The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s mission is to engage in a comprehensive effort on numerous levels aiming to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations to come. This goal is governed by two guiding principles: first is the acknowledgement of the unique diplomatic, economic and social environments in which Israel exists.  The second is the understanding that informed decisions must lean on a broad strategy that draws it insights from lessons of the past and aims its decisions to the very long term.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. The present installment of the Ideally series, IDSF HaBithonistim member, orientalist and expert on cyber terror Assaf Yishai explores Israel-Jordan relations and the ?? between their outward appearance and their true nature.

Disputes and interests: background of Israel-Jordan relations

To truly understand the relations between Israeli and Jordan, one must go back to 1921 – the year of the inception of the Kingdom of Jordan. The foundation of the Kingdon was put down already in 1916 when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the head of the royal Hashemite dynasty of Hejaz, led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This revolt was one of the catalysts of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the Middel East and the rise of the British occupation of the area, and the British promised to reward the Hashemite family for its part.

And reward the British did. Hussein’s sons were crowned over two new ??? entities created artificially by the British:  The Transjordan area was given to Abdullah bin Hussein while his brother Faisal received control of Iraq. This arrangement, dubbed “The Hashemite Arrangement”, served Britain well since it allowed it to control its territories through its Arab allies. However, the populations of those areas were loath to accept the ?? of rulers that were not kith and kin.

The Hashemite rule of Iraq was short-lived and ended within 36 years with a revolt and the assassination of the king. Many expected the fate of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan to be more of the same, and even then, Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion said in 1956 “Jordan is an artificial state with no future”.

But despite the somber forecasts, the Hashemite family was able to keep its place on the Jordanian throne for over 100 years now. Protecting the throne is paramount for the Hashemite royal family not only in terms of its own survival but also to ensure the longevity of the entire dynasty. Once the king falls in Jordan – it will spell the end of the Hashemite dynasty.

Milestones in Israel-Jordan relations

Some years after the foundation of the Kingdom of Jordan, the government began establishing relations with the Zionist leaders that were active in pre-state Israel.  After the establishment of the State of Israel, its leadership conveyed to King Abdullah not to wage war against the new state, however, he did not heed their warning and Jordan joined the coalition of Arab states that ganged up on Israel in the War of Independence.

In 1952, grandson of King Abdulla, Hussein, ascended the throne from which he ruled the Hashemite Kingdon for 46 years. During his reign, Hussien was able to maintain stability and prevent the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), which was ousted from Israel, to gain a stronghold in Jordan. Hussein cultivated relations with the US and the West and even had secret relations with the State of Israel. Ben Gurion, despite having doubts about the longevity of the Jordanian entity, thought the Hashemite Kingdom could be a strategic asset to Israel and had no problem openly saying so. Other Israeli leaders as well, such as Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, understood the importance of maintaining warm relations with the Jordanian administration, and diplomatic and security sources in Israel proposed viewing Jordan as Israel’s “little sister”.

However, despite the covert relations between Hussien and Israeli administrations, formally the two countries remained enemies and even fought each other in the Six Day War, in which Israel defeated the Jordanian military, and took the Temple Mount from Jordan. This cost the Hashemite family the last holy Muslim asset under its control.

It was only in 1994 that an official peace accord was signed between the two neighbors. As part of the agreement, the relations and the borders between the two were established, and Israel committed to supply Jordan with 50 million metric cubes of water annually. Over the years, Israel has doubled that quantity and to date it still provides 100 metric cubes of water a year to Jordan. Furthermore, both countries have various military and intelligence collaborations, most of which have been secretly established.

Since 1995, Jordan has been ruled by Hussien’s son, King Abdullah the Second. King Abdullah, like his father, maintained good relations with the US, the West and Israel. However, he cannot seem to gain the popularity and legitimacy in the same manner that his father had. He is perceived as disconnected from the people, and someone who lacks the historical roots to the land, being the son of a British mother, and educated in Britain with Western values. He commands the English language better than Arabic – not to mention the local Jordanian dialect, and the Jordanian public frown upon this. Abdullah’s rule once again raised doubts regarding the ability of the Hashemite dynasty to persevere.

Relations with Jordan since the outbreak of the Gaza War

The relations between Israel and Jordan have always been complicated, and the Jordanian public has always been hostile to Israel. After the October 7 attack and massacre, the already volatile relations have further deteriorated. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, there have been ongoing riots on the streets of Amman, and the Jordanian administration is overtly hostile towards Israel. Already in November 23 Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel – a move that was aimed – according to Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi “to emphasize Jordan’s opposition and condemnation of Israel’s war against Gaza, and the killing of innocents and the creation of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that could lead to a regional conflict”.

In Israel there was an expectation for Jordan to publicly condemn the massacre of October 7, but to no avail. Moreover, King Abdullah’s wife, Rania, had publicly attacked Israel on numerous occasions. The Jordanian administration also condemned Israel’s attack in Iran and said that it was “a violation of international law, an attack on Iran’s sovereignty and a dangerous escalation that further intensifies tensions in the region”. Jordan even called on the international community to take responsibility and take measures against Israel that “end Israel’s attacks against Gaza, the [West] Bank and Lebanon, as a first step to dial back the escalation”.

September 2024 saw further escalation in the relations of the two countries, when a Jordanian truck driver crossed the border illegally and murdered three Israelis working in the Alenbi border checkpoint. The Jordanian government appointed an inquiry committee to investigate the affair but the public – including members of parliament – celebrated the attack on the streets of Amman.

Despite the open hostility and condemnations, many claim that the situation behind the scenes is quite different. Various sources report that Jordan actually helped Israel intercept both Iranian missile attacks in April and October 2024. Some sources close to the matter claim that King Abdullah’s remarks in public are in stark contrast to what he says behind closed doors.

This discrepancy reflects the complex relations Israel has had with Jordan from the onset. On the one hand, the two countries have deep ideological disputes and clashes. On the other hand, both share common interests. When viewing the relations between both countries over the past decades and its frequent changes, it would appear that this duality is the only constant in these relations.

Assaf Yishai: A Vision for Israeli-Jordanian Relations

Aid in maintaining the stability of the Jordanian government

Current situation:

Since its inception, the Jordanian administration has been plagued by instability stemming, among others, from the varied demographic composition of the Jordanian people. Only a minority of these are loyal to King Abdullah II, while the majority perceives the king as a foreign element who does not belong in Jordan in the first place.

Furthermore, Jordan is plagued by a slew of internal problems – predominantly a serious water shortage – that threaten its internal stability. If that were not enough, the king has recently reformed the method of elections aiming to benefit his own interests but in reality, this played out against him. The reform, the purpose of which was to block the election of local leaders that serve only the interests of their clans, had resulted in a rise in the power of the Muslim Brotherhood movement which poses a major threat to the Hashemite rule.

The recent regional changes have also influenced Jordan’s internal stability. The Gaza War, which ostensibly has no relation to Jordan, caused a 40% decline in tourism to the Kingdom – a main engine of the country’s economy. The revolt in Syria, which toppled the Assad regime, is a Damocles sword hanging over the head of King Abdullah, who fears a similar outcome for his own country.

In light of the above mentioned, the main interest of the King is to ensure that he and the entire Hashemite dynasty survive. A king in a survival state of mind is willing to take irrational measures, like a drowning person grasping at straws. For Israel, this makes him an unpredictable leader and places a question mark on any possibility of stability of the Jordanian government.

Ideal situation:

• Placing more focus on Jordan: Israel must not become complacent and think that simply because it has a peace agreement with Jordan, it can enjoy quiet and stability on its eastern border. Already in the immediate term, Israel must allocate intelligence resources toward the Jordanian issue and keep its finger on the pulse to identify any change that could threaten Israel’s interests in the area.

• Continued support of King Abdullah – to a point: Israel should continue aiding the King, as it has always done, out of the understanding that any alternative regime would be far worse for Israel. At the same time, Israel should be clear about what it is willing to accept and what it is not. It cannot continue protecting the King at any cost, even if his regime no longer serves Israel’s interests.

• Prepare for the fall of the Jordanian regime: the State of Israel must prepare a contingency plan and formulate long-term strategies for the day after the fall of the Hashemite dynasty. These plans must be far-reaching, such as the seizure of the eastern face of the hills of Samaria bordering with Jordan, to prevent the capture by hostile Iranian and ISIS forces of this important strategic asset.

Securing the border with Jordan

Current situation:

The border with Jordan is Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country, stretching over 309 kilometers (192 miles). Due to the peace accord between the two countries and the relative quiet between them, the border is ostensibly calm – but in reality, it is far from it. The border with Jordan had always been troublesome, among others due to the lack of a regular security force. Throughout the years, this border has become a hotbed of drug and weapon-smuggling as well as infiltration of terrorist into the territory of Israel – much of this under the auspices of Iran, and ever since the smuggling routes through Syria were closed in the wake of the revolt, the incidents on the Jordanian border are increasing. Furthermore, the closing of the border with Egypt due to the Gaza War, places more criminal and terror demand on the Jordanian border, which remains one of Israel’s last unsecured borders.

Over the past years dozens of arms-smuggling attempts into Israel have been made on this border. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 2023, when a Jordanian MK attempted to smuggle 200 guns into Israel. Aside from the rife smuggling activity, the terror incidents are on the rise as well – the Jordanian truck driver, who crossed the border and murdered three Israelis and a month later – two other terrorists crossed the border illegally in the Dead Sea area and shot and wounded two Israeli soldiers.

To date, Israel’s border with Jordan is full of breaches and not sufficiently secured. Part of the border is fenced but other areas, such as the Negev Desert valley – have no physical barrier. Furthermore, Israel does not allocate sufficient forces to secure the border. It is possible that this laxity stems from complacency and a false trust of the Jordanian peacekeeping abilities and willingness, or it may be pure negligence. Whatever the reason, the current strategy represents a real strategic threat to Israel. Even if most of the illegal activity across the border is criminal, it is important to remember that terror characteristically rides on criminal activity to achieve its ends.

Ideal situation:

• Hermetically sealing the border: The Israel-Jordan border must be hermetically sealed for its entire length to ensure zero breaches. Furthermore, electronic surveillance should not be seen as the only security solution, rather the border must have a physical barrier such as a fence or a wall.

• Reinforcement of the border forces: the IDF should deploy a division to act as a security force on the Jordanian border, creating large-scale surveillance and establishing quick response capabilities.  Naturally, the IDF will have to considerably boost its ranks in order to have the manpower for said division.

Keeping Iran out of Jordan

Current situation:

One of Iran’s common stratagems in the Middle East in service of its global-Islamic vision, is to meddle in the affairs of other countries – especially the unstable among them – and identify the cracks through which it can cause chaos and wield its influence. This is what it had done until recently in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. This is what it had done in the Gaza Strip. Now, having lost most of its hold in the area, it may very well try to reclaim it by taking over Jordan.

Iran may do so with force, for example with pro-Iranian militias operating in neighboring Iraq. However, the King himself might opt to cooperate with Iran, if he believes that Iran would be more conducive to the survival of his reign more than Israel. The connection between Jordan and Iran is not self-evident to say the least, but even Saudia Arabia, Iran’s bitter enemy, chose to sign in March 2023 an agreement for the renewal of diplomatic relations, once it realized that the western axis is growing weak.

Ideal situation:

• Display of power and military prowess: The Middle East is a place that sets great store by strength; hence it behooves the State of Israel to demonstrate its military prowess and impress upon the King of Jordan that he can lean on Israel. If the King feels that Israel cannot guarantee his safety, he might seek another ally to do so, which most likely would be Iran.

• Preparation for an Iranian takeover of Jordan: Israel must prepare for any scenario wherein Iran will try to install its control in Jordan and summarily and decisively thwart any threat on part of pro-Iranian elements in Jordan.

Settlement of the Jordan Valley

Current situation:

The Jordan Valley is a territory under dispute in terms of international law. Many in Israel and the world see the area as an integral part of Israel while others claim it to be an occupied territory that is not part of Israel’s sovereign state.

The Jordan Valley has great security and strategic importance as it is the only stretch of land that protects Israel’s eastern border. Since the establishment of the State, most of Israel’s leadership acknowledged its significance, and even late PM Yitzhak Rabin in his last speech before the Knesset declared that the security protective border of Israel will be charted in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of the term.

Beyond its significance to Israel’s security, the Valley also has a geographic and economic importance, as it is a large swath of land that can be populated and developed. Furthermore, it carries great historic and cultural significance as it is home to numerous Jewish heritage sites.

Currently, the Jordan Valley is not included in Israel sovereign territory, thus Israeli law does not apply in the area as it does in the rest of the country. This sets an obstacle to the settlement and development of the Valley area, and ties Israel’s hands in dealing with violations in the area such as illegal Palestinian construction.

Ideal situation:

• Encouragement of Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley: Over the years Israel has proven that anywhere it creates Jewish settlements – security is higher, whereas areas with no or sparse Jewish population terror hotbeds germinate. Hence, the Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley is a sine qua none for ensuring the security in that area. Beyond that, the development of the Valley could serve as a response to high housing demands that many families in Israel are contending with, and can deepen the connection of Israelis to some of the most important Jewish heritage sites that are in that locale. For this end, Israel must encourage young people and new immigrants to make their homes in the Jordan Valley, among others by way of favorable terms for land acquisition and housing, and the development of local communities.

• Action towards securing Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley: For years there have been many attempts by Israel to gain sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, similarly to what it had achieved in the Golan Hights. This move first and foremost sends out a clear message that Israel is here to stay. Furthermore, once Israel gains sovereignty over the area it will be able to develop it as it sees fit, and establish institutes and infrastructures. Gaining sovereignty may pose a diplomatic issue for Israel, mainly vis a vis Europe, however as it has been proven time and time again – when Israel presents a united and unyielding front, the world remains silent. If Israel can gain consensus in Israeli society for such a move, making it clear that this is a security imperative and not occupation for the sake of occupation, it is highly likely that the international community will fall into line as well.

Condemnation of the Condemnations

Current situation:

Despite the Israel-Jordan peace accord, many people in Jordan openly condemn Israel. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, this state of affairs has only grown worse, until now, there are many anti-Israel protests throughout Jordan.

Even the Jordanian administration, despite its cooperation with Israel and its dependance on its neighbor to the west, exhibits an anti-Israeli front. The King failed to condemn the October 7 massacre, and his wife Rania even disputed it had even truly happened and attacked Israel from every global platform. In an interview to CNN, she spoke of the pain of the babies and children of Gaza, not once mentioning the dozens of innocent Jewish children Hamas heinously butchered. In another interview to CNN she insinuated that the massacre was not on the scale Israel and the US claim, saying that “President Biden did not witness with his own eyes the harsh things that had occurred in Israel, as he himself said”.

A short while after the Gaza War broke out, King Abdullah II sent two air shipments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. He also sent a third plane, whose cargo was deployed by his daughter, Princess Salma of Jordan, as a symbolic gesture to the children of Gaza.

Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, a close associate of the King, has also attacked Israel more than once since the outbreak of the war. Safadi also tried to promote anti-Israel measures at the United Nations, and recommended that Jordan join in the prosecution of Israel at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Even though the Jordanian King’s statements are merely lip service, as apparently, he sings a completely different tune behind closed doors –nevertheless, his statements and those of his family influence the mood on the streets of Jordan as well as the relations between the two countries.

Ideal situation:

• Demand the King moderate his rhetoric: although it is understandable to an extent that the ruler of an Arab state would have to display animosity toward Israel, his current condemnations are beyond the pale. The State of Israel must use the leverages it has on the King and the Jordanian administration – e.g. water supply and military aid – and demand he moderate his and his family’s statements, and halt the anti-Israel measure undertaken and the UN.

There is a lot more than meets the eye: conclusions

The relations between Israel and Jordan can be sketched with a single word: contrast. Contrast between the attitude of the Jordanian administration and the public; contrast between its public statements and what it says behind closed doors; and most importantly – contrast between the quiet on the surface and the threats brewing underneath. Israel must understand that its border with Jordan is not secure and the stability of the government there is not ensured. In the immediate-term, Israel must employ whatever leverages it has on the Jordanian administration – namely the water supply and military aid – to solidify its relations with the Kingdom. In the long term, Israel must create a contingency plan that charts courses of action for possible scenarios such as the ousting of the ruling Hashemite family and a takeover of Jordan by radical elements such as extremist Sunni militias or pro-Iranian forces.

Above all – Israel must populate the Jordan Valley and place it on par with the rest of its geographic strategic assets, both in terms of national security and development.

The state of affairs between Israel and Jordan, wherein the two are at loggerheads on the one hand, but cooperate on the other, can hold only to a certain point. What with the recent changes washing over the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder whether this point has now been reached, and if so – what is in store from now on.

הפוסט Ideally – Vision of the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The End of the Sherman: Do It Yourself

The Armored Corps is currently considered one of the main and most important forces in the IDF, but this was not always the case. During the War of Independence, the State of Israel relied mainly on infantry forces and possessed only 15 tanks. Over the years, the number of tanks gradually increased, and with it the scope of involvement of the armored forces in the IDF’s operational activities. In Operation Kadesh (the 1956 Sinai War), Israel already operated 200 tanks, in the Six Day War (1967) it operated about 1,000 tanks, and in the Yom Kippur War (1973) the number of tanks in use had already risen to 2,000.

Despite the quantitative increase, the quality of the tanks at Israel’s disposal barely improved. Due to various diplomatic motives, countries around the world refused to sell Israel new tanks, and the fledgling country was forced to rely on old and incompetent tanks such as the Shermans from World War II and the British Centurions that had become obsolete. The IDF and the Israeli defense industry made great efforts to rehabilitate and improve those old tanks, but it was clearly impossible to rely on such improvisations in the long run.

During the 1960s, two turning point events occurred that pushed the State of Israel to find a solution to the tank crisis. The first event was the news that Arab countries were expected to receive T-62 tanks from the Soviet Union, which were considered the most advanced tanks in the world at the time. The second event was the Chieftain tank affair, when England withdrew at the last minute from its commitment to sell advanced tanks to Israel. These two events made Israel realize that it had to catch up in the armor race vis-a-vis enemy countries, and that it had no choice but to do this on its own.

Getting the caterpillars moving: The development process begins

In 1969, subsequent to the collapse of the deal to purchase tanks from England, the possibility of Israel producing tanks itself was first considered. To examine the feasibility of this, a committee was formed, comprised of professionals and security experts, headed by Major General Israel Tal, later nicknamed the “Father of the Merkava.” The committee was required to examine both the State of Israel’s technological and infrastructural capabilities, as well as the economic viability of the move. The committee’s conclusions were that the State of Israel is capable of establishing a tank industry and that such an industry would provide a solution to its military needs, reduce dependence on other countries, and even benefit the country economically. A few months later, in August 1970, the official decision was made, and the State of Israel embarked on this ambitious project.

In order to promote the project, the Merkava Tank Planning Directorate was established, which bore overall responsibility for development, and the Tank Development Authority (TDA), which dealt with engineering planning. To save time and costs, it was decided to rely as much as possible on infrastructure that already existed in the IDF and the defense establishment. This is how the IDF Tank Rehabilitation and Maintenance Center (RMC), which until then had been used to improve tanks, became the assembly plant for the new tank. Similarly, the IDF’s Equipment and Spare Parts Center and the Procurement and Production Directorate were modified in order to meet the needs of the project. Another decision made was to make tank production a nationwide project, and for this purpose about 200 factories in the defense and civilian industries were converted into factories to manufacture tank parts. The Ardan foundry, for example, began producing heavy armor castings that were used for the turret and the chassis (the bottom portion of the tank), and the IMI factories began producing tank cannons.

The Israeli tank production process lasted a total of about nine years, and on February 20, 1979, the long-awaited moment arrived and the first Merkava tank entered operational use in the 7th Armored Corps Brigade.

Improving and perfecting the Merkava

The first Merkava tank, known as the Merkava Mark 1, was considered a modern and advanced tank at the time. It boasted unprecedented defense capabilities and high survivability, made possible in part by the revolutionary decision to move the engine to the front of the tank.

Since then, the Merkava tank has undergone a series of modifications, which improved both its defense and performance on the battlefield. The Merkava tanks were equipped with fire control systems, night vision devices, and improved firepower systems. Over the years, more advanced models were also developed, and the most advanced – the Merkava Mark 4 – entered IDF service in 2003. Today, the improved models of the Merkava Mark 4 tank benefit from advanced command and control systems, and are equipped with the Wind Jacket active defense system that facilitates maximum protection for the soldiers inside the tank.

Over the years, the State of Israel has produced thousands of Merkava tanks, and these have been used in all the campaigns and wars that have erupted since: In the First Lebanon War, the Merkava Mark 1 tank was used against Syrian armored forces; during the Second Intifada, the Merkava Mark 2 and 3 tanks were used for patrols in dangerous areas and to support infantry forces; during the Second Lebanon War, three armored divisions entered Lebanese territory; and during the Sword of Iron War, the tanks – mainly the Merkava Mark 3 and Mark 4 models – played a central combat role and greatly assisted in ground operations in Gaza and Lebanon.

Only in Israel: Sales prohibited to foreign countries

The Israeli Merkava tank is currently considered the most advanced tank in the world, and few tanks manage to come close to its capabilities. One might expect that the State of Israel would want to exploit the inherent economic advantage of this and export the tank to other countries, but from the very beginning of Merkava tank production, its sale to foreign countries was prohibited in order to maintain the Israeli Armored Corps’ unique advantage.

It was only in 2010 that the Ministry of Defense decided to permit, in principle, the sale of the Merkava Mark 4 tank to “select customers”. In 2014, the Ministry of Defense signed the first Merkava export deal with a foreign country, whose name is prohibited from publication. In 2023, negotiations were held to sell Merkava Mark 2 and Merkava Mark 3 tanks, which are retired from IDF service, to a European country and a South American country whose names were also not disclosed, but these plans were halted due to the Swords of Iron War. So, to date, the State of Israel is probably the only country in the world, or one of the few, in possession of the Merkava tank.

Besides its uniqueness, another source of pride lies in the fact that approximately 80% of the tank’s components are manufactured in Israel, so the project provides a source of livelihood for tens of thousands of Israelis in more than 200 factories nationwide. Nowadays, when there is much talk about the importance of self-development of weapons and combat equipment, it is good to remember the strength of the Israeli defense industry and the immense potential of domestic production.

הפוסט 46 years ago today: The Merkava tank entered operational use in the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The narrative that the root cause of the Middle East’s wars is Israel’s lack of acceptance of Palestinian freedom is a misconception. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict garners significant attention, an objective analysis of the region’s history over the past century reveals that most wars in the Middle East are unrelated to the Palestinian issue. The data unequivocally shows that over 98% of war-related deaths in the region stem from conflicts that have nothing to do with neither Israel or the Palestinians.

Over the last 100 years, the Middle East has been plagued by numerous conflicts, yet only 5 of the 20 most significant wars in the region had any direct connection to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These five wars, which include the Arab-Israeli wars and the Intifadas, resulted in approximately 156,000 deaths—a tragic number, but a small fraction compared to the approximately 5.7 million deaths from wars in the region overall.

The remaining conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Syrian Civil War, and the Yemen Civil War, were driven by power struggles, sectarian divisions, and geopolitical rivalries, not the Palestinian cause. For example:

• Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988): This devastating war resulted in up to 1,000,000 deaths and was rooted in territorial disputes and ideological differences between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Iranian government.

• Syrian Civil War (2011–present): With an estimated death toll of 500,000, this ongoing conflict involves a complex web of factions, including ISIS, Kurdish forces, and international powers like Russia and the U.S.

• Yemen Civil War (2015–present): Over 377,000 deaths have been attributed to this proxy war between Iran-backed Houthi rebels and a Saudi-led coalition.

These conflicts, among others, highlight the multifaceted nature of Middle Eastern wars, which are often fueled by internal divisions, external interventions, and competing ideologies rather than the Palestinian question.

Even within the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, the death tolls are overshadowed by the scale of other wars in the region.

A Fixation on the Palestinian Cause

Despite its relatively small human cost in the context of the region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receives disproportionate attention. This focus stems from several factors:

1. Media Coverage: The conflict often involves Western powers, which amplifies its visibility in global media disproportionately to the ears actual size and importance.
2. Geopolitical Interests: The involvement of influential countries like the U.S. and EU creates a narrative of global importance.
3. Symbolism: For many in the Arab and Muslim worlds, the Palestinian cause symbolizes resistance to Western influence, even as internal divisions persist. For them, Israel remains a foreign bastion representing Western interests over a once-Muslim occupied land, rather than the homeland of the Jewish people. Therefore fixation on the Palestinians issue draws attention away from crimes that are committed inside the Arab world and unites Muslim populations around their authoritarian leader. The Palestinian narrative has therefore become a cudgle to use against Israel rather than a real pressing issue.

Would a Palestinian State End Middle Eastern Wars?

The evidence suggests otherwise. Even if a new Palestinian state were established, the underlying causes of regional conflicts—such as sectarian divides, power struggles, and external meddling—would remain. The wars in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and beyond would likely continue unabated, as they are rooted in issues far removed from the Palestinian question.

The myth that Israel’s actions regarding Palestinian freedom are the linchpin for peace in the Middle East ignores the facts. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is impactful in geopolitical terms, it is neither the sole nor the primary driver of Middle Eastern instability, death, poverty and destruction. The broader challenges of governance, sectarianism, authoritarianism, radical Islamist ideologies and external interference are the main reasons that there is no “peace” in the Middle East.

Full Data

Syrian Civil War (2011–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 400,000 to 500,000

• Sides: Syrian government (Assad regime) vs. Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups, with involvement from ISIS, Kurdish forces, and foreign powers like Russia and the U.S

• Data: SOHR, UN Human Rights Office.

Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000

• Sides: Iran vs. Iraq

• Data: The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications” by Efraim Karsh, Britannica

Yemen Civil War (2015–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Over 377,000 (including direct and indirect causes)

• Sides: Houthi rebels vs. Yemeni government, with involvement from Saudi-led coalition and Iran

• Data: UN Reports on Yemen Civil War Casualties​

Iraq War (2003–2011)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 151,000 to 600,000

• Sides: United States-led coalition vs. Iraq (Saddam Hussein’s regime)

Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 120,000

• Sides: Various factions, including Christian militias, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and Muslim militias, with involvement from Syria and Israel

• Data: NY Times Report, AGBU Magazine

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1948–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 97,000

• Sides: Israel vs. various Palestinian groups and neighboring Arab states

• Data: Combination of many sources: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tmiA5j9zGOXV4FeYRjA5usareSFf8P73/edit?pli=1&gid=1185783474#gid=1185783474

Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 300,000 to 1,500,000

• Sides: France vs. Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)

• Data: Britannica

First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 500,000

• Sides: Sudanese government vs. Anyanya (Southern Sudanese rebels)

• Data: USHMM

Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 2,000,000

• Sides: Sudanese government vs. Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

• Data: PBS

Libyan Civil War (2011)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 30,000

• Sides: Muammar Gaddafi’s regime vs. rebel groups, with NATO involvement

• Data: SMH

Six-Day War (1967)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 20,000 (11,500 Egyptians, 6,094 Jordanians, 1,000 Syrians, 776 Israelis, 2,000 Iraq)

• Sides: Israel vs. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria

• Data: Britannica, Jewish National Library

Yom Kippur War (1973)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 19,000 (2500 Israelis, 15,000 Egyptians, 3,500 Syrians)

• Sides: Israel vs. Egypt and Syria

• Data: Jewish National Library

Suez Crisis (1956)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 3,000

• Sides: Egypt vs. Israel, United Kingdom, and France

• Data: Jewish National Library

First Intifada (1987–1993)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 1,250 (1,100 Palestinians, 162 Israelis)

• Sides: Palestinian protesters and militias vs. Israel

• Jewish National Library, Middle East Monitor

Second Intifada (2000–2005)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 3,200 (2,000 Palestinians, over 1,000 Israelis)

• Sides: Palestinian militants vs. Israel

• Data: Israeli Government

2006 Lebanon War

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 1,300

• Sides: Israel vs. Hezbollah (Lebanese militia)

• Data: HRW

Gulf War (1990–1991)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 20,000 to 35,000

• Sides: Iraq vs. Coalition forces (United States, Saudi Arabia, and others)

• Data: US Navy

Sinai Insurgency (2011–present)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 1,000 to 2,000

• Sides: Egypt vs. ISIS-affiliated groups

Iraq Insurgency and ISIS War (2014–2017)

• Estimated Deaths: Approximately 67,000

• Sides: ISIS vs. Iraqi government, Kurdish Peshmerga, and U.S.-led coalition

October War (2023)

• Estimated Deaths: An estimated 43,000 (23,500 terrorist, 17,000 others) Palestinians and 1840 Israeli’s (IDF and others)

• Sides: Israel vs. Hamas and allied Palestinian factions in Gaza

• Data: Warinisrael.org, IDF, OCHA . OCHA claims that over 51,700 Palestinians were killed. The Gaza Health Ministry identified 40,717 of those deaths. The IDF claims that 23,500 Terrorists were killed. The number of Palestinian deaths is anywhere between 23,500-50,000.

The text is solely the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the movement’s opinion.

הפוסט Debunking the Myth: As long as Israel does not accept Palestinians’ Right to Self Determination’, the wars in the Middle East will continue. הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A New World Order. These grand words take on a new meaning these days, with President Donald Trump stepping into office for his second term.

Having driven a spoke in Tehran’s wheels as well as those of its vassals to an unprecedented level – complemented by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria – Israel has left the Shi’ite axis all but paralyzed. Were it the US’s current administration’s wish to topple the Ayatullah regime, it could deliver a coup de grace in the form of a quick, targeted air strike to crush the skull of the Iranian snake, and in the same breath, take care of the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

Time to conclude the tale of Iran’s nuclear program

This rare and favorable window of opportunity represents a historic moment in which a coalition of the West, Israel, and moderate Sunni states, led by the US can and must bring a decisive end to the Iranian threat. However, one of the largest obstacles on the US’s way to green-lighting an overseas campaign is the public opinion on its streets.

The American public is weary and wary at any prospect of an overseas war, especially in light of the accumulative high death toll of the wars and engagements in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the staggering resources they drained. However, in this instance, the US would not actually be forced to initiate war – but to end it. The Israeli blitz airstrikes left a devastated Iranian air force, shattered many of the Republic’s strategic assets and delivered a crippling blow to its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Ayatullah reign is now more exposed than ever.

Hence, all that is required is a swift targeted move – a devastating airstrike on Iran’s nuclear sites, missile sites and military facilities, delivered by strategic bombers, without the need for boots on the ground, similarly to Israel’s attack last October. A campaign of mere days could bring the Shi’ite axis to its knees, and change the political map and balance of powers in the entire Middle East.

That same coalition should also launch a campaign against the reign of Houthi terror in Yemen, in collaboration with Saudia Arabia and the country’s internal opposition forces. The Houthis, as a proxy of Iran, have made themselves into an all-global nuisance with their disruptive attacks on international trade vessels in the Red Sea. If the US indeed does decide to exercise its full military might – it will have effected dramatic changes in that area within a very short period of time.

The attack against Iran is not only advisable – it is a sine qua non. Because Iran understands that it had lost significant assets such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, it will in all likelihood try to compensate and attempt by all means at hand to break out to a nuclear weapon. If the West cherishes its survival – it behooves it to prevent this at all costs.

Trump understands: the key to peace is might

The election of Trump to the presidency could not have come at a better time for Israel.

Over the past years, , the US has been gradually paring down its presence and involvement in the Middle East, leaving a vacuum into which Russia and China were all too happy to step. As a result of America’s wanning status in the region, an increasing number of countries are aligning themselves with the East. China, the main trade partner of the KSA and Iran, had already brokered an agreement between the two. China’s trade agreements in the Middle East have ballooned to seven times the current volume of the US’s – after it had cut its trade activity and reduced its dependance on Arab oil. The one thing the US can offer Middle East countries in order to reinstate its status as a dominant player in the region is military might.

Trump understands this all too well. He knows that peace and stability can come about only in the presence of military might and not appeasement. The mere fact that even before taking up residence in the White House, Trump declared  that he was interested in making Canada the 51st state of the US, and that he is interested in taking over Greenland and the Panama Canal, indicate that he views the United States as a super power that bears the task of reshaping the global map – and has no qualms about using the necessary force to make America great again.

An opportunity for new world order

Israel is quite literally handing the Middle East to the US on a silver platter.  After pulling the rug of hegemony in the Shi’ite axis from under Tehran’s feet and incapacitating its allies, the US can now step into the frame and reestablish its dominance on the chessboard with a move that would entail minimal effort, restoring its deterrence against the Chinese-Iranian-Russian syndicate.

Admittedly, it would be unwise of the US to ignite a direct military confrontation with the China-Russia sisterhood in the eastern theater. On the other hand – the weakest link in the chain, i.e. Iran, can be flicked off the gameboard almost effortlessly, thereby creating a strong deterrent for US’s adversaries in the region, and bulwarking the Middle East from China’s overtures.

This tactic would pave the road to broad regional peace accords, from Saudia to Indonesia, churning a tailwind for positive moves in the Middle East such as the formation of a moderate Sunni coalition with Israel in partnership with UAE and KSA.

Such a coalition, alongside Israel, moderate Sunni powerful countries and the West led by the US, coupled with normalization with the rest of the Sunni world, can stem the spread of the radical Shi’ite axis, including Turkey, Qatar, Afghanistan, and terror organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaida. The western coalition would prevent the Shi’ite axis from toppling the governments in countries such as Egypt and Jordan and seizing control thereof, and can form a new balance of power in the Middle East region.

This moderate alliance can potentially attract unaligned countries, such as Lebanon, which is controlled at present by Iran through Hezbollah; Iraq, which is partially controlled by Iran, and Libia, Egypt and Saudia. Taking Tehran out of the equation will leave the US alone at the top of the Middle East totem pole, which will in turn bring the unaligned countries – and perhaps more – to choose to align themselves with the moderate coalition, and perhaps even in a year or two, Lebanon will come around and sign – under the influence of Saudia – a peace accord with Israel.

Israel is the key

In a new regional alliance that would deepen and grow stronger with time, Israel would play a central role. Israel is the key that connects West to East, and is the crossroads in which new trade routes can be charted to provide land and maritime trade routes among India, the UAE, KSA and Israel. Israel has already set in place a network of mega-harbors, each under different supervision (The Sinai, Indian, European and Israeli) in preparation for this eventuality, with the aim of creating a global interest in using that network for trade and shipping activity. Making Israel into a global Singapore – a world trade center – is well within the country’s reach.

With new trade routes, regional peace and commercial cooperation with Saudia and other countries in the Middle East, coupled with the security and diplomatic support on part of the US, Israel would be able, for the first time in its history, to do what it has to do in order to ensure the future existence of the State for generations.

Fundamental dictate: maintaining sovereignty

After dealing with the Shi’ite axis and signing regional peace and normalization agreements, Israel will be required to present to the US administration a definitive resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, that must include the crucial elements that will ensure the long-lasting security of Israel.

Such a plan must include Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and most of the C areas in Judia and Samaria, cleared of Palestinian presence that might compromise the Jewish demographic hegemony in the State of Israel. It should outline a definitive solution of the conflict, such that does not allow for a Palestinian state and surely removes any possibility for the rule of terror organizations such as is the situation currently with Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah.

This is an opportunity to snuff out the Oslo Accords, dismantle the Palestinian Authority – a body that is in effect governed by a murderous terror organization that is actively pushing for the global delegitimization of Israel – and adopt an alternative model, to mention a few are: cantonization; emirate-style decentralized “Hamula” (family) government; a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or a Palestinian autonomy in the Sinai Peninsula under Egyptian supervision. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has presented to the Israeli governments various blueprints for this end. The choice of each specific model would depend on shifting circumstances. For example, a future scenario of the collapse of the Jordanian regime would push toward a Jordanian-Palestinian solution, whereas a willingness on part of Egyptian President el-Sisi to play an instrumental role in the stabilization of the Middle East would allow for a Palestinian autonomy in northern Sinai and Gaza.

The common ground for all these prospective solutions is the governing principle that the Zionist claim to the right of the Jewish people to the State of Israel and sovereignty thereof are non-negotiable. Cementing Israel’s right over the State of Israel is crucial spiritually and for its security – both aspects indivisibly interlinked. Israel cannot be completely secure without the spiritual conviction in the justness of this cause, and there is no understanding the security of cities in the heart of Israel without acknowledging the importance of settlements in Judia and Samaria.

Learning the lessons of October 7

A new plan to resolve the conflict would be different than that ideated by President Trump in his previous term. Trump’s Peace for Prosperity demanded painful concessions on part of Israel. But the October 7 attack made it clear that there is no room for such concessions. Any new plan must acknowledge Israel’s overall responsibility for the security of the entire area of the State of Israel. In the past round, Israel abstained from exercising sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and C areas, at Trum’s behest. Today, the public in Israel is more than ever ready for this step, that would anchor the eastern border belt as an integral part of the land of Israel, similarly to the southern and northern envelope areas. Trump’s current presidency is a historic opportunity to right this wrong and proclaim Israeli sovereignty – even unilaterally – in the territories over which the US acknowledges Israel’s right.

At the same time, Israel must present an exhaustive long-term plan for Gaza and Judia and Samaria. After learning the hard way over the past twenty years that the terror and Gaza cannot be eliminated solely with air strikes, precise as they may be, it is now clear that the Gaza Strip must have the presence of Israeli security forces – this is a unnegotiable condition if Israel wishes to see the objectives of the Gaza War materialize, among others affording Israel the freedom of immediate action in the event that terror – in any form whatsoever – lifts its head once again in the Gaza Strip.

It also must be acknowledged that a threat of territorial losses is a strong deterrent for organizations such as Hamas, since the loss of lives – even in the tens of thousands – and destruction have no meaning to the proponents of such ideologies. To ensure a long-lasting deterrence in the Gaza Strip, a portion of its territory must remain under Israel’s control. One such possibility that would gain wide support among Israeli public, is a militarized security zone along the parameter of Gaza under the control of Israel. These swaths of land can be used for cultivating agriculture by the communities that were the victims of the Hamas October 7 attack and breath life where Hamas has strewn death. This not only makes sense in terms of Israel’s security – it brings with it the much-needed historic justice.

Optimism is not enough

Trump’s reelection is a rare historic opportunity for Israel. With the support of a strong, realistic leader that had proven himself a true friend to the Jewish people, can the picture of the Middle East be radically changed, from which both Israel and the US can gain considerable – and crucial – advantages.

In order to ensure this historic opportunity is not missed, Israel must do two things. The first – enhance the cooperation with the US in a joint aim of eliminating the Iranian nuclear program.

The second is the formulation of a clear and definite long-term solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict that cements Israel’s security and diplomatic status in the Middle East region, and has zero tolerance for any approach that does not acknowledge Israel’s inalienable right over the land of Israel and its uncompromising right to maintain the security of the State and its citizens, ensuring the Trump administration’s full support of this aim.

Will Trump move the first piece on the board and launch an attack against Iran? Trump is a well-seasoned business mogul, who is very adept at identifying opportunities. However, at the end of the day, it is up to him and Israel to put forth proof of intent. In light of what is known about his previous term in the Oval Office, his recent appointments, and his guiding world views, it is likely that he will give Israel his security and diplomatic support and spearhead an attack on Iran.

One way or another, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement leads a steady clear line:

Israel’s national security leans on the State’s national ethos, the justness of the cause and its ability to protect its own security by itself with defensible borders and the understanding that the long-term security and the prosperity of Israel lies only in Israe’s hands.

This understanding must first and foremost stem from a common faith in the justness of Israel’s path, remembering the truth that has been at the foundation of Zionism since its inception – that if Israel does not take care of itself, no one else will.

Not even Donald Trump.

הפוסט Trump’s Second Presidency: A Critical Opportunity on a Silver Platter הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The campaign for the eradication of the murderous Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip had placed the IDF in a humanitarian conundrum: on one hand, there are over a million displaced who are in need of aid and housing. On the other hand, Hamas pillaged the humanitarian aid and is fortifying itself in areas of dense population.

At present, Israel is facing a triple challenge: it is demanded to provide the population with humanitarian aid, but must do so without the unintended consequence of boosting Hamas in the Strip. Is there a way to ensure the population has a roof over its head without having to rehabilitate the stronghold of terror in the Strip? How can Israel install the future civil leadership that would replace Hamas and the Palestinian Authority?

The Humanitarian Islands Plan, authored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement research department, led by researchers Adv. Yifa Segal, Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid, and contributing researcher Mrs. Jennifer Thiel, provides an answer to all these questions, which could change the face of Gaza.

A dangerous problem – Hamas takes advantage of humanitarian aid

The humanitarian aid predicament is a direct result of the October 7 massacre, that had brought Israel to launch the war in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has instructed the civilian population to evacuate the areas of fighting to eliminate the risk of hurting innocents, and allow the army to conduct operational activities against terror infrastructures that Hamas operated from within these areas. As a result of this activity, large areas were left either razed to the ground or unfit for habitation. To date, there are over one million Gazans that are considered displaced after having evacuated the battle areas.

