‘a sense of security’ are also over. The issue here is no longer what people feel. It’s what people see with their own eyes – and when you see the villages where attacks were launched being rebuilt, and when there’s no buffer zone, it doesn’t look like security. Remember, we didn’t defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. And Hezbollah’s stated goal is still to conquer the northern settlements. It’s time for us to start believing Hezbollah and stop underestimating its buildup. We also need to wean ourselves from the addiction to respite – and from methods of action such as the kind we used in the so-called war between the wars. There is a major lesson here for the leadership, the army officers, and the northern residents, and it is that the peace and quiet we long for can be bought only with determination and the force of arms.”

So what will security on the northern border look like?

“We constantly hear about weapons being seized and terrorist infrastructure being destroyed, even now during the ceasefire, but what will change the reality the day after the war is not how many weapons we removed, but whether the weapons will return to those places. As long as the army and government show no willingness to hold on to the areas where Hezbollah operated, we should be worried. It’s clear to me and many other residents that for security in the north, we must create a buffer zone like the ones at the Gaza border and the Syrian border. Besides keeping security threats away from the communities at the fence, a buffer zone would also deliver humiliation. The Lebanese will see abandoned villages standing as monuments that proclaim what happens to those who try to harm us.”

Don’t say “rehabilitation,” say “development”

Besides restoring security, another condition that must be met in order to return the residents of the north to their homes is the restoration of the damaged infrastructure, including the ruined drainage systems, the destroyed roads, the wrecked buildings, and the many homes that suffer from abandonment. Of course, we also need repairs at public institutions such as health funds and schools, and at businesses, because they are all integral to a reasonable lifestyle.

However, alongside physical restoration, there is another aspect, less talked about, which is the development aspect. “We hear all the time about ‘rehabilitating the north,’ but in my opinion, rehabilitation is the wrong concept because it implies restoring the conditions of October 6,” says Yair Kraus. The situation in the north has been shaky for many years, and it is impossible to prop something back up that has long been falling apart. There is an issue of attitude here, and it is time for us to replace the term ‘rehabilitation’ with the terms ‘momentum’ and ‘development.'”

Kraus expresses a feeling that many northern residents share – especially now, after they have glimpsed the lifestyle of the center’s residents. “Exposure to life in the center of the country made the residents of the north realize how far behind they were. The rift strongly affected their perception,” he explains. “After a few months of living in the center, residents of the north began to get used to conditions that residents of the center have long taken for granted, such as accessible public transportation, advanced health services, well-paying jobs, and a variety of leisure activities. It’s enough to notice how many movie theaters an average city has in central Israel and then look at the Upper Galilee. There isn’t a single movie theater in that entire region. But the problem is much deeper than that, of course. Such gaps exist in every field and influence every aspect of the residents’ daily lives. So if the state wants those residents to return to the north, it cannot be satisfied with merely restoring what they had before. It must assure them that they will receive the same conditions that exist in the center. People say that you don’t cry out for what you don’t notice the lack of – but now the residents of the north know what they lack and they will cry out.”

What should the development plan for the north include?

“We need to start improving public transportation and expanding railroad lines, build advanced medical centers, and place an emphasis on employment, education, and leisure. Beyond that, we need to work on reducing land prices in the decaying rural communities at the heart of the Galilee – because currently the prices are exorbitant, to the point where they harm the entire Jewish settlement enterprise in the Galilee. But above all, a new point of view is needed. Currently the state treats the north as an unwelcome assignment and not as an asset. For that reason, it develops the north according to economic and administrative considerations, and not considerations of Zionism and societal values.”

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north.

The people of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem aren’t wiser than we are

It is impossible discuss the rehabilitation and development of the north without addressing the question of responsibility. Currently there are various bodies trying to drive the process, and they are roughly divided into two groups – outsiders and insiders. The first group includes mainly government bodies and regulatory officials. The second group includes local leaders, residents, and private associations. Synchronization among the various bodies is not always successful, and sometimes it does not exist at all. Currently the reins are held by those external offices.

According to Yair Kraus, this trend is not new. “For years, the people in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem decided what was right for us, and how we should live, and even now there is a feeling that do-gooders are coming from outside again to save and heal us,” he says. “This criminal policy may derive from good intentions, but in practice it weakens the local leadership and the community’s resilience. It sends the message that the residents can’t take care of themselves.”

Kraus compares the situation in the north to national disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes. In such disasters too, we see delegations from elsewhere arriving to save the locals. The missions operate out of good will, and their assistance is indeed needed, but when they operate without the cooperation of the local population, their benefit is only partial.

“All the studies in the world prove that sustainable reconstruction after a national disaster is possible only when the community is part of the reconstruction and part of the action,” he explains. “We need to create a situation where we exert ourselves not merely for the community but together with it. Not only do the locals know best what they need. In addition, by taking responsibility for themselves they can achieve a sense of triumph and restore their own resilience, which is no less important than physical rehabilitation.”

Why, in your opinion, are the people of the north excluded from the reconstruction and development processes?

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north. Billions have been invested in the region over the years and have given back almost no profit. In my opinion, a solution needs to be found that will provide for supervision but also give the north a certain freedom of action. I don’t know what the solution is, but I know we must try to find it.”

No “state,” no “army,” only people

One of the clearest conclusions that Yair Kraus draws from the last year of the war is that we need to discard amorphous terms like “state” and “army,” and instead start talking about the people who make up these bodies.

He harks back to the period when he covered Operation Guardian of the Walls and many media outlets reported on various decisions made by the court. He, as a journalist, opposed that unspecific term and made sure to mention the name of the judge who made each decision. In today’s context, Kraus emphasizes that there is no army, but rather a Chief of Staff, a head of the Northern Command, a divisional commander, and so on. Similarly, there is no state. There are ministers, there are members of Knesset, there are advisors. “This precision is important because when you attribute the responsibility to the body, then no one is responsible,” he explains. “In contrast, when you say who has the authority, by name and position, and indicate what decision or what action that person took – then immediately an individual is responsible.”

His hope is that those in authority, from the most senior to the most junior, will take responsibility and truly fulfill their roles. Only in this way, he believes, will it be possible to influence the future of the country and its development.

Another conclusion that Kraus has retained is that we must no longer be captivated by promises. “In the last year and a quarter, we have received a very big lesson in realism, and I can no longer look at the future through a prism,” he says. “In my lifetime, I’ve heard enough exciting announcements that ultimately led to nothing. I hope that now, with the reality of the north finally on the public agenda, we will see real change. It’s a very harsh thing to say, but this terrible war could be a blessing for the north. If it weren’t for a game-changing event of this magnitude, I doubt we would be talking about the importance of the north and recognizing how acute the need is to take care of this region of the country and improve its conditions. In my view, we must leverage this event into development, so that out of the fearsome comes forth sweetness.”

הפוסט The North Needs a New Story: An Interview with Journalist Yair Kraus הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In September 2024, the Swedish authorities accused Iran of responsibility for thousands of text messages sent to residents of Sweden in 2023 and calling to avenge a Quran burning that had occurred in the kingdom. According to official Swedish sources, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had penetrated the Swedish text messaging system in a cyber attack and sent approximately 15,000 text messages in Swedish regarding the Quran burning. The Iranian embassy in Sweden characterized the accusation as “baseless” and as fabricated to “poison” relations between Tehran and Stockholm. For his part, the operational chief of Sweden’s security services (Säpo), Fredrik Hallström, said that the text messages were intended “to paint the picture of Sweden as an Islamophobic country” and “to create division in Swedish society,”

As early as August 2023, Swedish media reported that many people across Sweden had received text messages in Swedish calling for vengeance against those who burned the Quran. According to senior Swedish prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist, the messages were sent by a group that calls itself the Anzu Team. The messages’ content, as broadcast on Sweden’s SVT television network, said that “Those who desecrated the Quran must have their work covered in ashes” and called the Swedes “demons.” The public demonstrations that included Quran burning were covered by freedom of expression as protected under the Swedish constitution and therefore permitted by the police. However, those demonstrations did touch off a storm in the Middle East and brought threats from various sources, including Muslim states, against Sweden and against its citizens.

The storm surrounding the Quran burning began after Rasmus Paludan, a right-wing extremist with Danish and Swedish roots, set fire to a Quran outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm in January 2023, and outside the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen later during the same month. Paludan’s actions were copied by others such as Salwan Momika, an Iraqi refugee in Sweden who had prior connections with Christian militias in Iraq. Momika, demonstrating outside a Stockholm mosque in June 2023 during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha holiday, began setting a Quran afire.

As a result, several Arab countries — including the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia — summoned Swedish diplomatic representatives for reprimands. Iraq went so far as to break off relations with Sweden after a second Quran burning included setting the Iraqi flag on fire as well. In an additional response, crowds of Shiites torched the Swedish embassy in Baghdad. In Iran, the US flag was burned opposite the Swedish embassy and Sweden was warned that it would “suffer consequences.” A spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, summoned the Swedish ambassador for a reprimand and announced: “We strongly condemn the repeated desecration of the Holy Quran … in Sweden, and we hold the Swedish government fully responsible” for events that are “inciting the feelings of Muslims around the world” and for the consequences.

Further to the Iranian reprimand, the Hezbollah organization — a very close proxy of Iran’s — held a demonstration against Sweden in Beirut, in which it brandished a picture of the assassinated commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. In Malmö, Sweden’s third-largest city and home to a large Muslim population, many confrontations broke out as a result of the Quran burning. Many immigrants living in the city’s Rosengård neighborhood threw stones and torched tens of autos in an extremely violent riot. The Quran burnings frightened leaders in Western and Northern Europe. Following the events, the Swedish Prime Minister even added that “We are currently in the most serious security situation since the Second World War,”

In light of the unrest generated by those demonstrations, plus the rage among the Muslim immigrants throughout Sweden, Iran decided to “retaliate” in Sweden by the same method that it has long used against its opponents: intensifying the schisms in the local society. That tactic takes the spreading of the Iranian revolution several steps onward, not only by instigating terror attacks but also by enlarging Iran’s sphere of influence and creating social chaos. First, Iran infiltrates the country’s local Shiite community, if one exists, and then it proceeds into other population sectors or radical elements that can destabilize the country’s government, Iran’s hope being to intensify societal tensions in the case of a western state or to topple the regime in the case of a Mideast state such as Iraq. Spreading disinformation is an established Iranian method of operations in Israel, but now Iran is trying to employ it in countries across the ocean such as the USA, and in European countries such as Sweden.

The Iranians are not only advancing as the main opponent in their rival countries but also advancing against their enemies, or representative offices of their enemies, in third countries — including Israeli missions abroad. Thus, for example, last May the Swedish internal security agency accused Iran of employing criminal organizations in Sweden to attack Israeli or Jewish targets in Swedish territory. Security sources in Sweden confirmed an announcement from the Mossad that the Ayatollahs’ regime was using criminal gangs in European countries, including Sweden and Belgium, to attack Israeli and Jewish targets.

In fact, Iran was behind three unsuccessful attacks against Israeli targets in Sweden and Belgium between January and May 2024. On January 31, a hand grenade was thrown at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. The grenade did not explode. On May 16, shots were fired at the embassy in Stockholm. Subsequently, on May 24, two grenades were thrown at the Israeli embassy in Brussels. Investigation of the incidents revealed that Iran was behind the attacks, having enlisted criminal organizations that, at the same time, were at odds with one another. It appears that even in its relations with criminal organizations, Iran applies a method based on the dynamics between the parties in order to exploit the advantage of one organization over the other or to exploit the rivalry.

The use of criminal organizations for terrorism coincides with Iran’s policy of trying to promote terrorist activity against its enemies without leaving traces of its own involvement. The Iranians fund and direct criminal organizations around Europe just as they fund and direct Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Houthis of Yemen, and others. Iran avoids leaving its national fingerprints, in order to minimize political and legal repercussions that could lead to international sanctions against Tehran.

One of those Swedish criminal organizations is Foxtrot, considered the country’s largest criminal network. Its members have been responsible for many murders and for extensive drug trafficking. The organization’s boss is Rawa Majid, a Swedish citizen of Kurdish origin who is wanted by Interpol and who, on instructions from Iran, instigates attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe. However, a number of young people arrested following the shooting attack at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm were Iranian by background and were connected with the Rumba criminal gang, which is led by Ismail Abdo, a former associate of Majid’s at Foxtrot who is now his greatest rival.

The Ayatollahs’ regime directly threatens Sweden’s national security. Iran spies against Sweden’s industries, research institutes, and universities. Last June a strategic agreement was exposed that enables the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to exploit cooperation between Iranian and Swedish universities in order to advance Iran’s military programs.

That agreement, which until then was unknown to the Swedish authorities, permits the Revolutionary Guards to exploit academic cooperation between Swedish universities and their Iranian counterparts in order to acquire technological knowledge in fields such as UAVs, artificial intelligence, and advanced electronics. There are at least eight Swedish universities with ties to Iranian universities. The agreement threatens the national security not only of Sweden but also of all the other NATO countries. Sweden joined the transatlantic alliance in March 2023, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who for a time had vetoed its membership in the wake of Quran burning and anti-Turkish demonstrations in Stockholm, withdrew his objection. A strategic agreement of this kind serves the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, accentuating the threat of espionage and the infiltration of foreign forces into a NATO country.

Still, the main target of Iranian espionage is the Iranian opposition groups in Sweden. Like other European countries, Sweden has become a base of operations where Iranian agents plan their espionage and their attacks. One example involves Asadollah Asadi, an Iranian diplomat whom a Belgian court sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for terrorism. Asadi, who was third secretary at the Iranian embassy in Austria, was arrested by German security forces on a Bavarian highway in 2018, mere days after passing explosives to two Iranians in Belgium. The explosives were intended for an attack on members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organization — opponents of the Iranian regime — at a rally in Paris where then US Vice President Mike Pence was also in attendance. Although Asadi was posted to Austria and his crime was planned for France, interrogation and confiscated materials showed he was closely connected to Iranian agents in Sweden. The German police confiscated a notebook in which Asadi had recorded 289 sites, in 11 European countries, where he met Iranian agents. Among those countries was Sweden. This proved that the Iranians had active agents there — a fact further emphasized in December 2019 when an Iraqi citizen living in Sweden was convicted of spying for Iran against Iranian exiles who were Swedish residents. In May 2023 Asadi was released in a prisoner swap between Iran and Belgium, in return for Olivier Vandecasteele, a humanitarian worker whom Iran had arrested in 2022.

Europe and the international community must take note of Iran’s behavior, which threatens not only the countries of the Middle East but also those countries of the West that maintain diplomatic ties with Iran. Because of Iran’s extensive network extending into many of the world’s nations, Tehran can enlist local extremist elements or even, if it wishes, local criminal gangs as in the case of Sweden. With its subversion, Iran attempts to deepen the crises and conflicts in many countries, to widen societal rifts in order to topple governments, and to fragment nations. The widening of rifts and disagreements contributes to Iran’s efforts at weakening the West and strengthening its claim that western democracy is fundamentally flawed. The flourishing of local criminal organizations, alongside disinformation campaigns that poison the public discourse, could bring anarchy to the western nations and crumble them from within while the Muslim world grows stronger — with Iran seeing itself as the spearhead leading the Shiite alliance toward a Shiite Islamic hegemony.

The Iranians rule no tactics out. They use various organizations, but in similar methods: exacerbating societal rifts and disagreements, exploiting local groups to advance Iranian interests, using cyber tools to increase Iranian influence, and more. What Iran is doing in Israel, it also does in the western countries. Sweden is a single case among many in which Iran is waging dangerous subversion throughout the West. The Scandinavian countries, and the West in general, must understand that in the face of the Iranian threat, they share an interest with Israel. For a long time now, Iran has been threatening more than just the Middle East. Its subversion has made it a threat to security everywhere in the West.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran’s subversive activity in Sweden הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Following the Syrian rebels’ takeover of Damascus and approximately 70% of the country’s territory, rebel leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani is striving to establish a new regime in Syria to replace that of Bashar al-Assad’s. The fragile situation in Syria has become a source of deep concern for many nations — including Israel, the United States, Russia, and Turkey, all of which are closely monitoring developments. The primary fear is that these recent changes may lead to a power vacuum in Syria, providing jihadist organizations with fertile ground.

Over the past two weeks, al-Julani has sought to convey a message of moderation to the West, presenting himself in what could be described as a “softer version” in order to improve the image of his group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, his jihadist fighters project a far more uncompromising stance.

This week, jihadist rebels released a video on social media declaring that after victory in Damascus and the rest of Syria, they will “liberate and conquer Jerusalem and its Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as the Kaaba in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.”

The rebels’ bold statements follow the United Kingdom’s announcement that it is reconsidering its designation of HTS as a banned organization, and word from the U.S. government that it may be ceasing to list HTS as a terrorist organizations.

These responses from the U.S. and the U.K. exemplify typical Western naivety in the face of the new situation in Syria. It appears the West has again failed to learn from history, as previously in its dealings with Osama bin Laden, with al-Qaeda, and with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In contrast, al-Julani seems to have learned from the mistakes of major jihadists who came before him, such as bin Laden of al-Qaeda and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS. Al-Julani represents a more modern and sophisticated version of these figures, learning from history and trying not to repeat their errors. Knowing his Islamist roots, could the West truly be so naïve?

A quintessential example of this western perspective can be found in the American intelligence assessments. According to U.S. intelligence, Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS, underwent significant transformation, distancing itself from ties with ISIS and becoming independent from al-Qaeda. Furthermore, American intelligence asserts that al-Julani is energetically working to improve HTS’s image and purging the organization of its more extreme elements.

The American opinion notwithstanding, al-Julani’s actions should be assessed from outside the typical Western perspective. One example of how different the facts are is his visit to the great Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. His triumphant arrival and worship there send his followers a clear message about his and his jihadist fighters’ agenda:

The conquest of Damascus, and worship in the Umayyad Mosque alongside the mausoleum of Salah ad-Din, who was one of Islam’s most renowned military leaders, speaks for itself. It is a symbol with an obvious meaning — true not to how al-Julani seeks to display himself in the western media, but to what his fighters proclaim.

Given the West’s misguided outlook, the Syrian case may turn out to replicate the scenario of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban group promised to adopt a more moderate policy. once it had captured Kabul, in 2021, but in practice, it imposed severe restrictions on women and strictly enforced Sharia law in all aspects of governance.

Moreover, ISIS has a presence in Syria as it had in Afghanistan — a lower-profile presence now for that jihadist organization, but a presence nonetheless. Despite its frictions with HTS and other factions, ISIS could exploit another such power vacuum to expand its foothold in Syria. In fact, this week ISIS reported executing 54 of Assad’s soldiers whom it captured as they attempted to flee Syria.

Thus a power vacuum in Syria could lead to the emergence of a “new Afghanistan” on Israel’s border—a scenario that may afford ISIS a resurgence like the one that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, after which ISIS–Khorasan Province became the group’s most lethal branch.

Such a scenario could intensify competition between ISIS and other jihadist factions and particularly against HTS, which is poised to form the foundation of Syria’s new government. Even more dangerously, a government with roots in a jihadist movement would rule Syria in accordance with jihadist ideology and policies.

It is worth noting that HTS also expressed support for the October 7 attacks. If it consolidates itself and achieves dominance across the border from Israel, it will dramatically increase the Syrian threat and heighten the likelihood of a similar attack — an assault like that of October 7, but this time targeting Israeli communities in the Golan Heights.

The article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Is Syria the New Afghanistan? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As we count the days until the inauguration of President-Elect Donald Trump, we should devote careful thought to Israel’s future relations with the new administration and to attaining Israel’s long-standing strategic objectives.

The president-elect describes his personal approach, as follows: “In my life, there are two things I’ve found I’m very good at: overcoming obstacles and motivating good people to do their best work. One of the challenges ahead is how to use those skills as successfully in the service of others as I’ve done, up to now, on my own behalf.” Trump made this statement in 1977, in his best-seller, The Art of the Deal. At the end of 2024, it is clear that he has remained consistent throughout his election campaign and in his choice of nominees for the new cabinet.

Furthermore, as far as Israel is concerned, we must recall President Trump’s past accomplishments. He kept his promise and moved the American embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and sponsored the Abraham Accords. As a leader and entrepreneur, he is accustomed to thinking big, on a large and ambitious scale. For example, his vision includes the rebuilding of American industry, the exploration of space and space travel.

What does this mean for the Jewish State and its strategic needs? According to the fifteenth-century Florentine political thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli, one should ask powerful men for big things, because it is just as easy for them to grant large requests as small ones.

An episode in our history proves this point, namely, the meeting on March 18, 1948 between President Harry S. Truman and Dr. Chaim Weizmann. President Truman’s grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, tells the story, as follows: “…. On May 14, 1948, President Harry S. Truman made one of the most momentous decisions of his presidency: recognizing the new state of Israel just minutes after its founding. My grandfather is justly celebrated for providing the legitimacy this nascent democracy required to survive, but his WWI buddy and former business partner, Eddie Jacobson, deserves credit, as well. This installment of ‘First Family Stories’ is dedicated to a friendship that changed the world.”

It is well known that President Truman overcame both the opposition of Secretary of State George Marshall and the long-standing hostility of the American foreign policy establishment. Over the years, such attitudes have persisted. Most recently, the Obama/Biden foreign policy, while nominally positive toward Israel, has been ambivalent and, on occasion, downright nasty.

A recent example was President Biden’s arm twisting of

Israel to end the Hamas war by accepting a ceasefire and a compromise, which drew a false equivalence between a terrorist aggressor that had launched a war against a legitimate state and an American ally.

On July 24, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker of the House Mike Johnson of Louisiana. On the following day [July 25], the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Biden ended in a bust up. The President warned Netanyahu that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!”

From a historical perspective, this type of episode was not an isolated occurrence. American policy makers have frequently misunderstood the ways of our region and, consequently, have made costly mistakes that have harmed their own interests as well as those of Israel.

II.

The careful study of our past, particularly the Israeli decision-making process before the Six-Day War, provides valuable insights for the present and the future. The late Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto (1926-2015) was Chief of Planning and Operational Requirements of the Israel Airforce (IAF) prior to the Six-Day War (1967) and a well-informed insider. Several years before the Six-Day War, he visited France, which supplied Israel with Mirage jet fighters. On one of his visits, his colleagues discreetly informed him that the French government planned to end its special relationship with Israel. Subsequently, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol authorized Tsiddon-Chatto to negotiate Israel’s first purchase of an American light attack aircraft, the A4 Skyhawk, manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. Furthermore, it was Tsiddon-Chatto who discovered the American spy-ship, USS Liberty, standing still in the Mediterranean off Sinai during the Six-Day War.

As a military strategist, Tsiddon-Chatto made several basic observations: 1) America failed to distinguish between its friends and its enemies; 2) America refused to let Israel win a war; 3) When writing about pro-active defense and the decision in June 1967 to preempt the war, he emphasized the crucial importance of the dimension of time.

While the circumstances have changed over the past decades, Tsiddon-Chatto’s description of Israel’s situation is timely, as for example, President Biden’s forceful demand of July 25, 2024, that Prime Minister Netanyahu accept a ceasefire in Gaza instead of a decisive victory.

His statements have been gently edited as follows:

…. Since the ‘Czech arms deal’ of 1955, and the Soviet position [of] consolidation in the ME following the Eisenhower / Dulles handling [of] the Anglo-French in the Suez Crisis of 56/7, there was no question in the ME who is on the US and who on the Soviet side. The US seemed to be the only ones oblivious of reality, thus unwittingly reinforcing Soviet penetration in the ME. Moreover, the US, which related to Israel as if it were a millstone on its neck until the Six Day War … [The Americans] “discovered” only as a result of this war that Israel is the major regional power, unconditionally pro-US, and an inexhaustible source of intelligence on Soviet assets, captured in large numbers and handed over. [Author’s bold].

Tsiddon-Chatto had a basic complaint regarding American policy toward Israel, namely, that the U.S. consistently prevented Israel from achieving a decisive victory on the battlefield in order “to placate Arabia which, as it proves since 9/11, is implacable…. It should make sense to see the US picture of Vietnam and [the] ME as just two interacting sectors of the Cold War. There is abundant evidence to prove this, and that the US has, and probably is to this day, misunderstanding the Arab manipulative ways.”

Writing in general terms about the task of the strategist, Yoash describes his methodology and then emphasizes the dimension of time as the most important factor in the decision to preempt a war:

Planning must relate to all possible scenarios. The plan … must respond to the scenarios [which have] the highest probability of materializing, while assuring a response to the most pessimistic scenarios.

The dimension of time is a matter of decisive importance. If the threat increases and becomes more acute with time, it means that the danger grows every day, and it is possible that there will be a time when our weakness will compel us to take the initiative to the point of a preemptive strike, even if the preparations for war have not been completed. (Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Be-Yom, be-Lail be-Arafel [By Day, By Night, through Haze and Fog] (Jerusalem: Keterpress, 1995, in Hebrew): 306.

Tsiddon-Chatto describes the public mood in Israel at the end of May 1967, during the days prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. The Egyptian army was waiting on Israel’s border and the civilian reserves had been mobilized. This state of affairs could not be maintained for too long and paralyzed Israel’s economy. Thus, the dimension of time became the key variable in the equation: “… Were the Arab Coalition to open hostilities first, using their much superior air forces in the way we foresaw, the State of Israel would have ceased to exist….”

It is not well known that, at this critical moment, the U.S. vigorously opposed a pre-emptive strike. (See [Meir] Amit’s report of his meeting of May 25, 1967, with [John] Hadden, the CIA man in Israel. (Rosh be-Rosh (Head On), [Or Yehuda: Hed Arzi, 1999, Hebrew]: 235).

Meir Amit, Director of the Mossad, gives the real backstory of this episode. He wrote that a “tough conversation” took place at midnight in his home. [Also present were Efraim Halevy, a senior member of the Mossad, and Brigadier General David Carmon, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence.] There was shouting, and even shots of whisky did not calm the tense atmosphere. Amit tried hard to convince Hadden that the situation was really critical and that Israel would have to act as soon as possible. But Hadden threatened that if Israel pre-empted the war, America would send forces to fight on the Egyptian side. He held the firm conviction that we had to wait and warned: “Don’t create a situation in which we will be forced to go against you.”

Meir Amit describes how his urgent mission to Washington ultimately resulted in the decision of the government to pre-empt the war:

On the morning of May 29, we gathered [as we did] every day in the office of Eshkol to discuss the ongoing situation. Abba Eban participated at this meeting; as well as the Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Yaakov Herzog; the Head of Military Intelligence, General Aharon Yariv; and I. All of us had the feeling that things had gone too far, and it was necessary to do something to break the stalemate in which we were stuck. During this discussion, the head of military intelligence proposed that the head of the Mossad go to Washington immediately in order to bring us a reliable picture of what is going on.

‘Meir,’ Areleh [Aharon Yariv] said: ‘You are a member of the household there. Dick Helms, Head of the CIA is a personal friend of yours. In an informal chat, you will be able to hear directly from him what is really happening.’ (Amit, 237).

When he arrived in Washington, Amit discovered that his professional colleagues were understanding and well disposed. Meeting with Richard Helms, he learned that his assessment of the facts coincided with those of the CIA. Helms arranged an appointment for Meir Amit with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who grasped the situation immediately and made an important recommendation.

During this meeting, McNamara received two phone calls from President Johnson, asking to be updated on these talks. At a certain point, Amit asked the Secretary of Defense for advice:

‘What should I do now? Wait here a day of two?’

‘He cut me short with a brief sentence, “Go home, your place is there now.”’

Amit learned that America had no intention to help and concluded that time was against Israel. He recommended that Israel open hostilities immediately. (Amit, 241).

Amit added a most important fact — that precisely during the time he was in Washington, it became known that President Johnson received a message from former President Eisenhower reminding him that the Americans had a moral obligation to Israel which was given at the time of its withdrawal from Sinai in 1957. The Americans had undertaken to preserve the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and to assure freedom of navigation through the Straits of Eilat. (Amit, 242).

III.

As we look forward, it is possible to make several cautious predictions based upon past history and recent experience. We can return to the stated preferences of President-Elect Donald Trump and take note of his choices. Frequently, there is a link between domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, we may try to understand the outlook and policy goals of the new administration, and, at the same time, consider some recent changes in Israel’s defense policy.

As he has proclaimed, Donald Trump’s big idea is to “Make America Great Again.” Interestingly, his model has been the promising economic reform program of Javier Milei, President of Argentina. One of Milei’s innovations was to launch a Ministry of Deregulation, an idea which Trump adopted enthusiastically. His new approach embodies the rejection of the hard-left policies of the Obama/Biden administrations. Among his policies are: achieving American energy independence; rebuilding American industry; ending unrestricted immigration; and fighting rampant crime. It is a matter of record that Trump plans to end the Obama/Biden policy toward Iran, which had been consistently lenient and uncritical. It would be reasonable to expect that the new administration would continue some of the policies in our region and expand the framework of the Abraham Accords.

After the Hamas invasion and atrocities of October 7, 2023 and the war which followed, it is clear that Israel will have to be prepared to defend itself on its own and invest in its armaments industry. The entire situation has been transformed by the fact that war has been forced on Israel as an unavoidable policy option, that is, “diplomacy by other means.” This implies a change of approach. Israel must defend itself proactively, as was the case with the recent initiatives in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out that the United States could change its policy and help Israel decisively win this war (in which America has a vital interest).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel and the Second Trump Presidency: The Long Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Yesterday, the Syrian state founded in 1946 ceased to exist. This is the downfall not only of the Assad regime but of the state of Syria as a political framework that can impose order and structure. In this connection, it must be noted that the collapse of Syria, and of its Assad regime, is part of the same regional upheaval that began in 2010 and that has, in fact, not yet ended.

Since 2010, the Middle East has undergone a transformation out of the modern era where the region was organized under the “logic” of states as political frameworks. It has reverted to the pre-modern era of a different “logic” where the region is defined by communities, ethnic groups, transnational structures, and borderless ideologies.

With the developments in Syria, the Middle East is currently continuing a sort of backslide into the pre-nationalist, pre-modern era. In a way, this can be seen as a kind of revenge by the East against the West. The East is breaking away from the foundations of modernism and nationalism that the Europe of the late 19th century and early 20th century forced on it.

But the breakaway and the reversion to pre-nationalism are far from enough for the Middle East. Accompanying the breakaway process, it must be noted, is a quiet, creeping conquest of Western Europe by the pre-modern East through various agents — primarily through immigrant groups who never abandoned the ideological beliefs that they brought from the East and who are undermining the foundations of the modern, European-style order.

It may be said in general that the Middle East now speaks in a neo-olden language of politics and culture — one that is new in that it overrides its previous, European-made nationalist-modernist predecessor but is old in that it connects to the foundations of pre-modern political culture. The message is very difficult to define in simplistic terms of the positive and the negative.

From this standpoint, it must be granted that in the Middle East’s internal power struggle, the Shiite “Axis of Resistance” has suffered a critical blow. To that extent, Israel can claim a significant victory in this year’s battle against that axis’s representatives and proxies. But on the other hand, the collapse of Syria, and of the Assad regime, contains the seeds of a new Mideast reality full of dangers and complexities.

This reality has two immediate implications. The first concerns the situation in Syria, which is no longer Syria as we once knew it. At this stage, it is difficult to define the emerging new entity, which is evolving into a mix of sectarian power centers (Kurds, Druze, Alawites), transnational jihadist power hubs driven by an anti-Israel worldview no less than an anti-regime one, and the presence of actors like Turkey, whose transnational agenda is not far removed from that of Iran.

Practically speaking, the entire system of arrangements on the ground — as worked out between Israel and Syria after the war of 1973 and based on the logic of arrangements between states — is thus called into question and is little protected from those sources of power that do not at all think in terms of the “borders” that characterize a state. Consequently Israel must define red lines of its own befitting the situation, and strive especially to set up an iron wall preventing the “little jihad” against the Assad regime from turning into the “great jihad” against Israel.

But the second immediate ramification, which is even more significant, has to do with Iran — which has lost its Shiite axis, or at least two elements of it (Hamas and Hezbollah). Iran is at a strategic crossroads. It may be pushed into crossing the nuclear threshold in a sort of tit for tat, even before the US president-elect enters office. That move would leave little sand in the hourglass for an Israeli reaction against the prospect of an “Iranian Auschwitz.”

From that standpoint, Israel may possibly be said in general terms to be entering the third stage of its current war in the Middle East. The first stage was the illusory stage between May 2021 (Operation Guardian of the Walls) and October 7, 2023. The second stage proceeded intensively from October 7, 2023, into December 2024. But now Israel is entering the third stage of the war. In the shadow of a changing Mideast reality, Israel faces both veteran players — such as Iran, where the systems of ideology are eroding; and Turkey, which is turning from a shadowy enemy into a much more significant threat — and other players who are newcomers as Israel’s neighbors to the north.

But it is impossible to conclude without one important remark regarding Israel’s domestic arena. The currents of the Middle East have not bypassed Israel. Israel is part of the enormous process that the Middle East has experienced since 2010. In recent years it has also begun to budge away from its clearly state-centered foundations toward definitions of identity based on tribes and communities (haredi, secular, religious Zionist, Arab, and more) who, in their way, are battling for power.

