Over the past year, Hezbollah has faced a growing existential crisis, intensified by the targeted assassinations of senior figures including Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil, Jawad Tawil, and particularly Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and his successor, Hashem Safi al-Din. Once Iran’s most formidable proxy and a significant strategic actor in the Middle East, Hezbollah now contends with depleted leadership, military setbacks, and mounting international pressure. Does this signal genuine weakening within the Shiite terrorist organization?

According to Lebanese sources, Hezbollah is undertaking drastic measures to ensure its survival, notably relocating the families of hundreds of senior commanders to Latin America.

Lebanese journalist Ali Hamadeh recently disclosed in a video published on his X (formerly Twitter) account that the families of approximately 400 Hezbollah leaders have left Lebanon, finding refuge primarily in South American countries like Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador. Hamadeh explains this relocation is driven by the growing recognition that Hezbollah’s military capabilities are deteriorating, and the continued presence of these commanders’ families in Lebanon significantly increases their vulnerability to Israeli or international intelligence operations.

Hamadeh suggests this mass relocation indicates Hezbollah is preparing for an era of diminished direct military engagement in Lebanon, shifting instead towards increased political influence, economic operations, and organized criminal activities abroad.

Hezbollah in Latin America

Hezbollah has long maintained a prominent presence in Latin America. Since the early 1980s, the organization has cultivated extensive networks across the continent, driven by Iran’s aspiration to export its Islamic Revolution. Leveraging sizable Shiite Lebanese communities and the presence of weak or anti-Western governance, Hezbollah has effectively entrenched itself in various Latin American regions.

A significant hub of Hezbollah activity is the Tri-Border Area connecting Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, where the group operates elaborate networks involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. Under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela provided Hezbollah with favorable conditions to expand its influence, capitalizing on the substantial Lebanese community there.

Hezbollah’s activities are also notable in Brazil and Colombia. In 2023, Brazil thwarted a Hezbollah plot targeting its Jewish community. Additionally, Hezbollah was implicated in the devastating 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, prompting Argentina to officially designate the organization as a terrorist entity in 2019.

Strategic Implications of Relocation

If reports of Hezbollah leaders’ families relocating to South America are accurate, this strategic shift could significantly enhance Hezbollah’s continental influence. Establishing new local command structures and embedding deeper into criminal networks would enable the organization to preserve its global threat status, even as its direct military power in the Middle East diminishes.

For Iran, strengthening Hezbollah’s position in Latin America represents a strategic alternative following the collapse of the land corridor linking Tehran to Beirut through Iraq and Syria, a critical route disrupted by al-Julani’s takeover in Syria, which dismantled a primary achievement of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

This strategic pivot could enable Iran to rebuild Hezbollah, transforming it from a direct Middle Eastern military threat into a covert global actor, with Latin America as its new operational center.

These developments align with Iran’s ongoing efforts to reconstruct the fractured “Axis of Resistance” following Assad’s regime collapse, Nasrallah’s assassination, and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas due to targeted leadership eliminations. Iran seeks creative methods to rehabilitate its damaged proxy networks, including establishing new proxies like the “Islamic Resistance in Syria,” leveraging international criminal organizations, and promoting inter-proxy cooperation.

Threats to the United States

Hezbollah’s potential strengthening in Latin America poses serious security threats to both Israel and the United States. With the return of the Trump administration to the White House, renewed American attention to Latin America seems likely.

From a U.S. perspective, Hezbollah operatives migrating to South America pose security risks as well as structural immigration challenges. Countries like Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, with porous borders and weak or corrupt governance, provide ideal conditions for smuggling, document forgery, and evasion of immigration controls.

There is a real possibility that Hezbollah operatives could infiltrate the U.S. via its southern border, using forged passports or alternative identities. Consequently, Hezbollah is viewed not only as a regional threat but as a systemic danger undermining U.S. border control, economic stability, and societal cohesion.

President Trump previously adopted a firm stance against Hezbollah, isolating the group economically and initiating global investigations into its financial networks. Given the potential infiltration of Hezbollah operatives into Latin America under civilian guises, the Trump administration might implement several strategic actions:

• Initiate cooperation with Latin American countries to extradite Hezbollah operatives through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and international legal frameworks.
• Expand surveillance and disruption efforts led by U.S. Treasury, CIA, and FBI agencies.
• Enhance operational oversight and intelligence-gathering by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), reinforcing stringent immigration policies.

Furthermore, addressing Hezbollah as a hybrid entity combining organized crime and terrorism is essential. Efforts should integrate anti-illegal immigration measures with operations targeting organized crime and terrorism emanating from Middle Eastern groups operating through Latin American hubs.

Hezbollah exemplifies Iran’s global ambitions, and its activities across Latin America represent a strategic threat. A coordinated Israeli-American policy could strengthen intelligence cooperation between Jerusalem and Washington, undermine Hezbollah’s financial and logistical capacities, and heighten regional pressure on Iran.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Exile from Beirut: Is Hezbollah Weakening or Opening a New Front? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Everyone agrees that a “conception” led to the disaster of October 7, yet without clearly defining this conception and understanding its roots, such consensus is meaningless. Public discourse and media often attribute the failure to terms like “disengagement” or “suitcases of money for Hamas,” but these are merely symptoms of a much deeper, flawed mindset that over time became broadly accepted among security institutions, political leadership, and Israeli society at large.

Outlining the “Conception”

The terror attack on October 7 did not occur in a vacuum. It resulted from a longstanding failure in Israel’s national security approach.

Since the onset of the Oslo Accords, and especially following the Gaza disengagement, a prevailing doctrine within Israel’s political and security establishments advocated containment rather than eradication of threats, hoping that economic improvement and easing restrictions on the enemy would suffice to restrain its aggression.

This approach had profound, long-term implications. It weakened Israeli deterrence, bolstered enemy confidence, and significantly eroded IDF capabilities, both logistically and operationally.

At the core of this conception was the idea that even temporary reoccupation of Gaza, or any enemy territory, was unthinkable. This view first emerged during the Oslo process and intensified after the Gaza disengagement. It became entrenched within the political-security establishment, leading Israel to avoid reasserting military control in Gaza, even at the price of tolerating an openly hostile terror regime committed to its destruction. Even when clear opportunities to topple Hamas presented themselves—during Operation Cast Lead (2008), Operation Protective Edge (2014), and other occasions—Israel consistently refrained from decisive action.

Instead of confronting Hamas, Israel adopted a strategy of containment. Although never officially codified, this approach functioned almost as oral tradition: managing threats indirectly, avoiding direct confrontation, applying measured pressure, and maintaining “acceptable” risk levels. Within this framework, economic measures aimed at improving Gaza’s living conditions—employment, goods transfers, and permits—were promoted, hoping these gestures would gradually moderate Hamas.

From American Containment to Israeli Containment

This flawed Israeli approach was not born in isolation. It derived from American containment strategy during the Cold War, aimed at halting communism’s global spread by systematically restraining Soviet influence through clear boundaries, managing risks, and supporting allied states, thus avoiding full-scale war. This strategy assumed a rational superpower like the Soviet Union would act within calculated strategic constraints, avoiding dangerous escalation—a reasonable assumption, eventually borne out.

Unlike the American scenario, Israel faces adversaries not driven solely by rational strategic interests. Hamas is a terror organization motivated by radical religious ideology. Even when governing, Hamas does not demonstrate responsible state-like behavior toward its populace. Against such an opponent, any concessions or operational leeway do not lead to moderation but are instead exploited to build strength for the next conflict.

How Israel Lost the North

Israel’s handling of Hezbollah after the 2006 Second Lebanon War exemplifies this containment misconception. Despite initially weakening the Lebanese terror organization’s capabilities, Israel refrained from decisive measures to prevent Hezbollah’s military resurgence. Consequently, Hezbollah built an extensive missile arsenal capable of striking all of Israel and developed offensive tunnels penetrating Israeli territory—discovered later in Operations “Northern Shield” (2018) and “Northern Arrows” (2024). Had Hezbollah used these tunnels simultaneously with Hamas’s October 7 attack, the consequences would have been catastrophic.

Iran identified this Israeli policy weakness and exploited it, strengthening its regional grip. Iran established sophisticated military bases in Syria, becoming hubs for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), while also supplying Hezbollah with advanced weaponry and military technology. Israel’s targeted and limited military actions failed to counteract this trend, allowing Iran to turn Syria and Lebanon into frontline threats against Israel.

Erosion of Deterrence and Military Power

Containment policy was coupled with a belief that large-scale military confrontations were increasingly unlikely, reducing the perceived need for a robust, ground-based military supported by significant reserve forces. This assumption profoundly influenced IDF force structure. Under the slogan “a small and smart army,” Israel decreased the size and strength of ground and reserve forces, reducing ammunition stockpiles and capacity for sustained military campaigns. Increasing reliance on technology and intelligence came at the expense of maintaining powerful, well-trained ground forces.

This ongoing erosion significantly weakened Israeli deterrence. Iran and its proxies—Hamas and Hezbollah—understood Israel was not seeking decisive victory and used the opportunity to build up capabilities in preparation for a broader confrontation.

Have We Truly Learned?

The necessary conclusion is that the conception was not merely an intelligence failure or a single strategic error. It emerged from a deep-rooted cultural and intellectual failure. Decision-makers and opinion leaders became comfortable with temporary quiet, rather than pursuing sustainable security. It is a culture of denial, preferring to postpone confrontations instead of striving for decisive victory.

Now that we’ve identified this conception, we must ask: Have we learned our lesson? It seems we haven’t fully. Voices once again claim Israel cannot decisively defeat, occupy, or hold strategic security zones. Astonishingly, some of the same think tanks previously promoting containment are now advocating transferring Gaza control to the Palestinian Authority—a corrupt, weak, and terror-supporting entity. Rather than seeking victory, they once again propose handing power to hostile actors actively working against Israel. What greater proof of ongoing conceptual blindness could there be?

To ensure the horrors of October 7 never recur, Israel must return to its foundational Zionist security doctrine: security built upon decisive victory, military strength, and an unwavering pursuit of triumph.

הפוסט Roots of the Conception: The Ideological Failure Behind the October 7 Massacre הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The End of the Sherman: Do It Yourself

The Armored Corps is currently considered one of the main and most important forces in the IDF, but this was not always the case. During the War of Independence, the State of Israel relied mainly on infantry forces and possessed only 15 tanks. Over the years, the number of tanks gradually increased, and with it the scope of involvement of the armored forces in the IDF’s operational activities. In Operation Kadesh (the 1956 Sinai War), Israel already operated 200 tanks, in the Six Day War (1967) it operated about 1,000 tanks, and in the Yom Kippur War (1973) the number of tanks in use had already risen to 2,000.

Despite the quantitative increase, the quality of the tanks at Israel’s disposal barely improved. Due to various diplomatic motives, countries around the world refused to sell Israel new tanks, and the fledgling country was forced to rely on old and incompetent tanks such as the Shermans from World War II and the British Centurions that had become obsolete. The IDF and the Israeli defense industry made great efforts to rehabilitate and improve those old tanks, but it was clearly impossible to rely on such improvisations in the long run.

During the 1960s, two turning point events occurred that pushed the State of Israel to find a solution to the tank crisis. The first event was the news that Arab countries were expected to receive T-62 tanks from the Soviet Union, which were considered the most advanced tanks in the world at the time. The second event was the Chieftain tank affair, when England withdrew at the last minute from its commitment to sell advanced tanks to Israel. These two events made Israel realize that it had to catch up in the armor race vis-a-vis enemy countries, and that it had no choice but to do this on its own.

Getting the caterpillars moving: The development process begins

In 1969, subsequent to the collapse of the deal to purchase tanks from England, the possibility of Israel producing tanks itself was first considered. To examine the feasibility of this, a committee was formed, comprised of professionals and security experts, headed by Major General Israel Tal, later nicknamed the “Father of the Merkava.” The committee was required to examine both the State of Israel’s technological and infrastructural capabilities, as well as the economic viability of the move. The committee’s conclusions were that the State of Israel is capable of establishing a tank industry and that such an industry would provide a solution to its military needs, reduce dependence on other countries, and even benefit the country economically. A few months later, in August 1970, the official decision was made, and the State of Israel embarked on this ambitious project.

In order to promote the project, the Merkava Tank Planning Directorate was established, which bore overall responsibility for development, and the Tank Development Authority (TDA), which dealt with engineering planning. To save time and costs, it was decided to rely as much as possible on infrastructure that already existed in the IDF and the defense establishment. This is how the IDF Tank Rehabilitation and Maintenance Center (RMC), which until then had been used to improve tanks, became the assembly plant for the new tank. Similarly, the IDF’s Equipment and Spare Parts Center and the Procurement and Production Directorate were modified in order to meet the needs of the project. Another decision made was to make tank production a nationwide project, and for this purpose about 200 factories in the defense and civilian industries were converted into factories to manufacture tank parts. The Ardan foundry, for example, began producing heavy armor castings that were used for the turret and the chassis (the bottom portion of the tank), and the IMI factories began producing tank cannons.

The Israeli tank production process lasted a total of about nine years, and on February 20, 1979, the long-awaited moment arrived and the first Merkava tank entered operational use in the 7th Armored Corps Brigade.

Improving and perfecting the Merkava

The first Merkava tank, known as the Merkava Mark 1, was considered a modern and advanced tank at the time. It boasted unprecedented defense capabilities and high survivability, made possible in part by the revolutionary decision to move the engine to the front of the tank.

Since then, the Merkava tank has undergone a series of modifications, which improved both its defense and performance on the battlefield. The Merkava tanks were equipped with fire control systems, night vision devices, and improved firepower systems. Over the years, more advanced models were also developed, and the most advanced – the Merkava Mark 4 – entered IDF service in 2003. Today, the improved models of the Merkava Mark 4 tank benefit from advanced command and control systems, and are equipped with the Wind Jacket active defense system that facilitates maximum protection for the soldiers inside the tank.

Over the years, the State of Israel has produced thousands of Merkava tanks, and these have been used in all the campaigns and wars that have erupted since: In the First Lebanon War, the Merkava Mark 1 tank was used against Syrian armored forces; during the Second Intifada, the Merkava Mark 2 and 3 tanks were used for patrols in dangerous areas and to support infantry forces; during the Second Lebanon War, three armored divisions entered Lebanese territory; and during the Sword of Iron War, the tanks – mainly the Merkava Mark 3 and Mark 4 models – played a central combat role and greatly assisted in ground operations in Gaza and Lebanon.

Only in Israel: Sales prohibited to foreign countries

The Israeli Merkava tank is currently considered the most advanced tank in the world, and few tanks manage to come close to its capabilities. One might expect that the State of Israel would want to exploit the inherent economic advantage of this and export the tank to other countries, but from the very beginning of Merkava tank production, its sale to foreign countries was prohibited in order to maintain the Israeli Armored Corps’ unique advantage.

It was only in 2010 that the Ministry of Defense decided to permit, in principle, the sale of the Merkava Mark 4 tank to “select customers”. In 2014, the Ministry of Defense signed the first Merkava export deal with a foreign country, whose name is prohibited from publication. In 2023, negotiations were held to sell Merkava Mark 2 and Merkava Mark 3 tanks, which are retired from IDF service, to a European country and a South American country whose names were also not disclosed, but these plans were halted due to the Swords of Iron War. So, to date, the State of Israel is probably the only country in the world, or one of the few, in possession of the Merkava tank.

Besides its uniqueness, another source of pride lies in the fact that approximately 80% of the tank’s components are manufactured in Israel, so the project provides a source of livelihood for tens of thousands of Israelis in more than 200 factories nationwide. Nowadays, when there is much talk about the importance of self-development of weapons and combat equipment, it is good to remember the strength of the Israeli defense industry and the immense potential of domestic production.

הפוסט 46 years ago today: The Merkava tank entered operational use in the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A New World Order. These grand words take on a new meaning these days, with President Donald Trump stepping into office for his second term.

Having driven a spoke in Tehran’s wheels as well as those of its vassals to an unprecedented level – complemented by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria – Israel has left the Shi’ite axis all but paralyzed. Were it the US’s current administration’s wish to topple the Ayatullah regime, it could deliver a coup de grace in the form of a quick, targeted air strike to crush the skull of the Iranian snake, and in the same breath, take care of the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

Time to conclude the tale of Iran’s nuclear program

This rare and favorable window of opportunity represents a historic moment in which a coalition of the West, Israel, and moderate Sunni states, led by the US can and must bring a decisive end to the Iranian threat. However, one of the largest obstacles on the US’s way to green-lighting an overseas campaign is the public opinion on its streets.

The American public is weary and wary at any prospect of an overseas war, especially in light of the accumulative high death toll of the wars and engagements in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the staggering resources they drained. However, in this instance, the US would not actually be forced to initiate war – but to end it. The Israeli blitz airstrikes left a devastated Iranian air force, shattered many of the Republic’s strategic assets and delivered a crippling blow to its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Ayatullah reign is now more exposed than ever.

Hence, all that is required is a swift targeted move – a devastating airstrike on Iran’s nuclear sites, missile sites and military facilities, delivered by strategic bombers, without the need for boots on the ground, similarly to Israel’s attack last October. A campaign of mere days could bring the Shi’ite axis to its knees, and change the political map and balance of powers in the entire Middle East.

That same coalition should also launch a campaign against the reign of Houthi terror in Yemen, in collaboration with Saudia Arabia and the country’s internal opposition forces. The Houthis, as a proxy of Iran, have made themselves into an all-global nuisance with their disruptive attacks on international trade vessels in the Red Sea. If the US indeed does decide to exercise its full military might – it will have effected dramatic changes in that area within a very short period of time.

The attack against Iran is not only advisable – it is a sine qua non. Because Iran understands that it had lost significant assets such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, it will in all likelihood try to compensate and attempt by all means at hand to break out to a nuclear weapon. If the West cherishes its survival – it behooves it to prevent this at all costs.

Trump understands: the key to peace is might

The election of Trump to the presidency could not have come at a better time for Israel.

Over the past years, , the US has been gradually paring down its presence and involvement in the Middle East, leaving a vacuum into which Russia and China were all too happy to step. As a result of America’s wanning status in the region, an increasing number of countries are aligning themselves with the East. China, the main trade partner of the KSA and Iran, had already brokered an agreement between the two. China’s trade agreements in the Middle East have ballooned to seven times the current volume of the US’s – after it had cut its trade activity and reduced its dependance on Arab oil. The one thing the US can offer Middle East countries in order to reinstate its status as a dominant player in the region is military might.

Trump understands this all too well. He knows that peace and stability can come about only in the presence of military might and not appeasement. The mere fact that even before taking up residence in the White House, Trump declared  that he was interested in making Canada the 51st state of the US, and that he is interested in taking over Greenland and the Panama Canal, indicate that he views the United States as a super power that bears the task of reshaping the global map – and has no qualms about using the necessary force to make America great again.

An opportunity for new world order

Israel is quite literally handing the Middle East to the US on a silver platter.  After pulling the rug of hegemony in the Shi’ite axis from under Tehran’s feet and incapacitating its allies, the US can now step into the frame and reestablish its dominance on the chessboard with a move that would entail minimal effort, restoring its deterrence against the Chinese-Iranian-Russian syndicate.

Admittedly, it would be unwise of the US to ignite a direct military confrontation with the China-Russia sisterhood in the eastern theater. On the other hand – the weakest link in the chain, i.e. Iran, can be flicked off the gameboard almost effortlessly, thereby creating a strong deterrent for US’s adversaries in the region, and bulwarking the Middle East from China’s overtures.

This tactic would pave the road to broad regional peace accords, from Saudia to Indonesia, churning a tailwind for positive moves in the Middle East such as the formation of a moderate Sunni coalition with Israel in partnership with UAE and KSA.

Such a coalition, alongside Israel, moderate Sunni powerful countries and the West led by the US, coupled with normalization with the rest of the Sunni world, can stem the spread of the radical Shi’ite axis, including Turkey, Qatar, Afghanistan, and terror organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaida. The western coalition would prevent the Shi’ite axis from toppling the governments in countries such as Egypt and Jordan and seizing control thereof, and can form a new balance of power in the Middle East region.

This moderate alliance can potentially attract unaligned countries, such as Lebanon, which is controlled at present by Iran through Hezbollah; Iraq, which is partially controlled by Iran, and Libia, Egypt and Saudia. Taking Tehran out of the equation will leave the US alone at the top of the Middle East totem pole, which will in turn bring the unaligned countries – and perhaps more – to choose to align themselves with the moderate coalition, and perhaps even in a year or two, Lebanon will come around and sign – under the influence of Saudia – a peace accord with Israel.

Israel is the key

In a new regional alliance that would deepen and grow stronger with time, Israel would play a central role. Israel is the key that connects West to East, and is the crossroads in which new trade routes can be charted to provide land and maritime trade routes among India, the UAE, KSA and Israel. Israel has already set in place a network of mega-harbors, each under different supervision (The Sinai, Indian, European and Israeli) in preparation for this eventuality, with the aim of creating a global interest in using that network for trade and shipping activity. Making Israel into a global Singapore – a world trade center – is well within the country’s reach.

With new trade routes, regional peace and commercial cooperation with Saudia and other countries in the Middle East, coupled with the security and diplomatic support on part of the US, Israel would be able, for the first time in its history, to do what it has to do in order to ensure the future existence of the State for generations.

Fundamental dictate: maintaining sovereignty

After dealing with the Shi’ite axis and signing regional peace and normalization agreements, Israel will be required to present to the US administration a definitive resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, that must include the crucial elements that will ensure the long-lasting security of Israel.

Such a plan must include Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and most of the C areas in Judia and Samaria, cleared of Palestinian presence that might compromise the Jewish demographic hegemony in the State of Israel. It should outline a definitive solution of the conflict, such that does not allow for a Palestinian state and surely removes any possibility for the rule of terror organizations such as is the situation currently with Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah.

This is an opportunity to snuff out the Oslo Accords, dismantle the Palestinian Authority – a body that is in effect governed by a murderous terror organization that is actively pushing for the global delegitimization of Israel – and adopt an alternative model, to mention a few are: cantonization; emirate-style decentralized “Hamula” (family) government; a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or a Palestinian autonomy in the Sinai Peninsula under Egyptian supervision. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has presented to the Israeli governments various blueprints for this end. The choice of each specific model would depend on shifting circumstances. For example, a future scenario of the collapse of the Jordanian regime would push toward a Jordanian-Palestinian solution, whereas a willingness on part of Egyptian President el-Sisi to play an instrumental role in the stabilization of the Middle East would allow for a Palestinian autonomy in northern Sinai and Gaza.

The common ground for all these prospective solutions is the governing principle that the Zionist claim to the right of the Jewish people to the State of Israel and sovereignty thereof are non-negotiable. Cementing Israel’s right over the State of Israel is crucial spiritually and for its security – both aspects indivisibly interlinked. Israel cannot be completely secure without the spiritual conviction in the justness of this cause, and there is no understanding the security of cities in the heart of Israel without acknowledging the importance of settlements in Judia and Samaria.

Learning the lessons of October 7

A new plan to resolve the conflict would be different than that ideated by President Trump in his previous term. Trump’s Peace for Prosperity demanded painful concessions on part of Israel. But the October 7 attack made it clear that there is no room for such concessions. Any new plan must acknowledge Israel’s overall responsibility for the security of the entire area of the State of Israel. In the past round, Israel abstained from exercising sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and C areas, at Trum’s behest. Today, the public in Israel is more than ever ready for this step, that would anchor the eastern border belt as an integral part of the land of Israel, similarly to the southern and northern envelope areas. Trump’s current presidency is a historic opportunity to right this wrong and proclaim Israeli sovereignty – even unilaterally – in the territories over which the US acknowledges Israel’s right.

At the same time, Israel must present an exhaustive long-term plan for Gaza and Judia and Samaria. After learning the hard way over the past twenty years that the terror and Gaza cannot be eliminated solely with air strikes, precise as they may be, it is now clear that the Gaza Strip must have the presence of Israeli security forces – this is a unnegotiable condition if Israel wishes to see the objectives of the Gaza War materialize, among others affording Israel the freedom of immediate action in the event that terror – in any form whatsoever – lifts its head once again in the Gaza Strip.

It also must be acknowledged that a threat of territorial losses is a strong deterrent for organizations such as Hamas, since the loss of lives – even in the tens of thousands – and destruction have no meaning to the proponents of such ideologies. To ensure a long-lasting deterrence in the Gaza Strip, a portion of its territory must remain under Israel’s control. One such possibility that would gain wide support among Israeli public, is a militarized security zone along the parameter of Gaza under the control of Israel. These swaths of land can be used for cultivating agriculture by the communities that were the victims of the Hamas October 7 attack and breath life where Hamas has strewn death. This not only makes sense in terms of Israel’s security – it brings with it the much-needed historic justice.

Optimism is not enough

Trump’s reelection is a rare historic opportunity for Israel. With the support of a strong, realistic leader that had proven himself a true friend to the Jewish people, can the picture of the Middle East be radically changed, from which both Israel and the US can gain considerable – and crucial – advantages.

In order to ensure this historic opportunity is not missed, Israel must do two things. The first – enhance the cooperation with the US in a joint aim of eliminating the Iranian nuclear program.

The second is the formulation of a clear and definite long-term solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict that cements Israel’s security and diplomatic status in the Middle East region, and has zero tolerance for any approach that does not acknowledge Israel’s inalienable right over the land of Israel and its uncompromising right to maintain the security of the State and its citizens, ensuring the Trump administration’s full support of this aim.

Will Trump move the first piece on the board and launch an attack against Iran? Trump is a well-seasoned business mogul, who is very adept at identifying opportunities. However, at the end of the day, it is up to him and Israel to put forth proof of intent. In light of what is known about his previous term in the Oval Office, his recent appointments, and his guiding world views, it is likely that he will give Israel his security and diplomatic support and spearhead an attack on Iran.

One way or another, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement leads a steady clear line:

Israel’s national security leans on the State’s national ethos, the justness of the cause and its ability to protect its own security by itself with defensible borders and the understanding that the long-term security and the prosperity of Israel lies only in Israe’s hands.

This understanding must first and foremost stem from a common faith in the justness of Israel’s path, remembering the truth that has been at the foundation of Zionism since its inception – that if Israel does not take care of itself, no one else will.

Not even Donald Trump.

הפוסט Trump’s Second Presidency: A Critical Opportunity on a Silver Platter הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 27, 2024, the day the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect, the Syrian rebels took advantage of the opportunity and launched an attack against Bashar al-Assad’s army. After only 11 days, their forces had taken control of Damascus and completed the conquest of Syria. Assad himself fled to Russia.

Many were amazed at the dizzying speed with which the Syrian regime fell, and at the depth of hatred among the enraged crowd that wrecked the statue of the elder Assad and dragged it through Damascus.

The person least surprised was Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a member of the IDSF movement and one of the leading experts in Middle East studies. His analysis seems to imply that the Baath regime in Syria could have come to no different end.

Greater infidels than Jews and Christians

“The rebels succeeded in taking control of Syria so quickly because Syria is a hollow country. The people don’t believe in it and the army isn’t willing to die for it,” Kedar said in a special conversation with Or Yissachar, head of the IDSF research department, after the dramatic developments in Syria. “My book ‘Assad in Search of Legitimacy’ (2005) proves what other Orientalists have tried to deny or ignore,” claims Kedar, “which is that Hafez Assad, and later his son Bashar, tried in vain all these years to become legitimate rulers in the eyes of the public. They never succeeded. They didn’t have a nickel’s worth of legitimacy. Nothing, zero, nada. They ruled by force. Everything was phony, and that’s why it fell apart so quickly.”

Kedar explains that this is a chronicle of a collapse foretold. “Syria’s biggest problem is that in 1966 it was taken over by members of the Alawite religion, a minority who are considered by the country’s Sunni Muslim majority to be infidels – idolaters whose fate is to either convert to Islam or be slaughtered. The renowned medieval Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyyah called the Alawites ‘greater infidels than the Jews and Christians.’ Therefore, from the perspective of Muslims, an Alawite cannot be a ruler.”

Brutal repression and strategic surprise

“To deal with the hostility of the Muslim majority towards them,” says Kedar, “the Alawite leaders from the Marxist faction of the Baath Party – the secular nationalist party that has ruled Syria since taking over in 1966 – established a terrible dictatorial regime. It suppressed rebellions brutally. In 1976, the Muslim Brotherhood mounted an uprising in Syria and thousands of Sunni rebels fought against the government. The uprising ended in February 1982 with the Great Hama Massacre, where between 20,000 and 40,000 people were murdered. Military forces under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother, blew up houses with the residents inside – including old people, women, and children – and they killed other victims with gas. About 20,000 more people, who were taken into custody, were murdered in Palmyra prison.

“The next round began in March 2011, with a wave of anti-government protests that erupted as part of what was then called the ‘Arab Spring.’ Then too, in various regions, the rebellion was suppressed with deadly force. Many Syrian Muslims fled north to the Idlib region, close to Turkiye. The Turks helped them arm and equip themselves, organize, train, and prepare for the great day when they would break out and liberate the country from the rule of the Assad family.”

For 14 years, the rebels in the Idlib region waited, gathered strength, armed themselves, and watched for the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow to the Assad regime. “The turning point,” explains Kedar, “came with the end of Hezbollah’s war against Israel, which left the regime especially weakened.”

How did the rebels mount their surprise attack?

“Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – an Islamist organization formerly called Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated with al-Qaeda – was the first to attack, under the command of Muhammad al-Julani. The other rebel organizations quickly followed suit, to take advantage of the strategic surprise that wound up costing the Assad regime its life.”

Kedar describes the course of the battles: “First the rebel forces attacked in Aleppo, and a few days later they proceeded south to Hama and later to Homs. After that area was conquered, the Druze in As-Suwayda and the Bedouin in Daraa also joined the rebellion against the government. Then it was a short path to the conquest of Damascus and the final defeat of Assad.”

We will have won when Israeli flags are hoisted over former Iranian embassies

Although the rebels fought as a single front in the recent campaign, in reality they are a variety of organizations and their agendas differ and sometimes clash. “In the Idlib region, refugees from Daesh, Al Qaeda, and other organizations have accumulated over the years, especially after 2018. In contrast, there were also secular and multi-ethnic organizations without any religious agenda. They included Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawites, and members of other groups. These organizations appear more moderate and pragmatic, and at least two of them accept Israel. I know this because I’m in contact with their leaders,” Kedar reveals.

Does the agenda of most rebels actually appear to be relatively moderate?

“The statements that most organizations are issuing are quite positive. Some even say that Israel has nothing to fear. One of the organizations I’m in contact with wrote to me that for them the great victory over Assad, the Iranians, and Hezbollah will be when the Iranian embassies in Damascus and Amman have Israeli flags flying, meaning those buildings have become the Israeli embassies.”