Naturally, these displace are in need of humanitarian aid. And indeed, since the outbreak of the war, large-scale aid has been continuously shipped into the Gaza Strip, totaling as of now some one million tons. However, the displaced also need proper housing as well.

With that said, there are two prominent obstacles for the supply of this aid and housing. The first is that Hamas pillages huge amounts of food and equipment that arrive into the Strip for its own survival, on the expense of the lives of its own people.  The other challenge is that the people cannot return to their homes and rehabilitate the pre-war centers of population because here too, Hamas – concerned solely with its own preservation at whatever cost – had established its terror network above and underground in these areas.

The question is: how may Israel help the displaced citizens of the Strip while refraining to indirectly aid the terrorists?

The humanitarian islands – no entrance for terrorism

In order to untangle this predicament, a solution is called for, such that will allow for the flow of aid to the citizens to prevent a full-fledged humanitarian crisis in the strip, while ensuring Hamas does not gain control over the population centers and the aid, and expediting its eradication.

The most effective manner of achieving the aforementioned is by the establishment of displaced cities only in the Strip’s open areas rather than in the populace centers controlled by Hamas. Each city would be under Israeli supervision, without access by UNRWA or Hamas. This can be instrumental in the eradication of the pernicious presence of these two organizations in the Strip. The authority to distribute the aid would be in the hands of a new body that would be established in the Gaza Strip – the Humanitarian Administration of the Gaza Strip.

The role of that body will be the close supervision over the distribution of aid and ensuring these cities are clean of Hamas – or any other organization – terrorist. The displaced cities and the aid they receive will be managed autonomously, with the involvement of local public and aid organizations, without Israeli intervention in their daily operation.

How does it work?

Each displaced city will collaborate with the General Humanitarian Coordination Administration. The Administration’s role will be to ensure that the IDF has cleared the area of underground and other terrorist infrastructures even before the establishment of the new cities, to supervise their construction and lists of eligible residents, to ensure they remain clean of Hamas members, and to coordinate the arrival of supplies.

Entry to cities will be possible only with biometric entry documents specific to each city, and through security checks and metal detectors, which will prevent terrorists or gangs from infiltrating the cities or bringing in weapons.

At the same time, the IDF’s perimeter security force in the area and a system of routes and crossings will enable Israel to dissect the Gaza Strip into separate units, and will increase Israel’s control over the Strip and its ability to prevent Hamas from regaining control of the territory.

The goal – creating an alternative government to Hamas

The proximity to the population and control over aid supply will make it easier for Israel to cultivate a positive and peace-oriented local leadership that will assume only civilian powers. This leadership will be an alternative to both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which has proved to be a weak, corrupt and terror-supporting body that must not rule Gaza again.

To ensure that the local administration does not undermine Israel, it will be given only civil and humanitarian powers – not political or policy-making authorities. Although the IDF will not have a role inside the cities, it will have the full freedom to operate within them when the need arises in order to cleanse them of terrorists and terrorist infrastructure.

The best solution – safe, efficient and cost-effective

The “Humanitarian Islands” program has distinct advantages over other solutions – it is based on a well-known international model of creating displaced persons cities, which has been successfully implemented many times over the years across the world, e.g. in Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as on the experience gathered from the creation of improvised displaced cities in the Gaza Strip today.

In light of the extensive and successful experience with similar initiatives, it is possible to implement the program already in an efficient and gradual manner. It is worthwhile to start by establishing displaced towns in the northern Gaza Strip, where Hamas has relatively little military and civilian control, and later to establish additional cities in other parts of the Strip.

Another significant advantage of this plan is that the cost will not fall on the Israeli taxpayer. As is already the case in Gaza today and in similar situations around the world, funding will come only from international sources and will be budgeted for the various aid agencies.

In contrast to military rule or any form of Israeli control, a temporary humanitarian administration, which will hold no political authority and is operated by the local population, will encourage cooperation and reduce resistance.

The bottom line: The Humanitarian Island Plan will allow Israel to isolate Hamas, deny it access to aid and population centers, and eradicate it as a governing force, while at the same time cultivating local representation in the cities as an alternative leadership for the day after the war. All of this makes its implementation a necessary condition for the Gaza War to end with a real and decisive victory for Israel over Hamas.

For the full study >>

הפוסט Aid Displace, Cripple Hamas: A Humanitarian Solution that Could Change the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

n the past years – and increasingly so during the Gaza War – Israel has been conducting targeted eliminations against arch-terrorists at the top of Hamas and Hezbollah. However, this is hardly a new modus operandi for Israe. 29 years ago, on January 5, 1996, Israel had staged one of its most iconic assassinations, in which it took out the arch-terrorists Yahya Abdul Latif Ayyash, a.k.a “The Engineer” or in Arabic “Al Muhandis”.

Ayyash was the chief architect at the time of the Hama’s first suicide bombings, and under his tutelage, the organization carried out dozens of deadly terror attacks that amounted in a total death count of some 100 Israeli civilians and the wounding of some 400. In the early 90s Ayyash was at the top of Israel’s most wanted list, and for a long time Israel’s security establishment tried to get its hands on him. It was only after long months of meticulous planning, and after a number of misses, that Israel was able to eliminate Ayyash in a daring operation the likes of which the country had never seen. The death of Al Muhandis became a longstanding symbol till this day – both for his followers and rivals.

The student who became an arch terrorist: Who is Yahya Ayyash?

Yahya Ayyash was born and raised in the township of Rafat, in western Samaria, and already at a young age found his way into the arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. As an adult, Ayyash enrolled in the Bir Zeit university, where he learned electric engineering.  As a student he was an active member of the university’s “Muslim Bloc” of student organizations.

In the early 90s, a short while after graduating, Ayyash became one of the founders of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam brigades (EQB) – the military wing of Hamas – then and today. Ayyash harnessed the knowledge he acquired at in engineering school to tailor improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for the organization’s terror attacks. By 1992, al Muhandis was already designing his first attacks in Israel. In 1993 he orchestrated Hamas’ debut suicide bombing at Mahula Junction in the Jordan Valley. Since that first attack and until his death, Ayyash churned out numerous deadly attacks, among them the car bomb in the northern city of Afula and the suicide bombing in the number 5 bus in Tel Aviv. He was actively involved in terror attacks, being not only the one who prepared the explosive devices – but actually attacked them to the bodies of the suicide bombers.

A long manhunt, one failed attempt, and stellar success: the road to the elimination of “The Engineer”

Israeli security forces understood pretty quickly that Yahya Ayyash is the name behind the Hamas’ deadly terror attacks, and he climbs to the top of Israel’s most wanted list. Over a long period of time, many attempts were made to capture him, however, Ayyash would never stay in one place for long and would even disguise himself, thus escaping Israel’s clutches time and time again.

Until 1994, the pursuit of Ayyash took place chiefly in the Palestinian cities of Judia and Samaria, but at that time he moved to the Gaza Strip and the security forces continued with the attempts to track him down there as well, and even made an attempt on his life at the end of 1995. Israel’s security forces worked for months to put together the operation. The governing principle was not to harm innocents in the surrounding area. At first, the plan was to kill Ayyash by rigging a fax machine. Eventually it was decided to use a much smaller device – a mobile phone.

The General Security Service technology unit packed 11 grams of explosive material into a Motorola mobile device. The minute quantity of explosives meant that the success of the operation hinged on Ayyash holding the phone to his head long enough. To ensure this, the security forces had to devise a way to ensure Ayyash received – and used – the device. This was a real challenge as Ayyash would never stay in one place for long and would frequently change mobile phones.

Despite his unpredictable pattern of behavior, Ayyash had one constant – a phone call he would make religiously to his father every Friday. It was obvious to the security forces that his is the opportune moment in which the assassination would take place. In 1995, on the last Friday of the year, the rigged device was delivered to Ayyash though a collaborator within his inner circle. The collaborator, not knowing the purpose of the device, was also instructed to disconnect the landline phone in the apartment where Ayyash was staying, thus ensuring that Ayyash would use the deadly device.

Until that point, the operation was on track, with Ayyash receiving and using the mobile device to phone his father, however, the attempt to trigger the bombe failed, thus Ayyash was able to complete the phone call without harm, oblivious to the threat.

The device was recalled from Ayyash through the collaborator the very next day and sent to a lab to determine the cause of the malfunction, which was found to be a disconnected wire between the ear and mouth pieces. The detonation mechanism was swiftly repaired and on the following Friday, January 5, 1996, the collaborator returned the device returned to Ayyash.

As per planned, the collaborated handed Ayyash the phone to make his weekly call to his father. This time the detonator did not fail and Ayyash was killed on the spot.

The elimination of Ayyash was without doubt a stellar success, but those in the thick of the affair know to tell that immediately after Ayyash was killed, many high-level commanders from the Hamas arrived on the scene, among them head of the organization’s military wing – Muhammed Deif, and could have been eliminated on the spot. However, the government cabinet did not give the green light and that opportunity was missed.

From revenge terror attacks to memorials: the aftermath of the assassination

The elimination of “al Muhandis” was a major affair – for Israel, that wanted him off the map, and for his followers that mourned his death. For Israel this was a milestone operational achievement, as not only had one of the leaders of the deadly terrorist organization been taken out of its roster, but it also denied the organization a huge trove of technical knowledge. Granted, Ayyash was able to train additional Hamas terrorist in the preparation of IEDs, but none had the knowledge and experience he had.

Another crucial outcome of the assassination was the message it conveyed to other Hamas leaders and other terror organizations that they are well within the reach of Israel.

Yahya Ayyash was buried in Gaza in a mass funeral, and retaliations did not wait for long. Later that year, a number of retaliatory attacks occurred in Israel, including the attack on bus No. 18 in Jerusalem and the attack at Dizengoff Center in Tel Aviv, killing a total of 59 people. Beyond this severe reaction, Ayyash had become an icon for Hamas supporters. Armed cells of the organization began to boast nicknames such as “The Engineer’s Students” or “The Yahya Ayyash Cells,” and various sites and locales throughout the Gaza Strip were dedicated to him. The Ayyash memorial project continued for many more years – in 2010 it was decided to name the Palestinian Authority compound in Ramallah after the engineer, and about a decade later, Hamas produced a long-range rocket that was given the name “Ayyash 250.” This rocket was used in Operation Guardian of the Walls, and also during the Gaza War.

The Hamas rocket was not the only reminder of Yahya Ayyash of the Gaza War. In December 2023, Abd al-Fattah Ma’ali, once considered Ayyash’s right-hand man, was assassinated. Another reminder also came in September 2024 with the pager attack against Hezbollah operatives, which was somewhat reminiscent of the method in which the notorious engineer was killed, as the widespread use of pagers by the Hezbollah that allowed for the targeting of so many terrorists, was prompted by the attack on Ayyash by mobile phone after which Hezbollah instructed its members to opt for beepers instead of the mobile devices.

The story of the assassination of Yahya Ayyash is testament to the capabilities and perseverance of Israel’s security forces. But more than all, it shows that targeted eliminations are much more than operations against one individual or another – they bring a message that echoes decades later to those who choose to follow in the target’s path.

הפוסט 29 Years Ago: Architect of Hamas Deadly Attacks, Yahya Ayyash, the “Engineer” – Eliminated הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Assistant Commissioner, Brigadier General Betty Lahat served in the Israel Prison Service for 35 years, during which she filled senior positions and headed several prisons, among them the Neveh Tirtza women’s prison, the Sharon Prison and the Hadarim detention center which has been housing many high-profile Palestinian security prisoners. Her last position with the IPS was head of the Service’s intelligence department, in the capacity of which she had met many of the Palestinian security prisoners, Yahya Sinwar among them.

During her years in various positions, Lahat had worked with inmates from many demographics – from youths and women to heads of crime and arch-terrorists. “I’ve experienced a fair share of heartache during my career, and witnessed time and time again our inability to break the cycles of crime and terror”, she says. “I’ve raised generations of inmates – I had female inmates that gave birth while serving prison sentences, and later met their children in juvenile prisons, some of which even remembered me, and how I would throw them birthday parties in the prison cafeteria when they would visit their mothers. I would look at them and think to myself – they’re my children’s age, why did they have to end up in a place like this? It’s a huge heartache. On the other extreme, I have met some of the bloodiest terrorists and had to watch them as they walk around the prison yard, chatting away, laughing and enjoying themselves, while I  had to ensure they received appropriate care. There were times when I would get home and say to myself ‘good lord, what kind of a world am I living in?’”

We knew that his word was the law: the prisoner Yahya Sinwar

Over the years, Betty Lahat had seen some of the most dangerous prisoners Israel’s prisons had known. She had met murderers and heads of crime, and she had met some of the highest profile terrorists. Under her wardenship she had seen the likes of Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin, head of the Hamas military wing Salah Shehade, and head of izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria Ibrahim Hamed, who orchestrated most of the terror attacks during the Second Intifada. However, one of the most memorable inmates for Lahat – mainly due to his nefarious intelligence and shocking cruelty – is Yahya Sinwar.

What was your impression of Sinwar?

“I remember him as a very dominant figure who was very cruel. The prisoners elected him time after time as their prison leader. As such, he put together inmate terror cells and a telecommunications reconnaissance team that was tasked with gathering intel within and outside of the prison. He also commanded special units that interrogated new prisoners. Any prisoner suspected of collaborating with Israel was cruelly tortured. Naturally, Sinwar never did any of the dirty work himself, but it was clear that he was the one pulling the strings. He also took under his wing the most murderous terrorist that would arrive at the prison, and promoted them up the ranks. For example, he took under his wing Abdel-Aziz Salha, a West Bank Hamas militant jailed for life for his part in the lynching of two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah, famously depicted standing at a window holding up blood-stained hands, and made him head of the telecommunications units in the prison.  He also added to his ranks the murderers of the Fogel family and the perpetrator of the deadly bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya. Later, during negotiations for the release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Sinwar was involved in the selection of the terrorists to be released. He made sure that he and his cronies were on the list, and left out prisoners that were at odds with him. That was the kind of power he had”.

Would you have believed that Sinwar was able to orchestrate an attack on the scale of the October 7 massacre?

“Absolutely. Sinwar had no interest in coexistence and had always proclaimed he would never be resigned to the ‘Zionist settlers’ living on what he saw as the land of Palestine. I listened to him a lot, both in direct conversations I had with him as well as conversations with his prison associates we tapped. I had never witnessed him stray from his way of thought and staunch ideology. He had grand schemes and he truly believed that by 2027, he would lead a brutal attack that would result in the victory of Hamas over Israel – so whoever tries to claim that Sinwar held a pragmatic approach toward Israel has no idea what he is talking about”.

To what extent was Sinwar involved in events outside of prison?

“In my time, we had designated Sinwar as a national target prisoner, in other words, a prisoner that demands constant surveillance, as his sphere of influence extended beyond prison walls. He was extremely involved with what was happening in other security prisons and was very knowledgeable about current affairs in Israel. You must understand that Sinwar was deviously intelligent. He got to know Israeli society like the back of his hand and could analyze it brilliantly. It was clear from an early stage that he had set his mind on fragmenting Israeli society from within, and he knew just how to do it. His objective of fomenting discord in Israel was clearly evident even during the Gaza war, and it is clear to me that when he emerged from the tunnels and saw Gaza in ruins, he got the tailwind to carry on his fight from seeing the discord in Israel’s society  and he believed he would eventually prevail”.

You participated in the discussions on the list of terrorists to be released as part of the Shalit deal. Where did you stand on the release of Sinwar?

“I had a very hard time with Sinwar’s release, and I had warned them that this is not a terrorist that should be set free. At one point, one of the negotiation team members asked me ‘what do you have against Sinwar? He didn’t kill any Jews, he only killed Palestinian collaborators’, to which I responded – ‘Just wait. He’ll have plenty of Jewish blood on his hands’. I don’t know  exactly what I meant when I said this, but it was clear to me that once he sees an opportunity to commit heinous attacks against Jews – he’ll seize it. Whoever gets to know terrorists like Sinwar, and spends so much time with them as I did, knows what they’re capable of. And whoever was surprised by the sheer cruelty of the terrorist in the October 7 attack didn’t really know them at all”.

It is not a prison. It is summer camp for terrorists

Betty Lahat is very familiar with the situation in Israeli prisons and knows the conditions under which various classes of prisoners are held. She has a hard time accepting the manner in which prisoners – particularly security prisoners – manipulate public opinion in Israel and its justice system to gain unjustified amenities.

“The Palestinian security prisoners know that the Israeli justice system will always take care of them and that the doors of the High Court of Justice are always open to them”, says Lahat. “We are under the impression that when the prisons are quiet, and we give them what they want, we can rehabilitate them and change their ways. But what we fail to understand is that this humane approach is to our detriment. The better the conditions we give them are, the more they perceive us as weak. Even saving their lives has no effect on them. I spoke to Sinwar after he underwent surgery to remove a malignant tumor from his brain in an Israeli hospital. I asked him whether he now has some gratitude toward Israel, to which he replied that he has nothing to be grateful for as we simply did our job. We need to forgo this illusion that if we give them favorable conditions in prison, we can remove them from the path of terror. In all my years with the Israeli Prison Service, I’ve not once encountered a Hamas prisoner that had forsaken his ideology. It just doesn’t happen”.

What does the life of a security inmate look like?

“Each inmate must participate in a mandatory educational program. They also get to study for academic degrees through the Open University. In fact, the Palestinian Authority actually encourages them to earn an education in prison. The higher their academic achievement – the more money they get. In addition, they have a large library and there is not one book that reaches the book stores in Israel that is not added to their library immediately. I’ve seen with my own eyes Palestinian inmates reading canonic Jewish literature such as Jabotinsky’s ‘Iron Wall’ and Yehuda Ha’Levi’s ‘Kuzari’. They also regularly receive Israeli newspapers, their favorite being Ha’aretz – they have a permanent subscription and have a fit when it fails to arrive. In addition to the enrichment programs they’re entitled to from the system, the terror cells within the prisons cultivate education among their members – every member is required to learn Hebrew and serve a period as their spokesman.  They are also taught to gather intel, follow their guards, and follow commentary on Israeli news. They listen to the news and read the papers, and then they sit together and analyze the news and commentary. In particular they pay close attention to the social discord in Israel, to assess how fatigued Israeli society is and thus willing to make concessions. You have to understand that the Palestinian security inmate lives under iron discipline – especially those of them who are members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They waste no time and utilize their prison time to acquire education and skills that will come in handy for their terror activity and long-term plan execution”.

What is your opinion on the criticism on the living conditions of the security inmates?

“Security prisoners are not supposed to have the same conditions that criminal prisoners have, and this is also supported by international law. Whoever murders Jews just for being Jews should be held under completely different conditions. But in practice, the security prisons have long become a summer camp for terrorists. This happens, among others because of the justice system and the High Court of Justice, that hand down phantasmagoric rulings that are utterly out of touch with the reality in the prisons. One day, we were told that we cannot search under the prisoners’ prayer mats because it is disrespectful to their faith – do they even know what prisoners can hide or dig under their mats? As a matter of fact, there are Palestinian security prisoners whose sole job is to sit and compose petitions to the High Court of Justice. That is their job, to send petition after petition, and drive the system crazy. And if that were not enough, they also use lawyers and politicians to help them send out messages to associates on the outside and coordinate plans, and the General Security Service and the Attorney General’s office allow this to happen. If you ask me, the responsibility for the living conditions of security inmates should rest solely in the hands of the IPS, which is the suitable professional body for this, and my vast experience with the IPS teaches me that it would ensure that the security prisoners are treated according to what is stipulated by international law – no more, no less”.

“Every intelligence agency thinks they have a monopoly on brains”

Having climbed to key positions in the Israel Prison Service, Brigadier General Lahat has deep insights not only into the reality within prison walls but also on the fashion in which Israel’s entire security and intelligence apparatus works. One of the most material issues that she points to is the lack of collaboration among the various intelligence agencies. “Each agency thinks it has a monopoly on brains and that it knows better”, she says. “There is a lot of patronizing going around in these agencies, especially on part of the GSS and certain units within IDF Intelligence, and they don’t really strive to cooperate with the police and the prison service. When I was head of the IPS intelligence department, I literally begged them to collaborate with us because I knew we at the prison service, engaging with these prisoners on a daily basis, have valuable input. At that time some improvement was made in the relations between the IP and the intelligence agencies, but I think it pretty much went back to what it used to be. Even today, when I look at what is happening  in the Israeli intelligence community, I see nothing has changed”.

What about the deals for the release of prisoners – are they made without the IPS input?

“When they signed the Jibril prisoner exchange agreement (in 1985, when Israel had released 1,500 Palestinian prisoners – some of them very high profile – in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured in the First Lebanon War), we were not consulted at all, and in the Shalit deal – our involvement was just for appearances. Only after insisting on the presence of the Prison Service in the negotiations on the release of the terrorists, I was invited to the meetings. But even then, my role amounted to presenting background information on the terrorists. After all, the GSS is sure it knows everything, so why should it consult in the IPS?”

Sounds like you have a bellyful of grievances on the GSS. What is your opinion on its work in the past year?

“There are outstanding people in the GSS who do invaluable work, but personally I think that the GSS is a body that takes on responsibilities that are not within its scope of duty  – and often this comes at the expense of tasks that are”.

Generally speaking, do you get the impression that the policy of releasing prisoners in exchange for hostages influences the state of mind of the Palestinian prisoners?

“Very much so. The Palestinian prisoners truly believe that it’s only a matter of time till they are released and this keeps their spirits high. They don’t care how many years they’re sentenced to. Even prisoners who are sentenced to 60 years will say ‘Walla Ishi – “that’s nothing” – because they know that at one point or another, Israelis will be kidnapped and they’ll just be released in an exchange deal. Factually, they are not wrong”.

Are there any prisoners that will never be released with any deal?

“Aside from Yigal Amir (who is serving a life sentence for the assassination of PM Yitzhak Rabin) I know of no such prisoner. In the Jibreal deal and the Shalit deal we’ve released the worst of the terrorists, and I see the names of the terrorist that are on the table for release in the current exchange negotiations  for the Israeli hostages in Gaza and I’m absolutely appalled. When it comes to security prisoners, sooner or later they all get a chance to be released in an exchange deal”.

My family and I received threats, but I was never afraid

Retired Assistant Commissioner Betty Lahat is not just a former senior officer of the Israeli Prison Service – she is one of the first women in the organization to have scaled the ranks and chalk up such an impressive track record. “I don’t wave a feminist banner, but I have opened the doors to many women that followed in my footsteps and I’ve proved that we are every bit as good as the men in the IPS”, she admits. “I was a strong woman in a masculine environment and that wasn’t easy. When I was appointed head of the Sharon Prison,  which is one of Israel’s highest security prisons, there was big drama. Some had a hard time accepting a woman at the head of a men’s prison. When I first arrived, I was the target of scorning looks and remarks. But I didn’t let it affect me. I gathered everyone and proclaimed that I will not apologize for being a woman. Very soon, they all came to see my vast knowledge and experience, coupled with a deep familiarity with the brass tacks. They also saw how motivated I was and the important changes I effected, and no one dared act behind my back or try to sabotage me”.

Your job entailed daily dealings with the most dangerous prisoners in Israel. Weren’t you afraid?

“I had sat in the same room as heads of crime; I’ve sent terrorists to solitary confinement, and there was even a time when I would travel to Gaza by myself – I never felt scared. Even when our intelligence department notified me that there is intel about threats against me, I insisted to go into the wards and meet the prisoners. My family had also received dozens of threats. Marwan Barghouti’s people, for example, threatened to come after me for months because I took away some of their amenities in prison. I had to have a police detail on my house, but even then, I was not afraid. That was my job and that was part of the risk I had assumed with the job”.

What have you learned after 35 years with the IPS?

“One of the most painful insights that I’ve gained from my years with the IPS is that we cannot eradicate the incitement of terror in Palestinian society, and in truth – we really aren’t trying. Many of the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs are weaned from a very young age on hatred toward Jews, and then they go to school – some of them funded by the State of Israel – and are fed yet more false narratives. And if that weren’t enough, young boys are offered incentives for committing terror attacks. There are adolescents that are at the fringe of society, but after committing attacks against Israel, they are suddenly accepted, their families are provided for and they receive a salary. Also, in Israeli prisons, they are required to get their high school diploma, which is something that they could never have hoped to achieve on the outside. So what interest do they have to change their ways?  From what I saw, we do not really have the wherewithal to prevent these boys from becoming heinous terrorists in the future. Just like we cannot prevent the released terrorists from returning  to terrorism, nor from female prisoners from raising future generations of terrorists. These are unbreakable cycles”.

How had your career shape your outlook today as a citizen of Israel?

“I think my work taught me that there is no such thing as black and white. The reality in Israel is very complex and it is about time we stop trying to pull the country to one extreme or another. This is also one of the reasons I had joined the IDSF HaBithonistim movement. To me it is a hate-free movement that comes from a pragmatic stand point. The movement places the well-being of Israel above all and gives serious consideration to every issue related to the country’s security. This gives me the hope that it can lead us and the country to a better place”.

הפוסט “Whoever Was Surprised By the Cruelty of The Terrorists – Did not Really Know Them”, Interview with former Israel Prison Service Assistant Commissioner Brigadier General Betty Lahat הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, is turning 89 this month. Even before the open and pressing question of his successor as the chairman of the PA, his rule is already leaving the Authority in disarray. “The PA is in a state of collapse and dilapidation,” says Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid. “It doesn’t pay salaries to its employees; the entire Samaria region is no longer under its control; it doesn’t manage to operate as a political entity, and in regards to the Authority’s future – that’s the big question”.

The Lost Generation of the PA

Baruch, in an article you published last April, you mention a survey according to which most Palestinians view the PA as dead weight and demand its dismantling. Is that still true?

“True. But not a single survey – but a series of poles that found that a significantly high number of Palestinians – sometimes as high as 60 or 80 percent of them – view the Authority as a burden and do not perceive it as a historical achievement. They understand that aside from security coordination that serves mainly the IDF – the Palestinian Authority does not serve the Palestinian dream. It is on the background of this unrest that Hamas was able to garner such widespread sympathy”.

Even today, after the war, the organization enjoys such broad support?

“It’s hard and perhaps even impossible to know how much support Hamas currently has in Gaza, however, in Judea and Samaria it is very well supported. The buildup of Hamas in Judea and Samaria on the expense of the PA is a trend that was evident in all of the surveys on the topic from the past five-six years, although one must take Palestinian surveys with a grain of salt as they often distort the data. At any rate, these surveys clearly show what the world already knows: the Palestinian public harshly criticizes Abu Mazen, who originally was elected for a term of only five years, but after nearly 20 years is still in power, without ever having held elections for the presidency of the PA or its parliament”.

Who will step in to fill the vacuum left by the PA?

“At the present, there are some 40 organizations of Hamas, PIJ and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, particularly in the Samaria region and further north. These are young people, the group of 15–30-year-olds, which in regards to the PA are a lost generation. They were born after the Oslo Accords and hate the Authority because nothing in their lives had improved. They view Hamas and the military path as the realization of their ideological aspirations. Add to that the money that Hamas and Hezbollah pour into the region”.

How can the PA restore the public’s trust?

“Fatah members as well as Abu Mazen know that that in the 2006 elections, Fatah got more votes than Hamas, but the votes were distributed among the factions that comprise Fatah – nowadays it has three and a half leaders and several organizations and this is its greatest problem and the reason Hamas won the elections at the time with a landslide. So the solution is a reform, and everyone is pressuring Abu Mazen to introduce reforms; The Egyptians and Saudis also demanded that the PA undergo reform, but Abu Mazen has not complied due to fatigue and conservatism and his unwillingness to open the government to additional players”.

Why has he not complied with the demands?

“Most likely he hasn’t the energy to make reforms and open up the system and prefers to lean of the current situation. He prefers to preserve the current state rather than take risks. Everyone surrounding him is waiting for him to leave. He is more a token leader that a leader in effect. However, it is unclear what the day after will bring in the PA – whether he will be succeeded by another element in Fatah, if his moderate line will remain, or whether his successor will be Marwan Barghouti, who is very close to Hamas and very militant, or another leader that would collaborate with Hamas, and if elections will be held – in the event that Hamas takes over the Authority”.

The Return of the Saudis to the Abraham Accords

So many open questions. And what are the implications for Israel?

“The conclusion is that, in my opinion, Israel cannot rely on the PA as a viable factor.  I believe that the Egyptians and Saudis also realize this. Everyone – including the Americans and Emiratis – are demanding that Abbas carry out the reforms in order to prepare the ground for his successor, and after he steps down, everything will be open to a new reality,  and not necessarily a positive one.”

How should Israel act at the moment?

“It should maintain full security control of Judea and Samaria and Gaza, while at the same time cultivating a Palestinian civilian apparatus that will undertake the care of the population. For the time, under Abbas, this is happening, but there is no guarantee that it will be so in the future, and certainly there is no guarantee that it will be so in the long term. Israel should also try to expand the Abraham Accords, including interim agreements regarding the Palestinian Authority.”

That means agreeing to a Palestinian State, right?

“It will be necessary to give the Sunni states a horizon of some two-state solution, but this doesn’t have to happen at this moment, and is the biggest political challenge, since the Saudis, for example, declare morning, noon and night that without a Palestinian state, there will be no normalization. Although the messages Israel is receiving are different, this is the general direction”.

“At this stage, the model should be one in which Israel does not forgo the two-state option – i.e. does not annex Judea and Samaria and does not dismantle the Palestinian Authority. This would allow Saudi Arabia to enter an agreement. But the implementation of the solution itself will depend on a long-term agreement and will also be subject to changes. We’re talking about a period of 10 to 20 years, during which the Palestinian street will have to undergo significant change, and it also depends on the decline of Iran’s influence. Some sources in the Gulf states say it’s possible.”

Will the PA Return to Gaza?

In  order to understand the relations between the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, we need to go back to 2007, when Hamas deposed Fatah and seized control of Gaza in a series of violent clashes. Until that point, the PA had a bureaucratic apparatus set up in Gaza with its own officials. “Until today the PA claims it still has 18 thousand civil servants and 18 thousand security personnel in the Gaza Strip. In other words – over 30 thousand people that have remained in their positions, even under Hamas rule”.

Is this true?

“It’s unclear, and it is highly unlikely in the case of the security apparatus. Hamas did keep some Fatah members in professional positions withing Gaza’s civil service, and in many cases chose to place its own people in executive positions alone. However, it remains unclear how many Fatah members have actually remained in Gaza after Hamas’ takeover”.

And now the PA is planning its return to Gaza?

“As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned – and this it had stated even before the outbreak of the war – it is still the boss in Gaza. The Authority views its demand for a return to control in Gaza as only natural, thus it endeavored dozens of reconciliation attempts with Hamas. Two months ago, the Authority sent the Americans a 101-page document, in which it claims that it is the governing body of Gaza and that it has a plan for the reinstatement of its governance, such as reopening the hospitals, schools, government offices, and more. The Americans – it must be said – were not convinced”.

What is the position of the Arab states?

“Here things start getting complicated. Naturally the Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis all publicly support the control of the PA in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, as it serves the two-state vision. But under the surface the Egyptians and Saudis have a lot of criticism against the Authority and they are appalled by the corruption and its dysfunction and from the fact that Abu Mazen hasn’t held elections for the chairmanship of the Authority and for its parliament for nearly 20 years. But this is under the surface, and the Saudis still continue to transfer broad financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Only recently Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with the Saudi ambassador to Jodan, who transferred him aid money”.

In other words – the Arab world does not publicly criticize the PA?

“Public criticism of the Palestinian Authority is heard mainly in the Emirates. Two months ago, a proposal was made according to which the UAE undertakes financial support to the Authority, but the UAE rejected the suggestion out of hand, because they object to Abu Mazen heading the PA. This is why in an interview to The New York Times,  Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan proclaimed ‘no Abbas and no Hamas’. I’ve encountered this position on part of many sources in the Authority even before Dahlan. There are other sources that would like to see a governing body in Gaza as well as Judea and Samaria that is neither Abu Mazen nor Hamas”.

Abu Mazen’s Condition: Hamas Acknowledges the Oslo Accords

What is the position of the Sunni Arab states on Gaza?

“Egypt, Jordan and Saudia view Hamas as a terror organization. The UAE has plans for Gaza which designates as Chairman of the PA Dr. Salam Fayyad, former PM of the Authority under Abu Mazen more than a decade ago. Dr. Fayyad is not a member of Fatah or the PLO. He is an expert on economics. The moderate Arab world and the US wish to see him as head of the Palestinian Authority. However, Qatar has a long-standing vision of political Islam, which they hoped Hamas would realize. Already in 2019, the Qataris met with Hamas in Judea and Samaria and offered to fund them in the elections, but they would rather see Khaled Mashal as head of Hamas, They don’t favor Sinwar, who had detested and insulted them. There was no love lost between them– Qatar and Sinwar. Some claim that now the Qataris have the opportunity to try and reassert their influence with the Hamas leadership that resides overseas, but the Iranian’s and Hezbollah also want to maintain close ties with Hamas”.

What kind of relations would Qatar have between Hamas and the PA?

“Qatar would like to see Hamas as part of the PLO, as it would legitimize Hamas, and make it less militant. But Abu Mazen set a condition for this: if you want to be part of the PLO – you have to accept the Oslo Accords, which means the implied recognition in the State of Israel.  Meanwhile, Hamas is led by a council in lieu of a new leader, and it there appears to be a power struggle between the more moderate camp – the Muslim Brotherhood supported by Qatar – and the militant camp, which is close to Iran”.

In April you wrote that Mohammad Dahlan – the Fata leader living in Abu Dabi – is promoting a plan for leadership of the Gaza Strip, with the backing of a Arab Sunni force. Is this still true?

“Yes, he’s still working on it. But he also understands that forming the Arab force he’s talking about can only happen as part of a diplomatic process, and he understands that for the time being, Israel is not seeking any diplomatic arrangement, He understands that he’ll be forced to find a solution in collaboration with the Palestinian Authority. According to my sources, Dahlan’s people have recently  spoke on numerous occasions with Abu Mazen’s people to find a path to reconciliation and unite the forces in Gaza,. Also Israeli Defense Minister Galant’s ‘Security Island Plan’ for concentrating Gaza’s population in ‘humanitarian bubbles’ with a civil apparatus for each such bubble comprising locals that will be armed with light arms – is very acceptable on part of the Emiratis”.

הפוסט Lt. Col. (Res.) Baruch Yedid: “The Palestinian Authority Is In A State Of Collapse” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For years now, there are voices which would have the world view some of the most bloodthirsty and cruel terror organizations the world has ever known, i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah, not as the terrorists they are, but as “freedom fighters”. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, this bias has been pushed even further. They are being chanted in pro-Palestinian rallies, openly declared on banners on campuses of the most prestigious universities of the world, and are even heard in certain Israeli circles.

This paper reviews the goals that govern these organizations and their methods of operation and shows beyond doubt that equating terrorists and their organizations with freedom fighters is nothing short of fallacious. Aside from being a falsehood, this is a grave claim that harbors very dangerous consequences. When terrorist perpetrating war crimes are called freedom fighters, they are in effect gaining license to commit criminal activities and even immunity from the consequences thereof, and moreover, such claims breed further problematic misconceptions that view terror organizations as legitimate resistance movements, and the acts of terror themselves – as brutal and bloody as they might be – as legitimate means of popular struggle.

Therefore, any claims to that effect should be categorically denounced. At the same time, a comprehensive endeavor should be undertaken to debunk this narrative and reinforce the true understanding of terrorism and its overall end, for which any means are exploited: the annihilation of the Jewish state and its Jewish citizens.

In the name of enlightenment: how have terrorists become to be known as “liberators”?

The fictitious claim according to which terrorists are freedom fighters draws on an anti-Zionism narrative, according to which the Jews are colonialists that have seized control of a country called Palestine, with the aim of taking over a land with which they have no connection whatsoever. This contrived narrative is wrong on two accounts: the so-called state of Palestine had never existed, and secondly, the connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is undisputable and is established both historically and legally. The people of Israel are not foreign colonizers – they are a people returning to their rightful land after 2,000 years of unjust exile, which forced upon them an existence as mostly unwanted foreign elements in their hosting countries.

It follows that anyone who supports the Palestinian narrative is refuting the national rights of the Jewish people and disputing major legal rulings made by the international community, such as the British Mandate, granted by the League of Nations and the Partition Plan by the UN from 1947.

Although such claims have been voiced since the establishment of the State of Israel, they have been regaining tailwind under the auspices of radical progressive movements that had risen from the radical left in the Unites States such as the WOKE movement. WOKE and its counterparts are governed by the undiscerning principle that the weak are invariably in the right and victimized, and tend to turn what it perceives as the victim into the hero of the story. As part of this paradigm, the so-called struggle of the Islamic terror organizations for the “liberation” of “oppressed” minorities and the right to self-determination is perceived in some circles as a valiant post-modern struggle, and from there only a short leap was needed to view such terrorists as would-be freedom fighters.

The question of goals: what really motivates terrorists?

The raison d’etre of true freedom fighters is the liberation of their people and land from foreign conquerors that have invaded and seized it by force. A prime example of this is Mahatma Gandhi, who led a peaceful struggle against the British Empire’s rule in India and for national independence. In stark contrast, even a cursory examination of the stated objectives of some terror organizations clearly yields a completely different picture.

A quick look at the Hamas charter, for example, reveals that the organization makes no qualms about stating its overall goal – the all-out, end-justifying “Holy War” (Jihad) against the State of Israel, and the absolute rejection of any agreement or arrangement that would recognize the right of Israel to exist. The charter even quotes Hasan al-Banna ,the founder of its ally movement, The Muslim Brotherhood, who said: “Israel will rise and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it”.

As for Hezbollah, it too does not march under any banner of liberation – neither of people nor of country. It operates out of Lebanon – an independent state with no permanent Israeli  presence within its sovereign borders, and with no land dispute whatsoever with its southern neighbor such that calls for an irridentist agreement. Moreover, Hezbollah operates in Lebanon as a proxy and under the auspices and military support of another sovereign country, Iran, which resides 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Israel, and non-democratically forces its presence on the Lebanese people solely for its proclaimed purpose of annihilating the State of Israel and its citizens.

Another manifestation of the true non-peaceful intentions of terror organizations the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah – and indeed even official Arab organizations such as  the Palestinian Authority – is the fact that for decades, they have been rejecting out of hand nearly every solution or offer that Israel and Western administrations have brought to the table to bring the conflict to a resolution, thus proving that they are not motivated by the desire for emancipation. The underlying reason they have not accepted any diplomatic solution thus far is that all of these recognize the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. In other words – they strive only for a resolution that ensures the eradication of Israel from the map.

The question of operating method: how do terrorists differ from freedom fighters?

In 1984, acclaimed historian, Professor Benzion Netanyahu spoke at the second international conference of the Jonathan Institute for the study of terror. He spoke of the urgent need to fight the misconception regarding the true nature of terrorism, and in particular the perception of terrorists as “freedom fighters” or “protectors” of oppressed people. Professor Netanyahu addresses the manner in which freedom fighters operate and how it vastly differs from that of terrorists. He mentions three points of comparison that still hold true today, even after forty years:

Operating against civilians

Professor Netanyahu points to the fact that freedom fighters wage their struggle for a political or social end, with a fundamental respect to human rights of innocents. In stark contrast, terrorist make it a point to target innocent civilians as a means with which to foment fear and achieve their self-serving political interests.

Looking at the long list of terrorist attacks that have plagued Israel through recent decades – including the October 7 massacre in 2023, it is clear that terrorist organizations are systematically and deliberately targeting the civilian population as well, including the elderly, children and babies.

The installation of totalitarian regimes

Freedom fighters are committed to ensuring universal liberties and rights, says Prof. Netanyahu, which terrorists habitually ignore and violate – even the most basic of human rights – and propagate oppression in territories under their control. In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, it is common knowledge that they use their own people as human shields and ensconce themselves in densely populated areas, often causing intentional harm to innocent people on their side in self-protection or as a means of swaying public opinion with publicized propaganda. Furthermore, terrorist organizations violently oppress weak groups within their own population  such as women, minorities and members of the LGBTQ community. Hence, it would be absurd to present these organizations as champions of human rights and liberties.

Relations with dictatorships, oppressive regimes and organizations

The third point mentioned by Prof. Netanyahu relates to the connection frequently seen between terror organizations and violent groups and oppressive regimes. He explains that the aid terrorist often receive from these sources underscores their affinity to aims of oppression rather than values of liberty.

This connection is particularly evident with those terror organizations that operate on Israel’s borders. Hezbollah is an arm of the Shi’ite Iranian regime – a totalitarian state that had set its sights on orchestrating a world-wide Islamic revolution, and openly proclaims its intention of annihilating the State of Israel.   Interestingly, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), although members of the historically rival Islamic Sunni stream, are willing to benefit from Iran’s sponsorship just to further their cause against Israel, and view themselves as an affiliate of another extremist group – the Muslim Brotherhood – a  fundamentalist Sunni Islamist movement that calls for the eradication of the State of Israel, and is designated as a terrorist group in many countries.

It is evident that these terror groups enjoy the backing of powerful elements with a clear ideology of world dominance, and not only do they have no agenda of liberation – they are motivated by a desire to control and oppress.