The statehood concept championed by Ben-Gurion, which relied on elements such as the centralization of governmental power, the establishment of a politically neutral civil service, defined rules of governance, and respect for political authority, is undergoing significant erosion. This process is approaching a state akin to an undeclared civil war. So Israel must not only re-establish and rebuild the boundaries between itself and its obvious external enemies, but must also establish the political and cultural boundary between itself and the Middle East in order not to descend to the same condition in which the Middle East as a whole is thickly stewing.

This article was originally published in  Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Assad Regime Fell: Israel is Heading Toward a Third Campaign? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The situation in Syria over the past decade has been characterized by significant regional and international interventions, which have played decisive roles in shaping the current map. The “Arab Spring”, which began in late 2010, initially promised democratic reforms across the Middle East, but met with fierce opposition in Syria. There, the Assad regime, with the support of Iran, Russia, and Shiite proxies, managed to maintain its power despite widespread resistance and a significant number of casualties.

Iran’s involvement in Syria has been presented as a defense strategy against extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, which Tehran views as direct threats to its national security. This intervention was part of a broader regional strategy by Iran, often described as its own “war on terror.” The stabilization of the Assad regime, which depends to a large extent on Iranian and Russian support, has come at a considerable cost, both in human and economic terms. However, this stability was fragile, dependent on the continued presence and support of these foreign powers.

Recent regional developments have further complicated the situation in Syria. Russia’s military focus has changed significantly due to its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which has reduced its ability to maintain the same level of involvement in Syria. At the same time, Hezbollah, a decisive Iranian proxy actor, suffered significant losses due to Israeli military operations during 2024. These factors weakened the basic pillars of Assad’s stability, creating a vacuum that rebel groups in Syria were quick to exploit.

The resumption of rebel activity, especially in the ‘Idlib’ province, highlights the fragility of the current stability in Syria. The rapid collapse of the Syrian army in response to these attacks highlights the ongoing vulnerabilities in the regime’s military infrastructure. This instability has inevitably led to increased Iranian and Russian involvement, as they seek to re-establish their influence and restore a semblance of control.

The geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey further complicates the situation in Syria. The two countries have pursued different strategies, often finding themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. While Iran has focused on supporting the Assad regime, Turkey has conducted a number of military operations in northern Syria, ostensibly to combat cross-border terrorism, but has in fact established a Turkish zone of influence. This competition has the potential to escalate tensions, especially when both countries seek to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of the other.

Despite the establishment of the Astana peace process in 2017, which was intended to manage the conflict in Syria, the reality on the ground indicates that it was mainly used to demarcate areas of control between Iran, Russia, and Turkey, and not to foster a comprehensive peace. As the Assad regime gradually gained territorial control, Iran’s influence increased, while Turkey established its presence in the north. This distribution of influence underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in Syria, Especially in light of the weakening of the “chief groomsmen”, Russia and Iran’s proxies.

The current situation in Syria presents a complex set of opportunities and risks for Israel and for the entire Middle East. While various factions, especially Iran and its proxies, are refocusing their efforts on the internal conflicts in Syria, there is a temporary decline in their attention to Israel. This shift in focus gives Israel strategic breathing space in the short term. However, this reality entails significant risks, especially the potential for instability on the Syrian Golan border, which could expand into the Israeli Golan Heights. This instability could escalate regional tensions and drag the Middle East into a broader conflict.

Historically, the borders of the Middle East were determined after World War I through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided control between France and Britain and granted political sovereignty to various tribal leaders. This division has created countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, which are characterized by ethnic and religious diversity with little common ground between different groups. This situation has led to deep hostility, especially among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, Christians, and others, exacerbated by strategic interests in the region’s oil resources.

The gradual erosion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement over the past decade has intensified the search for a new regional order, manifested in violent clashes and episodes of genocide such as those perpetrated by ISIS, for example. The involvement of world powers such as the United States and Russia has led to temporary stability, but in some ways has further complicated the situation. It is worth noting that stability in Syria during the Trump administration has occurred through coordination with Russia, suggesting that future interventions may work similarly.

The critical question is whether such international interventions can provide long-term stability in the region. The ongoing negative energies and hostility among the peoples of the region indicate that a local response, even if coordinated between major powers such as Russia and the United States, may not achieve sustainable stability. Instead, it is likely that these interventions will only be able to offer temporary relief without addressing the underlying tensions.

From an Israeli perspective, the most urgent concern is Jordan’s stability. Unlike other neighboring countries, Jordan remains relatively affected by the “Arab Spring” or the so-called “Islamic Winter.” However, the current regional dynamics pose significant challenges to Jordan’s stability, which some analysts say is precarious. The potential for chaos in Jordan is a realistic scenario for which Israel must prepare. This includes a strategic reassessment of the IDF’s position along the Jordan Valley, emphasizing the need for a strong and flexible security infrastructure on Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country.

In conclusion, while the internal conflict in Syria offers a temporary reduction in direct threats to Israel, it simultaneously poses significant risks to regional instability. The historical context of arbitrarily established borders and ongoing ethnic and religious hostility underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in the Middle East. For Israel, Jordan’s stability is becoming a critical concern, requiring comprehensive security measures and a proactive defense strategy. Future international interventions, while potentially beneficial in the short term, are unlikely to resolve deep regional tensions, underscoring the need for a multi-layered and long-term approach to regional stability.

This article was originally published on Ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Back to the “Islamic Winter” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. In formulating the national vision, the IDSF HaBithonistim research department examines the security threats on Israel through a magnifying glass, to obtain a comprehensive understanding thereof and yield recommendations for the most effective method of addressing them. Recently an IDSF HaBithonistim research team spoke before the Nagel Commission on Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Building, and presented a detailed opinion paper to the decision makers.

This paper was written with the assistance of six key researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik, Lt. Col. (res.) Shosh Raban, Dr. Yaakov Rimmer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Or Issachar. They elaborate on the current challenges and perceptions that govern the IDF, and detail the steps that must be taken to ensure that the IDF’s force buildup fully responds to the reference scenarios facing the State of Israel.

Reference scenarios as the basis for the IDF’s force buildup

Israel is a small country with little strategic depth, surrounded by a choke ring of enemies and a slew of threats. Many of these threats have existed from the very first moment of Israel’s existence. However, the past decades have seen processes and changes that had bred new trends. If the formative years of Israel saw the young state surrounded by enemy countries, then today, after 75 years of fighting against many of them for its mere existence, Israel is now contending with a pernicious remote enemy in the form of Iran, and with terror militias operating on its borders and in its very midst. Nowadays, Israel is contending with a convergence of theaters, meaning that any conflagration of one almost inevitably sparks a flare-up in another. In this current map of challenges, Israel exists in a permanent state of security volatility that may see unexpected attacks from foreign entities and from hostile elements from within.

In order to optimally deal with such threats, as well as with many others, the IDF’s force buildup must be carefully designed and executed. Traditionally, the Israeli army’s force buildup had stood on six pillars: doctrine, armaments, training, professional advancement, organization and infrastructure. Force buildup has long-term implications on Israel’s military readiness, and demands careful consideration of the current reference scenarios and threats, as well as projections thereof for the future.

Paramount security threats:

• Iran: although almost 1,000 miles from Israel, Tehran operates a vast proxy-terror mechanism across the Middle East, and has succeeded in sending its tentacles into the heart of Israel, into the Palestinian arena. Iran sits on a huge stockpile of missile and drones, developed and dedicated solely to target the civilian heart of Israel. And on top of it all – Iran is now a nuclear threshold state that is dedicated to the development of weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with Iran’s aspirations for instilling global Shi’ite Islam, this places it not only as a major threat to Israel, but indeed a threat to the rest of the world.

• Syria and Lebanon: the conflict on Israel’s northern border is a clear and present danger to Israel as Syria and Lebanon, its neighbors to the north, are enemy states. Syria had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war, and its outcome is not yet clear in terms of the new regime’s stability or long-term intentions towards Israel. Lebanon is for all intents and purposes, ruled by Hezbollah and by proxy – Iran. This state of affairs renders Israel’s northern border highly volatile and demands the constant presence of Israeli forces along that border and a high level of military readiness.

• Egypt and Jordan: the State of Israel does have peace agreements with these two countries. However, they are extremely precarious, and with more than a few inherent vulnerabilities. One is the fact that these accords do not really render redundant the IDF’s activity along the borders with these countries. But they do limit it to a great extent, simply due to the fact that one country cannot operate militarily against an ally in the same manner it can against an enemy. Furthermore, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan do not reflect the current sentiment on the streets of Cairo and Amman. Most of their citizens are openly hostile towards Israel. In the event of a change of governments – a very plausible scenario in both highly unstable countries – their relations with Israel may in all likelihood be impacted. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a reversal of alliances wherein either or both countries become once again enemies of Israel.

• Gaza: the destiny of Gaza in the day after the Gaza War is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, Israel must be prepared for a long period of instability in the Strip. Once the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia of Gaza is completed, the IDF will have to remain deployed in the area to act as a bulwark and ensure the safety of the population along the Gaza border, while crushing further attempts from within the Strip to reignite terror activity against Israe.

• Terror militias: during the past several years, due mainly to misguided concepts, Israel had allowed the terror organizations on its borders to build up their force and stockpile weapons to staggering levels, with the help of Iran. Thus, these organizations – namely Hezbollah and Hamas – have grown to become highly trained and armed terror militaries. The October 7 massacre had made it clear beyond any shred of doubt that Israel cannot allow terror and terror militias to germinate on its borders or anywhere near them, and it must adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards any such attempts.

• The Palestinian arena: this is a pressing challenge for Israel. the Stability achieved by the security forces in Judea and Samaria in the wake of Operation Defensive Shield is wearing thin, and the area has become a hornet’s nest of renewed terror activity, inspired by the October 7 events. The Palestinian Authority is failing – if indeed it even wishes to – conduct effective counter-terror activity in the area against the mounting Islamic terror in its jurisdiction, forcing Israeli security forces to undertake this task in these areas as well.

• Internal arena: the multi-front conflagration is pouring over into the Israeli Arab population. Since the outset of the Gaza War, there has been an awakening of terror activity among the Arab population living within the Green Line and holding a full Israeli citizenship. To contend with this problem without further drawing on the already buckling IDF, Israel must form a national guard to reenforce the civil guard system.

The sad truth of the matter is that the IDF does not have the numbers to address the entire spectrum of threats and reference scenarios with which Israel is currently contending. Therefore, the IDF must build up its force in terms of manpower as well as its operational and firepower capabilities. Some of these changes, such as higher recruitment rates must be executed on a systemic level while others, such as the buildup of new divisions or the incorporation of advance technologies that better enable the designated units to achieve their mission, should be delivered in a manner tailored to the specific needs of each of these units, as detailed below.

The Vision for IDF Force Buildup – A Systemic Point of View

Upscaling manpower

Over the past decades, certain processes have been put in place to downscale the IDF’s manpower, mainly in the ground forces. This led among others to the mustering out of entire divisions, the reduction of mandatory service duration, and increased cuts in mandatory and reserves personnel. These processes were undertaken with the notion that the “army of the people”, as the IDF is perceived in Israel, could be downsized and shaped into a “small and smart army”. However, the outbreak of the Gaza War proved the fallacy of this approach, and has led to the detrimental shortage of regular and reserve manpower with which the IDF is currently struggling.

An additional manpower crisis, dubbed “The Captain Crisis”, referring to the phenomenon in which low raking officers opt to end their military career at the rank of captain, mostly due to better conditions waiting for them in the civilian labor market. This creates a shortage of officers that could have been designated to be the next generation of the IDF’s leadership.

The personnel shortage in the IDF consequent of these cuts, is a significant operational constraint for the IDF, in particular when it must juggle a number of fronts at the same time. Compounding this problem, is the erosion of those of the forces that bear most of the operational brunt due to an unbalanced assignment of the operational load.

Ideal situation:

• Extension of service: in June 2015, the length of the men’s mandatory service – and some of the women’s – was cut from 36 to 12 months. The mandatory three-year term must be reinstated as was the standard for decades – a move that will boost the ranks of the regular army.

• Extension of the reserve service: the increase in the number of reservists is an indispensable element of the buildup of the IDF, such that responds effectively to the current security realities. Recently, the age of discharge from reserves duty was upped by a year, and it may have to be further extended, at least until the army’s manpower had sufficiently been boosted and service exemption policies tightened.
• Expansion of mandatory service to additional demographics: for decades, there have been in Israel’s society entire demographics, which for numerous reasons are automatically exempt from military service – some under the dictates of law and policy, while others slip “under the radar”. This means that there are tens of thousands of able individuals, who are not part of the IDF’s service cycle. In order to address this issue, there are steps that the army can adopt, such as expansion of female induction and the extension of the mandatory induction to “special” demographics such as the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab populations. An additional course of action would be to have soldiers sign on for a short – salaried – extension of their service once their mandatory term is done.

• Improved officer retention: The army must improve the retention of its officers and boost the attractivity of the military careers it can offer young officers, with the aim of keeping them in the system for long-term careers. For this end the military must overhaul and modernize its HR practices and offer terms and conditions of service that can parallel with comparable jobs on the civilian labor market.

• Modernization of the organizational operation: As a hierarchal structure, the IDF is weighted down by a uniformity of approach and thought and its resistance to creative ways of thought that challenge deep seated conceptions. The IDF must adopt organizational cultures that accept diverse ways of thought and are open to a diversity of opinions and concepts.
• Establishment of an auxiliary national guard force: in tandem with the expansion of the military ranks, the IDF’s areas of responsibility must be streamlined. Currently, beyond its border security and defense of the country, the army is also burdened with the task of internal security, which hinders its capacity to prioritize missions and assign sufficient manpower to this and other tasks. To alleviate this burden and allow the army to focus on the missions for which it exists, a national guard that is subordinate to Israel Police should be formed, responsible for all matters pertaining to internal security threats and sharing the army’s workload.

Optimization of logistic readiness

Current situation:

The IDF’s logistic readiness is part and parcel of its operational readiness, but sadly, it is plagued by various problems mainly in the areas of armaments, maintenance and infrastructure.

In terms of armaments, Israel has been developing an increasing dependance on the import of technology and weapons from foreign countries, mainly the US. The Gaza War made it clear to what extent Israel’s deep dependance on foreign munition supplies is to the detriment of the IDF’s operational flexibility and its freedom of action.

In terms of maintenance, many of the army’s bases and headquarters are in dilapidated condition, and are not fully prepared for internal threats and ballistic attacks. This state of affairs poses a risk factor to IDF’s operational capability. Furthermore, most of the IDF’s infrastructures are above ground, and exposed to threats in scenarios of surface-to-surface rocket and missile attacks.

Ideal situation:

• Upscaling inventory and supervising its integrity: Inventories should be assigned minimal stock threshold as per standardized operational requirements, with mechanisms of timely restocking in times of emergency. Furthermore, munitions and weapons should be inspected regularly to maintain integrity and immediate usability.

• Reinforcement of the security industry: Israel’s security industry must be allotted further investment and developed to reduce Israel’s dependance on imported weapons, lower costs of ammunition, and develop dedicated technologies and systems, while allowing for fast restocking in times of war. A positive by-product of this kind of policy would be the creation of new jobs and a boost to the economy.

• Expansion of international arms supply relations: Alongside the development of a more robust local industry, Israel must establish procurement deals with as many countries as possible, to free it from the shackles of dependency on a handful of leading countries for weapons and ammunitions supply.

• Upscaling and optimization of military infrastructures: The IDSF bases and headquarters are a strategic asset for the State of Israel, and as such they must be maintained and secured to the highest level. The bases should be inspected to determine their level of regular operation and their readiness for a state of war.

• Introduction of underground infrastructures: Important strategic assets must be relocated to underground premises to ensure their protection in the event of missile and rocket attack. Additionally, Israel must be prepared for a contingency wherein it must use underground routes to deploy forces. Alongside the planning of dedicated underground spaces, it is advisable to turn existing civilian infrastructures such as tunnels and public parking lots into dual-use infrastructures that can serve military purposes in emergency times.

Technology & Cyber

Current situation:

Alongside the traditional battlefield exists an emerging crucial theater of battle – the technological arena. Over the past several decades, technology – and war technology – has advanced by leaps and bounds, introducing new weapons and widely used cyber warfare.  Recently, with the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), new, highly sophisticated systems have been introduced that pose even a greater challenge for Israel security establishment.

Israel’s security technology and cyber warfare are some of the most advanced in the world, but there are still significant barriers to the incorporation of these technologies on the battlefield. These are related, among others, to the organization’s resistance to changes, the need to work exclusively with large vendors and the limited access to such technologies for commanders in the field.

Even though technology is by no means a complete substitute for human capabilities and for the value of the national contribution of a people’s army, Israel must ensure technological superiority over its enemies, and remain at the forefront of technological development and progress.

Ideal situation:

• After-action review: the shortcomings that arose during the Gaza War must be studied, such as the shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and uncrewed vehicles, the lack of technologies that would allow the forces to deal with the Hamas tunnels and shortcomings in quick and effective responses to anti-tank rockets.

• Investment in technology: Israel must allocate considerable budgets and manpower for the development of defense technology while at the same time boost existing local industry, with an emphasis on dedicated weapons and systems for the use specified by the IDF.

• Incorporation of robotics: robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive motorboats, can bring a significant advantage on the battle field and considerably reduce the cost in human lives. Therefore, robotics should be incorporated in all of the IDF branches.

• Cyber warfare and AI: the cyber arena is getting more sophisticated by the moment, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is on the increase, posing yet new security threats. In order to ensure it maintains the upper hand in this arena, Israel must continue to invest in research and development of offensive and defensive cyber, and begin incorporating AI in its security needs.

• Tech training: The forces in the field must be trained to use the advanced tech tools that are and will become available to them. This calls for the installation of a whole new training array across all IDF branches and units, and the professional training of all the professional personnel allocated to this end.

• Diversification of tech acquisition portfolio: Israel’s security establishment currently deals with only a handful of large tech vendors, with which it has trade relations for decades. In order to introduce sophisticated tech systems, it must be open to doing business with smaller tech vendors and entrepreneurs.

The Vision of IDF Force Buildup According to Branches and Corps

Ground forces

Current situation:

The State of Israel is often forced to engage in multiple combat arenas, wherein the escalation in one often leads immediately to a domino effect conflagration of others. As demonstrated throughout the Gaza War, the battle of order of the IDF’s ground forces proved too short to cover more than one broad campaign in a single arena, while holding a defensive position in others. This also means that in the event of unexpected developments, the army does not have enough reserves to deploy.

In light of existing and projected threats outlined by reference scenarios, the State of Israel must boost its capabilities such that it can engage in high intensity combat in at least two fronts simultaneously, while assuming a broad defensive position in others.

Ideal situation:

• Overhaul of readiness protocols: the IDF must ensure that regular and reserve forces incorporate improved readiness protocols –in terms of quantity and quality of combat gear and weaponry, and in terms of the professional and physical operational readiness of troops and commanders, in order to allow short response times in a reality where surprise terror attacks have become part and parcel of daily life.

• Augmentation of forces by one regular service division and several reserves’ divisions: The IDF should add at least one more regular army division and two more reserves maneuver enhancement divisions to its personnel headcount. These divisions will include a full divisional structure and auxiliary units including tanks, artillery, engineering and logistics. One should be deployed at Israel’s northern border and the other in the Jordan Valley. This is a necessity in order to deal with the operative shortcomings in some arenas, and will additionally serve as reserve forces when needed.

• Establishment of a dedicated standalone combat auxiliary force: a reserve force at the level of at least a division, under the command of General HQ, should be formed to provide operational flexibility and provide relief to forces in the event of unexpected or prolonged events. The reserve force may be kept at a lower level of readiness and mid-level operational fitness, ensuring that these can be brought up to par quickly in times of need.

• Formation of a tunnel capture-and-destroy combat unit: In light of the growing tunnel warfare threat on Israel’s borders, the security establishment must seriously consider the formation of a new dedicated army corps specializing in the detection and destruction of tunnels and subterranean warfare.

• General internal audit of IDF units: The IDF must conduct an in-depth audit of relevant units to asses manpower, equipment and armament needs and shortages. For example, it has become clear in the current conflict that there is a pressing need to increase the numbers of tank in the armored units. Also, in the current climate in Israel’s multiple arena reality, special units such as the Oketz canine unit and the Yahalom combat engineering unit, must be augmented.

• Improvement of mobilization and deployment mechanisms and procedures: The convergence and interconnectivity of arenas in Israel demand that the army install a streamlined mobilization and deployment system and procedures to enable the swift reallocation of forces from one front to another. For this purpose, the army would have to create a dedicated road and rail infrastructure as an alternative to the congested civilian routes, and upscale its fleet of heavy carriers to included armored vehicles. To streamline quick force deployment and movement, civilian infrastructure, such as railways, should be considered for use as supplementary systems.

The Air Force: Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles

Current situation:

The Israeli Air Force is charged with three main missions: The protection of Israel’s areal space, offensives in enemy territories, and the support of ground campaigns. In order to accomplish these missions to their fullest, the IAF is required to have extremely complex and resource-intensive capabilities. It must be understood that no matter how supreme an army’s air force is – it cannot compensate for inadequate ground forces. It can, however, provide operational flexibility to its counterparts on the ground and in the ocean. This can be further boosted by newer advanced drone technology, which aside from expanding military capabilities, help reduce the cost in human lives.

Over the past years, significant changes have been occurring in the map of the areal threats. Israel’s enemies on its borders and remotely understand that they cannot contend with the superiority of Israel’s Air Force and thus abandoned the use of fighter jets, instead opting for the development of ballistic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, steep trajectory surface-to-surface missiles, and low-tech warfare i.e. glider terror attacks, and improvised explosive kites and balloons. These new threats demand the IAF to recalculate its offensive and defensive tactics and set in place procedures for force and resource deployment and means and weapons it uses.

Ideal situation:

• Increase of drone warfare: The most important objective for the use of UMAVs is the protection of the lives of soldiers. Even in the event that the use of human forces is unavoidable, drones can support IAF’s strikes in the heart of enemy territory. UMAV’s can assist in the protection of ground sectors and lend significant aid to ground campaigns. It is highly recommended that the IDF invest resources in increasing the use of this means of war.

• Incorporation of a steep trajectory array: the IDF should examine the incorporation of a steep trajectory array with rocket and attack glider capabilities.

• Streamlining Israel’s air defense system: In order to ensure the protection of the Home Front, the IDF’s air defense must undergo a comprehensive inspection to ensure it is able to contend with scenarios of attacks of thousands of rockets and missiles a day. Furthermore, Israel should consider forging regional alliances for the protection of Israel’s areal space.

Navy: Defense as a Priority

Current situation:

Israel’s naval arena is important on a number of levels: security-wise, Israel has expansive maritime borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Egypt. Economically, Israel has prolific maritime trade activities; strategically, the most substantial source of energy in the country comes from the natural gas fields within the country’s territorial waters.

Therefore, the State of Israel must maintain superiority in all naval arenas, securing its maritime supply routes, protect its shores, protect free passage of vessels and maritime trade, and protect its gas fields. However, as the most pressing threats are ground-based and since the military is struggling with manpower deficits, coupled with traditionally high costs of maintaining and operating naval vessels, the IDF must plan how to prioritize the Navy’s needs.

Ideal situation:

• Prioritization of defensive capabilities: Controlling the maritime territory demands superior offensive capabilities from the Navy, however, due to current constraints abovementioned the focus on the IDF’s Navy must be the development of defensive capabilities.

• Integration of unmanned platforms: It is possible, and necessary, to integrate unmanned surface and underwater vessels, which would be deployed primarily for patrolling, guarding Israel’s maritime borders, routine security, allowing the IDF forces to deal with more complex threats.

Home Front Command: Delegating responsibilities effectively

Current situation:

The Home Front plays a crucial role in the protection of the citizens of Israel, but the delegation of responsibilities between the body and the civil defense and rescue forces remains unclear. This unclarity leads to overlapping of responsibilities in some cases, and in others – tasks that fall between the cracks and remain unattended.

Furthermore, the Home Front Command has been red flagging its personnel shortage for some time. Over the recent years this demanded the allocation of IDF combat forces to supplement the Home Front’s search and rescue activities – forces that should have been serving in other critical ground-force missions. This demands the rethinking of the allocation of resources between the Home Front Command and the IDF operational units.

Another issue that demands attention is the auxiliary Territorial Defense array. Nowadays the territorial defense’s main area of operation is centered around the defense against external threats and search and rescue missions. The area of territorial defense that deals with internal threats such as terror attacks remains nearly untreated by the Home Front Command and this requires revisiting to consider including this task in the Home Front’s responsibilities.

Ideal situation:

• Assignation of areas of responsibilities: The responsibilities of the Home Front and the civil rescue bodies must be assigned and delineated in a clear manner, with consideration of the capabilities each body brings to the table, to allow for the most effective fulfillment of each responsibility.

• Improvement of protection of civil structures: In order to improve the protection of the civil Home Front and reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the wake of attacks against civilians, the Home Front must identify the public structures which lack protective areas and spaces, especially those near and in conflict areas.

• Balanced distribution of recruits: Since there are certain units in the Home Front Command that are in need of recruits with the same profile as the IDF’s other ground force units, the assignment of recruits must be based on considerations of operational priorities of each of the units.

• Reinforcement of the territorial defense array: In light of the terror threats against Israel from within the Arab-Israeli population, it is worth examining the integration of Home Front forces in the protection of the communities in conflict areas and border zones.

The Intelligence Directorate: Collaboration with Civil Bodies

Current situation:

The security intelligence establishment is a critical component in Israel’s security, strategically and tactically. However, Israel had developed over the recent years a dangerous dependence on its intelligence deterrence – the full implication of which was revealed in the October 7 disaster.

Therefore, the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence establishment must be further expanded and maintained but at the same time the security establishment’s other capabilities – especially in the operational field – must be boosted. Furthermore, the intelligence apparatus is currently plagued with some deeply engrained problems that pose a challenge to Israel’ superiority in the field, such as inadequate investment in diverse fields of intelligence, and the brain drain of the system due to much more economically gratifying jobs in the civilian job market.

The ideal:

• Recruitment of speakers of foreign languages: In order to respond to the current operational needs, the Intelligence Corps must augment the ranks of its foreign language speakers through a specially tailored recruitment and training program.

• Reinstatement of an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) array: The Israeli Intelligence OSINT array plays a critical role in the understanding of the broad political landscape in Israel and is indispensable for monitoring unforeseen sudden events, identifying information leaks, producing projections and for influencing public opinion. Therefore, the OSINT array in the intelligence establishment must be rehabilitated and further cultivated.

• Social networks as a viable source of intelligence (SOCMINT): Intelligence gathering from social networks should be increased as it is an indispensable source of intel yielding platform.

• Collaboration with civilian market: It is worth examining the integration of capabilities from Israeli high-tech and local industry. This kind of collaboration can allow the IDF Intelligence Corps to adopt advanced civilian technologies to maintain superiority in the field. Furthermore, it is worth considering opening some of the career military jobs in the Intelligence Corp to the civilian job market to obtain additional professional expert manpower from outside of the military system.

IDF Force Buildup Vision – Decision Making Processes

Improvement of decision-making processes

Current situation:

The security and strategic decision-making processes, including those that pertain to the IDF force buildup and budget allocation, mostly happen in the military executive branch, and are not always transparent to the relevant political and public factors. The limited number of participants in these processes often lead to perceptual shortcomings in the absence of broad perspectives and different points of view.

Another issue regarding decision making processes is related to control and monitoring processes. Currently, most if the control and monitoring of the Israel’s security establishment and the IDF’s activity are internal and are not transparent to the political system, not to mention to the public, which subjects them to a risk of partiality and bias.

Ideal situation:

• Transparent decision-making: The IDF must incorporate non-military professionals, such as public representatives and suitable professionals from each relevant field in its strategic decision-making processes, such that allows for decision-making that is based on multiple opinions and perspectives through organizational processes such as brainstorming sessions.

• Introduction of “red teams”: The intelligence analysis process often uses “red teams” – which simulates hostile attacks with the aim of detecting vulnerabilities and flaws in existing systems and responses. Many times, these teams comprise non-military professionals who bring knowledge and perspectives from outside of the military system. To improve decision-making across the entire security system, red teams should be incorporated in every branch and arm of the IDF.

• Bi-annual Cabinet updates: The Cabinet should hold bi-annual briefings focusing on various aspects of the IDF’s force buildup – including threat assessments, manpower allocations, operational readiness, procurement and armament. These meetings should be anchored in appropriate legislation, and the consequent decisions should be shared with the public. Furthermore, the security establishment should be required to present to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee all information pertaining to changes in the IDF force buildup.

• Establishment of independent supervisory committees: Independent supervisory committees comprising public and civilian representatives are needed to examine the IDF force buildup and report to the government and official control bodies. The government’s security cabinet will be obligated to discuss the committee’s findings and include civilian representatives to partake in discussions on unclassified findings.

Thought on Israel’s security: conclusion

The dynamic map of the security challenges characteristic to Israel and the Middle East region demands constant scrutiny of the present and future threats. Only with a broad understanding of the reference scenarios Israel faces, its military force can be built up in a proper and informed manner.

Nowadays, Israel is forced to contend with a long list of threats, spearheaded by Iran, which can turn into a nuclear state at any moment. Additionally, the current reference scenarios point to a multi-arena war placing Israel on several fronts at the same time, as well as a surprise attack that could be launched by any one of the terror organizations operating on Israel’s borders.

The Gaza War has proven that Israel and its security establishment must recalculate its route forward and methodically and skillfully plan the force buildup across the system. This is the only way to ensure a strong army that could protect Israel security now and in the future.

הפוסט Ideally – IDSF HaBithonistim National Security Vision. The Force buildup of the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Gaza war has been raging in a number of arenas, and accordingly has a number of objectives. On the southern front, reportedly, the objectives are the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia in the Gaza strip, the return home of all of the Israeli hostages from Gaza with no exception, and ensuring that no army of terror could resurface and take control of Gaza again. On the northern front, the objective is to deliver a devastating blow to Hezbollah, ensuring that it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel. However, there is another, less reported front, that does not make headlines like its counterparts but in effect, it holds sway on all the above and more – the global theater.

Israel’s broad strategy extends far beyond the borders of Lebanon and Gaza. The overall objective is the dismantling of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis as the controlling element of much of the Middle East. Local processes such as ceasefires and the separation of fronts, alongside the imminent administration change in the US, offer a valuable opportunity to drive change such that will not only decide the outcome of the current war but has the potential to reshape the entire  balance of power in the Middle East.

As proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles.

Israel has achieved everything. Almost.  Overview of the agreement terms

To better understand whether the ceasefire with Hezbollah is beneficial to Israel, we should first review its terms. Admittedly, it is all too easy to spot some loopholes, but it did hand Israel a few  extremely important achievements.

The first is the divorce between the war in Gaza and the conflict with Hezbollah. This separation has significant ramifications for Hezbollah and Hamas. At the time, Nasrallah proclaimed the Hezbollah’s mission was to come to the aid of their Palestinian brethren and made a commitment to continue the fighting on Israel’s northern border until the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Yet we see how Hezbollah has gone back on its promises, which in its own perception is a terrible humiliation.  This was a debilitating blow to Hamas, which has now been left to its own devices.

An additional achievement produced by the agreement is the demilitarization of southern Lebanon. If properly enforce, this clause will make it very hard for Hezbollah to rebuild its force on the border with Israel.

The third and perhaps the most significant achievement, is that Israel gains complete freedom of action in Lebanon which allows it to act against Hezbollah the moment it threatens Israel. This teaches the heads of Hezbollah that the moment they raise their heads – it will come rolling off. It could be said that Israel had achieved everything it wanted. Nearly. The problem with the agreement though is that it fails to chart a DMZ along the Lebanese border with Israel. In its current form, the agreement allows the population that lives near that border to return to their homes – some of which are located  just hundreds of yards from Israel. The problem is that as proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – many of these people are either Hezbollah terrorists or local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles. Once they return to their villages, Israeli intelligence will have a difficult time discerning which of them is an innocent civilian and which is a terrorist.

There is no doubt that this state of affairs will pose a challenge for Israel when coming to identify irregular activities  and stanch terror activity on the border. Nonetheless, there are three points to consider: Firstly, every negotiation by default entails concessions by all stakeholders, and perhaps this is a bitter pill that Israel has no choice but to swallow. The other point is that even if the population of south Lebanon does return to its villages on the border, Israel now has more tools and experience, and a stronger drive to eradicate terror. Thirdly, this is an interim agreement, meaning that Israel still has a chance to change it. The 60-day period set for the withdrawal and with the eminent entrance of the Trump administration into office, there is a fair chance that Israel could insist on creating a crucial DMZ along the border.

At the bottom line, on paper it appears that for the most part, the agreement is favorable for Israel – but of course, the soundness of these conditions will have to stand the test of enforcement. The US and France are involved in the agreement but at the end of the day, it is up to Israel and its security forces to prove the agreement productive. In the wake of October 7, the decision-making levels in Israel politics and military have come to understand that the international peacekeeping forces cannot be relied upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah. Israel has no choice but to take its own security fully in its own hands by any means necessary and impress upon Hezbollah that it is willing to jump right back in the fray if so pushed.

Upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah.

Why now? The timing of the signing in security and diplomatic terms

The signing of the ceasefire agreement had not materialized out of thin air. The timing was carefully selected with various security and diplomatic considerations. In terms of Israel’s security, the objectives set for the war in the northern border, i.e. the paralyzing of Hezbollah, was achieved to a large measure. Israel had catapulted the terror organization twenty years back in terms of its military prowess, and brought it to a state in which it is no longer a strategic threat on Israel. Admittedly, one can always claim that there was a lot more that Israel could have done to strike an even harsher blow against Hezbollah. Which is not wrong. However, insofar as the military objectives, they were realized for the most part, and the signing of the agreement marked the appropriate point in time to cease the IDSF HaBithonistim  activity in Lebanon.

Diplomatically speaking, it would seem that the timing of the ceasefire is opportune as well. Israel needs the support of the international community to legitimize its actions and to receive weapons and ammunition. The ceasefire agreement allows Israel to improve its position with the UN Security Council and in turn improve its diplomatic relations with the international community.

An additional diplomatic consideration that plays an important part in the timing of the ceasefire agreement is the forthcoming change of administrations in the United States – similarly to the last months of the Obama administration, the support of the US administration in Israel is ebbing. The timing of the agreement allows us to ride out the relations with the current Biden administration and prepare to forge relations with the incoming Trump administration.

Beyond all the above mentioned, the timing carries a critical operational advantage. Israel’s decision to take its foot off the pedal in the north means that it can focus militarily and strategically in its next two crucial objectives: bringing down Hamas and the overturning of the Shi’ite axis.

As per the first objective, a ceasefire up north allows Israel to shift its ground forces back into Gaza and return to high intensity fighting and thus increase the chances of crushing Hamas and returning the hostages. As for the second objective of overturning the Shi’ite axis – more will be detailed below.

The systemic solution is not in Lebanon: the global importance of the agreement

In the Middle East, there are three main forces vying for control of the region – the Shi’ite-Iranian axis, the radical Sunni axis, and the moderate Western-Sunni axis. In recent years, the Shiite axis led by Iran and its proxies was able to gain the upper hand to become the dominant force in the region. However, various processes that have unfolded over the past year have sent this dominance into decline, and if the US plays the right policy cards, the region just may witness the breakdown of the radical Shi’ite machine.

As the Shi’ite axis is yielding to pressure, the radical Sunni axis is coming into the center of the stage, led by Turkey together with extreme Suni terror organizations the likes of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The axis will prove to be no less pernicious than its Shi’ite counterpart if it grows stronger and will pose no less a threat to Israel and the West, and thus merits a red flag as well. Case in point is the recent events in Syria that led to the toppling of the Assad regime. The rebel forces were able to prevail among others thanks to a weakened Hezbollah, proving yet again the interconnectivity of events in the Middle East. For the moment, the fall of the historically hostile Assad regime may be taken as a favorable development for Israel, it is yet to be determined what kind of regime will step into the vacuum and what – if any – kind of threat it might pose to Israel. This means that Israel must not take its eyes of the radical Sunni axis that could be the biggest winner from the fall of the Shi’ite axis and might be no less evil-intentioned toward Israel.

Therefore, the State of Israel must keep a close eye both on the Shi’ite and Sunni axes while at the same time  act toward solidifying the third axis – the moderate West-Sunni axis. For that end, Israel needs to form a coalition with the US, western countries and Sunni countries such as Saudia Arabia, UAE, Indonesia, Malesia and Pakistan. Such a coalition, if strong enough, may even draw other countries to join forces, such as Lebanon and even Iraq. In tandem with this effort, Israel must strive to forge normalization agreements with moderate Sunni countries in the Middle East that will perhaps lead to regional and global peace agreements.

One way or another, Israel must condition any move in the Middle East on a combined offensive against Iran. Once the head of the snake is removed – all the rest will fall into place.

Forward looking: the day after the ceasefire

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is for a 60-day term – but in terms of Middle East security, this is ample time for things to change. There is no way to predict if indeed the ceasefire will be implemented verbatim, or what will transpire once the term is out; Hezbollah may very well breach the agreement, forcing Israel back into battle, and equally possible is that the agreement may lead to a permanent settlement that allows Israel to begin rehabilitating the north and return the evacuated citizens to their homes.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement wishes to see a rehabilitated and healing north. This is a complex process, but with smart resource allocation and oversight, this part of Israel can very soon be on track to recovery. Once this is underway, we can then turn to the next task at hand – the increase of the Jewish population in the north. The IDSF HaBithonistim sees this as a national imperative of top priority. A two-fold increase would make it clear to our enemies that they cannot push us back from our own borders, as well as contribute to the settlement of the land in agency of Israel’s security doctrine.

In order to realize these objectives, IDSF HaBithonistim has been engaging with policy-makers and is founding educational and pre-military programs designed to strengthen the settlements within Israel’s borders. These days the movement is in the midst of developing the “Ha’Tkuma” pre-military preparatory program that will operate in the Gaza border communities. In the future more of such programs will be founded in the north of Israel.

For many, rebuilding and resettling the communities in the ravaged north seems like a distant goal, but we are getting closer – and the ceasefire agreement is the first step in this direction. Despite some of the agreement’s downsides and the concessions Israel is required to make, it is important to understand that the State of Israel is now facing a historic opportunity to realize all of its aspirations. If we take advantage of this opportunity skillfully, we can change our security reality for generations to come and even stabilize the balance of power throughout the Middle East.

הפוסט “Analyzing Lebanon Not Within the General Context Is a Big Mistake” – The Broad Implications of a Ceasefire on Israel’s Northern Border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The fall of the Assad regime should signal to Israel that, amidst the chaotic sequence of events, it must uphold two critical interests. The first is to destroy the capabilities of the Shiite Ring of Fire. The second is to avoid being trapped in a Sunni Ring of Fire.

The Shiite Ring of Fire was first breached with the downfall of Hezbollah and Hamas. Breaches continued with an Israeli strike that stripped Iran of its air defense capabilities, and with the rapid collapse of the Assad regime — a development echoing across the Middle East. This is not merely the fall of a regime that was hostile to Israel and was part of Iran’s Sunni Ring of Fire. It is also a psychological game-changer that could reinvigorate the Iranian rebels.

In an effort to fortify itself, Iran is accelerating the development of its nuclear weapons. A report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the U.S. indicates that Iran has speeded up its uranium enrichment so that it will potentially be able to manufacture 12 nuclear bombs.

Russia, too, has a stake in Iran’s nuclear progress, raising concerns that Russian technologies could be transferred to Iran to shorten the time required to manufacture a nuclear bomb and strengthen the resistance from the Axis of Evil.

In the face of Iran’s rush toward nuclear armaments, Israel is counting the days until Trump enters the White House. The question is how many days we have left in our quiver before Iran achieves a bomb that could, Heaven forbid, once more reverse the region’s momentum.

Therefore Israel must act immediately to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and, along with it, the remnants of the Ring of Fire that Iran has constructed around Israel.

The second interest that Israel must uphold is rooted in an ancient Machiavellian principle that says every change begets another change.

It is already evident that Iran’s decline paves the way for Turkey’s rise. Erdoğan is lurking around the corner in hopes that Israel will mount the attack and that the Iranian regime will falter. He would then seize the opportunity he has been awaiting and attempt to position himself as the region’s Islamic power.

Whether actively encouraged or passively approved by Turkey, the offensive from Syrian rebels under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was made possible by Turkish financial and military support. It not only benefits Erdoğan strategically by advancing his regional hegemony, but also benefits him tactically by weakening the Shiite axis, pushing the Kurds away from Turkey’s borders, and returning Syrian refugees who have been burdening Turkey’s economy.

Israel’s understanding of its own future interests on the battlefield against the Turks must therefore prompt it to strike inside Syria now. During the current war Erdoğan, an extreme jihadist who seeks Israel’s destruction, has taken every step to label Israel as an enemy and display his practical intent to harm it. In July, for instance, he spoke of invading Israel the way he invaded Karabakh and Libya: “Just like we entered Karabakh and the way we entered Libya, maybe we’ll do the same thing. …We have to be strong.”

Unlike Iran, Erdoğan possesses a modern, well-equipped military. This includes twice as many enlisted troops as Israel, approximately 10% more fighter jets, nearly twice as many tanks, four times as many warships, and more than twice the number of submarines (!).

Although Israel holds military superiority over Turkey in quite a few aspects, one of the challenges in confronting Turkey could lie in a preemptive Israeli strike because Turkey is a NATO member. Under the NATO framework, an attack on one member state is considered tantamount to attack on them all.

In conclusion, it is a necessity — and an obligation — for Israel to complete the destruction of the Shiite Ring of Fire. At the same time, its operations in Syria against Erdoğan-aligned rebels must be subject to a calculated assessment of Israel’s future interests in a possible war against Turkey as well as to a resolute decision that the Shiite Ring of Fire must not be replaced by a Sunni equivalent.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel Must Not Replace a Shiite Ring of Fire with a Sunni Ring of Fire הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Analysis: US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon face hurdles as Hezbollah de facto controls Lebanon; Israel must choose between a limited agreement or continued warfare, balancing military success with the need for regional security and international support

The contacts between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States, illustrate the main difficulty of a settlement reality in an era in which a sub-state terrorist organization controls a supposedly sovereign state de facto. The American-mediated contacts are supposed to lead to understandings on the basis of which quiet will be maintained on the border between Israel and Lebanon, but in a situation in which Lebanon is de facto controlled by a terrorist organization whose fingerprints are evident in the negotiations, not to mention the escalation process it led, it is difficult to understand how such an agreement can last, for how long and if at all.

The alternatives available for Israel on the Lebanese border are divided between two options – a local arrangement that does not fundamentally change the geostrategic situation, or the continuation of the war to destroy the Hezbollah terrorist organization. The reality that Israel reached after a year of fighting in the Gaza Strip, while fighting defensively on the Lebanese border, led it to a significant operational achievement vis-à-vis the terrorist organization, both in terms of damage to infrastructure, damage to the top command and control leadership, damage to weapons stockpiles and harm to fighters. Above all, neutralizing Hezbollah’s operative ability to implement the plan it has been working on for years, which is a ground-intensive operation to conquer the Galilee – Hezbollah has lost this capability.

If Israel reaches an arrangement vis-à-vis Lebanon, and assuming that Iran, which controls Hezbollah and indirectly Lebanon, where the radical ideology of the Ayatollahs’ “umbrella” will not change, under this assumption it can be assumed that such an arrangement will last for a short period of time, and certainly will not prevent the strengthening of the terrorist organization, a clear Iranian proxy in Lebanon.

In fact, as far as Israel is concerned, and certainly in today’s public opinion, expects Hezbollah not to regain strength, and certainly not to cross the geographical border of the Litani River, in order to prevent the reestablishment of the option of occupying the Galilee, as well as removing the communities in northern Israel from the direct threat of anti-tank weapons.

The alternative, from the Israelis’ perspective, and among a wide Israeli consensus, even a preferred alternative, is for the IDF to enforce the agreement, i.e., the IDF to prevent Hezbollah’s renewed buildup in the area south of the Litani River. This demand is fraught with a paradox, since Lebanon is a sovereign state, and there is no bilateral rationale whatsoever for a neighboring country to operate on the territory of a sovereign state defined as an enemy, this is a violation of sovereignty and Lebanon will not accept it, certainly not the Iranians.

Hence, the two real alternatives are a limited liability arrangement, or ongoing warfare. With the understanding that Israel will not be able to impose military control of the IDF on the ground on Lebanon, and assuming that Iran will not accept this under any circumstances either, Israel must demand two critical dimensions in the arrangement agreement: first, freedom of action in order to prevent Hezbollah’s buildup, which includes neutralization the smuggling routes – such an action also requires intelligence coverage, and this must be demanded by Israel, even if the visual intelligence is transmitted through an American intermediary, At the CENTCOM level.

On the operational level, Israel must demand a buffer zone into which no weapons will enter, just as defined in the separation of forces agreement between Syria and Israel after the Yom Kippur War (1974). The combination of a buffer zone, legitimacy to act against the axes of buildup, and an informed security assessment on the Lebanese border, which is also based on quality intelligence – are the best guarantee Israel can receive, and this guarantee will also be limited.

There should also be an understanding among the international community that agreements between a democratic state and a state ruled by a terrorist state such as Iran cannot be trusted. As long as Iran seeks to expand in the Middle East, it will find a way to strengthen its destructive arms in the region, including Lebanon. Therefore, the arrangement between Israel and Lebanon is a very likely short-term operation, and no more than a few years until something significant happens in Iran – if it continues its radical strategy, all the peoples of the region, and certainly Israel, will suffer from this.

Therefore, the international community, and certainly Israel, must act immediately for a strategic change vis-à-vis Iran – its different conduct can provide a more realistic guarantee of agreements, especially when the Russian axis, which has a clear interest in the northeastern Mediterranean basin, is integrated into this story.

Can Israel afford to wait for a change of government in the United States?

In general, Israel can suspend negotiations with Lebanon and wait for the Trump administration, which appears to be clearly pro-Israel compared to the Biden administration and in general. At the same time, it is worth being realistic – such a wait means continuing the fighting for at least another year in Lebanon, which means: increasing the burden on IDF reserve duty, continuing the lives of those evacuated from northern communities in the existing format, i.e., another year away from home, which has deep and problematic consequences.

The fighting as it stands these days is characterized mainly by “counter fire,” i.e., the firing of missiles and rockets, combined with unmanned aerial vehicles that violate the security of Israel’s civilian home front several times a day. The IDF, on the other hand, continues to “clear” the Lebanese territory, destroying additional Hezbollah capabilities. On the face of it, time seems to be working against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena – the Israeli home front is showing greater resilience than the Iranians thought, and with each passing day Hezbollah is getting closer and closer to breaking. It is possible that from this perspective, it is convenient for Israel to actually “play the game” according to the current rules, and in this way bring Iran, Hezbollah and Lebanon to an arrangement that is much better for Israel in a few months, certainly under the auspices of a sympathetic American administration – Reaching an arrangement when the terrorist organization is defeated is infinitely more credible than the agreement currently proposed.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Arrangement or escalation: Security alternatives on the Lebanese border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For years now, there are voices which would have the world view some of the most bloodthirsty and cruel terror organizations the world has ever known, i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah, not as the terrorists they are, but as “freedom fighters”. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, this bias has been pushed even further. They are being chanted in pro-Palestinian rallies, openly declared on banners on campuses of the most prestigious universities of the world, and are even heard in certain Israeli circles.

This paper reviews the goals that govern these organizations and their methods of operation and shows beyond doubt that equating terrorists and their organizations with freedom fighters is nothing short of fallacious. Aside from being a falsehood, this is a grave claim that harbors very dangerous consequences. When terrorist perpetrating war crimes are called freedom fighters, they are in effect gaining license to commit criminal activities and even immunity from the consequences thereof, and moreover, such claims breed further problematic misconceptions that view terror organizations as legitimate resistance movements, and the acts of terror themselves – as brutal and bloody as they might be – as legitimate means of popular struggle.

Therefore, any claims to that effect should be categorically denounced. At the same time, a comprehensive endeavor should be undertaken to debunk this narrative and reinforce the true understanding of terrorism and its overall end, for which any means are exploited: the annihilation of the Jewish state and its Jewish citizens.

In the name of enlightenment: how have terrorists become to be known as “liberators”?

The fictitious claim according to which terrorists are freedom fighters draws on an anti-Zionism narrative, according to which the Jews are colonialists that have seized control of a country called Palestine, with the aim of taking over a land with which they have no connection whatsoever. This contrived narrative is wrong on two accounts: the so-called state of Palestine had never existed, and secondly, the connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is undisputable and is established both historically and legally. The people of Israel are not foreign colonizers – they are a people returning to their rightful land after 2,000 years of unjust exile, which forced upon them an existence as mostly unwanted foreign elements in their hosting countries.

It follows that anyone who supports the Palestinian narrative is refuting the national rights of the Jewish people and disputing major legal rulings made by the international community, such as the British Mandate, granted by the League of Nations and the Partition Plan by the UN from 1947.

Although such claims have been voiced since the establishment of the State of Israel, they have been regaining tailwind under the auspices of radical progressive movements that had risen from the radical left in the Unites States such as the WOKE movement. WOKE and its counterparts are governed by the undiscerning principle that the weak are invariably in the right and victimized, and tend to turn what it perceives as the victim into the hero of the story. As part of this paradigm, the so-called struggle of the Islamic terror organizations for the “liberation” of “oppressed” minorities and the right to self-determination is perceived in some circles as a valiant post-modern struggle, and from there only a short leap was needed to view such terrorists as would-be freedom fighters.

The question of goals: what really motivates terrorists?

The raison d’etre of true freedom fighters is the liberation of their people and land from foreign conquerors that have invaded and seized it by force. A prime example of this is Mahatma Gandhi, who led a peaceful struggle against the British Empire’s rule in India and for national independence. In stark contrast, even a cursory examination of the stated objectives of some terror organizations clearly yields a completely different picture.

A quick look at the Hamas charter, for example, reveals that the organization makes no qualms about stating its overall goal – the all-out, end-justifying “Holy War” (Jihad) against the State of Israel, and the absolute rejection of any agreement or arrangement that would recognize the right of Israel to exist. The charter even quotes Hasan al-Banna ,the founder of its ally movement, The Muslim Brotherhood, who said: “Israel will rise and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it”.

As for Hezbollah, it too does not march under any banner of liberation – neither of people nor of country. It operates out of Lebanon – an independent state with no permanent Israeli  presence within its sovereign borders, and with no land dispute whatsoever with its southern neighbor such that calls for an irridentist agreement. Moreover, Hezbollah operates in Lebanon as a proxy and under the auspices and military support of another sovereign country, Iran, which resides 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Israel, and non-democratically forces its presence on the Lebanese people solely for its proclaimed purpose of annihilating the State of Israel and its citizens.

Another manifestation of the true non-peaceful intentions of terror organizations the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah – and indeed even official Arab organizations such as  the Palestinian Authority – is the fact that for decades, they have been rejecting out of hand nearly every solution or offer that Israel and Western administrations have brought to the table to bring the conflict to a resolution, thus proving that they are not motivated by the desire for emancipation. The underlying reason they have not accepted any diplomatic solution thus far is that all of these recognize the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. In other words – they strive only for a resolution that ensures the eradication of Israel from the map.

The question of operating method: how do terrorists differ from freedom fighters?

In 1984, acclaimed historian, Professor Benzion Netanyahu spoke at the second international conference of the Jonathan Institute for the study of terror. He spoke of the urgent need to fight the misconception regarding the true nature of terrorism, and in particular the perception of terrorists as “freedom fighters” or “protectors” of oppressed people. Professor Netanyahu addresses the manner in which freedom fighters operate and how it vastly differs from that of terrorists. He mentions three points of comparison that still hold true today, even after forty years:

Operating against civilians

Professor Netanyahu points to the fact that freedom fighters wage their struggle for a political or social end, with a fundamental respect to human rights of innocents. In stark contrast, terrorist make it a point to target innocent civilians as a means with which to foment fear and achieve their self-serving political interests.

Looking at the long list of terrorist attacks that have plagued Israel through recent decades – including the October 7 massacre in 2023, it is clear that terrorist organizations are systematically and deliberately targeting the civilian population as well, including the elderly, children and babies.

The installation of totalitarian regimes

Freedom fighters are committed to ensuring universal liberties and rights, says Prof. Netanyahu, which terrorists habitually ignore and violate – even the most basic of human rights – and propagate oppression in territories under their control. In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, it is common knowledge that they use their own people as human shields and ensconce themselves in densely populated areas, often causing intentional harm to innocent people on their side in self-protection or as a means of swaying public opinion with publicized propaganda. Furthermore, terrorist organizations violently oppress weak groups within their own population  such as women, minorities and members of the LGBTQ community. Hence, it would be absurd to present these organizations as champions of human rights and liberties.

Relations with dictatorships, oppressive regimes and organizations

The third point mentioned by Prof. Netanyahu relates to the connection frequently seen between terror organizations and violent groups and oppressive regimes. He explains that the aid terrorist often receive from these sources underscores their affinity to aims of oppression rather than values of liberty.

This connection is particularly evident with those terror organizations that operate on Israel’s borders. Hezbollah is an arm of the Shi’ite Iranian regime – a totalitarian state that had set its sights on orchestrating a world-wide Islamic revolution, and openly proclaims its intention of annihilating the State of Israel.   Interestingly, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), although members of the historically rival Islamic Sunni stream, are willing to benefit from Iran’s sponsorship just to further their cause against Israel, and view themselves as an affiliate of another extremist group – the Muslim Brotherhood – a  fundamentalist Sunni Islamist movement that calls for the eradication of the State of Israel, and is designated as a terrorist group in many countries.

It is evident that these terror groups enjoy the backing of powerful elements with a clear ideology of world dominance, and not only do they have no agenda of liberation – they are motivated by a desire to control and oppress.

Debunking a claim of equivalence: Jewish resistance vs. Islamic terror

There are those who would equate the terror organizations threatening Israel to the struggle of the pre-state Jewish resistance, such as the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and Etzel (the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel). They claim that the members of these groups were no less terrorists than the members of Hamas or Hezbollah today, or alternatively – that the terrorists of the latter two are no less freedom fighters than the members of the Jewish resistance.

However, this comparison disregards all the points mentioned above, and fails to consider that different nature of these resistance movements and the terror organization in terms of objectives and methods of operation.

As far as the objectives of the Jewish resistance – as oppose to the terror organizations, they indeed were committed to true liberation and independence. In 1922, the predecessor to the UN – the League of Nations – ratified the British mandate. This was an international accord standing on solid legal ground that cemented Britain’s commitment to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel. In effect, the British blatantly violated this accord and banned the entrance of Jews in to Israel while at the same time encouraging the settlement of Arabs in the area and transferring territories from Israel to the Emirate of Transjordan. Thus, the Jewish resistance movement did indeed fight for the legal right given to them, and more importantly – once this aim was achieved, the resistance was disbanded or assimilated into the new state’s formal military.

The terror organizations, as above demonstrated, demand independence for a state that does not exist and had never existed. And still, they had received numerous offers over the course of the past decades but rejected any compromise, calling for the destruction of the State of Israel – an objective that has nothing in common with those of the Jewish resistance movement or any other freedom fighting movement for that matter.

A comparison of the methods of operation shows fundamental differences between the two: as oppose to the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, the members of the Jewish militias targeted the British military personnel in the country and not civilians of any nationality. Furthermore, they did all in their power to protect the Jewish population, even at the price of their own lives. Moreover, the fighters of the Jewish resistance did not operate under the auspices or with the support of any state or global organization, and were not affiliated with dictatorships or totalitarian regimes.

The attempt at attributing any equivalence between the pre-state Jewish resistance and the terror organizations is nothing more than a populistic ruse motivated by the aim of creating a distorted picture of reality, or at the very least – it stems from pure ignorance.

A policy of zero tolerance: conclusion and insights

Equating murderous terrorists with freedom fighters is not only fallacious and indeed offensive on many levels – it is downright dangerous. This comparison awards terrorists with justification for their actions, including murder, rape, torture and kidnapping innocents. Statements in support of such actions cannot be accepted, not even in the name of tolerance and freedom of speech, as they legitimize violence against and the murder of Jews. When the equation of terrorists with freedom fighters is heard from sources within Israel itself – not to mention on part of  Israeli officials – they are tenfold graver.

Sadly, these terror organizations have learned and perfected the art of propaganda and disinformation, and their abilities in this area are boosted by the skillful use of internet and AI. They are also very adept at  exploiting Western values and ways of thought to sway public opinion in the West and even in Israel, citing duplicitous pretexts of “human rights”.

Hence, it behooves Israel and the Jewish nation to conduct a holding action and do their share in informing and shaping public opinion – in Israel and the world.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement was formed precisely out of the need to bring the truth and advocate Israel and Zionism to the public. Our organization believes in the imperative of educating on the Jewish national ethos as it is our believe that first and foremost – it is the bedrock of Israel’s national security.

For this end, the IDSF HaBithonistim conducts various activities such as excursions to historic heritage sites across Israel and talks and conferences on Zionism. Recently we have established the pre-military program “Ha’tkuma” that is situated in the Gaza envelop area and held in collaboration with the communities there.

The IDSF HaBithonistim website provides a wide range of content, from commentary on current affairs to opinion pieces and analyses – all with the aim of providing a broad perspective rooted in facts and truth, reinforcing the conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause and above all – to stand as a reminder that in the story of the Jewish people and Zionism – the Jewish nation and the miracle that is the State of Israel are the true heroes.

הפוסט “Freedom Fighters”? Hamas and Hezbollah Are Terrorist Organizations; Any Attempt to Claim Otherwise is Condemnable הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The organized pogrom perpetrated against the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, in which Jews were humiliated and assaulted on European soil, sounded alarm bells this week. It must be said, however, that these came on top of countless red lights indicating the growing radical Islamic threat germinating European soil. Painful motifs, such as the timing of this pogrom – just moments before the anniversary of the Kristallnacht, the brutal violence, the hurling of Jews into the gracht waters or the blind eye turned by the authorities, made this event all the more outstanding and horrific. In view of the surge in anti-Semitism in Europe throughout the war and the increasing frequency of demonstrations and violent disturbances, one arrives at an unmistakable conclusion: these are no isolated incidents. Rather, this is a new, undeniable reality on European soil. In extreme scenarios, it could amount to fundamentally alter Israeli-European diplomatic and defense relations.

This new reality poses us a clear mirror: the classical continent, which is portrayed as a peaceful Western territory filled with picturesque villages, Gothic cathedrals, steam trains and iconic tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, the Schoenbrunn Palace and London Tower, is gradually undergoing a transformation. The change in the demographics and in the civilization itself in Europe has been taking form over past decades and at an accelerated pace this past decade. Faced with this reality, Europe, for the most part is helpless, slow to respond, and has yet to fully realize the magnitude of the threat that has entered into the belly of the beast.

Aided and abetted by the authorities, millions of immigrants from the Islamic world have been arriving, reshaping the continent with their feet. It is not uncommon nowadays to walk around Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris, Barcelona or London and feel how these so closely-familiar cities, touted as tourism and culinary hotspots, are being enveloped with entire ghettos and filling with large immigrant communities that are tightening their grip on these places. Cultural artifacts like billboards in Arabic and mosque minarets are increasingly becoming a feature of everyday life. “We have become the Gaza of Europe”, lamented Dutch leader Geert Wilders bitterly. “I refuse to accept this.”

But the reality is that 30% of Birmingham’s population is Muslim, some half of Brussels’ is of non-Belgian descent, and the most commonly-given name to newborn children is Muhammad. All of this dovetails with the reality in many other European cities, yet are met with a deep culture of denial among Europeans.

The last time demographic data on Islam’s prevalence in Europe was released was in 2016. For some reason, in the past eight years there has been no release of updated figures. In a conference I attended, a senior European Union official voiced her surprise at the complaints voiced by the “radical right” regarding mass immigration into Europe. She made comparisons to the massive presence of Venezuelan refugees throughout South America, or Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon – to the situation in Europe, which according to her was negligible. Another speaker, a senior NATO official, insisted – mistakenly – that the immigrants were not responsible for even a single terrorist attack in Europe. None other than French President Emmanuel Macron spoke about “séparatisme”, but stressed that the terrorist attacks are perpetrated by French people – not by immigrants – since they are French citizens, totally sidestepping the issue of the civilizational shift underway in his own backyard.

Incidents like the Amsterdam pogrom ought to shake even nationalistic governments out of their doldrums in reaction to these “Wir schaffen das”-type policies of former Chancellor Angela Merkl, but they are slow to react. Laws allowing for revocation of citizenship and deportation of inciters and terrorists are being hollowed out. Thus is the extradition of the “Jihad Widow” in Brussels being delayed for years as the legal wrangling drags on, and the Hamas-sympathizing agitator Muhammad Hanoun in Italy is still leading anti-Semitic demonstrations without his citizenship being revoked or him being deported – even though the US State Department has imposed sanctions against him. The Meloni government in Italy is still working on its Albania Plan without any tangible results, and even the newly-installed right-wing governments in Austria and the Netherlands are slow in implementing an effective immigration policy.

Countries such as France or Switzerland prefer, on the one hand, to pass laws outlawing burkas or mosque minarets in the public space, while on the other hand allowing hundreds of thousands of immigrants to enter their countries and remain there permanently. The European Union’s 2020 counter-terrorism strategy included a pitiful few measures aimed at tightening border security or deportation of agitators. They included mainly measures for strengthening “community resilience” through sport, intelligence cooperation, and removal of youths from the path toward radicalization through soft means.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the only countries that refuse to go along with the family reunion policy and with the pro-immigration policies of the rest of Europe, policies that have seen the admission of millions of immigrants into the continent with the world’s lowest average birth rate. The results are plain to see – an almost total absence of anti-Semitic incidents, even in view of the war in the Middle East, in stark contrast to the surge in such incidents throughout the rest of Europe.

The Amsterdam events are consistent with the European attitude toward the war in Israel. This begins with a profound denial of the root cause of the problem and the preference for “band-aid” solutions – in Israel’s case, Europe’s failure to call out Iran’s hegemonistic motives and Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s anti-Semitism, while focusing on the territorial dispute with the Palestinians and on the “two-state solution”. In the Amsterdam case, this means “severely punishing” the culprits or “strengthening security” – instead of addressing the broader threat from radical Islam. This is also the case when it comes to media coverage – although for the most part it reflected the reality on the ground, it did blow out of proportion isolated incidents perpetrated by “Jewish hooligans”, who had rioted and were arrested, or “Maccabi fans tore down Palestinian flags and provoked riots”. This skewed view of reality is nothing new for Israelis in the context of the war here in the Middle East, where headlines decry “massacre of civilians” or the “catastrophic famine” within the Strip.

Europe is still deep in denial. Around half of the teachers in France avoid discussing certain issues for fear of provoking Muslim students, particularly after the appalling murder of teacher Samuel Pati. The terrorist attacks in Paris, Barcelona and London, the assassinations of artists critical of Islam, as in the case of Dutch director Theo Van Gogh, or the attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, all these still meet a complacent European public, where only 32% of surveyed citizens are prepared to fight to defend their country. The rest of those surveyed are more worried about climate change than security issues.

The first signs of change in the European political landscape have begun to appear – right-wing governments, sometimes radical right-wing, are ascending to power. There is a marked drop in voting for green parties in favor of nationalist parties, and many constraints that have been stifling public debate are now crumbling. This denial has ushered in an ambiance conducive to immigration and radical Islam. Its dismantling is the first step toward confronting these issues.

Absent a change in trajectory, this might force Israel to regard Europe as more of a threat than a partner. Europe might come to be considered a hostile Arab space, and travel there could be categorized at a risk level equal to that of travel to Arab countries. Israelis, who have so far made do with a few simple measures like avoiding speaking Hebrew in public or not wearing anything indicative of their Jewish identities, will be compelled to further recalculate their moves. They might choose to avoid traveling to Germany, the same way they avoid traveling to countries like Egypt. One can only imagine a worst-case scenario in which these elements seize the centers of power, and the political and security implications Israel will have to deal with regarding this nearby, powerful continent. The European states had better wake up and outright reject this shifting cultural orientation, before it is too late.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

הפוסט The Amsterdam Pogrom: Europe could eventually be considered hostile Arab territory for Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After the Taliban extremists took over Afghanistan in August 2021, they announced that they hoped to continue good relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors: China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and the Gulf states as well. However, existing conditions made direct contacts difficult and the country chosen as principal intermediary — which was thus enabled to fill a significant role in shaping Afghanistan’s regional policy — was Qatar. Qatar had already constructed a relationship with the Taliban years before, when in 2013 it allowed the Taliban to open a diplomatic mission in Doha with support from the US government.

Washington had been looking for a neutral location for holding negotiations with the Taliban in preparation for withdrawing American forces from Afghanistan. It opened the diplomatic mission after finding that direct negotiations, with the Taliban on one side and Afghanistan and the NATO of the time on the other side, were a failure and concluding that a clear alternative channel was needed. The Doha mission would enable the Americans to communicate secretly with the Taliban while officially continuing to support the Afghan government. Qatar was ostensibly the go-between in those talks, but in practice it served as the Taliban’s patron. In the negotiations, the Americans agreed to release imprisoned Taliban members; and among those freed was a founder of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. He would become the head of the organization’s diplomatic mission in Qatar.

On the basis of the US support for Qatar as go-between in talks with the Taliban, Qatar was positioned to take on a broader role in matters touching on Afghanistan. Even after the Doha talks between the Taliban and the former Afghan government collapsed in 2020, western countries — and, especially, international organizations — accepted Qatar’s legitimacy as an intermediary and a point of contact with the Taliban. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and foreign ministers from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy arrived in an aerial caravan to Qatar, emphasizing the country’s importance — in comparison with other countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia — as an intermediary with Afghanistan.