It would be better for the rebels to establish a liberal regime

“There is no unified Syrian people,” explains Kedar. “Syria is an artificial state. It’s deeply divided ethnically, into Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Armenians – and religiously, into Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Alawites – and tribally, into powerful clans and extended families, many of them armed and valuing their internal loyalties and their own agendas. Those groups were together only because of the arbitrary border that France established when it concluded its mandate in the region. The gaps and tensions along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines have prevented a true Syrian people from forming.” According to Kedar, this is precisely the reason that it would be beneficial for al-Julani to establish a relatively liberal regime.

“If Syria becomes an Islamist state like Daesh or a dictatorship that tries to impose a unified national identity, it could fall apart – because the Druze, Kurds, and other minorities would not want to live in such a state.” On the other hand, if Syria were a pluralistic state as it was in the 1950s, intervening less harshly in the lives of its citizens, then all sorts of forces that want independence – such as the Alawites in the coastal region – could very possibly be content with what they have and not try to dismantle the country.”

If the alternative is Iran – I prefer Daesh

When asked whether the disintegration of countries like Iran or Syria will negatively affect stability in the Middle East, Kedar replies surprisingly that on the contrary, it will only improve stability.

“Only the Emirates, which are homogeneous countries, have remained stable over many years in this region. In contrast, countries made of several groups, heterogeneous countries, are very unstable. Consider, for example, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. They each include ethnic, religious, and tribal groups that don’t associate with each other, so why force them to live in a single framework?

If an extremist Islamist state like Daesh is established, is it still good for Israel that the Assad regime has fallen?

“Even the worst militias in Syria pose a threat that is primarily tactical – automatic weapons and heavy machine guns mounted on Toyotas. If I have to choose between that and a strategic threat from Iran in the form of ballistic missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons soon, then I prefer to deal with Daesh. Of course I really want to avoid that. But if the alternative is Iran, I prefer Daesh.”

Israel is ready for any scenario

Is uncertainty about the nature of Syria’s emerging regime the reason for the preventive measures that Israel has taken in recent weeks?

“Exactly. Israel is preparing for the worst-case scenario, in which extremist Islamists have control of Syria. That’s why we’re seeing a very large concentration of forces in the Golan. For the meantime, until it becomes clear where the new government is headed, the IDF has captured the Syrian side of Mount Hermon – which is higher than the Israeli side – and has also improved the Israeli positions on the Golan itself. These steps are important and it’s good that they were taken as a way of warding off danger and ensuring that we don’t relive October 7th – this time on the Golan – with military forces entering the State of Israel because it fell asleep on the watch.

“It’s impossible to know what will happen in Syria,” concludes Kedar. “It could be an Islamist terrorist state like Daesh, or an open, modern, liberal state like Syria was in the past. We have to wait and see. We can only hope that a reasonable, normal government will be established there that Israel can reach a dialogue with, so that we all can feel calmer about what’s happening across the border.”

הפוסט “Syria was always a fake – that’s why it fell apart so quickly” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the last three months, the center of gravity of the Swords of Iron war has shifted northward, but according to journalist Yair Kraus, the story of the northern sector began unfolding as early as October 7, 2023. As someone who lives in Acre and covers the northern region for Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth, he discerned from the beginning that his region was an integral part of the war.

“When we saw the terrible attack on the southern communities, we realized that such an attack could have happened here too, and in much more monstrous proportions,” he relates. “This completely changed our perception of security as residents of the north. It created a deep crisis in our trust for the state and the IDF. Today, when we hear statements like ‘Hezbollah is deterred,’ for us it’s a warning that the situation on the ground is probably the opposite.”

The days of a “sense of security” are over

Yair Kraus lives in Acre, so he and his family were not evacuated. But they certainly felt the echoes of the war. His eldest daughter, for example, had to leave home for an entire month to go to school in the center of the country, and his three younger children had no educational framework for about three months. Kraus also personally knows many families who were displaced from their homes, and has seen firsthand the difficulties they faced and are still facing. He is aware of many residents – mainly elderly – who are waiting for the moment when they can return home. Moreover, there are quite a few others who are not at all sure they wish to return, and some have already decided to leave the north for good. The trend toward relocating permanently is especially noticeable among young families whose children have already settled into new frameworks in central Israel. Those families do not want to uproot them again.

However, even if we focus on residents who are waiting to return – and even on exceptional individuals who decide to move to the north of the country now of all times – there is still a serious problem in that most of them are not yet able to do so.

According to Kraus, who has been covering the northern region since the Second Lebanon War, several conditions must be met before the north can be repopulated. The first involves security and survival. “The residents in the north, especially the evacuees, will carefully examine what conditions the state and the army want to return them to,” he says. “I hear from many friends that they will not return to a situation where they will see Hezbollah terrorists and their families settling again in the villages where attacks were launched, or go back to being on the front line with the army behind them.”

The residents of the north have had enough of promises, Kraus adds, and they will now demand to see changes on the ground. “The security establishment’s usual boasting and lying will no longer work, and there’s no use for more of their statements that have repeatedly turned out to be unfounded,” he concludes. “The days of ‘a sense of security’ are also over. The issue here is no longer what people feel. It’s what people see with their own eyes – and when you see the villages where attacks were launched being rebuilt, and when there’s no buffer zone, it doesn’t look like security. Remember, we didn’t defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon. And Hezbollah’s stated goal is still to conquer the northern settlements. It’s time for us to start believing Hezbollah and stop underestimating its buildup. We also need to wean ourselves from the addiction to respite – and from methods of action such as the kind we used in the so-called war between the wars. There is a major lesson here for the leadership, the army officers, and the northern residents, and it is that the peace and quiet we long for can be bought only with determination and the force of arms.”

So what will security on the northern border look like?

“We constantly hear about weapons being seized and terrorist infrastructure being destroyed, even now during the ceasefire, but what will change the reality the day after the war is not how many weapons we removed, but whether the weapons will return to those places. As long as the army and government show no willingness to hold on to the areas where Hezbollah operated, we should be worried. It’s clear to me and many other residents that for security in the north, we must create a buffer zone like the ones at the Gaza border and the Syrian border. Besides keeping security threats away from the communities at the fence, a buffer zone would also deliver humiliation. The Lebanese will see abandoned villages standing as monuments that proclaim what happens to those who try to harm us.”

Don’t say “rehabilitation,” say “development”

Besides restoring security, another condition that must be met in order to return the residents of the north to their homes is the restoration of the damaged infrastructure, including the ruined drainage systems, the destroyed roads, the wrecked buildings, and the many homes that suffer from abandonment. Of course, we also need repairs at public institutions such as health funds and schools, and at businesses, because they are all integral to a reasonable lifestyle.

However, alongside physical restoration, there is another aspect, less talked about, which is the development aspect. “We hear all the time about ‘rehabilitating the north,’ but in my opinion, rehabilitation is the wrong concept because it implies restoring the conditions of October 6,” says Yair Kraus. The situation in the north has been shaky for many years, and it is impossible to prop something back up that has long been falling apart. There is an issue of attitude here, and it is time for us to replace the term ‘rehabilitation’ with the terms ‘momentum’ and ‘development.'”

Kraus expresses a feeling that many northern residents share – especially now, after they have glimpsed the lifestyle of the center’s residents. “Exposure to life in the center of the country made the residents of the north realize how far behind they were. The rift strongly affected their perception,” he explains. “After a few months of living in the center, residents of the north began to get used to conditions that residents of the center have long taken for granted, such as accessible public transportation, advanced health services, well-paying jobs, and a variety of leisure activities. It’s enough to notice how many movie theaters an average city has in central Israel and then look at the Upper Galilee. There isn’t a single movie theater in that entire region. But the problem is much deeper than that, of course. Such gaps exist in every field and influence every aspect of the residents’ daily lives. So if the state wants those residents to return to the north, it cannot be satisfied with merely restoring what they had before. It must assure them that they will receive the same conditions that exist in the center. People say that you don’t cry out for what you don’t notice the lack of – but now the residents of the north know what they lack and they will cry out.”

What should the development plan for the north include?

“We need to start improving public transportation and expanding railroad lines, build advanced medical centers, and place an emphasis on employment, education, and leisure. Beyond that, we need to work on reducing land prices in the decaying rural communities at the heart of the Galilee – because currently the prices are exorbitant, to the point where they harm the entire Jewish settlement enterprise in the Galilee. But above all, a new point of view is needed. Currently the state treats the north as an unwelcome assignment and not as an asset. For that reason, it develops the north according to economic and administrative considerations, and not considerations of Zionism and societal values.”

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north.

The people of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem aren’t wiser than we are

It is impossible discuss the rehabilitation and development of the north without addressing the question of responsibility. Currently there are various bodies trying to drive the process, and they are roughly divided into two groups – outsiders and insiders. The first group includes mainly government bodies and regulatory officials. The second group includes local leaders, residents, and private associations. Synchronization among the various bodies is not always successful, and sometimes it does not exist at all. Currently the reins are held by those external offices.

According to Yair Kraus, this trend is not new. “For years, the people in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem decided what was right for us, and how we should live, and even now there is a feeling that do-gooders are coming from outside again to save and heal us,” he says. “This criminal policy may derive from good intentions, but in practice it weakens the local leadership and the community’s resilience. It sends the message that the residents can’t take care of themselves.”

Kraus compares the situation in the north to national disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes. In such disasters too, we see delegations from elsewhere arriving to save the locals. The missions operate out of good will, and their assistance is indeed needed, but when they operate without the cooperation of the local population, their benefit is only partial.

“All the studies in the world prove that sustainable reconstruction after a national disaster is possible only when the community is part of the reconstruction and part of the action,” he explains. “We need to create a situation where we exert ourselves not merely for the community but together with it. Not only do the locals know best what they need. In addition, by taking responsibility for themselves they can achieve a sense of triumph and restore their own resilience, which is no less important than physical rehabilitation.”

Why, in your opinion, are the people of the north excluded from the reconstruction and development processes?

“Regulators and government officials don’t trust us and don’t believe in the power of local leaders. They fear that the money will go to the wrong places, or that government investments will be unprofitable, and most importantly, they no longer believe that trees and neighborhoods can sprout in places where only thorns have sprouted so far. It must be said in fairness that these concerns are not imaginary and there really is a leadership problem in the north. Billions have been invested in the region over the years and have given back almost no profit. In my opinion, a solution needs to be found that will provide for supervision but also give the north a certain freedom of action. I don’t know what the solution is, but I know we must try to find it.”

No “state,” no “army,” only people

One of the clearest conclusions that Yair Kraus draws from the last year of the war is that we need to discard amorphous terms like “state” and “army,” and instead start talking about the people who make up these bodies.

He harks back to the period when he covered Operation Guardian of the Walls and many media outlets reported on various decisions made by the court. He, as a journalist, opposed that unspecific term and made sure to mention the name of the judge who made each decision. In today’s context, Kraus emphasizes that there is no army, but rather a Chief of Staff, a head of the Northern Command, a divisional commander, and so on. Similarly, there is no state. There are ministers, there are members of Knesset, there are advisors. “This precision is important because when you attribute the responsibility to the body, then no one is responsible,” he explains. “In contrast, when you say who has the authority, by name and position, and indicate what decision or what action that person took – then immediately an individual is responsible.”

His hope is that those in authority, from the most senior to the most junior, will take responsibility and truly fulfill their roles. Only in this way, he believes, will it be possible to influence the future of the country and its development.

Another conclusion that Kraus has retained is that we must no longer be captivated by promises. “In the last year and a quarter, we have received a very big lesson in realism, and I can no longer look at the future through a prism,” he says. “In my lifetime, I’ve heard enough exciting announcements that ultimately led to nothing. I hope that now, with the reality of the north finally on the public agenda, we will see real change. It’s a very harsh thing to say, but this terrible war could be a blessing for the north. If it weren’t for a game-changing event of this magnitude, I doubt we would be talking about the importance of the north and recognizing how acute the need is to take care of this region of the country and improve its conditions. In my view, we must leverage this event into development, so that out of the fearsome comes forth sweetness.”

הפוסט The North Needs a New Story: An Interview with Journalist Yair Kraus הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Following the Syrian rebels’ takeover of Damascus and approximately 70% of the country’s territory, rebel leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani is striving to establish a new regime in Syria to replace that of Bashar al-Assad’s. The fragile situation in Syria has become a source of deep concern for many nations — including Israel, the United States, Russia, and Turkey, all of which are closely monitoring developments. The primary fear is that these recent changes may lead to a power vacuum in Syria, providing jihadist organizations with fertile ground.

Over the past two weeks, al-Julani has sought to convey a message of moderation to the West, presenting himself in what could be described as a “softer version” in order to improve the image of his group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, his jihadist fighters project a far more uncompromising stance.

This week, jihadist rebels released a video on social media declaring that after victory in Damascus and the rest of Syria, they will “liberate and conquer Jerusalem and its Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as the Kaaba in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.”

The rebels’ bold statements follow the United Kingdom’s announcement that it is reconsidering its designation of HTS as a banned organization, and word from the U.S. government that it may be ceasing to list HTS as a terrorist organizations.

These responses from the U.S. and the U.K. exemplify typical Western naivety in the face of the new situation in Syria. It appears the West has again failed to learn from history, as previously in its dealings with Osama bin Laden, with al-Qaeda, and with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In contrast, al-Julani seems to have learned from the mistakes of major jihadists who came before him, such as bin Laden of al-Qaeda and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS. Al-Julani represents a more modern and sophisticated version of these figures, learning from history and trying not to repeat their errors. Knowing his Islamist roots, could the West truly be so naïve?

A quintessential example of this western perspective can be found in the American intelligence assessments. According to U.S. intelligence, Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS, underwent significant transformation, distancing itself from ties with ISIS and becoming independent from al-Qaeda. Furthermore, American intelligence asserts that al-Julani is energetically working to improve HTS’s image and purging the organization of its more extreme elements.

The American opinion notwithstanding, al-Julani’s actions should be assessed from outside the typical Western perspective. One example of how different the facts are is his visit to the great Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. His triumphant arrival and worship there send his followers a clear message about his and his jihadist fighters’ agenda:

The conquest of Damascus, and worship in the Umayyad Mosque alongside the mausoleum of Salah ad-Din, who was one of Islam’s most renowned military leaders, speaks for itself. It is a symbol with an obvious meaning — true not to how al-Julani seeks to display himself in the western media, but to what his fighters proclaim.

Given the West’s misguided outlook, the Syrian case may turn out to replicate the scenario of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban group promised to adopt a more moderate policy. once it had captured Kabul, in 2021, but in practice, it imposed severe restrictions on women and strictly enforced Sharia law in all aspects of governance.

Moreover, ISIS has a presence in Syria as it had in Afghanistan — a lower-profile presence now for that jihadist organization, but a presence nonetheless. Despite its frictions with HTS and other factions, ISIS could exploit another such power vacuum to expand its foothold in Syria. In fact, this week ISIS reported executing 54 of Assad’s soldiers whom it captured as they attempted to flee Syria.

Thus a power vacuum in Syria could lead to the emergence of a “new Afghanistan” on Israel’s border—a scenario that may afford ISIS a resurgence like the one that followed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, after which ISIS–Khorasan Province became the group’s most lethal branch.

Such a scenario could intensify competition between ISIS and other jihadist factions and particularly against HTS, which is poised to form the foundation of Syria’s new government. Even more dangerously, a government with roots in a jihadist movement would rule Syria in accordance with jihadist ideology and policies.

It is worth noting that HTS also expressed support for the October 7 attacks. If it consolidates itself and achieves dominance across the border from Israel, it will dramatically increase the Syrian threat and heighten the likelihood of a similar attack — an assault like that of October 7, but this time targeting Israeli communities in the Golan Heights.

The article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Is Syria the New Afghanistan? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As we count the days until the inauguration of President-Elect Donald Trump, we should devote careful thought to Israel’s future relations with the new administration and to attaining Israel’s long-standing strategic objectives.

The president-elect describes his personal approach, as follows: “In my life, there are two things I’ve found I’m very good at: overcoming obstacles and motivating good people to do their best work. One of the challenges ahead is how to use those skills as successfully in the service of others as I’ve done, up to now, on my own behalf.” Trump made this statement in 1977, in his best-seller, The Art of the Deal. At the end of 2024, it is clear that he has remained consistent throughout his election campaign and in his choice of nominees for the new cabinet.

Furthermore, as far as Israel is concerned, we must recall President Trump’s past accomplishments. He kept his promise and moved the American embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and sponsored the Abraham Accords. As a leader and entrepreneur, he is accustomed to thinking big, on a large and ambitious scale. For example, his vision includes the rebuilding of American industry, the exploration of space and space travel.

What does this mean for the Jewish State and its strategic needs? According to the fifteenth-century Florentine political thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli, one should ask powerful men for big things, because it is just as easy for them to grant large requests as small ones.

An episode in our history proves this point, namely, the meeting on March 18, 1948 between President Harry S. Truman and Dr. Chaim Weizmann. President Truman’s grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, tells the story, as follows: “…. On May 14, 1948, President Harry S. Truman made one of the most momentous decisions of his presidency: recognizing the new state of Israel just minutes after its founding. My grandfather is justly celebrated for providing the legitimacy this nascent democracy required to survive, but his WWI buddy and former business partner, Eddie Jacobson, deserves credit, as well. This installment of ‘First Family Stories’ is dedicated to a friendship that changed the world.”

It is well known that President Truman overcame both the opposition of Secretary of State George Marshall and the long-standing hostility of the American foreign policy establishment. Over the years, such attitudes have persisted. Most recently, the Obama/Biden foreign policy, while nominally positive toward Israel, has been ambivalent and, on occasion, downright nasty.

A recent example was President Biden’s arm twisting of

Israel to end the Hamas war by accepting a ceasefire and a compromise, which drew a false equivalence between a terrorist aggressor that had launched a war against a legitimate state and an American ally.

On July 24, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker of the House Mike Johnson of Louisiana. On the following day [July 25], the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Biden ended in a bust up. The President warned Netanyahu that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!”

From a historical perspective, this type of episode was not an isolated occurrence. American policy makers have frequently misunderstood the ways of our region and, consequently, have made costly mistakes that have harmed their own interests as well as those of Israel.

II.

The careful study of our past, particularly the Israeli decision-making process before the Six-Day War, provides valuable insights for the present and the future. The late Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto (1926-2015) was Chief of Planning and Operational Requirements of the Israel Airforce (IAF) prior to the Six-Day War (1967) and a well-informed insider. Several years before the Six-Day War, he visited France, which supplied Israel with Mirage jet fighters. On one of his visits, his colleagues discreetly informed him that the French government planned to end its special relationship with Israel. Subsequently, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol authorized Tsiddon-Chatto to negotiate Israel’s first purchase of an American light attack aircraft, the A4 Skyhawk, manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. Furthermore, it was Tsiddon-Chatto who discovered the American spy-ship, USS Liberty, standing still in the Mediterranean off Sinai during the Six-Day War.

As a military strategist, Tsiddon-Chatto made several basic observations: 1) America failed to distinguish between its friends and its enemies; 2) America refused to let Israel win a war; 3) When writing about pro-active defense and the decision in June 1967 to preempt the war, he emphasized the crucial importance of the dimension of time.

While the circumstances have changed over the past decades, Tsiddon-Chatto’s description of Israel’s situation is timely, as for example, President Biden’s forceful demand of July 25, 2024, that Prime Minister Netanyahu accept a ceasefire in Gaza instead of a decisive victory.

His statements have been gently edited as follows:

…. Since the ‘Czech arms deal’ of 1955, and the Soviet position [of] consolidation in the ME following the Eisenhower / Dulles handling [of] the Anglo-French in the Suez Crisis of 56/7, there was no question in the ME who is on the US and who on the Soviet side. The US seemed to be the only ones oblivious of reality, thus unwittingly reinforcing Soviet penetration in the ME. Moreover, the US, which related to Israel as if it were a millstone on its neck until the Six Day War … [The Americans] “discovered” only as a result of this war that Israel is the major regional power, unconditionally pro-US, and an inexhaustible source of intelligence on Soviet assets, captured in large numbers and handed over. [Author’s bold].

Tsiddon-Chatto had a basic complaint regarding American policy toward Israel, namely, that the U.S. consistently prevented Israel from achieving a decisive victory on the battlefield in order “to placate Arabia which, as it proves since 9/11, is implacable…. It should make sense to see the US picture of Vietnam and [the] ME as just two interacting sectors of the Cold War. There is abundant evidence to prove this, and that the US has, and probably is to this day, misunderstanding the Arab manipulative ways.”

Writing in general terms about the task of the strategist, Yoash describes his methodology and then emphasizes the dimension of time as the most important factor in the decision to preempt a war:

Planning must relate to all possible scenarios. The plan … must respond to the scenarios [which have] the highest probability of materializing, while assuring a response to the most pessimistic scenarios.

The dimension of time is a matter of decisive importance. If the threat increases and becomes more acute with time, it means that the danger grows every day, and it is possible that there will be a time when our weakness will compel us to take the initiative to the point of a preemptive strike, even if the preparations for war have not been completed. (Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Be-Yom, be-Lail be-Arafel [By Day, By Night, through Haze and Fog] (Jerusalem: Keterpress, 1995, in Hebrew): 306.

Tsiddon-Chatto describes the public mood in Israel at the end of May 1967, during the days prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. The Egyptian army was waiting on Israel’s border and the civilian reserves had been mobilized. This state of affairs could not be maintained for too long and paralyzed Israel’s economy. Thus, the dimension of time became the key variable in the equation: “… Were the Arab Coalition to open hostilities first, using their much superior air forces in the way we foresaw, the State of Israel would have ceased to exist….”

It is not well known that, at this critical moment, the U.S. vigorously opposed a pre-emptive strike. (See [Meir] Amit’s report of his meeting of May 25, 1967, with [John] Hadden, the CIA man in Israel. (Rosh be-Rosh (Head On), [Or Yehuda: Hed Arzi, 1999, Hebrew]: 235).

Meir Amit, Director of the Mossad, gives the real backstory of this episode. He wrote that a “tough conversation” took place at midnight in his home. [Also present were Efraim Halevy, a senior member of the Mossad, and Brigadier General David Carmon, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence.] There was shouting, and even shots of whisky did not calm the tense atmosphere. Amit tried hard to convince Hadden that the situation was really critical and that Israel would have to act as soon as possible. But Hadden threatened that if Israel pre-empted the war, America would send forces to fight on the Egyptian side. He held the firm conviction that we had to wait and warned: “Don’t create a situation in which we will be forced to go against you.”

Meir Amit describes how his urgent mission to Washington ultimately resulted in the decision of the government to pre-empt the war:

On the morning of May 29, we gathered [as we did] every day in the office of Eshkol to discuss the ongoing situation. Abba Eban participated at this meeting; as well as the Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Yaakov Herzog; the Head of Military Intelligence, General Aharon Yariv; and I. All of us had the feeling that things had gone too far, and it was necessary to do something to break the stalemate in which we were stuck. During this discussion, the head of military intelligence proposed that the head of the Mossad go to Washington immediately in order to bring us a reliable picture of what is going on.

‘Meir,’ Areleh [Aharon Yariv] said: ‘You are a member of the household there. Dick Helms, Head of the CIA is a personal friend of yours. In an informal chat, you will be able to hear directly from him what is really happening.’ (Amit, 237).

When he arrived in Washington, Amit discovered that his professional colleagues were understanding and well disposed. Meeting with Richard Helms, he learned that his assessment of the facts coincided with those of the CIA. Helms arranged an appointment for Meir Amit with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who grasped the situation immediately and made an important recommendation.

During this meeting, McNamara received two phone calls from President Johnson, asking to be updated on these talks. At a certain point, Amit asked the Secretary of Defense for advice:

‘What should I do now? Wait here a day of two?’

‘He cut me short with a brief sentence, “Go home, your place is there now.”’

Amit learned that America had no intention to help and concluded that time was against Israel. He recommended that Israel open hostilities immediately. (Amit, 241).

Amit added a most important fact — that precisely during the time he was in Washington, it became known that President Johnson received a message from former President Eisenhower reminding him that the Americans had a moral obligation to Israel which was given at the time of its withdrawal from Sinai in 1957. The Americans had undertaken to preserve the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and to assure freedom of navigation through the Straits of Eilat. (Amit, 242).

III.

As we look forward, it is possible to make several cautious predictions based upon past history and recent experience. We can return to the stated preferences of President-Elect Donald Trump and take note of his choices. Frequently, there is a link between domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, we may try to understand the outlook and policy goals of the new administration, and, at the same time, consider some recent changes in Israel’s defense policy.

As he has proclaimed, Donald Trump’s big idea is to “Make America Great Again.” Interestingly, his model has been the promising economic reform program of Javier Milei, President of Argentina. One of Milei’s innovations was to launch a Ministry of Deregulation, an idea which Trump adopted enthusiastically. His new approach embodies the rejection of the hard-left policies of the Obama/Biden administrations. Among his policies are: achieving American energy independence; rebuilding American industry; ending unrestricted immigration; and fighting rampant crime. It is a matter of record that Trump plans to end the Obama/Biden policy toward Iran, which had been consistently lenient and uncritical. It would be reasonable to expect that the new administration would continue some of the policies in our region and expand the framework of the Abraham Accords.

After the Hamas invasion and atrocities of October 7, 2023 and the war which followed, it is clear that Israel will have to be prepared to defend itself on its own and invest in its armaments industry. The entire situation has been transformed by the fact that war has been forced on Israel as an unavoidable policy option, that is, “diplomacy by other means.” This implies a change of approach. Israel must defend itself proactively, as was the case with the recent initiatives in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out that the United States could change its policy and help Israel decisively win this war (in which America has a vital interest).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel and the Second Trump Presidency: The Long Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Yesterday, the Syrian state founded in 1946 ceased to exist. This is the downfall not only of the Assad regime but of the state of Syria as a political framework that can impose order and structure. In this connection, it must be noted that the collapse of Syria, and of its Assad regime, is part of the same regional upheaval that began in 2010 and that has, in fact, not yet ended.

Since 2010, the Middle East has undergone a transformation out of the modern era where the region was organized under the “logic” of states as political frameworks. It has reverted to the pre-modern era of a different “logic” where the region is defined by communities, ethnic groups, transnational structures, and borderless ideologies.

With the developments in Syria, the Middle East is currently continuing a sort of backslide into the pre-nationalist, pre-modern era. In a way, this can be seen as a kind of revenge by the East against the West. The East is breaking away from the foundations of modernism and nationalism that the Europe of the late 19th century and early 20th century forced on it.

But the breakaway and the reversion to pre-nationalism are far from enough for the Middle East. Accompanying the breakaway process, it must be noted, is a quiet, creeping conquest of Western Europe by the pre-modern East through various agents — primarily through immigrant groups who never abandoned the ideological beliefs that they brought from the East and who are undermining the foundations of the modern, European-style order.

It may be said in general that the Middle East now speaks in a neo-olden language of politics and culture — one that is new in that it overrides its previous, European-made nationalist-modernist predecessor but is old in that it connects to the foundations of pre-modern political culture. The message is very difficult to define in simplistic terms of the positive and the negative.

From this standpoint, it must be granted that in the Middle East’s internal power struggle, the Shiite “Axis of Resistance” has suffered a critical blow. To that extent, Israel can claim a significant victory in this year’s battle against that axis’s representatives and proxies. But on the other hand, the collapse of Syria, and of the Assad regime, contains the seeds of a new Mideast reality full of dangers and complexities.

This reality has two immediate implications. The first concerns the situation in Syria, which is no longer Syria as we once knew it. At this stage, it is difficult to define the emerging new entity, which is evolving into a mix of sectarian power centers (Kurds, Druze, Alawites), transnational jihadist power hubs driven by an anti-Israel worldview no less than an anti-regime one, and the presence of actors like Turkey, whose transnational agenda is not far removed from that of Iran.

Practically speaking, the entire system of arrangements on the ground — as worked out between Israel and Syria after the war of 1973 and based on the logic of arrangements between states — is thus called into question and is little protected from those sources of power that do not at all think in terms of the “borders” that characterize a state. Consequently Israel must define red lines of its own befitting the situation, and strive especially to set up an iron wall preventing the “little jihad” against the Assad regime from turning into the “great jihad” against Israel.

But the second immediate ramification, which is even more significant, has to do with Iran — which has lost its Shiite axis, or at least two elements of it (Hamas and Hezbollah). Iran is at a strategic crossroads. It may be pushed into crossing the nuclear threshold in a sort of tit for tat, even before the US president-elect enters office. That move would leave little sand in the hourglass for an Israeli reaction against the prospect of an “Iranian Auschwitz.”

From that standpoint, Israel may possibly be said in general terms to be entering the third stage of its current war in the Middle East. The first stage was the illusory stage between May 2021 (Operation Guardian of the Walls) and October 7, 2023. The second stage proceeded intensively from October 7, 2023, into December 2024. But now Israel is entering the third stage of the war. In the shadow of a changing Mideast reality, Israel faces both veteran players — such as Iran, where the systems of ideology are eroding; and Turkey, which is turning from a shadowy enemy into a much more significant threat — and other players who are newcomers as Israel’s neighbors to the north.

But it is impossible to conclude without one important remark regarding Israel’s domestic arena. The currents of the Middle East have not bypassed Israel. Israel is part of the enormous process that the Middle East has experienced since 2010. In recent years it has also begun to budge away from its clearly state-centered foundations toward definitions of identity based on tribes and communities (haredi, secular, religious Zionist, Arab, and more) who, in their way, are battling for power.

The statehood concept championed by Ben-Gurion, which relied on elements such as the centralization of governmental power, the establishment of a politically neutral civil service, defined rules of governance, and respect for political authority, is undergoing significant erosion. This process is approaching a state akin to an undeclared civil war. So Israel must not only re-establish and rebuild the boundaries between itself and its obvious external enemies, but must also establish the political and cultural boundary between itself and the Middle East in order not to descend to the same condition in which the Middle East as a whole is thickly stewing.

This article was originally published in  Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Assad Regime Fell: Israel is Heading Toward a Third Campaign? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The situation in Syria over the past decade has been characterized by significant regional and international interventions, which have played decisive roles in shaping the current map. The “Arab Spring”, which began in late 2010, initially promised democratic reforms across the Middle East, but met with fierce opposition in Syria. There, the Assad regime, with the support of Iran, Russia, and Shiite proxies, managed to maintain its power despite widespread resistance and a significant number of casualties.