Debunking a claim of equivalence: Jewish resistance vs. Islamic terror

There are those who would equate the terror organizations threatening Israel to the struggle of the pre-state Jewish resistance, such as the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and Etzel (the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel). They claim that the members of these groups were no less terrorists than the members of Hamas or Hezbollah today, or alternatively – that the terrorists of the latter two are no less freedom fighters than the members of the Jewish resistance.

However, this comparison disregards all the points mentioned above, and fails to consider that different nature of these resistance movements and the terror organization in terms of objectives and methods of operation.

As far as the objectives of the Jewish resistance – as oppose to the terror organizations, they indeed were committed to true liberation and independence. In 1922, the predecessor to the UN – the League of Nations – ratified the British mandate. This was an international accord standing on solid legal ground that cemented Britain’s commitment to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel. In effect, the British blatantly violated this accord and banned the entrance of Jews in to Israel while at the same time encouraging the settlement of Arabs in the area and transferring territories from Israel to the Emirate of Transjordan. Thus, the Jewish resistance movement did indeed fight for the legal right given to them, and more importantly – once this aim was achieved, the resistance was disbanded or assimilated into the new state’s formal military.

The terror organizations, as above demonstrated, demand independence for a state that does not exist and had never existed. And still, they had received numerous offers over the course of the past decades but rejected any compromise, calling for the destruction of the State of Israel – an objective that has nothing in common with those of the Jewish resistance movement or any other freedom fighting movement for that matter.

A comparison of the methods of operation shows fundamental differences between the two: as oppose to the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, the members of the Jewish militias targeted the British military personnel in the country and not civilians of any nationality. Furthermore, they did all in their power to protect the Jewish population, even at the price of their own lives. Moreover, the fighters of the Jewish resistance did not operate under the auspices or with the support of any state or global organization, and were not affiliated with dictatorships or totalitarian regimes.

The attempt at attributing any equivalence between the pre-state Jewish resistance and the terror organizations is nothing more than a populistic ruse motivated by the aim of creating a distorted picture of reality, or at the very least – it stems from pure ignorance.

A policy of zero tolerance: conclusion and insights

Equating murderous terrorists with freedom fighters is not only fallacious and indeed offensive on many levels – it is downright dangerous. This comparison awards terrorists with justification for their actions, including murder, rape, torture and kidnapping innocents. Statements in support of such actions cannot be accepted, not even in the name of tolerance and freedom of speech, as they legitimize violence against and the murder of Jews. When the equation of terrorists with freedom fighters is heard from sources within Israel itself – not to mention on part of  Israeli officials – they are tenfold graver.

Sadly, these terror organizations have learned and perfected the art of propaganda and disinformation, and their abilities in this area are boosted by the skillful use of internet and AI. They are also very adept at  exploiting Western values and ways of thought to sway public opinion in the West and even in Israel, citing duplicitous pretexts of “human rights”.

Hence, it behooves Israel and the Jewish nation to conduct a holding action and do their share in informing and shaping public opinion – in Israel and the world.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement was formed precisely out of the need to bring the truth and advocate Israel and Zionism to the public. Our organization believes in the imperative of educating on the Jewish national ethos as it is our believe that first and foremost – it is the bedrock of Israel’s national security.

For this end, the IDSF HaBithonistim conducts various activities such as excursions to historic heritage sites across Israel and talks and conferences on Zionism. Recently we have established the pre-military program “Ha’tkuma” that is situated in the Gaza envelop area and held in collaboration with the communities there.

The IDSF HaBithonistim website provides a wide range of content, from commentary on current affairs to opinion pieces and analyses – all with the aim of providing a broad perspective rooted in facts and truth, reinforcing the conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause and above all – to stand as a reminder that in the story of the Jewish people and Zionism – the Jewish nation and the miracle that is the State of Israel are the true heroes.

הפוסט “Freedom Fighters”? Hamas and Hezbollah Are Terrorist Organizations; Any Attempt to Claim Otherwise is Condemnable הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After the Taliban extremists took over Afghanistan in August 2021, they announced that they hoped to continue good relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors: China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and the Gulf states as well. However, existing conditions made direct contacts difficult and the country chosen as principal intermediary — which was thus enabled to fill a significant role in shaping Afghanistan’s regional policy — was Qatar. Qatar had already constructed a relationship with the Taliban years before, when in 2013 it allowed the Taliban to open a diplomatic mission in Doha with support from the US government.

Washington had been looking for a neutral location for holding negotiations with the Taliban in preparation for withdrawing American forces from Afghanistan. It opened the diplomatic mission after finding that direct negotiations, with the Taliban on one side and Afghanistan and the NATO of the time on the other side, were a failure and concluding that a clear alternative channel was needed. The Doha mission would enable the Americans to communicate secretly with the Taliban while officially continuing to support the Afghan government. Qatar was ostensibly the go-between in those talks, but in practice it served as the Taliban’s patron. In the negotiations, the Americans agreed to release imprisoned Taliban members; and among those freed was a founder of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. He would become the head of the organization’s diplomatic mission in Qatar.

On the basis of the US support for Qatar as go-between in talks with the Taliban, Qatar was positioned to take on a broader role in matters touching on Afghanistan. Even after the Doha talks between the Taliban and the former Afghan government collapsed in 2020, western countries — and, especially, international organizations — accepted Qatar’s legitimacy as an intermediary and a point of contact with the Taliban. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and foreign ministers from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy arrived in an aerial caravan to Qatar, emphasizing the country’s importance — in comparison with other countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia — as an intermediary with Afghanistan.

In February 2020, the USA signed a historic peace agreement with the Taliban, including a commitment to gradually withdraw from Afghanistan and lift the sanctions against the organization. The Taliban, for their part, agreed to respect human rights, not to permit terrorist activity from the area under their control, and to open a dialogue with the Afghan government in order to find a solution for Afghanistan. Shortly afterward, when Abdul Ghani Baradar — head of the Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Qatar — landed in Afghanistan to take office as the new President on the Taliban’s behalf, he disembarked from a Qatar Emiri air force plane made in the USA.

Since most of the world’s nations do not officially recognize the Taliban regime, and most of the western embassies have left Afghanistan, intercession by a third party is required; and Qatar is in place as the natural candidate for that role. Qatar’s main interest in Afghan affairs, as in other matters, has to do with entrenching itself as the regional intermediary. Qatar advances its regional and international influence by means of the prestigious intermediation that positions it as a central player in the eyes of the world powers and international organizations. Thus, for example, Qatar intermediated between Germany and the Taliban during 2024 for the return of Afghan emigrants to Afghanistan.

However, some international players see Qatar as offering a platform for the extremism of the Taliban organization, which even cooperates directly with Al-Qaeda and assists in international terrorism.

Qatari policy is basically driven by a combination of political Islam and a business agenda. That policy includes granting material assistance, such as funding, favorable publicity, and even armaments, to various recipients. Thus, for example, for years the Qatari television station Al Jazeera, based in Doha, has given the Taliban a platform for addressing the world. The Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Doha underwent a quick process of branding and was presented as the legitimate representative of the Afghan nation — a sort of shadow government as against the government that sits in Kabul.

An example of Qatar’s deep ties in Afghanistan is that shortly after the attacks of September 11, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network was the only mass communications medium that succeeded in interviewing the number one suspect of the day, Al Qaeda commander Osama Bin Laden, at his hideout in Afghanistan. Thus Qatar’s policies advance its interests indirectly while exploiting its close alliance with the USA.

Qatar appears untroubled by its ties with disreputable players such as Hamas, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, it is such connections that have elevated it as the sole, key player that can lessen the distress of the west in the face of those enemies. Thus Qatar exploits the conflicts of the region and the problems of the west in order to propose a solution tailored by the wealthy little emirate itself. Qatar’s strategy displays more business thinking than ideological determination. However, Qatar’s approach is not pure business; it does also involve making western players dependent on its services so that it may be continue as a central player and as the exclusive address for solving problems with the anti-western elements of the Middle East.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Business Islam: On Qatari–Taliban relations and Qatar’s regional agenda הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the Gaza Strip during the Swords of Iron War, the IDF found large quantities of weaponry apparently made in North Korea. Militarily, Hamas — like Iran’s other proxy organizations — is directly or indirectly connected to North Korea in various ways, such as weapons trading, training, and exercises.

North Korea’s primary news agency, KCNA, rejected such contentions and called them “a baseless, mendacious rumor.” The agency furthermore accused the USA of spreading a conspiracy theory designed to divert attention from its participation alongside Israel in the Gaza warfare. However, the findings proved otherwise as the IDF discovered North Korean RPG F7 among the weapons captured from Hamas, as well as North Korean Bang122 artillery shells. How would weaponry from North Korea have reached Hamas in the Gaza Strip?

North Korea’s relations and deep partnership with Iran and Syria cover a history of many years, and so its military technology has reached Iran’s proxy organizations: Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas. In addition, North Korea’s ties with the Palestinians go back many years — to the beginning of the 1960s. During those early years, North Korea began providing financial assistance and military training to PLO personnel; and later, during the 1970s and 1980s, Yasser Arafat and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine met separately with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Those meetings resulted in a constant supply of North Korean weaponry to the Palestinians. After the Cold War ended, ties between North Korea and the Palestinians dwindled; but in 2007 with the ascendancy of Hamas in Gaza, the ties were revived.

In July 2014, when Israel embarked upon Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Hamas requested military aid from North Korea. In that arrangement, Hamas received rockets and military communications equipment; and besides providing weaponry, financial aid, and military training, North Korea may have also helped Hamas build its Gazan “Metro” — the network of Hamas tunnels — just as it helped Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Hostile though it is to the West and Israel, does North Korea assist terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah for ideological reasons alone? Despite its long-standing support for members of the “Axis of Resistance,” apparently North Korea is primarily motivated — aside from ideology — by economic considerations. North Korea lives under heavy international sanctions, but by its involvement in activities such as sales of weaponry to terrorist organizations it can obtain income to fund its own weapons programs.

North Korea is also pleased by the founding of an anti-American, anti-Western block which consists of Russia, China, and Iran. After Russia invaded Ukraine, North Korea sought a way to leverage strategic accomplishments in expanding its cooperation with Russia while interfering with US efforts in Ukraine. Now, as in Ukraine, North Korea is seeking an opportunity to undermine US interests in the Middle East as well while profiting economically from the conflicts there, such as Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These circumstances increase North Korea’s chances of expanding its sales of weaponry to the terrorist organizations, and to Hamas in particular, following a special decree from Kim Jong Un, as early as November 2023, in support of the Palestinians.

The North Korean angle is not well enough publicized, but it is dangerous and its shadow could darken the war. North Korea’s illegal sales of weapons to Hamas could help that terrorist organization recuperate more quickly than expected after the critical blow of the war in which most of its leadership in Gaza was eliminated — including the commander, Yahya Sinwar — and much of its war materiel and terrorist ground force was destroyed. Standing with Iran, which is also suffering heavily in the current war, North Korea may profit economically and strategically as it improves the condition of the terrorist organizations during the war and especially afterward.

“This article was originally published in ynetnews.”

הפוסט The North Korean Angle: On North Korea’s relations with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dr. Moshe Yegar’s home, in Jerusalem, tells a story. There are photos from diplomatic occasions around the world. There are certificates of appreciation and prizes relating to his diplomatic and academic work, including the Jabotinsky Prize for Literature and Research and a special prize for his part in establishing Israeli–Indian relations. In his rich library, 20 books may be found that he wrote in Hebrew. Several of them have been translated into other languages, and four more were written originally in English. Most of them deal with history and with the diplomatic side of Israel’s international relations.

A new immigrant who spoke Hebrew better than the sabras

Dr. Moshe Yegar was born in 1930, and at age 94 he still has his vim. We met him at his home to hear about his 40 years of service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about his perspective on the present situation. It was a special interview with a special person who had occasion to work under such figures as Golda Meir, Abba Eban, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yitzhak Shamir, among others. But we should start at the beginning.

Moshe, let’s go back to 1935. You arrived in Israel from — where?

We came from Argentina when I wasn’t yet five. My father was a Hebrew teacher, and he was sent to teach in Zichron Yaakov. I started kindergarten as a new immigrant, but my Hebrew was correct and graceful thanks to my father. From the day I was born, he’d spoken only Hebrew to me, even before we came to Israel. We lived in Zichron Yaakov for five years, and those years left a deep impression on me.

Did you join the Haganah?

I was a member of the youth brigades in the Haganah for two years. When the War of Independence began as soon as independence was declared, my fellow members and I were recruited into the IDF. I was one of the trainers for the scouts movement, and we were among the founders of the Nahal — together with the United Nahal Movement. We also founded Kibbutz Tel Katzir.

Did you consider continuing into a military career?

At a certain point I left Tel Katzir and went back to being an enlisted man in the IDF. I was in the Nahal’s first NCO course. I also took a Master Sergeant course and I was appointed master sergeant for the Nahal’s first company of privates. I was also sent for paratrooper training, and then to the eighth round of the officer training course. Afterward I was discharged from the IDF and I went to study at the Hebrew University.

And then it was straight out of the university into a diplomatic career?

After my bachelor’s degree in modern Middle Eastern history, political science, and general history, I went on to study for a master’s. But I wanted to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the end, I passed the qualifying exam for cadets. That was the third time it was given, in 1956. In the next 40 years, I held various positions in Israel and in Israeli missions abroad. I finished up my master’s while I was an emissary in Burma.

So was it your time in Burma that prompted you to become an expert in Asian Islam?

Because the Hebrew University wasn’t teaching Asian Islam at that time, I received special permission to write a thesis on Burma’s Muslim minority. Afterward, I researched Islam in British Malaya, which is Malaysia today. That was my doctorate. I worked for about twenty years, in my spare time, on a comparative study of Muslim uprisings in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The Bible as key to diplomatic ties

During his 40 years of diplomatic service, Dr. Yegar filled significant roles around the world. After his service in Malaysia, he was a consul in Los Angeles and consul general in Philadelphia. Among his various assignments in Israel, he was head of public diplomacy and of the Asian division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He participated in Operation Solomon (the airlift of Ethiopian Jews) and played a central role in establishing Israel’s relations with India and other Asian and African nations, besides serving terms as ambassador to Sweden and to the Czech Republic.

You held positions under several Foreign Ministers. What are the specifics?

When I was deputy head of the Asian division and Abba Eban was Foreign Minister, he appointed me to head the training department. When Yigal Alon was Foreign Minister, he appointed me department head for public diplomacy, and when Yitzhak Shamir was Foreign Minister, he appointed me division head for public diplomacy. I held that job for five years.

You developed a special cultural project in the Czech Republic. Tell us about it.

After the communist regime collapsed, the Czech Republic was very friendly toward Israel. I dreamed up a large festival focusing on the Bible as it’s reflected in various art forms. The festival was a year and a half or so in the making, and in the end it included 71 musical events, theatrical performances, art exhibits, academic seminars, and art competitions for schoolchildren — all based on biblical topics. It was a large display of culture in Prague and it made a significant contribution to Israel’s reputation. Everyone understood that the Bible was the gift of the Jewish people to human civilization.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, why are artistic and cultural ties important?

After World War II, technology surged forward and brought a complete change in the diplomatic profession. It’s no longer merely negotiations between the leaders of different countries, but also a means of creating broad-based ties between populations that had lived for generations without caring about their countries’ foreign relations.

Today’s communications media have given very large sectors of the public an interest in the diplomatic relations between countries and peoples. For that reason, there’s a new diplomacy with a new face. Today various countries engage in presenting their culture and their language to other populations in an effort to make friends with them. That’s a different kind of diplomacy, and a very interesting kind. It brings many challenges and it requires appointing diplomats who fit such a job. For example, diplomats today need a wider-ranging education — far beyond what was expected from them in past generations.

When other countries receive more extensive knowledge and understanding of the diplomat’s home country, a friendly atmosphere is created. That atmosphere can contribute directly to deeper economic ties, to security, and to all the other factors that mutually benefit the countries involved.

So there’s special importance to Israel’s integration of the Bible into public and cultural diplomacy in Christian regions, which recognize the Bible as an element of their own culture — the USA, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and even Asia’s sole Christian country, the Philippines.

Zionism should free itself of illusions and think straight

What’s your opinion on Israel’s current diplomatic and security situation?

We need to break free from illusions. At first, Zionism was looking for ways to come to an agreement with the Arabs. We hoped they would yield a little piece of their vast territory and allow the Jewish nation return to its historic homeland. The various streams of the Zionist movement made countless attempts to reach an understanding, an agreed compromise with the Arabs — including partition proposals — but they all failed. Now, after October 7, it’s clearer to us than ever. Likely not many of us still suffer from the illusions of the past. Zionism tried to win the understanding and consent of the Arabs by offering various suggestions, such as territorial compromise, or by advancing the idea that the homecoming of the Jews would bring benefits to the Arabs’ economy, their health system, their educational system, and so on. Nothing helped.

The Arabs received proposals for establishing their own “Palestinian” state, but they showed no interest in those proposals. The most prominent proposals that come to mind are those from the Peel Commission in 1938, the UN in 1947, and Oslo in 1993. There were other attempts as well, but the Arabs, the “Palestinians,” never showed interest in setting up a state of their own. Instead, they were determined and consistent in their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, be it big or small. They used every violent means at their disposal to prevent the birth of the State of Israel and they sank to inconceivable levels of barbarous, monstrous cruelty. Their determination has continued for almost 120 years now, coming to expression in what we call terrorist movements. The Arabs see them differently.

We’re at war now with two cruel terrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah. They both are managed and supported by our great enemy Iran. How do you expect this to end?

This war has gone on too long but it can be expected to end eventually with the destruction of those two movements. Still, we shouldn’t suffer any further illusions. The Arabs can be expected with some certainty to continue their violence and terrorism against us. They can set up new organizations, and many members of Hamas and Hezbollah will continue their activity against us as individuals or small squads. They’re not short of weapons.

In practical terms, what should be the final objective regarding Hamas and Gaza?

As a lesson to other Arab states, Israel should destroy Hamas, wipe out every trace of its presence, and complete the job by taking over the entire Gaza Strip. Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, but despite all its superiority, it hasn’t managed to defeat a terrorist organization like Hamas.

But what’s the definition of defeating Hamas?

We and the other side conceive of victory quite differently. The difference has reappeared in each round of conflict. Each time, I felt afterward that we hadn’t achieved much. From their point of view, they’ve won if their leadership survived and they have the ability to regroup. The loss of life, the destruction of Gaza, the civilian distress aren’t a consideration for them. There’s no deterrence. They believe they have a holy mission to exterminate Israel. As long as we leave them the ability to regroup, even if it takes them years, and as long as they have outside support, they’ll persist. Their ability to regroup needs to be rooted out completely.

Is your outlook, with the benefit of such age and experience, optimistic?

October 7 was a severe event, but yes, I’m optimistic despite our current situation. Throughout history, our enemies have always risen up against us and the Jewish nation has a special resilience even after suffering the greatest damage, such as the loss of six million lives in World War II when European Jewry was slaughtered by the Germans and their accomplices. We need to understand that our presence here is not to be taken for granted, and to remember at the same time that despite the difficulties, the Jewish nation has a certain internal energy, a rare self-healing power. We shall win out.

הפוסט “The nation of Israel has self-healing power. We shall win out.” An interview with Dr. Moshe Yegar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In mid-July 2024, the Azeri Embassy in Tehran was reopened after a year of negotiations to relieve the tensions between the two countries.

Relations soured between Iran and Azerbaijan after an armed assailant stormed the Azeri Embassy in Tehran in January 2023, killing the security officer and injuring two other guards. Despite Iran’s adamant denials, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, called this a “terrorist attack”.  Relations between the two countries deteriorated still further After Azerbaijan decided to open an embassy in Israel in March 2023. This infuriated the Iranians, since while their relations with their northern neighbor hit a new low, Baku’s relations with Jerusalem kept warming up.

It is no surprise the opening of an official Azeri presence in Israel caused the Tehran-Baku relations to sour. This being said, following the October 7 massacre by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two Iranian proxies, and the war in Gaza that ensued – the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan assumed yet another dimension.

In November 2023, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called on all Muslim countries to sever all their diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, given the war in Gaza. Khamenei even stressed that “oil and food export routes to Israel ought to be blocked”. Khamenei attempted to lead an anti-Israeli Islamic resistance front, however it seemed like this initiative failed to produce actual results on the ground.

This was due to the fact that two countries, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), were supplying oil to Israel: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Of these two oil-rich countries, Azerbaijan is the more important for Israel. Azerbaijan provides Israel with some 40% of its oil consumption. In return it is a recipient of advanced Israeli weaponry worth billions of dollars.

The Israeli armaments have enabled Azerbaijan to achieve a military advantage over its adversary, Armenia. On the other hand, Israel is given a foothold in a strategically important region. It uses the area for intelligence operations against Iran, Azerbaijan’s neighbor.

From the Iranian perspective, the close ties between Baku and Jerusalem mean an increased Israeli presence in the region – a presence that includes weapons and economic and security ties. However, the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship is just one factor impeding Tehran’s relations with Baku, a Shiite-majority country. Ever since Azerbaijan became independent with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has regarded it as a backyard of sorts for expanding its Shiite religious and political influence in its quest for regional hegemony.

Iran has always worked to recruit Shiite communities into its “Axis of Resistance”. This began with its strategy of warfare by proxy, which focused on Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Additionally, Iran sought to penetrate the Shiite community in Azerbaijan. In 2013, Iran established the Husayniyun – the Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan – in an effort to form a powerful proxy organization in the Caucasus. The first recruits to the Husayniyun were six Azeri citizens who left for Syria to defend Shiite shrines against Sunni opponents during the civil war against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Qasem Soleimani, the then-commander of the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elite unit, personally declared the establishment of the new proxy unit in 2017.

After Azerbaijan emerged victorious against Armenia in the 2020 war, and having regained control of the Nagorno Karabakh region, Azeris in Iran began identifying more strongly with Azerbaijan. At the same time, shortly after the war, Iranian proxy groups, including the Husayniyun, flooded the social media with videos in Azeri, promoting their radical religious ideology. They called for the local Shiites to rise up against the government and attack government buildings in Azerbaijan.

Later on, Iran stoked the unrest against the Azeri government. In response, Baku embarked on a mass oppression drive against pro-Iranian networks in the country. In November 2022, five persons were arrested and charged with spying for Iran. The detainees were accused of having provided the Iranian security agencies information harmful to Azerbaijan’s security.

In July 2023, an Afghani national Pavzan Musa Khan, was detained in Baku by Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX). He was suspected of conspiring to conduct a terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku. Khan was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison.

Khan mentioned “other brothers” that have attempted to commit such terror acts. This very fact traces back to Tehran and implies on Iranian involvement, as all previous attempts to attack Israeli targets in Baju were plotted by Tehran.

From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, activities by pro-Iranian forces in the south Caucasus region might potentially exacerbate regional tensions. For this reason, Iran has tried to use the Azerbaijan Husayniyun to deter Azerbaijan and lower the level of relations with Israel.

As Iran shifted its focus toward using its proxies against Israel in the Swords of Iron War, it appears that it has for the time being abandoned its strategy of influencing the Shiite communities in Azerbaijan and that it is now more intent on strengthening its ties with that country. As part of Iran’s fight against Israel through its proxies, it is attempting to isolate it regionally and internationally, meaning that improving its relations with Azerbaijan is now a high priority. Therefore, despite the tensions between the two countries, Iran and Azerbaijan have begun developing their economic ties, and in particular the trade and transport corridor that is also of interest to the northern neighbor, Russia.

Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan are tense and volatile. It is attempting to exert pressure on Baku following the war in Gaza and the widespread international condemnation of Israel. This being said, it appears that the Iranians do not have sufficient leverage to persuade Azerbaijan to sever its relations with Israel, thereby leaving it alone in the face of the threat from Tehran. In contrast to the other Shiite regional players, Iran is being unsuccessful in expanding its influence in a large Shiite country like Azerbaijan, as opposed to the successes it has had among Shiite communities throughout the Middle East, harnessing them under its control through local front-line franchises, as is the case in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Azerbaijan Shiite Challenge: On Iran-Azerbaijan relations and the Israeli Angle הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In an interview on May 8^th, President Biden proclaimed the following: “I made it clear that if they [the Israelis] go into Rafah… I’m not supplying the weapons…”. He said this a day after the operation in which the IDF took over the Philadelphi Corridor and the city of Rafah. At the time, Israeli was facing an unprecedented international campaign to pressure Israel in order to prevent it from reaching Hamas’s southern stronghold in the Gaza Strip and cut it off, advancing from the Philadelphi Corridor. The international community fumed over the possibility that Israel would “exacerbate the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza”, and further deteriorate the situation, which was already in a state if “catastrophe”.

Today’s public discourse on the Israel’s intention to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor casts light on the prevalence of the state of denial throughout the Israeli security establishment regarding the nature of the Gazan threat before the seventh of October – a pendulum that is now repositioning this issue at the heart of public discourse, and has even managed to infect large swathes of the public. Skeptics of the need to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor are leading certain segments of the population, egged on by former senior officials in the security establishment, to associate this objective, which is unequivocally based on security considerations, with political motives. They even describe it as a “spin designed to scuttle the hostage agreement”, for some unknown reason.

“The entire Philadelphi issue is fake news,” quipped one senior official, stating that there was no need to “overstate the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor in preventing Hamas from reconstituting, since it has just been dismantled, and since Hamas has been set back 30 years.” Another official claimed that “control of the Philadelphi Corridor is meaningless”, and even called it “the greatest sham since the establishment of the state.” Using the authoritativeness the comes with their security backgrounds, those former officials are trying to instill fear in the public at the prospect of taking responsibility for 2 million Gazans. They promise that the Gazan problem has been neutralized for the foreseeable future, and call on us to close this chapter in Gaza, and go to elections.

To make matters worse, these irresponsible statements are compounded with the promise that had already been made in the past, according to which the Philadelphi Corridor can be retaken the moment it’s needed to ensure our security. One of those officials even said that it just a “45-minute drive” to retake the 14-kilometer stretch along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The inconsistency reflected in these claims also gives pause for thought. On the one hand, they claim that the Philadelphi Corridor is strategically insignificant, but on the other hand, this insignificant region could easily be retaken when the ceasefire expires.

To be clear, statements like this mislead the general public with false hope, according to which there are “instant”, magical solutions to thorny strategic and security issues. Let’s start with the basics: Hamas has never agreed to release 109 Israeli hostages in exchange for a withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. The corridor was only one of the 29 “amendments” submitted by Hamas to the American-Israeli proposal. The other 28 pertained to the Netzarim Corridor, a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the end of the war, the release of prisoners, the reconstruction of Gaza after the war, among others. Otherwise, one might presume that Israel’s political leadership might have faced an entirely different dilemma.

Moreover, the decision to return to the Philadelphi Corridor after a ceasefire is not and will never be a tactical military decision which could be implemented with ease, based solely on how fast a tank can travel, or how fast three brigades can be mobilized. As in any other wartime decision, it exists within a web of political interests, international pressure, and a strategic objective vis-a-vis Egypt, the IDF, and the Israeli public as well.

Lest we forget, Israel stalled for nearly seven months, until May, to complete the occupation of Gaza from the south. People worldwide reacted hysterically to a possible Israeli incursion into Rafah, as a global campaign aimed at making Israel “stop the massacre in Gaza” was waged through the mass media, the social media, protesters who took to the streets, and decision-makers in foreign governments. Drawn by the “all eyes on Rafah” trend, tens of thousands of demonstrators waving Palestinian flags took to the streets and occupied campuses in Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Not a day went by in which the secretary general of the United Nations didn’t make a declaration peppered with hyperbole on “the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza”, including a statement that “the horror must end”. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, blamed Israel for “provoking famine in Gaza”, and called on the United States to halt arms shipments to Israel. When it came to pressuring Israel to concede and withdraw, it was no holds barred.

On March 25^th, ties between the Israel and the United States soured to the point that the US abstained from voting on a UN Security Council that did not tie the ceasefire to returning the hostages. Secretary of State Blinken repeatedly implored Israel not to insist on carrying out the operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, which was allegedly devoid of any strategic logic and for which it would take many months to evacuate the civilian population. Yet the civilians evacuated within days, relocating to humanitarian zones the IDF had set up, as it directed an unprecedented humanitarian relief effort.

This is also where the question of legitimacy plays in. Israel piggybacked on the momentum and legitimacy that followed the October 7^th massacre in order to carry out action that would decisively defeat Hamas in Gaza. This opportunity may never return. Starting a war to remove the threat hasn’t been defined as a war objective since the Six-Day War. This is evidenced by the fact that Hamas’s buildup in Gaza and Hezbollah’s buildup in Lebanon were neglected. After the Disengagement, the population was promised that a single rocket fired from Gaza would be met with a tough response, and those same people now feel that we’ll be able to take over the Philadelphi Corridor after the first smuggling operation. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The notion that contrary to what occurred in the past fifty years, this time, Israel would act differently and wage an elective war is a delusion. It deludes the public, since it involves a misunderstanding of the nature of the political and military echelons in Israel. This includes, first and foremost, avoiding an elective war, and preferring pinpointed operations, such that the denial zone expands to the point when we have no other choice – not to mention a significant international arm-twisting effort that could constrain Israel’s freedom of action.

A withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor would run contrary to Israel’s interest of not going from one war to the next, but rather, preserving the conditions for a stable security situation for generations to come. The notion that Israel should be forced to reach a tipping point to reproduce its achievements is indicative of myopic thinking, rather than strategic depth. It would be like turning off all of the traffic lights in Israel, since they could always be turned on again, once an accident occurs. These are not the principles upon which we can guarantee that we’ll control the situation on the ground.

Israel never excelled at insisting on rock-hard principles at the heart of its security concept, and it often preferred either taking the risks involved in withdrawals, in exchange for foreign troops being posted in the area – in the case of the Philadelphi Corridor, 750 Egyptian soldiers were posted, along with helicopters and APCs – or placing its security in the hands of foreigners – in the case of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was empowered to fight terror in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, instead of Israel. During the Disengagement, the IDF aligned its position with Prime Minister Sharon, and supported a full surrender of control of the corridor due to “the operational difficulty involved in controlling the narrow strip” and the fact that weapons were being smuggled through tunnels in any case, so for the IDF, surrendering control of the corridor was “the lesser of two evils”.

If there’s any major lesson that Israel could learn from the October 7^th massacre, it’s that metastasizing threats cannot be neglected, and that we can’t remain completely blind to what’s happening in Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, or Iran. The massacre prompted the populace to demand that their decision-makers decisively defeat the enemy and remove the threat – a war objective that hasn’t been set since the Six-Day War. Israel tried to avert war at any cost, following the policy of “quiet in exchange for quiet” and pinpointed operations, with the full blessing of the security establishment, keeping the political echelon in its comfort zone. Our hostages must be returned, while applying massive pressure on Hamas and the Gazan population, clarifying the cost of losing, applying international pressure on Iran as well, and breaking all of the rules that Hamas is trying to keep intact.

The Philadelphi Corridor must remain under Israel’s full control, including above-ground patrols to prevent unrestricted movement, underground detection to combat tunnels, and airborne activity, to prevent the infiltration of drones. This is how we can sever the lifeline used by Hamas and other terror organizations, and fulfill the war objective of destroying the organization in Gaza. Though most Israelis understand the gravity of the situation and rally around this objective, fully recalling the river of blood that flowed in the attempt to fulfill it, it’s unfortunate that this chorus isn’t seeking to remedy this, but rather, to go back to denial.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Retaking the Philadelphi Corridor will not be measured by the tank’s driving speed, but international pressure and Israeli denial הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Egypt, with its steadily growing population of some 113 million people (estimated to reach 160 million by 2050), is currently in the throes of a deep economic crisis, manifesting in a high inflation rate – approximately 34% as of 2023; a steep poverty rate at 29.7% as of 2019; a devaluation of the Egyptian Lira and a staggering debt to the tune of 165 billion dollars.

A new study by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement explores the causes of this crisis, Israel’s economic relations with Egypt and the potential opportunities lying therein for Israel.

One of the main threats to Egypt’s economy is the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on one of the Nile river’s sources. This project might cut off part of Egypt’s water supply, floating concerns of already soaring unemployment rates climbing even higher, as some 20% of the country’s population makes its living in agriculture. This also might deliver a blow to Egypt’s ability to produce food and supply electricity for its population, sinking the country’s GDP to a debilitating low. In turn, Egypt will find itself relying heavily on foreign import, increasing its already staggering debt and drag it into a whirlpool of financial crisis.

If that were not enough, Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, has been fostering various grandiose projects that are costing the Egyptian tax-payer billions of dollars. He is expected to continue pouring funds into these initiatives over the next few years, which will demand additional economic aid that will dig the economy into even deeper debt.

One such undertaking is the construction of the New Nile Delta project, aiming to enhance the country’s agricultural capacity to service its rapidly growing population. Egypt hopes that upon the conclusion of the Nile Delta expansion it will be able to independently produce vaster quantities of food at lower costs, while at the same time create jobs for millions of citizens.

Another such project is The New Administrative City – a new state-of-the-art capital located between its current capital of Cairo to Suez. The new city is expected to sit on an area of some 725 square kilometers (280 square miles) and become home to millions of people. The estimated cost of this project is approximately 58 billion dollars. An additional 14 cities are currently under construction across the country. Despite the fact that large swaths of the new city have already been completed, they remain unpopulated for the time being, and it is estimated that by the end of 2024, some 10,000 families will have relocated to the city.

At the same time, El-Sisi is pushing the construction of a new coastal city on an area of 170 square kilometers (66 square miles), which is planned to include new residential buildings, hotels, tourist attractions, hospitals, universities and more. This project aims to increase the country’s inflow of tourism, investments and foreign currency as a means with which to boost its economy. For this project, Egypt had signed in 2024 a financing agreement with the UAE  to the tune of 35 billion dollars. Estimates in Egypt are that total investments in this endeavor will amount to at least 150 billion dollars.

Another problem for the Egyptian economy is its debt crunch, wherein the country’s foreign debt now exceeds 165 billion dollars. In the 23-24 fiscal year, approximately 56% of the budget costs were allocated to covering past loans and interest, and to date, about 49% of the government’s revenues come from new loans. This creates a state of affairs in which Egypt is taking out gargantuan new loans to repay old debt and is in effect digging itself deeper into its financial hole. In light of this crisis, on December 2022 Egypt reached an agreement with the IMF for a 3-billion-dollar loan against a commitment to overhaul its economy and instate an economic reform. Despite less than adequate performance on this issue on part of Egypt, the IMF had agreed on March 2024 to increase the loan by another 5 billion dollars, and compromised on the execution of the reform, that would stand on four main pillars: an alternative and more flexible rate of exchange system; a tightening of the monetary and fiscal policies; earmarking a budget for supporting under the poverty line households; and attaining a healthy balance between the public and private sectors of the country.

Egypt’s economic relations with Israel

While Egypt is contending with its economic crises, Israel continues  its relatively steady trade relations with the Arab country. These ties are a ray of light in Egypt’s dismal economic situation.

One positive aspect of these relations is the Israeli tourism to the land of the Pharaohs. Every year, a large number of Israelis visit Egypt – mainly in the Sinai – boosting Egypt’s tourism. It is important to note though, that the outbreak of the Gaza war had significantly stemmed that flow.

In addition, the annual trade volume between the two countries is at hundreds of millions of dollars. These prolific relations bred joint trade meetings and conferences to expand economic collaboration and had even led to a plan to increase trade to 700 million dollars over the next several years. Just for comparison – in 2021, the volume of trade between Israel and Egypt – excluding gas – was at some 330 million dollars.

The main engine of the economic relations between the two countries is the gas export from Israel to Egypt – the mainstay of the trade relations. According to an agreement signed in 2018, Israel is to supply Egypt with 15 billion dollars’ worth of gas over a period of ten years. This gas is intended mainly for Egypt’s energy needs but some of it is exported by Egypt to Europe, after being processed by Egypt’s LNG plants, and is an important source of revenue for the government. Later, another agreement was signed between both countries in 2022, for the expansion of the supply from Israel. Additionally, in 2023, Egypt had pressured Israel to increase the supply. The outbreak of the Gaza war significantly reduced the supply of gas from Israel and in Egypt grievances were voiced on the frequent power cuts and the waning revenues from the LNG gas exports. Nonetheless, Israel continues to uphold its end of the deal and the partners of the Tamar gas field had even announced an increase of gas exports to Egypt starting 2025. It is safe to assume that in light of these developments, Egypt’s dependency on Israeli gas will deepen.

In conclusion, in the current state of affairs, Egypt is entrenched in a near-crippling economic crisis which is not expected to end in the next several years. Additionally, since the start of the Gaza war, Egypt has been adopting actions and rhetoric that are contradictory to Israel’s interest. In response, Israel can – and must – bring into play the leverages it possesses in the form of control over the gas tap, its relations with the US and its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, in order to advance Israel’s interest in the current armed conflict, i.e. the  seizure of Rafah, the elimination of Hamas, the return of the Israeli hostages and the control over the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border, and ensure Egypt’s support of these interest, while receiving aid from Israel.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Egypt’s Faltering Economy – A Local Crisis; An Opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The United Nations’ Secretary General, Antonio Gutteres, made a speech to mark one year to the October 7 massacre in Israel. Though he made the most compelling call for condemnation of Hamas, he failed to call upon his organization to recognize it as a terror group, to condemn Iran’s multifront campaign on the Jewish State, as well as touch upon the unprecedented anti-Israeli campaign he and the UN have been engaged in over the past year.

Here is an alternative speech that could still be delivered, if Guterres so choses.

The decision is his to make.

***

Distinguished delegates,

It has been one year since Iranian protégé Hamas’ horrible and inhumane massacre of innocent Israelis on October 7, and the Iran’s ensuing multifront campaign against Israel. It pains me to report, however, that the United Nations so far failed to take the most basic step and condemn this atrocity. One does not need to take sides to outright reject the human suffering caused by these enemies of civilization.

Over the past year, I made 37 work-related trips around the world in my capacity as the United Nations’ Secretary General. My unwavering commitment to the international community that entrusted me with this sacred mission is to be an honest broker, while insisting on fundamental values we should all share. I therefore traveled to all seven continents but Australia and Antarctica, and above all, the Middle East, in an attempt to bring the world together. Yet I regret to inform you that I preferred to skip over Israel, despite the fact that this long-standing member of the United Nations has just suffered the deadliest terrorist attack in its history.

However, I have taken the trouble to repeatedly talk at Israelis, rather than with them. I skipped no superlative in laying out my accusations of Israel, rushing to be “horrified” by Israeli airstrikes on Hamas compounds and averting against “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza. My deputy and a commission I appointed accused Israel of committing “war crimes”, my envoy to the Middle East claimed Israel had “no right of self-defense”, and my organization, the United Nations, still refuses to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. I myself invoked Chapter 99 for the first time since coming into office and only for the fourth time in history, citing concerns on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Yet I failed to explain how Gaza outperforms Yemen, with 400,000 dead from starvation, Syria, Ukraine, drug wars in Mexico, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, theaters that summon frail international reaction.

I repeatedly condemned Israel by name, accusing it of everything from deliberate starvation to genocide, with no evidence but Hamas’ bogus data (the “Gaza Ministry of Health”), ignoring over 1 million aid trucks that entered Gaza this year. Yet when Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles at Israeli cities, I never mentioned the Ayatollah regime by name, simply making a general reference to “escalation in the Middle East”, as if talking about the weather.

I have to admit that under my reign, I continued a UN tradition of anti-Israel bias. Already on October 19, before any Israeli troops ever entered Gaza, I traveled to Egypt and accused Israel of “starving” Palestinians in Gaza. “For nearly two weeks, the people of Gaza have gone without any shipments of fuel, food, water, medicine and other essentials,” I stated at the El Arish airport, as a 747 cargo was landing behind me, carrying 65 metric tons of humanitarian supplies on its way to Gaza.

I was oblivious, perhaps willfully, to the fact that since October 7, Israel remained the only country in the world to supply its enemy with food and fuel during wartime, with a great risk to its soldiers: over 60,000 trucks and airborne deliveries have shipped over 1 million tons of humanitarian aid into Gaza, supplying as many as 3,400 calories per day to every Gazan citizen. This policy remains highly unpopular among the Israeli public, as hostages are still being held in sub-human conditions in Gaza. Israel allowed and facilitated this despite clear indications that Hamas uses much of it to its own advantage.

I came back to Egypt in March, while flagrantly skipping over Israel once again. I did not skip over superlatives, though, claiming it was “monstrous” that “Palestinians in Gaza are marking Ramadan with Israeli bombs still falling, bullets still flying, artillery still pounding and humanitarian assistance still facing obstacle upon obstacle.” However, I made no request to Egypt, my host country, to stop blocking Palestinian refugees from fleeing into its territory or hurdling humanitarian aid, given it shares a border with Gaza. Egyptian President Al-Sisi even fenced out an enclave to block refugees in case the border is breached through the Rafah area. I would have never accepted such a situation had Moldova, Poland, or Romania ever blocked Ukrainian refugees from escaping a war zone.