In February 2020, the USA signed a historic peace agreement with the Taliban, including a commitment to gradually withdraw from Afghanistan and lift the sanctions against the organization. The Taliban, for their part, agreed to respect human rights, not to permit terrorist activity from the area under their control, and to open a dialogue with the Afghan government in order to find a solution for Afghanistan. Shortly afterward, when Abdul Ghani Baradar — head of the Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Qatar — landed in Afghanistan to take office as the new President on the Taliban’s behalf, he disembarked from a Qatar Emiri air force plane made in the USA.

Since most of the world’s nations do not officially recognize the Taliban regime, and most of the western embassies have left Afghanistan, intercession by a third party is required; and Qatar is in place as the natural candidate for that role. Qatar’s main interest in Afghan affairs, as in other matters, has to do with entrenching itself as the regional intermediary. Qatar advances its regional and international influence by means of the prestigious intermediation that positions it as a central player in the eyes of the world powers and international organizations. Thus, for example, Qatar intermediated between Germany and the Taliban during 2024 for the return of Afghan emigrants to Afghanistan.

However, some international players see Qatar as offering a platform for the extremism of the Taliban organization, which even cooperates directly with Al-Qaeda and assists in international terrorism.

Qatari policy is basically driven by a combination of political Islam and a business agenda. That policy includes granting material assistance, such as funding, favorable publicity, and even armaments, to various recipients. Thus, for example, for years the Qatari television station Al Jazeera, based in Doha, has given the Taliban a platform for addressing the world. The Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Doha underwent a quick process of branding and was presented as the legitimate representative of the Afghan nation — a sort of shadow government as against the government that sits in Kabul.

An example of Qatar’s deep ties in Afghanistan is that shortly after the attacks of September 11, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network was the only mass communications medium that succeeded in interviewing the number one suspect of the day, Al Qaeda commander Osama Bin Laden, at his hideout in Afghanistan. Thus Qatar’s policies advance its interests indirectly while exploiting its close alliance with the USA.

Qatar appears untroubled by its ties with disreputable players such as Hamas, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, it is such connections that have elevated it as the sole, key player that can lessen the distress of the west in the face of those enemies. Thus Qatar exploits the conflicts of the region and the problems of the west in order to propose a solution tailored by the wealthy little emirate itself. Qatar’s strategy displays more business thinking than ideological determination. However, Qatar’s approach is not pure business; it does also involve making western players dependent on its services so that it may be continue as a central player and as the exclusive address for solving problems with the anti-western elements of the Middle East.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Business Islam: On Qatari–Taliban relations and Qatar’s regional agenda הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dr. Moshe Yegar’s home, in Jerusalem, tells a story. There are photos from diplomatic occasions around the world. There are certificates of appreciation and prizes relating to his diplomatic and academic work, including the Jabotinsky Prize for Literature and Research and a special prize for his part in establishing Israeli–Indian relations. In his rich library, 20 books may be found that he wrote in Hebrew. Several of them have been translated into other languages, and four more were written originally in English. Most of them deal with history and with the diplomatic side of Israel’s international relations.

A new immigrant who spoke Hebrew better than the sabras

Dr. Moshe Yegar was born in 1930, and at age 94 he still has his vim. We met him at his home to hear about his 40 years of service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about his perspective on the present situation. It was a special interview with a special person who had occasion to work under such figures as Golda Meir, Abba Eban, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yitzhak Shamir, among others. But we should start at the beginning.

Moshe, let’s go back to 1935. You arrived in Israel from — where?

We came from Argentina when I wasn’t yet five. My father was a Hebrew teacher, and he was sent to teach in Zichron Yaakov. I started kindergarten as a new immigrant, but my Hebrew was correct and graceful thanks to my father. From the day I was born, he’d spoken only Hebrew to me, even before we came to Israel. We lived in Zichron Yaakov for five years, and those years left a deep impression on me.

Did you join the Haganah?

I was a member of the youth brigades in the Haganah for two years. When the War of Independence began as soon as independence was declared, my fellow members and I were recruited into the IDF. I was one of the trainers for the scouts movement, and we were among the founders of the Nahal — together with the United Nahal Movement. We also founded Kibbutz Tel Katzir.

Did you consider continuing into a military career?

At a certain point I left Tel Katzir and went back to being an enlisted man in the IDF. I was in the Nahal’s first NCO course. I also took a Master Sergeant course and I was appointed master sergeant for the Nahal’s first company of privates. I was also sent for paratrooper training, and then to the eighth round of the officer training course. Afterward I was discharged from the IDF and I went to study at the Hebrew University.

And then it was straight out of the university into a diplomatic career?

After my bachelor’s degree in modern Middle Eastern history, political science, and general history, I went on to study for a master’s. But I wanted to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the end, I passed the qualifying exam for cadets. That was the third time it was given, in 1956. In the next 40 years, I held various positions in Israel and in Israeli missions abroad. I finished up my master’s while I was an emissary in Burma.

So was it your time in Burma that prompted you to become an expert in Asian Islam?

Because the Hebrew University wasn’t teaching Asian Islam at that time, I received special permission to write a thesis on Burma’s Muslim minority. Afterward, I researched Islam in British Malaya, which is Malaysia today. That was my doctorate. I worked for about twenty years, in my spare time, on a comparative study of Muslim uprisings in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The Bible as key to diplomatic ties

During his 40 years of diplomatic service, Dr. Yegar filled significant roles around the world. After his service in Malaysia, he was a consul in Los Angeles and consul general in Philadelphia. Among his various assignments in Israel, he was head of public diplomacy and of the Asian division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He participated in Operation Solomon (the airlift of Ethiopian Jews) and played a central role in establishing Israel’s relations with India and other Asian and African nations, besides serving terms as ambassador to Sweden and to the Czech Republic.

You held positions under several Foreign Ministers. What are the specifics?

When I was deputy head of the Asian division and Abba Eban was Foreign Minister, he appointed me to head the training department. When Yigal Alon was Foreign Minister, he appointed me department head for public diplomacy, and when Yitzhak Shamir was Foreign Minister, he appointed me division head for public diplomacy. I held that job for five years.

You developed a special cultural project in the Czech Republic. Tell us about it.

After the communist regime collapsed, the Czech Republic was very friendly toward Israel. I dreamed up a large festival focusing on the Bible as it’s reflected in various art forms. The festival was a year and a half or so in the making, and in the end it included 71 musical events, theatrical performances, art exhibits, academic seminars, and art competitions for schoolchildren — all based on biblical topics. It was a large display of culture in Prague and it made a significant contribution to Israel’s reputation. Everyone understood that the Bible was the gift of the Jewish people to human civilization.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, why are artistic and cultural ties important?

After World War II, technology surged forward and brought a complete change in the diplomatic profession. It’s no longer merely negotiations between the leaders of different countries, but also a means of creating broad-based ties between populations that had lived for generations without caring about their countries’ foreign relations.

Today’s communications media have given very large sectors of the public an interest in the diplomatic relations between countries and peoples. For that reason, there’s a new diplomacy with a new face. Today various countries engage in presenting their culture and their language to other populations in an effort to make friends with them. That’s a different kind of diplomacy, and a very interesting kind. It brings many challenges and it requires appointing diplomats who fit such a job. For example, diplomats today need a wider-ranging education — far beyond what was expected from them in past generations.

When other countries receive more extensive knowledge and understanding of the diplomat’s home country, a friendly atmosphere is created. That atmosphere can contribute directly to deeper economic ties, to security, and to all the other factors that mutually benefit the countries involved.

So there’s special importance to Israel’s integration of the Bible into public and cultural diplomacy in Christian regions, which recognize the Bible as an element of their own culture — the USA, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and even Asia’s sole Christian country, the Philippines.

Zionism should free itself of illusions and think straight

What’s your opinion on Israel’s current diplomatic and security situation?

We need to break free from illusions. At first, Zionism was looking for ways to come to an agreement with the Arabs. We hoped they would yield a little piece of their vast territory and allow the Jewish nation return to its historic homeland. The various streams of the Zionist movement made countless attempts to reach an understanding, an agreed compromise with the Arabs — including partition proposals — but they all failed. Now, after October 7, it’s clearer to us than ever. Likely not many of us still suffer from the illusions of the past. Zionism tried to win the understanding and consent of the Arabs by offering various suggestions, such as territorial compromise, or by advancing the idea that the homecoming of the Jews would bring benefits to the Arabs’ economy, their health system, their educational system, and so on. Nothing helped.

The Arabs received proposals for establishing their own “Palestinian” state, but they showed no interest in those proposals. The most prominent proposals that come to mind are those from the Peel Commission in 1938, the UN in 1947, and Oslo in 1993. There were other attempts as well, but the Arabs, the “Palestinians,” never showed interest in setting up a state of their own. Instead, they were determined and consistent in their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, be it big or small. They used every violent means at their disposal to prevent the birth of the State of Israel and they sank to inconceivable levels of barbarous, monstrous cruelty. Their determination has continued for almost 120 years now, coming to expression in what we call terrorist movements. The Arabs see them differently.

We’re at war now with two cruel terrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah. They both are managed and supported by our great enemy Iran. How do you expect this to end?

This war has gone on too long but it can be expected to end eventually with the destruction of those two movements. Still, we shouldn’t suffer any further illusions. The Arabs can be expected with some certainty to continue their violence and terrorism against us. They can set up new organizations, and many members of Hamas and Hezbollah will continue their activity against us as individuals or small squads. They’re not short of weapons.

In practical terms, what should be the final objective regarding Hamas and Gaza?

As a lesson to other Arab states, Israel should destroy Hamas, wipe out every trace of its presence, and complete the job by taking over the entire Gaza Strip. Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, but despite all its superiority, it hasn’t managed to defeat a terrorist organization like Hamas.

But what’s the definition of defeating Hamas?

We and the other side conceive of victory quite differently. The difference has reappeared in each round of conflict. Each time, I felt afterward that we hadn’t achieved much. From their point of view, they’ve won if their leadership survived and they have the ability to regroup. The loss of life, the destruction of Gaza, the civilian distress aren’t a consideration for them. There’s no deterrence. They believe they have a holy mission to exterminate Israel. As long as we leave them the ability to regroup, even if it takes them years, and as long as they have outside support, they’ll persist. Their ability to regroup needs to be rooted out completely.

Is your outlook, with the benefit of such age and experience, optimistic?

October 7 was a severe event, but yes, I’m optimistic despite our current situation. Throughout history, our enemies have always risen up against us and the Jewish nation has a special resilience even after suffering the greatest damage, such as the loss of six million lives in World War II when European Jewry was slaughtered by the Germans and their accomplices. We need to understand that our presence here is not to be taken for granted, and to remember at the same time that despite the difficulties, the Jewish nation has a certain internal energy, a rare self-healing power. We shall win out.

הפוסט “The nation of Israel has self-healing power. We shall win out.” An interview with Dr. Moshe Yegar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In mid-July 2024, the Azeri Embassy in Tehran was reopened after a year of negotiations to relieve the tensions between the two countries.

Relations soured between Iran and Azerbaijan after an armed assailant stormed the Azeri Embassy in Tehran in January 2023, killing the security officer and injuring two other guards. Despite Iran’s adamant denials, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, called this a “terrorist attack”.  Relations between the two countries deteriorated still further After Azerbaijan decided to open an embassy in Israel in March 2023. This infuriated the Iranians, since while their relations with their northern neighbor hit a new low, Baku’s relations with Jerusalem kept warming up.

It is no surprise the opening of an official Azeri presence in Israel caused the Tehran-Baku relations to sour. This being said, following the October 7 massacre by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two Iranian proxies, and the war in Gaza that ensued – the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan assumed yet another dimension.

In November 2023, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called on all Muslim countries to sever all their diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, given the war in Gaza. Khamenei even stressed that “oil and food export routes to Israel ought to be blocked”. Khamenei attempted to lead an anti-Israeli Islamic resistance front, however it seemed like this initiative failed to produce actual results on the ground.

This was due to the fact that two countries, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), were supplying oil to Israel: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Of these two oil-rich countries, Azerbaijan is the more important for Israel. Azerbaijan provides Israel with some 40% of its oil consumption. In return it is a recipient of advanced Israeli weaponry worth billions of dollars.

The Israeli armaments have enabled Azerbaijan to achieve a military advantage over its adversary, Armenia. On the other hand, Israel is given a foothold in a strategically important region. It uses the area for intelligence operations against Iran, Azerbaijan’s neighbor.

From the Iranian perspective, the close ties between Baku and Jerusalem mean an increased Israeli presence in the region – a presence that includes weapons and economic and security ties. However, the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship is just one factor impeding Tehran’s relations with Baku, a Shiite-majority country. Ever since Azerbaijan became independent with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has regarded it as a backyard of sorts for expanding its Shiite religious and political influence in its quest for regional hegemony.

Iran has always worked to recruit Shiite communities into its “Axis of Resistance”. This began with its strategy of warfare by proxy, which focused on Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Additionally, Iran sought to penetrate the Shiite community in Azerbaijan. In 2013, Iran established the Husayniyun – the Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan – in an effort to form a powerful proxy organization in the Caucasus. The first recruits to the Husayniyun were six Azeri citizens who left for Syria to defend Shiite shrines against Sunni opponents during the civil war against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Qasem Soleimani, the then-commander of the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elite unit, personally declared the establishment of the new proxy unit in 2017.

After Azerbaijan emerged victorious against Armenia in the 2020 war, and having regained control of the Nagorno Karabakh region, Azeris in Iran began identifying more strongly with Azerbaijan. At the same time, shortly after the war, Iranian proxy groups, including the Husayniyun, flooded the social media with videos in Azeri, promoting their radical religious ideology. They called for the local Shiites to rise up against the government and attack government buildings in Azerbaijan.

Later on, Iran stoked the unrest against the Azeri government. In response, Baku embarked on a mass oppression drive against pro-Iranian networks in the country. In November 2022, five persons were arrested and charged with spying for Iran. The detainees were accused of having provided the Iranian security agencies information harmful to Azerbaijan’s security.

In July 2023, an Afghani national Pavzan Musa Khan, was detained in Baku by Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX). He was suspected of conspiring to conduct a terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku. Khan was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison.

Khan mentioned “other brothers” that have attempted to commit such terror acts. This very fact traces back to Tehran and implies on Iranian involvement, as all previous attempts to attack Israeli targets in Baju were plotted by Tehran.

From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, activities by pro-Iranian forces in the south Caucasus region might potentially exacerbate regional tensions. For this reason, Iran has tried to use the Azerbaijan Husayniyun to deter Azerbaijan and lower the level of relations with Israel.

As Iran shifted its focus toward using its proxies against Israel in the Swords of Iron War, it appears that it has for the time being abandoned its strategy of influencing the Shiite communities in Azerbaijan and that it is now more intent on strengthening its ties with that country. As part of Iran’s fight against Israel through its proxies, it is attempting to isolate it regionally and internationally, meaning that improving its relations with Azerbaijan is now a high priority. Therefore, despite the tensions between the two countries, Iran and Azerbaijan have begun developing their economic ties, and in particular the trade and transport corridor that is also of interest to the northern neighbor, Russia.

Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan are tense and volatile. It is attempting to exert pressure on Baku following the war in Gaza and the widespread international condemnation of Israel. This being said, it appears that the Iranians do not have sufficient leverage to persuade Azerbaijan to sever its relations with Israel, thereby leaving it alone in the face of the threat from Tehran. In contrast to the other Shiite regional players, Iran is being unsuccessful in expanding its influence in a large Shiite country like Azerbaijan, as opposed to the successes it has had among Shiite communities throughout the Middle East, harnessing them under its control through local front-line franchises, as is the case in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Azerbaijan Shiite Challenge: On Iran-Azerbaijan relations and the Israeli Angle הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The United Nations’ Secretary General, Antonio Gutteres, made a speech to mark one year to the October 7 massacre in Israel. Though he made the most compelling call for condemnation of Hamas, he failed to call upon his organization to recognize it as a terror group, to condemn Iran’s multifront campaign on the Jewish State, as well as touch upon the unprecedented anti-Israeli campaign he and the UN have been engaged in over the past year.

Here is an alternative speech that could still be delivered, if Guterres so choses.

The decision is his to make.

***

Distinguished delegates,

It has been one year since Iranian protégé Hamas’ horrible and inhumane massacre of innocent Israelis on October 7, and the Iran’s ensuing multifront campaign against Israel. It pains me to report, however, that the United Nations so far failed to take the most basic step and condemn this atrocity. One does not need to take sides to outright reject the human suffering caused by these enemies of civilization.

Over the past year, I made 37 work-related trips around the world in my capacity as the United Nations’ Secretary General. My unwavering commitment to the international community that entrusted me with this sacred mission is to be an honest broker, while insisting on fundamental values we should all share. I therefore traveled to all seven continents but Australia and Antarctica, and above all, the Middle East, in an attempt to bring the world together. Yet I regret to inform you that I preferred to skip over Israel, despite the fact that this long-standing member of the United Nations has just suffered the deadliest terrorist attack in its history.

However, I have taken the trouble to repeatedly talk at Israelis, rather than with them. I skipped no superlative in laying out my accusations of Israel, rushing to be “horrified” by Israeli airstrikes on Hamas compounds and averting against “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza. My deputy and a commission I appointed accused Israel of committing “war crimes”, my envoy to the Middle East claimed Israel had “no right of self-defense”, and my organization, the United Nations, still refuses to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. I myself invoked Chapter 99 for the first time since coming into office and only for the fourth time in history, citing concerns on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Yet I failed to explain how Gaza outperforms Yemen, with 400,000 dead from starvation, Syria, Ukraine, drug wars in Mexico, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, theaters that summon frail international reaction.

I repeatedly condemned Israel by name, accusing it of everything from deliberate starvation to genocide, with no evidence but Hamas’ bogus data (the “Gaza Ministry of Health”), ignoring over 1 million aid trucks that entered Gaza this year. Yet when Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles at Israeli cities, I never mentioned the Ayatollah regime by name, simply making a general reference to “escalation in the Middle East”, as if talking about the weather.

I have to admit that under my reign, I continued a UN tradition of anti-Israel bias. Already on October 19, before any Israeli troops ever entered Gaza, I traveled to Egypt and accused Israel of “starving” Palestinians in Gaza. “For nearly two weeks, the people of Gaza have gone without any shipments of fuel, food, water, medicine and other essentials,” I stated at the El Arish airport, as a 747 cargo was landing behind me, carrying 65 metric tons of humanitarian supplies on its way to Gaza.

I was oblivious, perhaps willfully, to the fact that since October 7, Israel remained the only country in the world to supply its enemy with food and fuel during wartime, with a great risk to its soldiers: over 60,000 trucks and airborne deliveries have shipped over 1 million tons of humanitarian aid into Gaza, supplying as many as 3,400 calories per day to every Gazan citizen. This policy remains highly unpopular among the Israeli public, as hostages are still being held in sub-human conditions in Gaza. Israel allowed and facilitated this despite clear indications that Hamas uses much of it to its own advantage.

I came back to Egypt in March, while flagrantly skipping over Israel once again. I did not skip over superlatives, though, claiming it was “monstrous” that “Palestinians in Gaza are marking Ramadan with Israeli bombs still falling, bullets still flying, artillery still pounding and humanitarian assistance still facing obstacle upon obstacle.” However, I made no request to Egypt, my host country, to stop blocking Palestinian refugees from fleeing into its territory or hurdling humanitarian aid, given it shares a border with Gaza. Egyptian President Al-Sisi even fenced out an enclave to block refugees in case the border is breached through the Rafah area. I would have never accepted such a situation had Moldova, Poland, or Romania ever blocked Ukrainian refugees from escaping a war zone.

I also failed to recognize how my own UN agencies actively colluded with Hamas. UNRWA facilitated the murder of Israelis with its teachers participating in the October 7 massacre, holding hostages, and over 400 of its members being part of Hamas’ Al Qassam Brigades. That did not stop me from claiming “188 UN workers” were killed in Gaza, outcrying how the “horror must stop,” while ignoring the oldest trick in the Hamas manual – registering terrorists as UN workers.

My agency UNOCHA, on its part, continues to whitewash Hamas’ disinformation. Figures neatly presented in charts and infographics illustrated how 42,000 Palestinians were allegedly killed in Gaza, based on bogus data provided by Hamas’ “Gaza Ministry of Health” and “various media reports”. I reiterated those figures, while professing to alert against “grave global harm” caused by other types of disinformation. Scores of violent protesters blocked Jewish students from entering campuses and attacked Jewish people on the streets around the world based on these false claims, that my own UN has slashed by half ever since.

Disinformation has even become normalized under my reign – though only when Israel is concerned. 35 Palestinians were never killed in an UNRWA school by an Israeli airstrike on June 6, yet my UN News agency rushed to report just that, and my spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric claimed that the incident was “another horrific example of the price that civilians are paying” in Gaza. Later I found out that 17 Hamas militants used the compound as a military site, a legitimate target according to any international law – with no civilian casualties. 500 Palestinians were never killed in the Al Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza on October 17, yet I rushed to announce I was “horrified” and “shocked” by the incident. Had I awaited the facts, I would have known that this was yet another Hamas fake news. In reality, a misfired PIJ rocket landed in the hospital’s parking lot, all but burning a few cars.

Israel was even excluded from the UN’s report on sexual violence despite multiple evidence on such crimes by Hamas on October 7, while we falsely accused Israel of committing such sexual crimes on Palestinians without a shred of evidence, simply for the sake of false balance.

Unlike my focus on Israel, I never made any significant appeal on Iran to cease funding terrorism, illegally developing nuclear weapons and publicly calling for the annihilation of Israel, while violating practically all of its international obligations. The Iranian regime instigated the October 7 massacre and continues to wreak havoc around the region and the world. I only mentioned Iran when paying tribute to its notorious president Raisi, in a special visit to Tehran, mourning the death of a mass murderer who made a mockery of international law and minority rights I care deeply about.

In general, I cannot report to you that I’m proud of my record from the past year. Rather than harshly criticizing Israel based on cooked numbers and partial reports, or only expressing empathy with Israeli victims within a “yes, but” context (as my famous speech shortly after the massacre, saying it “did not happen in a vacuum”), I should have rallied the international community against the clear and present threats aimed at the only Jewish state.

While Israel is fighting an existential war and is subject to attacks on multiple fronts, I failed to meet my obligations to it. I presided over a UN that according to my predecessor Koffi Annan, is “misused to constantly vilify the Jewish state and, in so doing, damage the world body itself and its universal values.” Its General Assembly dedicates 85% of its annual resolutions to Israel, while its Human Right Council’s infamous Article 7 singles Israel out for no apparent reason. No other country suffers this level existential threat while being in the crosshairs of the international community.

Going back to where I started – I did pay a visit to Israel during my tenure, albeit not in the past year, but in 2017. I stressed my commitment to combat anti-Semitism in the Yad Vashem holocaust memorial, while failing to meet that promise. I then visited the kibbutz of Nahal Oz, who borders Gaza and “heard from them of their fears of rocket attacks from Hamas, as well as tunnel infiltration”. I commended the residents’ will “to see Palestinians and Israelis living both in peace and both well.” I then toured a Hamas attack tunnel crossing the border. I failed to appreciate how this will evolve into an all-out massacre of 1,200 innocent Israelis, of which 16 were murdered and 8 taken hostage in the same Nahal Oz.

I realize my tenure will go down in history as a particularly shameful period as it relates not only to treating Israel, but any freedom-seeking nation. But now we have an opportunity to correct that record. Iran’s campaign of terror, rape and hostage taking must stop. Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire but to be encouraged to do justice with humanity’s most abominable enemies. We should all also appreciate the heroism of Israeli combatants who put their lives on the line not only for the defense of Israel, but all of us in the free world. Israel managed to channel unspeakable suffering into encapsulating human destiny with the spirit of its people and the ferocious Jewish belief in an ultimate good. For failing to meet my commitment, I ask Israel and my Jewish friends around the world for your forgiveness. May we leverage this war to vanquish evil, rather than appeasing it, and empowering Israel, rather than disavowing it.

Thank you.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט The Speech UN’s Guterres Should Have Given on October 7: “Time to Correct Our Record” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In recent years new concepts have been emerging in the global discourse, relating to the psychological warfare both within the cyberspace and beyond. Concepts such as Fake News, Disinformation, and Deep Space have entered popular jargon and brought to light  the gargantuan influence games raging between various global forces. One of those is Iran.

Iran has been waging ongoing sophisticated disinformation campaigns, aiming to sway public opinion against its enemies – namely Israel and the US. But Teheran can take a page out of the playbook of an old hand in sowing disinformation to influence public opinion – Russia.

For instance, Iran is attempting to intervene and influence the results of the upcoming presidential elections in the US. The Washington Post reported that the artificial intelligence (AI) developer OpenAI, announced in August 2024 that it had intercepted attempts by Iranian sources to use its famous chatbot ChatGP to manufacture online content to sow discord and widen the polarization in US society to influence the results of the elections this November. The network disseminated disinformation regarding both candidates – Democratic Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. The fake news aimed to increase the social discord in the United States by stoking social controversy. The Iranian network produced content mainly in the topic of the war in Gaza, LGBTQ rights and of course, the two presidential candidates.

According to intel in the US, the Iranian network, known as “2035-storm” operated a number of new websites and social networks. Iran’s primary objective in the information ecosystem is to stoke existing controversy in American society on particularly sensitive issues, propagate social chaos and undermine America’s political and social order from within. Presumably, even if the Iranians are able to foment discord even on a small scale, they will have considered this testimony to the long-standing claim championed by Iran that democracy is a flawed Western concept.

It seems that one popular topic utilized by the Iranian network is the current war in Gaza, which it frequently addresses. Thus for instance, it operates a website under the name Even Politics.com in which it publishes content on the ongoing Gaza war, the influence of religious groups and threats against American democracy. It is evident that most of the content of the site is biased against Donald Trump.

According to many experts in the field,  this method of disseminating disinformation is not the domain of Iran, and its attempts to sway the elections in the US seems to reflect the methodology employed by Russia, which operated a troll farm – an organized group engaging in the dissemination of disinformation – to flood the social networks with divisive content, ladened with disinformation. The telltale characteristic of the Russian methodology  apparent in the Iranian activity in the cyber ecosystem is the targeting of groups on both sides of the political divide in the US. The disinformation Iran uses aims to radicalize the political discourse, deepen the social discord and undermine the fabric of society in America.

Iranian efforts to influence the presidential elections in the US were evident already in 2018, when they set up a sophisticated system of fake accounts supposedly belonging to US House candidates and journalists. The Iranian campaign, which began in 2018, scaled up following the elimination of Qassem Soleimani, former Qods Force commander in Iraq in January 2020, under the order of then President, Donal Trump. Thus for instance, two Iranian nationals were charged in the US of involvement in the cybernetic disinformation  campaign targeting American voters ahead of the 2020 elections. Iranian perpetrators also sent threatening emails to voters during the 2020 campaign. Iran also used websites such as Even Politics to try and sway the 2022 midterm elections as well.

In addition to its use of social platforms, Iran utilizes other cyber instruments such as hacking and phishing, to try and throw the November elections into disarray. On August 10, officials in Trump’s campaign accused Teheran of hacking parts of its internal communications, leading to a federal investigation in the US. On August 19, the American federal Intelligence officials released an assessment confirming that there was “increasingly aggressive Iranian activity during this elections cycle”, which included “the recently reported activities targeting former President Trump’s campaign”. The intelligence assessment came after U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines suggested that Tehran’s efforts to influence the U.S. election were likely “because Iran’s leaders want to avoid an outcome that they believe would increase tensions with the United States,” i.e. Trump.

Iranian disinformation targeting Israel

Iran’s hostile interference activity in the cyberspace targets Israel as well. In the wake of October 7, Iran stepped up its activity aimed at spreading disinformation among the Israeli public. It was also recently revealed that a Telegram channel disguised as pro-Israel, “Tears of War”, has published dozens of messages since the beginning of the war, including heartbreaking posts pushing for the return of the hostages from Hamas captivity in Gaza. The posts were designed to convey a clear message: the Israeli government is to blame for the ongoing suffering of the hostages, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions were to blame for undermining prospects of a ceasefire. These are just a few examples of how this channel, along with others, is trying to deepen the discord in Israels’ political-social discourse on loaded issues that concern the Israeli public, such as the hostages and the ceasefire.

In all likelihood, the Tears of War account is operated by someone connected to Teheran and is used as a bellow with which to inflame tensions in Israel’s public. Through this and other channels, the Iranians are undermining the official Israeli narrative regarding the issue of the hostages and the war in Gaza in order to influence and manoeuvre the campaign according to Iranian interests. However, this devious campaign is just part of the picture of Iran’s network of activity in the information ecosystem against Israel.

From 2021 to date, Iran has been operating a widespread campaign in the digital ecosystem aiming to psychologically manipulate the Israeli public and further tear at the social and ideological conflict, particularly evident following Israel’s Operation Guardian of the Walls that year. Tehran’s ultimate goal is to turn the public in Israel against the government, to undermine the government and affect anarchy that would serve to weaken Israel.

To this end, Iran employs advanced tactics and methods, such as digital email campaigns, social media landing pages, and the dissemination of deep fake AI-generated content designed to reach more accurately segmented audiences and increase engagement.

The Iranian activity in the cyberspace has three discrete phases, each with specific objectives:

The escalation of tensions between the various groups from all sides of the social divides in Israel, e.g. religious groups and the LGBTQ community; religion and non-religious etc. The next step is fomenting pollical discord between the right and left of the political map. The third stage, of which Iran is presently engaged in, is to saw discontent in the Israeli public with regards to the Israeli government’s response to the actions of Hamas.

Teheran’s expansive use of the digital ecosystem is intended to create a skewed perception of reality among Israel’s public to the extent that they cannot discern between fact and fiction; victim and aggressor. Thus, the Iranians try to swamp the web with disinformation and distorted intentional narratives by exploiting – often unwitting – local resources to spread this content, amplified by of local content in leading channels.

Case in point: last May, the abovementioned “Tears of War” telegram channel paid for sponsored promotion on a Telegram channel of an Israeli blogger, Daniel Amram,  called “Uncensored Daniel Amram”, which has 378 thousand followers. The posts on Daniel Amram’s  channel gave the Iranian’s access to the mobile devices of thousands of Israeli followers and disseminate content calling for the cessation of the war. The use of local channels to promote fake narrative through such content is one instrument Tehran utilizes to saw confusion in the Israel’s public, obscuring the boundaries between what is in effect occurring and cyberspace. The disparity between the misguided perception and reality provides a convenient platform for mind engineering and influencing campaigns and for collecting data on followers, even for the recruitment of civilians for their cause. Iranian cyber networks use fake accounts to contact Israeli civilians by sending them private messages on social networks such as Telegram, WhatsApp etc. The use of content-intensive networks, which are full of fake accounts the respond to or upload posts lend a veneer  of credibility that allowד spreading messages to users, who are contacted through private messages, unaware that they are being recruited.

On January 2024, the Israeli General Security Services announce that fake accounts operated by an Iranian network posted fake job offers and surveys to recruit Israelis to carry out various tasks. These privately-sent requests included, among others, prompts to hang signs with slogans phrased by the Iranians, surveys, photographing protesters and so on. The Iranian network operated to recruit Israelis by deceit, and to use them for purposes of intelligence collection, such as photographing houses of anti-Iranians and individuals belonging to the Israeli security establishment.

In conclusion, it seems that the Iranian networks operating in the Israeli and American digital ecosystem have a deep understanding of the public discourse of both publics. The use of the various social networks and other means of dissemination, such as emails, is spreading by exploiting the ease with which massive numbers of users can be reached privately to deceitfully collect intelligence.

Furthermore, it seems that the Iranian methods of operations are becoming increasingly streamlined and Tehran’s influencing campaigns are able to hit upon exposed nerves in the social rift both in America and Israel. Moreover, the daily interaction with citizens affords Iran with comprehensive social insights, enabling it to analyze the social discourse and accordingly modify the messages it seeks to promote and advance its strategic objectives through instant messaging to users.

The US is heading toward its presidential elections, while Israel is in a state of a multi-theater war, and events are developing at breakneck speed. A  large part of the population uses social networks to stay abreast on current events, mainly on Telegram and -X (Twitter). This increased dissemination of content is a fertile ground for Iran’s frequent disinformation and mind engineering campaigns.

This sophisticated method of spreading messages and content via social networks serves Iran’s long-term strategic goals. The disinformation foments distrust in the governing institution of its enemies and disintegrate their societies – Israeli and American – from within.

Additionally, all this cements Iran’s status as a powerful player in the digital ecosystem and offensive cyber, increasing its ability to collect intelligence and hurt civilians. Teheran’s deep understanding of the main issues of social discourse in Israel, and its ability to influence sentiments in Israel’s public reflect an escalation in its ability to orchestrate influencing campaigns and spark social discord and controversy.

Moreover, the Iranian disinformation campaigns are greatly accelerated with the help of artificial intelligence, which they even use to produce deepfake videos, increase the quality of their fake content and mislead public officials, media outlets and many citizens. Teheran’s use of fake, manipulative content produced by artificial intelligence is expected to further expand, to increase the output and dissemination. The use of artificial intelligence will also contribute to the fine-tuning of messages to increase their influence on the public discourse, in Israel, the United States, or any other country Teheran considers its enemy.