Iran’s involvement in Syria has been presented as a defense strategy against extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, which Tehran views as direct threats to its national security. This intervention was part of a broader regional strategy by Iran, often described as its own “war on terror.” The stabilization of the Assad regime, which depends to a large extent on Iranian and Russian support, has come at a considerable cost, both in human and economic terms. However, this stability was fragile, dependent on the continued presence and support of these foreign powers.

Recent regional developments have further complicated the situation in Syria. Russia’s military focus has changed significantly due to its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which has reduced its ability to maintain the same level of involvement in Syria. At the same time, Hezbollah, a decisive Iranian proxy actor, suffered significant losses due to Israeli military operations during 2024. These factors weakened the basic pillars of Assad’s stability, creating a vacuum that rebel groups in Syria were quick to exploit.

The resumption of rebel activity, especially in the ‘Idlib’ province, highlights the fragility of the current stability in Syria. The rapid collapse of the Syrian army in response to these attacks highlights the ongoing vulnerabilities in the regime’s military infrastructure. This instability has inevitably led to increased Iranian and Russian involvement, as they seek to re-establish their influence and restore a semblance of control.

The geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey further complicates the situation in Syria. The two countries have pursued different strategies, often finding themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. While Iran has focused on supporting the Assad regime, Turkey has conducted a number of military operations in northern Syria, ostensibly to combat cross-border terrorism, but has in fact established a Turkish zone of influence. This competition has the potential to escalate tensions, especially when both countries seek to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of the other.

Despite the establishment of the Astana peace process in 2017, which was intended to manage the conflict in Syria, the reality on the ground indicates that it was mainly used to demarcate areas of control between Iran, Russia, and Turkey, and not to foster a comprehensive peace. As the Assad regime gradually gained territorial control, Iran’s influence increased, while Turkey established its presence in the north. This distribution of influence underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in Syria, Especially in light of the weakening of the “chief groomsmen”, Russia and Iran’s proxies.

The current situation in Syria presents a complex set of opportunities and risks for Israel and for the entire Middle East. While various factions, especially Iran and its proxies, are refocusing their efforts on the internal conflicts in Syria, there is a temporary decline in their attention to Israel. This shift in focus gives Israel strategic breathing space in the short term. However, this reality entails significant risks, especially the potential for instability on the Syrian Golan border, which could expand into the Israeli Golan Heights. This instability could escalate regional tensions and drag the Middle East into a broader conflict.

Historically, the borders of the Middle East were determined after World War I through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided control between France and Britain and granted political sovereignty to various tribal leaders. This division has created countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, which are characterized by ethnic and religious diversity with little common ground between different groups. This situation has led to deep hostility, especially among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, Christians, and others, exacerbated by strategic interests in the region’s oil resources.

The gradual erosion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement over the past decade has intensified the search for a new regional order, manifested in violent clashes and episodes of genocide such as those perpetrated by ISIS, for example. The involvement of world powers such as the United States and Russia has led to temporary stability, but in some ways has further complicated the situation. It is worth noting that stability in Syria during the Trump administration has occurred through coordination with Russia, suggesting that future interventions may work similarly.

The critical question is whether such international interventions can provide long-term stability in the region. The ongoing negative energies and hostility among the peoples of the region indicate that a local response, even if coordinated between major powers such as Russia and the United States, may not achieve sustainable stability. Instead, it is likely that these interventions will only be able to offer temporary relief without addressing the underlying tensions.

From an Israeli perspective, the most urgent concern is Jordan’s stability. Unlike other neighboring countries, Jordan remains relatively affected by the “Arab Spring” or the so-called “Islamic Winter.” However, the current regional dynamics pose significant challenges to Jordan’s stability, which some analysts say is precarious. The potential for chaos in Jordan is a realistic scenario for which Israel must prepare. This includes a strategic reassessment of the IDF’s position along the Jordan Valley, emphasizing the need for a strong and flexible security infrastructure on Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country.

In conclusion, while the internal conflict in Syria offers a temporary reduction in direct threats to Israel, it simultaneously poses significant risks to regional instability. The historical context of arbitrarily established borders and ongoing ethnic and religious hostility underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in the Middle East. For Israel, Jordan’s stability is becoming a critical concern, requiring comprehensive security measures and a proactive defense strategy. Future international interventions, while potentially beneficial in the short term, are unlikely to resolve deep regional tensions, underscoring the need for a multi-layered and long-term approach to regional stability.

This article was originally published on Ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Back to the “Islamic Winter” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Gaza war has been raging in a number of arenas, and accordingly has a number of objectives. On the southern front, reportedly, the objectives are the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia in the Gaza strip, the return home of all of the Israeli hostages from Gaza with no exception, and ensuring that no army of terror could resurface and take control of Gaza again. On the northern front, the objective is to deliver a devastating blow to Hezbollah, ensuring that it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel. However, there is another, less reported front, that does not make headlines like its counterparts but in effect, it holds sway on all the above and more – the global theater.

Israel’s broad strategy extends far beyond the borders of Lebanon and Gaza. The overall objective is the dismantling of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis as the controlling element of much of the Middle East. Local processes such as ceasefires and the separation of fronts, alongside the imminent administration change in the US, offer a valuable opportunity to drive change such that will not only decide the outcome of the current war but has the potential to reshape the entire  balance of power in the Middle East.

As proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles.

Israel has achieved everything. Almost.  Overview of the agreement terms

To better understand whether the ceasefire with Hezbollah is beneficial to Israel, we should first review its terms. Admittedly, it is all too easy to spot some loopholes, but it did hand Israel a few  extremely important achievements.

The first is the divorce between the war in Gaza and the conflict with Hezbollah. This separation has significant ramifications for Hezbollah and Hamas. At the time, Nasrallah proclaimed the Hezbollah’s mission was to come to the aid of their Palestinian brethren and made a commitment to continue the fighting on Israel’s northern border until the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Yet we see how Hezbollah has gone back on its promises, which in its own perception is a terrible humiliation.  This was a debilitating blow to Hamas, which has now been left to its own devices.

An additional achievement produced by the agreement is the demilitarization of southern Lebanon. If properly enforce, this clause will make it very hard for Hezbollah to rebuild its force on the border with Israel.

The third and perhaps the most significant achievement, is that Israel gains complete freedom of action in Lebanon which allows it to act against Hezbollah the moment it threatens Israel. This teaches the heads of Hezbollah that the moment they raise their heads – it will come rolling off. It could be said that Israel had achieved everything it wanted. Nearly. The problem with the agreement though is that it fails to chart a DMZ along the Lebanese border with Israel. In its current form, the agreement allows the population that lives near that border to return to their homes – some of which are located  just hundreds of yards from Israel. The problem is that as proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – many of these people are either Hezbollah terrorists or local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles. Once they return to their villages, Israeli intelligence will have a difficult time discerning which of them is an innocent civilian and which is a terrorist.

There is no doubt that this state of affairs will pose a challenge for Israel when coming to identify irregular activities  and stanch terror activity on the border. Nonetheless, there are three points to consider: Firstly, every negotiation by default entails concessions by all stakeholders, and perhaps this is a bitter pill that Israel has no choice but to swallow. The other point is that even if the population of south Lebanon does return to its villages on the border, Israel now has more tools and experience, and a stronger drive to eradicate terror. Thirdly, this is an interim agreement, meaning that Israel still has a chance to change it. The 60-day period set for the withdrawal and with the eminent entrance of the Trump administration into office, there is a fair chance that Israel could insist on creating a crucial DMZ along the border.

At the bottom line, on paper it appears that for the most part, the agreement is favorable for Israel – but of course, the soundness of these conditions will have to stand the test of enforcement. The US and France are involved in the agreement but at the end of the day, it is up to Israel and its security forces to prove the agreement productive. In the wake of October 7, the decision-making levels in Israel politics and military have come to understand that the international peacekeeping forces cannot be relied upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah. Israel has no choice but to take its own security fully in its own hands by any means necessary and impress upon Hezbollah that it is willing to jump right back in the fray if so pushed.

Upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah.

Why now? The timing of the signing in security and diplomatic terms

The signing of the ceasefire agreement had not materialized out of thin air. The timing was carefully selected with various security and diplomatic considerations. In terms of Israel’s security, the objectives set for the war in the northern border, i.e. the paralyzing of Hezbollah, was achieved to a large measure. Israel had catapulted the terror organization twenty years back in terms of its military prowess, and brought it to a state in which it is no longer a strategic threat on Israel. Admittedly, one can always claim that there was a lot more that Israel could have done to strike an even harsher blow against Hezbollah. Which is not wrong. However, insofar as the military objectives, they were realized for the most part, and the signing of the agreement marked the appropriate point in time to cease the IDSF HaBithonistim  activity in Lebanon.

Diplomatically speaking, it would seem that the timing of the ceasefire is opportune as well. Israel needs the support of the international community to legitimize its actions and to receive weapons and ammunition. The ceasefire agreement allows Israel to improve its position with the UN Security Council and in turn improve its diplomatic relations with the international community.

An additional diplomatic consideration that plays an important part in the timing of the ceasefire agreement is the forthcoming change of administrations in the United States – similarly to the last months of the Obama administration, the support of the US administration in Israel is ebbing. The timing of the agreement allows us to ride out the relations with the current Biden administration and prepare to forge relations with the incoming Trump administration.

Beyond all the above mentioned, the timing carries a critical operational advantage. Israel’s decision to take its foot off the pedal in the north means that it can focus militarily and strategically in its next two crucial objectives: bringing down Hamas and the overturning of the Shi’ite axis.

As per the first objective, a ceasefire up north allows Israel to shift its ground forces back into Gaza and return to high intensity fighting and thus increase the chances of crushing Hamas and returning the hostages. As for the second objective of overturning the Shi’ite axis – more will be detailed below.

The systemic solution is not in Lebanon: the global importance of the agreement

In the Middle East, there are three main forces vying for control of the region – the Shi’ite-Iranian axis, the radical Sunni axis, and the moderate Western-Sunni axis. In recent years, the Shiite axis led by Iran and its proxies was able to gain the upper hand to become the dominant force in the region. However, various processes that have unfolded over the past year have sent this dominance into decline, and if the US plays the right policy cards, the region just may witness the breakdown of the radical Shi’ite machine.

As the Shi’ite axis is yielding to pressure, the radical Sunni axis is coming into the center of the stage, led by Turkey together with extreme Suni terror organizations the likes of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The axis will prove to be no less pernicious than its Shi’ite counterpart if it grows stronger and will pose no less a threat to Israel and the West, and thus merits a red flag as well. Case in point is the recent events in Syria that led to the toppling of the Assad regime. The rebel forces were able to prevail among others thanks to a weakened Hezbollah, proving yet again the interconnectivity of events in the Middle East. For the moment, the fall of the historically hostile Assad regime may be taken as a favorable development for Israel, it is yet to be determined what kind of regime will step into the vacuum and what – if any – kind of threat it might pose to Israel. This means that Israel must not take its eyes of the radical Sunni axis that could be the biggest winner from the fall of the Shi’ite axis and might be no less evil-intentioned toward Israel.

Therefore, the State of Israel must keep a close eye both on the Shi’ite and Sunni axes while at the same time  act toward solidifying the third axis – the moderate West-Sunni axis. For that end, Israel needs to form a coalition with the US, western countries and Sunni countries such as Saudia Arabia, UAE, Indonesia, Malesia and Pakistan. Such a coalition, if strong enough, may even draw other countries to join forces, such as Lebanon and even Iraq. In tandem with this effort, Israel must strive to forge normalization agreements with moderate Sunni countries in the Middle East that will perhaps lead to regional and global peace agreements.

One way or another, Israel must condition any move in the Middle East on a combined offensive against Iran. Once the head of the snake is removed – all the rest will fall into place.

Forward looking: the day after the ceasefire

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is for a 60-day term – but in terms of Middle East security, this is ample time for things to change. There is no way to predict if indeed the ceasefire will be implemented verbatim, or what will transpire once the term is out; Hezbollah may very well breach the agreement, forcing Israel back into battle, and equally possible is that the agreement may lead to a permanent settlement that allows Israel to begin rehabilitating the north and return the evacuated citizens to their homes.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement wishes to see a rehabilitated and healing north. This is a complex process, but with smart resource allocation and oversight, this part of Israel can very soon be on track to recovery. Once this is underway, we can then turn to the next task at hand – the increase of the Jewish population in the north. The IDSF HaBithonistim sees this as a national imperative of top priority. A two-fold increase would make it clear to our enemies that they cannot push us back from our own borders, as well as contribute to the settlement of the land in agency of Israel’s security doctrine.

In order to realize these objectives, IDSF HaBithonistim has been engaging with policy-makers and is founding educational and pre-military programs designed to strengthen the settlements within Israel’s borders. These days the movement is in the midst of developing the “Ha’Tkuma” pre-military preparatory program that will operate in the Gaza border communities. In the future more of such programs will be founded in the north of Israel.

For many, rebuilding and resettling the communities in the ravaged north seems like a distant goal, but we are getting closer – and the ceasefire agreement is the first step in this direction. Despite some of the agreement’s downsides and the concessions Israel is required to make, it is important to understand that the State of Israel is now facing a historic opportunity to realize all of its aspirations. If we take advantage of this opportunity skillfully, we can change our security reality for generations to come and even stabilize the balance of power throughout the Middle East.

הפוסט “Analyzing Lebanon Not Within the General Context Is a Big Mistake” – The Broad Implications of a Ceasefire on Israel’s Northern Border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The fall of the Assad regime should signal to Israel that, amidst the chaotic sequence of events, it must uphold two critical interests. The first is to destroy the capabilities of the Shiite Ring of Fire. The second is to avoid being trapped in a Sunni Ring of Fire.

The Shiite Ring of Fire was first breached with the downfall of Hezbollah and Hamas. Breaches continued with an Israeli strike that stripped Iran of its air defense capabilities, and with the rapid collapse of the Assad regime — a development echoing across the Middle East. This is not merely the fall of a regime that was hostile to Israel and was part of Iran’s Sunni Ring of Fire. It is also a psychological game-changer that could reinvigorate the Iranian rebels.

In an effort to fortify itself, Iran is accelerating the development of its nuclear weapons. A report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the U.S. indicates that Iran has speeded up its uranium enrichment so that it will potentially be able to manufacture 12 nuclear bombs.

Russia, too, has a stake in Iran’s nuclear progress, raising concerns that Russian technologies could be transferred to Iran to shorten the time required to manufacture a nuclear bomb and strengthen the resistance from the Axis of Evil.

In the face of Iran’s rush toward nuclear armaments, Israel is counting the days until Trump enters the White House. The question is how many days we have left in our quiver before Iran achieves a bomb that could, Heaven forbid, once more reverse the region’s momentum.

Therefore Israel must act immediately to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and, along with it, the remnants of the Ring of Fire that Iran has constructed around Israel.

The second interest that Israel must uphold is rooted in an ancient Machiavellian principle that says every change begets another change.

It is already evident that Iran’s decline paves the way for Turkey’s rise. Erdoğan is lurking around the corner in hopes that Israel will mount the attack and that the Iranian regime will falter. He would then seize the opportunity he has been awaiting and attempt to position himself as the region’s Islamic power.

Whether actively encouraged or passively approved by Turkey, the offensive from Syrian rebels under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was made possible by Turkish financial and military support. It not only benefits Erdoğan strategically by advancing his regional hegemony, but also benefits him tactically by weakening the Shiite axis, pushing the Kurds away from Turkey’s borders, and returning Syrian refugees who have been burdening Turkey’s economy.

Israel’s understanding of its own future interests on the battlefield against the Turks must therefore prompt it to strike inside Syria now. During the current war Erdoğan, an extreme jihadist who seeks Israel’s destruction, has taken every step to label Israel as an enemy and display his practical intent to harm it. In July, for instance, he spoke of invading Israel the way he invaded Karabakh and Libya: “Just like we entered Karabakh and the way we entered Libya, maybe we’ll do the same thing. …We have to be strong.”

Unlike Iran, Erdoğan possesses a modern, well-equipped military. This includes twice as many enlisted troops as Israel, approximately 10% more fighter jets, nearly twice as many tanks, four times as many warships, and more than twice the number of submarines (!).

Although Israel holds military superiority over Turkey in quite a few aspects, one of the challenges in confronting Turkey could lie in a preemptive Israeli strike because Turkey is a NATO member. Under the NATO framework, an attack on one member state is considered tantamount to attack on them all.

In conclusion, it is a necessity — and an obligation — for Israel to complete the destruction of the Shiite Ring of Fire. At the same time, its operations in Syria against Erdoğan-aligned rebels must be subject to a calculated assessment of Israel’s future interests in a possible war against Turkey as well as to a resolute decision that the Shiite Ring of Fire must not be replaced by a Sunni equivalent.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel Must Not Replace a Shiite Ring of Fire with a Sunni Ring of Fire הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Analysis: US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon face hurdles as Hezbollah de facto controls Lebanon; Israel must choose between a limited agreement or continued warfare, balancing military success with the need for regional security and international support

The contacts between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States, illustrate the main difficulty of a settlement reality in an era in which a sub-state terrorist organization controls a supposedly sovereign state de facto. The American-mediated contacts are supposed to lead to understandings on the basis of which quiet will be maintained on the border between Israel and Lebanon, but in a situation in which Lebanon is de facto controlled by a terrorist organization whose fingerprints are evident in the negotiations, not to mention the escalation process it led, it is difficult to understand how such an agreement can last, for how long and if at all.

The alternatives available for Israel on the Lebanese border are divided between two options – a local arrangement that does not fundamentally change the geostrategic situation, or the continuation of the war to destroy the Hezbollah terrorist organization. The reality that Israel reached after a year of fighting in the Gaza Strip, while fighting defensively on the Lebanese border, led it to a significant operational achievement vis-à-vis the terrorist organization, both in terms of damage to infrastructure, damage to the top command and control leadership, damage to weapons stockpiles and harm to fighters. Above all, neutralizing Hezbollah’s operative ability to implement the plan it has been working on for years, which is a ground-intensive operation to conquer the Galilee – Hezbollah has lost this capability.

If Israel reaches an arrangement vis-à-vis Lebanon, and assuming that Iran, which controls Hezbollah and indirectly Lebanon, where the radical ideology of the Ayatollahs’ “umbrella” will not change, under this assumption it can be assumed that such an arrangement will last for a short period of time, and certainly will not prevent the strengthening of the terrorist organization, a clear Iranian proxy in Lebanon.

In fact, as far as Israel is concerned, and certainly in today’s public opinion, expects Hezbollah not to regain strength, and certainly not to cross the geographical border of the Litani River, in order to prevent the reestablishment of the option of occupying the Galilee, as well as removing the communities in northern Israel from the direct threat of anti-tank weapons.

The alternative, from the Israelis’ perspective, and among a wide Israeli consensus, even a preferred alternative, is for the IDF to enforce the agreement, i.e., the IDF to prevent Hezbollah’s renewed buildup in the area south of the Litani River. This demand is fraught with a paradox, since Lebanon is a sovereign state, and there is no bilateral rationale whatsoever for a neighboring country to operate on the territory of a sovereign state defined as an enemy, this is a violation of sovereignty and Lebanon will not accept it, certainly not the Iranians.

Hence, the two real alternatives are a limited liability arrangement, or ongoing warfare. With the understanding that Israel will not be able to impose military control of the IDF on the ground on Lebanon, and assuming that Iran will not accept this under any circumstances either, Israel must demand two critical dimensions in the arrangement agreement: first, freedom of action in order to prevent Hezbollah’s buildup, which includes neutralization the smuggling routes – such an action also requires intelligence coverage, and this must be demanded by Israel, even if the visual intelligence is transmitted through an American intermediary, At the CENTCOM level.

On the operational level, Israel must demand a buffer zone into which no weapons will enter, just as defined in the separation of forces agreement between Syria and Israel after the Yom Kippur War (1974). The combination of a buffer zone, legitimacy to act against the axes of buildup, and an informed security assessment on the Lebanese border, which is also based on quality intelligence – are the best guarantee Israel can receive, and this guarantee will also be limited.

There should also be an understanding among the international community that agreements between a democratic state and a state ruled by a terrorist state such as Iran cannot be trusted. As long as Iran seeks to expand in the Middle East, it will find a way to strengthen its destructive arms in the region, including Lebanon. Therefore, the arrangement between Israel and Lebanon is a very likely short-term operation, and no more than a few years until something significant happens in Iran – if it continues its radical strategy, all the peoples of the region, and certainly Israel, will suffer from this.

Therefore, the international community, and certainly Israel, must act immediately for a strategic change vis-à-vis Iran – its different conduct can provide a more realistic guarantee of agreements, especially when the Russian axis, which has a clear interest in the northeastern Mediterranean basin, is integrated into this story.

Can Israel afford to wait for a change of government in the United States?

In general, Israel can suspend negotiations with Lebanon and wait for the Trump administration, which appears to be clearly pro-Israel compared to the Biden administration and in general. At the same time, it is worth being realistic – such a wait means continuing the fighting for at least another year in Lebanon, which means: increasing the burden on IDF reserve duty, continuing the lives of those evacuated from northern communities in the existing format, i.e., another year away from home, which has deep and problematic consequences.

The fighting as it stands these days is characterized mainly by “counter fire,” i.e., the firing of missiles and rockets, combined with unmanned aerial vehicles that violate the security of Israel’s civilian home front several times a day. The IDF, on the other hand, continues to “clear” the Lebanese territory, destroying additional Hezbollah capabilities. On the face of it, time seems to be working against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena – the Israeli home front is showing greater resilience than the Iranians thought, and with each passing day Hezbollah is getting closer and closer to breaking. It is possible that from this perspective, it is convenient for Israel to actually “play the game” according to the current rules, and in this way bring Iran, Hezbollah and Lebanon to an arrangement that is much better for Israel in a few months, certainly under the auspices of a sympathetic American administration – Reaching an arrangement when the terrorist organization is defeated is infinitely more credible than the agreement currently proposed.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Arrangement or escalation: Security alternatives on the Lebanese border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For years now, there are voices which would have the world view some of the most bloodthirsty and cruel terror organizations the world has ever known, i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah, not as the terrorists they are, but as “freedom fighters”. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, this bias has been pushed even further. They are being chanted in pro-Palestinian rallies, openly declared on banners on campuses of the most prestigious universities of the world, and are even heard in certain Israeli circles.

This paper reviews the goals that govern these organizations and their methods of operation and shows beyond doubt that equating terrorists and their organizations with freedom fighters is nothing short of fallacious. Aside from being a falsehood, this is a grave claim that harbors very dangerous consequences. When terrorist perpetrating war crimes are called freedom fighters, they are in effect gaining license to commit criminal activities and even immunity from the consequences thereof, and moreover, such claims breed further problematic misconceptions that view terror organizations as legitimate resistance movements, and the acts of terror themselves – as brutal and bloody as they might be – as legitimate means of popular struggle.

Therefore, any claims to that effect should be categorically denounced. At the same time, a comprehensive endeavor should be undertaken to debunk this narrative and reinforce the true understanding of terrorism and its overall end, for which any means are exploited: the annihilation of the Jewish state and its Jewish citizens.

In the name of enlightenment: how have terrorists become to be known as “liberators”?

The fictitious claim according to which terrorists are freedom fighters draws on an anti-Zionism narrative, according to which the Jews are colonialists that have seized control of a country called Palestine, with the aim of taking over a land with which they have no connection whatsoever. This contrived narrative is wrong on two accounts: the so-called state of Palestine had never existed, and secondly, the connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is undisputable and is established both historically and legally. The people of Israel are not foreign colonizers – they are a people returning to their rightful land after 2,000 years of unjust exile, which forced upon them an existence as mostly unwanted foreign elements in their hosting countries.

It follows that anyone who supports the Palestinian narrative is refuting the national rights of the Jewish people and disputing major legal rulings made by the international community, such as the British Mandate, granted by the League of Nations and the Partition Plan by the UN from 1947.

Although such claims have been voiced since the establishment of the State of Israel, they have been regaining tailwind under the auspices of radical progressive movements that had risen from the radical left in the Unites States such as the WOKE movement. WOKE and its counterparts are governed by the undiscerning principle that the weak are invariably in the right and victimized, and tend to turn what it perceives as the victim into the hero of the story. As part of this paradigm, the so-called struggle of the Islamic terror organizations for the “liberation” of “oppressed” minorities and the right to self-determination is perceived in some circles as a valiant post-modern struggle, and from there only a short leap was needed to view such terrorists as would-be freedom fighters.

The question of goals: what really motivates terrorists?

The raison d’etre of true freedom fighters is the liberation of their people and land from foreign conquerors that have invaded and seized it by force. A prime example of this is Mahatma Gandhi, who led a peaceful struggle against the British Empire’s rule in India and for national independence. In stark contrast, even a cursory examination of the stated objectives of some terror organizations clearly yields a completely different picture.

A quick look at the Hamas charter, for example, reveals that the organization makes no qualms about stating its overall goal – the all-out, end-justifying “Holy War” (Jihad) against the State of Israel, and the absolute rejection of any agreement or arrangement that would recognize the right of Israel to exist. The charter even quotes Hasan al-Banna ,the founder of its ally movement, The Muslim Brotherhood, who said: “Israel will rise and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it”.

As for Hezbollah, it too does not march under any banner of liberation – neither of people nor of country. It operates out of Lebanon – an independent state with no permanent Israeli  presence within its sovereign borders, and with no land dispute whatsoever with its southern neighbor such that calls for an irridentist agreement. Moreover, Hezbollah operates in Lebanon as a proxy and under the auspices and military support of another sovereign country, Iran, which resides 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Israel, and non-democratically forces its presence on the Lebanese people solely for its proclaimed purpose of annihilating the State of Israel and its citizens.

Another manifestation of the true non-peaceful intentions of terror organizations the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah – and indeed even official Arab organizations such as  the Palestinian Authority – is the fact that for decades, they have been rejecting out of hand nearly every solution or offer that Israel and Western administrations have brought to the table to bring the conflict to a resolution, thus proving that they are not motivated by the desire for emancipation. The underlying reason they have not accepted any diplomatic solution thus far is that all of these recognize the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. In other words – they strive only for a resolution that ensures the eradication of Israel from the map.

The question of operating method: how do terrorists differ from freedom fighters?

In 1984, acclaimed historian, Professor Benzion Netanyahu spoke at the second international conference of the Jonathan Institute for the study of terror. He spoke of the urgent need to fight the misconception regarding the true nature of terrorism, and in particular the perception of terrorists as “freedom fighters” or “protectors” of oppressed people. Professor Netanyahu addresses the manner in which freedom fighters operate and how it vastly differs from that of terrorists. He mentions three points of comparison that still hold true today, even after forty years:

Operating against civilians

Professor Netanyahu points to the fact that freedom fighters wage their struggle for a political or social end, with a fundamental respect to human rights of innocents. In stark contrast, terrorist make it a point to target innocent civilians as a means with which to foment fear and achieve their self-serving political interests.

Looking at the long list of terrorist attacks that have plagued Israel through recent decades – including the October 7 massacre in 2023, it is clear that terrorist organizations are systematically and deliberately targeting the civilian population as well, including the elderly, children and babies.

The installation of totalitarian regimes

Freedom fighters are committed to ensuring universal liberties and rights, says Prof. Netanyahu, which terrorists habitually ignore and violate – even the most basic of human rights – and propagate oppression in territories under their control. In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, it is common knowledge that they use their own people as human shields and ensconce themselves in densely populated areas, often causing intentional harm to innocent people on their side in self-protection or as a means of swaying public opinion with publicized propaganda. Furthermore, terrorist organizations violently oppress weak groups within their own population  such as women, minorities and members of the LGBTQ community. Hence, it would be absurd to present these organizations as champions of human rights and liberties.

Relations with dictatorships, oppressive regimes and organizations

The third point mentioned by Prof. Netanyahu relates to the connection frequently seen between terror organizations and violent groups and oppressive regimes. He explains that the aid terrorist often receive from these sources underscores their affinity to aims of oppression rather than values of liberty.

This connection is particularly evident with those terror organizations that operate on Israel’s borders. Hezbollah is an arm of the Shi’ite Iranian regime – a totalitarian state that had set its sights on orchestrating a world-wide Islamic revolution, and openly proclaims its intention of annihilating the State of Israel.   Interestingly, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), although members of the historically rival Islamic Sunni stream, are willing to benefit from Iran’s sponsorship just to further their cause against Israel, and view themselves as an affiliate of another extremist group – the Muslim Brotherhood – a  fundamentalist Sunni Islamist movement that calls for the eradication of the State of Israel, and is designated as a terrorist group in many countries.

It is evident that these terror groups enjoy the backing of powerful elements with a clear ideology of world dominance, and not only do they have no agenda of liberation – they are motivated by a desire to control and oppress.

Debunking a claim of equivalence: Jewish resistance vs. Islamic terror

There are those who would equate the terror organizations threatening Israel to the struggle of the pre-state Jewish resistance, such as the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and Etzel (the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel). They claim that the members of these groups were no less terrorists than the members of Hamas or Hezbollah today, or alternatively – that the terrorists of the latter two are no less freedom fighters than the members of the Jewish resistance.

However, this comparison disregards all the points mentioned above, and fails to consider that different nature of these resistance movements and the terror organization in terms of objectives and methods of operation.

As far as the objectives of the Jewish resistance – as oppose to the terror organizations, they indeed were committed to true liberation and independence. In 1922, the predecessor to the UN – the League of Nations – ratified the British mandate. This was an international accord standing on solid legal ground that cemented Britain’s commitment to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel. In effect, the British blatantly violated this accord and banned the entrance of Jews in to Israel while at the same time encouraging the settlement of Arabs in the area and transferring territories from Israel to the Emirate of Transjordan. Thus, the Jewish resistance movement did indeed fight for the legal right given to them, and more importantly – once this aim was achieved, the resistance was disbanded or assimilated into the new state’s formal military.

The terror organizations, as above demonstrated, demand independence for a state that does not exist and had never existed. And still, they had received numerous offers over the course of the past decades but rejected any compromise, calling for the destruction of the State of Israel – an objective that has nothing in common with those of the Jewish resistance movement or any other freedom fighting movement for that matter.

A comparison of the methods of operation shows fundamental differences between the two: as oppose to the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, the members of the Jewish militias targeted the British military personnel in the country and not civilians of any nationality. Furthermore, they did all in their power to protect the Jewish population, even at the price of their own lives. Moreover, the fighters of the Jewish resistance did not operate under the auspices or with the support of any state or global organization, and were not affiliated with dictatorships or totalitarian regimes.

The attempt at attributing any equivalence between the pre-state Jewish resistance and the terror organizations is nothing more than a populistic ruse motivated by the aim of creating a distorted picture of reality, or at the very least – it stems from pure ignorance.