I also failed to recognize how my own UN agencies actively colluded with Hamas. UNRWA facilitated the murder of Israelis with its teachers participating in the October 7 massacre, holding hostages, and over 400 of its members being part of Hamas’ Al Qassam Brigades. That did not stop me from claiming “188 UN workers” were killed in Gaza, outcrying how the “horror must stop,” while ignoring the oldest trick in the Hamas manual – registering terrorists as UN workers.

My agency UNOCHA, on its part, continues to whitewash Hamas’ disinformation. Figures neatly presented in charts and infographics illustrated how 42,000 Palestinians were allegedly killed in Gaza, based on bogus data provided by Hamas’ “Gaza Ministry of Health” and “various media reports”. I reiterated those figures, while professing to alert against “grave global harm” caused by other types of disinformation. Scores of violent protesters blocked Jewish students from entering campuses and attacked Jewish people on the streets around the world based on these false claims, that my own UN has slashed by half ever since.

Disinformation has even become normalized under my reign – though only when Israel is concerned. 35 Palestinians were never killed in an UNRWA school by an Israeli airstrike on June 6, yet my UN News agency rushed to report just that, and my spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric claimed that the incident was “another horrific example of the price that civilians are paying” in Gaza. Later I found out that 17 Hamas militants used the compound as a military site, a legitimate target according to any international law – with no civilian casualties. 500 Palestinians were never killed in the Al Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza on October 17, yet I rushed to announce I was “horrified” and “shocked” by the incident. Had I awaited the facts, I would have known that this was yet another Hamas fake news. In reality, a misfired PIJ rocket landed in the hospital’s parking lot, all but burning a few cars.

Israel was even excluded from the UN’s report on sexual violence despite multiple evidence on such crimes by Hamas on October 7, while we falsely accused Israel of committing such sexual crimes on Palestinians without a shred of evidence, simply for the sake of false balance.

Unlike my focus on Israel, I never made any significant appeal on Iran to cease funding terrorism, illegally developing nuclear weapons and publicly calling for the annihilation of Israel, while violating practically all of its international obligations. The Iranian regime instigated the October 7 massacre and continues to wreak havoc around the region and the world. I only mentioned Iran when paying tribute to its notorious president Raisi, in a special visit to Tehran, mourning the death of a mass murderer who made a mockery of international law and minority rights I care deeply about.

In general, I cannot report to you that I’m proud of my record from the past year. Rather than harshly criticizing Israel based on cooked numbers and partial reports, or only expressing empathy with Israeli victims within a “yes, but” context (as my famous speech shortly after the massacre, saying it “did not happen in a vacuum”), I should have rallied the international community against the clear and present threats aimed at the only Jewish state.

While Israel is fighting an existential war and is subject to attacks on multiple fronts, I failed to meet my obligations to it. I presided over a UN that according to my predecessor Koffi Annan, is “misused to constantly vilify the Jewish state and, in so doing, damage the world body itself and its universal values.” Its General Assembly dedicates 85% of its annual resolutions to Israel, while its Human Right Council’s infamous Article 7 singles Israel out for no apparent reason. No other country suffers this level existential threat while being in the crosshairs of the international community.

Going back to where I started – I did pay a visit to Israel during my tenure, albeit not in the past year, but in 2017. I stressed my commitment to combat anti-Semitism in the Yad Vashem holocaust memorial, while failing to meet that promise. I then visited the kibbutz of Nahal Oz, who borders Gaza and “heard from them of their fears of rocket attacks from Hamas, as well as tunnel infiltration”. I commended the residents’ will “to see Palestinians and Israelis living both in peace and both well.” I then toured a Hamas attack tunnel crossing the border. I failed to appreciate how this will evolve into an all-out massacre of 1,200 innocent Israelis, of which 16 were murdered and 8 taken hostage in the same Nahal Oz.

I realize my tenure will go down in history as a particularly shameful period as it relates not only to treating Israel, but any freedom-seeking nation. But now we have an opportunity to correct that record. Iran’s campaign of terror, rape and hostage taking must stop. Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire but to be encouraged to do justice with humanity’s most abominable enemies. We should all also appreciate the heroism of Israeli combatants who put their lives on the line not only for the defense of Israel, but all of us in the free world. Israel managed to channel unspeakable suffering into encapsulating human destiny with the spirit of its people and the ferocious Jewish belief in an ultimate good. For failing to meet my commitment, I ask Israel and my Jewish friends around the world for your forgiveness. May we leverage this war to vanquish evil, rather than appeasing it, and empowering Israel, rather than disavowing it.

Thank you.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט The Speech UN’s Guterres Should Have Given on October 7: “Time to Correct Our Record” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the aftermath of Yahya Sinwar’s death, Hamas is in deep shock. They are now struggling to recover and choose a new leader. Sinwar’s killing is perceived to be much more significant than that of Ismail Haniyeh, and even of Ahmad Yassin in 2004. This is due to the fact that the Hamas leadership is now divided between the “Iranian-Shiite” axis and the “Sunni Axis”. Following Ismail Haniyeh’s killing in July, when it seemed that Khaled Mashal would take over from Haniyeh and resume his former role as Head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Iran and Sinwar were adamantly opposed to this move. Khaled Mashal was reputed to be the leader of the “Sunni Axis” in Hamas, close to and supportive of Qatar and Turkey.

In view of the schisms within the Hamas leadership – between the Shiite axis and the Sunni axis, and between the “Hamas Leadership Abroad” and the “Hamas Leadership in Gaza”, what are the implications of Sinwar’s death on this murderous terrorist organization?

The Hamas leadership is struggling to select a new leader so as to continue the war against Israel. The removal of Sinwar is a severe blow to the organization, however it is thought the organization is not going to disappear completely, and it might even recover. One of the prevailing assessments in the Israel security forces is that the center of gravity, where decisions will be made, will now migrate from the Hamas Leadership in Gaza to the Hamas Leadership Abroad, and that Sinwar’s replacement will be selected from this group.

A feverish battle of succession is now underway, where the Hamas Gaza also has a “trump card” in the form of Muhammad Sinwar, Yahya Sinwar’s brother, who is now leading Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The latter is now running the fight against Israel, he holds the Israeli hostages. With him is Muhammad Shabana, commander of the organization’s Rafah Brigade.

The Hamas senior leadership is now divided. The battle behind the scenes is between the candidates affiliated with Iran and those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent movement. Iran, it seems, will do whatever it can to retain Hamas as its proxy. Hamas, which is not an Iranian proxy by nature, since it is a Sunni organization, product of the Muslim Brotherhood, does have a convergence of interests with Iran – namely the destruction of the State of Israel.

Who are the senior Hamas figures out of whom the next leader will emerge?

“Shiite Axis” members, favoring Iran:

1. Khalil Al-Haya, who was Yahya Sinwar’s right-hand man, and who officially announced Sinwar’s death on behalf of Hamas. Al-Haya is based in Qatar, where he coordinates the indirect hostage release negotiations with Israel as part of the Hamas Leadership Abroad. Al-Haya is very closely aligned with the Iranian Faction of Hamas. He has even met with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, in Istanbul together with the organization’s Chairman of the Hamas Shura Council, Muhammad Darwish following Yahya Sinwar’s death.
2. Muhammad, Head of the Hamas Shura Council, is also affiliated with the Hamas Iranian faction.
3. Muhammad Sinwar, who masterminded the abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006, is supported by Iran, He is holding the Israeli hostages and is running the war against Israel in the Gaza Strip.

“Sunni Axis” members, favoring the Muslim Brotherhood:

1. Khaled Mashal, head of the Hamas leadership abroad, is the former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is affiliated with Qatar and Turkey as well as Pakistan. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement and is at odds with Iran. The Iranians have not forgotten his past statements and his sympathies with the Sunni world. Masal even went so far recently in his statements, in an interview, that Iran was behind the killing of Ismail Haniyeh.
2. Mousa Abu Marzouk, former head of the Hamas Political Bureau. He is close to the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. Abu Marzouk speaks frequently about the hostage deals and reflects Hamas’ position on this issue.

Sinwar’s death is an important pivotal point in the war. It might even tip the balance, subdue Hamas and trigger a renewed hostage deal. This being said, Muhammad Sinwar, who has Iran’s backing, might not agree to a hostage deal with Israel while the latter has the upper hand – this might constitute a surrender of the organization and admission of its defeat in the war. A decision has even been made recently in Hamas, to appoint Muhammad Sinwar as the decision-maker in all matters concerning a hostage deal with Israel. He has also apparently been named acting commander of the terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. This is not to say that Muhammad Sinwar has been elected as supreme leader of the organization, which would include the overseas branch, but it does elevate his standing considerably and it also increases the likelihood that he will eventually be chosen to replace Yahya Sinwar at the helm of the terrorist organization.

Moreover, Muhammad Sinwar might continue to tow the line mapped out by his brother Yahya Sinwar, who prior to his death decided to renew the suicide attacks inside Israel. It also seems that as far as the military wing of Hamas in Gaza is concerned, there are hopes of a further escalation in the hostilities between Israel and Iran and Hezbollah, which would divert the main thrust of the IDF’s pressure toward Lebanon or Iran.

This article was originally published in Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Implications on Hamas from the Killing of Yahya Sinwar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

One year ago, on October 7, 2023, Hamas perpetrated the largest and most brutal massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, a premeditated and executed slaughter of men, women, children, the elderly, and even infants. Rapes, beheadings, mutilations, cold-blooded murders, and abductions. The scenes of such atrocities shocked even seasoned soldiers who rushed to assist the devastated population in southern Israel.

Despite this, many rejoiced and celebrated the massacre, deeming it “resistance” or justifying it as a defensive action. Mohammad Hannoun, for example, the leader of Italy’s Associazione Palestinesi (Palestinian Association), referred to the massacre in a statement made to Italian television, as “legitimate self-defense” during a Palestinian demonstration in central Milan held a mere three days after the attack.

Hannoun’s comment is just one of many expressions of hatred toward Israel that multiplied throughout the West immediately after the massacre and well before the IDF began its ground operations in Gaza. For those espousing these views, Israel should not have even reacted. Indeed, Israel should not even exist, as highlighted by one of the popular slogans at “pro-Palestinian” demonstrations: “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,” clearly calling for the destruction of the Jewish state.

The disingenuous pretense of anti-Zionism has now been thoroughly exposed. As the World Jewish Congress has shown, anti-Zionism is simply a form of antisemitism, denying the right of the Jewish people to self-determination in their ancestral homeland and disregarding the historical and archaeological evidence of the Jewish connection to the Land of Israel. For too many, anyone supporting Jewish self-determination and the existence of the State of Israel is automatically labeled a “Zionist,” and therefore an “enemy.” This paves the way for violent actions against Jews in both Israel and the diaspora.

This toxic blend of antisemitism and anti-Zionism has dominated pro-Palestinian demonstrations throughout the West, from Canada to Australia, from the United States to Europe. University campuses have become strongholds of anti-Israel hatred, in some instances escalating beyond chants and slogans to violence against Jews. At the University of Pittsburgh, two Jewish students were assaulted by pro-Palestinian thugs after the yarmulkes they were wearing identified them as Jews.

In Britain, just one month after the October 7 massacre, Edward Isaacs, the president of the Union of Jewish Students, reported an unprecedented spike in assaults on Jewish students. Britain’s Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 67 antisemitic incidents from October 7 to November 3, 2023, across 29 campuses, compared to 12 during the same period in 2022. According to the BBC, which is far from being pro-Israel, this represents a significant increase in antisemitic incidents.

The CST also recorded 5,583 antisemitic incidents from October 7, 2023, to September 30, 2024, representing a 204% increase from the 1,830 such incidents reported the previous year. These are the highest figures recorded since the center began operations in 1984.

Following a similar pattern, in France, the Ministry of the Interior and the Jewish Community Protection Service reported 1,676 antisemitic acts in 2023, compared to 436 the previous year.

An independent public body fighting discrimination in neighboring Belgium reported 91 antisemitic incidents between October 7 and December 7, 2023, compared to 57 for the entire year of 2022.

According to data collected by Italy’s Osservatorio sicurezza Contro gli Atti Discriminatori (Observatory for Security Against Discriminatory Acts), 406 cases of antisemitism were recorded from October 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024, a figure that later rose to 456 following new incidents.

These are just the official numbers, but we can safely assume that not all incidents of slander, spitting, intimidation, and insults are recorded or reported.

Across Europe, imams have glorified Hamas and spread antisemitic propaganda. Protesters have hoisted black flags and Hezbollah flags and called for the destruction of Israel. The double standard has sometimes risen to the absurd. For example, in London, pro-Israel demonstrators were confined to a small fenced-off area while, just ahead, a procession of Islamists, left-wing extremists, and Israel-haters marched freely. Why were only Israel’s supporters prohibited from demonstrating?

Similarly, a Met Police officer near a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London threatened Gideon Falter, an activist from the “Campaign Against Antisemitism,” with arrest simply for his “openly Jewish appearance”– Falter was wearing a yarmulke. At Heathrow Airport, customs officers harassed some passengers arriving from Israel on an El Al flight.

Returning to Italy, in Milan, on January 27, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Italian student Mihael Melnic displayed a sign from his apartment window reading “Free Gaza from Hamas.” At the same time, the street below had become the scene of yet another unauthorized pro-Palestinian demonstration. Melnic, subjected to insults and threats by protesters, later received an intimidating visit from two police officers. They entered his apartment, identified him, and unsuccessfully tried to confiscate his sign. Melnic later gave an interview to The Times of Israel recounting the incident.

In Padua, Israeli student Jasmine Kolodro was summoned to the police station for displaying an Israeli flag near a pro-Palestinian demonstration.

These are alarming episodes, especially considering Forza Italia Senator Maurizio Gasparri’s assertion on October 1, 2024, that antisemitism is present in both journalism and security apparatuses.

The situation for Jews in Spain has also worsened. The Spanish Jewish community has expressed deep concern, and Jewish university students are afraid to attend classes.

In reality, the spread of antisemitism since October 7, 2023, is merely the evolution of a pre-existing “sick seed” that had already taken root throughout the West, just awaiting a trigger to erupt in full force.

The attacks on Jewish museums and schools in Belgium and France a decade ago during the so-called ISIS phase were a clear signal of what was to come. As was the 2014 assault on a Paris synagogue, which was met by the triumphant remark “the party’s over,” from no less than Davide Piccardo, coordinator of Coordinamento delle Associazioni Islamiche di Milano (Coordination of Islamic Associations of Milan) – a convert to Islam, and now the editorial director of the Islamist Italian-language website La Luce News.

It is notable that in France, the imams Mohamed Tataiat, Hassan Iquioussen, and Mahjoub Mahjoubi, after repeatedly coming under fire for spreading virulent antisemitic rhetoric, were eventually expelled earlier this year.

In Italy, too, the antisemitic atmosphere is quite dire. According to the Osservatorio Antisemitismo (Observatory on Antisemitism), Prime Minister Meloni’s government’s “let them vent” approach has led to blacklists, calls to mark the homes of “Jews and Zionists,” parades with signs portraying “Zionist agents,” defacing of Jewish elementary schools, pro-Hamas and antisemitic sermons in mosques, and the publication of antisemitic caricatures .

To make matters worse, the Shia Islamic center “Imam Mahdi” in Rome announced a commemoration for Hassan Nasrallah on October 3. The threat of antisemitism is becoming ever more serious, and a further escalation is likely unless the authorities intervene, even if belatedly.

As long as the distinction continues to be made between “antisemitism” and “anti-Zionism,” instead of the latter being recognized as an expression of the former, the antisemitism unleashed after the October 7 massacre cannot be addressed with the necessary intellectual clarity.

It is also important to remember that the Iranian regime oppresses and persecutes not only its own population but also the Lebanese, using Hezbollah—an organization that, until recently, had a more powerful army than that of Lebanon itself. All of this is met by international silence, with voices raised only when Israel defends itself. This, too, can be understood as antisemitism.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Antisemitism Proliferates After the October 7 Massacre הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A year and a half before October 7, officers of the IDSF movement sat in the living room of Amir Avivi, the movement’s founder and CEO. They understood that something was afoot and that they must warn the security services about what was liable to happen. At the meeting, they discussed a “strategic, tectonic, global, and regional change” that we were experiencing and that would lead, in their view, to immense escalation. “When we connected the dots, we understood that we were heading for war,” Avivi recalls.

At the same meeting, they decided to write a situational assessment. The IDSF movement delivered a 300-page document to Naftali Bennett and Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time were prime minister and opposition leader respectively, and to the head of the Mossad, the National Security Council, and others.

As early as May 2022, Avivi visited the Knesset with the report, which he’d prepared together with some leaders of the security services, and he warned that “today we’re in a situation where processes that have been under way for many years are reaching their culmination.” He expanded on the existential threats against the State of Israel. “There is an Iranian deployment that, in practice, embraces both the drive for nuclearization and the rockets, missiles, and drones. There is a force that will guide Iran toward the understanding that on the one hand they can attack, and on the other hand we’ll be forced to if they don’t.”

Today, a year after the Sabbath that saw the murder of more than 1,200 people, Avivi isn’t brandishing the report and its prophetic conclusions. Instead he is thinking of what comes next. He speaks of the hostages’ return as a matter of central importance, of the need for broad democratic consensus regarding the State’s deep-level processes, and of what the future may hold — a campaign for regional peace agreements.

“There was a belief in holding out a little longer”

On the anniversary of the events that opened the war, Avivi visited the Ynet studio for a special interview with Sharon Kidon. “Israel has been avoiding war, as part of a strategic choice that resembles what the USA chose in the face of the USSR — to wait for everything to settle down on its own,” Avivi said, explaining why Israel hadn’t taken action that would have prevented the massacre. “The Arab Spring gave the security services and the Israeli government a lot of confidence that the strategy was working. That while we were avoiding war, the other Mideastern states were reducing themselves to fragments. Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Syria. There was a belief that if we held out a little longer and then a little longer, eventually Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranians would all collapse. It was just a matter of holding out a bit.”

The IDSF warned of a severe attack impending, but without knowing what the timing would be. “I said, ‘When you see a swarm of rockets flying, you can be sure that’s the beginning of the war,’” Avivi relates. “We’ve learned that when you have a terrorist army at your fence, even the security services won’t necessarily be aware of the timing. For that reason, terrorist armies shouldn’t be at the fence.”

You’ve mentioned victory more than once. What’s your vision of victory?

“The developments we’re currently experiencing will force us to adjust our war objectives. We started out on October 7, a year ago, entering a war really against our will, and we set three objectives: eliminating Hamas as a governmental and military organization, returning all our hostages, and creating conditions in Gaza that will prevent a terrorist army from ever reappearing. We’ve more or less dismantled Hamas as a military organization, but not as a government. This is where the pronouncements of the security services and the prime minister come in, and they’re now getting into the humanitarian issue. We need to finish the work. We need to return our hostages.”

Can you define what victory looks like in this connection?

“Victory doesn’t mean that there’s not a single terrorist in Gaza,” he clarifies. “So what does it mean? That all the hostages are back. That Hamas has lost its hold on Gaza both militarily and governmentally. That everyone with a home in northern Israel is back, is safe, and can live confidently with no threat from Hezbollah. The State of Israel understands that it must add the Iranian nuclear program to its war objectives. Victory will mean that the existential danger from the Iranian nuclear umbrella has been dealt with. I hope that the Americans will open their eyes and understand that we need to handle that one together.”

“No need for uniformity — just unity”

On the issue of internal polarization in Israel, Avivi contends that what’s needed is not uniformity but unity. Differences in outlook should be put aside for the sake of joint decision-making that will make development and growth possible. “We don’t need to be uniform,” he explains. “We have lots of opinions, but we need to converge on the ethos on which the nation was founded. Let’s remember what we are here for, what the Land of Israel means to us, who and what we are as a people — and let’s hold a tolerant discussion. We don’t need to reach agreement on everything. Where we don’t, our democracy decides. But we need to agree on broad issues. Our culture needs a lot of work. A firm majority of Israeli society is tired of the squabbles and wants a safe, thriving, meaningful future.”

Avivi’s expectations for the future are optimistic, including regional peace agreements. “We all feel that within this war, there was a revolution,” he emphasizes. “We’ve all seen now what we’re capable of doing when we’re together in battle. I think that this year will be the decisive one, with us defeating our enemies. From there, we must proceed to peace agreements, a thriving economy, mass immigration, and a discourse among ourselves that makes for togetherness and unity in the spirit of our ethos. We have a tendency to embrace extremes, but we need to converge in the center. I’m optimistic. I think our society’s has wonderful days ahead.”

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט From the unheeded warning to the vision of peace: “This will be the decisive year” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel’s military operations in Lebanon have crippled Hezbollah, decimating not only its missile arsenal but also its command-and-control chain, to the point that only two senior commanders, Ali Karaki and Abu Ali Rida, are reportedly still alive. Initially, it was even believed that Karaki had died in an Israeli airstrike. The secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, remains hidden in his bunker.[1]

Additionally, the use of explosive beepers to target Hezbollah terrorists, a tactic never before used by any fighting force – and one that will go down in history—has sparked both amazement and harsh criticism.

As usual, Israel has once again faced accusations from multiple sources, the narrative always the same: the IDF attacks are not surgical and cause civilian casualties; Israel’s operations cannot be defined as counter-terrorism but rather as aggression against Lebanon; Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack; and finally, Israel is bombing Lebanese civilian homes.

It is vital to refute these biased and completely baseless accusations once and for all.

First, the surgical nature of the attacks and civilian casualties must be addressed. On January 2, 2024, the IDF missile that eliminated Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut directly hit the floor of the building where he was hiding, achieving the objective without causing the building’s collapse. The same tactic was used to eliminate Ibrahim Muhammad Qubeisi in Beirut’s densely populated Dahiyeh neighborhood on September 25, 2024.

The missile that successfully targeted Ibrahim Akil on September 20, 2024 hit the basement, causing the unintentional collapse of the adjacent building’s foundations. In contrast, in the attempted killing of Ali Karaki that same day, the wrong floor was hit, enabling the Hezbollah commander to survive the attack.

Can such attacks be considered non-surgical? Have other armed forces done better in other conflicts? The intelligence gathering behind Israel’s strikes, the work of years, is highly valuable. Similarly, missiles are very costly. It is not in Israel’s interest to waste them.

Taking the Lebanese population into consideration, the IDF repeatedly sends messages to civilians using SMS, audio messages, and radio broadcasts, warning them to stay away from civilian buildings where Hezbollah hides its forces and arsenals and fires at Israel. This same strategy has also been used in Gaza.

With regard to the detonation of Hezbollah terrorists’ beepers and walkie-talkies, it is a complete distortion of logic to argue that it is not surgical. It is clear that because terrorists hide among civilians, there is always a risk of civilian injury. However, this danger is caused by Hezbollah, not Israel. Moreover, eliminating terrorists saves lives, both Israeli and Lebanese.

Another accusation against Israel is that under the guise of counter-terrorism, it has attacked the sovereign state of Lebanon. This, too, is an incorrect oversimplification that reveals a misunderstanding of the current situation. Hezbollah is a fully-fledged military organization, dedicated to terrorism, which has taken control of Lebanon. It commands a true army, one more powerful than Lebanon’s, that answers to Hezbollah’s political arm. This army also serves as an Iranian proxy and a tool for regional destabilization.

The reality is that a full-scale war is taking place between the Israeli army and a military organization occupying Lebanese territory with the aim of attacking Israel.

Addressing the issue of civilian homes hit by the IDF in southern Lebanon, once again, the responsibility falls on Hezbollah. As noted above, Hezbollah uses civilian homes to hide missiles and other weapons and to launch attacks against Israel. This is a well-known tactic, used also by Hamas in Gaza. The image of a cruise missile positioned inside a civilian home, ready to be launched from a window, has made headlines worldwide, exposing Hezbollah’s true terrorist nature.

It is also important to mention that Hezbollah has been targeting populated areas in northern Israel for months. More than 60,000 Israeli citizens are currently displaced and waiting to return to their homes and businesses which they were forced to leave a year ago. The situation has become intolerable, and Israel has the right and duty to ensure safety and normalcy for its citizens. This can happen only through strong action against the threat, which is Hezbollah.

Finally, some have even claimed that Hezbollah was not capable of carrying out an October 7-style attack, despite boasting military and operational capabilities superior to those of Hamas. Such a statement is inherently contradictory, as greater capabilities and resources allow for more tactical choices.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog revealed that Hezbollah commanders (eliminated in an airstrike) had gathered in Beirut precisely to plan an October 7-style attack in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon. The U.S. site Al-Monitor also cited a source close to Hezbollah, who confirmed that this meeting was organized to plan a large-scale invasion of northern Galilee.

This, then, is the reality of the situation on the ground, free from biased theories that ignore concrete facts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

[1] This article was written just days before Karaki and Nasrallah were killed in an Israeli airstrike.

הפוסט Reflections on Israel’s “Surgical” Operations against Hezbollah: No Tactical-Strategic Merit to Criticisms הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This week has been rife with reports that Israel is leaning toward a military campaign in the north. A moment before the planes scramble, it may be worth rethinking the plans.

On October 8, Hezbollah opened war against Israel. While Hezbollah has primarily mounted attacks, and done so over a constantly expanding area, Israel has primarily mounted defense, using preventive operations, targeted killings, and destruction of launchers.

Israel is displaying weakness despite its actual strength. But at the same time, the more Israel refrains from displaying strength, the weaker it becomes. So why not go toe to toe at last and pay Hezbollah back in its own coin?

In a “Hezbollah First” scenario, as I’ll call it, Israel presses forward in the fight against Hezbollah, suffers weeks (or more) of accurate attacks on strategic assets, on civilians, and on fighters, and draws criticism from abroad that might be expressed in an arms embargo or in arrest warrants from the Hague against the country’s leaders. At this point, the Iranians may blithely assemble their nuke.

The Iranian leaders are rational players who want to reach their goal as efficiently as possible. If they consider the nuke an appropriate tool, they’ll use it. But even more ominously — they won’t have to.

An Iranian nuke will mean Israel’s hands are tied. Israel will have no role in the next round of play. Iran’s standing will benefit, and so will its military and its economy. Iran will quickly restore the military clout of its proxies but leave spots of ruin, and civilians with their diseases, as a powerful resource for propaganda and international funding.

What’s more, in order to halt the suffering of civilians “on both sides,” the US will revive a policy that it’s already tried to push through: It will declare a Palestinian state.

The result may well be a weakened Israel, completely dependent on the Americans — an Israel with a stumbling economy and a shattered society. The wolves lurking all around will find their hunger hard to control.

In an “Iran First” scenario, on the other hand, an Israeli attack could bring down the Iranian regime and put paid to the Iranian nuke. Israel would have enough strength left for dealing with the Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Gaza, which would be weakened by the bashing of the head of the snake. And after that, it would be time for rebuilding and growth.

There are those who believe that an attack against Iran must concentrate on its nuclear facilities. Prof. Benny Morris, the historian, published an article in the Haaretz newspaper headlined “To Survive, Israel Must Strike Iran Now: If Israel proves incapable of destroying the Iranian nuclear project using conventional weaponry, then it may not have any option but to resort to its nonconventional capabilities.”

Morris, who in the past was considered too far left to be employable in Israel and considered emigrating, has come to the conclusion that Iran does seriously intend to destroy Israel, that the day of judgment has come, and that the appropriate weapon should be deployed to the extent that it’s available.

I don’t know whether Morris has made a perfect prediction. But I’d like to put forward the proposition here that we don’t need to attack the Iranian nuclear sites in specific, although that might be the best course. Conventional weapons can be enough to destroy the Iranian nuclear capability.

Iran is suffering from a number of problems. Among its many ethnic and national minorities, the regime’s legitimacy is broadly rejected. The country’s air defenses are weak, its borders are long and undefended, and its military capabilities are not very strong. In order to sow destruction and shock in Tehran, no doomsday weapon is necessary.

One example showing the fragility of the Iranian regime is the episode of the “War of the Cities” during the Iran–Iraq war.

After eight years of bloodletting between Iran and Iraq, the war turned a corner at the end of February 1988. Military operations by Iraq brought a change. First Iraq attacked the refineries in Tehran and forced Iran to return to rationing fuel.

Next, after Tehran began the War of the Cities, Iraq launched a pre-planned attack by bombarding Tehran every day with long-range missiles. Although damage from the attacks was limited, for more than two months they combined with additional psychological factors to severely damage Iranian morale and they spurred millions of civilians to leave. What Iraq hadn’t accomplished in eight years, it managed to do in a couple of months.

Granted, today’s circumstances are different, historically and militarily. But the War of the Cities does carry a lesson, and an inspiration.

Would such an attack cost Israel very heavily? Apparently yes. Can Israel resort to some other strategic option that doesn’t depend on the hope for a deus ex machina? Not confidently.

Wise recruitment work can build an international coalition to lead the attack, to destabilize the Iranian regime from outside, to challenge it from inside, and to bring it down. Then a new regime can be helped to establish itself, to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure, and to rehabilitate Iran.

Israel needs to go to work assembling a Middle Eastern coalition that can in turn enlist the Europeans, the Americans, and the international public. They all need to understand that if the Iranians entrench their control of the Middle East, they will proceed to attack Europe and then, with the assets they have acquired there, they’ll attack the US. The US will be standing alone then, with no allies, when Iran, Russia, and China come to divide it up.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran First, and the Sooner the Better! הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Russia is avoiding direct military engagement in the Middle East

Russia has been walking a fine line between undermining U.S. strength in the Middle East and sidestepping commitment in the region – in a bid to avoid wider conflagration in the region. Moscow has shown little interest in U.S. diplomacy to achieve calm and stability, but it also does not want a regional conflagration writes Jennifer Teale. Such an escalation may well also complicate Russia’s relationships with Iran and the Gulf Arab states. It is much easier for Russia to maintain Gulf state relationships when the region is harmonious and conflict-free, rather than engaging in a perilous zero-sum game. Ultimately, Russia is more likely to support Iran or Hezbollah through electronic warfare or by funneling weapons to its partners that are not needed for the Ukraine campaign that to actually engage militarily in the Middle East directly, therefore.

Mounting Iran-Israel tensions could divert attention from Ukraine-Russia war

Mounting tensions between Iran and Israel could have advantages for Moscow, however. For one, such further escalation would almost certainly further divert Washington’s attention and supplies from Ukraine, where Russia is currently on the offensive.

Wider war in the Middle East would complicate Russia’s Gulf relations

Nonetheless, a wider war in the region would also most certainly carry major risks for Moscow. If Israel began to fight Hezbollah or Iran, the Kremlin would have to contend with three dangerous outcomes: the entanglement of its ally Syria, a weakening of Iran’s capacity to supply Russia with weapons, and a complication of its relations with the Gulf Arab states and Iran. Depending on what Israel—or the United States, should it opt to join in—decided to attack in an escalated situation, Iran’s defense industry could also come under serious strain.

Iran-Russia military co-operation hampered by Ukraine

Indeed, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow and Tehran have considerably expanded their military-technical cooperation, with Russia receiving various types of Iranian combat drones, artillery shells, small arms ammunition and glide bombs. For the moment however, the size of these deliveries from Iran is limited by the conflict situation in Ukraine.

Hamas assassination makes Russia wary of greater involvement

The July assassination of Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran has however left Iran in a precarious position regionally. On the one hand, it needs to respond to maintain its credibility both at home and among its regional allies. On the other, any significant retaliation risks escalating into a war with Israel. As after Israel’s relations with Russia became even more strained. Because of this, Russians now have smaller-scale diplomatic goals, for example, engaging with Hamas to get Russian hostages out from their territory.

In August, following the assassination, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited Iran and the US increased its military presence there. Shoigu’s trip aimed to strengthen interactions and examine regional and international issues and bilateral political security relations. Despite Russia’s broad military cooperation with Iran, it will still likely not fuel the flames of conflict in the Middle East, but instead still aims to deter escalation and prevent damage. Neither Washington nor Moscow wants an escalation in the Middle East, as they have priorities on the Ukraine crisis in Europe with little resources to spare.

To conclude

Russia’s engagement in the current conflict is about more than just Gaza. It is about really cementing themselves within the Arab world. More broadly, a distracted and destabilized Middle East serves Russia’s broader geopolitical goals by diverting Western attention and resources away from Eastern Europe where Russia is more directly engaged. Moscow has shown little interest in Western diplomacy to achieve calm and stability, but it also does not want a regional conflagration in the Middle East which could further complicate its relations.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Russia protecting its interests in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the days of gloom that followed October 7, 2023, it was unclear exactly how we would manage to win the war. Now, with Hamas already shattered as a military organization and with Hezbollah being heavily hit, not only can an Israeli victory be glimpsed on the horizon but a time of thriving, initiated upon the Day After, can be dreamt of.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

Most decisions were right: The war in retrospect

The October 7 disaster wrought great confusion and uncertainty, but one thing was certain from the start: This war will take time. There were two main reasons — first, that the Gaza Strip was full of tunnels and that the Hamas infrastructure there would require a complex, systematic effort of dismantling; and second, that among the ground forces the level of strength and armament was insufficient for intensive fighting on several fronts at once. In recent decades, the IDF had closed down a number of reserve battalions and the army had a relatively small stock of weaponry at hand. Israel had to resolve itself to mount a counterattack in Gaza while mounting nothing more than a defense on the other fronts. Because of that gradation of fighting, it was only after 11 months that the State of Israel shifted the campaign’s center of gravity from the south to the north.

Despite the optimism that is developing, we mustn’t forget that some important battles and many dangers still await us and that we cannot unilaterally determine how the Swords of Iron War will yet develop.

From examination of the circumstances in which we entered the war, it appears that the fighting was handled successfully for the most part and that most of the decisions were correct. However, there are at least three points where it would have been advisable to act differently.

First, it would have been better to maintain the same operational pressure that we had applied to Hamas at the start of the war. The military dismissed large numbers of reservists relatively early, and it may be that if it had not done so, we would have been able to pressure Hamas more strongly and shorten the fighting in Gaza.

Second, the incursion into Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was mounted too late. Hamas long enjoyed an oxygen supply in the form of control over the Corridor, which enabled it to fortify itself through the Sinai. If we had cut off that oxygen supply in the first days of the war, the entire course of fighting would have looked different.

The third point, which to this day has not been properly addressed, is the control over humanitarian aid that enters Gaza. The aid is intended for the citizenry but in practice it falls into the hands of Hamas operatives and thus it enables Hamas both to strengthen itself and to preserve its standing as the authority governing the Gazan populace.

Shock and awe: The current state of the war

The southern front

At the start of the war, the Southern Command estimated that it would need a year to dismantle Hamas as a military organization. Today we have indeed reached the point where Hamas has lost most of its military capacity, as shown by its markedly reduced ability to launch rockets into Israeli territory.

The nature of the fighting in Gaza today differs from what we saw at the war’s beginning. In the first months, the IDF was obliged to operate at great intensity, with a large deployment and with coordinated attacks. In addition, it needed to operate systematically — that is to say, street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood — in order to eliminate the terrorists and destroy the infrastructures. Today, most of the fighting in Gaza is carried out in pinpoint incursions and in precision attacks together with air force personnel. At the same time we see systematic elimination of senior Hamas officials. Most senior officials of the organization, including Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammed Deif, have already been eliminated. The loss of senior officials weakens the organization not only militarily but in terms of governance as well, and it is an important aspect in preventing Hamas from regaining strength later.

The northern front

During the past month, most of the fighting has been concentrated at the Lebanese border. We see a method of operation in the north that is reminiscent of the military doctrine developed by the USA in the late 1990s, known as “Shock and Awe.” The idea behind the doctrine is to frighten and weaken the enemy until it loses the will to fight. In that spirit, almost all the senior officials of Hezbollah, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, were already eliminated early in the fighting.

Furthermore, the IDF is undermining Hezbollah with a series of unusual operations. Especially prominent are the attacks via the pagers and walkie-talkies of the organization’s operatives as attributed to Israel. Those operations struck thousands of terrorists simultaneously — most of them from the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s elite fighting unit. Over and above the physical harm to the terrorists, the operation also spread powerful intimidation and proved how penetrable the organization was. While all that was happening, we were also witness to unceasing attacks by the Israel Air Force, which battered the Hezbollah infrastructures and deprived the organization of some significant capabilities.

Israel hoped that such a sequence of operations would compel Hezbollah to retreat completely from southern Lebanon and to stop firing at Israel — thus enabling the residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Still, Israel took into account that Hezbollah might continue fighting nonetheless, in which case a ground operation in Lebanon would be necessary.

That operation, if it goes forward, will differ from the operation that we saw in Gaza. On the one hand, southern Lebanon is significantly less densely populated than Gaza and most of its residents have already fled, so that there will be less friction with the locals. On the other hand, southern Lebanon’s landscape is liable to present a greater challenge, with its many hills and abundant foliage. It must be stressed that Hezbollah, like Hamas, has upgraded its subterranean capabilities; and we know that many of the organization’s strategic assets — including arms factories and bases — are underground. Thus southern Lebanon too portends difficult fighting, at least some of it in tunnels.

You can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon: Important conclusions from the war’s first year

On October 7 last year, we suffered a catastrophe. But that catastrophe awakened Israel from a long sleep and made Israel aware of what sizeable threats it faces. With time, that awareness has eroded among some of the leadership and public; and today there are those who call upon us to return to a policy of keeping our eyes closed.

In order that Israel remain secure over the coming generations, the State of Israel — leaders and society alike — must take action at a number of levels:

• Strictly preserving external security: First of all, we must confront the immediate threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But there’s more to the story. We must revise our outdated national security doctrine and understand that “deterring, alerting, and defeating” does not sum up the essentials. Israel’s security doctrine must include an element of zero tolerance for terrorist armies at our borders, and of nipping any terrorist force in the bud. It is unthinkable that we tolerate a situation where 50 thousand armed terrorists are located 100 meters from our border fence. That is a tsunami, and you can’t stop a tsunami with a teaspoon. Or a tablespoon.
• Strengthening governability and internal security: In the shadow of the external threats, we must not forget that the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has dogged us for 100 years now, is still alive domestically. The State of Israel must deal with the matter of governance within the country and ensure that all Jewish residents of Israel may feel safe in their country.
• Battling delegitimization and anti-Semitism: For years we have been confronted with inciteful attempts to delegitimize Israel and stir up anti-Semitism all over the world, and since the outbreak of war the campaign has only intensified. The State of Israel must subdue the forces that that are generating anti-Israeli activity at the UN and at the courts in the Hague, encouraging demonstrations, and bringing anti-Semitism into the streets and universities — forces led by the Palestinian Authority. To our regret, the State of Israel has not yet formulated a strategy for concrete action in the face of this severe problem.
• Instilling a common national ethos: We must unite the nation under the basic values on which the State of Israel was founded and under the Zionist–Jewish ethos nobly expressed in Israel’s proclamation of independence. Solidarity is not a luxury but a requirement for ensuring our security and survival, because without a set of values and an ethos, no tanks or airplanes will avail.
• Establishing an enlisted society— In the State of Israel, not serving is out of the question. Therefore we must establish an enlisted society here, in which all citizens of the state participate. At the same time, it must be stressed that this does not mean turning into Sparta. Israel is not a nation that glorifies power and violence. On the contrary, this nation lionizes culture and innovation. The balance is an important one, which we must all practice as individuals and as a society.

As we triumph, so shall we thrive: Israel on the Day After

The victory that we found difficult to visualize a year ago is taking form before our eyes, even though the pathway is a long one. Today, after the many drubbings we’ve delivered to Hamas and Hezbollah, most of the Israeli public believes that we can attain victory on all the fronts.

We of the IDSF movement do not wish to content ourselves with victory in itself. We hope to see this land thrive and grow. Our view is that the more greatly Israel triumphs in the war, the more greatly it will thrive after the war. When the states of the world, including our enemies’ states, see our strength displayed, they will be spurred to sign peace agreements and establish strong coalitions with us. Moreover, our economy will recover and burgeon. There will be mass immigration to Israel and we will also see the birthrate surge as it generally does after wartime.

In order to reach those optimal days, we must maintain patience, determination, and solidarity, and not ease off the gas pedal until we have passed successfully through all the challenges that lie before us.

הפוסט The journey ahead is long, but a clear direction emerges: Reflections and insights after a year of war הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building—Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, on the erosion of demilitarization.

The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered. Shimon Peres Tomorrow is Now, 1978.

We don’t need to issue a daily report to Israel on the operation [in Sinai] as it is a matter of sovereignty and national security—Egyptian Military, Reuters, August 21, 2012.

As the war rages on unabated in Gaza, the idea of demilitarization has once again taken center stage in the debate on how the fighting is to end. However, its proponents seem blissfully unaware of the fact that Gaza is already supposed to be demilitarized right now under the terms of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords.

A unique context?

The stunning failure of demilitarization in Gaza as a means for attaining peace makes a thorough probe into the notion—its theoretical rationale, its practical feasibility, an analysis of its past practice, and an assessment of its future prospects for success—both timely and apt.

As a cautionary aside, it should be noted that this paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all examples of demilitarization across the globe (such as the Solomon Islands and Costa Rica); or a comprehensive study of the history of demilitarization since the initial implementation of the notion (arguably from the 1856 Treaty of Paris).