Examples of posts from the “tears of War” Telegram channel

Many of the channel’s posts contain the hashtag #Its All His Fault! referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, aiming to widen the divide in Israel’s society and increase opposition to the government and its system:

This is one of many posts on the ‘Tears of War’ Telegram channel with the hashtag #It’s All His Fault, aiming to increase social controversy and opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government through an image insinuating the situation of the hostages in Gaza, depicting a drawing of the radar operators while being kidnapped from their base on October 7. The post aims to counter balance the shift of attention to the fighting in the northern arena against Hezbollah and Lebanon.

Some posts focus on Iran, suggesting that the channel’s operators are of Iranian source. Below is an example of such two posts published during the 2024 Paris Olympics, emphasizing that Iran has won more medals than Israel:

הפוסט Games of Influence: Iranian Disinformation in Israel and the USA הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the aftermath of Yahya Sinwar’s death, Hamas is in deep shock. They are now struggling to recover and choose a new leader. Sinwar’s killing is perceived to be much more significant than that of Ismail Haniyeh, and even of Ahmad Yassin in 2004. This is due to the fact that the Hamas leadership is now divided between the “Iranian-Shiite” axis and the “Sunni Axis”. Following Ismail Haniyeh’s killing in July, when it seemed that Khaled Mashal would take over from Haniyeh and resume his former role as Head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Iran and Sinwar were adamantly opposed to this move. Khaled Mashal was reputed to be the leader of the “Sunni Axis” in Hamas, close to and supportive of Qatar and Turkey.

In view of the schisms within the Hamas leadership – between the Shiite axis and the Sunni axis, and between the “Hamas Leadership Abroad” and the “Hamas Leadership in Gaza”, what are the implications of Sinwar’s death on this murderous terrorist organization?

The Hamas leadership is struggling to select a new leader so as to continue the war against Israel. The removal of Sinwar is a severe blow to the organization, however it is thought the organization is not going to disappear completely, and it might even recover. One of the prevailing assessments in the Israel security forces is that the center of gravity, where decisions will be made, will now migrate from the Hamas Leadership in Gaza to the Hamas Leadership Abroad, and that Sinwar’s replacement will be selected from this group.

A feverish battle of succession is now underway, where the Hamas Gaza also has a “trump card” in the form of Muhammad Sinwar, Yahya Sinwar’s brother, who is now leading Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The latter is now running the fight against Israel, he holds the Israeli hostages. With him is Muhammad Shabana, commander of the organization’s Rafah Brigade.

The Hamas senior leadership is now divided. The battle behind the scenes is between the candidates affiliated with Iran and those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent movement. Iran, it seems, will do whatever it can to retain Hamas as its proxy. Hamas, which is not an Iranian proxy by nature, since it is a Sunni organization, product of the Muslim Brotherhood, does have a convergence of interests with Iran – namely the destruction of the State of Israel.

Who are the senior Hamas figures out of whom the next leader will emerge?

“Shiite Axis” members, favoring Iran:

1. Khalil Al-Haya, who was Yahya Sinwar’s right-hand man, and who officially announced Sinwar’s death on behalf of Hamas. Al-Haya is based in Qatar, where he coordinates the indirect hostage release negotiations with Israel as part of the Hamas Leadership Abroad. Al-Haya is very closely aligned with the Iranian Faction of Hamas. He has even met with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, in Istanbul together with the organization’s Chairman of the Hamas Shura Council, Muhammad Darwish following Yahya Sinwar’s death.
2. Muhammad, Head of the Hamas Shura Council, is also affiliated with the Hamas Iranian faction.
3. Muhammad Sinwar, who masterminded the abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006, is supported by Iran, He is holding the Israeli hostages and is running the war against Israel in the Gaza Strip.

“Sunni Axis” members, favoring the Muslim Brotherhood:

1. Khaled Mashal, head of the Hamas leadership abroad, is the former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is affiliated with Qatar and Turkey as well as Pakistan. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement and is at odds with Iran. The Iranians have not forgotten his past statements and his sympathies with the Sunni world. Masal even went so far recently in his statements, in an interview, that Iran was behind the killing of Ismail Haniyeh.
2. Mousa Abu Marzouk, former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. Abu Marzouk speaks frequently about the hostage deals and reflects Hamas’ position on this issue.

Sinwar’s death is an important pivotal point in the war. It might even tip the balance, subdue Hamas and trigger a renewed hostage deal. This being said, Muhammad Sinwar, who has Iran’s backing, might not agree to a hostage deal with Israel while the latter has the upper hand – this might constitute a surrender of the organization and admission of its defeat in the war. A decision has even been made recently in Hamas, to appoint Muhammad Sinwar as the decision-maker in all matters concerning a hostage deal with Israel. He has also apparently been named acting commander of the terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. This is not to say that Muhammad Sinwar has been elected as supreme leader of the organization, which would include the overseas branch, but it does elevate his standing considerably and it also increases the likelihood that he will eventually be chosen to replace Yahya Sinwar at the helm of the terrorist organization.

Moreover, Muhammad Sinwar might continue to tow the line mapped out by his brother Yahya Sinwar, who prior to his death decided to renew the suicide attacks inside Israel. It also seems that as far as the military wing of Hamas in Gaza is concerned, there are hopes of a further escalation in the hostilities between Israel and Iran and Hezbollah, which would divert the main thrust of the IDF’s pressure toward Lebanon or Iran.

This article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Implications on Hamas from the Killing of Yahya Sinwar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Islamic terror attacks on the rise in turbulent Russia

Russia has been subject to increasing Islamic terror attacks in recent years. Two synagogues in Russia’s southern republic of Dagestan—one in the city of Derbent and one in the town of Makhachkala—were attacked in August this year.  Following these latest attacks, the Russian splinter branch of the Islamic State, ISIS-K, issued a statement cheering on the assault, saying the gunmen had responded to “the call.” “Our brothers from the Caucasus let us know that they are still strong,” ISIS-K said on social media. At the time, Russia was still reeling from its worst terror attack in decades. Over 130 people were killed this March after ISIS-K assailants stormed a concert venue complex in Moscow. These relentless attacks and threats by ISIS-K are seriously challenging President Putin’s self-declared reputation as a leader able to guarantee order across the vast, turbulent nation of Russia writes Jennifer Teale.

ISIS-K influence is spreading from Afghanistan into Russia

ISIS-K is presently implementing a regionalization and internationalization strategy that has increasingly focused on extending its reach into Central Asia and appealing to associated diaspora elements, especially in Russia. The movement’s Central Asian contingent has accounted for a notable share of ISIS-K-linked activity outside of Afghanistan, but still with a rising number of terrorist attacks involving Russian nationals, Chechens, and others from the Caucasus.

ISIS-K are critical of the Taliban’s relations with Moscow

In 2022, ISIS-K was already becoming more vocal in its online criticisms of the Taliban’s relations with Moscow for “befriending Russians, the murderers of Chechen Muslims.” It had also become increasingly overt online about its persistent intent to target Russia, urging supporters to continually “cast fear into the hearts of the sons of Putin and Russia, and to kill them with cars and knives.” With such calls to action, the ISIS-K media branch Al-Azaim was then preparing the information space for a suicide bombing against the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022, resulting in the deaths of two staffers.

Moscow remains cordial with the Taliban

In July, President Putin acknowledged that Afghanistan faces issues that require constant attention from Russia and the international community. President Putin now consistently refers to the Taliban governance of Afghanistan, as an “ally” in the fight against terrorism. “Generally, we have to proceed from the fact that the Taliban controls power in the country. In this sense, the Taliban are certainly our allies in the fight against terrorism, because any acting government is concerned with the stability of its administration and the state it governs,” he said. His cordiality prevails even though not one country has extended de jure diplomatic recognition to the new regime since it was taken over by force by the Taliban in 2021.

Russian global alliances cause concern

At the same time, Russia is building greater, more dubious alliances elsewhere. The BRINK quartet of countries of Belarus, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are becoming more strategically connected—a grouping geographically distant yet increasingly dangerous. Russia has the largest weapons of mass destruction arsenal in the world; North Korea continues to develop its nascent nuclear capabilities; Iran is at the nuclear threshold and Belarus hosts Russian nuclear weapons and delivery means.

Cooperation with violent regimes may be hindered by ideological and strategic differences

BRINK members are associated with ideologically close regimes to Russia including Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Eritrea, and the African Sahel. The group’s connections also include the post-Soviet para-state “black holes” of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria and the empowered violent non-state terrorist actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. While all BRINK states share the same strategic center of gravity, mutual misunderstandings between these states are still likely. What Moscow understands as sophisticated strategic signaling, Pyongyang may mistake for real commitment. Beijing maintains a delicate balance between North and South Korea.

To conclude

Moscow wants to enhance its political standing and influence as a superpower while minimizing potential risks to Russian domestic security coming from the region—especially, Islamist extremism and terrorism. Russia is attempting to advance its soft power diplomacy but with alliances such as Belarus, Iran and North Korea that exploit and destabilize Western cohesion.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Russia fends off domestic Islamic State attacks while expanding new dangerous alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Upon the collapse of the USSR, the USA remained as the sole and undisputed hegemonic power in the international arena. America’s dominance led many people of the West to adopt a worldview in which a substantial threat to their accustomed western way of life, culture, or freedom was unimaginable. Most of the West was a sleeping giant while existential threats took form.

Even when western leaders speak of the threats, most give no sign of having examined the dangers realistically and comprehensively. Their vision is narrow. They examine the situation as it stands, without seriously considering the efforts at undermining and weakening society from within; and they certainly are unready to consider far-reaching decisions that involve paying a price.

In contrast with the western slumber, the enemies of the West are working shrewdly according to a long-term plan designed to damage and eventually replace American hegemony and the liberal democratic culture that it oversees. Those enemies are working inside the world’s countries, including the western countries themselves, to take assets and power away and to weaken and undermine the regimes. Their efforts, despite an imbalance of capabilities that still appears significant on the surface, have succeeded more than once in disrupting the foundations of US power. Examination of the current situation suggests that the imbalance is not as large as many of us would like to think, and the threat is more powerful than ever. In fact, there are spheres in which the West no longer holds the initiative. For example, according to reports at the end of July, the cyber war between China and the USA has tipped in China’s favor.

It seems that in recent years not only are hostile nations challenging the American-led world order one by one but an anti-western bloc is consolidating, gathering strength, coordinating, and cooperating in its efforts. The anti-western bloc is led by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. In addition to those hostile states, the Muslim Brotherhood also deserves mention. Alongside the states whose leadership represents the Muslim Brotherhood — that is, Qatar and Turkey — the movement poses a much broader threat. In dozens of states around the world, both Arab and western, it is working quietly and methodically to expand its power and achieve its goal —building up the Islamic nation and making Islam the world’s dominant religion. The Brotherhood’s leaders at the global level guide and coordinate the activities of the various branches. Essentially, this is a broad-based global movement with long-term abilities of planning, integration, and performance; but the West has not yet had the presence of mind to treat it as an enemy. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, like that of the Islamic revolution in Iran, seeks not to live in peace as equals alongside the Western regimes but rather to replace them and rule in their stead.

The anti-western states and organizations are widely separated ideologically, they even compete with one another, and sometimes they carry long-standing mutual grudges. For example, Russia and China are disputing territory and resources, and between the Shiite Islam of the revolution and the Sunni Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood there are theological differences which they consider enormous and there are many centuries of extreme hostility. Those tensions are very comforting to many a western analyst who believes (or wishes to believe) that they will prevent the anti-westerners from cooperating as well as possible and dealing significant damage to the West in the long term. Possibly. But as I’ve found myself telling western leaders many times in recent years — hoping is not a policy. True leadership is not content merely to hope for the best. It prepares for the worst.

Moreover, reality has proven that despite their differences, the anti-western players are in ever-closer cooperation, in spheres that involve, among other things, the infliction of strategic damage — successfully — on the West. An excellent example is the establishment of SPFS, a Russian system that bypasses the SWIFT system used by America for transmitting financial instructions. The Russians began developing their system after the Americans threatened, as long ago as 2014, to use SWIFT for retaliation. Today many hundreds of financial institutions have joined the SPFS network. In my opinion, this episode should have sent wake-up tremors through the USA and the entire West, since it weakens the USA considerably in the international arena of finance, depriving the West of its monopoly and, together with that, of a palpable fraction of its influence.

Another instance that should have deeply rattled the West is China’s demand that Saudi Arabia accept payment for energy in Chinese currency (yuan). That demand was received in March 2022, around the time Russia detached itself from SWIFT. Previously the US dollar had held a near-monopoly over energy transactions, but its power is steadily weakening. Naturally the more transactions are performed in other currencies, the more the dollar’s clout is altered in the international marketplace — and together with the dollar’s clout, the clout of the USA. China, as the world’s largest oil importer, may significantly influence the balance with its purchasing power. In addition to buying oil from Saudi Arabia, China buys large quantities from Iran in violation of American sanctions.

Besides cooperating economically, creating detours around dependency on the USA, and making the USA weaker, the anti-western countries are also cooperating militarily. Such cooperation has increased significantly in the recent years following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Russians are purchasing enormous quantities of drones and missiles from the Iranians. The Iranians are requesting air defense technology from the Russians. North Korea is apparently contributing greatly to military efforts in both Russia and Iran, in projects involving missiles and, in the case of Iran, possibly nuclear weapons as well.

Still the West remains unaware that a new war is brewing between the two blocs. Its enemies are cooperating against it, while profiting from connections with it to the extent that it allows. The West, for its part, is bogged down at an earlier stage where, for the most part, it refrains from defining who the enemy is and certainly from undertaking firm countermeasures. The West is essentially allowing the countries of the world to play on both teams. A country will work with SWIFT on the one hand, for example, but also with Russia’s SPSF as convenient. It isn’t surprising that the West doesn’t demand that other countries choose a side, when the West’s indecisive behavior resembles their own.

Consider Iran for example. The West, including strategic allies of the USA such as the UK and France, continues trading with Iran on a large scale. The USA has not enforced sanctions against Iran in recent years, and it has even unfrozen large sums of money for Iran. Trade with China continues to be very significant for the entire western world, as does cooperation in other areas, perhaps the oddest of them being the renewal of funding for the laboratory in Wuhan that apparently spawned the Covid-19 epidemic. Countries such as Turkey and Qatar are not penalized for being run by Islamist ideologies or for supporting terrorist organizations.

In Israel, the war that broke out on October 7 has been widely termed a war by Iran and its proxies against Israel and its western allies, although all the western countries insist on trying to restrict the conflict terminologically to a local war between Israel and Hamas — even though American forces and assets are attacked frequently in Syria and Iraq, and though growing numbers of American soldiers have been hit. And even though maritime trade, the economy, and the world order under America’s aegis have been severely harmed by Houthi attacks, the West still refuses to call a spade a spade. The Americans are doing all they can to prevent the war from continuing and expanding. They are willing to pay any price, especially if Israel pays it. The current American government’s interest in stopping the war, and in continuing to belittle it by misdefinition, is clear; but it derives, once more, from a narrow perspective that considers nothing but short-term benefit. A strategic view of the threat would impel the USA to take more significant action for the world to see. The enemies of the West are watching developments and drawing important conclusions — for example, regarding how reliable a friend the USA is, especially as a supporter of Israel, which is considered one of its most significant allies. And can American assets and soldiers be targeted at no great cost? And how far can America be made to stretch its appeasement? There are further implications for the world order in the wake of this war; for example, China has been the big winner from the crisis that the Houthi attacks engendered in the Red Sea. Although the USA did form a coalition to attack the Houthis in Yemen, the Houthis continued nonetheless to enforce their de facto blockade in one of the world’s most important sea straits.

In conclusion, I must note that it would be wrong to call the USA blind to all those threats. There is a certain movement in a favorable direction. For some years already, there has been an attempt to investigate banning the sale of dual-purpose technologies to countries that are not close US allies. There is a deeper understanding of the competition from China, including the economic aspects and of course the threat against Taiwan. With regard to Russia, of course there has been very significant progress since the invasion of Ukraine. But the West is still hesitates to adopt difficult decisions and to pay a price in the short term. Its leaders aren’t telling their public about the scope of the threat — particularly the threat of an emerging anti-western bloc. And therefore, the public is unaware and almost no measures are being taken yet against subversion inside the western nations themselves. The West still largely prefers appeasement to confrontation and believes that appeasement can bring peace and coexistence. But the more strength its opponent gathers, the less easy — or even the less possible — withstanding that opponent will be.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Intensifying War Against The Sleeping West — The New Bipolar War הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Anyone looking for an indication of Israel’s success against Hezbollah, need not check the number of missiles the IDF destroyed, or the number of those killed. It is enough to look at a report that came out today (Wednesday) from Reuters, stating that Hezbollah is asking for a ceasefire now, regardless of the cessation of the fighting against Hamas.

Hezbollah’s announcement stands in stark contrast to the policy it has declared since October 8, and comes only against the backdrop of the organization’s military defeat.

Beyond the fact that Iran’s ring of fire around Israel was breached, Israel’s successes vis-à-vis Hezbollah have dramatic implications on several levels. First, they constitute a tremendous opportunity for the Lebanese state to create stability, after Hezbollah’s prolonged and longstanding occupation of the Lebanese people and all its sources of livelihood and subsistence. Second, they provide a stabilizing factor in regimes such as Jordan and Egypt. Third, they “maintain the path of peace” for “threshold countries” with a tendency toward the axis of evil, such as Turkey.

But beyond the shift in the regional power structure, the most important implications concern the evil regime of the Ayatollahs and the Iran-Russia-China axis. Israel’s success, thank God, creates new opportunities that until a few weeks ago were completely unthinkable.

An opportunity has arisen that no one had realistically considered before the war, to cut off the head of the octopus, to liberate the Iranian people from the murderous regime of the Ayatollahs, and to destroy the evil nuclear enterprise that it is working on. This is an opportunity that is not only rare, but likely also the last before Iran breaks through with a nuclear bomb.

That is why in recent days there have been many voices in Israel encouraging, in fact demanding, that the government attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

This call is correct and justified, but it is not accurate. This is because all the speakers directed their remarks to the Israeli government, while they should be directing their words and pressure to the American administration and the European community.

An Iranian bomb would cast a dark and threatening shadow over the world, cause instability, strengthen the Russia-China-Iran axis, and cause World War III in which the United States itself would be attacked. This is without mentioning the misery of the Iranian people and the peoples of the Middle East, who are already suffering from the regime of the Ayatollahs.

Therefore, to use the successful images from the prime minister’s recent speeches at the UN, the Americans must head the coalition of the “blessing”, and destroy the “curse” that the Iranians are trying to bring to the Middle East and the entire world.

The results of a successful attack will lead to the overthrow of the Ayatollahs’ regime and the establishment of a benevolent regime in Iran, to calm in the Middle East, and the breaking of the Russia-Iran-China axis of evil, which will help Ukraine and European countries. Such an attack would bring calm and stability, and prevent an all-out global war.

The credit that Israel provided for the free world with the blood of its sons must be redeemed and realized now!

Contrary to the prevailing assessment that the United States will not embark on an adventurous move before elections, I would argue that in the present case, due to the special circumstances and the tremendous opportunity that has been created, the upcoming elections actually constitute an incentive for an attack.

The incentive could come from President Biden, who will want to make his mark in world history before he retires. This is also a golden opportunity for him to contrast himself with Obama, who leads a Chamberlain policy vis-à-vis the Ayatollahs. Iran is Obama’s baby. The elimination of the Ayatollahs’ regime could be Biden’s last word in the fight for his impeachment, which he says was waged by Obama.

The incentive could also come from Vice President Harris, who will see an opportunity in a successful strike that will free the free world from Iran’s shadow and contribute to geopolitical stability in the world, to reach elections on the waves of glory and secure the next four years in the White House.

Former President Trump is likely to welcome the move, as he led a hawkish line against Iran and carried out the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. He would certainly be happy to resolve these difficulties before taking office, if elected.

Whether Biden, Harris or the convergence of interests of both, the coming days and articulate Israeli spokesmen should be used to mobilize the Americans to head the coalition of blessed countries and free the world from the curse of the Ayatollahs.

The bottom line is that even if the United States of America does not assume its historic role, Israel has the obligation, and the right, to destroy the Iranian nuclear project. This last opportunity must be exercised!

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Coalition of “Blessing” Must Destroy the Iranian Nuclear Project הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A year and a half before October 7, officers of the IDSF movement sat in the living room of Amir Avivi, the movement’s founder and CEO. They understood that something was afoot and that they must warn the security services about what was liable to happen. At the meeting, they discussed a “strategic, tectonic, global, and regional change” that we were experiencing and that would lead, in their view, to immense escalation. “When we connected the dots, we understood that we were heading for war,” Avivi recalls.

At the same meeting, they decided to write a situational assessment. The IDSF movement delivered a 300-page document to Naftali Bennett and Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time were prime minister and opposition leader respectively, and to the head of the Mossad, the National Security Council, and others.

As early as May 2022, Avivi visited the Knesset with the report, which he’d prepared together with some leaders of the security services, and he warned that “today we’re in a situation where processes that have been under way for many years are reaching their culmination.” He expanded on the existential threats against the State of Israel. “There is an Iranian deployment that, in practice, embraces both the drive for nuclearization and the rockets, missiles, and drones. There is a force that will guide Iran toward the understanding that on the one hand they can attack, and on the other hand we’ll be forced to if they don’t.”

Today, a year after the Sabbath that saw the murder of more than 1,200 people, Avivi isn’t brandishing the report and its prophetic conclusions. Instead he is thinking of what comes next. He speaks of the hostages’ return as a matter of central importance, of the need for broad democratic consensus regarding the State’s deep-level processes, and of what the future may hold — a campaign for regional peace agreements.

“There was a belief in holding out a little longer”

On the anniversary of the events that opened the war, Avivi visited the Ynet studio for a special interview with Sharon Kidon. “Israel has been avoiding war, as part of a strategic choice that resembles what the USA chose in the face of the USSR — to wait for everything to settle down on its own,” Avivi said, explaining why Israel hadn’t taken action that would have prevented the massacre. “The Arab Spring gave the security services and the Israeli government a lot of confidence that the strategy was working. That while we were avoiding war, the other Mideastern states were reducing themselves to fragments. Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Syria. There was a belief that if we held out a little longer and then a little longer, eventually Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranians would all collapse. It was just a matter of holding out a bit.”

The IDSF warned of a severe attack impending, but without knowing what the timing would be. “I said, ‘When you see a swarm of rockets flying, you can be sure that’s the beginning of the war,’” Avivi relates. “We’ve learned that when you have a terrorist army at your fence, even the security services won’t necessarily be aware of the timing. For that reason, terrorist armies shouldn’t be at the fence.”

You’ve mentioned victory more than once. What’s your vision of victory?

“The developments we’re currently experiencing will force us to adjust our war objectives. We started out on October 7, a year ago, entering a war really against our will, and we set three objectives: eliminating Hamas as a governmental and military organization, returning all our hostages, and creating conditions in Gaza that will prevent a terrorist army from ever reappearing. We’ve more or less dismantled Hamas as a military organization, but not as a government. This is where the pronouncements of the security services and the prime minister come in, and they’re now getting into the humanitarian issue. We need to finish the work. We need to return our hostages.”

Can you define what victory looks like in this connection?

“Victory doesn’t mean that there’s not a single terrorist in Gaza,” he clarifies. “So what does it mean? That all the hostages are back. That Hamas has lost its hold on Gaza both militarily and governmentally. That everyone with a home in northern Israel is back, is safe, and can live confidently with no threat from Hezbollah. The State of Israel understands that it must add the Iranian nuclear program to its war objectives. Victory will mean that the existential danger from the Iranian nuclear umbrella has been dealt with. I hope that the Americans will open their eyes and understand that we need to handle that one together.”

“No need for uniformity — just unity”

On the issue of internal polarization in Israel, Avivi contends that what’s needed is not uniformity but unity. Differences in outlook should be put aside for the sake of joint decision-making that will make development and growth possible. “We don’t need to be uniform,” he explains. “We have lots of opinions, but we need to converge on the ethos on which the nation was founded. Let’s remember what we are here for, what the Land of Israel means to us, who and what we are as a people — and let’s hold a tolerant discussion. We don’t need to reach agreement on everything. Where we don’t, our democracy decides. But we need to agree on broad issues. Our culture needs a lot of work. A firm majority of Israeli society is tired of the squabbles and wants a safe, thriving, meaningful future.”

Avivi’s expectations for the future are optimistic, including regional peace agreements. “We all feel that within this war, there was a revolution,” he emphasizes. “We’ve all seen now what we’re capable of doing when we’re together in battle. I think that this year will be the decisive one, with us defeating our enemies. From there, we must proceed to peace agreements, a thriving economy, mass immigration, and a discourse among ourselves that makes for togetherness and unity in the spirit of our ethos. We have a tendency to embrace extremes, but we need to converge in the center. I’m optimistic. I think our society’s has wonderful days ahead.”

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט From the unheeded warning to the vision of peace: “This will be the decisive year” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This week has been rife with reports that Israel is leaning toward a military campaign in the north. A moment before the planes scramble, it may be worth rethinking the plans.

On October 8, Hezbollah opened war against Israel. While Hezbollah has primarily mounted attacks, and done so over a constantly expanding area, Israel has primarily mounted defense, using preventive operations, targeted killings, and destruction of launchers.

Israel is displaying weakness despite its actual strength. But at the same time, the more Israel refrains from displaying strength, the weaker it becomes. So why not go toe to toe at last and pay Hezbollah back in its own coin?

In a “Hezbollah First” scenario, as I’ll call it, Israel presses forward in the fight against Hezbollah, suffers weeks (or more) of accurate attacks on strategic assets, on civilians, and on fighters, and draws criticism from abroad that might be expressed in an arms embargo or in arrest warrants from the Hague against the country’s leaders. At this point, the Iranians may blithely assemble their nuke.

The Iranian leaders are rational players who want to reach their goal as efficiently as possible. If they consider the nuke an appropriate tool, they’ll use it. But even more ominously — they won’t have to.

An Iranian nuke will mean Israel’s hands are tied. Israel will have no role in the next round of play. Iran’s standing will benefit, and so will its military and its economy. Iran will quickly restore the military clout of its proxies but leave spots of ruin, and civilians with their diseases, as a powerful resource for propaganda and international funding.

What’s more, in order to halt the suffering of civilians “on both sides,” the US will revive a policy that it’s already tried to push through: It will declare a Palestinian state.

The result may well be a weakened Israel, completely dependent on the Americans — an Israel with a stumbling economy and a shattered society. The wolves lurking all around will find their hunger hard to control.

In an “Iran First” scenario, on the other hand, an Israeli attack could bring down the Iranian regime and put paid to the Iranian nuke. Israel would have enough strength left for dealing with the Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Gaza, which would be weakened by the bashing of the head of the snake. And after that, it would be time for rebuilding and growth.

There are those who believe that an attack against Iran must concentrate on its nuclear facilities. Prof. Benny Morris, the historian, published an article in the Haaretz newspaper headlined “To Survive, Israel Must Strike Iran Now: If Israel proves incapable of destroying the Iranian nuclear project using conventional weaponry, then it may not have any option but to resort to its nonconventional capabilities.”

Morris, who in the past was considered too far left to be employable in Israel and considered emigrating, has come to the conclusion that Iran does seriously intend to destroy Israel, that the day of judgment has come, and that the appropriate weapon should be deployed to the extent that it’s available.

I don’t know whether Morris has made a perfect prediction. But I’d like to put forward the proposition here that we don’t need to attack the Iranian nuclear sites in specific, although that might be the best course. Conventional weapons can be enough to destroy the Iranian nuclear capability.

Iran is suffering from a number of problems. Among its many ethnic and national minorities, the regime’s legitimacy is broadly rejected. The country’s air defenses are weak, its borders are long and undefended, and its military capabilities are not very strong. In order to sow destruction and shock in Tehran, no doomsday weapon is necessary.

One example showing the fragility of the Iranian regime is the episode of the “War of the Cities” during the Iran–Iraq war.

After eight years of bloodletting between Iran and Iraq, the war turned a corner at the end of February 1988. Military operations by Iraq brought a change. First Iraq attacked the refineries in Tehran and forced Iran to return to rationing fuel.

Next, after Tehran began the War of the Cities, Iraq launched a pre-planned attack by bombarding Tehran every day with long-range missiles. Although damage from the attacks was limited, for more than two months they combined with additional psychological factors to severely damage Iranian morale and they spurred millions of civilians to leave. What Iraq hadn’t accomplished in eight years, it managed to do in a couple of months.

Granted, today’s circumstances are different, historically and militarily. But the War of the Cities does carry a lesson, and an inspiration.

Would such an attack cost Israel very heavily? Apparently yes. Can Israel resort to some other strategic option that doesn’t depend on the hope for a deus ex machina? Not confidently.

Wise recruitment work can build an international coalition to lead the attack, to destabilize the Iranian regime from outside, to challenge it from inside, and to bring it down. Then a new regime can be helped to establish itself, to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure, and to rehabilitate Iran.

Israel needs to go to work assembling a Middle Eastern coalition that can in turn enlist the Europeans, the Americans, and the international public. They all need to understand that if the Iranians entrench their control of the Middle East, they will proceed to attack Europe and then, with the assets they have acquired there, they’ll attack the US. The US will be standing alone then, with no allies, when Iran, Russia, and China come to divide it up.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran First, and the Sooner the Better! הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the days of gloom that followed October 7, 2023, it was unclear exactly how we would manage to win the war. Now, with Hamas already shattered as a military organization and with Hezbollah being heavily hit, not only can an Israeli victory be glimpsed on the horizon but a time of thriving, initiated upon the Day After, can be dreamt of.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

Most decisions were right: The war in retrospect

The October 7 disaster wrought great confusion and uncertainty, but one thing was certain from the start: This war will take time. There were two main reasons — first, that the Gaza Strip was full of tunnels and that the Hamas infrastructure there would require a complex, systematic effort of dismantling; and second, that among the ground forces the level of strength and armament was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. In recent decades, the IDF had closed down a number of reserve battalions and the army had a relatively small stock of weaponry at hand. Israel had to resolve itself to mount a counterattack in Gaza while mounting nothing more than a defense on the other fronts. Because of that gradation of fighting, it was only after 11 months that the State of Israel shifted the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

From examination of the circumstances in which we entered the war, it appears that the fighting was handled successfully for the most part and that most of the decisions were correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to act differently.

First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. The military dismissed large numbers of reservists relatively early, and it may be that if it had not done so, we would have been able to pressure Hamas more strongly and shorten the fighting in Gaza.

Second, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Hamas long enjoyed an oxygen supply in the form of control over the Corridor, which enabled it to fortify itself through the Sinai. If we had cut off that oxygen supply in the first days of the war, the entire course of fighting would have looked different.

The third point, which to this day has not been properly addressed, is the control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives and thus it enables Hamas both to strengthen itself and to preserve its standing as the authority governing the Gazan populace.

Shock and awe: The current state of the war

The southern front

At the start of the war, the Southern Command estimated that it would need a year to dismantle Hamas as a military organization. Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity, as shown by its markedly reduced ability to launch rockets into Israeli territory.

The nature of the fighting in Gaza today differs from what we saw at the war’s beginning. In the first months, the IDF was obliged to operate at great intensity, with a large deployment and with coordinated attacks. In addition, it needed to operate systematically — that is to say, street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood — in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy the infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks together with air force personnel. At the same time we see systematic elimination of senior Hamas officials. Most senior officials of the organization, including Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif, have already been eliminated. The loss of senior officials weakens the organization not only militarily but in terms of governance as well, and it is an important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. We see a method of operation in the north that is reminiscent of the military doctrine developed by the USA in the late 1990s, known as “Shock and Awe.” The idea behind the doctrine is to frighten and weaken the enemy until it loses the will to fight. In that spirit, almost all the senior officials of Hezbollah, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, were already eliminated early in the fighting.

Furthermore, the IDF is undermining Hezbollah with a series of unusual operations. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. Over and above the physical harm to the terrorists, the operation also spread powerful intimidation and proved how penetrable the organization was. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force, which battered the Hezbollah infrastructures and deprived the organization of some significant capabilities.

Israel hoped that such a sequence of operations would compel Hezbollah to retreat completely from southern Lebanon and to stop firing at Israel — thus enabling the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Still, Israel took into account that Hezbollah might continue fighting nonetheless, in which case a ground operation in Lebanon would be necessary.

That operation, if it goes forward, will differ from the operation that we saw in Gaza. On the one hand, southern Lebanon is significantly less densely populated than Gaza and most of its residents have already fled, so that there will be less friction with the locals. On the other hand, southern Lebanon’s landscape is liable to present a greater challenge, with its many hills and abundant foliage. It must be stressed that Hezbollah, like Hamas, has upgraded its subterranean capabilities; and we know that many of the organization’s strategic assets — including arms factories and bases — are underground. Thus southern Lebanon too portends difficult fighting, at least some of it in tunnels.

You can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon: Important conclusions from the war’s first year

On October 7 last year, we suffered a catastrophe. But that catastrophe awakened Israel from a long sleep and made Israel aware of what sizeable threats it faces. With time, that awareness has eroded among some of the leadership and public; and today there are those who call upon us to return to a policy of keeping our eyes closed.