A policy of zero tolerance: conclusion and insights

Equating murderous terrorists with freedom fighters is not only fallacious and indeed offensive on many levels – it is downright dangerous. This comparison awards terrorists with justification for their actions, including murder, rape, torture and kidnapping innocents. Statements in support of such actions cannot be accepted, not even in the name of tolerance and freedom of speech, as they legitimize violence against and the murder of Jews. When the equation of terrorists with freedom fighters is heard from sources within Israel itself – not to mention on part of  Israeli officials – they are tenfold graver.

Sadly, these terror organizations have learned and perfected the art of propaganda and disinformation, and their abilities in this area are boosted by the skillful use of internet and AI. They are also very adept at  exploiting Western values and ways of thought to sway public opinion in the West and even in Israel, citing duplicitous pretexts of “human rights”.

Hence, it behooves Israel and the Jewish nation to conduct a holding action and do their share in informing and shaping public opinion – in Israel and the world.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement was formed precisely out of the need to bring the truth and advocate Israel and Zionism to the public. Our organization believes in the imperative of educating on the Jewish national ethos as it is our believe that first and foremost – it is the bedrock of Israel’s national security.

For this end, the IDSF HaBithonistim conducts various activities such as excursions to historic heritage sites across Israel and talks and conferences on Zionism. Recently we have established the pre-military program “Ha’tkuma” that is situated in the Gaza envelop area and held in collaboration with the communities there.

The IDSF HaBithonistim website provides a wide range of content, from commentary on current affairs to opinion pieces and analyses – all with the aim of providing a broad perspective rooted in facts and truth, reinforcing the conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause and above all – to stand as a reminder that in the story of the Jewish people and Zionism – the Jewish nation and the miracle that is the State of Israel are the true heroes.

הפוסט “Freedom Fighters”? Hamas and Hezbollah Are Terrorist Organizations; Any Attempt to Claim Otherwise is Condemnable הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Not many people are as strongly connected to the northern region of Israel as Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi. Although she wasn’t born in the Galilee, she spent many years there during her military service, and today she lives in the Galilee with her family. Zehavi is the founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in the security challenges Israel faces on its northern border. “What happens in the North,” Zehavi says, “must be recognized as important by every Israeli citizen. The State of Israel must recognize that the North is a strategic asset that demands investment. The equation is simple: If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us.”

“The state didn’t take the North seriously”

Because Zehavi warned of the Hezbollah forces’ considerable preparations at the northern border long before the war, and because she is well experienced with the results of inattention to those warnings, the past year of warfare has got her goat. “The state didn’t take the North seriously,” she asserts. “The attribution scenarios relating to an attack from the North and a combined attack were well known, yet we did not prepare for them, neither offensively, nor defensively. If there had been any such preparations, maybe matters in the North would have developed differently and we wouldn’t have needed to evacuate 60 thousand people from their homes.”

Despite her anger and frustration, Zehavi acknowledges that the recent progress on the northern front, including the elimination of senior Hezbollah leaders and the significant damage to the organization’s infrastructures, certainly inspires some optimism in her. “The past weeks have given me hope that things will be changing and that we’ll be able to rebuild the North,” she notes. “You could say that we have the color back in our cheeks, after going through a whole year without seeing where this was headed.”

Research and fieldwork at the Alma Research and Education Center

Lt. Col. (Res.) Sarit Zehavi served for close to 15 years in the Intelligence Corps, and many of her positions were in the Northern Command. In 2018, four years after her discharge from the army, she founded the Alma Research and Education Center, which focuses on the security challenges facing the State of Israel at its northern border and how they affect Israel’s home front.

Zehavi grants that her Center didn’t anticipate the current war that broke out from the south, but she and her team of researchers did give plentiful warning that Hezbollah operatives, including the organization’s elite Radwan Force, were coming closer and closer to the fence and that they appeared to be actively preparing for an attack. At the same time, the Center’s researchers were also monitoring global trends, particularly on the Shiite axis; and there too, they saw a growing inclination to attack Israel. “Our main conclusion as a research institute was that the ability to observe at the juncture between tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence is an important ability — and without it, anyone would be hard put to warn of a coming war,” she relates. “Taking the tactical viewpoint, you look at what’s actually happening around the fence, like Hezbollah operatives gathering or patrolling. Taking the strategic viewpoint, you examine the moves that are under way on the Shiite axis, like Iran cultivating militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, or like the detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Only from the combination of both viewpoints, one up close and one at a distance, can you construct a complete intelligence picture and truly understand the scope of the danger we’re facing. Today we can see clearly how various processes that occurred in the Middle East converged eventually in the activities at the Israeli-Lebanese border.”

Since the outbreak of the war, the Alma Research and Education Center has been focusing mainly on creating a database that details all the attacks on the North. “We are monitoring every single incident and cross-checking data from different sources,” Zehavi relates. “Our objective is to understand the attributes of those attacks to assemble the clearest possible picture of the situation. The data we assembled enabled us, for example, to point out that since July the targeting of areas that had not been evacuated has expanded. Similarly, we can also point out increases and decreases in the use of means such as UAVs and anti-tank guided missiles.”

The progress is impressive, but the threat has not yet been removed

Many operations on the northern front during last September weakened Hezbollah significantly. Most of the organization’s senior leaders, foremost among them Hasan Nasrallah, were eliminated already in the initial stages. In parallel, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks not only hit thousands of operatives but also damaged the internal communications of the organization. Additionally, attacks by the Israel Air Force damaged many of the organization’s infrastructures. Although it is still early to talk about the dissolution of Hezbollah, the organization certainly is in a very different place today than only a few weeks ago.

According to Zehavi, the many blows being dealt to Hezbollah are necessary and welcome; but she does not delude herself into thinking that this will restore complete calm to the North. In fact, she expects new problems that may arise at this very moment, when Hezbollah is already not the same powerful, hierarchical organization that it was. “When we take action against an organization that isn’t really organized any longer, new challenges come up and they require different methods of operation,” she explains. “I expect that in the future we’ll see a lot of scattered operations by all kinds of offshoots and squads that are trying to take charge — and in such a situation, prior warning is harder to attain. Besides that, when it’s not clear who the commander is, pushing for negotiations and diplomatic arrangements is harder.”

Nonetheless, she emphasizes that the terrorist threat from squads and individual operatives is less severe than the strategic threat from a well-structured organization backed by a strong state such as Iran. “I’m not saying that the strategic threat that challenged us at the northern border has been completely removed,” she says, “but if we keep up what we’re doing — I believe that we’re approaching the point where that will happen.”

“Without security, we have nothing” — the North’s most urgent problems

Despite the impressive progress in dealing with Hezbollah, many problems on the northern front still require a response. In Zehavi’s opinion, the state and its society will need to mobilize for the rehabilitation of the North and the rebuilding of the communities there, but currently the most urgent of the problems on the table is the security problem because “without security, we have nothing.” Zehavi believes in confronting the remaining security threats on three levels: offensive, defensive, and the quest for a diplomatic arrangement.

On the offensive level, attacks should continue intensely over at least the short term. Afterward, there should be zero tolerance. Hezbollah and all its operatives should be made to understand that for every missile launched toward Israel, hundreds will be launched in return. On the defensive level, Israel should devise a dedicated defense plan for each community. In each community, a civilian emergency squad should be armed and trained. It should be able to rely on reservists who are on alert, without a full-scale mobilization that would require more budgeted personnel. In addition, all homes and institutions in the North must be properly secured, as there are still many private homes, schools, and kindergartens that do not have shelters.

Zehavi explains that progress must be made not only on the offensive and defensive levels but also on processes that will eventually lead to a diplomatic arrangement, since Israel has no interest in dealing with endless guerilla warfare. Zahavi emphasizes that such an arrangement is not intended to replace the military actions currently taking place and that it should occur only after we achieve a sufficient outcome against Hezbollah. A sufficient outcome, according to Zahavi, would be having clear evidence that a high percentage of Hezbollah’s rockets and launchers have been destroyed and that there are no operatives near the border. “Two messages for the decision-makers are important to me in this connection,” she adds. “The first is that we must be prepared for the attribution scenarios already the stage of the military’s force buildup, and the second is that the only way to deter our enemies is to take away as many of their capabilities as possible.”

“Returning civilians to their homes in the North is a national mission”

Beyond the security aspects, returning the residents of the North to their homes requires a comprehensive solution to problems and providing incentives for the residents. Even before the outbreak of the war, many northern communities were suffering from insufficient infrastructure, limited opportunities for work and recreation, and a shortage of basic public services – including health services. Since the war began, that situation has only worsened. Today there is also a need to repair many roads and buildings that were wrecked by missile fire and by various military operations.

According to Zehavi, the approach to that problem must involve first mapping out the various needs of all the communities. “Thought needs to be invested in each type of locality here — moshavim, kibbutzim, community settlements, and cities — because each type of locality has different requirements,” she says. “While the war damage is being repaired, projects need to be resumed that were under way before war broke out. There were lots of initiatives here for setting up centers of employment and frameworks for young people. Improving public services was also discussed a lot because, for example, a city like Kiryat Shmona can’t do without an emergency room.”

Zehavi notes that along with the work of repair and construction, there must be incentives encouraging residents to return to the North, and even attracting new residents to the area. Those incentives, she says, must take the form of financial grants, tax benefits, and preferential housing terms. She also indicates that where demography is concerned, preference should be given to young families with children because the children will be the foundation of the area’s future; and where occupations are concerned, preference should be given to the fields of agriculture and industry. “In recent years, the North has seen investment primarily in tourism, while fields that are no less important, like agriculture, have been badly ignored. It’s important to understand that besides being a profession, agriculture is a major instrument in carrying out the Zionist vision. Trumpeldor said that the plough’s furrow marks the boundaries of the state. It was true a hundred years ago and it’s just as true today.”

The end of the war? It’s not here yet, but it’s coming into sight.

In her professional capacity as a researcher, Sarit Zehavi had an eventful and fascinating year — but in her capacity as a Galilean, she primarily faced difficulties. “During the war’s first weeks, there was real fear that Hezbollah would invade in the way Hamas did. And the fear was backed up by proclamations from Hezbollah and statements by the Foreign Minister of Iran,” she recounts. “Later, a new kind of difficulty set in, and it’s still with us. The children haven’t been to school in a long time, we constantly hear alerts and explosions, and dozens of communities are still evacuated. The beautiful North that we had is burnt and unsafe. But the real difficulty, for sure, was that we could see no end to it all. Even before the strong attack in the northern front began, we were living for months with the feeling that something horrible was about to happen at any moment. And that feeling can drive you crazy.”

Despite all the difficulty, Zehavi stresses that she has never for a moment had second thoughts about living in the North. “We’ve been through a lot recently, but we never thought of leaving,” she says. “I’m happy that I put down stakes in the North. My children have the privilege of growing up in a mixed population, and they’re used to being around people with different lifestyles and different beliefs. This special Galilean atmosphere is something we won’t give up on.”

הפוסט “If we’re not on the ground in the North, our enemies will be holding the ground there instead of us”: A research-based and personal perspective on the reality of the northern border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel’s military operations in Lebanon have crippled Hezbollah, decimating not only its missile arsenal but also its command-and-control chain, to the point that only two senior commanders, Ali Karaki and Abu Ali Rida, are reportedly still alive. Initially, it was even believed that Karaki had died in an Israeli airstrike. The secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, remains hidden in his bunker.[1]

Additionally, the use of explosive beepers to target Hezbollah terrorists, a tactic never before used by any fighting force – and one that will go down in history—has sparked both amazement and harsh criticism.

As usual, Israel has once again faced accusations from multiple sources, the narrative always the same: the IDF attacks are not surgical and cause civilian casualties; Israel’s operations cannot be defined as counter-terrorism but rather as aggression against Lebanon; Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack; and finally, Israel is bombing Lebanese civilian homes.

It is vital to refute these biased and completely baseless accusations once and for all.

First, the surgical nature of the attacks and civilian casualties must be addressed. On January 2, 2024, the IDF missile that eliminated Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut directly hit the floor of the building where he was hiding, achieving the objective without causing the building’s collapse. The same tactic was used to eliminate Ibrahim Muhammad Qubeisi in Beirut’s densely populated Dahiyeh neighborhood on September 25, 2024.

The missile that successfully targeted Ibrahim Akil on September 20, 2024 hit the basement, causing the unintentional collapse of the adjacent building’s foundations. In contrast, in the attempted killing of Ali Karaki that same day, the wrong floor was hit, enabling the Hezbollah commander to survive the attack.

Can such attacks be considered non-surgical? Have other armed forces done better in other conflicts? The intelligence gathering behind Israel’s strikes, the work of years, is highly valuable. Similarly, missiles are very costly. It is not in Israel’s interest to waste them.

Taking the Lebanese population into consideration, the IDF repeatedly sends messages to civilians using SMS, audio messages, and radio broadcasts, warning them to stay away from civilian buildings where Hezbollah hides its forces and arsenals and fires at Israel. This same strategy has also been used in Gaza.

With regard to the detonation of Hezbollah terrorists’ beepers and walkie-talkies, it is a complete distortion of logic to argue that it is not surgical. It is clear that because terrorists hide among civilians, there is always a risk of civilian injury. However, this danger is caused by Hezbollah, not Israel. Moreover, eliminating terrorists saves lives, both Israeli and Lebanese.

Another accusation against Israel is that under the guise of counter-terrorism, it has attacked the sovereign state of Lebanon. This, too, is an incorrect oversimplification that reveals a misunderstanding of the current situation. Hezbollah is a fully-fledged military organization, dedicated to terrorism, which has taken control of Lebanon. It commands a true army, one more powerful than Lebanon’s, that answers to Hezbollah’s political arm. This army also serves as an Iranian proxy and a tool for regional destabilization.

The reality is that a full-scale war is taking place between the Israeli army and a military organization occupying Lebanese territory with the aim of attacking Israel.

Addressing the issue of civilian homes hit by the IDF in southern Lebanon, once again, the responsibility falls on Hezbollah. As noted above, Hezbollah uses civilian homes to hide missiles and other weapons and to launch attacks against Israel. This is a well-known tactic, used also by Hamas in Gaza. The image of a cruise missile positioned inside a civilian home, ready to be launched from a window, has made headlines worldwide, exposing Hezbollah’s true terrorist nature.

It is also important to mention that Hezbollah has been targeting populated areas in northern Israel for months. More than 60,000 Israeli citizens are currently displaced and waiting to return to their homes and businesses which they were forced to leave a year ago. The situation has become intolerable, and Israel has the right and duty to ensure safety and normalcy for its citizens. This can happen only through strong action against the threat, which is Hezbollah.

Finally, some have even claimed that Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack, despite boasting military and operational capabilities superior to those of Hamas. Such a statement is inherently contradictory, as greater capabilities and resources allow for more tactical choices.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog revealed that Hezbollah commanders (eliminated in an airstrike) had gathered in Beirut precisely to plan an October 7-style attack in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon. The U.S. site Al-Monitor also cited a source close to Hezbollah, who confirmed that this meeting was organized to plan a large-scale invasion of northern Galilee.

This, then, is the reality of the situation on the ground, free from biased theories that ignore concrete facts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

[1] This article was written just days before Karaki and Nasrallah were killed in an Israeli airstrike.

הפוסט Reflections on Israel’s “Surgical” Operations against Hezbollah: No Tactical-Strategic Merit to Criticisms הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the days of gloom that followed October 7, 2023, it was unclear exactly how we would manage to win the war. Now, with Hamas already shattered as a military organization and with Hezbollah being heavily hit, not only can an Israeli victory be glimpsed on the horizon but a time of thriving, initiated upon the Day After, can be dreamt of.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

Most decisions were right: The war in retrospect

The October 7 disaster wrought great confusion and uncertainty, but one thing was certain from the start: This war will take time. There were two main reasons — first, that the Gaza Strip was full of tunnels and that the Hamas infrastructure there would require a complex, systematic effort of dismantling; and second, that among the ground forces the level of strength and armament was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. In recent decades, the IDF had closed down a number of reserve battalions and the army had a relatively small stock of weaponry at hand. Israel had to resolve itself to mount a counterattack in Gaza while mounting nothing more than a defense on the other fronts. Because of that gradation of fighting, it was only after 11 months that the State of Israel shifted the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

From examination of the circumstances in which we entered the war, it appears that the fighting was handled successfully for the most part and that most of the decisions were correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to act differently.

First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. The military dismissed large numbers of reservists relatively early, and it may be that if it had not done so, we would have been able to pressure Hamas more strongly and shorten the fighting in Gaza.

Second, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Hamas long enjoyed an oxygen supply in the form of control over the Corridor, which enabled it to fortify itself through the Sinai. If we had cut off that oxygen supply in the first days of the war, the entire course of fighting would have looked different.

The third point, which to this day has not been properly addressed, is the control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives and thus it enables Hamas both to strengthen itself and to preserve its standing as the authority governing the Gazan populace.

Shock and awe: The current state of the war

The southern front

At the start of the war, the Southern Command estimated that it would need a year to dismantle Hamas as a military organization. Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity, as shown by its markedly reduced ability to launch rockets into Israeli territory.

The nature of the fighting in Gaza today differs from what we saw at the war’s beginning. In the first months, the IDF was obliged to operate at great intensity, with a large deployment and with coordinated attacks. In addition, it needed to operate systematically — that is to say, street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood — in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy the infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks together with air force personnel. At the same time we see systematic elimination of senior Hamas officials. Most senior officials of the organization, including Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif, have already been eliminated. The loss of senior officials weakens the organization not only militarily but in terms of governance as well, and it is an important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. We see a method of operation in the north that is reminiscent of the military doctrine developed by the USA in the late 1990s, known as “Shock and Awe.” The idea behind the doctrine is to frighten and weaken the enemy until it loses the will to fight. In that spirit, almost all the senior officials of Hezbollah, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, were already eliminated early in the fighting.

Furthermore, the IDF is undermining Hezbollah with a series of unusual operations. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. Over and above the physical harm to the terrorists, the operation also spread powerful intimidation and proved how penetrable the organization was. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force, which battered the Hezbollah infrastructures and deprived the organization of some significant capabilities.

Israel hoped that such a sequence of operations would compel Hezbollah to retreat completely from southern Lebanon and to stop firing at Israel — thus enabling the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Still, Israel took into account that Hezbollah might continue fighting nonetheless, in which case a ground operation in Lebanon would be necessary.

That operation, if it goes forward, will differ from the operation that we saw in Gaza. On the one hand, southern Lebanon is significantly less densely populated than Gaza and most of its residents have already fled, so that there will be less friction with the locals. On the other hand, southern Lebanon’s landscape is liable to present a greater challenge, with its many hills and abundant foliage. It must be stressed that Hezbollah, like Hamas, has upgraded its subterranean capabilities; and we know that many of the organization’s strategic assets — including arms factories and bases — are underground. Thus southern Lebanon too portends difficult fighting, at least some of it in tunnels.

You can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon: Important conclusions from the war’s first year

On October 7 last year, we suffered a catastrophe. But that catastrophe awakened Israel from a long sleep and made Israel aware of what sizeable threats it faces. With time, that awareness has eroded among some of the leadership and public; and today there are those who call upon us to return to a policy of keeping our eyes closed.

In order that Israel remain secure over the coming generations, the State of Israel — leaders and society alike — must take action at a number of levels:

• Strictly preserving external security: First of all, we must confront the immediate threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But there’s more to the story. We must revise our outdated national security doctrine and understand that “deterring, alerting, and defeating” does not sum up the essentials. Israel’s security doctrine must include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders, and of nipping any terrorist force in the bud. It is unthinkable that we tolerate a situation where 50 thousand armed terrorists are located 100 meters from our border fence. That is a tsunami, and you can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon. Or a tablespoon.
• Strengthening governability and internal security: In the shadow of the external threats, we must not forget that the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has dogged us for 100 years now, is still alive domestically. The State of Israel must deal with the matter of governance within the country and ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel may feel safe in their country.
• Battling delegitimization and anti-Semitism: For years we have been confronted with inciteful attempts to delegitimize Israel and stir up anti-Semitism all over the world, and since the outbreak of war the campaign has only intensified. The State of Israel must subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague, encouraging demonstrations, and bringing anti-Semitism into the streets and universities — forces led by the Palestinian Authority. To our regret, the State of Israel has not yet formulated a strategy for concrete action in the face of this severe problem.
• Instilling a common national ethos: We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. Solidarity is not a luxury but a requirement for ensuring our security and survival, because without a set of values and an ethos, no tanks or airplanes will avail.
• Establishing an enlisted society— In the State of Israel, not serving is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate. At the same time, it must be stressed that this does not mean turning into Sparta. Israel is not a nation that glorifies power and violence. On the contrary, this nation lionizes culture and innovation. The balance is an important one, which we must all practice as individuals and as a society.

As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the pathway is a long one. Today, after the many drubbings we’ve delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts.

We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Our view is that the more greatly Israel triumphs in the war, the more greatly it will thrive after the war. When the states of the world, including our enemies’ states, see our strength displayed, they will be spurred to sign peace agreements and establish strong coalitions with us. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon. There will be mass immigration to Israel and we will also see the birthrate surge as it generally does after wartime.

In order to reach those optimal days, we must maintain patience, determination, and solidarity, and not ease off the gas pedal until we have passed successfully through all the challenges that lie before us.

הפוסט The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges: Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After 2 weeks of spectacular military operations in Lebanon including feats, taken straight from a spy thriller film, Israel finally took out the most powerful terrorist in the world: Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nassrallah.

Israel’s repeated strikes and operations against the Shia terror group have demonstrated that Israeli decision makers have decided to shift gears and be willing to take calculated risks to change the geopolitical balance of power. For the first time there is a sense that Israel is willing to go all the way for a decisive victory, leaving no stone unturned rather than kicking the Hezbollah can down the road for the next generations of Israelis to deal with.

Israel is at a crossroads and has found a golden opportunity to finish off Hezbollah, potentially changing the fabric of Lebanon and the Iranian entrenchment on its northern borders from Lebanon and Syria.

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden, now a lame duck, has a much weaker leverage over Israel in attempting to hamstring Israel from dominating the escalator ladder. The US is fully immersed in the election cycle and the White House signals that it is not too keen to divert attention and resources to another Middle East crisis it needs to “contain”.

On its part, however, Iran is making strides in its attempts to assuage the west and get a new nuclear deal as reiterated by the New Iranian president. Iran cannot afford to get directly involved in a conflict with Israel right now when it needs the West. According to reports, Iran declined to directly attack Israel and protect its proxy to the chagrin of Hezbollah. After the strikes on Friday on Beirut’s Dahia quarter, Hezbollah’s infamous stronghold, former IRGC commander and Minister of Interior Ahmad Vahidi said in an interview to the Iranian national TV that every leader is replaceable, hinting that they have a successor to Nassralah. Irans allies see it as abandoning them in the money time.

Israel now has the opportunity to further the wedge between Iran and its strongest proxy Hezbollah. With continued attacks against Hezbollah, Israel could force Iran to either allow it to finish off Hezbollah in order to save a potential nuclear deal or get involved and “kiss goodbye” a lucrative nuclear deal that would fill the Islamic Republic’s coffers. Neither choice would benefit Iran.

Moreover, a weakened Hezbollah coupled with the ecstatic swathes of the Syrian and Lebanese factions who openly celebrated Nassralah’s demise, could be pushed and assisted into weakening Iran’s iron grip over these countries. Once a critical mass of anti-Hezbollah forces coalesce at a time when the Shia terror group is overwhelmed, a social tipping point could be reached changing the balance of power against Iran for the next decades.

Cutting off the largest tentacle of the Iranian octopus could also have a trinkle down effect for other proxies and restore Israel’s lost deterrence. Following the news on Nassralah’s elimination, Iranian supreme leader Ali Kameniei was moved to a secure location fearing another Israeli attack.

This momentum must continue so Israel will be able to break the tie in northern Israel and have its own internal displaced persons return to their homes. It would prove to Israelis and the jihadists that Israel will achieve its other war aims just like it achieved the restoration of the north.

This is the way to end the war, maintain and image of victory and change the narrative that Israel’s enemies tell themselves about Israel’s vulnerability.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel’s golden opportunity post Nasrallah הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that national security cannot exist in isolation but depends on a broad system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that making informed decisions requires developing a comprehensive strategy that draws on the past and looks toward the future.

These understandings have led IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Or Yissachar will discuss the relations between Israel and Iran — a pattern of relations that was benign until a few decades ago but has changed to currently threaten our existence.

Background — From a cold peace to a fiery threat: The reversals in Israel-Iran relations

Israel–Iran relations may be divided into two main periods: Before and after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Between those periods, the differences are fathomless.

The reign of the Shah

From 1941 to 1979, Iran was a monarchy ruled by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah pursued a pro-Western policy that envisioned turning Iran into a modern, secular country. During his reign, relations between Iran and Israel were proper and stable. The two countries maintained close relations in various spheres.

Although in 1947 Iran voted against the founding of the State of Israel, it recognized Israel as a state as early as 1950. From that year until the 1970s, relations progressively warmed; and the two nations even maintained extensive economic and security ties. Iran was Israel’s main supplier of oil, and helped Israel lay the Trans-Israel pipeline. Israel, for its part, aided Iran in agriculture and in regional development, sold it military equipment, and even trained its army and helped set up the Iranian secret police.

Diplomatically too, the two countries maintained ties, whether more openly or less openly. Thus, for example, the IDF had military attachés stationed in Tehran and in 1964 even established an Israeli consulate. Today we also know that Iranian legislators secretly visited Israel and that Ben-Gurion himself secretly visited Iran and met its Prime Minister, Ali Amini. Later Israeli visitors to Iran included prime ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, several foreign ministers, the head of the Mossad at the time, and a number of senior IDF commanders. In return, Iranian ministers, commanders, and other senior figures visited Israel.

The upshot is that the two countries were definitely maintaining a cold peace, albeit with no official peace agreement, and they had interests in common. That balance began to teeter in the mid-1970s as the Iranian Revolution showed signs of approaching.

The Iranian Revolution

In the mid-to-late 1970s, religious and political resistance to the Shah’s regime began, emanating primarily from the Shiite Muslims. The Shah had drawn anger for many reasons, including his wasteful lifestyle, the cruelty inflicted on the regime’s opponents by his secret police, his reforms in “surrender” to international pressures to improve the standing of women and minorities, and especially his war against religion and his persistent attempts to turn Iran secular.

The year 1978 saw many protests and other actions against the Shah’s regime. In January 1979 the Shah fled Iran, and two weeks later the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ascended to power. He was a Shiite cleric who had preached for many years against the Shah and had been forced into lengthy exile.

The Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed the transformation of Iran into an Islamic republic. As soon as he took power, he began a purge in the government and army, executing thousands of officers who had supported the Shah as well as people he considered sinners — including homosexuals. Khomeini also lambasted the USA as “the Great Satan,” and Israel as “the Little Satan,” and he called for Islamic revolutions everywhere in the Muslim world. Khomeini formed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, enforced the Sharia law that requires Iranian men and women to abide by the Islamic dress code, forbade Western music, and significantly reduced the rights of women and minorities in the country.

As soon as he took power, it was obvious that relations with Israel would not remain as they were; and within a short time the two countries had become clear enemies.

Today Iran is still a Shiite Islamic republic, led by extremist clerics, disdainful of the West, and constantly calling for Israel’s destruction. In 1989 Khomeini died, and from then until today the present Iran’s supreme leader has been the Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Khamenei has continued in the footsteps of his predecessor and is working to advance the Iranian nuclear program, to expand the Quds Force, and to strengthen the terrorist organizations and pro-Iranian militias throughout the Middle East.

Iran’s extremist regime, its arrival at the nuclear threshold, and the forces of its many proxies have turned it into the number one existential threat against Israel and possibly against the entire western world. However, Iran is also deep in an economic and diplomatic crisis that threatens its regime’s stability, and at the same time it faces many rivals inside the Arab world, the main one being Saudi Arabia.

In order to be handled, the Iranian threat must be understood in its true form. On the one hand, it must not be underestimated; but on the other hand, the limits of its power, and the possibility of exploiting its weaknesses, must be remembered.

Ideally according to Or Yissachar: His vision for Israeli–Iranian relations

Don’t slow it down, stop it short

The current situation:

Since the turn of the millennium, the State of Israel has been waging a war-between-the-wars with Iran. The guiding principle of that policy is to prevent the enemy from gaining strength and to deter the enemy increasingly by means of measured and well-considered actions which fall short of triggering war.

Absurdly, Israel’s persistent attempts to prevent escalation and to avoid a descent into war are the very thing that led to today’s security deficiency. If we had made a point of halting the Iranian threat instead of merely slowing it down, Iran would not have managed to achieve such might, nor to strengthen all the terrorist armies of the region.

The policy of the war between wars works up to a point, but it cannot demolish a buildup of power. That policy also carries the danger that the moment we misjudge the enemy’s intentions and abilities, or overestimate our own deterrent power, we may suffer an event like October 7.

Ideally:

• Israel’s policy must change from reactive to proactive. Only by initiating action at the right time for ourselves can we eliminate the terrorist leaders, damage the missile factories, destroy the smuggler tunnels, and significantly weaken Iran and its accomplices. Israel’s elimination of Isma’il Haniyah was certainly a step in the right direction.

Reverse the nuclearization

The current situation:

After many years of research and development, Iran is now a nuclear threshold state. According to the latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has so far accumulated roughly 136 kg of highly enriched uranium which it can turn, within weeks, into the payload for a nuclear weapon. Moreover, experts believe that Iran has acquired most of the technical knowhow necessary for assembling a simple nuclear weapon and that within one to two years it will be able to develop a nuclear warhead for delivery by missile.

That information proves that the 2015 agreement involving the great powers was not able to stop the Iranian nuclear program, and the reason is simple. Iran will never put aside its nuclear ambitions. The sanctions that the great powers imposed on Iran were not actually enforced, and after being lifted they were not reimposed. The world is currently attempting to ignore the Iranian nuclear threat. It has not risen to the awareness that the threat is existential not only for Israel but for all Iran’s enemies, including the Sunni states and the western states.

Ideally:

• On the international plane: The State of Israel must make clear to the international community that the entire world has a stake in removing the Iranian nuclear threat. Israel must recruit the western nations and the Gulf nations to form a strong coalition led by the USA. Such a coalition can pose a credible military threat to Iran — and can impose strong sanctions as well, such as limiting oil exports to China or disconnecting Iran from SWIFT (the international cooperative for financial communications between banks).
• On the bilateral plane: Israel must assume a much more aggressive stance and make clear to the Iranians that we can attack their nuclear facilities and we can bomb strategic assets without which their economy will shut down. With or without help from other countries, we must exploit the appropriate moments to mount well-considered attacks that will send the Iranian nuclear program a decade backward.