Rather, it is meant to be confined to instances where demilitarization arrangements are likely to have policy relevance for Israel, making examples such as the demilitarization of Japan or in the Korean peninsula beyond the scope examined.

Indeed, the policy-pertinence of demilitarization regarding the Middle East conflict, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, has its own unique characteristics and exigencies. Accordingly, inferences valid in numerous other instances may not be readily transferable for application in this case. Indeed, as a Foreign Policy article correctly underlines:

“None of the existing states and territories without armed forces compare to the uniquely difficult circumstances faced by Israelis and Palestinians, and none offers a model that can simply be adopted to resolve one of the most intractable conflicts in one of the world’s most restive regions.”

The sovereignty imperative

According to Oxford Public International Law:

“The concept of demilitarization denotes the reduction or even total abolishment of armaments…and military presence in a specific geographic area. In operational terms, it implies the dismantlement of arms, ammunition, and armed forces in order to put them beyond military use. Demilitarization also connotes the process of sustained reductions in the influence of the military in a given State and society”.

For the purposes of this analysis, we distinguish between “Demilitarization,” an externally imposed arrangement (see below), and “Demobilization,” which refers to the voluntary reduction in the size of the demobilizing party’s army.

As such, demilitarization cuts against the grain of the overarching organizing concept of the international system—that of sovereign nation-states existing in an anarchic system in which there is no recognized hierarchical order. It is, thus, a process that is antithetical to the existential nature of a sovereign political organism. Indeed, one might say that it runs directly counter to the “primal DNA” of the nation-state.

Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the political landscape is littered with the burnt-out wrecks of demilitarization agreements that have failed—more often than not, with disastrous results. Indeed, in an analysis of the “special challenges” demilitarization poses, the late Professor David Bederman warns that such attempts are often doomed to failure. He elaborates:

“…the chief reason for the failure of demilitarization is the weakness of institutional mechanisms to effectively encourage and monitor compliance, as well as to punish transgressions.”

Significantly, the same malaise can, to a large degree, be discerned in the events leading up to October 7.

Demilitarization: A violation of the sovereignty imperative?

In essence, “sovereignty” is the supreme authority within a defined territory. As such, it does not recognize the legitimacy of any other source of authority in that territory as superior to it.

Now, any demilitarization arrangement effectively annuls the right of the demilitarizing country to determine what weapons it can deploy, how many it can deploy, and where they can be deployed.

Thus, by its very nature, demilitarization entails a violation—or at least, constriction—of the sovereign rights of the demilitarizing country.

Clearly, there are only two ways such an arrangement can be maintained. Either by the imposition on the demilitarizing country by a more powerful external force (such as an alien state or a coalition of such states); or by the willing acquiescence of the demilitarizing state to refrain from—or limit—the deployment of military forces in that state—or in a portion of the state.

Accordingly, demilitarization, as a stable reality, can prevail only as long as the demilitarizing party continues to agree to be demilitarized. For, if such agreement is revoked, it will either lead to the restrictions previously consented to being thrown off and militarization reinstated, or to their forcible reimposition by external parties.

The history of the past hundred years has included several major demilitarization agreements, few of which instill great confidence in the idea as an effective remedy for conflict.

Arguably, the most significant example—and the one whose collapse precipitated the gravest consequences—was the demilitarization of the Rhineland after WWI and whose violation precipitated WWII.

Demilitarization as a harbinger of war

The gory battles of WWI ended with the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed complex and comprehensive constraints—both quantitative and qualitative—on the German military with the purpose of stripping it of the ability to instigate future offensive action. These also included the demilitarization of the Rhineland, with the demolition of existing fortification 50 km east of the Rhine River, and a prohibition on the construction of new ones.

Germany was severely limited as to the kind and amount of weapons it could possess, manufacture, or store and was even forbidden completely with regard to others, such as submarines (Article 181) and an air force (Article 198).

However, as Germany rebuilt its national capabilities—and the resolve of the Europeans waned—the demilitarization arrangement fell apart.

Indeed, it was Winston Churchill, in his epic chronicle of the history of the outbreak of WWII, The Gathering Storm, who vividly described how the demilitarization conditions were eroded out of existence. He wrote:

“Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building; the Berlin- Rome Axis established; Austria devoured and digested by the Reich; Czechoslovakia deserted and ruined by the Munich Pact, its fortress line in German hands, its mighty arsenal of Skoda henceforward making munitions for the German armies… the services of thirty five Czech divisions against the still unripened German Army cast away… all gone with the wind.”

Indeed, as demilitarization disintegrated, an increasingly confident Germany with its arsenal replenished unleashed a wave of aggression that culminated in the bloodiest war in the history of humanity, in which an estimated total of 70–85 million people perished, or about 3% of the estimated global population of 2.3 billion in 1940.

Sinai: A fraying accord

Another example of a demilitarization agreement, signed to bring hostilities between Egypt and Israel to an end following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was included in the 1979 Camp David Accords.

In recent years, this agreement is also showing signs of strain and is beginning to “fray around the edges.”

For well over a decade, Egypt has been champing at the bit to shake off the restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the Sinai,

Annex 1 of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accords established a system of security arrangements intended to allow Israel to withdraw from Sinai without incurring serious risk. Unequivocal constraints were placed on Egyptian military activities and deployments in the area. The rationale was clear: Should Cairo’s disposition toward Israel change for the worse, Sinai would continue to comprise a buffer between Egyptian forces and the Israeli border. If Cairo deployed any sizeable ground forces or armed aircraft into the peninsula, it would comprise a clear violation of the Accords and provide a warning of aggressive intentions. Thus, should war break out, Egypt’s long lines of supply in Sinai would be vulnerable, particularly to Israel’s powerful air force.

However, with the passage of time and the deteriorating internal situation in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula—given the dilution of military power (due to demilitarization) and the commensurate decline of Cairo’s ability to impose its will in the remote region—became a tempting target of Islamist insurgency.

Insurgency as justification for remilitarization

This provided Egypt with grounds to claim that the demilitarization clauses in the peace accords with Israel denied it sufficient forces to impose law and order in the peninsula.

Indeed, as early as 2007, Israel allowed the Egyptians to deploy additional troops into Sinai to fight weapons smuggling particularly to Jihadi elements.

Since then, at least two processes have fueled the attrition of the demilitarization of Sinai.

The one is the ongoing modernization and acquisition of offensive arms by the Egyptian military; the other is the deeply ingrained animus towards Israel and affiliation with Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. Indeed, as an analysis from the American University in Cairo underscores:

“Even after three decades of formal peace, most Egyptians still view Israel as a threat to national security and as an enemy, not only of Palestinians but of all Arabs.”

As the years passed, Jihadi attacks on Egyptian forces in Sinai intensified. This provided Cairo with grounds for demanding forces beyond those specified in the 1979 peace agreement. Gradually these violations increased—enabled either by ex-ante Israeli approval, or` ex-post Israeli approval, or despite no Israeli approval at all. When Egypt, in 2023, ` eventually managed to rein in the jihadi insurgency, the post-October 7th fighting in Gaza–particularly close to the Southern border of Rafa, gave Egypt fuel for continued allegations to bolster its forces in violation of the treaty.

Thus, in a Foreign Policy analysis, entitled Egypt’s Remilitarized Sinai Is a Future Powder Keg, the Washington Institute’s David Schenker provided a cautionary critique of the developments in the Peninsula up to mid-2022:

“…Israel also allowed Cairo to flood Sinai with troops and heavy equipment substantially in excess of the treaty’s limits…The longer Egypt’s additional forces remain in Sinai, especially now that the Islamic State appears to be under control, the more challenging it will become to revert to the limits imposed by the treaty”.

A poor bulkhead against war

Sadly, Israel’s history provides ample testimony as to the inadequacy of demilitarization as an effective barrier to war—or even as a device for reining in violence.

Indeed, immediately following its inception in 1948, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) established on the Golan as a means to separate Israeli and Syrian forces failed to prevent periodic clashes between the two militaries, which—among other things—eventually led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War.

But quite apart from the manifest difficulty sustaining demilitarization in an area such as Gaza, there are, perversely, no less acute difficulties that could arise if, in fact, it was achieved. Indeed, the possibilities for unintended—and undesired—consequences seem boundless.

After all, if, Israel were somehow to compel the rulers of Gaza to disarm and to deny them the capacity to rearm, this would inevitably undermine, not only their ability to impose law and order internally in the Strip, but externally against more radical opponents from within the adjacent Sinai Peninsula. Indeed, if some future disarmed successor regime were faced with a significant challenge to its rule, whether from domestic or foreign sources, who—would be called upon to defend it?

If some foreign military force, this would imply the remilitarization of Gaza—leaving open the question of to whom such a force would be answerable.

If Israel, it is difficult to conceive of a more absurd scenario than one in which IDF forces need to be mobilized to prop up an Arab regime, so “unsavory” that cannot be trusted with the wherewithal needed to defend itself.

The preceding discussion—both of the political-scientific theory and the empirical case studies—ought to provide Israeli policymakers with sufficient caveats against succumbing to the temptation of a repeat attempt at adopting the failed and fatally flawed formula of demilitarization as a means of inducing—if not peace, them at least stable and durable non-belligerence. This is particularly true when the demilitarizing party is governed by an authoritarian regime that, on the one hand, places considerable stock on martial might and, on the other, has scant regard for implications violation of the demilitarization may have for its own citizenry, (Emmanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 1799).

There appears, therefore, little option but to embrace the dire warning against demilitarization as a prudent policy prescription, once forcefully articulated by the very person who later endorsed it—with calamitous consequences.

This was Shimon Peres, who counseled:

“ …the idea of demilitarization…seems to me a dubious remedy, The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Demilitarization: Policy pertinent parameters הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article we shall focus, with the help of Adv. Yifa Segal, on the international legal system and the way Israel’s standing worldwide influences our national security and our very existence here. We shall also examine how to use our leveraging powers and technological advantages to better present ourselves and to improve our standing in the global arena.

Background – rules of war, Anti-Semitism and anti-Israelism: Trends in the world legal and social conversation

The international rules of war began taking shape less than 200 years ago. They were officially delineated only in the past century. The history of rules of war began in 1859. That is when the Battle of Solferino took place in Lombardy (present-day northern Italy), as part of the process of unifying Italy. Jean-Henri Dunant, an Austrian businessman, witnessed the consequences of the battle and was appalled by the way thousands of wounded were abandoned in the field. These spectacles drove him to establish a medical assistance organization to help the war-wounded, better known today as the “Red Cross”. About a year later a convention was held in Geneva, in which 12 countries signed a treaty, or convention, that granted immunity to medical teams and to any civilian assisting medical staff in a war zone. This was the first Geneva Convention.

In the early 20th century, two more Geneva Conventions were signed, which dealt with maritime warfare and with the treatment of prisoners of war. In 1949, following World War 2 and the horrific war crimes committed against civilian population by Nazi Germany, the first three Geneva Conventions were rewritten and another was added, which included rules concerning the treatment of civilians in wars and also concerning civilians within occupied territories, who are subject to the martial law of a hostile army. The Geneva Conventions and the lessons learned from the two World Wars form the basis for the rules of war which nowadays fall under the category of “international humanitarian law”.

Since there has not been another world ware since World War 2, the rules of war have remained unchanged for the most part. This being said, talk about human rights has in recent decades become a more and more key issue in the global social conversation. We see this conversation beginning to trickle down to international law, influencing rulings and decisions made in international courts, in various UN councils and in national parliaments. Using “human rights” as its pretext, the International Court of Justice ruled in 2004 that the Separation Fence, which was intended to provide us with a security defense, constitutes illegal annexation. Similarly, many countries have latched onto, and are still adhering to, the humanitarian excuse for boycotting Israel economically, culturally and academically.

More political, less just: the absurdity behind the international legal system

The international legal system includes two main institutions, both seated in the city of Hague in The Netherlands: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), tasked with adjudicating in disputes between countries, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is tasked with adjudicating the accountability of individuals in crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Besides the differences between their respective tasks, the two courts also have different authorities.

The International Court of Justice can rule only on matters concerning countries that have chosen to accept its authority – whether through advance consent or ad-hoc consent, or due to the signing of one Convention or another. Additionally, it is authorized to issue an advisory opinion on legal issues, at the request of the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

The International Criminal Court, on the other hand, has more far-reaching judicial authority. Since it deals with individuals, it is authorized to issue international arrest warrants against individuals and it is also authorized to impose international sanctions. Until recently the International Criminal Court worked against brutal dictatorships such as Sudan and Libya but, following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel too has found itself in the company of these undesirables. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, an attempt was made to issue arrest warrants against senior Israeli individuals, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. The charge – involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Meanwhile these warrants have not yet been issued, however if they do get issued, then the 124 member-states of the International Criminal Court will be obliged to arrest and extradite each and any defendant entering their territory – meaning that there might well be severe legal implications.

To all intents and purposes, the two international courts are apolitical judicial organs. The process of appointing the serving judges is, however, a decidedly political process and as a result, these two institutions have consistently been exhibiting a glaring anti-Israel attitude. This unfairness is also related to ingrained anti-Semitism – more on that later – and also to the disparity in the expectations, which began taking form already back in the days the rules of international war were written.

When the western powers wrote the rules of war in the early twentieth century, the hope was that these would form the rules that would dictate the global agenda and would apply to every country in the world as well as to non-state entities. In reality they only affect a handful of countries that share similar values. Then and now, most players on the international stage do not share the values of democracy and liberalism. As a result, many of them disregard the international rules and even openly support terrorism.

One might have expected a well-functioning legal system to mete out its judgments equally with any country that violates international law, however what we see is that most countries manage to evade judgment thanks to the close-knit bloc they belong to and to the powerful political influences. This is the case with Muslim countries and with anti-Western countries, which have banded together and shield each other, including in cases where egregious crimes are being committed. In the same vane, this is also what happens with western, democratic countries, which ally themselves with one another or with powers that are powerful enough to defend themselves, like the United States. In this context one such case stands out – in which the international court sought to examine whether the United States committed war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. John Bolton, who at the time was President Trump’s National Security Advisor, attacked the international court and declared that the United States would not cooperate with an illegitimate institution. Bolton went as far as to threaten sanctioning the court in the Hague, which ultimately caused the court to withdraw and the investigation evaporated.

When one looks at the politics behind the international legal system, one realizes that there is no real concern for justice; instead it is simply a power play. If international courts take one course of action against certain countries, and a different course against other countries just because they uphold a different set of values, or because they wield considerable political power – then the inevitable outcome is that they lose credibility, and that the entire raison d’être comes into question.

From Anti-Semitism to Anti-Israelism

The international system’s preoccupation with Israel exceeds the volume of occupation with all the rest of the world’s countries combined. Unfortunately, this disproportionate dealing with Israel is not confined to the halls of justice alone. It spills over into the streets in the form of demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, and even terrorism and violence.

The anti-Israeli sentiments prevalent worldwide are undoubtedly a form of anti-Semitism. Suffice it to listen to the chants and speeches at the various demonstrations to understand that people are not merely condemning Israel, the conversation is about the very delegitimization of the existence of the State. It goes so far as to justify extreme, violent actions such as kidnapping and murder of civilians.

There is no other case in the world in which the very legitimacy of a country is called into question, as is the case with Israel. Even in the most glaring cases of violent, rogue regimes and illegal conduct – including what is happening in Russia, China and Iran – one does not hear claims that these countries should not have existed in the first place and that they should cease to exist without delay. Clearly the conversation about Israel goes far beyond reason, It is driven – at least in part – by a clear hatred of Jews as a people.

Adv. Yifa Segal: The Vision for International Law and Israeli Public Diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Continue Resisting the International Legal System

Current state:

The international courts hide under a thin patina of judicial neutrality, while in reality they are biased political bodies. Suffice it to consider the identity of the judges to understand that a country like Israel has no hope of receiving a fair hearing. The person presently serving (September 2024) as presiding judge in the International Court of Justice is a Lebanese judge – Nawaf Salam, who has a documented history of extreme anti-Israeli statements. He has even voted against Israel several times in the United Nations. According to the rules of that court, when a judge is called upon to adjudicate in matters concerning a country towards which he has an obvious negative attitude, he must recuse himself. Salam did indeed receive requests that he recuse himself from proceedings involving Israel but he refused to do so.

Besides the panel of judges, many of the rulings and legal opinions handed down by the International Court base themselves on distorted facts and ignore international precedents. Thus for example, in July 2024 the International Court of Justice ruled in a non-binding legal opinion that all of the Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, in Judea and Samaria and in the Jordan Valley is illegal. When taking a closer look at the ruling, it transpires that the court is in fact calling for a total ethnic cleansing of all the Jews living in these territories – a completely unprecedented ruling anywhere in the world. The court ignores the deep historic link between Jerusalem and the Jewish People, it completely disregards the right of the Jews to self-determination, and it regards Palestine to be a full-fledged country with full sovereign rights, despite the fact that such a state has never been established.

No less incensing is the discrepancy between the yardstick to which Israel is being held, and the total absence of any yardstick when it comes to our enemies. Ever since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Israel has been subjected to numerous allegations, while at the same time there is virtually no scrutiny of the legal violations on the part of the Palestinians.

In a properly-functioning international order, one that is not driven by short-sighted political expediency, we would expect a more detailed response from the ICC to Hamas’s horrific crimes, one would hope Israel would be examined under the context of the crimes committed on October 7. Besides that, it would have been desirable that many countries, not just a handful, would be alarmed by this blaming of the victim in the ICJ, that they would submit their objections accordingly.

Israel is also subjected to unjust treatment in the International Criminal Court, the ICC. When the possibility of issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, the possibility of issuing similar arrest warrants against Yahya Sinwar, Muhammad Deiff and Isma’il Haniyah. Make no mistake – this is not about trying to strike a balance – the very idea of placing Israeli leaders in the same dock as the senior Hamas leaders is indicative of the crooked perception of reality and of a dangerous equation of Israel and a murderous terrorist organization.

The line Israel has been following in recent years, in most of the trials and debates held against us is a line of resistance. Realizing we will not be given a fair trial, Israel has deliberately opted not to take part in proceedings being conducted against it, thereby sending the message that it does not recognize the authority of the International Court. Besides this message, non-cooperation on the part of Israel also impedes the court when it attempts to drill down in its investigations since it is barred from accessing all the testimony and data, such that sometimes it is unable to deliver a ruling.

Ideally:

• Work to change the methodology at the international legal system: the international legal system purportedly operates democratically, however so long as most of the players involved are undemocratic, the distortions we are experiencing to our cost are bound to persist. Israel has got to exert Hasbara and diplomatic efforts to expose this injustice, which besets the international legal system. The goal should be to reorganize the method and the balance of power within the international courts.
• Refuse to cooperate with injustice: changing the international legal system will take time but it is also a long, complicated process. We must therefore focus mainly on its conduct. Israel has got to persist with the its policy of non-cooperation with biased legal proceedings. Contrary to what many believe, in most cases there is no point in participating in these proceedings since most of the judges arrive with a “precooked” verdict and we have no real way of influencing their decisions through legal means. The best we can do is repeatedly echo the message that we do not recognize the court’s authority, since it is operating in a manner that contradicts every conceivable principle of law and justice.

Use the leverage we have in the bilateral arena

Current state:

There are two different spheres of activity when it comes to diplomatic relations. The first is the multilateral arena – the domain of international institutions. The second is the bilateral arena – where the focus is on relations between two countries cooperating based on common interests.

In the multilateral arena, Israel is relatively isolated. We do not have a bloc to shield us like the Muslim countries have. On the other hand in the bilateral sphere we have many tools and leverage vis-à-vis individual countries with which we have collaborations. At the moment, however, these are not sufficiently being used.

Ideally:

• Improve our standing in the multilateral arena: Israel has got to invest in forming a bloc with other western countries or in joining an existing bloc, so as not to be isolated in the international arena and to ensure there will be countries that will shield it – as is exactly the case with the Muslim countries.
• Move from defensive to offensive: rather than work within a group of countries and try to stave off threats and sanctions, we ought to go on the offensive vis-à-vis countries where we do have leverage. Thus, will we be able to alter voting patterns in the United Nations and gain advantages in the international arena. One good example is our relationship with Jordan: behind the scenes, Jordan is dependent on us militarily and economically. It needs its cooperation with us but in the international arena it continually condemns us and works against us. We need to use our levers with Jordan, as we ought with other countries, and exact a price for the various anti-Israeli actions taken against us internationally.

Improve Israeli Public diplomacy (“Hasbara”)

Current state:

There is an expectation that the State should take responsibility for the entire issue of Hasbara. There are two reasons why this is an unrealistic expectation. First of all, many of the technologies that could be extremely effective in the Hasbara world belong to the private market. Secondly, Israel, being a state, is subject to copious bureaucracy and rules that do not apply to private citizens. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to operate freely.

Another problem with Israeli Hasbara is that Israel is numerically inferior compared to its adversary states. This makes it very difficult for us to counteract our enemies using traditional tools. No matter how much we might demonstrate – our enemies will always be able to outnumber us on the streets. No matter how much information we might release – our enemies will release more. We have therefore got to find a way to neutralize the quantitative element and achieve advantage by other means.

Another problem we face in this respect is that Jewish communities in the diaspora also occasionally turn against us and even inside Israel there are numerous voices that question the entire faith in the righteousness of our ways. It is obviously acceptable that one or another government policy can be criticized, but when Jews and Israelis criticize the State of Israel per se, the Hasbara damage is tremendous. It also results in internal fissures that weaken us as a nation.

Ideally:

• Hasbara is everybody’s responsibility: we need to let go of the state of mind that says that the State is supposed to take care of everything. After all, the State is the collective representing all of us. In the early stages of the war there was widespread engagement by the general public, which mobilized especially in favor of Hasbara and we scored some impressive results. Over time most people resumed their everyday life and the issue was abandoned. Once people realize that it is their responsibility, and that they are able to take part in the Israeli national Hasbara effort, we will be able to engage our best minds, freeing ourselves of the constraints that hobble the state and do wonders for Israel’s international standing.
• Leverage our technological superiority: since we cannot bridge the quantitative gap with our enemies, we have to find our advantages in other areas. Outstanding among these is technology. Israel is a leader in this area. If we concentrate our efforts and adopt new tools, such as AI, we could improve our Hasbara capacity and better echo the messages we want to convey.

Not neglect the domestic Hasbara channels: The Israeli Hasbara efforts need to be directed inwards, not only outwards. We must see to it that the country’s citizens do not fall prey to false information and that they do not take part in propagating these lies to the rest of the world, since this weakens us as a people and is even more detrimental to our international image.

Increase enforcement in Israel and worldwide

Current state:

Around the world, and in Israel as well, there are various organizations that are operating under the umbrella of humanitarian work and human rights while in actual fact they are part of a well-organized terrorist network. These organizations pose a great danger since they create a false picture of the reality and drive processes harmful to Israel in terms of its Hasbara, its legal standing, and sometimes they even result in actual terrorist attacks.

These organizations employ sophisticated modus operandi. In most cases it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the link between them and terrorist organizations of terror-supporting countries. The result is an absurd state of affairs where around the world and in Israel itself, various NGOs are operating, benefitting from tax exemptions and other advantages while in effect calling for the destruction of Israel.

Despite the difficulty, a concerted effort and efficient investigation and interrogation techniques would enable incrimination of the fraudulent organizations and taking effective anti-crime measures against them. Germany has provided one example of this . Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war and the global rise in anti-Semitism, Germany has increased its investigation and enforcement in this area. In July 2024 it managed to shut down an organization that had for many years been operating as an offshoot of Iran.

Ideally:

• Fight terrorism-supporting organizations: Israel has to increase the State’s domestic enforcement and carefully scrutinize suspicious organizations operating within it so as to understand where their financing is coming from and with whom they are in contact. The State has also got to withhold tax benefits from NGOs that condemn it and even call for its destruction.
• Mobilize foreign states: Israel must harness other countries in favor of the fight against terror-supporting organizations and make it clear to them that if there are organizations within them calling for anti-Semitism and genocide, this is a national problem requiring their intervention.

No Quick Fix: Summary and Conclusions

The international institutions, primarily the United Nations and the international courts, have long ago become yet another weapon in Israel’s enemies’ arsenal – a weapon they use skillfully. Even though the international courts have no way of enforcing their rulings against Israel, the damage caused to Israel’s image abroad is considerable. It shapes a false image of Israel and brands it as a rogue state.

It is important to understand that the courts’ rulings affect not only the legal and diplomatic arenas. They filter down into society and influence public opinion, including the opinions of key media personalities and influential global political and security influencers. The courts’ rulings also lend legitimacy to various NGOs and humanitarian organizations worldwide and sometimes lead to sanctions and boycotts being imposed on Israel, causing it economic harm and damaging cultural exchanges. Worse than that, the rulings by the international courts play into the hands of Israel’s enemies. They fan the flames of anti-Semitism around the world and stimulate the calls to delegitimize Israel.

The inherent injustice typical of the international legal system is infuriating and our ability to reshape the system is very limited. This being said, we should not remain idle. Israel has got to exploit its leverage with various countries worldwide, it must augment its control and enforcement capabilities, and it must achieve technological advantages to enable it to counteract its enemies, who far outnumber us. The population at large must also understand that they bear their share of responsibility. They have to seek ways to contribute toward improving Israel’s Hasbara worldwide. They must help silence the voices from outside and from within that call for banishing us from our land and even for our extermination.

At the same time we must realize that we need to take a deep breath, that there is no instant precooked solution for our predicaments. The task of improving Israel’s image and legal standing is going to take a lot of long-term, hard, challenging work. Our enemies have been patiently working to tarnish our image for decades. Now is the time for us to exhibit the same patience.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: International Law, Israel’s Public Diplomacy and Delegitimization הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, IDSF researcher Shahar Citron will discuss the relationship between Israel and the important country that borders it to the south: Egypt. Based on past experience and political and security assessments, he will explain why both sides have interests in preserving the peace treaty, what will happen if the agreement is canceled anyway, and whether there will come a day when Israelis will be able to stroll relaxedly among the pyramids.

Background – Cold, Cold, Getting Colder: The Israel-Egypt Relationship

The relationship between Israel and Egypt has experienced many ups and downs since the establishment of the State. During the first three decades of the State of Israel, the two were bitter enemies and fought each other in five different wars. The process of change began in 1977, with the visit to Israel of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, which signaled a warming of relations and opened the door to a peace initiative.  Two years later, the two countries indeed signed a historic peace agreement, and since then they have cooperated on various economic, political and security issues.

When examining the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, one can clearly see that both countries have an interest in preserving it.

The Egyptian Interest:

Egypt borders on Libya and Sudan – two countries in deep internal turmoil. It is therefore convenient that at least there is quiet on its northern border with Israel.

Furthermore, the peace treaty with Israel contains an element of reaching out a hand to the West. Thanks to the agreement and to American interests, the Egyptians receive very significant economic support from the USA.

Egypt also enjoys military cooperation with Israel – for example, when the two worked together against ISIS forces in the Sinai Desert. In addition, Egypt used Israel’s good relations with Ethiopia to try to resolve the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which threatens the Nile River.

Beyond the political and security interests, over recent years Egypt has also derived considerable economic benefit from its relations with Israel, as Israel exports natural gas to Egypt on a large scale, which helps Cairo deal with the country’s energy crisis.

The Israeli Interest:

For its part, Israel also enjoys the fruits of the peace treaty with Egypt. Above all else, it benefits from the quiet on the southern border, and instead of dealing with a strong enemy it has a strong partner. In addition, it has allies on the border with Gaza that at least on the theoretical level can help it fight the terror organizations there.

Beyond that, Egypt serves as a liaison with the Muslim world – a role that has reached its peak in the current war, in which it mediates extensively between Israel and Hamas.

From the economic point of view, Israel also benefits from the gas export agreement with Egypt, and does not want to jeopardize it.

When one understands what each country gains from the peace agreement, one can assume with high probability that they will make sure to preserve it. However, one must not forget that peace with Egypt is a “cold peace,” as the two countries are not really friendly with each other, and the Egyptian population is mostly hostile to Israel.

Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, and due to its geographic location and diplomatic status, Egypt has become the natural mediator between Israel and Hamas. This role creates new opportunities for the relationship between Israel and Egypt, although it also presents challenges that could threaten their peace agreement. At the same time, various developments are taking place in Egypt in both domestic and foreign policy that also make it clear that the partnership between it and Israel cannot be taken for granted.

So what will be the deciding factor – common interests or the growing pressures? In order to assess what the relationship between Israel and Egypt will look like in the future, one needs to know the main factors that threaten it, as well as the opportunities that the State of Israel can take advantage of for its own benefit.

Shahar Citron: The Vision for the Israel-Egypt relationship

Swords of Iron: Harnessing the Egyptians for the war effort

Current state: The Swords of Iron War is challenging the relationship between Israel and Egypt. First, Egypt’s role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas naturally creates a situation in which it finds itself in a conflict of interests. Second, since Egypt borders on Gaza and controls part of the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel’s actions in the war have a direct impact on its national security. Above all, Egypt is concerned that Israel’s military operations will cause a wave of immigration of Gazan refugees into Egyptian territory, which is why it opposes many actions of the IDF. Third, the Egyptian government is under heavy pressure from its citizens, who demand that it stand firm on the side of the Palestinians.

Ideally:

• Israel should act in Gaza according to the war goals it defined, but it must show sensitivity to the Egyptians’ interests, strive to reach agreements with Egypt as much as possible, and make it clear to Egypt that the operations in Gaza do not endanger them.

• In order to reach agreements with Egypt, Israel can use its economic, military and political levers.

• Economically, Israel can limit or ease the export of gas to Egypt.

• Politically, Israel has two main levers: It can influence the relationship between Egypt and the United States, and it can use its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia to help Egypt deal with the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that threatens to damage the water supply of the Nile River.

• Militarily, Israel can support Egypt in its fight against the Houthis, who are attacking vessels in the Red Sea, thereby causing the loss of dozens of percentage points in Egyptian income from the Suez Canal.

Stopping Egypt from drawing closer to the “Axis of Evil”

Current state: Over recent years, there has been a decline in American support for Egypt – both in terms of financial aid and in terms of military supplies. This decline led Egypt to look for other sources of support, and to team up with countries such as Russia and China. Egypt currently purchases billions of dollars’ worth of arms and weaponry from these countries. At the same time, it has become clear that a certain thawing of relations between Egypt and Iran has taken place, and there is even a warming of relations between it and countries associated with the “Muslim Brotherhood,” such as Qatar and Turkey. The Egyptian rapprochement with the countries of the “Axis of Evil” and extremist Muslim countries could lead to a strategic change in Egyptian policy, a change that will damage the sphere of influence of the Western world as well as relations with the State of Israel.

Ideally:

• On the political level: The State of Israel is the bridge between the West and East, and as such, it should take advantage of its ties with the United States to encourage it to support Egypt, and ease the sanctions that were imposed upon it.

• On the public diplomacy level: Israel must invest effort in the public diplomacy effort and clarify to Western countries that if they won’t be there for Egypt, Egypt won’t be there for them.

Keep an eye on the growing strength of the Egyptian army

Current state: In recent years, the Egyptian army has undergone modernization and has significantly improved in the aspects of force building, arming itself, upgrading infrastructure and upgrading its training. These processes are making it one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East, and even in the entire world. According to the GFP ranking for 2024, the Egyptian army ranks 15th among the strongest militaries in the world, while the IDF is only 17th. If so, the Egyptians’ military capabilities are a threat to Israel’s security, especially since Israel is not seriously preparing for the possibility of an Egyptian attack.

Ideally:

• Israel must become familiar with Egypt’s power and prepare for a situation in which in turns against the Jewish state. Instead of developing complacency in the face of the calm on the Egyptian front, Israel should take advantage of it to gather intelligence, study the Egyptian army, and plan an adequate military response right now.

• At the same time, as long as Israel and Egypt are at peace with each other, Israel can be helped by the power of the Egyptian army by cooperating together against common enemies such as the Houthis.

Influencing public opinion in Egypt

Current state: With 34% inflation, 7% unemployment, and a national debt of $165 billion, Egpyt is in a deep economic crisis. Nevertheless, President el-Sisi is initiating grandiose projects such as the establishment of the “New Administrative City” and the expansion of the “Nile Delta” area, which have no immediate benefit to the citizens. This reality generates great anger among Egyptian citizens, and leads to many protests.

Parallel to the economic protests, since the Swords of Iron War began, many Egyptians have come out against the government with the claim that it does not offer enough support to the residents of Gaza.

The strong public opposition in both these arenas could affect the government’s decision-making process and perhaps even bring about its downfall – exactly as occurred in the 2011 protests that caused President Hosni Mubarak to resign. If Egypt’s government should fall, it’s possible that the new one who would arise would be more hostile to Israel, which would put the countries’ peace agreement in real danger.

The Ideal Situation

• Israel should prove the importance of the peace treaty not only to Egypt’s government but also to its people. To do this, Israel must try to help Egypt’s economy, among other ways by exporting gas and drumming up support from the U.S. and other Western countries.

• Israel should try to involve Egypt as much as possible in the decisions regarding the fighting in Gaza, in order to quieten public opinion and reduce the pressure that the public is applying to the regime.

• It is worthwhile trying to reshape Egyptian public opinion, through activity on social networks and through social initiatives that will mobilize the younger generation. As soon as Israel has a toehold in the Egyptian consciousness, it will be able to expand its influence, and hopefully it will also succeed in creating a real perceptual change among the Egyptian public.

Hope for the Good, Expect the Bad: This is How the State of Israel Must Approach Its Relationship with Egypt

Since the Swords of Iron War began, there have been numerous claims that the war endangers the relations between Israel and Egypt. In practice, the war only brings out problems that have existed under the surface for many years. In a certain sense, the war is actually good for the relationship between the two countries because it caused some sobering reflections and now requires both sides to see reality as it truly exists.

As demonstrated above, the relationship between Israel and Egypt is a complex one. On the one hand, the countries have been reinforcing their peace agreement for nearly fifty years, conducting many collaborations together, and benefiting greatly from the mutual ties. On the other hand, there is hostility between the countries, and in recent years there have been many processes that threaten to create a deep rift between them and damage all stability in the region.

In their essence, Israel and Egypt are both pragmatic countries, and there are many reasons to believe that they will keep the peace agreement between them, and perhaps even manage to warm their relations by a degree or two. However, in a reality where Egypt is growing closer to the countries of the “Axis of Evil,” getting stronger militarily and suffering from public protests, the peace agreement cannot be taken for granted.

If so, the State of Israel must act on two seemingly contradictory levels – on one level, it must ensure the preservation and improvement of relations with Egypt, but on the other level it must keep one observant eye open and prepare intelligence-wise and militarily for a situation in which the current reality will change.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Relationship with Egypt הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Dr. Omer Dostri looks at Israel’s security doctrine — a doctrine that took form when the state was founded and has not been updated since.

Background — Deterring, alerting, defeating: The current security doctrine of the State of Israel

In the 1950s, David Ben-Gurion formulated Israel’s security doctrine. Ben-Gurion is generally assumed to have based his doctrine on principles that appeared in Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s essay “The Iron Wall.” Ben-Gurion believed that, as the essay says, a strong army must be established, and national power developed, in order to halt the enemy’s attempts to attack until, understanding that we cannot be expelled or exterminated, the enemy finally accepts our existence. Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine, also known as the “security triangle,” included three key components:

• Deterring: The State of Israel must display military superiority in order to deter its enemies and convince them that attacking Israel is not worthwhile. Because Israel is at a geographic and demographic disadvantage, Israeli deterrence is built primarily on significant alliances, a strong economy, and a technological advantage.

• Alerting: The State of Israel must develop intelligence capabilities and use methods of early warning in order to be able to prepare itself in advance of any attack.

• Defeating: Once an attack has taken place or a palpable threat has been discovered, the enemy must be confronted and overcome.

That doctrine, including the sequence that it dictates — first deterring, then alerting, then defeating — may have suited the geopolitical and military situation of the State’s early years, a situation in which we confronted hostile states such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq; but today, aside from Iran, we are hardly obliged at all to deal with hostile states as such. Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with us, Syria and Iraq have been exhausted by civil wars, and Lebanon has fallen to Hezbollah. Thus our enemies today are not states but rather terrorist organizations — and such enemies require a completely different security doctrine.

Over the years, there have been a few attempts to change Israel’s security doctrine. Thus, for example, in 2006 the Meridor Committee expanded the security doctrine, adding the element of protection. But no other significant changes came about in doctrine or in operations, and the State of Israel continues to rely on an erroneous doctrine. The direct result of that error was the disaster of October 7.

In order to prevent an additional disaster, the State of Israel must impose the necessary revisions right away and formulate a new security doctrine that suits today’s reality and can provide a response to the threats currently at our doorstep.

Dr. Omer Dostri: The vision of a new security doctrine for Israel

Deterrence will derive from victory

Current state: The State of Israel has become addicted to the element of deterrence. In recent years, most of our military operations in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have been intended to deter our enemies, not to defeat them. Even in the Second Lebanon War, Israel did not try to defeat Hezbollah decisively and destroy it as a military and governmental factor, but contented itself with instilling fear.

Those operations and rounds of fighting have not proven themselves, for the simple reason that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to deter an extremist Islamic enemy. States and organizations with a Western mentality may somehow be susceptible to influence, but enemies such as Hamas and Hezbollah speak a completely different language and cannot easily be deterred, if at all.

Ideally:

• Reverse the sequence: History shows that the best deterrence is obtained by a clear military victory. Thus the sequence of matters must be reversed. First aim for victory, and after victory the deterrence will emerge automatically.

• Defeat Hamas and Hezbollah: The most urgent objective of the State of Israel is the defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah. Such a defeat will not only leave us in the dominant position but also provide us with deterrent power in the region for the next two decades.

Deterrence based solely on intentions is not deterrence

Current state: In order to achieve prior deterrence against attacks, the State of Israel has focused mainly on the enemy’s intentions and tried to assess how likely an attack is. Our enemies’ intentions are indeed important, but it is unreasonable to ignore their capabilities. Over the years, we have seen Hamas grow stronger and stronger, and instead of nipping that process in the bud, we allowed it to continue because we believed that Hamas would not dare attack Israel.

If we continue to base our system of deterrence on the enemy’s supposed intentions, we are likely to overlook many further items of importance.

Ideally:

• Base deterrence on abilities: The State of Israel and the IDF must strongly emphasize intelligence gathering, in order to learn the enemy’s abilities and discern any buildup of strength in advance.

• Take the initiatives: Rather than waiting for the enemy to express the intent to inflict harm on us, Israel should go into action as soon as it sees that the enemy’s strength is sufficient to do so.

Above all else, victory

Current state: Currently the element of victory ranks at the bottom of the national security doctrine. In recent years the State of Israel has stopped short of true victory over the enemy and been satisfied with tightly targeted operations against local threats. That approach enabled our enemies to gather strength and created the circumstances that beset us today.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel should aim for true victory over its enemies. First and foremost, we must defeat Hamas. We must not halt the war in Gaza before we have completely demolished the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, because otherwise Hamas will bounce back.

• The next stage is to defeat Hezbollah at the northern border. A long spell of quiet, such as followed the Second Lebanon War, is not enough. This time we must put an end to the entity known as Hezbollah, even at the cost of an arduous all-out war in Lebanon. If we do not neutralize Hezbollah now, then in another five or ten years we will face an October 7 on steroids.

• After we have finished with Gaza and Lebanon, we must completely clear Judea and Samaria of terrorism. Tightly targeted operations of two or three days will not suffice. A comprehensive operation, a Defensive Shield 2, must expunge all the terrorist nests that have sprung up there. Only complete victory on all fronts will provide us with quiet and safety for years to come.

Giving the geographic component its place

Current state: As soon as the state was founded, its leaders — both left-wing and right-wing — saw clearly that Jewish settlement is the foundation for everything. However, the current security doctrine gives no consideration to the geographic or settlement component. Moreover, in recent decades Israel has taken various steps of withdrawal from territories in the naïve hope that calm and quiet would result.

As history teaches, every retreat from the Jewish settlements exacts a heavy price. We saw it under the Oslo Accords when we left parts of Judea and Samaria, we saw it when we left the Lebanese security zone behind and it turned immediately into a zone of terror, and we are seeing it now in Gaza. Obviously if there had been Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip — as there was before the Disengagement — October 7, in the sickening form that it took, could not have occurred.

Ideally:

• Jewish settlement is the foundation for security, because wherever we are not present, our enemies will be and they will foment terror. We must encourage settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel, with wisdom, with understanding, and with an emphasis on the north, the south, the Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza.

Civilians too have their role

Current state: Before the War of Iron Swords, most of Israel’s citizens were not actively taking part in the national defense effort. There was not enough of a hold on the periphery and on the agricultural expanses at the border. The emergency squads in the border communities were not properly trained and equipped, and only a few civilians carried small arms.

Ideally:

• Extensive occupancy of land: We must firm up our control, and our agriculture, in the outlying areas as part of the extensive occupancy of the land.

• Outlying communities as part of the border security system: We must establish more emergency squads, train them properly, and provide them with weapons and ammunition.