In order that Israel remain secure over the coming generations, the State of Israel — leaders and society alike — must take action at a number of levels:

• Strictly preserving external security: First of all, we must confront the immediate threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But there’s more to the story. We must revise our outdated national security doctrine and understand that “deterring, alerting, and defeating” does not sum up the essentials. Israel’s security doctrine must include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders, and of nipping any terrorist force in the bud. It is unthinkable that we tolerate a situation where 50 thousand armed terrorists are located 100 meters from our border fence. That is a tsunami, and you can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon. Or a tablespoon.
• Strengthening governability and internal security: In the shadow of the external threats, we must not forget that the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has dogged us for 100 years now, is still alive domestically. The State of Israel must deal with the matter of governance within the country and ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel may feel safe in their country.
• Battling delegitimization and anti-Semitism: For years we have been confronted with inciteful attempts to delegitimize Israel and stir up anti-Semitism all over the world, and since the outbreak of war the campaign has only intensified. The State of Israel must subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague, encouraging demonstrations, and bringing anti-Semitism into the streets and universities — forces led by the Palestinian Authority. To our regret, the State of Israel has not yet formulated a strategy for concrete action in the face of this severe problem.
• Instilling a common national ethos: We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. Solidarity is not a luxury but a requirement for ensuring our security and survival, because without a set of values and an ethos, no tanks or airplanes will avail.
• Establishing an enlisted society— In the State of Israel, not serving is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate. At the same time, it must be stressed that this does not mean turning into Sparta. Israel is not a nation that glorifies power and violence. On the contrary, this nation lionizes culture and innovation. The balance is an important one, which we must all practice as individuals and as a society.

As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the pathway is a long one. Today, after the many drubbings we’ve delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts.

We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Our view is that the more greatly Israel triumphs in the war, the more greatly it will thrive after the war. When the states of the world, including our enemies’ states, see our strength displayed, they will be spurred to sign peace agreements and establish strong coalitions with us. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon. There will be mass immigration to Israel and we will also see the birthrate surge as it generally does after wartime.

In order to reach those optimal days, we must maintain patience, determination, and solidarity, and not ease off the gas pedal until we have passed successfully through all the challenges that lie before us.

הפוסט The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges: Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After 2 weeks of spectacular military operations in Lebanon including feats, taken straight from a spy thriller film, Israel finally took out the most powerful terrorist in the world: Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nassrallah.

Israel’s repeated strikes and operations against the Shia terror group have demonstrated that Israeli decision makers have decided to shift gears and be willing to take calculated risks to change the geopolitical balance of power. For the first time there is a sense that Israel is willing to go all the way for a decisive victory, leaving no stone unturned rather than kicking the Hezbollah can down the road for the next generations of Israelis to deal with.

Israel is at a crossroads and has found a golden opportunity to finish off Hezbollah, potentially changing the fabric of Lebanon and the Iranian entrenchment on its northern borders from Lebanon and Syria.

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden, now a lame duck, has a much weaker leverage over Israel in attempting to hamstring Israel from dominating the escalator ladder. The US is fully immersed in the election cycle and the White House signals that it is not too keen to divert attention and resources to another Middle East crisis it needs to “contain”.

On its part, however, Iran is making strides in its attempts to assuage the west and get a new nuclear deal as reiterated by the New Iranian president. Iran cannot afford to get directly involved in a conflict with Israel right now when it needs the West. According to reports, Iran declined to directly attack Israel and protect its proxy to the chagrin of Hezbollah. After the strikes on Friday on Beirut’s Dahia quarter, Hezbollah’s infamous stronghold, former IRGC commander and Minister of Interior Ahmad Vahidi said in an interview to the Iranian national TV that every leader is replaceable, hinting that they have a successor to Nassralah. Irans allies see it as abandoning them in the money time.

Israel now has the opportunity to further the wedge between Iran and its strongest proxy Hezbollah. With continued attacks against Hezbollah, Israel could force Iran to either allow it to finish off Hezbollah in order to save a potential nuclear deal or get involved and “kiss goodbye” a lucrative nuclear deal that would fill the Islamic Republic’s coffers. Neither choice would benefit Iran.

Moreover, a weakened Hezbollah coupled with the ecstatic swathes of the Syrian and Lebanese factions who openly celebrated Nassralah’s demise, could be pushed and assisted into weakening Iran’s iron grip over these countries. Once a critical mass of anti-Hezbollah forces coalesce at a time when the Shia terror group is overwhelmed, a social tipping point could be reached changing the balance of power against Iran for the next decades.

Cutting off the largest tentacle of the Iranian octopus could also have a trinkle down effect for other proxies and restore Israel’s lost deterrence. Following the news on Nassralah’s elimination, Iranian supreme leader Ali Kameniei was moved to a secure location fearing another Israeli attack.

This momentum must continue so Israel will be able to break the tie in northern Israel and have its own internal displaced persons return to their homes. It would prove to Israelis and the jihadists that Israel will achieve its other war aims just like it achieved the restoration of the north.

This is the way to end the war, maintain and image of victory and change the narrative that Israel’s enemies tell themselves about Israel’s vulnerability.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel’s golden opportunity post Nasrallah הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article we shall focus, with the help of Adv. Yifa Segal, on the international legal system and the way Israel’s standing worldwide influences our national security and our very existence here. We shall also examine how to use our leveraging powers and technological advantages to better present ourselves and to improve our standing in the global arena.

Background – rules of war, Anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism: Trends in the world legal and social conversation

The international rules of war began taking shape less than 200 years ago. They were officially delineated only in the past century. The history of rules of war began in 1859. That is when the Battle of Solferino took place in Lombardy (present-day northern Italy), as part of the process of unifying Italy. Jean-Henri Dunant, an Austrian businessman, witnessed the consequences of the battle and was appalled by the way thousands of wounded were abandoned in the field. These spectacles drove him to establish a medical assistance organization to help the war-wounded, better known today as the “Red Cross”. About a year later a convention was held in Geneva, in which 12 countries signed a treaty, or convention, that granted immunity to medical teams and to any civilian assisting medical staff in a war zone. This was the first Geneva Convention.

In the early 20th century, two more Geneva Conventions were signed, which dealt with maritime warfare and with the treatment of prisoners of war. In 1949, following World War 2 and the horrific war crimes committed against civilian population by Nazi Germany, the first three Geneva Conventions were rewritten and another was added, which included rules concerning the treatment of civilians in wars and also concerning civilians within occupied territories, who are subject to the martial law of a hostile army. The Geneva Conventions and the lessons learned from the two World Wars form the basis for the rules of war which nowadays fall under the category of “international humanitarian law”.

Since there has not been another world ware since World War 2, the rules of war have remained unchanged for the most part. This being said, talk about human rights has in recent decades become a more and more key issue in the global social conversation. We see this conversation beginning to trickle down to international law, influencing rulings and decisions made in international courts, in various UN councils and in national parliaments. Using “human rights” as its pretext, the International Court of Justice ruled in 2004 that the Separation Fence, which was intended to provide us with a security defense, constitutes illegal annexation. Similarly, many countries have latched onto, and are still adhering to, the humanitarian excuse for boycotting Israel economically, culturally and academically.

More political, less just: the absurdity behind the international legal system

The international legal system includes two main institutions, both seated in the city of Hague in The Netherlands: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), tasked with adjudicating in disputes between countries, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is tasked with adjudicating the accountability of individuals in crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Besides the differences between their respective tasks, the two courts also have different authorities.

The International Court of Justice can rule only on matters concerning countries that have chosen to accept its authority – whether through advance consent or ad-hoc consent, or due to the signing of one Convention or another. Additionally, it is authorized to issue an advisory opinion on legal issues, at the request of the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

The International Criminal Court, on the other hand, has more far-reaching judicial authority. Since it deals with individuals, it is authorized to issue international arrest warrants against individuals and it is also authorized to impose international sanctions. Until recently the International Criminal Court worked against brutal dictatorships such as Sudan and Libya but, following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel too has found itself in the company of these undesirables. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, an attempt was made to issue arrest warrants against senior Israeli individuals, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. The charge – involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Meanwhile these warrants have not yet been issued, however if they do get issued, then the 124 member-states of the International Criminal Court will be obliged to arrest and extradite each and any defendant entering their territory – meaning that there might well be severe legal implications.

To all intents and purposes, the two international courts are apolitical judicial organs. The process of appointing the serving judges is, however, a decidedly political process and as a result, these two institutions have consistently been exhibiting a glaring anti-Israel attitude. This unfairness is also related to ingrained anti-Semitism – more on that later – and also to the disparity in the expectations, which began taking form already back in the days the rules of international war were written.

When the western powers wrote the rules of war in the early twentieth century, the hope was that these would form the rules that would dictate the global agenda and would apply to every country in the world as well as to non-state entities. In reality they only affect a handful of countries that share similar values. Then and now, most players on the international stage do not share the values of democracy and liberalism. As a result, many of them disregard the international rules and even openly support terrorism.

One might have expected a well-functioning legal system to mete out its judgments equally with any country that violates international law, however what we see is that most countries manage to evade judgment thanks to the close-knit bloc they belong to and to the powerful political influences. This is the case with Muslim countries and with anti-Western countries, which have banded together and shield each other, including in cases where egregious crimes are being committed. In the same vane, this is also what happens with western, democratic countries, which ally themselves with one another or with powers that are powerful enough to defend themselves, like the United States. In this context one such case stands out – in which the international court sought to examine whether the United States committed war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. John Bolton, who at the time was President Trump’s National Security Advisor, attacked the international court and declared that the United States would not cooperate with an illegitimate institution. Bolton went as far as to threaten sanctioning the court in the Hague, which ultimately caused the court to withdraw and the investigation evaporated.

When one looks at the politics behind the international legal system, one realizes that there is no real concern for justice; instead it is simply a power play. If international courts take one course of action against certain countries, and a different course against other countries just because they uphold a different set of values, or because they wield considerable political power – then the inevitable outcome is that they lose credibility, and that the entire raison d’être comes into question.

From Anti-Semitism to Anti-Israelism

The international system’s preoccupation with Israel exceeds the volume of occupation with all the rest of the world’s countries combined. Unfortunately, this disproportionate dealing with Israel is not confined to the halls of justice alone. It spills over into the streets in the form of demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, and even terrorism and violence.

The anti-Israeli sentiments prevalent worldwide are undoubtedly a form of anti-Semitism. Suffice it to listen to the chants and speeches at the various demonstrations to understand that people are not merely condemning Israel, the conversation is about the very delegitimization of the existence of the State. It goes so far as to justify extreme, violent actions such as kidnapping and murder of civilians.

There is no other case in the world in which the very legitimacy of a country is called into question, as is the case with Israel. Even in the most glaring cases of violent, rogue regimes and illegal conduct – including what is happening in Russia, China and Iran – one does not hear claims that these countries should not have existed in the first place and that they should cease to exist without delay. Clearly the conversation about Israel goes far beyond reason, It is driven – at least in part – by a clear hatred of Jews as a people.

Adv. Yifa Segal: The Vision for International Law and Israeli Public Diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Continue Resisting the International Legal System

Current state:

The international courts hide under a thin patina of judicial neutrality, while in reality they are biased political bodies. Suffice it to consider the identity of the judges to understand that a country like Israel has no hope of receiving a fair hearing. The person presently serving (September 2024) as presiding judge in the International Court of Justice is a Lebanese judge – Nawaf Salam, who has a documented history of extreme anti-Israeli statements. He has even voted against Israel several times in the United Nations. According to the rules of that court, when a judge is called upon to adjudicate in matters concerning a country towards which he has an obvious negative attitude, he must recuse himself. Salam did indeed receive requests that he recuse himself from proceedings involving Israel but he refused to do so.

Besides the panel of judges, many of the rulings and legal opinions handed down by the International Court base themselves on distorted facts and ignore international precedents. Thus for example, in July 2024 the International Court of Justice ruled in a non-binding legal opinion that all of the Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, in Judea and Samaria and in the Jordan Valley is illegal. When taking a closer look at the ruling, it transpires that the court is in fact calling for a total ethnic cleansing of all the Jews living in these territories – a completely unprecedented ruling anywhere in the world. The court ignores the deep historic link between Jerusalem and the Jewish People, it completely disregards the right of the Jews to self-determination, and it regards Palestine to be a full-fledged country with full sovereign rights, despite the fact that such a state has never been established.

No less incensing is the discrepancy between the yardstick to which Israel is being held, and the total absence of any yardstick when it comes to our enemies. Ever since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel has been subjected to numerous allegations, while at the same time there is virtually no scrutiny of the legal violations on the part of the Palestinians.

In a properly-functioning international order, one that is not driven by short-sighted political expediency, we would expect a more detailed response from the ICC to Hamas’s horrific crimes, one would hope Israel would be examined under the context of the crimes committed on October 7. Besides that, it would have been desirable that many countries, not just a handful, would be alarmed by this blaming of the victim in the ICJ, that they would submit their objections accordingly.

Israel is also subjected to unjust treatment in the International Criminal Court, the ICC. When the possibility of issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, the possibility of issuing similar arrest warrants against Yahya Sinwar, Muhammad Deiff and Isma’il Haniyah. Make no mistake – this is not about trying to strike a balance – the very idea of placing Israeli leaders in the same dock as the senior Hamas leaders is indicative of the crooked perception of reality and of a dangerous equation of Israel and a murderous terrorist organization.

The line Israel has been following in recent years, in most of the trials and debates held against us is a line of resistance. Realizing we will not be given a fair trial, Israel has deliberately opted not to take part in proceedings being conducted against it, thereby sending the message that it does not recognize the authority of the International Court. Besides this message, non-cooperation on the part of Israel also impedes the court when it attempts to drill down in its investigations since it is barred from accessing all the testimony and data, such that sometimes it is unable to deliver a ruling.

Ideally:

• Work to change the methodology at the international legal system: the international legal system purportedly operates democratically, however so long as most of the players involved are undemocratic, the distortions we are experiencing to our cost are bound to persist. Israel has got to exert Hasbara and diplomatic efforts to expose this injustice, which besets the international legal system. The goal should be to reorganize the method and the balance of power within the international courts.
• Refuse to cooperate with injustice: changing the international legal system will take time but it is also a long, complicated process. We must therefore focus mainly on its conduct. Israel has got to persist with the its policy of non-cooperation with biased legal proceedings. Contrary to what many believe, in most cases there is no point in participating in these proceedings since most of the judges arrive with a “precooked” verdict and we have no real way of influencing their decisions through legal means. The best we can do is repeatedly echo the message that we do not recognize the court’s authority, since it is operating in a manner that contradicts every conceivable principle of law and justice.

Use the leverage we have in the bilateral arena

Current state:

There are two different spheres of activity when it comes to diplomatic relations. The first is the multilateral arena – the domain of international institutions. The second is the bilateral arena – where the focus is on relations between two countries cooperating based on common interests.

In the multilateral arena, Israel is relatively isolated. We do not have a bloc to shield us like the Muslim countries have. On the other hand in the bilateral sphere we have many tools and leverage vis-à-vis individual countries with which we have collaborations. At the moment, however, these are not sufficiently being used.

Ideally:

• Improve our standing in the multilateral arena: Israel has got to invest in forming a bloc with other western countries or in joining an existing bloc, so as not to be isolated in the international arena and to ensure there will be countries that will shield it – as is exactly the case with the Muslim countries.
• Move from defensive to offensive: rather than work within a group of countries and try to stave off threats and sanctions, we ought to go on the offensive vis-à-vis countries where we do have leverage. Thus, will we be able to alter voting patterns in the United Nations and gain advantages in the international arena. One good example is our relationship with Jordan: behind the scenes, Jordan is dependent on us militarily and economically. It needs its cooperation with us but in the international arena it continually condemns us and works against us. We need to use our levers with Jordan, as we ought with other countries, and exact a price for the various anti-Israeli actions taken against us internationally.

Improve Israeli Public diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Current state:

There is an expectation that the State should take responsibility for the entire issue of Hasbara. There are two reasons why this is an unrealistic expectation. First of all, many of the technologies that could be extremely effective in the Hasbara world belong to the private market. Secondly, Israel, being a state, is subject to copious bureaucracy and rules that do not apply to private citizens. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to operate freely.

Another problem with Israeli Hasbara is that Israel is numerically inferior compared to its adversary states. This makes it very difficult for us to counteract our enemies using traditional tools. No matter how much we might demonstrate – our enemies will always be able to outnumber us on the streets. No matter how much information we might release – our enemies will release more. We have therefore got to find a way to neutralize the quantitative element and achieve advantage by other means.

Another problem we face in this respect is that Jewish communities in the diaspora also occasionally turn against us and even inside Israel there are numerous voices that question the entire faith in the righteousness of our ways. It is obviously acceptable that one or another government policy can be criticized, but when Jews and Israelis criticize the State of Israel per se, the Hasbara damage is tremendous. It also results in internal fissures that weaken us as a nation.

Ideally:

• Hasbara is everybody’s responsibility: we need to let go of the state of mind that says that the State is supposed to take care of everything. After all, the State is the collective representing all of us. In the early stages of the war there was widespread engagement by the general public, which mobilized especially in favor of Hasbara and we scored some impressive results. Over time most people resumed their everyday life and the issue was abandoned. Once people realize that it is their responsibility, and that they are able to take part in the Israeli national Hasbara effort, we will be able to engage our best minds, freeing ourselves of the constraints that hobble the state and do wonders for Israel’s international standing.
• Leverage our technological superiority: since we cannot bridge the quantitative gap with our enemies, we have to find our advantages in other areas. Outstanding among these is technology. Israel is a leader in this area. If we concentrate our efforts and adopt new tools, such as AI, we could improve our Hasbara capacity and better echo the messages we want to convey.

Not neglect the domestic Hasbara channels: The Israeli Hasbara efforts need to be directed inwards, not only outwards. We must see to it that the country’s citizens do not fall prey to false information and that they do not take part in propagating these lies to the rest of the world, since this weakens us as a people and is even more detrimental to our international image.

Increase enforcement in Israel and worldwide

Current state:

Around the world, and in Israel as well, there are various organizations that are operating under the umbrella of humanitarian work and human rights while in actual fact they are part of a well-organized terrorist network. These organizations pose a great danger since they create a false picture of the reality and drive processes harmful to Israel in terms of its Hasbara, its legal standing, and sometimes they even result in actual terrorist attacks.

These organizations employ sophisticated modus operandi. In most cases it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the link between them and terrorist organizations of terror-supporting countries. The result is an absurd state of affairs where around the world and in Israel itself, various NGOs are operating, benefitting from tax exemptions and other advantages while in effect calling for the destruction of Israel.

Despite the difficulty, a concerted effort and efficient investigation and interrogation techniques would enable incrimination of the fraudulent organizations and taking effective anti-crime measures against them. Germany has provided one example of this . Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war and the global rise in anti-Semitism, Germany has increased its investigation and enforcement in this area. In July 2024 it managed to shut down an organization that had for many years been operating as an offshoot of Iran.

Ideally:

• Fight terrorism-supporting organizations: Israel has to increase the State’s domestic enforcement and carefully scrutinize suspicious organizations operating within it so as to understand where their financing is coming from and with whom they are in contact. The State has also got to withhold tax benefits from NGOs that condemn it and even call for its destruction.
• Mobilize foreign states: Israel must harness other countries in favor of the fight against terror-supporting organizations and make it clear to them that if there are organizations within them calling for anti-Semitism and genocide, this is a national problem requiring their intervention.

No Quick Fix: Summary and Conclusions

The international institutions, primarily the United Nations and the international courts, have long ago become yet another weapon in Israel’s enemies’ arsenal – a weapon they use skillfully. Even though the international courts have no way of enforcing their rulings against Israel, the damage caused to Israel’s image abroad is considerable. It shapes a false image of Israel and brands it as a rogue state.

It is important to understand that the courts’ rulings affect not only the legal and diplomatic arenas. They filter down into society and influence public opinion, including the opinions of key media personalities and influential global political and security influencers. The courts’ rulings also lend legitimacy to various NGOs and humanitarian organizations worldwide and sometimes lead to sanctions and boycotts being imposed on Israel, causing it economic harm and damaging cultural exchanges. Worse than that, the rulings by the international courts play into the hands of Israel’s enemies. They fan the flames of anti-Semitism around the world and stimulate the calls to delegitimize Israel.

The inherent injustice typical of the international legal system is infuriating and our ability to reshape the system is very limited. This being said, we should not remain idle. Israel has got to exploit its leverage with various countries worldwide, it must augment its control and enforcement capabilities, and it must achieve technological advantages to enable it to counteract its enemies, who far outnumber us. The population at large must also understand that they bear their share of responsibility. They have to seek ways to contribute toward improving Israel’s Hasbara worldwide. They must help silence the voices from outside and from within that call for banishing us from our land and even for our extermination.

At the same time we must realize that we need to take a deep breath, that there is no instant precooked solution for our predicaments. The task of improving Israel’s image and legal standing is going to take a lot of long-term, hard, challenging work. Our enemies have been patiently working to tarnish our image for decades. Now is the time for us to exhibit the same patience.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: International Law, Israel’s Public Diplomacy and Delegitimization הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Dr. Omer Dostri looks at Israel’s security doctrine — a doctrine that took form when the state was founded and has not been updated since.

Background — Deterring, alerting, defeating: The current security doctrine of the State of Israel

In the 1950s, David Ben-Gurion formulated Israel’s security doctrine. Ben-Gurion is generally assumed to have based his doctrine on principles that appeared in Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s essay “The Iron Wall.” Ben-Gurion believed that, as the essay says, a strong army must be established, and national power developed, in order to halt the enemy’s attempts to attack until, understanding that we cannot be expelled or exterminated, the enemy finally accepts our existence. Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine, also known as the “security triangle,” included three key components:

• Deterring: The State of Israel must display military superiority in order to deter its enemies and convince them that attacking Israel is not worthwhile. Because Israel is at a geographic and demographic disadvantage, Israeli deterrence is built primarily on significant alliances, a strong economy, and a technological advantage.

• Alerting: The State of Israel must develop intelligence capabilities and use methods of early warning in order to be able to prepare itself in advance of any attack.

• Defeating: Once an attack has taken place or a palpable threat has been discovered, the enemy must be confronted and overcome.

That doctrine, including the sequence that it dictates — first deterring, then alerting, then defeating — may have suited the geopolitical and military situation of the State’s early years, a situation in which we confronted hostile states such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq; but today, aside from Iran, we are hardly obliged at all to deal with hostile states as such. Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with us, Syria and Iraq have been exhausted by civil wars, and Lebanon has fallen to Hezbollah. Thus our enemies today are not states but rather terrorist organizations — and such enemies require a completely different security doctrine.

Over the years, there have been a few attempts to change Israel’s security doctrine. Thus, for example, in 2006 the Meridor Committee expanded the security doctrine, adding the element of protection. But no other significant changes came about in doctrine or in operations, and the State of Israel continues to rely on an erroneous doctrine. The direct result of that error was the disaster of October 7.

In order to prevent an additional disaster, the State of Israel must impose the necessary revisions right away and formulate a new security doctrine that suits today’s reality and can provide a response to the threats currently at our doorstep.

Dr. Omer Dostri: The vision of a new security doctrine for Israel

Deterrence will derive from victory

Current state: The State of Israel has become addicted to the element of deterrence. In recent years, most of our military operations in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have been intended to deter our enemies, not to defeat them. Even in the Second Lebanon War, Israel did not try to defeat Hezbollah decisively and destroy it as a military and governmental factor, but contented itself with instilling fear.

Those operations and rounds of fighting have not proven themselves, for the simple reason that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to deter an extremist Islamic enemy. States and organizations with a Western mentality may somehow be susceptible to influence, but enemies such as Hamas and Hezbollah speak a completely different language and cannot easily be deterred, if at all.

Ideally:

• Reverse the sequence: History shows that the best deterrence is obtained by a clear military victory. Thus the sequence of matters must be reversed. First aim for victory, and after victory the deterrence will emerge automatically.

• Defeat Hamas and Hezbollah: The most urgent objective of the State of Israel is the defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah. Such a defeat will not only leave us in the dominant position but also provide us with deterrent power in the region for the next two decades.

Deterrence based solely on intentions is not deterrence

Current state: In order to achieve prior deterrence against attacks, the State of Israel has focused mainly on the enemy’s intentions and tried to assess how likely an attack is. Our enemies’ intentions are indeed important, but it is unreasonable to ignore their capabilities. Over the years, we have seen Hamas grow stronger and stronger, and instead of nipping that process in the bud, we allowed it to continue because we believed that Hamas would not dare attack Israel.

If we continue to base our system of deterrence on the enemy’s supposed intentions, we are likely to overlook many further items of importance.

Ideally:

• Base deterrence on abilities: The State of Israel and the IDF must strongly emphasize intelligence gathering, in order to learn the enemy’s abilities and discern any buildup of strength in advance.

• Take the initiatives: Rather than waiting for the enemy to express the intent to inflict harm on us, Israel should go into action as soon as it sees that the enemy’s strength is sufficient to do so.

Above all else, victory

Current state: Currently the element of victory ranks at the bottom of the national security doctrine. In recent years the State of Israel has stopped short of true victory over the enemy and been satisfied with tightly targeted operations against local threats. That approach enabled our enemies to gather strength and created the circumstances that beset us today.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel should aim for true victory over its enemies. First and foremost, we must defeat Hamas. We must not halt the war in Gaza before we have completely demolished the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, because otherwise Hamas will bounce back.

• The next stage is to defeat Hezbollah at the northern border. A long spell of quiet, such as followed the Second Lebanon War, is not enough. This time we must put an end to the entity known as Hezbollah, even at the cost of an arduous all-out war in Lebanon. If we do not neutralize Hezbollah now, then in another five or ten years we will face an October 7 on steroids.

• After we have finished with Gaza and Lebanon, we must completely clear Judea and Samaria of terrorism. Tightly targeted operations of two or three days will not suffice. A comprehensive operation, a Defensive Shield 2, must expunge all the terrorist nests that have sprung up there. Only complete victory on all fronts will provide us with quiet and safety for years to come.

Giving the geographic component its place

Current state: As soon as the state was founded, its leaders — both left-wing and right-wing — saw clearly that Jewish settlement is the foundation for everything. However, the current security doctrine gives no consideration to the geographic or settlement component. Moreover, in recent decades Israel has taken various steps of withdrawal from territories in the naïve hope that calm and quiet would result.

As history teaches, every retreat from the Jewish settlements exacts a heavy price. We saw it under the Oslo Accords when we left parts of Judea and Samaria, we saw it when we left the Lebanese security zone behind and it turned immediately into a zone of terror, and we are seeing it now in Gaza. Obviously if there had been Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip — as there was before the Disengagement — October 7, in the sickening form that it took, could not have occurred.

Ideally:

• Jewish settlement is the foundation for security, because wherever we are not present, our enemies will be and they will foment terror. We must encourage settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel, with wisdom, with understanding, and with an emphasis on the north, the south, the Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza.

Civilians too have their role

Current state: Before the War of Iron Swords, most of Israel’s citizens were not actively taking part in the national defense effort. There was not enough of a hold on the periphery and on the agricultural expanses at the border. The emergency squads in the border communities were not properly trained and equipped, and only a few civilians carried small arms.

Ideally:

• Extensive occupancy of land: We must firm up our control, and our agriculture, in the outlying areas as part of the extensive occupancy of the land.

• Outlying communities as part of the border security system: We must establish more emergency squads, train them properly, and provide them with weapons and ammunition.

• National guard: A national guard must be established, and it must receive extensive powers and ample budgets in order to assume a significant defensive role in the outlying communities and the mixed cities.

• New gun licensing policy: The process of obtaining a gun license must be made simpler for Israeli citizens. Terrorism is not a problem located across the border, it is happening inside Israel and we see many cases in which armed civilians have taken charge in the face of terrorism and saved fellow civilians.

Reducing military dependency

Current state: Israeli military industry has shrunken in recent years, while the State of Israel has increasingly relied on weapons and other materiel imported from foreign countries. In such circumstances Israel, needing other countries to arm it, loses a great deal of its independence and freedom of action in security matters. It needs to submit explanations that will satisfy the countries on which it depends.

Ideally:

• Independent manufacturing ability: One of the most significant lessons from October 7 is that Israel must base its warfare as thoroughly as possible on its own weapons manufacturing. Granted, the State of Israel is a small country with a limited workforce and apparently we will never fill all our military needs ourselves — but the more we reduce our dependency on other countries, the more we increase our bargaining power and our ability to act independently.

New doctrine — new security: Summary and conclusions

Security is an end, not a means, and its preservation is of paramount importance. However, the State of Israel observes a 75-year-old security doctrine that may have been wise in its early days but has long since lost its applicability. The disaster of October 7 is painful, decisive proof.

In order to successfully answer today’s threats, we must develop a new security doctrine. Whereas the old doctrine included only three components — deterring, alerting, and defeating — the new doctrine must also consider Jewish settlement, the role of the civilians in defense, and Israel’s security independence. In addition, we must not overvalue the component of deterrence, certainly not to the point of ignoring the most important component of all: victory. We must also understand that in order to attain lasting security and stability, we will be paying a heavy price, particularly at the present fateful juncture which may be determining the country’s future for decades to come.

The author is solely responsible for the content of this article, and it does not necessarily reflect the position of the IDSF movement.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The national security doctrine הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Traditionally speaking, the Tul Karem sector was not considered among the most hostile sectors of Judea and Samaria, particularly not when compared with hornets’ nests such as Jenin or Nablus. However, during the years of the Gaza War, we have been witnessing a shift of the fulcrum of terror in Judea and Samaria wherein Tul Karem is becoming a rising hotbed of terror that is extremely challenging for Israel’s security forces.

Almost on a weekly basis, videos are posted to the Telegram app, showing young armed Palestinians, faces covered, firing their weapons in the direction of the Jewish communities of the Hefer Vally on the other side of the Green Line.

In response, Israeli security forces conducted counter-terror activity in Tul Karem, detaining many terrorists and eliminating terror squads. Out of the 600 terrorists eliminated in the Judea and Samaria area since the start of the Gaza War, 125 were from Tul Karem alone. On August 2024 the Israeli security forces launched Operation Summer Camps in northern Judea and Samaria, which targeted terror cells in Jenin, Tul Karem and the Nur a-Shams refugee camp. To date, the ongoing operation has resulted in the capturing of a copious amount of ready-to-use IEDs, the elimination of senior terror operatives and the seizure of large amounts of arms and ammunition.

Despite the security forces’ frequent counter-terror activity in Tul Karem, the terrorists continue expanding their ranks, stepping up their terror activity and sowing fear in the hearts of the communities in the Sharon district and central Israel, with a slew of threat assessment and scenario projections which are reminiscent of the picture on the Gaza border right before the October 7 massacre.

How had Tul Karem become an incendiary terror hotbed?

The October 7 massacre has become a source of inspiration for terrorists and terror organizations in Israel and the world, and accordingly Tul Karen had also taken a page out of the Hamas’ book of terror and the city and its environ refugee camps have become seething  hotbeds of terror.

The geographic location of Tul Karen poses a grave threat to the communities of the Sharon region, most of all to the Bat Hefer community, which is located only a few dozens of meters away. To give one example: the residents of Emek Hefer have been reporting that they have been hearing sounds of digging under their houses for quite a while. And more – there have been numerous incidents of armed men firing automatic rifles from the direction of Tul Karem toward Bat  Hefer and other Jewish communities across the Green Line. In 2024, two terror attacks against IDF soldiers were committed in that area, claiming the lives of a soldier and an officer.

The new terror groups that the area has been breeding draw members predominantly from young terrorists from Tul Karam, the Nur a-Shams refugee camp, Qalqilya and Tubas. These terrorists were weaned on the vehement antisemitic and anti-Israel incitement of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Judea and Samaria, and they certainly  perceive the October 7 attack as inspiration for more of the same attacks.

From Bat Hefer to Tehran: The Iranian connection

The multiplying terror operatives in Judea and Samaria enjoy the support of various types from Iran and its proxies – namely Hamas and the PIJ.

In mid-May 2024, a proxy terror conference was held in Tehran, in which the Iranian and the representatives of their proxies agreed to aim for further escalation vis a vis Israel, as a means for pressuring it into ending the Gaza War, not by means of diplomacy and negotiations for an agreement for the release of the hostages. It is plausible that the firing incidences toward the Bat Hefer community are part of that stratagem.

Iran and its proxies support the terror organizations that operate in Judea and Samaria, particularly those from the Tul Karem area. This support is in the form of financing, smuggling of arms and ammunition, and knowledge-sharing. The numerous shipments of smuggled arms Israel has been apprehending lately in the Judea and Samaria region teaches that Iran is actively swamping the area with weapons and ammunition. Most of these weapons come, most probably, through Jordan and are smuggled successfully into Judea and Samaria due to inadequate border security – both on the Israeli side and the Jordanian side.

It is important to understand that the Iranians, like many other players in the Middle East, view the October 7 attack an achievement that marks the beginning of the end for the Jewish state. The heinous massacre has galvanized them, Hamas and the rest of the “resistance axis” members to plan and attempt more such attacks. This time, believe these terror elements, the attack will come from the Judea and Samaria region, aimed at the soft underbelly of Israel – the Sharon region and the center of the country.