Lop off the tentacles

The current situation:

In recent decades, Iran has developed and enhanced the use of proxy forces — third parties that wage war on its behalf. Thus for example Iran operates Hezbollah in Lebanon, arms the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations in Gaza, supports pro-Iranian militias in Syria, and strengthens the Houthis in Yemen. The proxy forces are tentacles that Iran can send everywhere in the Middle East in order to operate in faraway arenas without being directly involved. Iran helped set up a pro-Iranian Shiite government in Iraq, supported the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, tried to overthrow the governments in Bahrain and Qatar, fielded the Houthis against its great enemy Saudi Arabia, and of course strengthened the terror organizations surrounding Israel and contributed greatly to the sudden October 7 attack.

Israel is well aware of the pro-Iranian proxy forces, but the world at large still has trouble understanding that most of the terrorism in the Middle East is orchestrated by Iran.

Ideally:

• Contextualize the Iranian threat: The State of Israel must understand, and explain to the nations of the world, that Iran is not merely a lone nation but also an entire network active throughout the Middle East and also standing behind the current war against Israel. Only when the world comes to understand that Iran is also Hezbollah and also Hamas and also the Houthis will we be able to turn attention to the Iranian threat as it truly is and find ways to deal with it.
• Begin with the tentacles: The best way to weaken the Iranian octopus is to lop off its tentacles. First of all, the State of Israel must complete its campaign in the Gaza Strip and topple Hamas, thus removing the Iranian threat that comes from that direction. The next step is to significantly weaken Hezbollah in order to remove the threat from the direction of Lebanon. Later, we must proceed to the less nearby tentacles such as the Houthis in Yemen and the militias in Iraq. When Iran loses its proxy forces, the head of the octopus will be much easier to attack.

Remove the Iranian missile threat

The current situation:

Iran’s arsenal of missiles is the largest in the Middle East, with thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs that can attack at various ranges with high precision. Some of the missiles can carry devastating quantities of explosives, and some can even accommodate nuclear warheads.

Most of the missiles are kept in Iran; but some are in the hands of proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Thus Iran can reach faraway targets such as Israel by means of short-range missiles and UAVs.

On the night between April 13 and 14, 2024, Iran demonstrated its ballistic abilities by a massive launch from its turf directly at Israeli territory. That attack included 185 UAVs, 110 ballistic missiles, and 36 cruise missiles, carrying 60 tons of explosives in all. Despite the massiveness of the onslaught, roughly 99% of the hardware was intercepted thanks to the multi-level defenses of the Israel Air Force and to cooperation with Israel’s allies — including the USA and Jordan.

Thus it may be said that the Iranian missile attack exposed both the offensive capacity of Iran and the defensive capacity of Israel. That time, we carried the day. But we must make no mistake: The Iranians are already absorbing the lessons from that episode and improving their abilities for a future attack.

Ideally:

• No more policy of restraint: The State of Israel has invested a great deal in establishing its air defense but has ignored the no less important matter of establishing deterrence. The assault proved, above all else, that Iran is not fearful of confronting Israel; and Iran’s attitude is a problem we must solve. While developing advanced abilities of missile interception, we must also make clear to the Iranians — by assertiveness, military threats, and strong coalitions — that Israel is a country unwilling to tolerate missile attacks on its territory.
• Look into the remaining percent: The Israel Air Force successfully intercepted 99% of the incoming hardware originating in Iran, and that figure is a source of rightful pride. However, we must not forget the one percent that we failed to intercept. If the unintercepted missiles and UAVs had managed to penetrate into the State of Israel, they would have inflicted great harm upon us. And if such missiles had carried nuclear warheads, the damage would have been calamitous. Thus we must not rest on our laurels. Our operational and intelligence forces must remain alert, and we must take action to destroy Iran’s missile system. As long as that threat from Iran remains, the State of Israel faces existential danger.

Keep thwarting the cyber threats

The current situation:

Iran is one of the first states to have formulated a national cyber strategy, and today it is among the world’s most active players in that arena. The Iranians attempt hundreds of cyber attacks a day against the State of Israel. Some originate from units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, and others from independent attack groups. Most of the attacks target governmental organizations, hospitals, universities, and strategically important industries. The various attacks are intended to strengthen Iranian deterrence, to foment conflicts within Israeli society and spread falsehoods, to embarrass Israel globally, to spy and extract sensitive information, to disrupt the public routine, and to damage vital infrastructures.

Israel’s governmental and military cyber defenses block most of the attempted attacks, but some succeed. Thus, for example, Iranian hackers have managed to attack the computer servers of the Israel Police, to deceive Israeli embassies, to damage Israel’s power stations, refineries, and water and sewage systems, and to penetrate into Israeli computer systems in the fields of insurance, medicine, and finance in order to capture sensitive information.

It is important to understand that the Iranian cyber threat — although overshadowed among the public by the nuclear and missile threats — may, if not properly dealt with, result in great harm to the State of Israel.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel must understand that the Iranians are constantly growing stronger, and it must therefore see to preserving its cyber superiority by means of appropriate budgeting, recruitment of professionals, and constant improvement of its technological abilities. At the same time, we must examine the past attacks and analyze the Iranian hackers’ methods of operation in order to better understand how to tackle this threat.

Understanding the Iranian problem: Summation and conclusions

In order to deal with the Iranian threat, it is first of all necessary to bring about a change of thinking — both in the Israeli perspective and in the international perspective.

The State of Israel must understand that in recent years its war-between-the-wars policy enabled the Iranians and their proxies to build more and more strength and to dominate the entire region. The October 7 attack made clear that we must not continue our delaying but must take action now to remove the threats that surround us. Furthermore, we can no longer depend on our assessment of the enemy’s intentions. Instead we must look at the enemy’s capabilities and not allow them to grow stronger.

In the international arena, we must change over from a soft-power approach to a hard-power approach. The USA and the EU proceed from the assumption that if Iran prospers, it will have no reason to complain and it will join the family of nations. That assumption represents deep misunderstanding of the Middle East, and even disdain for Iran and for radical Islam. The Iranians are pursuing a vision: The destruction of the State of Israel and the imposition of Islam on the West. Until it understands that Iranian vision, the world cannot act against Iran with the necessary force.

Once the problem has been identified and the nature of Iran has been understood, Iran’s power must be soberly examined. Although Iran is a significant player, it is not all-powerful and it too has its vulnerabilities. Iran’s Achilles heel is oil. Without oil, its economy does not exist. Moreover, Iran’s regime suffers from domestic non-recognition of its legitimacy; and the multitude of protests threatens to undermine it. Militarily, despite its progress in nuclearization and missile deployment, Iran is not very strong or sophisticated. Its air force is antiquated, authority is scattered, and there are many different branches so that the right hand does not always know what the left hand is doing.

In the long term, the best that Israel can hope for is that the present Iranian regime will fall and be replaced by a moderate, pragmatic one. However, that scenario must be recognized as not very probable. Despite the protests and disputes within Iranian society, most of the Iranian populace wants Iran to remain traditional; and even while criticizing the government, the public is neither truly supportive of regime change nor able to impose it.

Accordingly, a more reasonable ambition is to bring about a weakened regime with no nuclear program, no arsenal of precision missiles, and no proxies. In such a situation, even if deep enmity persists, Israel and Iran could once more conduct proper relations.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Israel–Iran Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel must dramatically rethink its strategic approach to managing the war: no longer should the north be a defensive front; instead, it should become the primary battlefield. Are we facing a historic opportunity to reshape the security landscape against Hezbollah for generations to come? Let me explain why I believe so.

On August 25, Israel launched a preemptive airstrike on Hezbollah, yet we remain on the defensive. Since October 7, Israel has adopted a strategic approach focused on an offensive in Gaza while maintaining a defensive posture on other fronts.

This reality emerged despite the longstanding belief in the corridors of Israel’s defense establishment that the northern border represents the main front. However, the surprise attack by Hamas, along with various constraints (such as limited forces and ammunition shortages), led to a shift in priorities, resulting in a “Gaza First” approach.

This situation has created uncertainty for Israel’s northern residents. Unlike those in the south, many of whom have returned home and see light at the end of the tunnel, many northern residents were evacuated with no return date in sight. They now watch from afar as their homes and communities are systematically destroyed.

The north is economically paralyzed, and the displaced are forced to start the upcoming school year in temporary and improvised settings, a situation many find intolerable. While many residents are determined to return home in the future, some have already lost hope.

In numerous conversations with northern residents, I’ve heard a clear message: they refuse to return to a reality where “Nukhba-like terrorists on steroids” like Hezbollah’s elite “Radwan Unit” sit on their borders, capable of committing atrocities similar to those seen on October 7 in Gaza border towns.

To create a reality where northern residents can safely return to their homes, there are theoretically two options:

1. A diplomatic solution that would see Hezbollah withdraw north of the Litani River: This option seems unlikely at the moment, especially given the lack of significant international pressure on Iran and Hezbollah. Furthermore, there are no clear mechanisms to enforce such a withdrawal that would prevent Hezbollah from returning to southern Lebanon. Additionally, all discussions between special U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein and Lebanon have so far been fruitless, focusing instead on territorial concessions demanded by Hezbollah from Israel.
2. A military solution: In the absence of a diplomatic resolution, the realistic option is a military one. This would require setting war objectives, the foremost being: creating the conditions for the safe and long-term return of northern residents to their homes. Achieving this would necessitate the destruction of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the establishment of a security zone, neutralizing the organization’s capabilities.

Is this achievable? Absolutely. Unlike the situation we face in Gaza, the IDF enjoys complete intelligence superiority in the north. This superiority has been demonstrated over the past ten months with the elimination of dozens, if not hundreds, of senior commanders and operatives in Hezbollah and other organizations, including the assassination of Hezbollah military chief Fuad Shukr. On Sunday morning, the IDF showcased its intelligence and operational dominance by intercepting missile and drone attacks on central Israel.

Being on the defensive is not an ideal state, especially for a country with limited strategic depth. While the decision to maintain a defensive posture on other fronts was correct over the past ten months, a new reality has emerged. In this reality, the Gaza front is on the verge of being resolved. If the trend in the south continues, Hamas will be completely destroyed as a fighting force in the Gaza Strip.

Its weapons production infrastructure has already been obliterated, the supply line from Egypt through the Philadelphi Corridor has been cut off, and northern Gaza is sealed off by IDF forces. The civilian population has by now evacuated most of the Gaza Strip, and the IDF is eliminating Hamas at a rate of 50 terrorists per day. Hamas’ expiration date is very near.

There is no connection between the hostage deal and the strategic considerations regarding our forces’ activities on the northern border. While Iran and Hezbollah are trying to link the two issues, claiming that a cease-fire in the south would lead to a similar cease-fire in the north, this serves the enemy’s interests, not Israel’s. Israel’s interest lies in removing the threat from the northern border, not in achieving a cease-fire under Hezbollah’s terms, which would allow it to continue sitting on the fences of Israeli border communities like Metula and Hanita.

Now that the Hamas threat in the south is almost neutralized, the time has come to fundamentally change our strategic approach, namely: defining Gaza as a secondary front and establishing the north as the primary one. This is the only significant decision the Cabinet must make now.

The shift from defense to offense in the north is essential not only because we wish to create the conditions for Israeli residents to return home. It is also necessary if we ever want to regain the initiative. Israel must learn from experience and understand: we must choose between a Six-Day War scenario and a Yom Kippur War scenario. If we do not take the initiative, we will be surprised and pay in blood, for what’s here today, is gone tomorrow.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Israel can’t stay on the defensive in the north הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“In war, there is but one favorable moment, the great art is to seize it.” This quote by Napoleon remains one of the most fundamental principles of warfare to this day. Our adversary in the north had such a moment on the morning of October 7th, but he failed to seize it. When I heard reports of the outbreak of war in Gaza, I waited with great vigilance for similar news from the north. When these did not come, I felt a slight relief, despite the terrible news from the south. That Saturday morning was the perfect moment for the enemy, a moment when we were caught by strategic surprise.  An attack from another front, especially the northern one, would have led to outcomes I don’t even want to imagine.  “There is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come in one moment,” our sages of blessed memory said. Fortunately, our enemy did not acquire his share with a strategic surprise.

Is this our moment? A strategic surprise like Pearl Harbor or the Six-Day War seems unattainable for either side at the moment. Both sides are already engaged in mutual hostilities; one might even call it war. Either way, both sides are alert and on guard.  However, there is an additional advantage in taking the initiative with a preemptive strike, even in the absence of strategic surprise.

Taking the initiative, as opposed to waiting, which results in absorption or containment, derives from the principle known as the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) – a decision-making model developed by military strategist and United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd. The third component of the model refers to making a decision before taking action, and is based on the processes that precede it. These, in turn, are based on the given situation at that moment in the battlefield. However, an attack initiative by one side completely changes the data upon which the other side’s plans are based.  The situation upon which the enemy’s assumptions and action plans are based becomes irrelevant the moment an attack is launched by the other side.

One of the early philosophers in ancient Greece, Heraclitus, stated: “No man ever steps in the same river twice.”  Allegedly, each one of us can perform an experiment that would disprove this claim. However, Heraclitus’ intention was that reality changes all the time and therefore the river is no longer the same river (and the foot stepping in it is no longer the same foot). This is exactly the idea behind taking the initiative of the attack – changing the river in such a way that all the opponent’s plans are no longer suitable for that “new” river.

Taking the initiative has immense value in every field, especially when it comes to maneuvering armies during wartime. It is not merely semantics.  “Who dares, wins,” said Colonel David Stirling, who founded the Special Air Service (SAS). This is true not only for military purposes. It also applies to economics, sports, and even science.  War is not a tennis match that requires waiting for the opponent’s serve and reacting to it, but rather a simultaneous sequence that requires initiative and, no less, continuity of that offensive opening.

Humans crave certainty and are willing to pay for it. This is the reason why insurance companies exist or why there is a premium on high-risk loans. But in war, one cannot buy insurance policies. There is no certainty on the battlefield in any case. Therefore, even choosing a passive method of operation is a high-risk choice which provides no certainty.  Accordingly, I see only one good course of action on the northern border: Act first. As General George Patton is reputed to have said: “In case of doubt, attack!”

This article was originally published in ynet

הפוסט In case of doubt, attack! הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The worn aphorism “the formula must be fundamentally changed” has become something of a cliche used by Israeli decision-makers, yet following that terrible massacre in Majdel Shams, where 12 innocent children lost their lives, it seems as if their room for maneuver has narrowed considerably.

Israel has been mired in a long-standing dogma of containment and proportionality, kicking the can down the road, until the gloomy reality on the other side of the border hit it hardest at dawn time, October 7. The following day, another curtain was drawn wide open, unveiling Hezbollah’s motivation to distract Israel and attempt to lure it into a full-blown two-front war.

The truth is that rather than strategic initiative, Israel has long been accustomed to “buying silence”, counting on its granted military superiority. The Gaza theater was imposed on it, and now the Beirut one could too.

If any, this is “catch 22”, or rather “catch 24”: will summer 2024 usher in a dark new reality in the Israeli home front, pounded by thousands of rockets per day as a result of fully launching a war on Hezbollah, or a swift, American-backed blitzkrieg that will send shockwaves around Lebanon and the region and force Hezbollah’s hand into a long-term cease-fire?

Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, the true landlord of Lebanon, has long branded himself as the “defender of Lebanon”, yet this inconvenient incident for him left him with no real plans for dealing with two fronts: an Israeli all-out attack combined with a domestic rebellion by Druze communities, completely livid after that terrible massacre of their relatives across the border.

This could also trigger other minorities in Lebanon to rebel against the much-rejected Shi’ite minority now effectively controlling their country, backed by Iranian support.

Hezbollah initially took pride in the incident, saying through its mouthpiece newspaper “Al Akhbar” that it successfully targeted the Israeli post of Maale Golani in the Golan Heights with a 50kg Falaq missile. Later, when the disastrous result turned out, it was quick to disavow it, calling it Israeli misinformation and accusing a mislanded Iron Dome rocket of causing the harm – which no one quite believed.

Meanwhile, livid Druze dignitaries in Lebanon called it no less than a “terrorist attack” and a massacre, without calling Hezbollah by name; while normally loyal Druze elements such as political leader Walid Junbalatt and the Tawhid Al-Arab party were more prudent, much like the Lebanese Foreign Minister, generally condemning any harm of civilians and demanding to hold an open investigation to find out the truth. Nasrallah’s sweat could be discernable from kilometers away.

On its part, Israel is vowing to claim a heavy cost from Hezbollah, and the real question now lies before Israeli decision-makers: will they be forced into making the same decision they avoided for almost 10 months now, and launch an all-out attack on Hezbollah, or take a deep breath and do nothing more than striking more “significant” targets in Lebanon, while signaling Hezbollah with a wink and a nod that it has no intention of going any further?

The coming days will tell. But it is clear that Israel’s can-kicking doctrine over the past 10 months facing Lebanon, carrying out limited airstrikes in response to having 60 thousand of its citizens evacuated, constant attacks by Hezbollah and Iran and dozens of its citizens and soldiers killed and wounded – is no longer tenable.

Over 1,200 significant terrorist attacks were foiled by the Shin Bet just last year in West Bank; and 6,000 targets – missiles, rockets, anti-tank missiles, and suicide drones – were fired from Lebanon just in the past 10 months. Each and every one of them constitutes a declaration of war. One does not need 12 innocent, beautiful dead children to realize this could very well be the result of neglect and containment.

Most pundits and experts exasperatedly ask why a much-expected statistical error such as this had not been quite well known all this time, and why a result, rather than an intention, always pushed Israel to muscle up? Israel now has no time to waste – rather than waiting for Hezbollah to surprise attack, inspired by Hamas’ October 7 massacre, and possibly greenlighted by Iran, it should take the initiative and strike first, under conditions most favorable to it.

The U.S. must also meet the gravity of the moment, and with the momentum of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s address to Congress, not just enable Israel “the right to defend itself” – itself a ludicrous statement – but actively support it. This would include both military strikes and diplomatic ultimatums to Hezbollah’s puppet master, the Islamic Republic of Iran. No “de-escalation” can be achieved in any other way.

This article was originally published on Ynetnews

הפוסט Catch 24: Will Israel overstep the mark in Lebanon? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Recently it seems that we are witnessing increasingly more omens that foreshadow an imminent full-fledged war between Israel and Hezbollah, such as the proximity of the Eisenhauer carrier to the Israel’s shores, and proclamations by Amos Hochstein, US special envoy, on the failure to secure a viable arrangement on the Israel-Lebanon border.

The more these signs appeared, the more signals Iran has been sending out, warning that if Israel dares to initiate military action against Hezbollah – Iran would retaliate with an attack against Israel.

Iran’s agenda is clear – it is interested in ending the war, and if indeed this happens in the current state of affairs, Iran will be able to pitch this as a colossal success. This will crown the Republic as the dominant power in the Middle East, on a very imminent threshold of nuclear capabilities, and with numerous global and regional tentacles of terror at its disposal. Of these proxies, two are grasping at Israel – Hamas, which Iran will rehabilitate, and Hezbollah, which with the exception of a few mere scratches, would emerge mostly unscathed from the current conflict.

Not dragged into conflict but initiate it

At the same time, the intentions of the US are vague. Last week’s statement by Chief of Joint staff, General Charles Brown, that the US would find it challenging to protect Israel in the event of a war on Israel’s northern border, is not only tantamount to the abandonment of Israel in its conflict with Hezbollah, but also in its defense against the threat from Iran, as, according to Brown, a full-scale conflict with Hezbollah might drag Iran into war with Israel.

Does relating to Iran as one that could be “dragged into” a conflict indicate a lack of understanding on part of the General of the fact that Iran is not one to be “dragged” into war but rather initiate it?

Iran, which states on every opportunity it gets, that its goal is the annihilation of the State of Israel, is in fact the root cause of destabilization – and not only across the Middle East. Iran is an active member of the axis of evil, alongside China and Russia. If the Americans have any designs of getting Iran to cross the line by sacrificing Israel, then it is clear that never have Americans negotiated with an Iranian merchant; Iran will rake in anything that the United States could give it, and then turn around and use those same assets to attack the West, in the exact same manner that the Palestinians did with every asset they received from Israel.

There is no diplomatic arrangement or agreement that can survive Iran’s deadly intentions. Attempts to reach an arrangement in Gaza, with the help of the Saudis, preempting a campaign in Lebanon, might have been a noble cause if it wouldn’t have entailed a  significant setback in dealing with Iran. Therefore, when the West finally finds itself in a conflict with the Republic, it will have come to find that it is on the battlefield facing a nuclear power, which is now significantly stronger economically and bolstered by many more Middle Eastern allies than before, and with a much stronger and steadier government.

And Iran’s growing stability and power is not a matter limited to Iran or even to the Middle East alone – it spells a tectonic change in the global geopolitical map. If Iran gets the upper hand in the current conflict, the Middle East will become Europe’s “Soviet Union”, with Iran and its allies jostling to become the most extreme anti-Western regime that inflicts the most harm on Western states.

The Obligation of the free world

In this matter it is important to precisely understand the concept of “victory”. On part of the Iranians, victory in the current round means in fact the failure to defeat Hamas and Hezbollah, its eschewing any accountability for its part in the war, and the continuation of the Iranian nuclear program. In other words, undefeated means victory, for Iran and its proxies.

It therefore behooves the forcers at play in the free world to recalculate the Middle Eastern challenge, firstly understanding that the future of the West will be written in Gaza and Lebanon. Although the war in the Middle East seems far removed from the citizens of Berlin and Paris, they might find that their destinies were determined by a victory of the Iranian bloc in the current conflict.

The free world must acknowledge this and take a decisive and active stand to thwart this existential threat against it, and ensure the defeat of Iran.

At present, there is a window of opportunity to launch an attack on Iran, but it is rapidly closing. Iran had skillfully built a nuclear program that is hard to hit. However, even if this program cannot be completely shot down, it can be compromised and brought to a significant slowdown. And right now, the West needs all the time it can buy in order to eliminate the looming threat.

In order for any attack to obtain more than just a slowdown of Iran’s nuclear program, the West must be quick to leverage the disquiet that is sure to arise in the country following such an attack, and make two complementary steps: firstly, assist in fomenting any internal civic uprising, to undermine one of the cruelest regimes the world has known. Secondly, at the same time launch a decisive strike against Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah.

If the West skillfully takes decisive measures against the Iranian legacy of terror – it will have saved not only the Middle East, but itself as well.

The article was originally published on Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran Already Knows: The Future of the West Will Be Written in Gaza & Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In 2000, the IDF withdrew its forces entirely from Lebanon, ending an 18-year engagement in the security zone. The hasty exit left a vulnerable Lebanese military force in south Lebanon, leading to the disbanding of the south Lebanese army and creating a vacuum into which Hezbollah stepped, having risen to power during the war, making its driving doctrine the elimination of the State of Israel by any means available to it. While this goal was impeded for several years during the Second Lebanon War and the civil war in Syria, where the organization was preoccupied temporarily with assisting the Assad regime fight the rebel forces, the war against Hamas in Gaza was a signal for the terror movement that the conditions had ripened for an active offensive against Israel.

To date, Israel has been refraining from officially declaring war in its northern border. Some hoped for recourse in the form of diplomatic pressure to push Hezbollah away from the border with Israel and out of southern Lebanon, in accordance to UN resolution 1701 issued after the end of the Second Lebanon War. This resolution charged the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the task of peacekeeping in south Lebanon. However, despite the resolution, Hezbollah was able to rebuild its force and regained control of the area. Today, the prospects of Hezbollah complying with the resolution and withdraw from south Lebanon are slim, as it had never accepted it to begin with and is currently under no significant pressure to do so. Hezbollah and Iran clearly see the laxness of the international community on this matter, and support from the American administration is lagging as well. Seeing that the majority of the diplomatic pressure on part of the international community is actually aimed at Israel and not on it, Hezbollah sees no deterrence that could force it to hold its fire, or to withdraw.

In the absence of any diplomatic solution that would prevent Hezbollah from establishing its presence on the border and operating there against Israel, and such that can allow the evacuated residents of the northern communities to return to their homes and live their lives safely – the war on the northern arena is not a fanciful notion but a sine qua non. It is nothing short of a moral duty towards the tens of thousands of people who had been living for decades under Hezbollah’s sword of Damocles, and eventually were driven out of their homes and lives by the terror organization’s unrelenting attacks, living for over a year as refugees in their own land and continuing to pay a heavy price for that organization’s bloodthirsty ideology. The time has come for Israel’s war Cabinet to draw the line in the sand and fully advocate a decisive solution on the northern border with the understanding that without an all-out campaign against Hezbollah, the north will never know quiet and the conflict will not see an end – certainly not a victorious one.

South and north: different players, different theaters

The Gaza War is playing out both on Israel’s southern and northern borders. However, while the campaign in Gaza on the southern border is an official offensive action, the campaign on the northern border has yet to be declared an all-out war against Hezbollah, and Israel’s forces have been operating mainly within a mostly defensive position.

The main reason that Israel had refrained from officially declaring war on both fronts out of the gate is related to the size of the IDF’s personnel. Over the years, the army has been downsizing its numbers, creating a situation wherein it cannot undertake a wide scope of operation in both areas at the same time. Thus, it is forced to operate in stages – first completing most of its mission in Gaza, thus allowing it to leave a smaller peacekeeping force in the area, and only then deploying what forces it has to deal with the northern theater, with the intention of making this happen as soon as possible, as with every passing day that Israel is forced to engage with Hamas, it is prevented from taking care of the Hezbollah problem.

In viewing the southern arena against its northern counterpart, it is important to keep in mind that Hamas and Hezbollah are two very different types of enemies. In certain aspects, Hezbollah’s capabilities significantly outweigh those of Hamas, but the Lebanon-based terror organization contends with more than a few Achilles heels.

Operationally, there is no dispute regarding Hezbollah’s superiority over Hamas, with an army of highly trained combat soldiers, huge stockpiles of precision-guided missile, and a vast fleet of attack drones, all supplied by Iran, which is not only the sponsor of the organization but in effect its true handler.

But despite its operational shortcoming in comparison to Hezbollah, Hamas does enjoy a significant advantage that its northern counterpart lacks, and that is overwhelming regional support. Up to the war, Hamas controlled the entirety of the Gaza Strip, militarily and civically. The majority of the residents in Gaza supported Hamas and even mobilized to assist the terror organization. This was made unquestionably apparent with the advent of the war and the daily discoveries by Israeli security forces of tunnel-entrances, military posts, and stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions cached in almost every other house. Contrarily, Hezbollah is ensconced within a hostile arena, surrounded by a host of enemy factions such as the Christians, the Druze and the Suni Muslims. The Lebanese not only do not support Hezbollah, but they point the blaming finger at the terror organization – as well as at its Iranian mentor – for Lebanon’s dire situation which has brought the once vibrant and developed Land of Ceders to the brink of collapse.

Hezbollah’s precarious position in Lebanon means that its war with Israel carries potential critical risks for the organization, as it is well aware that if Israel is able to sufficiently compromise its capabilities, it will affect a shift in Lebanon’s internal politics and enable the rival factions in the country to change the balance of powers such that would prove detrimental to Hezbollah’s position.

The discrepancies between the two theaters and the nature of the enemies naturally sets different objective for each front. While in Gaza the declared goal is the total upending the rule of Hamas’ in Gaza, in the north Israel has no designs of toppling Hezbollah, as it knows that when all else fails, Hezbollah could always resort to withdrawing solely to Beirut or even to Syria. And anyhow the organization is a proxy of the Iranian Ayatullah regime, which supports and assists it and views it as a more important player than Hamas, thus the total eradication of Hezbollah is highly unlikely within one limited campaign.

Therefore, Israel’s objectives in the northern war theater are to push Hezbollah northward to upper Lebanon, destroy its infrastructure on the border with Israel and debilitate its leadership and ultimately create the conditions for the residents of the north to return safely to their homes.

These are three crucial objectives. All three are within Israel’s reach.

Beyond the red line; time for declaring the objective of the war in the north

The State of Israel has of yet to officially declare war up north. This despite the fact that the IDF has been operating in that sector since October 7. In the time that has passed, the IDF had targeted Hezbollah’s areal defense systems thereby restoring Israel’s freedom of operation in Lebanon’s aerial space. At the same time, it had also taken out a considerable portion of the command of Hezbollah’s special ops unit in south Lebanon, Radwan Force, and had destroyed many of the organization’s infrastructures and had pushed part of Hezbollah’s forces several kilometers northward into Lebanon.

All the above have created probably what would be the best conditions Israel can hope for to launch a broad offensive against Hezbollah. Yet there are many voices calling for the suspension of such a move due to considerations of personnel and ammunition shortages and battle fatigue of the forces, among others. However, anyone calling for suspension lacks a clear understanding of the reality on the ground and the severe consequences such a decision could have.

The first issue with this approach is the indefinite delay in the safe return of families to their homes, which aside from the humanitarian issue also constitutes a consequential ideological crisis that could truly jeopardize the Zionist enterprise. The longer the residents of the north remain in their substitute homes, chances of their full return home to live yet again under threat grow slimmer, thus the vital continuity of settlement along a border with a major security importance unravels, and decades of achievements gained by the Zionist enterprise of settling the entire historic land of Israel are rolled back, not to mention the gaping loss of productivity that the region contributes to Israel’s GDP – these are but a few of the prices a delay in a resolution on the norther border will exact on Israel.

The second outcome of such a delay is akin to gifting one of Israel’s largest enemies with the time it direly needs to lick its wounds, regroup and regain its malicious power. If Iran and Hezbollah know that Israel will declare an all-out war only in a year, or possibly two, the immediate action they would undertake is to pour their entire network of militias in the Middle East into south Lebanon, reequipping and retraining them, now with a better understanding and more experience in Israel’s military tactics and strategies, and use them against us, having had the time to prepare for Israel’s new order of battle.

It is also worth mentioning that beyond the above considerations, there is the toll that a war with Hezbollah will exact on the Israeli population. A crucial element in an army’s resilience is a strong civilian backbone, and a war against such an able enemy is sure to subject the civilian population of Israel to challenges such as advanced missile attacks wreaking destruction on vital infrastructures (roads, water, electricity) possibly even claiming lives, rising costs of living, and the disruption of daily life. These burdens are easier for civilians to bear when moral is high and they can get behind the leadership and army and support the cause. Israel has been at war for over a year, with the civilian population’s support and willingness to contribute whatever it takes to win and restore quiet and security. However, in a year or two, a new war might prove to be a very difficult sell to the jaded Israeli public.