• National guard: A national guard must be established, and it must receive extensive powers and ample budgets in order to assume a significant defensive role in the outlying communities and the mixed cities.

• New gun licensing policy: The process of obtaining a gun license must be made simpler for Israeli citizens. Terrorism is not a problem located across the border, it is happening inside Israel and we see many cases in which armed civilians have taken charge in the face of terrorism and saved fellow civilians.

Reducing military dependency

Current state: Israeli military industry has shrunken in recent years, while the State of Israel has increasingly relied on weapons and other materiel imported from foreign countries. In such circumstances Israel, needing other countries to arm it, loses a great deal of its independence and freedom of action in security matters. It needs to submit explanations that will satisfy the countries on which it depends.

Ideally:

• Independent manufacturing ability: One of the most significant lessons from October 7 is that Israel must base its warfare as thoroughly as possible on its own weapons manufacturing. Granted, the State of Israel is a small country with a limited workforce and apparently we will never fill all our military needs ourselves — but the more we reduce our dependency on other countries, the more we increase our bargaining power and our ability to act independently.

New doctrine — new security: Summary and conclusions

Security is an end, not a means, and its preservation is of paramount importance. However, the State of Israel observes a 75-year-old security doctrine that may have been wise in its early days but has long since lost its applicability. The disaster of October 7 is painful, decisive proof.

In order to successfully answer today’s threats, we must develop a new security doctrine. Whereas the old doctrine included only three components — deterring, alerting, and defeating — the new doctrine must also consider Jewish settlement, the role of the civilians in defense, and Israel’s security independence. In addition, we must not overvalue the component of deterrence, certainly not to the point of ignoring the most important component of all: victory. We must also understand that in order to attain lasting security and stability, we will be paying a heavy price, particularly at the present fateful juncture which may be determining the country’s future for decades to come.

The author is solely responsible for the content of this article, and it does not necessarily reflect the position of the IDSF movement.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The national security doctrine הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Colonel (Res.) Ilan Dikstein focuses on establishing a national guard – an idea that has been around for a long time but which has not yet materialized.

Background – From Ordinary Criminality to Governability Issues

The State of Israel has for many years now been coping with internal security issues. These include criminal activity, terrorism, agricultural terrorism and so forth. Officialdom has shied away from naming it explicitly, for political correctness reasons, but it is common knowledge that it is the Arab and Bedouin population that has been at the heart of these activities. Quite often the motives are purely of a terrorist nature.

This trend saw a major uptick, which the country endured painfully in the events that preceded Operation Guardian of the Walls. In May 2021, riots broke out in hundreds of locations nationwide. These included arson, stone-throwing and public order violations. Three people lost their lives in these riots. Hundreds were injured and property damage was estimated at tens of millions of Shekels. According to the security authorities, some 90% of those involved in the riots were Israeli citizens from the Arab community.

These riots shook the establishment, which realized that there is a severe governability issue – that this was a security issue for all intents and purposes requiring a targeted response. This is when the idea was raised of setting up a national guard, which would be based primarily on volunteer citizens, and which would serve as an additional defensive layer on a regular basis and in emergencies.

Since 2021, this notion of a national guard has been taking shape, but it has not yet been acted upon. The delay is due, among other things, to various disagreements as to the exact nature of the guard. Such questions as: will the guard be comprised primarily of volunteers or will it be based on serving personnel? Will the guard replace the Border Police or will it operate alongside it? Will the guard be accountable to the Israel Police or to the Minister of the Interior? And also: where will it operate? What will be its mandate? How much authority will it be given?

Despite the disagreements, most decision-makers are already convinced that one way or another, such a national guard has to be established to be charged with internal security with special emphasis on incidents of a terrorist nature. Should another outbreak like Guardian of the Walls occur, and in particular these days when we are engaged in a war on our southern border and also on our northern border – we might find ourselves facing a scenario for which we are simply unprepared.

Colonel (Res.) Ilan Dikstein: The Vision for a National Guard

Stare the Problem in the Eye

Current state:

The State of Israel and the police balk at outlining the root of the problem, even though it is common knowledge that there is one sector here that systematically harms another sector of the population. In many cases, cases of theft, harassment or sabotage are committed not purely in the criminal realm. They frequently have a terrorist dimension, reinforced by a Jihadist ideology. Moreover, the perpetrators of the criminal activities could subsequently, just as easily, repurpose their acts in support of terrorist objectives. Similarly, the weapons used in criminal offenses can be redirected toward the Jewish population in a terrorist incident, meaning there is a dangerous escalatory trajectory here.

We have got to realize that Israel’s Arabs are living inside our country without a fence to restrict their movements, while among them there are many groups which identify with the Palestinian nationalist ideology and are hostile toward the Zionist endeavor. Our enemies from outside are fully aware of this and are therefore supporting these groups materially and financially in an effort to subvert them against Israel. Thus, a new battle front has formed in Israel – only this time the front is internal. Whether in peaceful times or in emergencies, this front could transform into an active battlefront in its own right, as was the case in Operation Guardian of the Walls, and during wartime it could also become yet another theater of combat in addition to the rest of the battlefronts. Despite these dangers, we still persist in skirting the issue rather than seeking a real solution for it.

Ideally:

• Define the issue: The time has come to stop hiding behind political correctness and state outright that there is a serious problem of criminality and terrorism coming from substantial groups within the Israeli Arab population. This being said, we are fully aware that a large proportion of Israel’s Arabs are loyal, productive citizens. These activities cause an acute governability issue across large swathes of the country.
• Define the specific attack scenarios: the homeland front within the State of Israel is a battle front for all intents and purposes and has to be treated that way. These specific attack scenarios along this front have to be outlined, and the threats we are facing have to be understood. These threats include sabotaging bases deep inside the country, loss of governance within the Arab sector, sabotaging of national infrastructures, blocking of critical traffic arteries, attacks against Jewish settlements, rioting inside mixed-population cities, and more. Besides this, one must take into consideration that this front can heat up on its own or concurrent with other fronts as part of a multi-theater war.
• Operate during peaceful times, prepare for emergencies: The national guard has got to prepare itself and maintain readiness for a wartime scenario, although the bulk of its work would be done during peaceful times. This routine work serves two important goals: training the forces for an emergency or for war, such that when needed they can be called upon and will be sufficiently well-trained. The second goal is to nip in the bud the threats in the field, thereby reducing and even preventing the problems that might erupt in emergencies or during a war.

Establish a professional, specially-trained force

Current state:

Internal Security is currently assigned to the Israel Police, however in emergencies the police is not always prepared in terms of capabilities and manpower, in which case the IDF has to intervene as well. An IDF intervention in internal security issues raises two main issues. First of all, this is an immense burden on the IDF, which in any case has multiple fronts to attend to. Secondly, if the IDF fights against our own citizens, a complicated balance is struck, which might jeopardize our democracy.

It is worth noting that IDF intervention in matters of internal security is due not only to the need to protect public security, it is also due to the need to facilitate the continued proper functioning of the military itself. Israel is a small country with a small army. Therefore the very same forces are needed for operations along various sectors. Redeployment of IDF forces from one theater to another is done along internal routes in the country’s heartland. Should there be civil unrest leading to routes being blocked or barricaded, or should access to military bases be obstructed – as was the case with the Nevatim base during Operation Guardian of the Walls – the IDF will have difficulties in carrying out its missions. This reality is a major concern for the IDF. It forces the IDF to allocate forces and resources for dealing with a situation that should not be part of its responsibilities.

Ideally:

• Free the IDF of internal security: the IDF should be freed from any involvement in internal security so as to enable it to focus on its other responsibilities and to prevent friction between the military and the civilians.
• Find a proper solution for all internal security issues: in order to enable the IDF to completely disengage from dealing with homeland front issues, organs need to be created, which will be ready, both in terms of capabilities and in terms of order of battle, for any criminal or terrorist scenario that might destabilize the home front.
• Professional national guard: since the Israel Police alone cannot cope with all of the internal security specific attack scenarios, a professional national guard must be established, which will be comprised of skilled soldiers in the regular army and reservists. It is important to understand that the original suggestion to set up a volunteer-based guard is inadequate. First of all, professionalism and commitment are better when an organization is not based on volunteer manpower. And since this is a highly-sensitive arena, in which any miscalculation could result in injury, one cannot compromise on unskilled forces. Secondly, in an emergency, most of the volunteers would be going to their army units, leaving the National Guard short-staffed.

The Border Police as a National Guard – Redefining the mission, the sector and the nature of its work

Current state:

Besides the IDF and Israel Police, the Border Police is also a force operating inside the country. On the one hand this is a semi-military force but on the other hand it is under the command of the police and its main occupations are on issues of internal security. The Border Police’s status makes it a reserve force, operating in a “twilight zone”, where it is called in to help with a wide range of missions without having a clear zone of authority and without specializing in any particular sector or in any specific mission.

Ideally:

One of the ways in which the issue can be dealt with efficiently is to turn the Border Police into a National Guard. Such a move would require a few changes:

• Rename the Border Police: the name this force has been given – Border Police – is antiquated, since it has long ago ceased to reflect this organization’s role. The IDF is the force that effectively polices our borders. For this reason, the name “National Guard” is more appropriate.
• Define responsibilities: A national guard force needs to have clearly-defined responsibilities with a list of missions and goals according to which it is measured. According to the job description, the Guard would attend to matters of internal security, focusing on terrorist crime and criminality committed within Arabic society. Among its occupations would be counter-terrorism, weapons smuggling, agricultural terrorism and racketeering. This definition would also be significant in the fight against crime within the Arab sector. This is an issue the State of Israel is committed to dealing with, first and foremost for the sake of the well-being of the Arab sector itself.
• Define a clear sphere of activity: The new Guard’s operations would be confined only to the territory of the State of Israel, leaving the Judea and Samaria or Gaza territories completely out of scope. Furthermore, the forces should be trained in accordance with specific regions of activity. The division into regions, or sectors, will serve as a force multiplier, since the moment the forces specialize in a specific sector and in a specific type of activity, they will be much better prepared for dealing with the challenges as they arise, with a smaller order of battle.
• Proactive rather than reactive: The Israel Police is mostly reactive – a problem arises, it steps in to solve it. The IDF, on the other hand, engages more in proactive and preventive action so as to strengthen deterrence and prevent escalation. The National Guard will also have to adopt this practice and it will need to take proactive measures to strengthen internal governability.

Solving the issue of the National Guard’s allegiance

Current state:

One of the factors delaying the establishment of a national guard is the issue of whom it will belong to. Some believe the national guard should come under the Israel Police just as the Border Police is today. Others believe it should operate as a separate entity answerable directly to the Minister of Public Security. Both approaches have their merits, however so long as this issue is not resolved, it is impossible to move ahead and set it up.

Ideally:

• In the beginning – place the National Guard under the Israel Police: at least in the first few years, the National Guard would best function under the police the way the Border Police does at the moment. This would avoid political pushback and would expedite the setting up of the Guard. It would also make sure the police remains in charge of internal security issues.
• Hedging and differentiating the National Guard: despite its assignment to the police, the National Guard ought also to be hedged in terms of its missions and in terms of the manpower and resources allocated to it. Such hedging would prevent the police from using it as a reserve force that can be deployed at the police’s discretion. It would enable the Guard to operate freely within its purview.
• Later on – consider reassigning the Guard to the Ministry of Public Security: after several years, it will be possible to re-evaluate the situation and consider whether to break the National Guard away from the Police and place it under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security. It is important to emphasize that also in such a situation, the Israel Police would remain in charge of internal security.

Force-building – gradually and wisely

Current state:

Considering the Border Police, the force out of which the National Guard would probably be coming – one can see several problems. First of all the Border Police staff is short on power, its intelligence capabilities are inadequate, and it lacks a recruitment organization commensurate with its needs. Secondly, the Border Police operates in company formations. It is unaccustomed to working in battalions or brigades. Thirdly, manpower utilization in the Border Police is not optimal – this applies both to the regular force and to its reservists: nowadays there are many Border Police reserve companies, but these hardly ever show up for reserve military service days and are therefore inadequately trained. Moreover, the Reserve Military Service Law is not applied to the Border Police reserve force the same way it is applied to the IDF reserve military service force.

Ideally:

• Strengthening the staff: The goal is to turn the Border Police headquarters – which will eventually become the National Guard headquarters – into a body that is not only a force builder, it should also apply the force. In other words, it should be a body with clear responsibilities and it should be amply capable of carrying out its missions. To achieve this, the Guard’s headquarters should be reinforced through allocation of resources such as information systems and Command & Control systems; its intelligence gathering capabilities must be improved, including through arranging collaboration with the GSS, and a recruitment organization must be set up to enable large-scale recruitment of high-quality manpower.
• Scaling up the order of battle: manpower is the most important resource. It will take a cross-system thinking process to scale up the order of battle serving in the National Guard. For example: to extend conscript service back to three full years, thereby enabling allocation of more soldiers to the National Guard. Another measure could be to recruit populations that are currently outside the circles of recruitment for various reasons – for example the Haredi community, assuming they would be more comfortable serving in a Border Police-styled force, and in a force that would make it easier for them to maintain their specific lifestyle. Besides that, reservists from IDF combat units could be brought in for service in the National Guard. Besides these measures, it is also important to ramp up the National Guard’s image among the general public, to offer preferential terms for their service so as to attract high-quality, highly-motivated manpower.
• Planning for force multipliers: besides scaling up the order of battle, the brigades and battalions that will make up the National Guard must also have additional force multipliers, which would enable even a relatively small force to achieve a lot. Part of the force multipliers have already been mentioned here. These include recruitment of high-quality manpower, a comprehensive training program, specialization in a specific sector, improvement of the surveillance capabilities and of the Command & Control capabilities, strengthening of the intelligence network etc.
• Stepwise progression: this force must be built up gradually, in three main phases – short-term (one year), intermediate-term (three years) and long-term (five to seven years). It is advisable to begin with a single region, to settle in and only then to expand to the rest of the regions. The intention is that at the end of the process, each region will have its own specialized brigade made up of a regular-army battalion and several reserve battalions.
• Optimal utilization of the manpower: the Border Police reserve companies should be converted into reserve companies of the National Guard. Besides that, the Border Police’s reserve companies should be consolidated, they should be armed and trained, exactly the way this is done in the IDF.
• Volunteer layer: the regular units and the reserve units in the National Guard can be augmented by volunteer civilians, who will be able to reinforce the units during peacetime and in emergencies. The volunteers must also be organized in proper units and they have to be well-trained. It should also be possible to place the volunteers by their residential address, such that they will be positioned to promptly respond to a call within their region. This being said, one should bear in mind that in an emergency and also in wartime, most of the volunteers will contact the regular units to which they are assigned, such that this force can only be regarded as a complementary force. When setting up the volunteer network, one can rely on existing networks such as the alert squads that defend settlements, intervention units and various urban battalions.

Set up an interministerial committee

Current state:

As mentioned earlier, the idea of setting up a national guard arose already in 2021 and, since 2023 it has been worked on in government committees – however the force has yet to materialize. Currently the idea is under discussion mainly in the Ministry of Public Security although it is important to understand that this is a cross-systemic issue requiring a multidisciplinary policy.

Ideally:

• An interministerial committee should be set up, which would include representatives of the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Minister of Justice and any other relevant stakeholder. This is the only way to form a holistic policy and to succeed in realizing this plan.

Don’t ignore, take action: summary and conclusions

Internal Security is officially the responsibility of the Israel Police, however as we often see, the actual solution is provided by the IDF. This is because there are criminal activities taking place which are of a terrorist nature, requiring a military-style response. This is not something the Israel Police can provide.

The current state of affairs, in which the IDF is virtually the only executive body in Israel, is untenable. It is wrong from the operational standpoint, from the legal standpoint and from a democracy standpoint. Ideally, the IDF should be unburdened of any responsibilities related to solving internal domestic problems. Responsibility for this should be assigned to the police and the National Guard, for which the appropriate resources and tools should be provided. Such a move would relieve the IDF of a considerable load and would enable the IDF to focus on its real mission – coping with enemies from beyond our borders.

The most effective, most efficient way to set up a national guard is to base it on an already-existing Border Police force, which is structured similarly, but to upgrade it and fine-tune its missions. As opposed to the Border Police, which currently serves as a reserve force for the police and for the IDF, the National Guard would have clear authorities with clearly-demarcated sector boundaries. Its mission will be to deal with terrorist-based criminality while focusing on the Arab sector, which is the source of the majority of such criminality.

Also, as opposed to the Border Police, the National Guard will operate within geographic regions, it will be trained to combat in large orders of battle – battalions and brigades – and it will maintain a well-formed, well-trained reserve force. Besides the regular soldiers and the reservists, volunteers can also be included in the National Guard. These will help reinforce the units on an as-needed basis. As mentioned earlier, initially the National Guard will come under the Israel Police, however over time it will be possible to split it off as a separate organization with a clear identity and with its own unique capabilities.

The concept of setting up a national guard has been around for many years but now, with Israel in the midst of a war on multiple fronts, it has taken on an added urgency to the extent that it is imperative that it be implemented without any further delay.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Establishing of a National Guard הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

“Israel’s economic policy over the past 15 years has been endangering the nation’s security. When I said so in the past, people answered back “Think you’re so wise?” says Prof. Yaron Zelekha, former Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance. “By now it’s no stroke of genius to propose that such an economic policy contributed to the situation on October 7, but there were indications far earlier.”

Zelekha is currently a professor of accountancy and economics and he heads the School of Accountancy, Economics, and Financial Management at Ono Academic College. He served as Accountant General at Israel’s Ministry of Finance between 2003 and 2007, when Benjamin Netanyahu was Finance Minister. In this interview, he speaks about the destructive influence of the many years of reductions in the defense budget, and about the inefficiency of the public sector — including the security services. But he begins by explaining how Israel reached its current pass in the first place.

“The GDP in Israel — the gross domestic product — comes to something like 2 trillion shekels and it’s built from 5 factors: private consumption, private investment, government outlays, exports, and imports. In a normal situation, exports and imports more or less balance out and the rest are responsible for the level of the GDP. But in Israel today, private consumption amounts to about 50 percent of the pie, and that’s very low as compared to a country like the USA where it’s 68 percent, or the UK where it’s 63 percent, or as compared to Israel in the past.”

What about other countries in Europe, where private consumption is relatively low?

“It’s true that in countries like Germany and Sweden, private consumption is lower than in the USA and the UK, but their governments are very efficient so that the factor of government outlays compensates for the limited private consumption. In contrast, Israel falls short on both counts. On the one hand, private consumption isn’t allowed to grow into an engine big enough to propel the GDP. And on the other hand we don’t have a government of Germans and Swedes to propel the economy. We lose on the swings and lose on the roundabouts. No private consumption and no governmental efficiency.”

So the main problem is simply low consumption?

“The low private consumption is a result of unsuccessful policy. One of the main factors restraining private consumption in Israel is that the trillion shekels of private consumption are channeled into our own country of thievery, where competition suffers from many problems. If I let you choose where to shop with a trillion shekels, you wouldn’t shop here. You’d shop somewhere much cheaper, in Europe or in the USA. But we’re forced to spend the trillion shekels here in our beloved land of robbers. As a result, the consumers’ money — instead of driving the economy — lines the pockets of monopolists, sole licensed importers. bankers, and an inefficient government.”

It’s no wonder, then, that so many Israelis make purchases overseas for shipment to Israel.

“Israel is under-importing. When consumption rises, imports should rise. But in Israel, that doesn’t happen. Although everything you might want is priced lower by tens of percent a few hours away by plane, imports are blocked. Ideally when exports rise there are more dollars circulating, the dollar weakens, and imports become cheaper, raising the consumers’ standard of living. But in Israel the surplus from exports doesn’t trickle down to raise the consumers’ standard of living. In our lopsided economy, it’s impossible to extract the full benefit from the export engine. Our economy is repressing private consumption by means of distorted prices and high taxation, while the government is large and dysfunctional.”

So what economic policy would help Israel out of this predicament?

“The main point is to liberate the consumers and enable them to freely drive the wheels of the economy, without having the banks and the big importers slice themselves an unnecessarily large share at the expense of the consumers and small businesses. When I came to the Finance Ministry at the start of 2003, the national debt had reached almost 100% of the GDP, the deficit was 10% of the GDP, and the income per capita in real terms had sunk to 49% of the income per capita in the USA — a drop that put us back at the 1960s level — while the price of housing had risen to 96 monthly salaries for an average apartment. That situation was an all-time low for our economy, worse even then 1985. But after 5 years of a policy that stopped repressing private consumption, the real income per capita had risen to 62% of the income per capita in the USA. In 2007 prices were 5% to 10% lower than in the USA, and housing prices dropped to a level of 80 monthly salaries for an average apartment. And prices could have dropped farther if the policy that I’d set out had continued. Today apartment prices have risen to 170 monthly salaries on the average and prices overall are higher by 35% than in the USA.”

What are the implications of that economic predicament for our security?

“The powerful growth during my term enabled us to channel 7% of the GDP to security. But in the 15 years since then, the economic policy has been entirely different under Netanyahu, Gantz, Bennett, and Lapid. As a result, the economy was in trouble even before the war. Real income per capita in Israel, with purchasing power factored in, dropped to less than 50% of the income per capita in the USA. In that situation, it’s impossible to keep channeling 7% of the GDP to security as we’d been doing before, and so all those prime ministers and ministers of defense and finance were forced to cut back on security. Before the war hit, the defense budget stood at 5% of the GDP as against the former 7% that I mentioned. The difference amounts to 40 billion shekels per year. But that’s not all. The defense budget includes two elements: salaries and operations. The salary part has increased in the meantime, meaning that the part for operations — that is, the money available for weaponry, training, and so on — suffers twice over. There’s a smaller pie to divide up, and operations receives a smaller fraction of it.”

You’re saying that economics is the key to security.

“Yes. Everyone knows about the Battle of Waterloo, where the British and Prussian armies fought Napoleon to his final defeat and ended the Napoleonic Wars. Who was the most important participant in the battle? None of the commanders. It was Rothschild, the funder of that carnival, and without him the British and the Prussians couldn’t have advanced a single step toward the enemy. In Israel, our distorted economy is unable to support the army and therefore downsizes it. Divisions and air squadrons are closed down, training is reduced, and less ammunition is manufactured. The 40 billion shekels missing from the budget make a dent that the security services feel strongly — not to mention the similar effect on health, education, and infrastructure.”

Fighting against monopolies just as against the (not comparable) Hamas terrorists

Zelekha believes that the core crisis in Israel’s economy is the cost of living and the government’s unwillingness to deal with it. The high cost of living is caused by the hampering of free competition, by corruption and intermingling of the power of capital and the power of government through the agency of public servants and politicians who favor the wealthy, and by the monopolies, sole importers, and banks that dominate the economy. Under that banner, Zelekha founded the New Economic Party, which ran in two elections — for the 24th and 25th Knessets — but did not pass the electoral threshold.

The million-dollar question is how to fight the cost of living and the housing crisis.

“In fighting the cost of living, there are three fronts to address. The first is against the monopolies and the sole importers, and most of it is rather easy to tackle. Cancel all the customs duties and all the local standards, and most importantly ֮— break up the interlocking ownership of the import companies. If you’re sole importer for a big international player, you shouldn’t also be the sole importer for a competing international player, because then you’re fixing prices for them both. If you’re a local monopoly manufacturing some product, you shouldn’t also be the main importer of the same product because then you’re blocking competition against yourself.”

Is it really that simple to stop the monopolies?

“It won’t be an instant cure. Battling against the tycoons’ practice of centralization, and against their attempts to control the economy, is a ceaseless job because capital always wishes to create centralization. But the government must fight back. Just as it fights terrorism — although those two enemies are obviously not comparable. Even a small change will bring a plentiful return.”

So that’s the first battlefront against the cost of living. What’s the second?

“The second front is our lopsided taxation. Among other things, it adds to the burden not only on consumers, as I mentioned, but also on small businesses. It prevents them from competing properly with large businesses. The tax benefits for large businesses should be cancelled and the small businesses should be free to compete with them on the basis of equal taxation.”

Isn’t there added value for the local economy in the economic activity that big multinationals bring to Israel?

“Yes, there is added value, but there is a price as well and the price outweighs the benefit. In my opinion, they would come to Israel even after cancellation of the benefits — which they don’t receive in the West anyway.”

Let’s go on to the third battlefront against the cost of living.

“The third battlefront concerns the budget. Both the size of the budget and the quality of governmental services. When government services in infrastructure, education, and health are inefficient, it doesn’t help to increase the budget. For example, if you add hours to the school day instead of investing your money in reducing class sizes, you’re cultivating an absurdity. We have many more class hours than are customary in Europe, but we also have many more children in each classroom. So an hour of school isn’t worth much, because it’s impossible to teach in those conditions. When there are 40 children in the classroom, more hours won’t benefit you because zero plus zero plus another zero is still zero. But progress on the three fronts that I’ve mentioned will reduce housing prices even with no other intervention.”

“I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers.”

After the attack of October 2023, you said no more Palestinian laborers should be admitted into Israel from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza because they come to envy the Israelis and they impede the self-reliance of the Palestinian Authority. Aren’t you worried for the many Palestinian families who depend on work opportunities in Israel?

“First and foremost, I’m against admitting Palestinian laborers because of the distortion caused to the Palestinian economy and to the Israeli construction sector. The Palestinians do receive lots of jobs at better pay than they could earn in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, but they work in low-productivity sectors so we’re actually diverting labor from places where in the long run the productivity could be higher. For example, when a factory opens in the Judea and Samaria area and offers wages lower than in the Israeli construction sector, the best workers will go to Israel instead of to the factory even though the factory has the potential of eventually offering higher wages. So working in Israel raises the standard of living for the Judea and Samaria area in the short run, but it freezes the standard of living at a relatively low level over the long run.”

Don’t you think that letting Palestinian laborers work here promotes peace and quiet on the ground?

“On the contrary, I think that the Palestinian economy’s dependence on the Israeli economy made the intifadas and other confrontations possible. Confrontations like those do wreck the economy, but if you have no local economy anyway, you have nothing to lose. Furthermore, it aggravates the conflict when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians come and see what our own standard of living is. They envy us. Envy is human. They can be replaced by Chinese, Thai, and Indian workers. Is it hard to find laborers whose families don’t live two meters from us?”

Then what about the Israeli construction sector? It depends on cheap labor.

“But the problem is that if you bring cheap labor in, the contractors have no reason to invest in automation and in modern working methods. What should be replacing the laborers is, above all, equipment and technology. Technology will enable the sector to do well with fewer workers. I mean not only the technology underlying equipment, but also methods of construction and also advanced knowhow. In Israel, the construction methods are labor-intensive whereas elsewhere in the world much more advanced methods are used.”

Let’s move on to agriculture. You said that you believe direct support for the farmers is preferable to raising customs duties on imports. Why?

“Because it’s cheaper and more efficient. Currently we’re trying to help the farmers by impeding imports. We’re paying for the world’s most expensive fruits and vegetables, and how much of the retail price reaches the farmers? Zilch and zero. It’s simpler to give the money directly to the farmers while importing freely and cheaply.”

How vital are the farmers economically?

“There are many reasons for well-developed agriculture. Food security, retention of the border areas, distribution of the populace, environmental quality, and more. But economics isn’t one of them. It would be wrong to say that agriculture is vital to the economy. But not everything is about the economy. The economy needs to be strong enough to support our values.”

In conclusion — if you were appointed Minister of Finance, what would you do first?

“Ultimately, economic policy is intended to affect the public’s expectations. As soon as it starts improving their expectations, it starts to achieve benefits — even before any material change occurs. So the first target is expectations. In taxation, benefits should be cancelled for large companies and VAT should be reduced. For pricing, it’s enough to grab 4 or 5 big monopolies and wipe the floor with them (pardon the expression) to send a clear message that policy toward monopolies and importers has changed. Visibility is an inseparable part of economic policy, because if we want the public to consume more, it needs to believe that we’re going to reduce the cost of living. Then we need to deal with the three biggest gougers, and as soon as the public sees we’re serious, consumption will be spurred.”

הפוסט Prof. Yaron Zelekha: “Israel’s economic policy contributed to October 7.” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Traditionally speaking, the Tul Karem sector was not considered among the most hostile sectors of Judea and Samaria, particularly not when compared with hornets’ nests such as Jenin or Nablus. However, during the years of the Gaza War, we have been witnessing a shift of the fulcrum of terror in Judea and Samaria wherein Tul Karem is becoming a rising hotbed of terror that is extremely challenging for Israel’s security forces.

Almost on a weekly basis, videos are posted to the Telegram app, showing young armed Palestinians, faces covered, firing their weapons in the direction of the Jewish communities of the Hefer Vally on the other side of the Green Line.

In response, Israeli security forces conducted counter-terror activity in Tul Karem, detaining many terrorists and eliminating terror squads. Out of the 600 terrorists eliminated in the Judea and Samaria area since the start of the Gaza War, 125 were from Tul Karem alone. On August 2024 the Israeli security forces launched Operation Summer Camps in northern Judea and Samaria, which targeted terror cells in Jenin, Tul Karem and the Nur a-Shams refugee camp. To date, the ongoing operation has resulted in the capturing of a copious amount of ready-to-use IEDs, the elimination of senior terror operatives and the seizure of large amounts of arms and ammunition.

Despite the security forces’ frequent counter-terror activity in Tul Karem, the terrorists continue expanding their ranks, stepping up their terror activity and sowing fear in the hearts of the communities in the Sharon district and central Israel, with a slew of threat assessment and scenario projections which are reminiscent of the picture on the Gaza border right before the October 7 massacre.

How had Tul Karem become an incendiary terror hotbed?

The October 7 massacre has become a source of inspiration for terrorists and terror organizations in Israel and the world, and accordingly Tul Karen had also taken a page out of the Hamas’ book of terror and the city and its environ refugee camps have become seething  hotbeds of terror.

The geographic location of Tul Karen poses a grave threat to the communities of the Sharon region, most of all to the Bat Hefer community, which is located only a few dozens of meters away. To give one example: the residents of Emek Hefer have been reporting that they have been hearing sounds of digging under their houses for quite a while. And more – there have been numerous incidents of armed men firing automatic rifles from the direction of Tul Karem toward Bat  Hefer and other Jewish communities across the Green Line. In 2024, two terror attacks against IDF soldiers were committed in that area, claiming the lives of a soldier and an officer.

The new terror groups that the area has been breeding draw members predominantly from young terrorists from Tul Karam, the Nur a-Shams refugee camp, Qalqilya and Tubas. These terrorists were weaned on the vehement antisemitic and anti-Israel incitement of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Judea and Samaria, and they certainly  perceive the October 7 attack as inspiration for more of the same attacks.

From Bat Hefer to Tehran: The Iranian connection

The multiplying terror operatives in Judea and Samaria enjoy the support of various types from Iran and its proxies – namely Hamas and the PIJ.

In mid-May 2024, a proxy terror conference was held in Tehran, in which the Iranian and the representatives of their proxies agreed to aim for further escalation vis a vis Israel, as a means for pressuring it into ending the Gaza War, not by means of diplomacy and negotiations for an agreement for the release of the hostages. It is plausible that the firing incidences toward the Bat Hefer community are part of that stratagem.

Iran and its proxies support the terror organizations that operate in Judea and Samaria, particularly those from the Tul Karem area. This support is in the form of financing, smuggling of arms and ammunition, and knowledge-sharing. The numerous shipments of smuggled arms Israel has been apprehending lately in the Judea and Samaria region teaches that Iran is actively swamping the area with weapons and ammunition. Most of these weapons come, most probably, through Jordan and are smuggled successfully into Judea and Samaria due to inadequate border security – both on the Israeli side and the Jordanian side.

It is important to understand that the Iranians, like many other players in the Middle East, view the October 7 attack an achievement that marks the beginning of the end for the Jewish state. The heinous massacre has galvanized them, Hamas and the rest of the “resistance axis” members to plan and attempt more such attacks. This time, believe these terror elements, the attack will come from the Judea and Samaria region, aimed at the soft underbelly of Israel – the Sharon region and the center of the country.

This notion might be an item on Iran’s “unification of the arenas” agenda. The person captaining this strategy is member of Hamas political bureau Zaher Al-Jabarin, who last May hinted “Hamas still has many cards up its sleeve that have not been use yet. Al-Jabarin added that “the West Bank will surprise the enemy sometime soon, and we shall see new chapters in the Palestinian military creativity”.

How do we prevent an October 7 in the Sharon region?

The current reality in Judea and Samaria, where terror organizations are engaged in establishing armed militias and fomenting another active front in the heart of Israel, is unacceptable. Therefore this threat on part of the terror nests from within Arab Judea and Samaria towns and refugee camps, must be eradicated, the area must be demilitarized and cleansed of weapons and ammunition.

To do so, Israel must first drive a wedge among the militias, and fragment their military unity with the entire body of terror organizations, especially in northern Samaria. Additionally, Israel must adopt a change of paradigm and depart from the common conception that the Hamas and Jihad terror organizations are fundamentally different then the FATAH-aligned terror organizations, such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Furthermore, Israel must exact a price from the Palestinian Authority and publicly proclaim the Authority responsible for every and any act of terror coming from Judea and Samaria. In addition, Israel must step up its counter-terror activity and begin planning a broad military campaign to paralyze and eradicate the terror infrastructure that is developing in the region.

Alongside the abovementioned remedies, Israel must boost its forces along the Jordanian border to restore its control over the area and consolidate its supervision and control along that border in order to stem the illegal flow of firearms and other weapons from Jordan into Israel, while at the same time demanding the Jordanians to take measures on its part to seal the border for illegal smuggling on the Jordanian side as well.

There are many who claim that now is not the time to open a new front while the war in Gaza is in full swing, to avoid a multi-theater campaign. However, such opinions fail to understand that Israel is already in the throes of a multi-theater war, and without a well-structured strategy to fight the pernicious terror of Judea and Samaria, that violence will continue claiming victims among the Jewish people living in that region as well as inevitably – in the Sharon area and in the very heart of Israel, becoming a shroud of danger covering the entire country and placing all of its citizens in peril.

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הפוסט A New Terror Hub Called Tul Karem: Summary of IDSF HaBithonistim Position Paper הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, researcher Eran Lahav will focus on the organizations waging global jihad. He will detail the ideological and practical distinctions among the various organizations, explain how the current war influences their activities, and explain why Israel and the western nations must cooperate against the threat in its increasing severity.

Background — The global jihad organizations: An overview

Global jihad is a general term covering the various branches in a network of radical Islamic organizations that call for total war against the infidels and for establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

In order to understand how global jihad emerged, it is necessary to revisit the 1960s. In that decade, Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb published a call to action explaining why western culture must be combatted. Qutb’s opinions strongly influenced the Muslim world — notably including Palestinian Sheikh Abdallah Yousuf Azzam, who today is considered “father of the jihad.” Azzam was a senior figure in the Muslim Brotherhood and subsequently founded Al Qaeda, which today remains one of the most significant jihadi organizations. Azzam is also considered the mentor of Osama bin Laden; he played an important role in nurturing that arch-terrorist.

Since then, the global jihad organizations have multiplied. Today hundreds of organizations fit the definition, and they operate all around the world. Over the past 40 years, those organizations have committed roughly 50 thousand terror attacks, spanning many countries, and brought death to thousands of innocent people.

Most of the global jihad organizations are composed of Salafi Sunni operatives. The Salafi movement, or Salafism, is a radical Islamic movement that venerates the “salaf” — the primal forefather. According to the Salafists, Islam was at its best in the days of the Prophet Muhammad and of the first caliphs, and so the Salafists wish to bring modern Islam as close as possible to the spirit of those times. In order to reach their goal, the organizations embrace jihad — an important concept that comprises two aspects. They believe that there is the greater jihad, which is the spiritual battle within each individual, and there is the lesser jihad, which is the war in defense of Islam against the infidels. From the western world’s point of view, the lesser jihad is in practice the greater jihad, the one that confronts us in the form of murderous terror attacks.

Among the global jihad organizations, despite their ideological similarity and shared objective, there are palpable differences and even rivalries.

The two largest and most significant jihadi organizations active in the world today are Al Qaeda and ISIS (the Islamic State). Although ISIS arose from within Al Qaeda, the two organizations are fiercely hostile and they battle one another.

One reason for their conflict is the desire for primacy, as each organization wishes to be the world’s largest and most significant.

Another reason concerns ideology, and more specifically the way in which the organization interprets the concept of the “infidels.” To ISIS, even the Shiite Muslims fall within the category. In contrast, although Al Qaeda is a Salafi Sunni organization, it is not at war with the Shiites. In fact, during recent decades Al Qaeda has cooperated with Iran, which is very much a Shiite state, and in fact Al Qaeda’s present leader, Saif al-Adel, is widely believed to be currently in hiding inside Iran.

Who versus who?

Both ISIS and Al Qaeda operate under a system of decentralized forces, maintaining branches and cells all over the world. The central branch of ISIS today is ISIS – Khorasan Province. That branch is responsible for the attack at the Moscow concert hall and poses a threat throughout Europe.

In Al Qaeda, one of the main branches is Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, which operates in Somalia. It is a strong organization, the source of many problems. Recently it has started cooperating with the Houthis in Yemen and, by doing so, with Iran as well.

Al Qaeda also enjoys support from various regimes, most prominently the Taliban of Afghanistan. Some members of Al Qaeda also hold various positions in the Taliban administration; thus cooperation between those forces is full and continuous. The cooperation angers ISIS in particular, because ISIS considers the Taliban infidels.

Global jihad and the regional terrorist organizations

A common question is whether Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which operate in Gaza, are also considered global jihad organizations. The short answer is no. The long answer is that rather than being Salafi, Hamas and PIJ follow the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although they hope, like the global jihad organizations, to establish an Islamic caliphate and gain control of all the western nations, they are willing to approach that objective more gradually.

Hamas sees itself, odd though this may seem, as a pragmatic organization, and so it is prepared to negotiate with the “infidels” in order to advance its agenda. Negotiations with the West and with Israel would never be acceptable to organizations of the global jihad.

Moreover, Hamas and PIJ include an element of nationalism stronger than their universalism. Their foremost objective is to destroy Israel as a Jewish state and replace it with a Palestinian state; and only afterward would they find occasion to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

Hamas and PIJ also differ from the global jihad organizations by their affinity to Iran. Although they are Sunni organizations, Hamas — and PIJ even more so — cooperate with Shiite Iran in pursuit of their shared objective: the destruction of Israel. Such cooperation would be unacceptable to most global jihad organizations, and especially to ISIS and its branches.

Which is more dangerous, global jihad or Iran?

To Israel, Iran is definitely the primary threat at the doorstep today. But as evidence below will show, the global jihad organizations too may certainly rise up against Israel.

For the western nations, both threats are matters of life and death. They both need to be removed promptly. But unfortunately, just as the world is hesitant in handling the Iranian threat, the global jihad threat is also being handled far from satisfactorily.

Eran Lahav — The vision for dealing with the threat of global jihad

Understanding the jihadi ideology

The current situation:

The western world has repeatedly suffered harm from the global jihad organizations, but its view of the ideology motivating them remains mistaken. The countries of North America, and more so the countries of Europe, have difficulty understanding why a Somali or Syrian immigrant, having received privileges and resources and a significantly better life, would choose to attack the provider of that good fortune. Even if those countries do understand that a problem exists, they do not deeply grasp the concept of jihad and the implications behind its war against the infidels.

That incomprehension causes the West to retain a policy that has long been failing and thus continue to offer immigrants privileges and money to no avail.

Until recently, even some Israelis believed that by answering humanitarian needs or improving infrastructures, they could bring about a halt to terrorism, but after the disaster of October 7, it is clear to us that the terrorist ideology does not really soften under comfortable living conditions.

Ideally:

• Comprehending the ideology: Having stood for years on the front line against radical Islam, Israel comprehends the jihadi ideology much better than western countries do. We must convey our knowledge and experience to those countries in order to open their eyes and enable them to thoroughly understand the nature of the enemy.
• Recognizing the complexity of immigration: Certainly many of the immigrants from states in distress, and from war zones, are innocent citizens seeking only to improve their quality of life, and they are deserving. However, there must be no ignoring the many who exploit their foothold in the western countries in order to damage them from within. The damage can come not only from the immigrants themselves but also from their children who are born in the West and considered full-fledged American or European citizens. Only with a true understanding of that complex situation can the western nations contend with the dangers that immigration brings.

Recognizing the power of technological media and social networks

The current situation:

From their inception, the global jihad organizations have known how to exploit technology. Even photos of Bin Laden hiding in his cave, after the attack on the World Trade Center, show sophisticated technological equipment in the foreground.

Today, with many of their operatives living in North America and Europe, those organizations can all the more easily adopt western technology; and thus the problem becomes much more difficult.

Over the past decade and a half, the jihadi organizations have made extensive use of the social networks. They know how to leverage those networks effectively for propaganda and incitement. Recently, with the emergence of artificial intelligence, they have succeeded in upgrading their abilities yet further, and they use the various AI tools to create deep fake videos, to design deceptive images, and to spread disinformation. Some even operate chatbots, such as ChatGPT, that help spread slanted and exaggerated information.