This notion might be an item on Iran’s “unification of the arenas” agenda. The person captaining this strategy is member of Hamas political bureau Zaher Al-Jabarin, who last May hinted “Hamas still has many cards up its sleeve that have not been use yet. Al-Jabarin added that “the West Bank will surprise the enemy sometime soon, and we shall see new chapters in the Palestinian military creativity”.

How do we prevent an October 7 in the Sharon region?

The current reality in Judea and Samaria, where terror organizations are engaged in establishing armed militias and fomenting another active front in the heart of Israel, is unacceptable. Therefore this threat on part of the terror nests from within Arab Judea and Samaria towns and refugee camps, must be eradicated, the area must be demilitarized and cleansed of weapons and ammunition.

To do so, Israel must first drive a wedge among the militias, and fragment their military unity with the entire body of terror organizations, especially in northern Samaria. Additionally, Israel must adopt a change of paradigm and depart from the common conception that the Hamas and Jihad terror organizations are fundamentally different then the FATAH-aligned terror organizations, such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Furthermore, Israel must exact a price from the Palestinian Authority and publicly proclaim the Authority responsible for every and any act of terror coming from Judea and Samaria. In addition, Israel must step up its counter-terror activity and begin planning a broad military campaign to paralyze and eradicate the terror infrastructure that is developing in the region.

Alongside the abovementioned remedies, Israel must boost its forces along the Jordanian border to restore its control over the area and consolidate its supervision and control along that border in order to stem the illegal flow of firearms and other weapons from Jordan into Israel, while at the same time demanding the Jordanians to take measures on its part to seal the border for illegal smuggling on the Jordanian side as well.

There are many who claim that now is not the time to open a new front while the war in Gaza is in full swing, to avoid a multi-theater campaign. However, such opinions fail to understand that Israel is already in the throes of a multi-theater war, and without a well-structured strategy to fight the pernicious terror of Judea and Samaria, that violence will continue claiming victims among the Jewish people living in that region as well as inevitably – in the Sharon area and in the very heart of Israel, becoming a shroud of danger covering the entire country and placing all of its citizens in peril.

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הפוסט A New Terror Hub Called Tul Karem: Summary of IDSF HaBithonistim Position Paper הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, researcher Eran Lahav will focus on the organizations waging global jihad. He will detail the ideological and practical distinctions among the various organizations, explain how the current war influences their activities, and explain why Israel and the western nations must cooperate against the threat in its increasing severity.

Background — The global jihad organizations: An overview

Global jihad is a general term covering the various branches in a network of radical Islamic organizations that call for total war against the infidels and for establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

In order to understand how global jihad emerged, it is necessary to revisit the 1960s. In that decade, Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb published a call to action explaining why western culture must be combatted. Qutb’s opinions strongly influenced the Muslim world — notably including Palestinian Sheikh Abdallah Yousuf Azzam, who today is considered “father of the jihad.” Azzam was a senior figure in the Muslim Brotherhood and subsequently founded Al Qaeda, which today remains one of the most significant jihadi organizations. Azzam is also considered the mentor of Osama bin Laden; he played an important role in nurturing that arch-terrorist.

Since then, the global jihad organizations have multiplied. Today hundreds of organizations fit the definition, and they operate all around the world. Over the past 40 years, those organizations have committed roughly 50 thousand terror attacks, spanning many countries, and brought death to thousands of innocent people.

Most of the global jihad organizations are composed of Salafi Sunni operatives. The Salafi movement, or Salafism, is a radical Islamic movement that venerates the “salaf” — the primal forefather. According to the Salafists, Islam was at its best in the days of the Prophet Muhammad and of the first caliphs, and so the Salafists wish to bring modern Islam as close as possible to the spirit of those times. In order to reach their goal, the organizations embrace jihad — an important concept that comprises two aspects. They believe that there is the greater jihad, which is the spiritual battle within each individual, and there is the lesser jihad, which is the war in defense of Islam against the infidels. From the western world’s point of view, the lesser jihad is in practice the greater jihad, the one that confronts us in the form of murderous terror attacks.

Among the global jihad organizations, despite their ideological similarity and shared objective, there are palpable differences and even rivalries.

The two largest and most significant jihadi organizations active in the world today are Al Qaeda and ISIS (the Islamic State). Although ISIS arose from within Al Qaeda, the two organizations are fiercely hostile and they battle one another.

One reason for their conflict is the desire for primacy, as each organization wishes to be the world’s largest and most significant.

Another reason concerns ideology, and more specifically the way in which the organization interprets the concept of the “infidels.” To ISIS, even the Shiite Muslims fall within the category. In contrast, although Al Qaeda is a Salafi Sunni organization, it is not at war with the Shiites. In fact, during recent decades Al Qaeda has cooperated with Iran, which is very much a Shiite state, and in fact Al Qaeda’s present leader, Saif al-Adel, is widely believed to be currently in hiding inside Iran.

Who versus who?

Both ISIS and Al Qaeda operate under a system of decentralized forces, maintaining branches and cells all over the world. The central branch of ISIS today is ISIS – Khorasan Province. That branch is responsible for the attack at the Moscow concert hall and poses a threat throughout Europe.

In Al Qaeda, one of the main branches is Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, which operates in Somalia. It is a strong organization, the source of many problems. Recently it has started cooperating with the Houthis in Yemen and, by doing so, with Iran as well.

Al Qaeda also enjoys support from various regimes, most prominently the Taliban of Afghanistan. Some members of Al Qaeda also hold various positions in the Taliban administration; thus cooperation between those forces is full and continuous. The cooperation angers ISIS in particular, because ISIS considers the Taliban infidels.

Global jihad and the regional terrorist organizations

A common question is whether Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which operate in Gaza, are also considered global jihad organizations. The short answer is no. The long answer is that rather than being Salafi, Hamas and PIJ follow the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although they hope, like the global jihad organizations, to establish an Islamic caliphate and gain control of all the western nations, they are willing to approach that objective more gradually.

Hamas sees itself, odd though this may seem, as a pragmatic organization, and so it is prepared to negotiate with the “infidels” in order to advance its agenda. Negotiations with the West and with Israel would never be acceptable to organizations of the global jihad.

Moreover, Hamas and PIJ include an element of nationalism stronger than their universalism. Their foremost objective is to destroy Israel as a Jewish state and replace it with a Palestinian state; and only afterward would they find occasion to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

Hamas and PIJ also differ from the global jihad organizations by their affinity to Iran. Although they are Sunni organizations, Hamas — and PIJ even more so — cooperate with Shiite Iran in pursuit of their shared objective: the destruction of Israel. Such cooperation would be unacceptable to most global jihad organizations, and especially to ISIS and its branches.

Which is more dangerous, global jihad or Iran?

To Israel, Iran is definitely the primary threat at the doorstep today. But as evidence below will show, the global jihad organizations too may certainly rise up against Israel.

For the western nations, both threats are matters of life and death. They both need to be removed promptly. But unfortunately, just as the world is hesitant in handling the Iranian threat, the global jihad threat is also being handled far from satisfactorily.

Eran Lahav — The vision for dealing with the threat of global jihad

Understanding the jihadi ideology

The current situation:

The western world has repeatedly suffered harm from the global jihad organizations, but its view of the ideology motivating them remains mistaken. The countries of North America, and more so the countries of Europe, have difficulty understanding why a Somali or Syrian immigrant, having received privileges and resources and a significantly better life, would choose to attack the provider of that good fortune. Even if those countries do understand that a problem exists, they do not deeply grasp the concept of jihad and the implications behind its war against the infidels.

That incomprehension causes the West to retain a policy that has long been failing and thus continue to offer immigrants privileges and money to no avail.

Until recently, even some Israelis believed that by answering humanitarian needs or improving infrastructures, they could bring about a halt to terrorism, but after the disaster of October 7, it is clear to us that the terrorist ideology does not really soften under comfortable living conditions.

Ideally:

• Comprehending the ideology: Having stood for years on the front line against radical Islam, Israel comprehends the jihadi ideology much better than western countries do. We must convey our knowledge and experience to those countries in order to open their eyes and enable them to thoroughly understand the nature of the enemy.
• Recognizing the complexity of immigration: Certainly many of the immigrants from states in distress, and from war zones, are innocent citizens seeking only to improve their quality of life, and they are deserving. However, there must be no ignoring the many who exploit their foothold in the western countries in order to damage them from within. The damage can come not only from the immigrants themselves but also from their children who are born in the West and considered full-fledged American or European citizens. Only with a true understanding of that complex situation can the western nations contend with the dangers that immigration brings.

Recognizing the power of technological media and social networks

The current situation:

From their inception, the global jihad organizations have known how to exploit technology. Even photos of Bin Laden hiding in his cave, after the attack on the World Trade Center, show sophisticated technological equipment in the foreground.

Today, with many of their operatives living in North America and Europe, those organizations can all the more easily adopt western technology; and thus the problem becomes much more difficult.

Over the past decade and a half, the jihadi organizations have made extensive use of the social networks. They know how to leverage those networks effectively for propaganda and incitement. Recently, with the emergence of artificial intelligence, they have succeeded in upgrading their abilities yet further, and they use the various AI tools to create deep fake videos, to design deceptive images, and to spread disinformation. Some even operate chatbots, such as ChatGPT, that help spread slanted and exaggerated information.

Whereas global jihad organizations once distributed videos of someone reading a sermon, today they already can distribute far more attractive and persuasive content. Such content especially influences the young, and it encourages them to join the organizations’ branches, to set up cells on their own, or simply to operate as “lone wolves” and carry out terror attacks at their own initiative. And indeed, since the emergence of social networks and all the more since the development of artificial intelligence, we see that an organizational infrastructure is no longer necessary for terror attacks. One person is enough, if incited by a video to pick up a knife and act out.

Ideally:

• Not underestimating the enemy: We must understand that even while holding attitudes that seem obsolete to us, our enemy can still be clever and advanced in its operations. The global jihad organizations well recognize the power of technology, and they exploit it. Moreover, they also exploit their familiarity with western culture, and with its weaknesses, in order to focus their propaganda efforts.
• Retaining technological superiority: Israel and the western countries must retain technological superiority and make sure that they stay one step ahead of the jihadi organizations rather than vice versa. To that purpose, we must develop a more sophisticated, masterful presence on the social networks. They are an open intelligence medium that carries daily messages encouraging terrorism. Many of those messages are couched in hints between the lines, but enough effort from us can discover them too.

Follow the money

The current situation:

The global jihad organizations are very wealthy, and their wealth fuels their mounting strength. Their funds come from various sources, such as donations from activists and grants from supportive governments. These organizations also manage to pilfer more than a little western aid money intended for civilians in war zones. Some funding also derives from crime. For example, the Taliban gave Al Qaeda access to Afghanistan’s opium fields and thus Al Qaeda can profit from manufacturing illegal drugs.

The organizations also maintain trade relations with one another, buying and selling weapons and other assets — thus running an underground economy.

In recent years, the organizations have been extensively using digital currencies, and much of their money is carried through such channels. Digital currency makes the sources of the organizations’ funding much more difficult to trace, contributing further to their growing wealth and strength.

Ideally:

• Enlisting technology: Following the money can be a way to uncover a great deal of information about terrorist organizations and can even damage them financially. The western countries should continue their efforts to trace these organizations’ sources of funding, on the understanding that the organizations use advanced resources such as digital currencies. Here too, technological superiority is the key to removing the problem.
• Supervising the aid money: Just as Hamas appropriates the humanitarian supplies sent into the Gaza Strip, the global jihad organizations appropriate the funds sent to civilians in such areas as Iraq and Syria. The donor countries must exert better control over the funds that they supply. They must ensure that the funds reach the intended hands.

Remember that a secondary threat can become a leading threat

The current situation:

To the global jihad, Israel and the Jews are an enemy but not at top priority. For most of those organizations, the main objective is to hit at the western powers who, in their eyes, are colonialists who dethroned Islam.

Another reason for Israel’s secondary priority is that the jihadi organizations have difficulty taking root in our region. Besides having to cope with Israel’s security forces and, to an extent, with those of the Palestinian Authority, they also need to elbow the local terrorist organizations aside, primarily Hamas. It is important to understand that in the local arena, the prevailing ideology is the Muslim Brotherhood’s, which means that the global jihad organizations do not find easy acceptance.

As for Israel, just as it is not considered a top priority by global Islamic jihad, it does not rank the global jihad organizations as a top priority of its own. So it has always been, but currently as we wage a multi-front war and are forced to deal with the threat from Iran and its proxies, any confrontation with the global jihadi threat is relegated to yet lower priority.

However, it must be understood that those organizations still do wish to destroy us and that today they already enjoy a certain foothold inside Israeli territory. Although ISIS has no organizational infrastructure inside Israel, it does have operatives among the Israeli Arabs and they have even attempted to organize a ISIS cell in the country’s north. Moreover, a number of attempted terror attacks by ISIS inside Israel have been foiled, such as the April 2024 terror attack intended for Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem.

It is also important to realize that the global jihad organizations are strongly influenced by the Swords of Iron war. They see it as a springboard for a worldwide war of jihad. Since the outbreak of war, we have witnessed widespread calls for attacks against Jews around the world. Some such attacks have been foiled.

Ideally:

• Keeping a steady watch: Of course Israel must focus on its central challenge, which is Iran. But at the same time it must not forget that the global jihad organizations pose a further threat. Regarding the current war, some of those organizations, most prominently Al Qaeda, are cooperating with Iran and could certainly assume a place in Iran’s war effort. Furthermore, we have seen many times that in the unstable Middle East, a secondary threat can turn quickly into a leading threat.

• Protecting Jews worldwide: Even while the State of Israel itself is exposed to an immediate threat from the jihadi organizations, Jews are vulnerable around the world. Spurred by the Swords of Iron war, those organizations are sounding many calls for attacks on synagogues and Jewish communities around the world. We must understand that our local war can develop into a worldwide jihad, and we must take responsibility for our brothers and sisters in the Diaspora.

Building a worldwide coalition

The current situation:

The jihadi organizations are calling for total war against the infidels — including the Jews, the Christians, and even a large portion of the Muslims. This situation exposes many of the world’s citizens to the jihadi threat, and they may fall victim to terror attacks emanating from those organizations. Thus the danger applies not only to Israel and to the western nations but also to moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Those nations are already suffering more than a little from the jihadi organizations, and they see those organizations as a palpable threat that could topple their regimes.

However, no worldwide coalition has yet formed to confront the jihadi threat, and as of now, most nations are trying to cope with that threat independently or in narrow cooperation.

Ideally:

• Forming a stable worldwide coalition: A coalition must be formed including all the states that are threatened by global jihad — including the USA, Canada, Western Europe, Israel, and the moderate Arab states. Only such cooperation can properly respond to the jihadi threat in terms of quantity and of knowhow and skills. The aim is to have all those states represented in a forum that meets regularly and advances the handling of the threat. It is important to understand that each state can contribute. The western states have resources and capabilities, Israel has much experience in intelligence and operations, and the Arab states bring the best understanding of the jihadi ideology and of the forces that motivate those organizations.

Israel and the West in the same boat — Summation and conclusions

Global jihad did not die with the elimination of Osama Bin Laden. In fact, it has only gained further power and intensity since then, and today it includes hundreds of sub-organizations active everywhere in the world. Despite the disputes and rivalries between the organizations, they all share the goal of wiping out the infidels and establishing a global Islamic caliphate.

In order to be tackled, the global jihadi threat must first be understood. Most western nations still have difficulty absorbing an in-depth understanding of jihad as a concept, and they tend to underestimate the enemy who stands before them. Having learned from experience, Israel should help the western nations understand that the jihadi ideology is more powerful than any economic incentive, and Israel should make it clear that this is a clever enemy in possession of the most highly advanced technological abilities.

Thus we must work to create a strong worldwide coalition. After all, the declared objective of the global jihad organizations is to exterminate whoever is not a Salafi Muslim. So Israel, the West, and even some of the Muslim nations are all in the same boat.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Threat of Global Jihad הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Declaration of Independence is first and foremost the most seminal document in Israel’s history. It lays out succinctly and clearly the blueprint and justification for the newly founded State of Israel and tells the story of the Jewish people.

The declaration opens with the assertion of the Jewish people’s historical right to the land of Israel and points to the thousand years of Jewish life in the Land before the Jews were taken into exile. It cites the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate as international confirmation of the  legal right of the Jews to the Land of Israel, and refers to the Holocaust as testament to the urgency in which the Jewish State must become a reality. The Declaration also establishes the values on which the State shall be founded, and calls upon all diaspora Jews to congregate in the Land of Israel and together bring the vision of the redemption of the land to life.

It tells a story of the Jewish nation which is historically accurate as it is conclusive. Unfortunately, over the past decades there are those who strive to diminish that narrative’s internal cohesiveness by using groundless narratives to pick at the justifications presented in the seminal document, and many of the Jews in Israel are losing sight and conviction of the justness of the Jewish nation’s cause.

This loss of conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause is one of the most dangerous phenomena manifesting recently in Israel’s society; without deep faith in the absolute right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, we have little reason to exist in that land. Without that conviction, we cannot ensure a conclusive and long-standing victory in the current war and we surely will not be able to guarantee peace for our future generations.

“Accordingly we are here assembled”: the factors laying the groundwork for the establishment of the State of Israel

Historical right

The Declaration of Independence was penned only three years after World Ward 2 and the atrocities of the Holocaust. Nonetheless, the document does not open on the story of the six million Jews who perished in Europe, but with the assertion: “Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel] is the  birthplace of the Jewish people, where its spiritual, religious and political identity was forged”. In other words, the Declaration’s point of departure is the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, stating: this is the place from which the Jewish people had arisen as a nation; here we lived as sovereigns of our land for generations, and here we created our national cultural inalienable assets. The Declaration underscores the “forcible” exile of the Jews from their land, and asserts that despite this, even in its exile, the Jewish people had staunchly kept its allegiance to the Land of Israel, yearningly praying for the return to the Jewish homeland and the renewal of its national liberty.

The Declaration addresses the Zionist enterprise, mentioning the pioneers who came to the Land of Israel to cultivate its soil and revive the Hebrew language, as well as the speech in the  first Zionist Congress (1897) by the founding father of the Zionist movement, Theodor Hertzel, stating the Jewish nation’s right to be reinstated in its land as a nation.

Legal justification

Furthermore, the Declaration addresses the legal right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel. It draws on the Balfour Declaration from 1917, which acknowledges the right of the Jewish people to establish their national home in the Land of Israel. The Balfour Declaration was the basis for the British Mandate in Israel. The Mandate document states: “…the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917 by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers [the Allied Powers], in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people…”

The Mandate, conferred upon Britain by the League of Nations (predecessor of the United Nations) is the most binding legal document pertaining to international recognition of the Jewish people’s right to the Land of Israel, in which the British have accepted the responsibility of acting to put this right into effect. It should be mentioned that Arthur James Balfour’s original intention was to establish a national home for the Jewish people on the entirety of the land of biblical Israel, including the Transjordan territories – Greater Eretz Israel.

However, history shows that the British Mandate in effect acted in contradiction to the mandate they were given, and rather than facilitating the establishment of the Jewish State as agreed upon in the Mandate document, the British administration prevented the immigration of Jews to Israel and moreover – allowed scores of Arabs from the entire Middle East to pour into the area. Furthermore, the British issued the White Paper (policy paper), which blatantly flouted the terms agreed upon in the Mandate. And if that were not enough, the British excluded the Transjordan territories from the historic territory of Greater Israel and of the Jewish national homeland, and allowed the creation of a new sovereign entity unorganic to the area under the Hashemite rule, named Jordan, in the Transjordan area.

Despite the British violation of the Mandate conferred upon then, and their commitment to the League of Nations, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate remained legal binding documents that stated beyond doubt that the Jewish people have national rights to the Land of Israel.

The Holocaust imperative

It is only after the declaration asserts the historical and legal right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel, that it addresses the Holocaust, citing that “The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people – the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe” as a “clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State”. The Declaration states that the State of Israel would be open for Jewish immigration from all exiles of the Jewish nation, thereby laying the foundations for the Law of Return, which grants people of Jewish descent the automatic right to live in Israel and gain citizenship.

The fashion in which the case for the Jewish right to the Land of Israel is laid out aimed to ensure that the Holocaust would not be taken as the framework of – and surely not the sole justification for – the Jewish entitlement to their national homeland. The authors of the Declaration single out the Holocaust as testimony to the urgency of an immediate solution, such that is deeply engrained in the historical and legal right of the Jews to the Land of Israel – far predating the events of the Holocaust.

Fast forward to present day Israel.

Sadly, over the recent decades, a growing number of Israelis have been forgetting this right, and have come to see the Holocaust as the driving factor justifying the existence of Israel.

It behooves us to understand that albeit a deeply painful reminder of the importance of a Jewish homeland, the Holocaust is not the pretext for the establishment of Israel, and that the Jews live in Israel by right and not by the grace of others.

The Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly

The first part of the Declaration ends with the mention  of the UN resolution for the establishment of a Jewish State in the land of Israel, on November 29, 1947.  The Declaration underscores that this recognition is “irrevocable”, and emphasizes that the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel is “… the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State”.

This takes us to the most historic and iconic declaration in the document: “We, members of the people’s council…declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel”

As envisioned by the ancient profits of Israel: the bedrock values of the Declaration of Independence

The values of the state to be

The last portion of the Declaration addresses the nature and values of the new State, and chiefly the assertion that the State “shall be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles”, in effect designating the State as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Later are mentioned additional values such as liberty, peace, equality and the freedom of religion, as envisioned by the biblical profits of Israel, thereby indicating, again, a return to the historic and religious anchor that defines the Jews as a nation.

Today, they are voices that accuse Israel of failing in its commitment to afford equal rights to all its citizens. These claims are with no foundation as every eligible citizen of the State of Israel has the right to vote, and all votes are equal; Evey civil body – including all bodies of government, Knesset and the Judiciary – have representatives from every demographic in the State of Israel; All Israeli citizens are equal before the law, regardless of their ethnicity, and since its very inception the State never had separate systems of laws for Jews and Arabs. The State’s education system and employment market have equal opportunities for all, and the increasing rate of Arab students in the country’s education institutions year on year – reflect almost their portion in the country’s population – all these stand as testimony that refutes such claims. Moreover, since 2020, nearly half of the new doctors in Israel come from the Arab and Druze sectors. This is the shape of a society based on equal rights.

Extending a hand to peace

The latter part of the Declaration also addresses the complex security demands of the Jewish state vis a vis the Arab population therein and the surrounding Muslim countries. It opens with inviting the Arab population to partake in the building of the State as fully equal nationals. Then the Declaration addresses the Middle East countries, stating “We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness”, and expresses the commitment of the new State to “do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East”, thereby clearly establishing the peaceful nature of the State of Israel.

The redemption of Israel

The Declaration ends with an appeal to the Jewish people of the diaspora, calling on the world Jewry to come to Israel and together realize the dream of generations of Jews of the redemption of Israel.

The last line of the Declaration is a return to that which unites the Jewish people as a nation, and mentions that the Declaration was signed with “Trust in the ‘Rock of Israel’”, i.e God.

Refraining from determining the form of government and borders: what is not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence

A Jewish egalitarian state

The authors of the Declaration were deliberate in selecting each word in the document and no less – that which was not mentioned. Nowadays it is a matter of fact that the State of Israel is Jewish and democratic; however, it is interesting to see that while the words “Jew” and “Jews” appear 20 times in the Declaration, the word “Democracy” does not appear even once. This is no coincidence.

The Declaration of Independence refrains from specifying the new state’s form of government simply as at the time it was not a given that Israel would become a democracy. In fact, the majority of the leadership was deeply connected to communist Russia and held the ideology of the kibbutzim – agricultural coop communities – in the highest regard, hence many among them supported the installation of a communist, rather than a democratic, form of government.

On the other hand, the Declaration proclaims a statehood that upholds such values that are congruent with those underpinning the democratic ideology i.e. equality, justice and liberty, thereby establishing the balance which is much addressed by Israeli society, of a national homeland for the Jewish people on the one hand, and a democratic state, on the other. Fully understanding the Declaration of Independence shows that the two are compatible and not contradicting.

Without demarcation of borders

Another topic that the Declaration of Independence does not address – and justly so – is that of the borders of the state-to-be. The authors of the Declaration refrained from mentioning the Partition Plan, voted on by the UN General Assembly on November 29. This stems from the understanding that the borders of the State of Israel are yet to be formed.

And indeed, no sooner was the Declaration signed, seven neighboring hostile armies rose against Israel, which found itself in a fight for its survival in the War of Independence. Not only was that war won by Israel – it redefined the country’s borders. Since that war, Israel had found itself in numerous confrontations that led to the reshaping of its borders, and there are large parts of Israel’s society that would see Israel regain its historic biblical borders of “Greater Eretz Israel”.

Between politics and security: the Declaration of Independence and the reality today

The politicization of the Declaration

The Declaration of Independence had become the defining document of the State of Israel. Sadly, in recent years – particularly on the background of the loaded debate on the judicial reform – it has become a battering ram of sorts, for all stakeholders.

Many groups in Israel resort to the Declaration of Independence to buttress their claims. As welcome as this renewed interest and discourse may be – as it reflects a wide recognition in the seminal importance of the Declaration – it also misuses the document by cleaving from it a narrow political interpretation that defies the full meaning of the Jewish nation’s most important document in modern history. It is imperative to understand that the Declaration of Independence represents an organic concept that cannot be partially accepted or rejected, no more than the story of the Jewish people can be partially acknowledged.

One of the most dangerous things Israeli society can do is turning the document that is the foundation for its existence in the Land of Israel, into a means to political gain.

The loss of an ethos

Without understanding the Declaration of Independence with all of its articles, we allow subversive elements to undermine not only the entire national ethos of Israel but also the conviction in the  right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel.

Over the past several years, we are witnessing the proliferation of lies attempting to show Israel as a colonialist force scheming to occupy a land with which it has no legitimate connection. These lies wish to expunge the story of the Jewish people and the State of Israel and as such should be  vehemently rejected, not only by Jews but also by any truth seeking individual.

It is imperative that the Israeli public knows to differentiate between essence and practice – firstly, it must understand and embrace the narrative of a Jewish people, returning to its lost land, and rising again as a nation in the comity of nations. Only on the foundation of this inalienable document can true and long-term solutions be had. Thus, even when compromises are necessary – as painful as they might be – they will stem from a practical vantage point that clearly sees the dictates of reality, rather than from a position that turns its back on the values that define the Jewish people.

Protecting ourselves, by ourselves

Sadly, the current debate on issues of security and defense in Israel have been derailed to the realm of shallow, political sloganism. In order to truly address this topic with all the seriousness and reverence it deserves, we must look to the Declaration of Independence as a guiding light.

The Declaration states that the Jewish nation had never stopped demanding its natural right to live as a free, respected nation in its birthright land. Implied in the narrative of the document is the imperative of the Jewish nation to establish the ability to protect its land, by itself, thereby laying the ideological and ethical foundation on which the new state should stand.

The DNA of the Jewish nation: the eternal importance of the Declaration of Independence

The current “iron Swords” war in Gaza and its counterpart in Lebanon underscore the importance of the conviction in the justness of the Jewish claim to its land. The prime entity that is the driving force behind this war is Iran – a country with which Israel has no common borders and no territorial disputes whatsoever. The Iranian Republic and its global and regional network of proxies are fueled by a single-minded desire to eradicate the State of Israel, stoked by Teheran’s zealous hatred of Israel. Hence, the real struggle of the State of Israel is not for land – it is ideological.

In this respect, Israel has a long way to go. Its enemies are well skilled at preserving and instilling their own ethos, while the infighting that is tearing at the very fabric of Israeli society only weakens its ethos as a nation and alienates it from the values that have been the bedrock of the Jewish nation for thousands of years, akin to a tree, whose roots are rotting and can no longer sustain itself, destined to eventually collapse.

To sustain the tree that is the Jewish nation and the State of Israel, and prevail in this ideological war, we must reconnect to the Declaration of Independence and to the defining narrative of the Jewish people. It is the spirit – not only the size of the army and the superiority of its weapons – that will win the present struggle and ensure the security of Israel for generations to come. It is the spirit that derives from the conviction in the justness of the Jewish nation and its historic and present right to the Land of Israel.

הפוסט Understanding the Declaration of Independence – Understanding the Jewish Right to The Land of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that national security cannot exist in isolation but depends on a broad system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that making informed decisions requires developing a comprehensive strategy that draws on the past and looks toward the future.

These understandings have led IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Or Yissachar will discuss the relations between Israel and Iran — a pattern of relations that was benign until a few decades ago but has changed to currently threaten our existence.

Background — From a cold peace to a fiery threat: The reversals in Israel-Iran relations

Israel–Iran relations may be divided into two main periods: Before and after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Between those periods, the differences are fathomless.

The reign of the Shah

From 1941 to 1979, Iran was a monarchy ruled by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah pursued a pro-Western policy that envisioned turning Iran into a modern, secular country. During his reign, relations between Iran and Israel were proper and stable. The two countries maintained close relations in various spheres.

Although in 1947 Iran voted against the founding of the State of Israel, it recognized Israel as a state as early as 1950. From that year until the 1970s, relations progressively warmed; and the two nations even maintained extensive economic and security ties. Iran was Israel’s main supplier of oil, and helped Israel lay the Trans-Israel pipeline. Israel, for its part, aided Iran in agriculture and in regional development, sold it military equipment, and even trained its army and helped set up the Iranian secret police.

Diplomatically too, the two countries maintained ties, whether more openly or less openly. Thus, for example, the IDF had military attachés stationed in Tehran and in 1964 even established an Israeli consulate. Today we also know that Iranian legislators secretly visited Israel and that Ben-Gurion himself secretly visited Iran and met its Prime Minister, Ali Amini. Later Israeli visitors to Iran included prime ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, several foreign ministers, the head of the Mossad at the time, and a number of senior IDF commanders. In return, Iranian ministers, commanders, and other senior figures visited Israel.

The upshot is that the two countries were definitely maintaining a cold peace, albeit with no official peace agreement, and they had interests in common. That balance began to teeter in the mid-1970s as the Iranian Revolution showed signs of approaching.

The Iranian Revolution

In the mid-to-late 1970s, religious and political resistance to the Shah’s regime began, emanating primarily from the Shiite Muslims. The Shah had drawn anger for many reasons, including his wasteful lifestyle, the cruelty inflicted on the regime’s opponents by his secret police, his reforms in “surrender” to international pressures to improve the standing of women and minorities, and especially his war against religion and his persistent attempts to turn Iran secular.

The year 1978 saw many protests and other actions against the Shah’s regime. In January 1979 the Shah fled Iran, and two weeks later the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ascended to power. He was a Shiite cleric who had preached for many years against the Shah and had been forced into lengthy exile.

The Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed the transformation of Iran into an Islamic republic. As soon as he took power, he began a purge in the government and army, executing thousands of officers who had supported the Shah as well as people he considered sinners — including homosexuals. Khomeini also lambasted the USA as “the Great Satan,” and Israel as “the Little Satan,” and he called for Islamic revolutions everywhere in the Muslim world. Khomeini formed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, enforced the Sharia law that requires Iranian men and women to abide by the Islamic dress code, forbade Western music, and significantly reduced the rights of women and minorities in the country.

As soon as he took power, it was obvious that relations with Israel would not remain as they were; and within a short time the two countries had become clear enemies.

Today Iran is still a Shiite Islamic republic, led by extremist clerics, disdainful of the West, and constantly calling for Israel’s destruction. In 1989 Khomeini died, and from then until today the present Iran’s supreme leader has been the Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Khamenei has continued in the footsteps of his predecessor and is working to advance the Iranian nuclear program, to expand the Quds Force, and to strengthen the terrorist organizations and pro-Iranian militias throughout the Middle East.

Iran’s extremist regime, its arrival at the nuclear threshold, and the forces of its many proxies have turned it into the number one existential threat against Israel and possibly against the entire western world. However, Iran is also deep in an economic and diplomatic crisis that threatens its regime’s stability, and at the same time it faces many rivals inside the Arab world, the main one being Saudi Arabia.

In order to be handled, the Iranian threat must be understood in its true form. On the one hand, it must not be underestimated; but on the other hand, the limits of its power, and the possibility of exploiting its weaknesses, must be remembered.

Ideally according to Or Yissachar: His vision for Israeli–Iranian relations

Don’t slow it down, stop it short

The current situation:

Since the turn of the millennium, the State of Israel has been waging a war-between-the-wars with Iran. The guiding principle of that policy is to prevent the enemy from gaining strength and to deter the enemy increasingly by means of measured and well-considered actions which fall short of triggering war.

Absurdly, Israel’s persistent attempts to prevent escalation and to avoid a descent into war are the very thing that led to today’s security deficiency. If we had made a point of halting the Iranian threat instead of merely slowing it down, Iran would not have managed to achieve such might, nor to strengthen all the terrorist armies of the region.