A crucial element in an army’s resilience is a strong civilian backbone

Short and forceful: possible scenarios for a war in the north

Many in Israel fear a third Lebanon War that would drag on for years, as the collective memory still holds the pain of the first and second Lebanon wars that claimed a precipitous cost in lives and left the country in deep trauma that is still felt to this day. However, with lessons well-learnt and with the right command, a war in Lebanon now could be even shorter than the campaign in Gaza. The goal is to land a swift, decisive blow on Hezbollah, twisting the organization and Iran’s arm into seeking a mechanism that would provide them with a quick exit. Iran fears the loss of its most nurtured proxy, and a debilitating blow on part of Israel to Hezbollah could very likely leave Iran scurrying to end the war. Moreover, it can put into play another lever against Iran in the form of internal Lebanese forces that are hostile to Hezbollah and would be more than happy to get the organization’s back up against a wall.

But this might prove easier said than done, what with pro-Iranian support players the likes of Syrian militias, which would likely come to Hezbollah’s help, complicating things for Israel. A suitable preemptory action would be Israel informing the Syrian regime, that if it chooses to join the fray, a swift and decisive retaliation will follow.

Iran’s active involvement in such a war could actually play out to the advantage of Israel, as it would be a green light for America to join in, possibly putting in motion what might very well become a global war, with strong western militaries – and odds – stacked up against Iran. The Shi’ite Republic would be advised to weigh its steps carefully in such a scenario.

One way or another, Israel will have to ensure that south Lebanon remains a sterile, unpopulated area without any presence whatsoever of Hezbollah. Israel has no designs of annexing nor settling in south Lebanon, surely. Nonetheless, Israel must control the area at least for an initial interim period, meaning that all the Israeli forces positioned on the Lebanese border on the Israeli side will have to be moved into Lebanon. Similarly to the IDF’s military buffer zone in Gaza, Israel will have to deploy its forces in the south Lebanon area, using the Litany River as a natural border. The short-term objective is to have the returned residents of northern Israel see the IDF when the look towards Lebanon, and not Hezbollah.

Alongside the deployment of forces, Israel must generate international pressure that would lead to the disbanding of Hezbollah, as the state of affairs in which a neighboring country is controlled by a terror organization hell-bent on the annihilation of Israel can no longer be acceptable. The international community must be harnessed to devise a long-term and sustainable solution, as Israel can no longer trust what until now was an ineffective UN peacekeeping force to ensure the quiet on its border, and expects a solution that includes the placement of a substantial international military force that could deal with Hezbollah if necessary.

The initiative must be in Israel’s hands: conditions for ending operations in Lebanon

As explained above, there are three conditions for ending Israel’s operations in south Lebanon – the scouring of that area of Hezbollah’s presence, the crippling of the organization and its infrastructures, and the securing of conditions for the northern residents to return safely to their homes. All of these are obtainable objectives, even perhaps in the near future. It requires creative thought and determination, and Israel must take the initiative to make this happen.

Finally, in response to the claims that Israel’s soldiers are already suffering from battle fatigue at this point of the war – it is important to remember the other side of that coin: the soldiers and commanders that will go to the northern front have immense battle experience and understand crucial lessons learnt in the past year. So rather than a fatigued army, the IDF is now a well-oiled and unstoppable fighting machine, so let us not stop it from doing its job.

הפוסט When to Begin and How We Should End: The Imparative of a Broad Military Campaign in South Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The October 7 attack by Hamas against Israel killed 1,200 people, including 32 U.S. citizens, renewing the global focus on radical Islamic terrorism. Those fears include the possibility that Hezbollah forces in Latin America could join the fight against Israel and carry out terrorist attacks in Latin America or in the United States and the Middle East.

On November 8, Brazilian Federal Police uncovered a plot by alleged Hezbollah operatives to attack Jewish targets. On December 7, the FBI presented Brazilian authorities with an urgent alert about the possible planning of an imminent terrorist attack in the country. Also in early December, Israel raised the travel alert level for its citizens in 80 countries, including Brazil and Argentina. This raise alert level was in response to Iran’s rising efforts to target Israelis and Jews[1]. Brazil is home to Latin America’s second-largest Jewish community, after Argentina, and the arrests further raises fears about the region’s vulnerability to terrorism[2].

Given Latin America’s history of terrorism and the conflict in the Middle East, there is a clear need for greater cooperation to combat terrorism in the region. Latin America’s proximity to the United States, and its significant problems with endemic corruption, organized crime and economic dysfunction, calls for the Americans to act in the current climate. Without greater US support, it is not clear that Latin America’s law enforcement and intelligence efforts have the capacity to detect and dismantle Hezbollah. Yet the U.S. national security focus has generally been tilted toward power politics with China and Russia and away from combatting international terrorism.

Fortunately, there are counterterrorism cooperation mechanisms to build upon. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay established the 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security. Yet whilst these entities are useful, they may not be sufficient to meet the current threat. Without greater intelligence and law enforcement resources dedicated to countering Hezbollah, Latin America will remain a soft target for the type of international terrorism that the region has suffered in the past.

Argentinian President Milei has yet to officially designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, even though Hezbollah has been on their list since 2019. Paraguay meanwhile designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization less than a month after Argentina. Hezbollah’s extensive operations in Latin America will likely mean that more countries in the region will follow in Paraguay and Argentina’s lead and blacklist the group.[3]

In the first half of 2023, 160 migrants on the terrorist watch list have been stopped from trying to enter the US from Mexico[4]. Numbers of illegal migrants have consistently grown throughout President Biden’s presidency. It is unclear how many terrorists are included in the one point five million illegal migrants who have entered the US since he took office.  The Biden administration have cancelled the “remain in Mexico” policy which was proving to be a significant deterrent to abuse of asylum claims. Guatemala offered Washington a comprehensive deal in 2021 on managing border migration, which the Biden administration rebuffed[5].

Defying US Sanctions

Migrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East often use Venezuela as a point of entry in the Western Hemisphere for illegal migration to the U.S. Recently, the U.S. offered sanctions relief to Venezuela in exchange for promises of free and fair national elections, effectively ignoring the increasingly prominent role the Caracas regime plays in global human trafficking.

On February 12, The United States seized a Boeing 747 cargo plane that Iran sold to a Venezuelan state airline, drawing condemnation from Tehran. Washington says that the sale of the plane to Venezuela in 2022 by Iran’s Mahan Air violated its sanctions on Tehran. The US has imposed sanctions on the airline due to its affiliation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mahan Air – known to transport weapons and fighters for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah – violated our export restrictions by selling this airplane to a Venezuelan cargo airline. Venezuela’s government called the transfer a “shameful rapacious operation” and vowed to “take all actions to restore justice and achieve the restitution of the aircraft to its legitimate owner.”.[6]

It is unlikely that Hezbollah will use the clandestine immigration stream into the US, because every Hezbollah agent that has come into America has been eventually exposed by the authorities. Instead, would-be agents have always come into the US legally, then have applied for green card citizenship. Once they have a passport, their Hezbollah activities begin. There have been 4 cases between 2017 and today of such agents, and there is this visible pattern[7]. Individuals are also coming into the US from the Middle East, Asia, Africa all of which exacerbates the likelihood of a future US domestic terrorist attack.

It has become clear therefore that the current US foreign policy is not sufficient. The US wants to export its own values of good governance and transparency, sanctioning perpetrators of other issues such as human rights violations such as Nicaragua. The Biden administration also wants to create the impression it is finally getting tough on Hezbollah. Recent Treasury Department sanctions against 3 Colombian-based Hezbollah operatives seem to suggest the White House is taking the threat more seriously[8]. But by the time the sanctions were imposed and Colombian officials had a mandate to investigate, the operatives had disappeared[9].

The US treasury does not have the capacity and its effect is often underwhelming. There are also the almost unprecedented challenges from US domestic political contentions. If Republicans were to win the presidency in 2024, U.S. foreign policies would likely shift dramatically. Conversely, should President Joe Biden win re-election, the administration may struggle to further develop sustainable policies. Either way, Latin American policy will prove uniquely challenging for the U.S., which usually does not make hemispheric relations a priority, particularly in the latter stages of a presidential term.

A Presidential Visit in South America

Iran’s President Raisi recently visited Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua in defiance of the US and in violation of sanctions. Iran is exporting its Islamist ideology into Latin America, creating terror cells as well as influential cultural centers. Mostly Iran sees a potential in the ideological sphere to emphasize its worldviews with authoritarian Latin American leaders, penetrating academia and reaching out to influencers.

Whilst Iran cannot match China or Russia’s military, economy or technology, it is not an insignificant on the world stage as they all share the common goal of diminishing American global influence. But China and Russia are not promoting the same revolutionary ideology as Iran.

Brazil’s President Lula allowed Iranian warships to dock in ports in Rio de Janeiro in 2023[10]. He did so just after returning from a trip to Washington to meet with President Biden, where the US threatened further sanctions, which President Lula simply ignored[11].  The Iranian signal is that they are going to ignore US sanctions and pressure, even though Brazil has since signed more bilateral agreements with the US on the promotion of workers right internationally. President Lula is essentially telling the world that America will no longer dictate what he does.

Hezbollah has a pervasive presence in Latin America. We know that it is responsible for the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires[12]. The country froze Hezbollah’s assets and branded it a “terrorist organization” in 2019. In December 2023, the United States charged an alleged Hezbollah member, Samuel Salman El Reda, accusing him of providing assistance for a 1994 bombing in Argentina.[13] Killing Jews may have been a benefit for its presence in Argentina at that time, but its criminal enterprises of drug trafficking and money laundering are a prime factor in its movement in Latin America.

Conversely, newly-elected President Milei is presenting a significant change of tone in the Latin country’s attitude toward Israel. Foreign Minister Israel Katz welcomes Argentinian President Javier Milei upon his arrival to Israel in February. Israel Katz thanked President Milei for his support for Israel against Hamas and for recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. “You are a person of values ​​who is committed only to the truth,” Israel Katz told President Milei, “And it is no wonder that you chose to come to Israel right away to support us in the just struggle for the defense of the Jewish people against the murderers of Hamas.”[14]

The Challenge of Hezbollah’s Narco Terrorism

Hezbollah works closely with other cartels including the Medellin cartel and cartels in Brazil and Mexico[15]. The principal service they offer is money laundering and Iran has bankrolled Hezbollah since its inception[16]. But as Hezbollah’s operational budget influence has grown over the years, its financial needs have grown too, so it engages in illicit activities in Latin America to help meet those needs. No evidence of a direct connection yet exists between these networks that launder money for crime and the criminal networks that bring fentanyl through Mexico into the United States, but given that Hezbollah has developed this money laundering infrastructure worldwide for decades now, a connection may well emerge. There is a role for US criminal investigation organizations like the DEA because Hezbollah’s illicit financial networks heavily rely on US jurisdictions to move money around. One of the reasons for this is that a lot of the money generated by illicit drug sales comes from America[17].

U.S. officials now assess that there is a rising risk that Hezbollah militants will strike Americans in the Middle East — and even potentially hit inside the United States[18]. This turnaround comes after the US publicly stated in October that it believed Tehran and its proxies were not seeking a wider regional war or a confrontation with the U.S. Either scenario — an attack domestically or on troops or diplomats overseas — would deal a blow to the Biden administration which has worked to prevent the Israel-Hamas conflict from broadening into a wider regional war and to keep American forces out of the fray. It would also likely draw Washington back into the Middle East at a time when it is trying to focus its national security resources on countering China and Russia.

Lack of American Deterrence in the Region

Since October 7, U.S. troops in the Middle East have been attacked by multiple other Iranian proxy groups, including Iraqi paramilitary group Harakat-al-Nujaba[19]. The Pentagon announced on February 12 that the number of US casualties in Iraq, Syria and Jordan since Oct. 18 now totals around 186.[20] The U.S. has hit back multiple times, including a January 4 drone strike in Baghdad that killed a senior militia member[21].

“Iran, Hezbollah and their linked proxies are trying to calibrate their activity, avoiding actions that would open up a concerted second front with the United States or Israel while still exacting costs in the midst of the current conflict… their actions carry the potential for miscalculation,” Christy Abizaid, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said during a congressional hearing in October[22]. During his visit to the Middle East Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “this is a conflict that could easily metastasize.”

US intelligence officials have testified in recent months about the threats posed by Hezbollah, saying the group has significant capability to carry out overseas terrorist attacks and that its motivation to strike the U.S. has grown following the Trump administration’s 2019 strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, the leader of one of Iran’s top military units. “The arrests of individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Hezbollah’s main overseas terrorist arm, and their intelligence-collection and procurement efforts, demonstrate Hezbollah’s interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in the homeland,” FBI director Chris Wray said in a congressional hearing Nov. 15[23].

A preemptive attack on Hezbollah in the Middle East has faced sustained U.S. opposition because of the concern that it may draw Iran and other proxies into the conflict. But there has been broader concern about an escalation in the past weeks, particularly as Israel announced the temporary withdrawal of several thousand troops from Gaza on January 1 — a decision that could open up resources for a military operation in the north. Hezbollah, meanwhile, may want to avoid a major escalation and to steer clear of a wider war. In a speech on January 5, Hasan Nasrallah vowed a response to Israeli aggression, while hinting that he might still be open to negotiations on border demarcation with Israel[24]. A full-scale conflict between Israel and Lebanon would surpass the scale of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war on account of Hezbollah’s substantially larger arsenal of long-range precision weaponry.

Need for American Leadership

The United States must take more aggressive steps to moderate the Iranian and Hezbollah threats to its security and interests, which also include vast networks of narco-terrorism, information war and terrorist cells that are becoming increasingly epidemic in Latin America. Halting Iranian expansionism behooves taking stricter measures in places that often seem remote from the geopolitical public eye such as Latin America.

[1] https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/brazil-and-the-rising-hezbollah-concern-in-latin-america/

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67367483

[3] https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1883066/exclusive-%E2%80%93-why-did-paraguay-designate-hezbollah-terrorist

[4] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/number-people-terror-watchlist-stopped-mexico-us-border-risen-rcna105095

[5] https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/united-states-latin-america/

[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/us-takes-over-boeing-747-iran-had-sold-to-venezuela

[7] https://emetonline.org/resource/iran-hezbollah-and-other-threats-to-our-national-security-from-latin-america-transcript/

[8] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/09/21/treasury-sanctions-hezbollahs-network-in-colombia-but-what-took-so-long/

[9] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/09/21/treasury-sanctions-hezbollahs-network-in-colombia-but-what-took-so-long/

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-allows-two-iranian-warships-dock-rio-despite-us-pressure-2023-02-27/

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/under-us-pressure-lula-delays-brazil-docking-iran-warships-sources-2023-02-09/

[12] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/20/us-charges-alleged-hezbollah-member-over-1994-buenos-aires-bombing

[13] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/20/us-charges-alleged-hezbollah-member-over-1994-buenos-aires-bombing

[14] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/argentinas-new-president-arrives-in-israel-reiterates-pledge-to-move-embassy-to-jerusalem/

[15] https://www.meforum.org/64464/hezbollah-a-worldwide-criminal-organization

[16] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg25730/html/CHRG-115hhrg25730.htm

[17] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/deas-targeting-hezbollahs-global-criminal-support-network

[18] https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/american-intel-officials-warn-of-risk-of-hezbollah-attacking-u-s/#:~:text=U.S.%20officials%20assess%20that%20there’s,with%20the%20intelligence%20told%20POLITICO.

[19] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/10/american-intel-officials-hezbollah-u-s-attack-risk-00134874

[20] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/pentagon-says-number-of-us-causalities-in-iraq-syria-jordan-since-oct-18-totals-186/3135583

[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-iran-backed-militia-fighters-killed-baghdad-drone-strike-sources-2024-01-04/#:~:text=BAGHDAD%2FWASHINGTON%2C%20Jan%204%20(,move%20condemned%20by%20Iraq’s%20government.

[22] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/10/american-intel-officials-hezbollah-u-s-attack-risk-00134874#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIran%2C%20Hezbollah%20and%20their%20linked,the%20National%20Counterterrorism%20Center%2C%20said

[23] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/10/american-intel-officials-hezbollah-u-s-attack-risk-00134874

[24] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/07/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-blinken/

הפוסט Latin America and the Hezbollah Connection: A Threat to US National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Nearly five months into the Gaza conflict, Israel’s primary front is now in Lebanon. Hezbollah has intensified its attacks against Israel in recent days, corresponding with Israel’s increased actions, including the elimination of field-level commanders within the terrorist organization.

Since the conflict’s inception, approximately 80,000 Israeli residents have been evacuated from the northern region due to Hezbollah attacks from Lebanon. Media reports and statements from Israeli officials suggest that Israel aims to resolve the limited conflict with Hezbollah through a diplomatic agreement, akin to Security Council Resolution 1701. This agreement would require Hezbollah to withdraw several kilometers from the Israeli border, pushing their forces beyond the Litani River. Nasrallah on his part does not seem so sure – he argued cynically that it would be easier to bring the Litani river closer to the Israeli border than to push Hezbollah militants from the Israeli border to the Litani river.

Despite this, it appears that the Israeli government remains committed to the concept of October 6th. Meanwhile, mayors and residents in the north have stated that they will not return to their homes until Israel provides them with a sustainable solution.

Even if Israel succeeds in pushing Hezbollah several kilometers back from its border through limited political or military means, such a move would be far from resolving the northern threat. The notion of Hezbollah withdrawing beyond the Litani River is outdated and naive, offering no long-term solution. The threat from Hezbollah extends beyond border incursions and settlements adjacent to the fence.

Hezbollah would still possess approximately 200,000 missiles and rockets, a fleet of UAVs, and advanced surveillance capabilities. They would continue to upgrade their air defense systems and bolster their military presence throughout Lebanon. Even if Hezbollah abides by an agreement to retreat beyond the Litani and refrains from attacking northern settlements, their power and capabilities are likely to strengthen over time.

This scenario would leave Israel to confront a more formidable enemy in the future, as Hezbollah already represents a serious and dangerous threat, second only to Iran. Additionally, Hezbollah’s arsenal of missiles and rockets would continue to pose a significant and destructive threat to Israel as a whole.

The likelihood of Hezbollah agreeing to voluntarily withdraw from southern Lebanon is slim. As their attacks persist and Israel responds with measured severity, deterrence may continue to erode, emboldening Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s identity as a “resistance organization” is rooted in its opposition to Israel, ostensibly to protect Lebanon. Withdrawal could weaken its image as Lebanon’s defender and the champion of Palestinian aspirations, leading Hezbollah to resist such a move.

For Israel to push Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, it would likely require significant military force. Israel must reassess its security strategy, not only in the south but also in all areas, especially in Lebanon. Relying on a military or political solution that only safeguards northern settlements is insufficient. Israel should not assume that Hezbollah will agree to evacuate voluntarily, and even if it does, there is no guarantee it won’t return to the area south of the Litani River.

Israel must shift from a strategy of deterrence to one of decisiveness. Military actions should not aim solely at deterring Hezbollah, as was the case in the Second Lebanon War, but should be part of a comprehensive war to defeat Hezbollah. This would involve preparing the Israeli public for a large-scale war in Lebanon aimed at dismantling Hezbollah, including the occupation of southern Lebanon and the destruction of major Lebanese cities like Beirut.

In such a scenario, it is likely that the American administration would support Israel’s actions, given Israel’s restraint in responding to Hezbollah’s provocations since October. This restraint was part of an unofficial agreement with the Biden administration, which sought to prevent a war in Lebanon. If Hezbollah does not withdraw beyond the Litani River through diplomatic efforts, Israel would have American legitimacy for a full-scale war.

Ultimately, Israel should take control of its destiny and not rely on foreign entities. Only by defeating Hezbollah and destroying its infrastructure throughout Lebanon, even if it means devastating Lebanese cities, can Israel achieve a better security reality and long-term peace.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The writer has a PhD in political studies. He is a military strategy and national security expert, and a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and at the Israel Defense and Security Forum (Habithonistim). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

הפוסט To provide security to its citizens, Israel must go to war with Hezbollah הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

There are various levels of security that a state can provide to its citizens, from full security down to insecurity. That spectrum of levels is overlaid by a second spectrum, the “sense of security,” which may or may not correspond to the objective security situation but influences the attitudes of the local residents and their ability to carry on with everyday life.

Leaving our citizens displaced radiates weakness

We shall start with the assumption that the residents of the north must return to their homes within the coming months. The State of Israel cannot and must not continue supporting a body of almost 100,000 refugees inside the country for long. Not only does the situation impose a heavy economic burden; it also sends a message of weakness both to our enemies and to our citizens when there is somewhere in the country, even close to the border, where life as usual cannot be continued even though Zionism recognizes the value, to the nation and to its security, of civilian life in the country’s risk-prone periphery.

Accordingly, the security services must fulfill certain conditions promptly in order to enable at least reasonable security for the area’s residents, and a sense of security that will persuade them to resume the routine of everyday civilian life in the northern communities.

I wish to stress first that in my view, Israel can enable its northern residents to return even without any large-scale military operation, at least for the moment. Granted, at a certain point Israel will need to take thoroughgoing action against Hezbollah and free itself from the security threat in the north. But there are many reasons not to do so now, and consequently a proper solution must be found that will enable the area’s residents to return home and enjoy reasonable security along with a sense of security.

Thickening the day-to-day military presence

Israel must first massively thicken the military presence along the border and institute a new level of peacetime deployment while taking into account, of course, the more challenging areas of the border, which require greater attention and greater exercise of caution.

Emergency squads and civilian defense forces

In addition to military forces, Israel must arrange for formation of effective emergency squads and civil defense forces in appropriate numbers, through an effort coordinated with the northern communities. Israel must ensure sufficient ordnance at hand, a modicum of training, etc. Israel can no longer rely on the idea that at any given time the intelligence sources can provide prior warning. That is the first and most important lesson from the events of October 7. Israel must be prepared for a massive invasion of Hezbollah forces that are larger and better than those of Hamas, and ensure that what happened on October 7 at the southern border will not recur in the north.

Dealing with Hezbollah’s tunnels

Israel must also persistently and intensively deal with Hezbollah’s attack tunnels. In the time since Operation Northern Shield, which began in December 2018 and handled six cross-border tunnels, more tunnels may have been dug that require attention. This is clearly relevant to the matter of a sense of security. Residents who report that they hear digging beneath their homes feel a serious threat to personal security, particularly after the events of October 7, and this is the best time for taking care of the matter — while legitimacy and international backing are not in question, the border is in readiness, and Hezbollah is treading cautiously in order to avoid all-out war. By dealing with the tunnels inside its territory, Israel will not increase the chance of war. Israel has already done so in the past and Hezbollah did not see it as a “violation of understandings.” Israel knows how to do the job.

Improving protection

Another necessity is to prepare the home front and close the gaps surrounding the border defenses. It must be ensured that all the areas most exposed to missile and rocket fire from Lebanon are equipped with basic means of defense — proper safe rooms, shelters, alarm systems in good repair, etc. It must be said, in all transparency, that the missile and rocket capability of Hezbollah will remain a challenge to the State of Israel even after a large-scale war. The area of southern Lebanon is larger than the Gaza Strip by an order of magnitude, and the organization’s arsenal of missiles and rockets is enormous — far larger than those of Hamas and the other Gazan organizations. Of course Hezbollah’s rocket capability is not confined to southern Lebanon but resides in Lebanese areas farther north as well, so the IDF must be able to neutralize that threat as thoroughly as possible even in territories where, at least at the start of fighting, it will have no ground forces deployed.

Hezbollah will still be able fire rockets, antitank missiles, and other missiles at the northern communities even when the ground operation is well under way and even if Hezbollah’s capabilities are damaged or eroded. Complete neutralization of its deployment will require a long time, and the home front must be in the best possible preparedness in order to mnimize loss of life.

Those are the four conditions that I believe must be implemented with due speed in order to enable the residents of the north to be returned home as quickly as possible rather than dragging out the question of their return any longer than the lengthy period that has so far been necessary.

Over and above the immediate conditions that must be in place, I believe that Israel must strive to attain further accomplishments in the current conflict and to capitalize on the efforts on all fronts.

Driving Hezbollah back across the Litani

One much-discussed condition, and perhaps the most difficult, is driving Hezbollah back north across the Litani River, or at least some kilometers northward. Israel has presented that requirement to the USA, France, and other mediators between itself and Lebanon, but the pullback must either be born of a complicated diplomatic maneuver with international cooperation and with pledges and guarantees from our friends, or be born of a decisive war that brings destruction of infrastructures and elimination of Hezbollah operatives throughout southern Lebanon as far as the Litani River. Hezbollah is currently in a complex position because while it wants to signal support for the Palestinian cause and is even willing to pay a price for doing so, it takes care not to enter an all-out war that apparently even its Iranian patrons do not desire at the moment. Israel must leverage that complexity, with the necessary caution, and make Hezbollah understand that for this demand, Israel is willing to wage war — and even to initiate war, which would cost us heavily on the home front. The pullback must include, most of all, the Radwan Force — the special Hezbollah unit trained for several scenarios of ground incursion into Israeli territory, from limited to large-scale. Israel must, of course, be sure of any agreement’s resources for enforcement — intelligence, partnerships, and other resources — and the consequences of violating the agreement must be clear in advance.

Continuing the targeted killings

Furthermore in the same connection, Israel would do well, in my opinion, to exploit Hezbollah’s obvious wariness of all-out war by including targeted killings, with all necessary caution, during its days of fighting in southern Lebanon. For example, the elimination of Wissam al-Tawil, a senior commander in the Radwan Force, was a significant blow to the organization and its readiness, as was the killing of Abbas Al-Debs, a sector commander in the organization. Those strikes were attributed to Israel without crossing the line into all-out war.

Another achievement Israel should aspire to is stopping the flow of war materiel from Syrian territory. Israel has recently attacked many times in Syria, but the war between the wars is, by its nature, not self-contained and the military buildup of the axis has intensified over recent years.

Attacking without fear

After October 7, according to reports, Israel began to attack senior Iranian elements in the Syrian arena and to assertively strike at more of the key personnel in the strengthening of the axis in the region, including Iranians and Hezbollah operatives whom Israel had been careful not to harm in the past. Israel needs to continue doing so, assertively and without fear. Iran and Hezbollah should be made to realize that Syria is an arena where Israel operates freely and that therefore any Iranian or operative of Hezbollah in the Syrian arena, by taking action against Israel directly or indirectly, becomes a target for elimination by Israel. That is a system-level achievement which will require a long time and will need to be accomplished in parallel with the immediate efforts as part of a new vision that Israel must formulate and pursue at the northern borders.

Preparing the public mentality

On the home front, another prominent aspect — which I consider not a necessary condition for returning the residents to their homes but still important for the future — is the attitude of readiness. The residents of the north in specific, and of Israel in general, have not experienced a war with Hezbollah since 2006. The country’s citizens need to be prepared for the immense, sustained firepower that Hezbollah possesses, something the citizens of Israel have never before known, an order of magnitude greater than Hamas and with better accuracy. In a single volley, Hezbollah can launch more high-trajectory missiles than Hamas can launch in several days of continuous fighting.

The above steps can enable Israel to stabilize its security at the northern border for the long term and ensure the minimum conditions for a return of the northern residents to their homes. It is in Israel’s interest to re-establish routine life in the north, even if accompanied by tension, while thickening the belt of defense and bolstering the country’s security interests. All this can be achieved and maintained only if the war aims in Gaza are accomplished, including victory over Hamas and neutralization of its terrorist and governmental abilities.

הפוסט What conditions must the State of Israel guarantee in order to return the residents of the north to their homes? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

1. I. is a member of the IDSF movement (in Hebrew, Habithonistim) who served for almost 30 years in the Mossad. His final Mossad position, as division head, capped a career of engrossing and challenging assignments that touched on neutralizing infrastructures and terror attacks of Islamic terrorist organizations in the international arena, delaying and disrupting the Iranian nuclear weapons project, and continually sabotaging attempts by the Shiite axis to build up its military strength.

“I come from the conservative school,” he told me in advance of the interview, and he proceeded to explain: “Over the last few years, the organization has opened up a little. Suddenly you’re hearing about us in the media, more books are being written about us, and there are more revelations in the media coverage. On the one hand, I understand the need because we’re an integral part of the life around us. On the other hand, I’m still one of those who believe that secrecy is a vital part of the strength of the Mossad. It’s a core component of our ability to deter the country’s enemies and opponents by making them feel vulnerable, penetrable, and uncertain.”

Despite his fondness for secrecy and his appreciation of its power — attitudes that are not promising in an interviewee — this was an especially intriguing interview. I. spoke about Iran, its nuclear buildup and its influence on Israel’s vicinity, and then elaborated on the phenomenon of noncompliance among senior reservists and how, in his opinion, it brings harm worldwide to the reputation of Israel and of the Jewish people.

The Iranian threat, the American hammer, and the Israeli nail

For many years “the Iranian problem” has occupied a central place in the international arena, from agreements and international coalitions, through economic sanctions, and on to the Iranian threats positioned at our own border and discussed by the Israeli media. Although the issue always seems to persist in the background, and although senior political figures will warn from time to time that Iran is closer than ever to manufacturing a nuclear bomb, the general feeling in the meantime is that the threat is not materializing and that the 1500-kilometer distance between Tehran and Jerusalem affords Israel calm. Our first question to I. was whether the calm is illusory.

Is the Iranian threat really so near and palpable?

“It has certainly come nearer, and it is palpable, but to understand the situation better, I’ll use a different example that we’re all familiar with: travel advisories for Israelis who take trips abroad. When the Mossad receives a warning of an anticipated threat to Israelis in Sinai, for example, we see to it that a travel advisory is published. In practice, some people will choose to travel to Sinai anyway and some will cancel their trips and stay in Israel. When nothing happens and everyone comes home safe, those who did make the trip say ‘Look, nothing happened’ and those who stayed home say ‘We should have gone.’ But what’s less obvious, both to those who made the trip and those who didn’t, is that we don’t only issue the warning but also keep operating around the clock, secretly and with determination, against the attacks or terrorists that the warning was concerned with in the first place.”

And what’s the parallel with Iran?

“Year after year it’s reported that Iran is one or two years away from manufacturing a nuclear bomb. How could that be? The answer is simple: When they say once more that the Iranian threat has come near us, when they warn once more that Iran is the same short distance away from manufacturing a bomb — that’s because we’re making sure that the distance doesn’t shrink. Just like the example of the Sinai travel advisory: besides warning and cautioning against the nuclear threat, we take action to maintain Iran’s distance from bombmaking, year after year in ways that change, that cover a range, and that can be strange. When I say ‘we,’ I mean the Mossad, of course, as a leading player, besides all the Israeli security services as significant partners; but I also mean other participants in the international network that operate together with us, with the USA foremost among them. The USA has played a decisive role in the war against Iran ever since the days when it fought in the streets of Iraq.”