Whereas global jihad organizations once distributed videos of someone reading a sermon, today they already can distribute far more attractive and persuasive content. Such content especially influences the young, and it encourages them to join the organizations’ branches, to set up cells on their own, or simply to operate as “lone wolves” and carry out terror attacks at their own initiative. And indeed, since the emergence of social networks and all the more since the development of artificial intelligence, we see that an organizational infrastructure is no longer necessary for terror attacks. One person is enough, if incited by a video to pick up a knife and act out.

Ideally:

• Not underestimating the enemy: We must understand that even while holding attitudes that seem obsolete to us, our enemy can still be clever and advanced in its operations. The global jihad organizations well recognize the power of technology, and they exploit it. Moreover, they also exploit their familiarity with western culture, and with its weaknesses, in order to focus their propaganda efforts.
• Retaining technological superiority: Israel and the western countries must retain technological superiority and make sure that they stay one step ahead of the jihadi organizations rather than vice versa. To that purpose, we must develop a more sophisticated, masterful presence on the social networks. They are an open intelligence medium that carries daily messages encouraging terrorism. Many of those messages are couched in hints between the lines, but enough effort from us can discover them too.

Follow the money

The current situation:

The global jihad organizations are very wealthy, and their wealth fuels their mounting strength. Their funds come from various sources, such as donations from activists and grants from supportive governments. These organizations also manage to pilfer more than a little western aid money intended for civilians in war zones. Some funding also derives from crime. For example, the Taliban gave Al Qaeda access to Afghanistan’s opium fields and thus Al Qaeda can profit from manufacturing illegal drugs.

The organizations also maintain trade relations with one another, buying and selling weapons and other assets — thus running an underground economy.

In recent years, the organizations have been extensively using digital currencies, and much of their money is carried through such channels. Digital currency makes the sources of the organizations’ funding much more difficult to trace, contributing further to their growing wealth and strength.

Ideally:

• Enlisting technology: Following the money can be a way to uncover a great deal of information about terrorist organizations and can even damage them financially. The western countries should continue their efforts to trace these organizations’ sources of funding, on the understanding that the organizations use advanced resources such as digital currencies. Here too, technological superiority is the key to removing the problem.
• Supervising the aid money: Just as Hamas appropriates the humanitarian supplies sent into the Gaza Strip, the global jihad organizations appropriate the funds sent to civilians in such areas as Iraq and Syria. The donor countries must exert better control over the funds that they supply. They must ensure that the funds reach the intended hands.

Remember that a secondary threat can become a leading threat

The current situation:

To the global jihad, Israel and the Jews are an enemy but not at top priority. For most of those organizations, the main objective is to hit at the western powers who, in their eyes, are colonialists who dethroned Islam.

Another reason for Israel’s secondary priority is that the jihadi organizations have difficulty taking root in our region. Besides having to cope with Israel’s security forces and, to an extent, with those of the Palestinian Authority, they also need to elbow the local terrorist organizations aside, primarily Hamas. It is important to understand that in the local arena, the prevailing ideology is the Muslim Brotherhood’s, which means that the global jihad organizations do not find easy acceptance.

As for Israel, just as it is not considered a top priority by global Islamic jihad, it does not rank the global jihad organizations as a top priority of its own. So it has always been, but currently as we wage a multi-front war and are forced to deal with the threat from Iran and its proxies, any confrontation with the global jihadi threat is relegated to yet lower priority.

However, it must be understood that those organizations still do wish to destroy us and that today they already enjoy a certain foothold inside Israeli territory. Although ISIS has no organizational infrastructure inside Israel, it does have operatives among the Israeli Arabs and they have even attempted to organize a ISIS cell in the country’s north. Moreover, a number of attempted terror attacks by ISIS inside Israel have been foiled, such as the April 2024 terror attack intended for Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem.

It is also important to realize that the global jihad organizations are strongly influenced by the Swords of Iron war. They see it as a springboard for a worldwide war of jihad. Since the outbreak of war, we have witnessed widespread calls for attacks against Jews around the world. Some such attacks have been foiled.

Ideally:

• Keeping a steady watch: Of course Israel must focus on its central challenge, which is Iran. But at the same time it must not forget that the global jihad organizations pose a further threat. Regarding the current war, some of those organizations, most prominently Al Qaeda, are cooperating with Iran and could certainly assume a place in Iran’s war effort. Furthermore, we have seen many times that in the unstable Middle East, a secondary threat can turn quickly into a leading threat.

• Protecting Jews worldwide: Even while the State of Israel itself is exposed to an immediate threat from the jihadi organizations, Jews are vulnerable around the world. Spurred by the Swords of Iron war, those organizations are sounding many calls for attacks on synagogues and Jewish communities around the world. We must understand that our local war can develop into a worldwide jihad, and we must take responsibility for our brothers and sisters in the Diaspora.

Building a worldwide coalition

The current situation:

The jihadi organizations are calling for total war against the infidels — including the Jews, the Christians, and even a large portion of the Muslims. This situation exposes many of the world’s citizens to the jihadi threat, and they may fall victim to terror attacks emanating from those organizations. Thus the danger applies not only to Israel and to the western nations but also to moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Those nations are already suffering more than a little from the jihadi organizations, and they see those organizations as a palpable threat that could topple their regimes.

However, no worldwide coalition has yet formed to confront the jihadi threat, and as of now, most nations are trying to cope with that threat independently or in narrow cooperation.

Ideally:

• Forming a stable worldwide coalition: A coalition must be formed including all the states that are threatened by global jihad — including the USA, Canada, Western Europe, Israel, and the moderate Arab states. Only such cooperation can properly respond to the jihadi threat in terms of quantity and of knowhow and skills. The aim is to have all those states represented in a forum that meets regularly and advances the handling of the threat. It is important to understand that each state can contribute. The western states have resources and capabilities, Israel has much experience in intelligence and operations, and the Arab states bring the best understanding of the jihadi ideology and of the forces that motivate those organizations.

Israel and the West in the same boat — Summation and conclusions

Global jihad did not die with the elimination of Osama Bin Laden. In fact, it has only gained further power and intensity since then, and today it includes hundreds of sub-organizations active everywhere in the world. Despite the disputes and rivalries between the organizations, they all share the goal of wiping out the infidels and establishing a global Islamic caliphate.

In order to be tackled, the global jihadi threat must first be understood. Most western nations still have difficulty absorbing an in-depth understanding of jihad as a concept, and they tend to underestimate the enemy who stands before them. Having learned from experience, Israel should help the western nations understand that the jihadi ideology is more powerful than any economic incentive, and Israel should make it clear that this is a clever enemy in possession of the most highly advanced technological abilities.

Thus we must work to create a strong worldwide coalition. After all, the declared objective of the global jihad organizations is to exterminate whoever is not a Salafi Muslim. So Israel, the West, and even some of the Muslim nations are all in the same boat.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The Threat of Global Jihad הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, we will be focusing — with the help of Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen — on the topic of settlement. With Hacohen’s remarks as our guidelines, we will examine the geographical traits of the country’s various regions, expand on the connection between settlement and national security, and detail the settlement vision that the State of Israel must adopt in order to ensure its security for generations to come.

Background: From the Crusaders to Yitzhak Rabin — The Land of Israel as a strategic asset

The Land of Israel connects Asia to Africa and is linked to Europe by the Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of its location, it has served since ancient times as an important passageway between continents and between great powers, and for that reason many nations have tried to take control of it.

The various conquerors, and the Crusaders above all others, understood that the Land of Israel cannot be conquered and defended by occupying its coastal plain alone. So the Crusaders deployed a network of fortresses not only in the coastal cities but also in Sinai and on the ridges east of the Jordan, such as the Ajloun Castle in the land of Gilead.

Unfortunately, that important concept of breadth is not expressed in the distribution of communities today. On the contrary, more than 60% of Israel’s Jewish residents live on the coastal plain, a strip no more than 15 km wide. Furthermore, most of Israel’s strategic assets — including Ben Gurion Airport, the power stations, Ashdod Port, an office for supervision of banking, and the national headquarters of the various armed services — are all in that same tight space.

Besides being narrow and crowded, the coastal plain is dominated by the Judean Hills and by the Samarian slopes that overlook it from the east along its entire length. Those hills provide a direct view of the plain — and a convenient base for attacking it, whether by short-range rocket fire or by a ground incursion. Thus whoever controls the hills of Samaria and Judea is, for practical purposes, in control of the entire coastal plain.

Many leaders from across the political spectrum have well understood the connection between control of that area and preservation of security, and they have recognized the importance of maintaining defensible borders. That understanding underlay the “Allon Plan,” which Yigal Allon first presented to Levi Eshkol’s government immediately after the Six Day War. And the same understanding was also embodied in Yitzhak Rabin’s policy approach. Rabin’s last speech to the Knesset, in October 1995, outlined his national security policy and put forward four principles of settlement that he saw as vital:

• The first principle stipulated that in order to ensure Israel’s existence as the Jewish state, its population must be 80% Jewish. That was one of the reasons that Rabin placed all the Palestinian population of Gaza and of areas A and B under the Palestinian Authority.
• Rabin’s second principle was that Jerusalem, with Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev, must be kept united under Israeli sovereignty.
• The third principle stipulates that the Jordan Valley, in the most comprehensive sense, will be the Israeli side of the security border. That is to say, Israel must maintain possession of the Jewish settlements in every part of the Jordan Valley — from Route 90 westward to the line of ridges.
• According to the fourth principle, a Palestinian entity should be created which is “less than a state.” One practical implication of that principle is that Israel must retain control over the airspace of Judea and Samaria.

It should be emphasized that those principles were set out not by some right-wing faction but by leaders of the Labor movement; and they were expressing a broad national consensus. That fact alone reflects the importance of Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel and it makes clear that before settlements became a political issue, they were already a necessity for survival.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen: The settlement vision of the State of Israel

Jerusalem: A metropolis, not a border town

The current situation:

The historical, religious, and cultural importance of Jerusalem is clear, but the city also carries critical strategic importance. Jerusalem sits among hills, dominates central traffic arteries, and is also the only place with a Jewish majority on the watershed.

Possession of the Jerusalem area is essential both for ensuring that Jerusalem remains Israel’s capital and a central Israeli metropolis, and for operational and strategic reasons. Because it is close to a large portion of the sources of terrorism, Jerusalem makes a convenient base for dispatching security forces and a hub for intelligence activities.

Moreover, possession of the Jerusalem area is vital for keeping control over the central traffic arteries and over additional areas. It is Jerusalem that makes possible the retention of the Jordan Valley as a buffer zone between the coastal plain and the threats from the east. And the possession of hillside communities such as Na’aleh and Beit Arieh is what provides for control of the central traffic arteries and the strategic assets of the country’s interior, including Ben Gurion Airport. Thanks to possession of the ridge and of the Yatir region’s communities, the valley lands of Beersheba and Arad can be defended, as can the Nevatim airbase.

Furthermore, any territorial concessions in Jerusalem would be considered an Israeli surrender and would only encourage Arab and Muslim extremists to continue gnawing away at the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and in the rest of Israel.

Ideally:

• Strengthening Jerusalem’s standing as a metropolis: Before the Six Day War, Jerusalem was a remove border town, a marginal satellite of Tel Aviv. But since then, it has become an important metropolis. Jerusalem in the form of a metropolis is key to controlling the Land of Israel, and Jerusalem must retain that form. In order to remain a metropolis, Jerusalem requires all its surrounding communities — the Etzion Bloc to the south, Maale Adumim and Mishor Adumim to the east, and the Benjamin district to the north.
• Ruling out the partitioning of Jerusalem: Partitioning Jerusalem would not only endanger its standing as Israel’s capital but also critically harm Israel’s national security. There is no guarantee that partitioning the city would actually end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Apparently terrorism would still continue, and partitioning would merely provide it with far more dangerous opportunities for action. And all that aside, nowhere else in the world has such a large city been divided. Even on paper, the idea is simply not feasible.

Judea and Samaria: To become Israel’s backbone to the east

The current situation:

In the Oslo Accords, Rabin divided the Judea and Samaria area into areas A. B. and C. Only Area C is fully under the civil and security authority of the State of Israel. Area C currently includes some 120 Jewish communities, with more than 500 thousand residents in all. There are also some 500 Arab communities with roughly 200 to 300 thousand residents.

Although Israeli control over Area C is anchored in the Oslo Accords, many voices around the world are raised against Jewish settlement in that territory. Much is said about the “illegal settlements,” and about the wildcat outposts in Area C, but illegal construction by Palestinians in that territory is in fact immeasurably greater than Jewish construction. As of December 2023, Area C contains roughly 90,000 illegal Palestinian structures; and there is no attempt at removing them.

Another accusation leveled against the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria is that the Jews there burden the Israeli security forces. That accusation is fundamentally erroneous. Above and beyond not being a burden, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria is what provides the IDF with freedom of operation in those territories. The size of the IDF’s deployment in Judea and Samaria is not sufficient in itself to preserve stability in such a complex area. Stability persists only thanks to the weight of half a million Jews who live there.

Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria also provide the security forces with convenient access to areas A and B — a benefit that has served the IDF well in various operations such as the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield.

Furthermore, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria also demonstrates to the Palestinians that our presence there is stable and dominant and that they are obliged to cooperate with us. An Israeli withdrawal of any size would indicate weakness and encourage our enemies’ thoughts of seizing the area and even expanding beyond it.

The settlements in Judea and Samaria also deserve to be credited with contributing to objectives mentioned in the previous section (which dealt with the Jerusalem area), including turning Jerusalem into a metropolis, retaining control over the Jordan Valley, defending the coastal plain and Ben Gurion Airport, defending the valleys of Beersheba and Arad, and keeping constant control over the main traffic arteries. Every settlement and outpost in the Judea and Samaria area is serving at least one of those objectives, and therefore they all are justified on grounds of security.

Ideally:

• World opinion cannot dictate our policy: As even David Ben Gurion understood in his day, Israeli policy cannot address all the objections raised around the world. Cooperating in response to the various rulings handed down by the international court in the Hague would mean a death sentence for all the Jews in Israel, because if we try to survive only inside the Green Line we will not survive at all.
• Driving home the perspective on settlements: As demonstrated, all the territory of Area C is vital to security and must remain in Israel’s hands forever. That understanding must be made clear to all the decision-makers, and preferably to all the country’s residents.
• Development of the settlements in Judea and Samaria: Not only is settlement in Judea and Samaria less than extensive; it is in fact too limited. A backbone of 3–4 million residents is necessary between Arad and the Gilboa, in order to relieve Israel of the crowding in the Dan Bloc. To make that possible, the existing settlements must be enlarged, new ones established, and the system of roadways and trains expanded to connect all those communities to the country’s center.

The Jordan Valley: Apply Israeli sovereignty

The current situation:

The Jordan Valley is Israel’s security border to the east. As of today, the Jordan Valley is under Israeli control but is not officially considered part of the State of Israel. In January 2020, the USA published its “Deal of the Century” peace plan, which gave Israel a historic opportunity to assert its sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and to fully annex the valley and the northern Dead Sea. Unfortunately, Israeli politicians torpedoed the plan and the Jordan Valley remains in a precarious status, exposed to both domestic and international criticism.

To understand the Jordan Valley’s strategic importance, it is first necessary to understand the geography. The Jordan Valley is located 250–400 meters below sea level, while the hills of Samaria and of Hebron rise to an altitude of up to 1,000 meters above sea level. Thus as long as the Jordan Valley remains in Israeli hands, an invasion of Israel from the east is very difficult because there is no easy way to move massive military forces across such steep territory.

Granted, we are at peace with Jordan today and no invasion from there is expected soon. But we must not forget that our eastern border is the most important one for Israel’s defense, both because it is our longest border and because it is the closest to the triangle — defined by Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa — where most of the country’s Jewish residents and its most important infrastructures are located. Moreover, even if relations with Jordan remain stable, it must be understood that without Israeli possession of the Jordan Valley, Iranian militias can quickly move into Qalqilya and Tulkarm to fire artillery at the Dan Bloc. It is not lightly that Rabin called the Jordan Valley, in its most comprehensive sense, the security border of the State of Israel.

Above and beyond its strategic importance, the Jordan Valley also possesses no little residential value. It is a very extensive territory that can, and should, accommodate millions of dwellers. By settling the Jordan Valley, we can balance the geographical distribution of Israel’s citizenry and ease the currently worsening population density of the coastal plain.

Ideally:

• Applying sovereignty to the Jordan Valley: Not only must possession of the Jordan Valley not be waived, but action must be taken to fully annex the area and apply Israeli sovereignty to the valley. Only such action will enable wide-ranging governmental plans to be established, and the valley’s standing as Israel’s security border at the east to be ensured for the long term.
• Expanding the settlements in the Jordan Valley: In order to solve the problem of crowding in central Israel and provide for better geographical distribution of the populace, the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley should be expanded. In addition, new immigrants should be encouraged to settle in the valley rather than in the already crowded coastal cities.

The Galilee: Expand the Jewish communities

The current situation:

In 2005 the Israeli government approved National Master Plan 35, known as Tama 35. In accordance with that plan, it was decided to limit construction and settlement in open areas because of the importance of preserving green spaces. In practice, the plan limited only Jewish settlement and was not applied to Arab communities. In many parts of the country, including the Galilee, it has been impossible to establish new Jewish settlements since the plan’s approval. And it has been very difficult to expand existing communities, because of quotas limiting the number of residents.

Tama 35 created an absurd situation in which Arab communities such as Sakhnin can expand with approval and even double their population whereas a Jewish community such as Yodfat is not allowed to expand beyond the 400 households that it already includes. Furthermore, the land sold to Jews and the land sold to Arabs differ dramatically in valuation. In Karmiel, for example, plots of 350 sq m were marketed in 2021 for 1.2 million shekels. But five minutes’ drive from there, at Deir al-Assad, similar plots were marketed the same year for only 20,000 shekels; and moreover the land development there was subsidized.

Because of those conditions, the Galilean heartland (leaving aside the cities of Nahariya, Safed, Tiberias, and Afula) is only 15% Jewish.

Ideally:

• Change the National Master Plan: The National Master Plan must be promptly changed and a new plan approved that is based on the understanding that an extensive network of Jewish villages must be developed. Thus the Jewish communities must be freed from the limitations imposed only on them and become the basis for an approved expansion.
• Encourage young people to settle in the Galilee: Jewish residents, and especially young families, should be encouraged to settle in the Galilee. To that purpose, they must be offered land at worthwhile prices and with economic benefits; and the vicinity must be developed with convenient roadways, public transportation, workplaces, etc.

The Golan — Hoping for a hundred thousand Jewish residents

The current situation:

The State of Israel wrested the Golan from the Syrians in 1967, and the area has been controversial since then. Many countries around the world see it as “occupied territory,” but most Israelis see it as an integral part of their country. In December 1981 the State of Israel decided to apply Israeli law in the Golan Heights, and that decision remains in force today.

In 1994, in the spirit of the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government took steps toward returning the Golan to Syrian hands as part of an attempt to reach a peace agreement with Syria. The Barak and Olmert governments weighed a similar idea but did not proceed to carry it out.

Meanwhile, over time, the Golan’s standing as Israeli won a degree of acknowledgement in the world; and in 2019 US President Donald Trump signed an executive order declaring that the USA officially recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. However, most of the world’s nations still do not officially consider the Golan a part of the State of Israel, and Israel’s hold on the area is still under threat.

Ideally:

• Quash the idea of retreating from the Golan: International pressures must be withstood, because giving up the Golan Heights would bring terrible consequences. First of all, without the Golan Heights we have no chance of living securely. We would be vulnerable to threats from Syria and Lebanon. Also, giving up the Golan Heights would cost the State of Israel heavily in terms of culture and tourism because the Golan is a beautiful area and one of the country’s few green lungs.
• Enlarge the Jewish population in the Golan: Currently the Golan is home to 23 thousand Jews. In order to anchor our presence in that area, as well as relieving Israel’s overcrowdedness elsewhere, the hope is to settle 100 thousand Jews in the Golan over the next five years. With suitable conditions and proper incentives, such an undertaking is certainly feasible.

The Negev: Extensive rural Jewish settlement

The current situation:

The Negev covers approximately 60% of the State of Israel but it remains one of the country’s least populated regions. David Ben Gurion is remembered as recognizing the importance of developing and settling the Negev. He even called it “a great Zionist asset, with no substitute anywhere in the country.”

Unfortunately, Ben Gurion’s vision has not yet been carried out fully and the Negev still suffers from slow development and scanty Jewish settlement. The volume of settlement no longer depends only on how well motivated the settlers are to move south. It is now also subject to governmental limitations — first and foremost Tama 35, which makes establishing new Jewish communities and expanding existing ones difficult.

The few Jews who already live in the Negev are concentrated in Beersheba and in urban settlements such as Ofakim and Sderot, where they live in apartment buildings. Thus we have no truly extensive presence in the area and consequently no control over the main traffic arteries. The Bedouin population, in contrast, is distributed over broad tracts of land and thus enjoys control over the grounds and over the traffic arteries.

The Negev, it must be understood, is important to the State of Israel not only because of its size. It is home to a number of critical military and strategic assets, including the Nevatim airbase. Because control over the area was lacking, Bedouin rioters during Operation Guardian of the Walls, in 2019, managed to block access to the airbase and thus interfered with the IDF’s freedom of action. That was a severe security incident, and lessons must be learned.

Ideally:

• Extensive rural Jewish settlement: Development of Jewish settlements in the Negev must be encouraged, with an emphasis on rural settlements with single-family houses, in order to cover broad tracts. That is the only way to create balance in the area and ensure security along the traffic arteries. To that purpose, settlement planning in the Negev must be revolutionized to reduce land prices, create proper conditions for settling, and provide incentives for those who will come settle the Negev.

The Gaza Strip: Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities

The current situation:

The Gaza Strip has known many vicissitudes in recent decades. In the 1970s, Israel’s government established Jewish communities inside the Gaza Strip under the “Five Fingers Plan” put forward by Ariel Sharon. However, in 1982, Israel withdrew from the Yamit district and later the Oslo Accords obliged Israel to abandon further implementation of the Five Fingers Plan and waive control over the Philadelphi Corridor as well. In 2005, it will be recalled, the Jewish communities of the Katif Bloc were all evacuated under the Disengagement plan — and thus Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip came to an end.

Aside from the settlements inside the Gaza Strip itself, the Gaza Envelope communities and those surrounding the Gaza Strip in the northern Negev must be borne in mind. Following the Disengagement, those communities became the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from central Israel; and as such, they suffered many attacks — which climaxed on October 7, 2023.

As of this writing, there is no end yet to the Swords of Iron war that was engendered by that disaster; and most of the Gaza Envelope communities have not yet been repaired and fully repopulated. Despite the security threats, the State of Israel must repopulate the area bordering the Gaza Strip. Some of the veteran residents may not wish to return, but there are enough ideologically motivated citizens who understand the area’s importance and will agree to replace them there.

Ideally:

• Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities: The Gaza Envelope communities must be repopulated, whether by returning residents or by newcomers. The area is vital to Israel’s security and must not be abandoned. Even leaving aside Zionist pioneering ideology, it is a beautiful area suitable for a balanced lifestyle close to the land. The Gaza Envelope communities are actually not far from the center of Israel. Most are an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv and are well connected to public transportation, so that life there is definitely convenient.
• Jewish settlement in Gaza: Although valid in principle, this idea must be weighed against other national priorities and it may be that efforts should concentrate not on settling inside the Gaza Strip but on settling other areas in the Land of Israel.

There is no security without settlements: Summation and conclusions

The country’s first leaders, foremost among them Ben Gurion, appreciated the close connection between possessing and settling the land on the one hand and national strategy and security on the other hand. Subsequent leaders across the political spectrum, including leaders of the left such as Rabin, also understood that territory may be conceded only up to a certain point.

In practice, under cover of “green” programs, a National Master Plan has been adopted that prevents the plan of settlement from being fulfilled. Tama 35 limits the development of the State of Israel and weakens its security. The Master Plan must be revised. Among other things, Judea and Samaria must be regarded as strategic, economic, and security assets for Israel, and their development should be given consideration accordingly. In addition, the Jerusalem metropolis should continue being built extensively; the Jordan Valley, Galilee, and Golan should be settled; and the intolerable concentration of most of Israel’s assets and residents in a certain narrow district.

The drawing of Israel’s boundaries is a decision of concern to future generations, and so it must reflect more than the current situation. Our responsibility is to draw secure boundaries for the State of Israel — borders that can withstand the political upheavals of the Middle East and the changes in technology. Any policy that fails to consider possible threats to Israel’s future security is a policy of irresponsibility toward the nation.

And finally, it must be remembered that programs at the national level are carried out by the citizenry. At the cutting edge of any settlement plan stand the settlers who build the houses, plant the trees, bond with the land and the location, and are ready to fight for them as necessary.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Settlement and Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

It is often reported in mainstream and state-controlled media, as well as in international forums, that Israel deliberately targets civilians and might even be committing genocide against the population of Gaza. These accusations are not only baseless but are also easily debunked by the following data, numbers and facts from the War in Israel database, an IDSF project.

Before launching any strikes on cities, refugee camps or other territories, the IDF takes extensive measures to warn civilians in the Gaza Strip. These measures include distributing evacuation maps, dropping leaflets, sending SMS messages, making automated calls and even conducting live phone calls.

Since the war began, the IDF has dropped over 9.3 million pamphlets, sent over 1.55 million SMS messages, made more than 17 million automated calls and conducted over 100,000 live phone calls—all aimed at ensuring that non-combatants can move to safety.

The primary responsibility for evacuating civilians from combat zones lies with Hamas, the governing body in the Gaza Strip. However, Hamas often neglects this duty and even forces civilians to remain in harm’s way, which may itself constitute a war crime.

Israel critics have claimed that Israel is deliberately starving Palestinians in Gaza by imposing strict blockades that severely restrict the flow of food, medicine and other essential supplies. They argue that these measures exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, leading to widespread suffering and malnutrition among the civilian population in Gaza. The truth is the exact opposite.

The IDF works closely with NGOs and international governments to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Since the onset of the war, Israel and its partners have transported over 900,000 metric tons of supplies by land, air and sea. This includes 727,000 metric tons of food, 73,000 metric tons of shelter equipment, 49,000 metric tons of water, 25,000 metric tons of medical supplies and an additional 36,000 metric tons of other essentials.

For example, the IDF has provided Al Shifa Hospital with medical equipment, incubators and baby food, and in February, delivered over 20 oxygen tanks and additional medical supplies to Al Amal Hospital in Khan Younis.

Targeted strikes

The Israeli Air Force was a pioneer in integrating computers into bombers, drastically improving the precision of airstrikes. By the 1990s, these computers became small enough to be installed directly into bombs, leading to the development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

The IDF has increasingly adopted this technology, particularly since the mid-1990s, to minimize collateral damage. For instance, during the First Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. used smart weapons in just 8% of strikes, but by later conflicts like 2008’s Operation Cast Lead, nearly 100% of the munitions used were smart bombs.

In the current war, Israel has not only employed smart bombs to target terrorists embedded within civilian populations—a Hamas war crime in itself—but has also integrated new technologies to enhance the accuracy of ground troops and artillery.

One such innovation is the Dagger sight by Smart Shooter, which uses computer vision and artificial intelligence to ensure that every shot is precise, effectively turning each soldier into a sniper and significantly reducing the risk of hitting unintended targets.

Another game-changing technology is the Iron Sting mortar, developed by Elbit. Unlike conventional mortars, which are generally imprecise, the Iron Sting is accurate to within meters. It relies on inputted coordinates rather than electro-optical imaging, significantly reducing collateral damage and the likelihood of civilian casualties.

Throughout the war, there were several well-known instances where Israel targeted terrorists in schools, with international media echoing Hamas propaganda by claiming that Israel killed many civilians during these strikes.

For example, on August 10, Israel targeted terrorists at Tabeen School. The Guardian reported: “At least 80 people have been killed in Israeli missile strikes on a school compound in Gaza City, according to the territory’s civil defense service.” In reality, the IDF targeted 20 terrorists, causing minimal damage to the school, and provided evidence demonstrating that the inflated number of casualties was highly unlikely. The IDF even posted the names and photos of those killed in the attack.

The Tabeen School strike is just one example of numerous propaganda attempts by Hamas and their allies to tarnish Israel’s image and further their strategy of maximizing civilian casualties to pressure Israel on the world stage.

A comparative perspective

These practices have enabled the IDF to achieve remarkable success on the battlefield while minimizing civilian casualties. The IDF reports that it has eliminated over 14,300 terrorists. Even if we accept the inflated figures from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which are based on numbers provided by Hamas, the civilian death toll would be around 24,000. This results in a ratio of approximately 1.5 civilians killed for every one combatant. In comparison, the Soviet-Afghan War had a ratio of 10 to 1, and the Biafran War had a ratio of 15 to 1.

When we consider the total civilian death toll, which stands at around 26,000 (including Israeli civilians), this conflict is far less deadly for civilians than other recent wars. For example, the war in Yemen has resulted in over 367,000 civilian deaths, the Syrian Civil War has claimed over 617,000 lives and the Liberian Civil War left more than 200,000 civilians dead.

The IDF’s efforts to avoid civilian casualties stand in stark contrast to these conflicts, demonstrating a commitment to minimizing harm even in the midst of intense warfare.

To get additional data and numbers, debunk myths, read analysis and watch informative content on the wars Israel is fighting, visit warinisrael.org

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Debunking the myth: Inside the IDF’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that national security cannot exist in isolation but depends on a broad system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that making informed decisions requires developing a comprehensive strategy that draws on the past and looks toward the future.

These understandings have led IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Or Yissachar will discuss the relations between Israel and Iran — a pattern of relations that was benign until a few decades ago but has changed to currently threaten our existence.

Background — From a cold peace to a fiery threat: The reversals in Israel-Iran relations

Israel–Iran relations may be divided into two main periods: Before and after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Between those periods, the differences are fathomless.

The reign of the Shah

From 1941 to 1979, Iran was a monarchy ruled by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah pursued a pro-Western policy that envisioned turning Iran into a modern, secular country. During his reign, relations between Iran and Israel were proper and stable. The two countries maintained close relations in various spheres.

Although in 1947 Iran voted against the founding of the State of Israel, it recognized Israel as a state as early as 1950. From that year until the 1970s, relations progressively warmed; and the two nations even maintained extensive economic and security ties. Iran was Israel’s main supplier of oil, and helped Israel lay the Trans-Israel pipeline. Israel, for its part, aided Iran in agriculture and in regional development, sold it military equipment, and even trained its army and helped set up the Iranian secret police.

Diplomatically too, the two countries maintained ties, whether more openly or less openly. Thus, for example, the IDF had military attachés stationed in Tehran and in 1964 even established an Israeli consulate. Today we also know that Iranian legislators secretly visited Israel and that Ben-Gurion himself secretly visited Iran and met its Prime Minister, Ali Amini. Later Israeli visitors to Iran included prime ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, several foreign ministers, the head of the Mossad at the time, and a number of senior IDF commanders. In return, Iranian ministers, commanders, and other senior figures visited Israel.

The upshot is that the two countries were definitely maintaining a cold peace, albeit with no official peace agreement, and they had interests in common. That balance began to teeter in the mid-1970s as the Iranian Revolution showed signs of approaching.

The Iranian Revolution

In the mid-to-late 1970s, religious and political resistance to the Shah’s regime began, emanating primarily from the Shiite Muslims. The Shah had drawn anger for many reasons, including his wasteful lifestyle, the cruelty inflicted on the regime’s opponents by his secret police, his reforms in “surrender” to international pressures to improve the standing of women and minorities, and especially his war against religion and his persistent attempts to turn Iran secular.

The year 1978 saw many protests and other actions against the Shah’s regime. In January 1979 the Shah fled Iran, and two weeks later the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ascended to power. He was a Shiite cleric who had preached for many years against the Shah and had been forced into lengthy exile.

The Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed the transformation of Iran into an Islamic republic. As soon as he took power, he began a purge in the government and army, executing thousands of officers who had supported the Shah as well as people he considered sinners — including homosexuals. Khomeini also lambasted the USA as “the Great Satan,” and Israel as “the Little Satan,” and he called for Islamic revolutions everywhere in the Muslim world. Khomeini formed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, enforced the Sharia law that requires Iranian men and women to abide by the Islamic dress code, forbade Western music, and significantly reduced the rights of women and minorities in the country.

As soon as he took power, it was obvious that relations with Israel would not remain as they were; and within a short time the two countries had become clear enemies.

Today Iran is still a Shiite Islamic republic, led by extremist clerics, disdainful of the West, and constantly calling for Israel’s destruction. In 1989 Khomeini died, and from then until today the present Iran’s supreme leader has been the Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Khamenei has continued in the footsteps of his predecessor and is working to advance the Iranian nuclear program, to expand the Quds Force, and to strengthen the terrorist organizations and pro-Iranian militias throughout the Middle East.

Iran’s extremist regime, its arrival at the nuclear threshold, and the forces of its many proxies have turned it into the number one existential threat against Israel and possibly against the entire western world. However, Iran is also deep in an economic and diplomatic crisis that threatens its regime’s stability, and at the same time it faces many rivals inside the Arab world, the main one being Saudi Arabia.

In order to be handled, the Iranian threat must be understood in its true form. On the one hand, it must not be underestimated; but on the other hand, the limits of its power, and the possibility of exploiting its weaknesses, must be remembered.

Ideally according to Or Yissachar: His vision for Israeli–Iranian relations

Don’t slow it down, stop it short

The current situation:

Since the turn of the millennium, the State of Israel has been waging a war-between-the-wars with Iran. The guiding principle of that policy is to prevent the enemy from gaining strength and to deter the enemy increasingly by means of measured and well-considered actions which fall short of triggering war.

Absurdly, Israel’s persistent attempts to prevent escalation and to avoid a descent into war are the very thing that led to today’s security deficiency. If we had made a point of halting the Iranian threat instead of merely slowing it down, Iran would not have managed to achieve such might, nor to strengthen all the terrorist armies of the region.

The policy of the war between wars works up to a point, but it cannot demolish a buildup of power. That policy also carries the danger that the moment we misjudge the enemy’s intentions and abilities, or overestimate our own deterrent power, we may suffer an event like October 7.

Ideally:

• Israel’s policy must change from reactive to proactive. Only by initiating action at the right time for ourselves can we eliminate the terrorist leaders, damage the missile factories, destroy the smuggler tunnels, and significantly weaken Iran and its accomplices. Israel’s elimination of Isma’il Haniyah was certainly a step in the right direction.

Reverse the nuclearization

The current situation:

After many years of research and development, Iran is now a nuclear threshold state. According to the latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has so far accumulated roughly 136 kg of highly enriched uranium which it can turn, within weeks, into the payload for a nuclear weapon. Moreover, experts believe that Iran has acquired most of the technical knowhow necessary for assembling a simple nuclear weapon and that within one to two years it will be able to develop a nuclear warhead for delivery by missile.

That information proves that the 2015 agreement involving the great powers was not able to stop the Iranian nuclear program, and the reason is simple. Iran will never put aside its nuclear ambitions. The sanctions that the great powers imposed on Iran were not actually enforced, and after being lifted they were not reimposed. The world is currently attempting to ignore the Iranian nuclear threat. It has not risen to the awareness that the threat is existential not only for Israel but for all Iran’s enemies, including the Sunni states and the western states.

Ideally:

• On the international plane: The State of Israel must make clear to the international community that the entire world has a stake in removing the Iranian nuclear threat. Israel must recruit the western nations and the Gulf nations to form a strong coalition led by the USA. Such a coalition can pose a credible military threat to Iran — and can impose strong sanctions as well, such as limiting oil exports to China or disconnecting Iran from SWIFT (the international cooperative for financial communications between banks).
• On the bilateral plane: Israel must assume a much more aggressive stance and make clear to the Iranians that we can attack their nuclear facilities and we can bomb strategic assets without which their economy will shut down. With or without help from other countries, we must exploit the appropriate moments to mount well-considered attacks that will send the Iranian nuclear program a decade backward.

Lop off the tentacles

The current situation:

In recent decades, Iran has developed and enhanced the use of proxy forces — third parties that wage war on its behalf. Thus for example Iran operates Hezbollah in Lebanon, arms the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations in Gaza, supports pro-Iranian militias in Syria, and strengthens the Houthis in Yemen. The proxy forces are tentacles that Iran can send everywhere in the Middle East in order to operate in faraway arenas without being directly involved. Iran helped set up a pro-Iranian Shiite government in Iraq, supported the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, tried to overthrow the governments in Bahrain and Qatar, fielded the Houthis against its great enemy Saudi Arabia, and of course strengthened the terror organizations surrounding Israel and contributed greatly to the sudden October 7 attack.

Israel is well aware of the pro-Iranian proxy forces, but the world at large still has trouble understanding that most of the terrorism in the Middle East is orchestrated by Iran.

Ideally:

• Contextualize the Iranian threat: The State of Israel must understand, and explain to the nations of the world, that Iran is not merely a lone nation but also an entire network active throughout the Middle East and also standing behind the current war against Israel. Only when the world comes to understand that Iran is also Hezbollah and also Hamas and also the Houthis will we be able to turn attention to the Iranian threat as it truly is and find ways to deal with it.
• Begin with the tentacles: The best way to weaken the Iranian octopus is to lop off its tentacles. First of all, the State of Israel must complete its campaign in the Gaza Strip and topple Hamas, thus removing the Iranian threat that comes from that direction. The next step is to significantly weaken Hezbollah in order to remove the threat from the direction of Lebanon. Later, we must proceed to the less nearby tentacles such as the Houthis in Yemen and the militias in Iraq. When Iran loses its proxy forces, the head of the octopus will be much easier to attack.

Remove the Iranian missile threat

The current situation:

Iran’s arsenal of missiles is the largest in the Middle East, with thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs that can attack at various ranges with high precision. Some of the missiles can carry devastating quantities of explosives, and some can even accommodate nuclear warheads.

Most of the missiles are kept in Iran; but some are in the hands of proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Thus Iran can reach faraway targets such as Israel by means of short-range missiles and UAVs.

On the night between April 13 and 14, 2024, Iran demonstrated its ballistic abilities by a massive launch from its turf directly at Israeli territory. That attack included 185 UAVs, 110 ballistic missiles, and 36 cruise missiles, carrying 60 tons of explosives in all. Despite the massiveness of the onslaught, roughly 99% of the hardware was intercepted thanks to the multi-level defenses of the Israel Air Force and to cooperation with Israel’s allies — including the USA and Jordan.

Thus it may be said that the Iranian missile attack exposed both the offensive capacity of Iran and the defensive capacity of Israel. That time, we carried the day. But we must make no mistake: The Iranians are already absorbing the lessons from that episode and improving their abilities for a future attack.

Ideally:

• No more policy of restraint: The State of Israel has invested a great deal in establishing its air defense but has ignored the no less important matter of establishing deterrence. The assault proved, above all else, that Iran is not fearful of confronting Israel; and Iran’s attitude is a problem we must solve. While developing advanced abilities of missile interception, we must also make clear to the Iranians — by assertiveness, military threats, and strong coalitions — that Israel is a country unwilling to tolerate missile attacks on its territory.
• Look into the remaining percent: The Israel Air Force successfully intercepted 99% of the incoming hardware originating in Iran, and that figure is a source of rightful pride. However, we must not forget the one percent that we failed to intercept. If the unintercepted missiles and UAVs had managed to penetrate into the State of Israel, they would have inflicted great harm upon us. And if such missiles had carried nuclear warheads, the damage would have been calamitous. Thus we must not rest on our laurels. Our operational and intelligence forces must remain alert, and we must take action to destroy Iran’s missile system. As long as that threat from Iran remains, the State of Israel faces existential danger.

Keep thwarting the cyber threats

The current situation:

Iran is one of the first states to have formulated a national cyber strategy, and today it is among the world’s most active players in that arena. The Iranians attempt hundreds of cyber attacks a day against the State of Israel. Some originate from units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, and others from independent attack groups. Most of the attacks target governmental organizations, hospitals, universities, and strategically important industries. The various attacks are intended to strengthen Iranian deterrence, to foment conflicts within Israeli society and spread falsehoods, to embarrass Israel globally, to spy and extract sensitive information, to disrupt the public routine, and to damage vital infrastructures.

Israel’s governmental and military cyber defenses block most of the attempted attacks, but some succeed. Thus, for example, Iranian hackers have managed to attack the computer servers of the Israel Police, to deceive Israeli embassies, to damage Israel’s power stations, refineries, and water and sewage systems, and to penetrate into Israeli computer systems in the fields of insurance, medicine, and finance in order to capture sensitive information.

It is important to understand that the Iranian cyber threat — although overshadowed among the public by the nuclear and missile threats — may, if not properly dealt with, result in great harm to the State of Israel.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel must understand that the Iranians are constantly growing stronger, and it must therefore see to preserving its cyber superiority by means of appropriate budgeting, recruitment of professionals, and constant improvement of its technological abilities. At the same time, we must examine the past attacks and analyze the Iranian hackers’ methods of operation in order to better understand how to tackle this threat.

Understanding the Iranian problem: Summation and conclusions

In order to deal with the Iranian threat, it is first of all necessary to bring about a change of thinking — both in the Israeli perspective and in the international perspective.