The policy of the war between wars works up to a point, but it cannot demolish a buildup of power. That policy also carries the danger that the moment we misjudge the enemy’s intentions and abilities, or overestimate our own deterrent power, we may suffer an event like October 7.

Ideally:

• Israel’s policy must change from reactive to proactive. Only by initiating action at the right time for ourselves can we eliminate the terrorist leaders, damage the missile factories, destroy the smuggler tunnels, and significantly weaken Iran and its accomplices. Israel’s elimination of Isma’il Haniyah was certainly a step in the right direction.

Reverse the nuclearization

The current situation:

After many years of research and development, Iran is now a nuclear threshold state. According to the latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has so far accumulated roughly 136 kg of highly enriched uranium which it can turn, within weeks, into the payload for a nuclear weapon. Moreover, experts believe that Iran has acquired most of the technical knowhow necessary for assembling a simple nuclear weapon and that within one to two years it will be able to develop a nuclear warhead for delivery by missile.

That information proves that the 2015 agreement involving the great powers was not able to stop the Iranian nuclear program, and the reason is simple. Iran will never put aside its nuclear ambitions. The sanctions that the great powers imposed on Iran were not actually enforced, and after being lifted they were not reimposed. The world is currently attempting to ignore the Iranian nuclear threat. It has not risen to the awareness that the threat is existential not only for Israel but for all Iran’s enemies, including the Sunni states and the western states.

Ideally:

• On the international plane: The State of Israel must make clear to the international community that the entire world has a stake in removing the Iranian nuclear threat. Israel must recruit the western nations and the Gulf nations to form a strong coalition led by the USA. Such a coalition can pose a credible military threat to Iran — and can impose strong sanctions as well, such as limiting oil exports to China or disconnecting Iran from SWIFT (the international cooperative for financial communications between banks).
• On the bilateral plane: Israel must assume a much more aggressive stance and make clear to the Iranians that we can attack their nuclear facilities and we can bomb strategic assets without which their economy will shut down. With or without help from other countries, we must exploit the appropriate moments to mount well-considered attacks that will send the Iranian nuclear program a decade backward.

Lop off the tentacles

The current situation:

In recent decades, Iran has developed and enhanced the use of proxy forces — third parties that wage war on its behalf. Thus for example Iran operates Hezbollah in Lebanon, arms the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations in Gaza, supports pro-Iranian militias in Syria, and strengthens the Houthis in Yemen. The proxy forces are tentacles that Iran can send everywhere in the Middle East in order to operate in faraway arenas without being directly involved. Iran helped set up a pro-Iranian Shiite government in Iraq, supported the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, tried to overthrow the governments in Bahrain and Qatar, fielded the Houthis against its great enemy Saudi Arabia, and of course strengthened the terror organizations surrounding Israel and contributed greatly to the sudden October 7 attack.

Israel is well aware of the pro-Iranian proxy forces, but the world at large still has trouble understanding that most of the terrorism in the Middle East is orchestrated by Iran.

Ideally:

• Contextualize the Iranian threat: The State of Israel must understand, and explain to the nations of the world, that Iran is not merely a lone nation but also an entire network active throughout the Middle East and also standing behind the current war against Israel. Only when the world comes to understand that Iran is also Hezbollah and also Hamas and also the Houthis will we be able to turn attention to the Iranian threat as it truly is and find ways to deal with it.
• Begin with the tentacles: The best way to weaken the Iranian octopus is to lop off its tentacles. First of all, the State of Israel must complete its campaign in the Gaza Strip and topple Hamas, thus removing the Iranian threat that comes from that direction. The next step is to significantly weaken Hezbollah in order to remove the threat from the direction of Lebanon. Later, we must proceed to the less nearby tentacles such as the Houthis in Yemen and the militias in Iraq. When Iran loses its proxy forces, the head of the octopus will be much easier to attack.

Remove the Iranian missile threat

The current situation:

Iran’s arsenal of missiles is the largest in the Middle East, with thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs that can attack at various ranges with high precision. Some of the missiles can carry devastating quantities of explosives, and some can even accommodate nuclear warheads.

Most of the missiles are kept in Iran; but some are in the hands of proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Thus Iran can reach faraway targets such as Israel by means of short-range missiles and UAVs.

On the night between April 13 and 14, 2024, Iran demonstrated its ballistic abilities by a massive launch from its turf directly at Israeli territory. That attack included 185 UAVs, 110 ballistic missiles, and 36 cruise missiles, carrying 60 tons of explosives in all. Despite the massiveness of the onslaught, roughly 99% of the hardware was intercepted thanks to the multi-level defenses of the Israel Air Force and to cooperation with Israel’s allies — including the USA and Jordan.

Thus it may be said that the Iranian missile attack exposed both the offensive capacity of Iran and the defensive capacity of Israel. That time, we carried the day. But we must make no mistake: The Iranians are already absorbing the lessons from that episode and improving their abilities for a future attack.

Ideally:

• No more policy of restraint: The State of Israel has invested a great deal in establishing its air defense but has ignored the no less important matter of establishing deterrence. The assault proved, above all else, that Iran is not fearful of confronting Israel; and Iran’s attitude is a problem we must solve. While developing advanced abilities of missile interception, we must also make clear to the Iranians — by assertiveness, military threats, and strong coalitions — that Israel is a country unwilling to tolerate missile attacks on its territory.
• Look into the remaining percent: The Israel Air Force successfully intercepted 99% of the incoming hardware originating in Iran, and that figure is a source of rightful pride. However, we must not forget the one percent that we failed to intercept. If the unintercepted missiles and UAVs had managed to penetrate into the State of Israel, they would have inflicted great harm upon us. And if such missiles had carried nuclear warheads, the damage would have been calamitous. Thus we must not rest on our laurels. Our operational and intelligence forces must remain alert, and we must take action to destroy Iran’s missile system. As long as that threat from Iran remains, the State of Israel faces existential danger.

Keep thwarting the cyber threats

The current situation:

Iran is one of the first states to have formulated a national cyber strategy, and today it is among the world’s most active players in that arena. The Iranians attempt hundreds of cyber attacks a day against the State of Israel. Some originate from units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, and others from independent attack groups. Most of the attacks target governmental organizations, hospitals, universities, and strategically important industries. The various attacks are intended to strengthen Iranian deterrence, to foment conflicts within Israeli society and spread falsehoods, to embarrass Israel globally, to spy and extract sensitive information, to disrupt the public routine, and to damage vital infrastructures.

Israel’s governmental and military cyber defenses block most of the attempted attacks, but some succeed. Thus, for example, Iranian hackers have managed to attack the computer servers of the Israel Police, to deceive Israeli embassies, to damage Israel’s power stations, refineries, and water and sewage systems, and to penetrate into Israeli computer systems in the fields of insurance, medicine, and finance in order to capture sensitive information.

It is important to understand that the Iranian cyber threat — although overshadowed among the public by the nuclear and missile threats — may, if not properly dealt with, result in great harm to the State of Israel.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel must understand that the Iranians are constantly growing stronger, and it must therefore see to preserving its cyber superiority by means of appropriate budgeting, recruitment of professionals, and constant improvement of its technological abilities. At the same time, we must examine the past attacks and analyze the Iranian hackers’ methods of operation in order to better understand how to tackle this threat.

Understanding the Iranian problem: Summation and conclusions

In order to deal with the Iranian threat, it is first of all necessary to bring about a change of thinking — both in the Israeli perspective and in the international perspective.

The State of Israel must understand that in recent years its war-between-the-wars policy enabled the Iranians and their proxies to build more and more strength and to dominate the entire region. The October 7 attack made clear that we must not continue our delaying but must take action now to remove the threats that surround us. Furthermore, we can no longer depend on our assessment of the enemy’s intentions. Instead we must look at the enemy’s capabilities and not allow them to grow stronger.

In the international arena, we must change over from a soft-power approach to a hard-power approach. The USA and the EU proceed from the assumption that if Iran prospers, it will have no reason to complain and it will join the family of nations. That assumption represents deep misunderstanding of the Middle East, and even disdain for Iran and for radical Islam. The Iranians are pursuing a vision: The destruction of the State of Israel and the imposition of Islam on the West. Until it understands that Iranian vision, the world cannot act against Iran with the necessary force.

Once the problem has been identified and the nature of Iran has been understood, Iran’s power must be soberly examined. Although Iran is a significant player, it is not all-powerful and it too has its vulnerabilities. Iran’s Achilles heel is oil. Without oil, its economy does not exist. Moreover, Iran’s regime suffers from domestic non-recognition of its legitimacy; and the multitude of protests threatens to undermine it. Militarily, despite its progress in nuclearization and missile deployment, Iran is not very strong or sophisticated. Its air force is antiquated, authority is scattered, and there are many different branches so that the right hand does not always know what the left hand is doing.

In the long term, the best that Israel can hope for is that the present Iranian regime will fall and be replaced by a moderate, pragmatic one. However, that scenario must be recognized as not very probable. Despite the protests and disputes within Iranian society, most of the Iranian populace wants Iran to remain traditional; and even while criticizing the government, the public is neither truly supportive of regime change nor able to impose it.

Accordingly, a more reasonable ambition is to bring about a weakened regime with no nuclear program, no arsenal of precision missiles, and no proxies. In such a situation, even if deep enmity persists, Israel and Iran could once more conduct proper relations.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Israel–Iran Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel must dramatically rethink its strategic approach to managing the war: no longer should the north be a defensive front; instead, it should become the primary battlefield. Are we facing a historic opportunity to reshape the security landscape against Hezbollah for generations to come? Let me explain why I believe so.

On August 25, Israel launched a preemptive airstrike on Hezbollah, yet we remain on the defensive. Since October 7, Israel has adopted a strategic approach focused on an offensive in Gaza while maintaining a defensive posture on other fronts.

This reality emerged despite the longstanding belief in the corridors of Israel’s defense establishment that the northern border represents the main front. However, the surprise attack by Hamas, along with various constraints (such as limited forces and ammunition shortages), led to a shift in priorities, resulting in a “Gaza First” approach.

This situation has created uncertainty for Israel’s northern residents. Unlike those in the south, many of whom have returned home and see light at the end of the tunnel, many northern residents were evacuated with no return date in sight. They now watch from afar as their homes and communities are systematically destroyed.

The north is economically paralyzed, and the displaced are forced to start the upcoming school year in temporary and improvised settings, a situation many find intolerable. While many residents are determined to return home in the future, some have already lost hope.

In numerous conversations with northern residents, I’ve heard a clear message: they refuse to return to a reality where “Nukhba-like terrorists on steroids” like Hezbollah’s elite “Radwan Unit” sit on their borders, capable of committing atrocities similar to those seen on October 7 in Gaza border towns.

To create a reality where northern residents can safely return to their homes, there are theoretically two options:

1. A diplomatic solution that would see Hezbollah withdraw north of the Litani River: This option seems unlikely at the moment, especially given the lack of significant international pressure on Iran and Hezbollah. Furthermore, there are no clear mechanisms to enforce such a withdrawal that would prevent Hezbollah from returning to southern Lebanon. Additionally, all discussions between special U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein and Lebanon have so far been fruitless, focusing instead on territorial concessions demanded by Hezbollah from Israel.
2. A military solution: In the absence of a diplomatic resolution, the realistic option is a military one. This would require setting war objectives, the foremost being: creating the conditions for the safe and long-term return of northern residents to their homes. Achieving this would necessitate the destruction of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the establishment of a security zone, neutralizing the organization’s capabilities.

Is this achievable? Absolutely. Unlike the situation we face in Gaza, the IDF enjoys complete intelligence superiority in the north. This superiority has been demonstrated over the past ten months with the elimination of dozens, if not hundreds, of senior commanders and operatives in Hezbollah and other organizations, including the assassination of Hezbollah military chief Fuad Shukr. On Sunday morning, the IDF showcased its intelligence and operational dominance by intercepting missile and drone attacks on central Israel.

Being on the defensive is not an ideal state, especially for a country with limited strategic depth. While the decision to maintain a defensive posture on other fronts was correct over the past ten months, a new reality has emerged. In this reality, the Gaza front is on the verge of being resolved. If the trend in the south continues, Hamas will be completely destroyed as a fighting force in the Gaza Strip.

Its weapons production infrastructure has already been obliterated, the supply line from Egypt through the Philadelphi Corridor has been cut off, and northern Gaza is sealed off by IDF forces. The civilian population has by now evacuated most of the Gaza Strip, and the IDF is eliminating Hamas at a rate of 50 terrorists per day. Hamas’ expiration date is very near.

There is no connection between the hostage deal and the strategic considerations regarding our forces’ activities on the northern border. While Iran and Hezbollah are trying to link the two issues, claiming that a cease-fire in the south would lead to a similar cease-fire in the north, this serves the enemy’s interests, not Israel’s. Israel’s interest lies in removing the threat from the northern border, not in achieving a cease-fire under Hezbollah’s terms, which would allow it to continue sitting on the fences of Israeli border communities like Metula and Hanita.

Now that the Hamas threat in the south is almost neutralized, the time has come to fundamentally change our strategic approach, namely: defining Gaza as a secondary front and establishing the north as the primary one. This is the only significant decision the Cabinet must make now.

The shift from defense to offense in the north is essential not only because we wish to create the conditions for Israeli residents to return home. It is also necessary if we ever want to regain the initiative. Israel must learn from experience and understand: we must choose between a Six-Day War scenario and a Yom Kippur War scenario. If we do not take the initiative, we will be surprised and pay in blood, for what’s here today, is gone tomorrow.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Israel can’t stay on the defensive in the north הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Ever since Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran (according to foreign reports) and Fuad Shukr in Beirut, it seems the world has been anxiously awaiting Iran’s response.

But regardless of what may finally happen on the battlefield, we Israelis should long ago have learned a certain lesson that our enemies already understand thoroughly: The way the discourse is framed and the narrative is shaped can be just as crucial as the facts on the ground—if not more so.

In fact, the discourse over the past two weeks—whether from Israeli or foreign commentators, Arab media, the pro-Iranian sphere, or even within the Iranian establishment—has centered on how the Iranian regime and Hezbollah might respond to Israel’s actions. In other words, the discourse is framed as follows: Israel has acted, and now it is up to Iran and Hezbollah to respond. In other words, the implication—whether stated outright or subtly suggested—is that if Israel hadn’t taken its actions, we wouldn’t be in the current situation.

In the English-language press outside Israel, the vocabulary is even more blunt. Iran is not simply expected to “respond” but to “retaliate.”

We Israelis don’t always realize when our rhetoric fuels a hostile narrative, unwittingly playing into the enemy’s hands. In the picture being painted for the world, Israel will be held responsible for any escalation, as everything that follows will be seen as a reaction to Israel’s actions. Instead, our narrative should consistently highlight Iran’s culpability—guilt for the events of October 7, for attacks on Israel from Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, for terrorism originating in Judea and Samaria, and for assaults on American bases in Syria and Iraq. This also includes Iran’s responsibility for the destabilization of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which has disrupted maritime commerce and threatened America’s allies. And, of course, Iran bears responsibility for every incident in Gaza and for every additional day of war, with even greater guilt if the conflict escalates further.

Suppose the USSR had fielded proxies to shoot at US territory, citizens, and facilities during the Cold War. Would the US have fought back only against the proxies and not against the USSR itself? All Israel did was target the head of the serpent — the country that is financing, instigating, and managing the warfare in the Middle East overall and especially against Israel. Taking action is not only Israel’s right but, as should be emphasized, its duty. In practice, addressing only the symptoms of a conflict may alleviate them to some extent but will not cure the underlying disease.

For that reason, the narrative should be that Israel is not waiting for Iran’s response but for its next move. Will Iran choose to escalate and expose itself as a direct target, or will it continue to hide behind its proxies? Until the public discourse changes and unequivocally demands that Iran stop the aggression, the goal will not be reached.

The issue of framing extends beyond this specific event. Various voices are attempting to depict the current conflict as a limited war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, deliberately omitting the broader context of a war being waged by Iran and its network of proxies against Israel and Western interests in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, those attempts at framing have been rather successful so far and seem to have determined the dominant narrative in extensive sectors of public discourse in the Arab world and the Western world alike. The Palestinians are naturally invested in maintaining the misleading narrative that portrays Israel as the Goliath and themselves as the David—a small, oppressed nation demonstrating courage and determination in resisting a powerful state and its sophisticated military.

Iran and its proxies are invested in the success of the Palestinian narrative not only because it weakens and delegitimizes Israel on the international stage, but also because it allows Iran to evade responsibility for its own actions.

The Americans and their Western allies hesitate to blame Iran, likely because doing so would force them to explain to their own citizens what actions they plan to take or why their policies allowed Iran to reach such a position in the first place. Thus, for example, we hardly hear from the American media about the militias attacking American bases in Syria and Iraq, or about attacks by the Houthis.

But it’s not just the outside world that we need to be cautious about misleading with our language. Israel’s own citizens are also not experts in Middle Eastern geopolitics, Western interests, or the agendas of radical Islam.

Whatever we fail to teach our children, they may learn from other sources. We must continuously safeguard the narrative and facts in public discourse. In these tense times, as the Israeli public anxiously awaits the potential expansion of the war, we must be careful not to miscommunicate in a way that reinforces the enemy’s narrative, both abroad and at home.

War with Iran is already under way, and so of course is war with Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the militias in Syria and Iraq. The question now is not whether war will break out in the north, but whether Iran has decided to expand, together with its proxies, this already blazing war for which it is wholly responsible.

“This article was originally published in ynetnews.”

הפוסט Shaping the Story: “Iran’s Retaliation” and the Battle for the Narrative הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“In war, there is but one favorable moment, the great art is to seize it.” This quote by Napoleon remains one of the most fundamental principles of warfare to this day. Our adversary in the north had such a moment on the morning of October 7th, but he failed to seize it. When I heard reports of the outbreak of war in Gaza, I waited with great vigilance for similar news from the north. When these did not come, I felt a slight relief, despite the terrible news from the south. That Saturday morning was the perfect moment for the enemy, a moment when we were caught by strategic surprise.  An attack from another front, especially the northern one, would have led to outcomes I don’t even want to imagine.  “There is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come in one moment,” our sages of blessed memory said. Fortunately, our enemy did not acquire his share with a strategic surprise.

Is this our moment? A strategic surprise like Pearl Harbor or the Six-Day War seems unattainable for either side at the moment. Both sides are already engaged in mutual hostilities; one might even call it war. Either way, both sides are alert and on guard.  However, there is an additional advantage in taking the initiative with a preemptive strike, even in the absence of strategic surprise.

Taking the initiative, as opposed to waiting, which results in absorption or containment, derives from the principle known as the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) – a decision-making model developed by military strategist and United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd. The third component of the model refers to making a decision before taking action, and is based on the processes that precede it. These, in turn, are based on the given situation at that moment in the battlefield. However, an attack initiative by one side completely changes the data upon which the other side’s plans are based.  The situation upon which the enemy’s assumptions and action plans are based becomes irrelevant the moment an attack is launched by the other side.

One of the early philosophers in ancient Greece, Heraclitus, stated: “No man ever steps in the same river twice.”  Allegedly, each one of us can perform an experiment that would disprove this claim. However, Heraclitus’ intention was that reality changes all the time and therefore the river is no longer the same river (and the foot stepping in it is no longer the same foot). This is exactly the idea behind taking the initiative of the attack – changing the river in such a way that all the opponent’s plans are no longer suitable for that “new” river.

Taking the initiative has immense value in every field, especially when it comes to maneuvering armies during wartime. It is not merely semantics.  “Who dares, wins,” said Colonel David Stirling, who founded the Special Air Service (SAS). This is true not only for military purposes. It also applies to economics, sports, and even science.  War is not a tennis match that requires waiting for the opponent’s serve and reacting to it, but rather a simultaneous sequence that requires initiative and, no less, continuity of that offensive opening.

Humans crave certainty and are willing to pay for it. This is the reason why insurance companies exist or why there is a premium on high-risk loans. But in war, one cannot buy insurance policies. There is no certainty on the battlefield in any case. Therefore, even choosing a passive method of operation is a high-risk choice which provides no certainty.  Accordingly, I see only one good course of action on the northern border: Act first. As General George Patton is reputed to have said: “In case of doubt, attack!”

This article was originally published in ynet

הפוסט In case of doubt, attack! הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Iran’s newly elected President, Masoud Pezeshkian, is considered a “reformist” who may help change the world’s image of Iran. Pezeshkian defeated a more conservative candidate, Saeed Jalili, and now Iran wants to show the West a different face — more open and more friendly. The opportunity fell into the Iranians’ hands like ripe fruit, since Israel is facing a threat of international isolation and Iran can leverage that situation to alter its own image in the West.

So who is Masoud Pezeshkian?

Masoud Pezeshkian is a cardiac surgeon by profession, He is 69 years old and has held office in Iran as Minister of Health and as First Deputy Speaker of Parliament. After his medical studies in the city of Qasr-e Shirin, in the province of Kermanshah, he served in the Iran–Iraq war as a physician. Then he studied cardiac surgery at the Iran University of Medical Sciences in the city of Tabtiz and rose to become president of that university.

Pezeshkian began his political career in 1997, joining the government of Mohammad Khatami as Deputy Minister of Health. He was Minister of Health from 2001 to 2005.

In 2013 he ran for president for the first time. He tried again in 2021 but his candidacy was disallowed. And in 2024 he was elected.

He mother’s ancestry was Kurdish and his father’s Azeri. He is fluent in Azeri, and his non-Persian heritage may have scored him points against his opponent, Saeed Jalili, among the many minority sectors of Iran and even with Ali Khameini the Supreme Leader of Iran.

How would that be?

Iran is a fanatical state, and the West has increasingly viewed it that way. The hijab protests that swept the country in 2022 harmed Iran’s image even further and hardened the attitudes of the great powers who were already punishing Iran with heavy sanctions.

So Khameini came to understand that he needs to present a different face, to improve the dialogue, and to smile toward the West while Iran — protected by some kind of agreement with the great powers — quietly speeds toward nuclear weaponization. It is still the Supreme Leader, Ali Khameini, who is setting the agenda. The “reformist” President is a mere spectacle.

Upon taking office, Pezeshkian spoke with the leaders of Iran’s proxies, including Ismail Haniyeh who was heading the political bureau of Hamas. He promised Haniyeh “Iran’s support for the Palestinian people, until Jerusalem is liberated.”

Iran’s closest proxy is Hezbollah, and Pezeshkian wrote to its Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah:

“The support for the resistance will continue forcefully… Iran was, and will remain, a supporter of all the resistance in the region against the Zionist entity… I am certain that the resistance movements of the region will not permit that entity to continue its crimes against the Palestinian nation.”

It appears that although the President is a new one, the Iranian policy stays unchanged. The only difference is in the tone that expresses it. Unlike his predecessor Ebrahim Raisi, the “hangman of Tehran” whose unyielding attitude toward the West was the more terrifying for his violent past, Pezeshkian is a physician, a former university president, a man who studied administration in Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. A president like that is easier for the West to accept. And for that reason, the West should beware.

The President’s “reformist” label testifies that the Iranian military intends to exploit Israel’s diplomatic distress while Israel confronts a war, on several fronts, that Iran’s own proxies ignited. The opportunity is one that Khameini could never pass up.

A leader like Pezeshkian, by tipping a nod to the West, can win the Iranians many concessions, such as cancellation of heavy economic sanctions. And Iran, which has never stopped exporting its Islamist revolution, can strengthen its proxies as revolutionaries and as fighters against Israel.

As Israel now wages a multi-front war and America’s reputation in the region suffers, Iran perceives a chance to intensify its efforts and attain its goals — but quietly and cagily, without drawing the West’s attention.

This is a golden opportunity for Khameini, and Pezeshkian as new President has already hurried to call for a renewed nuclear agreement with the West in order to put an end to the economic sanctions against Iran.

One prompt hint that Iran’s “play-acting” for the West will not succeed has come from Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the son of the Shah of Iran. The Prince, whose father was overthrown by Khameini, Khomeini, and their allies in 1979, predicted that Khameini’s choice of Pezeshkian as President “will not extract this regime from its disputes and from its inevitable downfall.” Calling Pezeshkian the “number one agent” of Khameini, Reza Pahlavi recognized that the show is being run by Khameini as Supreme Leader. Thus, behind the diplomatic window-dressing presented to the West, Iran stands more extremist than ever, and more determined to advance its regional agenda: nuclear capability, hegemony over the region, and the destruction of the State of Israel. That is the true face of Iran.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran with a different face? About Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new President הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On July 24, 2024, the Prime Minster of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, delivered a formal address to a joint session of Congress on the invitation of Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson of Louisiana. Prime Minister Netanyahu used this extraordinary opportunity to speak directly to the American people (and the world) and to state Israel’s case. He defined Israel’s position clearly and forcefully. In fact, he achieved a remarkable level of identification with his listeners.

Congress is one of the important components of the American government, composed of three branches — the Legislative, the Executive (the President) and the Judicial (the Supreme Court). Article I, Section I of the Constitution states simply, “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Effectively, Congress may potentially be the most powerful branch of the government. It has the authority to pass laws, raise taxes, decide appropriations, and exercise oversight. In addition, Congress has the power to place an issue on the national agenda, such as Israel’s right to self-defense and the aggressive pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses, some of which featured open attacks on Jewish students.

Our world has changed and American legislators understand the danger of terrorism. In fact, a solid representation of Congressmen and women have served in the in the armed services, particularly the Marines, and have become familiar with the ways of the Middle East.

Many of them are sensitive to moral and cultural considerations, and in a real sense, the observations of the French historian, Alexis de Tocqueville, who visited America in the 1830s, are relevant. Tocqueville wrote the classic, Democracy in America, where he stated that the “morality and equity” of Christianity were a moderating influence in American life and the basis of American freedom. Without calling it by name, he described the essence of American exceptionalism:

Religion, which, among Americans, never mixes directly in the government of society, should therefore be considered as the first of their political institutions; for if it does not give them the taste for freedom, it singularly facilitates their use of it.

…. I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion – for who can read the bottom of hearts – but I am sure that they believe it necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion does not belong only to one class of citizens or to one party, but to the entire nation; one finds it in all ranks.

When President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he called on the legendary Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill, who advised him that “The Congress of the United States includes some of the most talented and knowledgeable lawmakers in the world. Some of them have been here for years, because the people at home have such faith in them.” Tip O’Neill’s description remains valid. Congressmen and women seek their own sources of information and draw their own conclusions. The formidable initiatives of the House Education Committee are an example.

As far as the back story of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s address, there is a difference of opinion between President Biden and the Prime Minister. Despite the atrocities of October 7 and the deaths of 1,200 Israelis, American policy was and remains imposing a ceasefire which would leave Hamas in power, while Israel’s policy is to end the conflict by defeating the enemy and winning. Concurrently, the same debate continues in Israel.

The moral issue is whether a self-respecting sovereign country which had been the victim of aggression should make a deal with terrorists whose motto is “by any means necessary.” In his address, Netanyahu boldly called this war “a clash between barbarism and civilization,” and declared that the United States and Israel must stand together, because we have the same enemy. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s forcefully stated, “We will win!”

According to Caroline Glick, the meeting with President Biden on the day after the Prime Minister’s address ended in a bust up. The President admonished the Prime Minister that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!” Glick noted that the Prime Minister represents the majority of the Israeli public which support his position.

Over the years, there have been ups and downs in the relations between America and Israel. Nevertheless, there is a continuity of friendship, shared values, and interests. Therefore, we must show great appreciation for the Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, who graciously invited the Prime Minister to address Congress and stateIsrael’s case directly to the American people.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Prime Minister’s Address to Congress: Context and Content הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The West has got to revise its thinking. It needs to begin threatening Iran militarily and even to take active measures in that direction, if it wants to change the course of Iran’s modus operandi – its progress toward nuclear capability and its sponsoring of terrorism worldwide.

Background

Ever since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran has been transformed. From a friend of Israel, cooperating in a variety of fields and aligned with the United States, Iran has set its sights on exporting its Islamic revolution and on opening a front against the West. One example of this, is the establishing of the Revolutionary Guards, whose mission is to export the revolution to various countries and its well-known slogan: “The United States is the Great Satan and Israel is the Little Satan”.

Concurrent with its support for terrorism, Iran also built a military nuclear program on the foundations of the civilian nuclear program that had been started during the pre-revolution years. While Iran’s first revolutionary leader Khomeini was in charge, the military nuclear program remained mothballed since he believed it was inconsistent with Islam. However, after he died in 1989, the plan was revived despite Iran’s claims that it was not working to achieve nuclear military capability. They insisted their program was purely focused on energy production.

As a result, the United States decided to impose sanctions on Iran. The first sanctions were imposed in November 1979, following the US embassy hostage crisis in Tehran. These sanctions were lifted in January 1981 following the release of the hostages, only to be reimposed in 1987 in response to Iran’s support for terrorism and steps it took against maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf. Ever since then the United States has persisted with its sanctions against Iran under successive administrations and under several laws and Presidential decrees.

Besides the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions calling on Iran to suspend its nuclear-related activities. The first such resolution was 1696. The Security Council has imposed and upheld sanctions against Iran in an effort to thwart its nuclear-related activities.

However in 2015, the world superpowers signed an agreement with Iran, in which Iran committed to slowing down its nuclear activities in exchange for a lifting of most of the sanctions that had been imposed on it – both the US sanctions and the UN sanctions.

In May 2018, after having criticized the nuclear deal during his presidential election campaign, US President Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal, reinstated the American sanctions on Iran and further extended the American sanction regime against the Iranian State and various Iranian institutions, corporations and individuals. This sanction regime was extensive and plunged Iran into a deep economic crisis. With Joe Biden’s accession to the US Presidency, the enforcement of the American sanctions was slightly relaxed (although the legal framework remained virtually unchanged).

In addition, throughout all those years the world powers kept up their diplomatic pressure on Iran through media statements that Iran must discontinue its nuclear program and also its regional activities, through the passage of resolutions in the international organizations and by calling on Iran to cease its nuclear activities. For example, in September 2003 the Council of Commissioners of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution calling on Iran to cease all its uranium enrichment activities. Over the years the Agency adopted further resolutions along the same lines.

What is being done at present against Iran’s activities

The Swords of Iron War has put Iran’s support of the various terrorist organizations in the Middle East under the spotlight (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Shiite militias in Iraq) and on its intention to destroy Israel and eliminate the perceived threat it poses. This goal of theirs was actively pursued in the Iranian attack against Israel on April 13, 2024, in which Iran launched hundreds of UAVs, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles toward Israel. At the same time Iran is continuing with its nuclear program, and the “snapback” deadline (the possibility of reinstating the sanctions against Iran, in the event it is decided that it was violating its part in the deal) approaching.

In order to stop Iran’s nuclear activities, the West has to change its methods. Currently the West’s measures against Iran follow two channels: sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran. However in recent years these measures have proven inadequate for dissuading Iran to desist from its hostile activities – none of the measures have been able to alter its course, particularly while China and Russia are not cooperating with the West and maintain economic ties with Iran.

For the Iranian regime, the paramount principle is to ensure its own survival. This is the basis for all other matters. The Iranian moves are all played out under a rationale of long-term regime continuity. All its moves are measured against this yardstick. For this reason, the West’s modus operandi should have one aim – to undermine the Iranian regime’s resiliency in such a way as to force it to alter its behavior, withdraw from its nuclear program and discontinue its funding of the Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, which are sowing chaos and evil indiscriminately. The West has got to turn the equation on its head and create an inverse relationship, rather than a direct relationship, between the nuclear program and the regime’s survival.

The main means of undermining its sense of resiliency is through a tangible military threat, which will make it unmistakably clear to Iran that if it does not change its ways, they are risking widespread military attacks by the West, which will weaken the State institutions and put the future of the Ayatollahs’ rule in grave danger. This military threat does not necessarily mean pulling out the heavy guns right from the start. For example, the West could take measures such as blocking the Straits of Hormuz, through which virtually all Iranian goods are exported – mainly oil and its byproducts. Such a blockade will also impact Iranian ability to import goods.

Needless to say, such measures could lead to an all-out war throughout the Middle East, but the current circumstances in the Middle East call for drastic measures. After all, if Iran persists along its current trajectory this might provoke Israel, the moderate Sunni countries and other countries like Saudi Arabia into a much more destructive battle against the forces of terrorism and evil throughout the Middle East, chief among them Iran and the terrorist organizations it supports.

Such measures must be imposed with a clearly-understandable goal – to make it clear to the Iranian ruler and his regime that the current equation cannot stand any longer. Iran cannot persist in linking its survival to its progress with its nuclear program and to its propagation of Islamic terrorism in all directions. Their leader will be forced to choose whether he accepts the new equation, under which he is free to operate within Iranian borders, or whether he is willing to risk a fight at the end of which he, and the entire Shiite regime in Iran, will be deposed.

For this to happen, the West must realize that the wars of the present day must be fought now and not sometime in the future. Iran and the Shiite Axis must be dealt with firmly, using all force necessary. In the absence of this, the Western powers will be faced with a very different reality – a nuclear Iran, terrorist organizations capable of doing Iran’s bidding, bereft of allies in the Middle East and threatened with Islamic extremism at home.

This article was originally published in ynetnews.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט To Keep Iran In Line, It Needs the Occasional “Slap In The Face” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.