Did you say Iraq?

“Right. In 2003, two years after the terror attack that brought down the World Trade Center in New York, the US President at the time, George W. Bush, decided to enter Iraq in full force. Not many people know this, but Iran was very close to manufacturing an operational nuclear bomb at that very time. Later, when we’d captured the Iranian nuclear archive, we found that it supported and reinforced that information. To a great extent, if the Americans hadn’t come to Iraq and the Iranians had continued their armaments project, it’s quite reasonable to suppose they would have reached complete nuclear capability — a capability they don’t have today.”

Still, what does US activity in Iraq have to do with Iran’s nuclear capability?

“Consider this: The Iranians see the US army, the strongest in the world, come from the other side of the globe to their neighbor country and go all in. The Americans use everything they have, within a few weeks Saddam Hussein’s statue is pulled down in the middle of Baghdad, and a little later they catch up with Saddam himself and subdue him. The Iranians shook with fear.”

Why?

“That ferocious neighbor of theirs, the worst nightmare of the Iranian government and citizens, had been considered invincible. Seeing it overthrown so quickly, the regime of the Ayatollahs was terrified. Suddenly the Iranians understood that they’d better be very careful, and as a precaution, they put a stop, by themselves, to their secret, unmonitored work on a nuclear weapon.”

Okay, but that was 20 years ago. What’s stopping Iran today?

“Since then, there’s been a long, varied campaign to delay the program, both by closely targeted attacks on the capabilities themselves and by confronting the regime with pressure that deters it from deciding to break through to what’s called ‘military enrichment’ or ‘high enrichment’ — that is, enriching uranium to 90% — let alone deciding to develop a nuclear weapons system.”

And how, in practice, is that done?

“The farther Iran advances in technology, and in amassing knowledge and practical experience in uranium enrichment, the less effectively its capabilities can be undermined and the more important political, economic, and military deterrence become. In parallel, the closer Iran approaches its goal technologically, the more importance lies with the diplomatic campaign led by the USA together with the countries of the West and Israel.”

So the USA is the most significant player in halting the Iranian juggernaut.

“Definitely. Every administration in Washington has applied pressure on the Iranians and has repeatedly emphasized its complete, sincere commitment to denying a military nuclear capability to Iran. I’ve always been one of the big believers in that American commitment, and certainly in America’s ability to fulfill it, and today I still hold to that belief. As one administration replaces another in Washington, the difference, as I see it, isn’t in the overall objective of preventing the military nuclearization of Iran but in how the administration chooses to accomplish that, in the adaptation of its diplomatic approach, and in the kind of action that goes along with it.”

What’s an example of the difference?

“The Bush administration applied military pressure against Iran, even if not directly. Obama applied a combination of diplomatic and economic pressure. And Trump, by what he was and what he did, combined economic pressure with the pressures of uncertainty and deterrence. Like everyone, the Iranians considered him unpredictable. Let’s put it this way: If Trump had won a second term, the Iranians apparently would have climbed down to their bunkers.”

And does the current administration in Washington fit the pattern?

“Yes. Today too, the US administration is applying pressure to the Iranians and it is continuing to voice its commitment to denying the nuclear weapon to Iran. But on a broader scale, it’s more important that we take to heart a further strategic issue: The Middle East is no longer so interesting to the USA, and therefore the Americans’ motivation to behave more energetically against Iran is also at a different level — lower and less adventurous.”

Why are the Americans less interested in the Middle East?

“You have to understand that what brought the Americans to the Middle East was global terrorism, and more precisely the Salafist Sunni terrorism of Al Qaeda and ISIS. It hit them where it hurts — on their own turf, with the attack of September 11 that destroyed the World Trade Center. At the same time, they were showing interest in the Middle East for economic reasons, with an emphasis on the energy market. But that has all changed: their homeland security is less threatened by terrorism, and the USA has found independent energy alternatives that depend less on the oil wells and natural gas deposits of the Middle East. Washington has changed its national priorities, and its attention and resources are directed at the Pacific area and at the conflict of the great powers — the struggle against China for economic and technological hegemony. Israel can benefit from the change in priorities by maneuvering wisely amid the conflict between the great powers while clearly loyal to the American side. But yes, we should be very worried about the decline of interest in the Middle East.”

And why exactly should we worry?

“Over recent decades, Israel’s strength has drawn greatly from its alliance with the USA and from the special relationship between the countries. As a result, Israel has also had the opportunity to work in coordination with the American ‘locomotive’ at the operational level and to position nails beneath the American hammer. More than once, the American hammer has pounded targets that Israeli intelligence has pointed out; and it has operated according to an Israeli logic of operations, from the targets for antiterrorist activity to the targets for financial blockage as part of the sanctions regime. The USA comes to the table with the strength of a superpower and we come with precise, concrete intelligence. Both for strategic reasons and for tactical operational needs, it is clearly in Israel’s interest to keep the USA in the region. My opinion, for what it’s worth, is that China’s growing involvement in our region will accelerate the return of the USA to the Middle East. It’s important to Israel and it’s important to many other countries in the region.”

Judea and Samaria as potential arena for Iran’s confrontation with Israel

Today the word “Iran” appears to carry with it a large variety of entities and collectives that extend far beyond the country itself. They range from forces inside the Islamic Republic itself through militias in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and on to the territories of the Palestinian Authority in the Judea and Samaria area and Gaza Strip. We asked I. whether it’s possible to assign clear boundaries to the Iranian threat.

What is “Iran,” actually?

“First of all, a little history: Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the regime of the Ayatollahs in Iran has succeeded — in a notably, admirably systematic and persistent way — in establishing a Shiite hegemony throughout the Middle East. It’s necessary to understand the Shiite mentality a bit: The Shiites always feel their status is one of inferiority. They live with a constant sense of needing to defend themselves and be prepared for the worst. It’s ingrained in their traditions and in the story of the Shiite community’s founding.”

When we think of the Shiite axis, “inferiority” isn’t a word that springs to mind.

“Out of the Shiites’ sense of inferior status, their strength evolved. The Iranians, through the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, penetrated to every concentration of Shiites in their vicinity. They gave the Shiites a sense of pride and belonging, an economic standing, and — most importantly — military preeminence in their vicinity. Those factors have been translated, over the years, into political power as well, and even into a change in the demographic balance between the Shiites and the other people of the region’s countries.”

What do the Shiites need to defend against?

“At the basis of their rationale, the Iranians are arming and funding Shiites around the Middle East in order to give those Shiites a defensive capability against Sunni forces and in order to spread Iranian Shiism and the Iranian revolution’s ideas in general. Over the years, those militias have evolved from ethnic defensive forces to significant local and regional power players in terms of numbers and quality, providing assurance and entrenching Iran’s influence in the countries where they reside. In practice, they gradually become an obedient extension of Iran, working to achieve Iranian interests. It’s happened in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and most obviously in Lebanon.”

In Lebanon, you mean Hezbollah?

“Right. For the Iranians, Hezbollah occupies a special place. It’s a force that Iran has a unique investment in, and as a result, Hezbollah isn’t just another terrorist organization or armed militia; Hezbollah has the character of a state, with an army, and it wields great influence over the economy, society, and politics of Lebanon. Iran helps Hezbollah because of its principle of aid to ‘suffering Shiites,’ but — of course — you can’t ignore Hezbollah’s special importance to Iran as a contiguous neighbor of the State of Israel.”

But Hezbollah’s threat to Israel wasn’t always considered linked to Iran. That association belongs to recent years.

“Since Hezbollah was founded, it has posed a major threat to Israel —inside Lebanon until the year 2000, and afterward at the Lebanese border and out in the arena of worldwide terrorism. Over the years, the threat of terror attacks abroad has greatly subsided, both because the Mossad has led successful activity against the organization’s infrastructures and operational abilities and because Hezbollah is less motivated to operate in the international arena. Along the border, too, there’s been a clear decline in the kind of attempts at fatal attacks that we saw in the past, mostly because of the balance of deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah. Where the change is less encouraging is in Iranian–Israeli relations.”

What happened?

“Not long ago, we ranked low on the list of Iran’s enemies — after the USA, Saudi Arabia, and ISIS. But now we’ve become Tehran’s enemy number one. That being so, all the power centers that Iran has deployed in the region — in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and of course Lebanon — escalate their direct threat to Israel accordingly. Granted, each of those proxies has its own ‘prior commitments’ and local constraints, but it isn’t unthinkable that Iran may someday coordinate a joint operation of all those forces against Israel, on several fronts, certainly if Iran is attacked or feels challenged to the point where its stability suffers. Iran now regards Israel as its primary nemesis.”

Are we really the primary nemesis of Iran?

“Look at it from the Iranian regime’s standpoint. They’ve succeeded in stabilizing the region. Iran’s internal conditions are more or less quiet, it has Saudi Arabia on a short leash, the USA has left the region, even the Shiite–Sunni tension is in balance — and here comes the State of Israel pestering and offending Iran. Building regional coalitions that could, in Iran’s view, upset the balance of power to its disadvantage. That’s how Israel reaches the top of Iran’s enemy list, with implications for all the Iranian proxies surrounding Israel — and inside it.”

Inside Israel? Do you mean in the Judea and Samaria area?

“Yes. Iran’s reason for involvement specifically in the Judea and Samaria area has to do with a number of factors: the Palestinian Authority is weakening, the Palestinians of Judea and Samaria are in ferment, and neither Hezbollah nor Hamas is interested in waging war in or from their own territories because of the weighty implications for Lebanon and the Gaza Strip respectively. Thus the interests of all those parties converge on the transformation of the Judea and Samaria area into the central arena for anti-Israeli activity and Iran finds it fertile ground for mounting terrorist operations and firming up its operative ties with the Palestinians — not only in Judea and Samaria but in the Gaza Strip and even in Israel proper — so as, in their view, to undermine Israel’s security and possibly even its stability.”

So what’s to be done?

“There are lots of ways that Israel can and should take action. Besides the covert operations that take place far from here and through secret channels, we need to continue on the course that began with the signing of the Abraham Accords. The State of Israel needs to add to its series of peace agreements in the Middle East. That’s the winning card. I once had a clever commander who called it ‘killing them with honey,’ and I’d add to that if I may — ‘with wasps’ honey.’ ”

Meaning what?

“The more agreements and regional coalitions Israel can manage to conclude with the Arab and Muslim world, the better for our strategic position and our ability to overcome the Iranian threat by relying not only on ourselves, not only on military force, and not only on protection from a great power. And this point isn’t even about the security advantages of those agreements but only about the economic, civil, social, and environmental aspects, which can lower the flames throughout the region and maybe even move the center of gravity away from wars and religious radicalization and over to regional development and improving the quality of life and the personal and national security in our region.”

Warplanes over the Knesset, and the magic that mustn’t be damaged

A topic that had gone unmentioned in our discussion with I. — surprisingly, considering its centrality on the public agenda — was the refusal of reservists to volunteer, against the background of the proposed judicial reforms. After all, that refusal was crossing civil and political divides and sparking publicly discussed concern over the IDF’s readiness.

As a security figure, how do you see the wave of refusals to volunteer?

“Never mind how I see it. Ask my daughter, who’s serving as a combat soldier now. She sees generals and other senior officers — our role models as we grew up, all of us reading books by them and about them — step up one day to call for a halt to volunteering. What is she supposed to think? There’s a lot being said about the political and security implications of what they’ve done, but no one is talking about the long-term educational effects and that’s where the real danger lies.”

Still, though, the political and security implications are there.

“I believe that when generals set out to change the decisions of the elected leaders, it’s as if they brought their tanks to the gates of the Knesset and circled warplanes overhead. True, that’s not how it was literally done, but that’s how I see it and it upsets me. They’ve done more to undermine a pillar of democracy than any pitiful legislative proposal of reform has done.”

But most of them acknowledge that in a pinch, they will report for duty.

“Even if they do report for duty, the damage has already been done because the enemy’s trigger finger will be itchier with Israel’s deterrence eroded. Even if the pilots would show up at the hangars in a pinch — and I’m sure they’d show up with their eyes blazing — that’s no help against the approach of the next war. On the day that, heaven forbid, we pay our respects to the fallen, their political stances will have no importance whether they waved flags on Kaplan Street or wore prayer shawls in the land of Benjamin.”

What would your expectations be from those senior officers?

“I expect a lot of personal resilience, patriotic responsibility, tolerance, and patience from those who, like me, are party to a contract of trustworthiness and good faith with the State of Israel. It’s a contract that’s inviolable — whether in active service, in retirement, or in reserve duty. We’re parties to that contract with the society of Israel and the people of Israel, and the government of Israel too — whatever its political identity and its likeness may be. I’ll add that I absolutely reject the disproportionate comparisons to evil regimes, which I’d rather not name. That’s by no means our situation. We’re protected by a morality that’s higher than any legislation.”

In conclusion… Do the Israeli security services deserve their halo?

“Look, I have a lot of professional colleagues in various Western and Arab countries who will confirm what I’m about to say. I say categorically: The world sees a certain magic and a certain halo accompanying us, and we’ve earned them honestly. People around the world, experts in security and military science and intelligence work, know about Israel’s operations and its security services, and study them. People remember and admire Operation Moked from 1967, and the Entebbe operation, and the bombing of the reactors in Iraq and Syria. Jaws dropped at the sight of the shelves of material swiped from the Iranian nuclear archive. And above all, the whole world is well aware that if any Jew is in trouble anywhere on the planet, the State of Israel will come to the rescue no matter how difficult the challenge or how high the cost. That’s our strength — the Jewish–Israeli fist that no one else has, a fist of unique courage and innovativeness. It’s creative and bold, it’s unpredictable and unhesitant. Not only Nasrallah and the Iranian regime are watching that fist. So is the entire world, both friends and foes. We simply must not damage that magic, and we must not extinguish it.”

הפוסט Shadows over Iran — An interview with I., a former division head in the Mossad הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Inspired by the Nazis

If anyone had any doubt that the Hamas terrorists are a modern semblance of the Nazis, here is a piece of history that shows where these terrorists drew inspiration:

In World War 2, the Nazis used drugs – mainly the methamphetamines Pervitin and Isophan– that were nicknamed “Hermann Goering pills” by the Wehrmacht tank crews.

Those “courage pills” were used as stimulants and inspired a heightened sense of confidence among the troops, and served the Third Reich’s obsession with physical and emotional supremacy.

Already in the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1939, the Wehrmacht’s military physicians prescribed Pervitin to the German troops. In this battle that bread the term “Blitzkrieg”, or blitz war, two elements were viewed as paramount for victory: speed and surprise, catching the enemy unprepared and swiftly acting on that advantage. However, battle fatigue was a hindrance to the full execution of this doctrine, slowing the Nazi invasion. This is the point where Pervitin came into play.

With a powerful relentless Blitzkrieg, assisted to a great extent by these stimulants, the Nazis stormed like a wildfire through Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and finally France. The Wehrmacht paratroopers were described by the British press as “heavily drugged, fearless and crazed”.

Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister during World War II, even wrote in his memoirs:

“’I was dumbfounded’…The speed of the attack was jaw-dropping. High on Pervitin, German tank and artillery drivers covered ground night and day, almost without stopping. Foreign commanders and civilians alike were caught entirely off guard.”

Now, as in the events of the Nazi atrocities and aggression, the power of these hard drugs left its impression on those who’ve had the misfortune to witness their effects. In a chilling resemblance to the Nazi drugged troops, testimonies from the October 7 massacre survivors speak of terrorists with a cold, detached and vicious look in their eyes.

What is Captagon?

Captagon, also known as the “cocaine of the poor,” “ISIS’s drug” and the “jihad drug,” is a drug that contains a synthetic stimulant from the amphetamine family called phenylene. In the past, the drug was used to treat ADHD, but due to concerns over its addictive properties, the drug’s use was discontinued. Captagon induces extremely high levels of energy and suppresses the need for sleep enabling the user to operate intensively for hours and even days, and creates a feeling of euphoria and suppresses appetite. This is one possible motivation for the use of the drug by Hamas: by using Captagon, terrorists would be able to spend long hours without the need for sleep or food, while staying in Israeli territory, committing atrocities and capturing hostages.

However, Hamas neither discovered nor developed Captagon. It was widely used by ISIS terrorists and is trafficked and sold by Hezbollah’s narco-terrorist 320 billion dollar per year worldwide cartel. Investigation of the deadly Paris   terror attack in 2015 revealed that the terrorist took Captagon in their hotel room right before the attack. The probable objective in using the drug was to induce a sense of euphoria and emotional detachment. Testimonies from survivors of the Paris attack mention that the terrorist acted like zombies and were oddly detached.

ISIS was not the first either to discover or use the drug. The “jihad drug” has been in use by the Hezbollah for decades, and the organization has been manufacturing and trafficking it around the entire Middle East. Hezbollah is considered one of the largest narco-terror groups in the world, with funding arriving not only from Iran but in no small amount also from the terror organization’s drug and money laundering business.

One main problematic center of Captagon distribution is the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia. Captagon is especially prevalent among the youth in the KSA, who in Captagon have found a substitute to alcohol, which is forbidden according to Islam. KSA is one of many countries with a growing Captagon problem and it is essentially considered the Ecstasy (MDMA) of the Arab world and regional terror organizations.

How has Captagon become the “drug of Jihad”?

Captagon was first manufactured in 1961 by a German company by the name of Degussa – the very same company that also developed Zyklon B used in the gas chambers in the Nazi extermination camps. After being discovered to be highly addictive, Captagon was outlawed in most Western countries.

Since one of the properties of the drug is the suppression of fear, it had become a drug of interest for terrorist organizations across the Arab world. In the wake of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Lebanon became an empire of counterfeit medicines. Hezbollah, which was severely damaged after the war, was also at a point where funds were desperately needed. So, who stepped in to take advantage of the situation and “come to the aid” of the murderous organization? The same “patron” from Tehran which had been nurturing Hezbollah throughout the years as its favorite and closest proxy. The Iranians could not leave Hezbollah in a ruinous state and had to stabilize the organization after the war in order to continue furthering their regional interests. However, rather than supplying Hezbollah with a suitcase full of cash, Iran sent machines – machines to manufacture counterfeit Captagon as a means with which to generate the needed funds. As many businesses in postwar Lebanon delt in the trade of counterfeit materials and products, Hezbollah discovered that the machines it now had in its possession – are literally money-printing machines.

However, the issue of religion presented a problem. The trafficking and use of drugs are prohibited under Islamic law – the Sharia. But Hezbollah General Secretary Nasrallah and his organization were relentless and found a loophole of sorts in Sharia law that enabled them to legitimize the use of Captagon: they came up with a whitewash decision that since Captagon was not a genuine drug, but a counterfeit, its distribution therefore was permitted. In 2011, the Kuwaiti newspaper El-Siyasa reported that Tehran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had issued a secret fatwa at Nasrallah’s request that legitimized the counterfeit pharmaceutical industry in Lebanon. Since then, millions of dollars have been rolling off of Hezbollah’s Captagon machine. However, the fatwa was given on one opportune condition: that the Captagon would not be sold to Shiites such as the Hezbollah and Iran, but only to their Sunni rivals and other elements. From that point on, the ersatz drug was sold in commercial quantities in Muslim Sunni countries, such as Saudi Arabia, also reaching the hands of Hezbollah’s enemies – ISIS, the Salafist-Sunni organization. If you will, Captagon plays a central role in the Sunni-Shiite rift, and is deliberately distributed to Sunni elements in the region (including Hamas, a Sunni organization – a product of the distinctly Sunni Muslim Brotherhood movement).

It is worth mentioning that Captagon, as manufactured by Hezbollah, contains components that are much cheaper to produce than the original drug, which plays a central role in the Sunni-Sh’ite rift in the sense that Shi’ites manufacture cheap material that drugs Sunnis, making profit off of their suffering.

Captagon was smuggled in various forms, with routes used by many mixed nationality Arab smuggling groups including Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians and others. It was only a matter of time until terrorist organizations and extremist jihad groups got their hands on Captagon.

The Syrian civil war changed the rules of the game and ratcheted up the distribution of Captagon, creating distribution “on steroids” – thus it was not long before all sides of the Syrian civil war were on Captagon to enhance their performance in the battlefield.

The drug of war

Hezbollah, an organization with a well-developed sense of business, seized the opportunity and established the production of counterfeit Captagon in Syria. Soon, the drug began to permeate into all the elements involved in the fighting in Syria, including Jabhat al-Nusra, rebel militias, Assad’s army and ISIS – and even Hezbollah operatives, despite the Shiite religious prohibition.

Everyone recognized the potential of the drug and the fact that its cheap production and sale to countries in the region could finance the continuation of the fighting.

With Syria was on the brink of total disintegration, and the Assad family search for creative ways to maintain a steady cash flow –Hezbollah’s business model fit like a glove.

Welcome to ‘Narco-state’

Captagon laboratories in Syria began churning out the drug around the clock. According to assessments by foreign sources, Captagon laboratories in Syria are concentrated mainly in the cities of Homs and Daraa (right next to the Jordanian border), and in the rural areas of the port city Latakia (considered a stronghold of support for the Assad family) in the north of the country.

The labs mostly operate in abandoned factories or abandoned villas, with soldiers from the Syrian army’s Fourth Division positioned around the labs and with “closed military area” signs around the entire perimeter.

Captagon pills are sent out from these makeshift factories to packaging facilities, where they are packaged and hidden in various goods, and sent on to the port of Latakia or to the land borders under the guise of legal goods.

In addition, Syria sits at a strategic commercial crossroads that on the one hand allows access the Mediterranean Sea – and from there by sea to Europe – and on the other hand it shares very long land borders with Iraq and Jordan, making it easier to ship goods to rich Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

It is no mere coincidence that the main targets for Syrian Captagon shipments are Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. These countries have higher socioeconomic demographics as compared with other Arab countries. Another reason is the strict Sharia laws in these countries such that do not allow the sale of alcohol to locals, and they seek substitutes, and Captagon fills the bill.

Captagon’s shipments from Syria generate billions of dollars used for the purposes of terrorist organizations, and help the Assad regime keep its head above water, making Syria the main supplier of the “jihad drug” to the KSA.

Hezbollah also plays an important role in the Captagon industry (although the leading role in drug production has shifted to Syria): the Shiite organization controls the border crossings in the Beqaa Valley, and thus controls the supply of raw materials into these improvised factories in Syria and their distribution by Beirut’s sea and air ports.

It should be noted that drug smuggling from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia has led to a serious crisis in relations between the two countries. In April 2022, 5 million Captagon pills were found inside a shipment of grenades arriving to Saudi Arabia from Lebanon. The Saudis were furious and announced that they were forbidding the import of all goods from Lebanon, hinting at Hezbollah’s involvement in the smuggling.

In general, Saudi Arabia is considered the country most afflicted by the use of Captagon.

However, it is not only the wealthy Persian Gulf and Sunni Arab states which are in the crosshairs. Huge Captagon shipments were also seized in Italy, Greece and Malaysia, meaning that other Muslim countries, European countries and the rest of the Western world are also in the crosshairs of the “narco–jihad”.

In recent years, the drug has also become popular in the Gaza Strip with tens of thousands of addicts, especially among young people caught in the unemployment cycle.  The French newspaper Le Figaro revealed that the smuggling of Captagon drugs from Syria into the Gaza Strip has doubled through the border crossings, and the volume of sales of the drug has increased immeasurably compared to other drugs considered popular in the Gaza Strip, such as hashish and Tramadol.

Despite Israel’s boycotts as part of its counter-drug smuggling effort, smuggling operations are carried out unhindered at the Rafah Crossing, with trucks passing through it on a daily basis (including shortly before the war) with aid for Gaza residents.

The main supplier of the Captagon drug today is Bashar al-Assad and his malicious regime. Militias operating under Assad’s auspices deal in drug production and trafficking to supplement the country’s revenues in the wake of the war and to pay off large debts to Russia and Iran.  Assad’s relatives use the ports of Tartus and Latakia in Syria to ship and smuggle the drug by sea as well.

In conclusion, Captagon is found in Gaza, arriving there on a daily basis. Its low price, popularity in the population, and properties conducive for combat are qualities that appeal to terrorist organizations. With that said, it is important to realize that the cruelty and heartlessness of terrorist organizations such as Hamas cannot be solely attributed to Captagon alone, as these atrocities would not be possible without systemic, methodic and continuous brainwashing and radical incitement of these organizations.

Another thing about the bags of Captagon pills found on the Hamas and PIJ terrorists in the wake of the horrific massacre on October 7, is proof of the ongoing connection and the utilization of terrorist MOs and know-how provided by Hezbollah and Iran to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip – namely Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. This all is part of Iran’s guidance to realized its intentions, thus sharing methods and strengthening the capabilities of these proxy organizations and making them into proxies “on steroids”.

It can be assumed the IDF ground forces that go into Gaze will have to fight Hamas terrorists hyped up on Captagon.

הפוסט Jihad on Speed: Captagon at the Service of Terror Organizations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Hamas’ “Pyrrhic Victory”

In 280 BCE King Pyrrhus of Epirus led an Tarentine army against Rome. Legend says that Pyrrhus may have won the battle but he paid such a high price that he coined the saying “If we beat the Romans in one more battle, we’re lost”. This is the sort of achievement which the Hamas garnered on Saturday. They may have presented a picture of unprecedented victory in their own eyes, but the final outcome will be their utter decimation.

Did the Hamas not foresee the extensive public and political consensus for their annihilation? One could claim that this is in fact the situation. Firstly, it seems as though Hamas did not expect this level of success for their operations on Saturday. They expected to encounter a more significant military response at a much earlier stage of the operation, and never thought that they would succeed in reaching these numbers of people murdered and kidnapped. Secondly, it is very likely that the Hamas did not foresee the national resilience which Israeli society demonstrated over recent days. For months now, we’ve heard in both the Israeli and international press about the social cohesion which has been damaged, about the IDF’s capabilities which were questioned, about the lack of faith in the government about refusal to serve. These news stories were not ignored by Hamas, who tried to test the strength of these Israeli “spiders webs” and found that, in fact, they were made of steel.

However, this is not the entire story.

America vs. Iran – The Big Picture

As we recall, the second question which concerns both me and many other citizens in Israel is – why did Hezbollah not launch a coordinated attack? In order to explain this, it’s necessary to rise up a few thousand feet and have a look at the bigger picture.

Both Hezbollah and Hamas are mere pawns in Iran’s game. They are both funded by Iran and receive arms, equipment and orders from them, in order to harm Israel and through them, America. Iran has been painstakingly planning this war for a long time, but they are still unprepared. For this reason they need to hone their nuclear capabilities and other military abilities, and to carefully select the appropriate time to allow them to win a multi-front war. This is not the war which has broken out now. This is not the big war Iran is planning.

The attack by Hamas is not the comprehensive one. It is a planned, calculated sacrifice by Iran. Why did the Iranian octopus decide to launch and sacrifice Hamas? Because of the new threat which began to concern Iran recently; the strategic coalition of the US with Israel and the Sunni states. Normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia means normalizing relations as well with the entire Sunni world including Indonesia, Pakistan and Oman, which are very close to Iran. This cooperation endangers Iran and, among other things, will include placing American weapons in neighbouring territories, and highly advanced weaponry in Saudi Arabia.

It is crucial for the Iranians to prevent the advance of these peace agreements. In order to achieve this, they decided to sacrifice one of the arms they had wrapped around Israel; Hamas. Just as in a chess game it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice an important piece in order to advance on the board, Iran chose to activate Hamas, knowing that they were likely sacrificing them, in order to sabotage the peace accords between Israel and the Sunni states. They decided to keep Hezbollah, the queen on Iran’s chess board, for another occasion.

From past experience, the Iranians know that these rounds of fighting lead to problematic relations between Israel and the United States, and more importantly, between Israel and the Sunni states. Nonetheless, something in the Iranian plan went awry, and the United States are firmly and loudly remaining by our side, stronger than ever.

What is making them, our greatest allies, send us aircraft carriers and to threaten to join the battle, and can we ascribe this decision to Hamas’ barbarity which was exposed in the Gaza Envelope?

The Leader and the Nation

There is no doubt that America is Israel’s best friend, but there have been periods in which support from them was more hesitant. Up until a few weeks ago it seemed as though Israel-US relations were far from idea and some reports hinted that the American government were less than thrilled with the political situation in Israel. Notwithstanding, two individual and national elements have led to America’s current firm response.

Just as America is a true friend of Israel, Joe Biden himself is a lover of Israel, and a man with an understanding of the Shoah burned into his mind. As someone born during the Second World War, Biden is a man for whom the horrors of the Shoah are engraved upon his heart. The images of the atrocities which emerged on Saturday, and the scope of the disaster which became clearer in the days following, reminded Biden and the entire American nation of the decisive role they took upon themselves in the Second World War as leaders of the free world, as well as their responsibility to prevent a recurrence of similar atrocities.

However, in addition to America’s touching commitment to save Jews, there were decisive other interests at play here. Just as a Saudi-Israeli peace agreement would threaten Iran, it strengthens the US both economically and politically. This is at the top of America’s list of interests, and would be a very significant feather in his cap for President Biden, who is already considering a run for the presidency in another year. Iranian damage to this sort of national and personal interest would not go by without a response.

A Campaign in the North – It’s Just a Matter of Time

This is the reason that currently, the Iranians are choosing not to activate Hezbollah. Hezbollah entering the war would lead to a heavy price to pay, including the destruction of all of the organization’s infrastructures, which would strategically damage all of Iran’s plans. Furthermore, this sort of action would likely activate the Americans and possibly lead to an attack on Iranian soil. At the same time, it’s uncertain whether Iran would be prepared for the complete decimation of Hamas, and they may choose to throw Hezbollah into battle when the time comes.

Currently, Hezbollah are playing around on the border – in two ways. First, they aren’t launching a war. The anti-tank fire on the northern border comes nowhere the fire power that Hezbollah has squirrelled away, and they are taking care not to escalate matters to the critical stage. Nonetheless, they are not exactly leaving Hamas on their own, and are employing irritating force to keep the IDF busy up north. Only once the ground movement is initiated and American power in the area is put to the test will Iran decide how to proceed.

As far as Israel is concerned, Iran’s intentions are less important, given that the conclusions drawn from Saturday are forcing Israel to conclude the same about what’s happening in Lebanon. Just as in Gaza they have the Nuheba unit who attacked our communities in the Gaza Envelope, in Lebanon they have the Raduan Brigade who are trained to create a similar situation in the norther region, with larger, better trained forces. For Israel, the war in Lebanon is unavoidable. Sooner or later, the IDF will have to deal with the Raduan’s location along the border. The only question is when.

הפוסט What is the Aim of the Hamas and What’s Happening with Hezbollah? The Iranian Octopus Has Yet to Decide הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On April 30, 2020, Germany designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization and declared it illegal, thus prohibiting all activity on its behalf. Later, Horst Seehofer, the then Minister of the Interior, ordered arrests of Hezbollah operatives and suspects, and searches of their homes, mosques, and known gathering spots. But three years after the designation, it seems that Hezbollah continues to function, representing a significant security threat to Germany. Despite the nation’s efforts to reduce Hezbollah activity on its soil, its ranks have only swelled and the level of identification with the organization has only increased since then. Operations are in full swing mostly within Shiite Muslim associations linked in some way with Hezbollah through which the radical, Iran-inspired Shiite ideology is disseminated. A 2022 special report by the German intelligence services claims that Hezbollah “demands the application of the Shari’a, the Islamic legal system” and aims “its propaganda against Wester institutions” to further its agenda.

These Shiite associations are maintained by diverse Hezbollah supporters. Some are active association members and others are Lebanese Hezbollah supporters living in Germany. There are also Hezbollah operatives who come directly from Lebanon to Germany to participate in religious ceremonies, memorials, commemorations, and so on. All this allows the organization to preserve active, widespread connections with its operatives abroad, all under Iran’s watchful eye.

A case in point is the Islamische Zentrum Hamburg (IZH), an association infamous for its ties with Iran and Hezbollah, which has been monitored by the German authorities since 1993: in 2022, Seyed Soliman Mousavifar, a former IZH deputy director, was expelled from Germany and deported with his family to Iran for supporting radical Shiite organizations, including Hezbollah. Moreover, in 2021, Philipp Woldin, Hamburg managing editor of the daily Die Welt, wrote that “the IZH is Iran’s most important center of Iranian propaganda in Europe,” which sends busses full of pro-Iranian and pro-Hezbollah activists to Berlin to participate in the annual International Quds Day march and rally.

The IZH’s pro-Iranian work has cast a shadow on the association’s connections with Hamburg’s Shura Council, the umbrella organization of Muslim (Sunni and Shia) groups, which represents some 40 communities, mosques, and other Islamic institutions in the city. To dissociate itself from IZH activity and not risk tainting the entire Islamic population of Hamburg as subversives, the Shura Council removed the IZH from its board of directors in January 2022. It explained its decision as a response to the IZH’s support for the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Qassam Suleimani, its former commander, and to accusations that the center was “the long arm of Iranian terrorism in Europe,” after Germany’s intelligence agency confirmed ties to both Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei and Hezbollah.

Iran and Hezbollah use Shiite Islamic associations in Europe as a way to function via an elaborate continental network sustaining terrorist activity and promoting Iran’s ambitions while also undermining and harming the interests and institutions of its enemies (i.e., Jewish and Israeli targets abroad). Hezbollah itself earns millions of dollars flowing in from drug smuggling and distribution via its operatives throughout Europe in general and Germany in particular as the latter is a key crossroads for of terrorist organizations’ global trade in illegal drugs. In addition to drug smuggling, their activities also include money laundering and trading in stolen vehicles. Furthermore, Hezbollah uses Germany as a base for recruiting operatives and supporters, engaging in espionage, and acquiring weapons.

It would therefore seem that despite German declarations and its thwarting efforts, the Iranian-Hezbollah activity in Germany continues to thrive. he hardening of official policy towards them has not ended this subversive network; greater efforts are necessary. The German authorities must develop a better understanding of the personal and ideological connections between Shiite citizens of Germany (of both Iranian and Lebanese extraction) and Shiite organizations and groups (in the Middle East and throughout Europe) belonging to the axis directed by Tehran. Their religious zealotry for the fundamentals of the Shia supersedes their loyalty to the German republic.

In spite of surveillance of Shiite Islamic centers, the fact that various plots are constantly being uncovered is evidence of continuing subversive activity at those centers; thus, the network continues to be active and there are still key figures that must be arrested and placed behind bars. Only this May, two Hezbollah operatives, working to realize the organization’s goals via a local NGO called Al-Mustafa, were arrested. The two had organized appearances by preachers to increase ideological support and establish a youth group of the NGO. The two had been recruited by Hezbollah in Lebanon; one, Abd al-Latif was even a member of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite special ops unit. Since 2012, he’d served as the chairman of Al-Mustafa. Germany banned the NGO in 2022. The activity of these two is but a fraction of the operations of a large network of Lebanese-Germans, exploiting their double citizenship to promote the goals of Hezbollah and Iran.

The German authorities must therefore increase security at all of the nation’s ports, control and limit the entry of Iranian and Lebanese nationals, and track radical activity in the social media and among the contacts of those entities. Similarly, they must increase surveillance of local merchants who are members of Shiite communities all over Germany. It is necessary to investigate the connections among parties in the community and understand how propaganda materials, weapons, logistics, and intelligence from espionage, all under the guise of normal business, are disseminated.

Undercover operatives of the Quds Force have infiltrated Iranian and Shiite communities in Germany to spy on Iranian exiles opposed to the Ayatollahs’ regime, and on Jewish and Israeli targets in the country. Iran has never stopped spying and gathering intelligence on Jewish and Israeli parties around the world to carry out terrorist attacks even after local and foreign security services managed to eliminate agents acting on its behalf.

Iranian terrorist activity spans the entire globe and uses Shiite communities as its springboard. Hezbollah, the prime organizational protégé of the ayatollahs, is an effective and lethal tool in the Iranian arsenal, while Shiite communities are pawns in Iran’s game of chess against Germany and the West. Hezbollah may have been designated illegal in Germany, but religious and social activity continues to thrive in Shiite societies along with terrorist activity. German law is one thing; Shiite ideology is quite another.

הפוסט A Community in Camouflage: Hezbollah in Germany הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Background, and Nasrallah’s growing confidence

Hezbollah is increasingly daring, and the organization and Nasrallah are increasingly confident in themselves, to the point where it seems their arrogance may ignite a war even unintentionally. Why do they behave like that? And on what basis? First of all, the provocations didn’t start yesterday. Hezbollah has in fact been operating against Israel since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War, absorbing lessons and educating itself.

It has been steadily eroding Israel’s deterrence; we need mention no more than the antitank fire against an IDF ambulance next to the border community of Avivim (2019), which was a “response equation” result of the killing of Hezbollah operatives on Syrian territory; the challenge to Israel’s freedom of action in Lebanese airspace; and Hezbollah’s “achievements” regarding the “Karish” gas field. Its threats against “Karish” led to an agreement that gave away part of Israel’s territorial waters and enabled gas to be extracted for the future profit of Lebanon.

In the Megiddo incident of March 2023, a disaster was miraculously avoided. In July 2023, antitank fire was directed at the village of Ghajar. And of course, tents were set up in Israeli territory and posts were established neighboring and flanking the border fence area in violation of UN Resolution 1701. Residents of communities near Lebanon are harassed by noise, dazzling lasers, and more.

Why does Hezbollah behave like that? How is it in its interest?

Hezbollah has a number of considerations in mind. The first is the situation in Lebanon and the decline of Hezbollah’s standing there. Lebanon is a crumbling state, with no president, no central bank governor, no functioning institutions of government, and indeed no dependable electricity or running water. An ordinary person can’t withdraw money from a bank, and can’t even buy medicine because the shelves are empty. Ethnic tensions are growing between Shiites and Christians and between Muslims of various sects in the refugee camps. To spark a war, nothing is needed but one little provocation or one misstep by one of the parties.

The IDF can “return Lebanon to the Stone Age,” as Israel’s Defense Minister has said, but it doesn’t need to. Lebanon has nearly returned there by itself. Exceptions to the Lebanese plight are Hezbollah and its operatives. They enjoy regular payments at the end of each month, in cash dollars(!) from Iran. Many of Lebanon’s day-to-day difficulties resound in accusations and hatred against Hezbollah among the Lebanese public, because of Hezbollah’s responsibility for the lack of institutional functioning (through its insistent influence over the candidates that it fields). In addition, since Israel withdrew from Lebanon and certainly since the end of the Lebanon War, Hezbollah has lost its image as Lebanon’s protector and acquired the image of Lebanon’s destroyer (since the 2006 Lebanon War).

Justification for its existence under the banner of resistance, and the aim of deflecting accusations from itself to Israel, may be a motivation for Hezbollah’s provocations (portraying itself as a defender who is reconquering occupied lands). Moreover, Iran’s own considerations are there in the background and it may be that Nasrallah, who is a senior figure in the politics of Iran, of the region, and certainly of Lebanon, is “performing a part” under instructions from Iran within the campaign to wear Israel down and to distract Israel’s attention from Iran’s approach to the nuclear threshold and from its ongoing entrenchment in the area.

But that’s not all. Because of the combination of all those circumstances, plus the great internal crisis in Israeli society, the threats of refusal to report for duty, and the rift in the populace and the IDF, Hezbollah (wrongly) believes that it can challenge Israel and pay no price.

Hezbollah’s capabilities

Hezbollah is the world’s largest and most powerful terrorist organization. In fact, it is a terrorist organization with a state of its own and with capabilities that many states themselves don’t have. Hezbollah and Israel are conducting a campaign of mutual deterrence in consideration of the many capabilities that Hezbollah has accumulated and developed over the years. In that context, since the 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah has been active on three main tracks:

The Force Buildup Track – a large investment in swelling its arsenal, with an emphasis on missile and rocket capabilities and with the largest outlay being on precision missiles, UAVs, cruise missiles, shore-to-sea missiles, air defense development, and the crowning achievement – the Radwan Force, a unit composed of thousands of soldiers of relatively high military worth (still inferior to any IDF infantryman, and not to be overrated), trained and equipped primarily as an attack force to capture Israeli posts and communities particularly for use as strategic bargaining chips. Hezbollah smuggles its weaponry from Iran through Syria. Israel takes action, in what came to be known as the “war between the wars”, to reduce (with some success) such capabilities. However, Hezbollah is now also capable of independently manufacturing precision missiles inside Lebanon.

The Force Exertion Track – Hezbollah was involved in Syria’s civil war, where it assisted President Assad and gained valuable battle experience (at the cost of many casualties), including the management of relatively large deployments and the coordination of different troops (intelligence, reconnaissance, air power, and firepower).

The Warfare Concepts Track – In addition, Hezbollah is developing a more sophisticated operational concept. This entire track is directed at challenging the IDF, but here is not the place for specifics.

The regional and multi-front campaign – Hezbollah is advancing its cooperation and coordination with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas by preparing the option of an integrated war infrastructure involving both the Palestinians from Lebanon and the participation, by means of fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel, of Hamas and the PIJ. At the same time, Hezbollah is improving the operational capabilities of terrorist cells in the Judea and Samaria area and even among Israeli Arabs. The goal of the entire campaign is to establish a multi-front capability that Hezbollah believes will challenge Israel and harm its operational capability.

And what about Israel?

“Israel is not widowed” (Jeremiah 51:5). The IDF is not sitting back. It is building up its forces against the enemy’s challenges, training its troops as appropriate, and assembling concepts and plans for attacks, on Hezbollah and on additional fronts, of a kind that Hezbollah cannot imagine. Similarly, the IDF is strengthening its air defenses, including those against precision missile fire and against UAVs, although of course, no defense is airtight. There would be many casualties, damage to infrastructure, and other damage on the ground, but Israel’s national, military, and functional continuity would persist. In addition, the IDF possesses powers of maneuverability beyond any resemblance to the memory of 2006. As for its attack force – The IDF has significant strikes capability, and the remark that Lebanon could be returned to the Stone Age was no exaggeration.

It isn’t certain that on the day after the war, Nasrallah will be there to see the results, or that Hezbollah will be a functioning organization at all. However, Israel doesn’t want war. We would be paying a high price, and Israel’s supreme interest is in keeping war as distant a possibility as possible while pursuing the country’s security and prosperity, staying wary of provocations, operating wisely and thoughtfully, and – if force must be exerted – dealing a blow that is well-timed, clever, very forceful, and long to be remembered in the region.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט On the brink of war – Hezbollah’s challenge to Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Only a handful of people are familiar with the “hidden hand” of Iran that is behind this policy, and not only in Lebanon, but also in Syria, Gaza and Judea and Samaria, alongside Iraq, Yemen and other places. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevy and Chief of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva have also made unusual comments regarding these developments, in which they said “Nasrallah is close to making a mistake that will throw the entire area into a large-scale war”, and that the Hezbollah dares to “challenge us where it thinks no war can occur. This is an opportunity to manufacture some surprises if needed”.

Teheran is the hand that to a great extent mobilizes the elements which are part of the “Jerusalem Axis” – Iran’s effort to integrate all its proxies, or “fingers” into a single crushing “fist” against Israel, in a multi-arena campaign, in which the Hezbollah, the Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other entities act in a concerted effort against Israel is a challenging scenario for the IDF, which prefers focused fighting and defeating or deterring the enemy in a single theater. However, a multi-arena campaign is precisely the scenario Teheran is diligently working on.

The launching of the 34 rockets against Israel by south Lebanese Hamas squad in April 2023 during Easter and Ramadan can be viewed as the harbinger of the collaboration between Hamas and the Hezbollah. Any activity transpiring in south of Lebanon is undoubtedly done with the full knowledge and approval of Hezbollah and Nasrallah. What is left is to follow how this collaboration materializes. According to reports in the Wall Street Journal, a week prior to the shooting incident, the commander of the Iranian Qods Force Ismail Qa’ani, who was responsible for building Iran’s proxy cells in the region, met with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and head of Hamas’ political bureau ,Ismail Haniyeh, and his deputy Saleh Arouri at the Iranian embassy in Beirut. Qa’ani encouraged them to act against Israel by firing 34 rockets into Israeli territory – an unusual action by the Hamas in south Lebanon – as an act of retaliation for Israel’s air strike in Syria, which resulted in the death of two Iranian advisers, and for a series of steps Israel had taken to thwart Iran from gaining a foothold in Syria. The Lebanese media reports that it is unlikely that an attack on such a scale could be carried out without being brought to Qa’ani’s attention, only hours before the attack taking place while he was having the Iftar supper with senior members of the organizations. Iran, which usually refrains from pointing a finger at Israel, did so publicly after the strike, and during the two funerals that were attended by masses of people, even stated that it would take revenge against Israel.

A senior source in the IDF told us that “Ismail Qaani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Al-Quds Corps, who visited Lebanon in early April, ordered the opening of this center”, a center of operational coordination between Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in southern Lebanon, “a few hours before rockets were fired at Israel.” The source added that estimates in Israel are that the rocket launched into Israel in the wake of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021 was also carried out by Hamas operatives at the behest of Iran.

Nasrallah is aiming for and all-out war

A very senior official of Israel’s political security ranks told IDSF HaBithonistim: “The next move [by Nasrallah] will not be viewed on our part as a ‘Megiddo 2.0’ but as a ‘Third Lebanon War’”. In regard to General Haliva’s comments, the source said that “”The comments made by Head of Military Intelligence were intended for Nasrallah’s ears, who should know that the operation planned by him will inevitably drag the region into war, which the head of Military Intelligence described as a ‘large-scale war’.”

According to A. D. formerly a very senior official in Israel’s security and intelligence establishment “Nasrallah believes with all his heart that Israel is a ‘cobweb,’ as he said in 2006, and therefore he is betting on its weakness and the lack of an Israeli retaliation”. According to his estimates, Nasrallah believes that Israel will not act against Hezbollah solely for the provocative rocket fire by Hamas forces in southern Lebanon, reflecting his attempts to pass the buck for the Megiddo attack to other elements. “In the meantime, Nasrallah has an Israeli counterpart in this assessment”, he said, referring to statements by Israeli political sources that made this clear.

The “Jerusalem Axis” Exposed: The Iranian Names and Faces Behind the Formation of Iran’s’ Concerted Force in Lebanon

The radical “Jerusalem Axis” is the Iranian mechanism for “combining the arms”: a command center of concerted tools that integrates the military capabilities of Iranian proxy cells ahead of the “H-Hour”– Hezbollah, Hamas operatives in southern Lebanon, pro-Iranian organizations in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. The mechanism was established to counter balance the Abraham Accords and has been building its force since Operation Guardian of the Walls. It remains to be seen whether and how the operations in Gaza and Jenin will affect the internal relations among the Axis members.

Various reports indicate that Iran supplies advanced equipment to the member organizations of the Jerusalem Axis – such as radars, UAVs and electronic technology for the operation of its joint command center. Iran has also dispatched specialists to operate this equipment.

One of the most important links in the Jerusalem Axis is the Palestinian branch of the Al-Quds Corps of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which is charged with the development of the military capabilities of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Lebanon, part of which operates also in the Gaza and Judea and Samaria arenas. Saleh Arouri, a member of Hamas’ political bureau and the person in charge of Judea and Samaria in the organization, is a key player in the Axis and is the engine behind the force buildup and coordination with the Iranians.

We reveal here for the first time the senior Iranian commanders who lead the Palestinian branch of the Iranian Al-Quds Corps in southern Lebanon, and who also were responsible for the rocket launching against Israel during Passover 2023:

Sa’id Izadi: born 1964, head of the “Palestinian branch” of the Lebanese Corps of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and in charge of all coordination with Hamas and the PIJ, including in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and Jordan. Izadi is an Iranian who lives in Lebanon and is responsible for weapons smuggling into Lebanon and Syria, and is therefore under surveillance by Western intelligence organizations. He is responsible for the coordination between Hamas, the PIJ and even Hezbollah, and is considered the coordinating element of the cooperation of the Jerusalem Axis terrorist organizations. He is considered one of the most prominent representatives of Iran in Lebanon and has been engaged for years in advancing Iran’s overall mission against Israel, including terrorist attacks against it.

Izadi has reportedly visited the Gaza Strip at least twice in recent years, entering the Strip through the Egyptian side of the Rafah crossing, using a fake Palestinian passport. He has close relations with PIJ leaders, including Akram Ajouri – a senior PIJ official in Damascus, who was targeted by Israel for assassination, and often encourages the PIJ officials to act independently against Israel, even when Hamas opts for inaction. Izadi also pressured his commanders in Iran, including Qassem Soleimani, to grant preference to the “loyal and disciplined” PIJ operatives over Hamas, creating tension between himself and elements within the Hamas such as Haniyeh, Arouri and Sinwar.

In 2018, Israel published Izadi’s photo. His significant role in the powered buildup of terrorist organizations in Lebanon led the Trump administration to impose economic sanctions against him in 2019.

Ali Marshad Shirazi (“Abu Jawad” or “Haj Marshad”): born 1969, Izadi’s bureau chief, according to Arab and other sources. He is also an Iranian who lives in Lebanon. Shirazi heads the monitoring and control unit tasked with executing military plans. As a result, he is in charge of a broad sector that includes Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip.

Oftentimes, Shirazi requests the assistance of Unit 340 – the Al-Quds Corps’ technical unit that is in charge of the research and development of weapons and rockets – for his associates in the PIJ.

Izadi and Shirazi also operate the Cyber Unit, which provides special services to Hamas and the PIJ, headed by Abd Rahman al-May, an instructor in the field of cyber and information security, who was appointed to the position by Izadi and Shirazi. This unit is apparently also responsible for Hamas’ efforts to extract information from IDF soldiers’ cellular devices.

Majid Zira’i (“Abu Raqiya”): born 1977, operations officer of the Palestinian branch, which operates under the IRGC in Lebanon. His colleague Mustafa Khani (“Haj Majid”) heads the branch’s training and weapons division.

Dr. Majtaba Khodadi: a polygraph specialist and behavioral sciences expert, serves as an investigations and intelligence instructor for Hamas and PIJ terrorist operatives. Working alongside him is Hossein Roozave, a lecturer at Imam Hussein University, and an expert on international relations and head of the university’s Center for the Study of the Future, as an instructor in the field of international relations, where he trains researchers and analysts.

Conclusion: are Hezbollah and Hamas indeed seeking to form a concerted iron fist?

An integrated mechanism of all Iran-backed elements in south Lebanon would serve Iran’s designs against Israel well. An intended byproduct of such an alliance would be to dampen Israel’s “enthusiasm” to act against Iranian targets. Moreover, if Hezbollah can use Hamas in south Lebanon for operations, without sustaining Israeli retaliation against Hezbollah targets – it would afford Iran and the Hezbollah added value.

A former senior Intelligence officer told IDSF HaBithonistim: “There is no doubt that Iran wishes to see Israel drawn into routine security operations, and engage it with terrorist strongholds and border incidents, while Iran continues to build its force in the region”.

Yet sources within the security establishment claim that Hezbollah is not enthusiastic, to say the least, to form a mechanism that would operate on its home field in south Lebanon, and that there is internal pressure within the organization in Lebanon to avoid activities that would harm the already faltering country. The Shi’ites in southern Lebanon, who have not forgotten the horrors of the Second Lebanon War of 2006, are opposing such a strategy as well. Consequently, the relations between Hezbollah and the leaders of the Shi’ite community in southern Lebanon and the other political players in the country, place on the organization a host of constraints that demand a careful and balanced policy, albeit Nasrallah’s incessant boundary pushing recently.

In Hamas, the situation is far more complicated. Hamas had already signaled that it prefers to sit by the sidelines and bid its time, in the wake of the paralyzing blow it sustained in Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, as it had in two previous rounds Israel fought against PIJ in Gaza (Operation Breaking Dawn and Operation Shield and Arrow). An integrated mechanism of the various organization might render Hamas a mere Hezbollah “proxy” for all intents and purposes, which is why such an alliance is not supported by all of heads of Hamas’ political bureau, among them Yahya Sinwar, Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who is considered very close to Egypt and not necessarily to Iran, and Khaled Mashaal, head of the Qatari camp, who has also visited Lebanon last year, but was not granted audience with the Hezbollah leadership – a public humiliation. As oppose to them stands the “Iran camp” in Hamas, led by deputy commander of the organization, Saleh Aruri. In any event, Sinwar himself had said in a speech at the beginning of May 2023, that Hamas will successfully breech the naval blockade on Gaza with the help of the Jerusalem Axis.

Given that Hamas is a component of the Iran axis and enjoys significant funding and support by Iran, even though it has its own interests, the stronger the Jerusalem Axis – the notion of “pacification” in the Gaza strip grows distant. Iran has no problem with this, and even views positively the escalation of tensions in the Strip, supported also by the Qatar-based Hamas leadership. Despite opposition by various elements in the Hamas, the threats made by Arouri right before Ramadan this year, are an indicator to the direction that the organization has been taking – the joining of the Jerusalem Axis, under Iran’s leadership. However, it may be that for the foreseeable future the Hamas will focus on perpetrating terror attacks in the Judea and Samaria area, both to prevent Israel’s retaliation against its infrastructure in Gaza, as well as to challenge the Palestinian Authority there.

A multi-arena scenario that will prove problematic for Israel is one in which Iran will be able to forge its “fingers” into a crushing “fist”, uniting Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ and others against Israel. Hezbollah’s growing audacity in recent months is met by high vigilance on part of Israel, but might pose a threat of a new kind, such that will demand a comprehensive strategy against the Iran-led Jerusalem Axis along and within Israel’s borders.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Exclusive: The Iranian Commanders Behind the Effort to Integrate Hezbollah and Hamas into a Crushing Fist Against Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the IDF and security circles, one term often used is “the war between the wars.” It refers to a campaign waged by the State of Israel against the strengthening of the terrorist players that threaten the country, first and foremost Iran. According to foreign publications, the State of Israel is responsible for the disappearance of Iranian scientists, for explosions destroying vehicles on the roads of Tehran, for targeted killings from the air in Syria, and for strikes against weapons depots in Lebanon.

But while the media and the public are spotlighting those daring raids, it’s important to remember that Iran isn’t sitting idly either. Iran is busy all the time. Rocket fire, commandos on the borders, drones, and UAVs – ultimately, it’s all Iran.

While recent years may have accustomed us to short rounds of fighting in Gaza that are financed and directed by Iran, earlier this year we received proof, in Jenin, that Iran can also run terror cells in Judea and Samaria. And now, after years of relative quiet, more and more security incidents are occurring along the State of Israel’s northern border.

First Gaza, then Jenin, and now Lebanon

In order to understand why the northern front is heating up at this particular time, it’s necessary to examine the geopolitical environment of our region from a broad perspective. Initially, the Iranians focused their activity on the Gaza Strip, and from one round to the next, we did indeed see a measurable improvement in the rocket precision and military capabilities of Hamas. However, while the capabilities of Hamas were improving, the IDF was dealing severe blows, time after time, to Hamas and its operatives. Hamas’s heavy losses, together with the Gazan leadership’s investment of money in terrorism rather than in improving the population’s standard and quality of living, generated unrest among the Gazan civilians. Their lives were becoming unbearable.

The Iranians very quickly understood that in Gaza, the price they paid in civilian unrest outweighed the benefit from the Hamas regime they were controlling, and so they had to make changes. One such change is the relatively new focus on arming Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in northern Samaria. The Iranians began massive smuggling of money and weapons into Samaria through Jordan, while explicitly announcing their intention to turn northern Samaria into a second Gaza, and we saw the results during Operation “House and Garden” in Jenin.

However, in Jenin as in the Gaza Strip, the IDF bore down on the PIJ and critically damaged its military abilities. This time too, the Iranians understood that their current approach had exhausted itself.

At that stage, the Iranians decided to move the center of gravity for their activity to Israel’s northern front.

Hezbollah pushes the borderline

Considering recent events, such as the erection of Hezbollah tents in the Mount Dov area or the photo of IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi inspecting the vicinity of the border, it might be assumed that Iran – through Hezbollah – is looking for an excuse to start a war against Israel. But that assumption isn’t accurate. The Iranians don’t want to start a war. They have no interest in squandering Hezbollah on a localized war that would take a great, irreversible toll on Nasrallah’s troops. However, it certainly is a purpose and a desire of theirs to wear away at the IDF, to force a challenge on the State of Israel, and – while they’re at it – to try to humiliate Israel.

What we’re looking at on our northern border is a significant change in Israeli–Lebanese relations. For many years, the northern front was kept relatively quiet. The quiet was preserved until last year, when Hezbollah taunted Israel by sending three unmanned aircraft toward the “Karish” maritime gas field. That incident may have ended in an Israeli victory, since the IDF successfully intercepted the three aircraft, but the truly significant incident occurred immediately afterward: an explicit threat by Hezbollah to foil Israel’s quest for legal and international approval of the Israeli claim to the gas deposit.

In response to the threat, Israel – amazingly enough – fell in line. The area, which was under Israeli control and was intended to be divided more or less equally between Lebanon and Israel, was turned over wholly to Hezbollah by the Israeli government. In return for what? For nothing.

When Israel yielded de facto to the voicing of terrorist threats by Hezbollah, we – as a movement – understood that such surrender leads Hezbollah to believe that Israel fears to confront it. Leaders of the IDSF-Habithonistim movement warned last year of exactly that problem. In real-time, before the agreement was signed, we petitioned against it. We assembled thousands of signatures, we researched the subject and then we showed our findings to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

But the signing took place. And in fact, when Hezbollah understood that it had defeated Israel in the maritime conflict – it moved on to the land-based conflict. This is exactly what we’re observing now: observation posts being constructed, soldiers patrolling along the border, security cameras being stolen, tents being set up on our territory, and provocations and disturbances at the village of Ghajar.

We mustn’t be a spider web

After Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Nasrallah addressed the Arab world in his famous Spider Web Speech. In that speech, Nasrallah compared the robustness of Israeli society to that of a spider web, saying Israeli society is contentious and fragmented to the point where its social robustness is as meager as a spider web’s.

Over 20 years, Israeli society has shown time and again that while the public does disagree and argue, the IDF – with its solidarity and robustness – would always stay out of those arguments. But recently we’ve seen the utmost irresponsibility displayed by retired senior officers and by current volunteers who refuse, for various political reasons, to report for the righteous mission of defending Israel’s security. By their refusal, those irresponsible people are materially endangering their own children’s lives.

They are grossly violating the spirit of comradeship, which is one of the IDF’s fundamental values. As you charge forward toward the enemy, at the risk of your life, you can do so because you trust your fellow soldier to charge forward along with you. But if your fellow soldier suddenly announces that for him, charging is conditional on all kinds of political considerations, then he sets off a chain reaction destabilizing the entire foundation that the IDF is built on. Refusing to report for duty, or no longer volunteering – call it what you like – must be condemned.

The IDSF-Habithonistim movement is uncompromisingly battling the phenomenon of refusal to report. It is an unworthy, unprincipled, un-Zionist phenomenon and it harms Israel’s security. Granted, it includes senior figures who have done service and bodily protected the State of Israel, and respect for their contribution is undimmed. But at the same time, it must be said explicitly: Whoever refuses is no tragic hero but rather someone behaving unacceptably toward the society and the State, and playing into the hands of our enemies. Not coincidentally, the same person who compared Israeli society to a spider web is examining how far he can push the borderline, figuratively and literally.

While we flourish, they wither

Our responsibility, as former senior officers in the security establishment and its various branches, is to present an accurate picture, not one that derives from propaganda or from ulterior motives. In this connection, it should be emphasized that concerning refusals to report, the figures presented in the media are inflated and exaggerated. As the Minister of Defense and the IDF Chief of Staff said only recently – the army is at full readiness.

Moreover, the enemy facing us must be viewed in its true proportions: It amounts to some thousands of Hezbollah troops. We are not confronting regular brigades and divisions, with tanks, attack helicopters, warships, or submarines. And the societal condition of the enemy must also be taken into account: Thousands of people have been killed and wounded in Lebanon’s civil strife, its economy is collapsing, morale in its domestic battles is low, and in actuality, the State of Lebanon is falling apart. To put it simply:  While we’re flourishing, they’re withering.

This week I participated in a news panel on one of the media channels. When the program’s moderator asked the interviewee next to me, a major general in the reserves, if we could be defeated in the north, that man’s answer was yes – we could lose. I was floored. I say clearly, unambiguously, unmistakably that in the next campaign we will not be defeated. In the next campaign, we will win. Yes, it will be hard. Yes, there will be challenges. Yes, there may be fatalities and injuries – but the next time the IDF leaves Lebanon, it will leave behind no functioning, battleworthy Hezbollah forces. Nothing will stop us. However, as a society, we must pull ourselves together and take a clear stand against refusal to report for duty.

הפוסט Pushing the borderline: Hezbollah is heating the front up. Why specifically now? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.