The State of Israel must understand that in recent years its war-between-the-wars policy enabled the Iranians and their proxies to build more and more strength and to dominate the entire region. The October 7 attack made clear that we must not continue our delaying but must take action now to remove the threats that surround us. Furthermore, we can no longer depend on our assessment of the enemy’s intentions. Instead we must look at the enemy’s capabilities and not allow them to grow stronger.

In the international arena, we must change over from a soft-power approach to a hard-power approach. The USA and the EU proceed from the assumption that if Iran prospers, it will have no reason to complain and it will join the family of nations. That assumption represents deep misunderstanding of the Middle East, and even disdain for Iran and for radical Islam. The Iranians are pursuing a vision: The destruction of the State of Israel and the imposition of Islam on the West. Until it understands that Iranian vision, the world cannot act against Iran with the necessary force.

Once the problem has been identified and the nature of Iran has been understood, Iran’s power must be soberly examined. Although Iran is a significant player, it is not all-powerful and it too has its vulnerabilities. Iran’s Achilles heel is oil. Without oil, its economy does not exist. Moreover, Iran’s regime suffers from domestic non-recognition of its legitimacy; and the multitude of protests threatens to undermine it. Militarily, despite its progress in nuclearization and missile deployment, Iran is not very strong or sophisticated. Its air force is antiquated, authority is scattered, and there are many different branches so that the right hand does not always know what the left hand is doing.

In the long term, the best that Israel can hope for is that the present Iranian regime will fall and be replaced by a moderate, pragmatic one. However, that scenario must be recognized as not very probable. Despite the protests and disputes within Iranian society, most of the Iranian populace wants Iran to remain traditional; and even while criticizing the government, the public is neither truly supportive of regime change nor able to impose it.

Accordingly, a more reasonable ambition is to bring about a weakened regime with no nuclear program, no arsenal of precision missiles, and no proxies. In such a situation, even if deep enmity persists, Israel and Iran could once more conduct proper relations.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Israel–Iran Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Ahiram Levi, a 30-year-old combat engineering soldier, opens our interview with an apology. He has much to say, he explains, but he isn’t quite sure how to phrase his opinions.

And indeed, as we embark on our discussion, the words come tumbling out with passion and pain. However, as the interview progresses, Ahiram gets a better handle on his thoughts and he presents structured and concise messages – sentiments shared by himself and his comrades in the field; messages that must be heard by every decision-maker in Israel.

“I speak for many reservists, all who sanctify life – regardless of their political leanings”, he wishes to clarify. “When I talk about the leadership, I mean all of Israel’s leadership – political, judiciary, military, media. As far as I’m concerned, they all should shoulder the responsibility”.

“No one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to reserves’ service”

Ahiram was summoned to report to duty at the outbreak of the October 7 attack, just eight months after his wedding, and a month after he quit his job. During the long months of fighting he also had to move and found himself contending with a complex series of personal difficulties. Added to this were the challenges from the battle field: the uncertainty, the constant fear, and the loss of comrades, which breaks the heart each and every time.

Ahiram is well aware that he’s not alone in this story. All of his comrade reservists are dealing with similar difficulties. “The reservists in particular are paying a dear price in this war, and this does not receive the attention it deserves”, he says. “I still have a hard time finding a job since no one wants to hire employees that will just be called back to duty. I have friends that because of their [prolonged] reserves’ duty have gotten divorced or have lost their jobs.  There are even some reservists who have committed suicide between tours. And the public – try as it may to be supportive – doesn’t really understand how difficult things are for us”.

Despite the mounting difficulties, and personal costs, Ahiram states that if summoned again he would immediately report, no questions asked. He only has two requests, both of which he wishes to convey to Israel’s decision-makers and to the citizens of the country: respect our lives by giving us your support and letting us win, and take responsibility for the unity of the public in Israel”.

“No more back-and-forth raids”: the reservists want to win

Since October 7, uncertainty has become part and parcel of the daily lives of the Israeli public. But there are those who deal with more uncertainty than the rest. Putting aside uncertainties that are products of being a combat soldier in war, there is the uncertainty that arises from the reservist’ constant transition lately between civilian and military life. “There is a large measure of unclarity regarding the reserves’ service”’ says Ahiram. “It starts already at the moment we get our summons. I’ve repeatedly received summons that were either postponed or called off all together. You must understand that when we receive a call to report for duty, our entire life circles around the upcoming tour. We stop everything, change plans. When we receive a summons out of the blue – it makes us feel that we – and our time – are being taken for granted, because they know that whenever called – we will step up to protect the country”, he shares candidly. “But the lack of clarity doesn’t end here. During fighting we usually are not informed of the objective of our missions. We’re told to go in, get out, fight, desist. This is has become even more prevalent in the recent months of the fighting”.

Can you see any difference between the fighting at the onset of the war as oppose to now?

“Absolutely. When the war began, the troops fought intensively and aggressively, however, lately, the soldiers feel that we’re bogged down in the Gaza mire instead of driving the fighting towards victory. The leadership and the public must understand that the longer we’re in Gaza – the more soldiers die. The troops in the field want to see a return to continuous intensive fighting, coupled with heavy artillery, mopping-up operations, a concerted military effort and a broad seizure of territory; no more back-and-forth raids; no more tours. [we want] warfare that means business and says to us: ‘we brought you here from home to win this war’”.

What in your opinion, is holding back the IDF from victory?

“I don’t intend to address the bringing of politics into the military; however, I would like to touch upon the considerations of international pressure. I understand that this is an important issue – but it’s not more important than our lives. The lives of the soldiers should be treated with reverence. Beyond that, there is a gap between the mindset of the troops in the field and the messages that are sent out by the leadership. As common soldiers we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that our army has everything it takes to tackle a terrorist organization – as complex is it might be – and to crush it. But without the conviction in the imperative of victory on part of the leadership, we can stay entrenched in this fight for another three years with no conclusion in sight.”

What is you view on the possible cessation of the war before all its objectives have been reached?

“As a civilian I would comment on the issue, but as a soldier it is not my place to voice an opinion. The army’s job is to execute decisions and we, as soldiers, are committed to carrying out in the field any decision coming down from the top. The problem is that we see mainly foot-dragging. It’s frustrating. We get up and leave everything – our families, our work, our businesses, and report to duty, but then have to face indecision. I say – if you don’t want to win, then don’t call us in. End the war and let it go at that. But if you do wish to win – let us fight until we do.”

“The lives of the reservists are not even on the public agenda”

On July 1st, Sergeant Major (res.) Nadav Elchanan Noller, an old and good friend of Ahiram’s, fell in battle. This is not the first friend he has lost since the beginning of the war, but Elhanan’s death had rattled him in particular.

“Every person killed is a world onto its own. But seeing such high numbers of casualties leads to indifference. The fallen march by in a long line and most of us aren’t even familiar with their names, don’t know who they are, hurt for their loss for one moment. Unfortunately, it is only when grief comes knocking at your own door you understand its meaning”, he says. “This indifference is displayed by the public as well as by the leadership”.

Ahiram says that as citizens of Israel, it is our duty to take pause to hear and honor every single name of a fallen soldier. But this is only one side of the story. “I want us to be honored and respected while we’re still alive”, he stresses. “We risk our lives and souls for the country and the public, and you don’t have to see the epitaph ‘Rest in Peace’ near our names to call us heroes. We don’t need to be loved as dead heroes”.

How would you have the leadership treat the soldiers and reservists differently?

“I expect the leadership to back us up: in the battles in the field as well as in life outside the battlefield. At the moment the sentiment is that everything is on the table – international relations, the economic situation, the hostages, the evacuees. Everything but us. I’m not underestimating any of these issues; they’re all important. But it is not acceptable that the lives of the reservists are not on the public agenda as well. The day Nadav was killed, the sole issue on everyone’s mind was whether to reconnect Gaza to electricity or not. It feels like were getting stabbed in the back; it’s as if the lives of the Gazans are more important than those of the reservists. You have to understand that the attempts to appease the international community not only divert the limelight from us, but also lead to decision-making that impedes our ability to fight – reconnecting Gaza to the electricity helps Hamas and most of the humanitarian aid reaches the terrorists’ hands and reenforces them. Creative alternatives can be put in place that can protect our international interests but also allow us to engage in continuous aggressive operation. Furthermore, we also want to see an enveloping support system for us and our families. That means real financial aid and not occasional benefits of one sort or another, as the reservists cannot shoulder that burden on top of everything else.”

What do you expect of the Israeli public?

“There are amazing people who have been nonstop supporting the soldiers, the wounded and the families of the victims. Nonetheless, most of the public has returned to routine life, and this manifests in the levels of volunteering and emotional involvement on their part. It’s understandable. I didn’t expect the level of support at the beginning of the war to continue on such a scale, and at the end of the day – we’re out there fighting so that the public can live its routine life, but still, it’s hard for me to deal with the indifference in society now and the obliviousness to the difficulties that the reservists are experiencing”.

What can be done to help the reservists?

“People want to tell us ‘Well done’ and even reach into their pockets and donate. But when they encounter these difficulties in a challenging setting – they don’t really know how to help. I’m not saying that everyone needs to volunteer, but there are other ways to share the burden, like refraining from firing employees that are absent due to reserves duty, despite the difficulties. Similarly, employers should be patient with employees returning from reserves duty and have difficulties readjusting. Furthermore, the families of reservists should be supported, especially the wives, who are alone at home with the children. Generally speaking, society can – and should – be sensitive about seeing how it can help others, even if it’s not clear what difficulties they’re dealing with.”

“The TV studios are like kindergartens”

One of the most common expressions heard since the onslaught of the war is “unity”. We encounter it in almost every junction, on signs proclaim “Together We Shall Win”. We hear it repeatedly in politicians’ speeches. Commanders preach it to their soldiers. Social media posts are replete with it and it appears in musical releases – but as far as Ahiram is concerned, at the moment unity is little more than a catchy slogan.

“I watch what goes on in the TV studios – they’re like kindergartens now”, he says. “It’s hard to watch our leaders go at each other’s throats, and foment intrigue. We’ve reached a state in which the government is identified with the right and the army – with the left. This is unacceptable. I want to call on all levels of the political and military leadership – and to the media as well – be responsible. Think twice before you speak and ask yourself wither your cultivating love or stoking hate; promoting unity or fomenting  discord”.

According to Ahiram, there is a significant gap between the manner in which the Israeli leadership and society manage disputes and how the soldiers and reservists handle them. “There is a very high degree of cohesion among the reservists. We are able to conduct discussions bringing up opinions across the political spectrum and do so in a respectful manner. Sometimes I feel that we have parallel universes here – the universe in which the reservists exist and that of the outside world”.

Still, how can unity be promoted in the “outside world”?

“It is the leadership that must take the responsibility for promoting unity among the people – this should be the number one priority of the Knesset. It starts with the way the politicians themselves talk to each other and continues with the comments we hear in the media. We must shift the idea of unity from a slogan into practice and get it into our heads that if we continue to split into factions and camps, and if we don’t learn how to build a future for us all – we’ll simply no longer be here”.

“I’m needed, so I’m there”

As of now, Ahiram Levi is back at his civilian life, but he knows that at any moment he could be summoned back to reserves’ duty. And it is clear to him that if he is– he will report for duty. Meanwhile, as long as he is home, he is working on his fresh marriage, getting used to his new house, and trying to finally find a job. And in between it all, he visits the troops, but as a volunteer. Beyond Ahiram’s important contribution as a fighter, he has also recently founded the “Unity War Room” – an organization dedicated to helping soldiers, operating under the slogan “Because We Have No Other Country”. Ahiram and his volunteers travel the country, distributing food and gear to soldiers and mainly conveying to them: we see you.

How do you find the motivation to continue to serve and volunteer?

“What gives me the strength is the knowledge that the people of Israel have experienced difficulties throughout history, and prevailed. When you stick to a narrow view – it’s hard to get up in the morning. But adopting a perspective that sees us as a link in a long line of Jewish generations, allows me to rise above the hardships. I also understand that no one else is going to do it for me and my family. I’m needed – so I’m there.”

Now that you’ve expressed such painful thoughts, what is your message to Israel’s leadership?

“My first message is: take responsibility and show us we are important. Put our lives on the scales when you weigh your decisions and give us real support. The second message is: don’t toy with us. If you want to win the war – let us fight properly and bring about its conclusion. Don’t leave us in this limbo because we are sick of sacrificing our lives because of your indecision.”

הפוסט You Called Us to Serve. Now let Us Win הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

One common motif in folk tales is the story of the villain who is caught in his own trap. Who among us isn’t pleased to hear that scarcely a single step separates Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, from the pit that he himself has dug?

For the sake of understanding the specific story ahead of us and the alignment of forces on the Mideast chessboard, the newness of the current situation must first be appreciated. The difference before our eyes is that Israeli and US are in agreement regarding all that concerns the ceasefire deal. Thus, essentially for the first time, the two countries are on the same side regarding everything about the nature of the deal. The present deal was first formulated last weekend in negotiations that bridged the gaps between the American and Israeli positions, and the countries agreed on a document that was delivered to Hamas. Now the ball has been passed to Hamas.

What is the content of that joint proposal? In it are four main points on which the Israeli position has stayed unchanged since last May: The IDF will remain in full control of the Philadelphi Corridor, armed Palestinians will not return to the northern Gaza Strip, no fewer than 30 live hostages will return, and combat will resume after the ceasefire.

One important factor to keep in mind is Sinwar’s degree of control over events. It is a critical factor for understanding the situation because Sinwar’s authority now extends both over “internal affairs,” following the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh, and over “foreign affairs.” But as a hunted man, in the tunnels beneath the Gaza Strip, how effectively can Sinwar communicate? Are the Egyptians and Qataris in contact with him? Suppose they are; how firmly can he control his forces throughout the Gaza Strip? To what extent is he managing the fate and the conditions of the hostages? Hamas has never provided any information about the hostages, and so there is no telling which are alive or who is holding them. Even Sinwar may be unaware of the answers.

What does Hamas want? First of all, Hamas wants regional war and that is why it mounted its October 7 massacre. Its strategic objective was to draw as many of Israel’s enemies as possible into a multi-front confrontation. If the fighting expanded from the local level to full scale, involving several fronts, Israel’s pressure on Hamas in particular would be greatly weakened. That scenario may be the only way that Sinwar, having sparked the confrontation, can see himself emerging from it with the upper, bloodstained hand. And we are in fact on the verge of such an escalation, but Sinwar finds himself trapped between two alternatives and both are bad for him.

If he accepts the proposed deal, Iran and its proxies will stop their aggression. They have explicitly announced that. Moreover, the end of fighting is also in America’s interest and the White House is unleashing enormous pressure to that purpose. The pressure includes a palpable threat to Iran in the form of naval, airborne, and amphibious attack forces rushed to the vicinity, and in the form of a coalition of the West that is capable of dealing a crushing blow to Iran together with Israel — or at least joining in Israel’s defense. A sword is hovering above Iran’s neck and is not to be blinked at. The coalition’s switch from defense to attack may be very quick and unexpected. History teaches that a small mistake on one side can suffice to change a defensive alliance to a powerful attack force. So if the deal Hamas demands is accepted, it forfeits its strategic objective of regional war. It also loses its only chance of survival in the Gaza Strip, and Sinwar apparently forfeits his head.

If there is a monitored and selective return into the northern Gaza Strip, only terrorists and hostages will remain in the Al-Muwasi zone. Then, with the zone free of Palestinian civilians, the IDF will be able to mount a meaningful operation to wipe out the vestiges of Hamas and free the remaining hostages.

The barring of armed Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip is the other minefield facing Sinwar. By now, setting aside 300 thousand civilians who returned to the northern Gaza Strip, almost the entire population of the center and south is in the greater Al-Muwasi area, extending to Deir al-Balah. According to a rather well-grounded assumption, the influx of refugees into the Al-Muwasi area involved transport of hostages as well. That assumption, together with the great density of the civilian presence in the area, makes IDF activity difficult there. If a monitored and selective return is carried out as stipulated in the pending agreement, only terrorists and hostages will remain in the Al-Muwasi area. In that case, the IDF will enjoy a significant operational opportunity for mopping up Hamas and freeing the hostages in that area emptied of Palestinian civilians.

Sinwar too understands that if Hamas accepts the deal, he will not be granted the regional war that he desired — and at the end of the six-week ceasefire, the IDF will be ideally positioned to eliminate him. And in that case, Hamas will be unable to recover. Its armories, its workshops, and all its infrastructure were destroyed by heavy bombing. Its supplies will be impossible to renew through the Philadelphi Corridor because Israel insists on controlling the entrances from Egypt. Moreover, the reserve forces of Hamas are being rapidly eroded.

The bottom line is that the deal puts forth acceptable conditions for Israel. We will receive the hostages alive, and then, after evacuating the civilians from Mawasi, we will enjoy dramatically improved freedom of action. But Hamas will have nowhere left to hide.

The State of Israel considers two strategic objectives more important than the fighting in Gaza: the return of normal living conditions at the northern border with the elimination of Hezbollah’s presence there, and the removal of the Iranian nuclear threat.

Here, on the issue of regional war, is where the interests of Hamas and of Israel ironically coincide. The Gaza Strip, for all the significance of the war there, is still a secondary battlefield. Strategically, precedence goes to the north where the danger is Hezbollah and to Iran where the danger is nuclear. Israel has realized correctly that with a defensive coalition at its side — in addition to the operational capability to hit strongly at the head of the Iranian serpent, and its throat across the northern border — a historic opportunity is at hand.

Despite the strategic opportunity presented by regional war, Israel and the US have not made their offer insincerely. The Israeli government has afforded top priority to the freeing of the hostages, which is an American interest as well. If Hamas accepts the deal, it will go forward. Sinwar understands that the ball has been passed to him and must decide correctly and quickly. Otherwise, he will find that the ball explodes.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Sinwar’s days of reckoning הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On July 24, 2024, the Prime Minster of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, delivered a formal address to a joint session of Congress on the invitation of Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson of Louisiana. Prime Minister Netanyahu used this extraordinary opportunity to speak directly to the American people (and the world) and to state Israel’s case. He defined Israel’s position clearly and forcefully. In fact, he achieved a remarkable level of identification with his listeners.

Congress is one of the important components of the American government, composed of three branches — the Legislative, the Executive (the President) and the Judicial (the Supreme Court). Article I, Section I of the Constitution states simply, “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Effectively, Congress may potentially be the most powerful branch of the government. It has the authority to pass laws, raise taxes, decide appropriations, and exercise oversight. In addition, Congress has the power to place an issue on the national agenda, such as Israel’s right to self-defense and the aggressive pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses, some of which featured open attacks on Jewish students.

Our world has changed and American legislators understand the danger of terrorism. In fact, a solid representation of Congressmen and women have served in the in the armed services, particularly the Marines, and have become familiar with the ways of the Middle East.

Many of them are sensitive to moral and cultural considerations, and in a real sense, the observations of the French historian, Alexis de Tocqueville, who visited America in the 1830s, are relevant. Tocqueville wrote the classic, Democracy in America, where he stated that the “morality and equity” of Christianity were a moderating influence in American life and the basis of American freedom. Without calling it by name, he described the essence of American exceptionalism:

Religion, which, among Americans, never mixes directly in the government of society, should therefore be considered as the first of their political institutions; for if it does not give them the taste for freedom, it singularly facilitates their use of it.

…. I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion – for who can read the bottom of hearts – but I am sure that they believe it necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion does not belong only to one class of citizens or to one party, but to the entire nation; one finds it in all ranks.

When President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he called on the legendary Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill, who advised him that “The Congress of the United States includes some of the most talented and knowledgeable lawmakers in the world. Some of them have been here for years, because the people at home have such faith in them.” Tip O’Neill’s description remains valid. Congressmen and women seek their own sources of information and draw their own conclusions. The formidable initiatives of the House Education Committee are an example.

As far as the back story of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s address, there is a difference of opinion between President Biden and the Prime Minister. Despite the atrocities of October 7 and the deaths of 1,200 Israelis, American policy was and remains imposing a ceasefire which would leave Hamas in power, while Israel’s policy is to end the conflict by defeating the enemy and winning. Concurrently, the same debate continues in Israel.

The moral issue is whether a self-respecting sovereign country which had been the victim of aggression should make a deal with terrorists whose motto is “by any means necessary.” In his address, Netanyahu boldly called this war “a clash between barbarism and civilization,” and declared that the United States and Israel must stand together, because we have the same enemy. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s forcefully stated, “We will win!”

According to Caroline Glick, the meeting with President Biden on the day after the Prime Minister’s address ended in a bust up. The President admonished the Prime Minister that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!” Glick noted that the Prime Minister represents the majority of the Israeli public which support his position.

Over the years, there have been ups and downs in the relations between America and Israel. Nevertheless, there is a continuity of friendship, shared values, and interests. Therefore, we must show great appreciation for the Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, who graciously invited the Prime Minister to address Congress and stateIsrael’s case directly to the American people.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Prime Minister’s Address to Congress: Context and Content הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Italy seems to encounter difficulties in dealing with pro-Hamas hate preachers attacking the Jews and Israel on social media and at public rallies. Some could say that it’s something quite common now in the West; we have all seen hateful demonstrations on US campuses and in central London, but that is exactly the problem, because what we are seeing is a normalization of hateful narrative against the Jews, often disguised as “antizionism”.

But what is Zionism after all, if not the right for the Jews to live in their historical land, to have their nation? How come we haven’t seen such full support, like the one provided to the Palestinian cause, to other ones such as the Kurdish cause, the Tibetan, the Uyghur, the Rohingya, and so on? It seems like the Jews are always the preferred target.

Additionally, some Italy-based preachers did not have an issue verbally attacking the Jewish people for being Jews, for instance, in May 2021, during a street speech in Bologna’s main square, “Piazza Maggiore”, Pakistani preacher Zulfiqar Khan stated that:“…Jews are cruel and they use intelligence to harm others”.

In November 2023, during the Italian mainstream TV show “Dritto e Rovescio”, Khan stated: “The Israelites are terrorists and deceivers according to the Bible,” adding that “deception with the aim of self-interest is part of the Jewish faith.”

Isn’t this antisemitism? It is worth recalling that in Italy the Mancino Law has been in force since 1993 and establishes severe penalties for those who promote racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination. Khan also glorified Hamas and the Houthis on several occasions during his sermons and posted images of Hamas terrorists on his Facebook account.

Khan also defined Joe Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu “the two horns of Satan” on plenty of occasions and in June 2024 he accused Israel of murdering on purpose Palestinian children and pregnant women, of burning them alive and he stated that the only terrorists are the Zionists.

In June 2024, during an interview with local TV, he refused to condemn the October 7th massacre.

In July of 2024, Khan posted two fatwa-like videos on the Islamic Center’s Facebook page where he verbally attacked Italian-Egyptian Allam, accusing him of slandering Islam, apostasy and for speaking at a pro-Israel conference. Allam has been under police protection for many years following his criticism of Islam and his conversion to Christianity.

It is worth noting that on July 9th, during a response to a parliament inquiry on Khan’s activity, the Minister of Interior, Matteo Piantedosi, referred to the preacher’s positions as “intransigent”:

“…he has often expressed intransigent positions regarding issues on the West, on homosexuality, on the role of women and, after the attacks of 7 October, also on the Palestinian people and the Israeli Government, demonstrating appreciation for the actions carried out by Hamas”.

Minister Piantedosi must understand that Khan’s positions are not “intransigent”, they are hateful and extremely dangerous.

In addition, Piantedosi stated that “from 1 January 2023 to 5 July, 22 people linked to religious terrorism/extremism circles were arrested”. It is unclear what the term “religious” means.  If they all were radical Islamists, why not state it clearly?

Let’s move on. On October 10th, 2023, just three days after the October 7th massacre, Palestinian activist Mohammed Hannoun (imam in Genoa and president of the Association of Palestinians in Italy, who was photographed years back with moth, Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal), stated that the attack perpetrated by Hamas was “self-defense”. Such claims were made in an interview with the Italian State TV Rai3.

On January 4th, 2024, Hannoun glorified Yahya Ayyash, Hamas’ notorious bombmaker, sadly known for both developing Hamas’s use of suicide bombings and building many of the explosives used in the attacks, and Saleh al-Arouri, a senior Hamas leader in Lebanon who was killed by Israel in Beirut in a drone strike on January 2nd, 2024.

On March 30th, 2024, during a pro-Palestinian demonstration outside Milan’s Central Station. Hannoun, microphone in hand, concluded his speech inciting to turn all Israeli embassies into centers for Palestinian resistance.

In July 2024, Hannoun praised Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades former commander, Emad Akel, and Mohammad Abu Salmiya, director of the al-Shifa hospital. He also invoked freedom for “all Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons”. On July 19th, during a sermon he held as imam of a mosque in Genoa, he accused Israel of destroying hospitals, schools, and mosques in Gaza.

On July 25th he published a post calling for protests against the upcoming meeting between Italian PM, Giorgia Meloni, and Israeli President, Isaac Herzog.

It is important to recall that in 2021, after several reports to the Anti-Money Laundering Office, Hannoun’s charity ABSPP had its bank accounts frozen due to a series of anomalies. From failure to register in the Revenue Agency register to the massive movement of cash, in some cases to subjects registered in the blacklists of European databases. However, according to the Italian media, the indictment that was launched by the judicial office did not lead anywhere due to the lack of verifiable elements in the Palestinian territories.

In July 0f 2023, the Israeli Ministry of Defense asked the Italian police to seize Hannoun’s money. From the investigation conducted by the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic intelligence agency, it emerged that 500,000 euros were available to the architect who in the past was accused by Israel, without any criminal repercussions, of hiding financial support to Palestinian suicide bombers.

Despite the accounts being frozen, in June 2024, Hannoun opened a new charity named “Golden Dome” and started to collect funds once again.

Despite all this, both individuals are still preaching and active on social media platforms.

Hannoun received support from Italian left-wing political figures such as Laura Boldrini, Nicola Fratoianni, Michele Piras, Alessandro Di Battista, and Stefania Ascari, as indicated on several occasions by the Italian press, but this whole situation does not seem to be exclusively political.

On January 27th, 2024, the Shoah Memorial Day, a pro-Palestinian unauthorized demonstration led by Hannoun and other well-known Palestinian activists, was held in Milan’s via Padova, a street with a high presence of Muslims.

During the demonstration, a resident of the street, 25-year-old Mihael Melnic, opened the window of his apartment and exposed a cardboard sign with the writing “Free Gaza from Hamas”, which immediately caused a wave of insults and threats from the crowd. Incredibly, shortly after, his flat was raided by the plainclothes police who questioned Melnic, tried to confiscate his sign (without success), and attempted to intimidate him. Melnic told his story in an interview with the Times of Israel. Melnic exposed the violent nature of certain “pro-Palestinian” demonstrations and their sympathy for Hamas, and some may not have appreciated this.

Taken singularly, these cases may not seem too significant, but once connected, many questions arise. The impression is that things are being dealt with differently if compared to cases regarding ISIS or al-Qaeda because the Palestinian cause is at stake. While the Italian authorities have been swift and strict in taking measures against ISIS supporters (often through deportations), things seem to be different when it comes to the Palestinian cause, especially Hamas.

Since October 7th, the Meloni-led Italian government has shown support for Israel, unlike other European executives; therefore, could this situation rather originate within the internal mechanisms of timeworn risky agreements with inappropriate interlocutors and perpetrated by deep intel apparatuses that go beyond the governments that come and go?

There are two points to keep in mind: the first one has to do with internal security: in the 1970s Italy set an underground agreement with Palestinian terrorist formations, known as “Lodo Moro”, following the Fiumicino massacre in December 1973, in which Italy guaranteed freedom of passage to Palestinian terrorists on their national territory; in exchange, the Palestinians ensured not to strike on Italian soil. Obviously, this does not mean that the agreement is still in force, but it is fair to ask whether some semblance of an approach like the “Lodo” may be active today with the Palestinians.

It is also important to recall that Italy has been very open and tolerant of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is present and active on Italian soil. The concept could be summarized in the mantra “They are extremists but not terrorists”, which could be translated as “as long as they spread extremism in certain directions, but do not engage in violent actions against us, it is tolerable”.

Hamas is, after all, the Palestinian branch of the MB and it is well-known how Hamas’s electoral victory in 2007 helped the group to transition from a terrorist organization to a recognized political actor. Additionally, the legitimation, during the Arab Spring, of political Islam through the MB only made things worse, since the Islamists have proven to be way far from democracy and the safeguard of political opposition.

The second point has to do with foreign policy, since Italy’s presence in Libya and Somalia has been closely related to the Islamists and those Middle Eastern countries supporting them. For instance, as exposed in November 2020 by Israeli intelligence analyst Oded Berkowitz, Italy provided the Islamist-led GNA government in Tripoli with diplomatic, intelligence, and counter-terror assistance, side to side with Turkey, while Qatar provided the GNA with economic support. The table shared by Berkowitz came from the US AFRICOM data.

Another interesting issue is the one concerning the liberation of Silvia Romano, an Italian charity worker kidnapped in Kenya in 2018 by al-Shabab terrorists and taken to Somalia. In May 2020, Romano was freed under unclear circumstances, and a photo of her wearing a Turkish special forces vest sparked controversies, with some Italian media accusing the government of having relied on Turkey. The Italian authorities claimed that Romano was recovered by their intelligence and that the photo was fake. However, the Turkish media reported otherwise, publishing the photo and stating that its intelligence (MIT), was primarily involved in the operation.

It is well known that Qatar and Turkey are, together with Iran, the main sponsors of Hamas. The declarations of Turkish President Erdogan and the role played by Doha in supporting the Palestinian terrorist organization leave no doubt. The massacre of October 7th upsets the political-strategic balance between the West and the Middle East. Anti-Semitism has emerged, side by side with hatred towards the Jewish state; Hamas showed its real face as a ruthless, Nazi-sympathizer, terrorist organization deserving to be dealt with as such, rather than as a legitimate political interlocutor, just like ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Unfortunately, until now, unlike what happened over the years with ISIS, very few interventions have been seen against Hamas supporters. The only known case is the deportation of 56-year-old Algerian citizen Amor Branes, in April 2024, for sharing pro-Hamas and jihadist content on social media. Therefore, it would be appropriate to see more arrests and expulsions of Hamas supporters, because its ideology and operational activity is not less dangerous than the one carried out by ISIS or al-Qaeda.

It must also be noted that al-Aqsa Brigades member (leader of the “Rapid Response-Tulkarem Unit”), Yaesh Anan, and two accomplices, were arrested in central Italy in January 2024 only after a request for extradition forwarded by Israel. Anan was directly in touch from Italian soil with Al-Aqsa chief commander in Lebanon, Mounir al-Maqdah, with whom he frequently talked on video call using the Whatsapp application. The investigation papers indicate that Anan and his cell were collecting funds and planning a series of attacks against Israeli politicians, the former war cabinet, and an armed assault like the one that occurred in southern Israel on October 7th, 2023, this time against the Israeli settlement in Avnei Hefetz. The judges of the Italian Appeal Court of L’Aquila refused Israel’s request for extradition, “due to the difficult conditions of Israeli prisons”.

The issue of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli narrative and activity being spread on behalf of Islamist preachers and activists involves the whole European continent, and not just Italy.

European authorities have been tightening the net on Islamist extremist groups, with high-profile raids, deportations, financial restrictions, and a crackdown on their online activities. France and Germany seem to be the two countries that have so far taken a tougher stance on this type of activity.

For instance, in February 2024, Mahjoub Mahjoubi, an imam in the small southern French town of Bagnols-sur-Ceze, was deported to Tunisia, less than 12 hours after his arrest. In his sermons, the preacher encouraged discrimination against women, radicalization, and he referred to Jewish people as “the enemy”.

In April 2024, Algerian citizen Mohamad Tatait, who held the role of imam at a mosque in Toulouse, was expelled from France after being accused of incitement to hatred and discrimination against Jews.

In July 2024, a 37-year-old Senegalese citizen was arrested in Aube before being expelled. The individual was known to French authorities for his radical speeches and caused unrest in Troyes mosques and relayed, on his social networks where he was followed by thousands of people, messages inciting intolerance and hatred.

In Germany, authorities have taken strong measures against pro-Hamas and pro-Hezbollah supporters, limiting pro-Palestinian marches, while schools have been granted the power to place bans on Palestinian flags and keffiyeh scarves. Across the country, using the pro-Palestinian slogan “From the river to the sea” is a criminal offense. In addition, recent arrests have also been made against Hezbollah cells, while the Shia Islamic Center in Hamburg was shut down.

It would be desirable to see a tougher hand from Italy towards those who support and flank Palestinian and Islamist terrorism, and against those who spread hate speech towards Jews and Israel, because otherwise the situation will very likely get worse in the coming months.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The timid Italian approach in tackling Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Is Israel fated to eternal war over its protection and existence? Sadly, the answer is yes. This is the cold, harsh truth and indeed, the only truth. The sooner Israel understands and accepts this, it will better be able to address its security concerns.

In this paper, I would like to discuss this axiom on three levels: religious, national and historic.

On a religious level, the hostility towards Israel in all its forms and manifestations in the Middle East falls under the umbrella of a war of religion. The end goal of the Islamic religious war is the establishment of world-wide rule of Islam. This fight comprises two parts: “Dar Al-Islam” (house of Islam) and “Dar Al-Harb” (house of sword). Dar Al-Islam refers to the regions held or conquered in the past by Islam, whereas Dar Al-Harb pertains to those regions that have not yet been taken over by Islam. According to Islam, one of the duties of the observant Muslim is to liberate the Dal Al-Islam areas that are controlled by non-Muslims (heretics or others). Israel, having been for a certain period under Islam rule, must be “liberated” and returned to Muslim control, as the per Dar Al-Islam doctrine.

Furthermore,  Muslims buck against the very idea of being under the rule of Jews, and living as a minority under Jewish rule in the State of Israel is an insult added to the injury that is the Jewish control over the many biblical Jewish heritage sites across Israel that throughout history have taken on religious significance to Islam, such as the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron and the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Put all this together in one small land and you have all the ingredients for a holy Jihad. It was not incidental that Hamas dubbed the October 7 massacre “The Al-Aqsa flood” – all Muslim believers, whether Shia or Suni , subscribe to the principles above mentioned. This is also the reason why Muslims around the world – Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and more – closely follow what is happening in Israel, and are even mobilizing to send forces to join their Muslim brethren in the current war. Any expectation that this would – and indeed could – change, is absurd and has no leg to stand on.

Peace with Egypt – Why is the Egyptian army building up its forces?

Some may wonder how, then, in light of the Dar Al-Islam and the pan-Islamic solidarity could Egypt and Jordan sign a peace agreement with Israel. This is explained by the approach in Islam that commands Muslims to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad, who preached that peace with an enemy is acceptable when a Muslim is in a disadvantage, but once the Muslim is strong enough to uphold the Islam rules of war the agreement may be broken. When understanding this way of thought, who can guarantee that these peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan will last for long? Over the recent years, the Egyptian army has been undergoing a rapid and significant buildup of force, including the construction of infrastructures under the Suez Canal and in the Sinai Peninsula on the border with Israel. It is true that Egypt has its own threats and conflicts within the African continent (Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia), but these conflicts are not on a scale that could justify this buildup of force. Why, then, are the Egyptians doing this? Isreal has a track record of warm relations with Muslim states that have soured and turned hostile – Iran and Turkey to name but two. Is there really anyone who truly believes that the same cannot happen with Egypt?

The State of Israel was established on the territories of a decaying Ottoman empire. At the time, the territory was considered part of what was called the Greater-Syria region, as were the territories of Jordan and Lebanon. Modern Syria has never disguised its ambition to regain control over Lebanon – a state that was artificially created in the 20^th century by the French and British mandates over territories in the Middle East. The same is true of Jordan, that continues to exist in the past decades thanks to Israel’s close attention. Can we truly say that Syria had gave up its desire to regain control of the Land of Israel?

A Palestinian state has never existed, and inasmuch as it depends on Israel – one will never come to be. The October 7 massacre helped many understand this. Furthermore, all public opinion polls taken in the past year among the Judea and Samaria Arabs show that the overwhelming majority would commit such a massacre of Jews if given the opportunity. It takes a great degree of naiveté to believe that there would come a time when the entire Arab population from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea would forsake their collective aspirations to be the sole lords of the entirety of the Land of Israel.

Moving on to the historical level. Several years ago I spent the day with my children at an amusement park in the Netherlands. Looking around and seeing all the happy faces of the children, I thought to myself how wonderful it must be to be able to live life without being under constant threat. However, this, apparently, is not the lot of generations of Jewish children. History shows time and time again, that no matter where Jews live there will always be those who persecute them, whether for religious causes, xenophobia or – mostly- pure antisemitism. Anyone with even a general knowledge of history cannot but acknowledge this simple yet sad fact. Whether Jews staunchly uphold their religious believes and traditions or try as they might to assimilate into the society they live, whether we live in Europe, America or Israel – this is the truth. Do the images from university campuses across the United States leave any doubt that this is not something that will change in the foreseeable future?

I do not know of one Jew who does not wish to live a peaceful threat-free life; I do not know of any Jew who lives in a place that allows this. To put it succinctly, nothing has really changed since founder of the Revisionist Zionist movement Zeev Jabotinsky wrote in his seminal essay “About the Iron Wall” from 1923, that we can live in the State of Israel only through military might that would deter Israel’s enemies from without and within.

And those of us who still choose to leave Israel and try their luck elsewhere, all we can do is wish them the best of luck and remind them that the State of Israel will always be here to welcome them back when the next pogrom sends them back home.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Shall The Sword Devour Forever? For Israel the Answer Is Yes הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On the afternoon of Friday, July 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced an opinion regarding “Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem.” Despite the drama that the event generated among the stakeholders, it was by no means a dramatic event. The anti-Israeli character of the decision was a foregone conclusion. Below, I shall briefly review the circumstances that led to the decision’s publication and, for the sake of explaining the reasons, focus a bit on its content.

First of all, as Jews we have learned from experience about the timing that international institutions generally choose for announcing a decision against us — a decision based on rejecting our historical, national, or religious rights. So the news that the decision was to be announced on a Friday afternoon, when most Israelis are not at work and the Sabbath is about to start, implied which way the wind was blowing. Such decisions are generally announced on a Friday or the eve of a Jewish holiday. It’s hard to cite exceptions.

Secondly, the phrasing of the question that was posed by the UN General Assembly to the ICJ, as reflected in the title of the decision, presupposes that Israel is guilty of violating international law. Note that the procedure supposedly allows the General Assembly to ask the ICJ a legal question provided that the question does not yet have a clear answer. Here, the General Assembly has decided the legal answer in advance and proceeds, in an attempt to justify turning to the ICJ, to pose a further question about the implications. In other words, guilt is decided before the court has even begun to examine any legal aspects and therefore it’s no surprise that the court’s answer is no more than a sort of rubber stamp branding Israel as guilty.

From the list of countries supporting the request for this opinion, another hint foreshadows the response. Only 80 countries supported the request, two thirds of them have no diplomatic relations with Israel, and most of them do not recognize its right to exist at all.

Added to that is the fact that no Palestinian infraction has ever been brought before the panel. The judges have never been asked to consider the Palestinian Authority’s policy of payments to terrorists and their families, the incitement to terrorism and anti-Semitism, the rule of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, or the terror attacks against Israel.

Another matter to be taken into account is the identity of the judges. For example, the President of the ICJ is none other than Nawaf Salam, a Lebanese diplomat and jurist. As may be expected from a Lebanese diplomat, Salam has a lengthy documented history of harsh anti-Israeli statements as well as votes against Israel in the UN. With such a judge presiding over an institution purported to rule objectively, and authoring the majority opinion, again we may guess at the spirit of the decision without reading a word of it. It bears noting that ICJ procedure requires a judge who is so clearly inclined against one of the parties to recuse himself, and following the ICJ’s receipt of the request Salam received many calls to do so — not only from sources who value Israel’s wellbeing, but also from sources who value the ICJ’s image and fear that such a disgrace, which does not lend itself to concealment, will damage the court’s reputation. Salem, of course, declined. He continued, unimpeded, to head the proceedings, which have turned into a weapon against Israel.

Indeed the international institutions have long been transformed into anti-Israeli weapons, and Israel stands at a significant strategic disadvantage in this arena. Israel’s enemies, on the other hand, have learned to exploit the same arena to the fullest.

Another fact demanding attention is the glee with which the decision was welcomed by the murderous terrorist organization Hamas. In light of that, what can the international community say in its defense? It is quite a painful fact that mere months after the atrocities of October 7, and with more than 100 Israeli hostages still being held in the Gaza Strip, the ICJ has awarded an unprecedented prize to Palestinian terrorism and sent an unambiguous message to terror supporters everywhere: Terrorism pays, on the chief condition that it targets Jews.

A word about the content. The decision is packed with misrepresented facts as well as with indifference to history and to all international rules and precedents. All means are acceptable for reaching the predetermined objective — the condemnation of Israel as a war criminal.

Space will not accommodate all the absurdities that are smeared over the many pages, but I will provide a few examples.

To begin with, according to the ICJ all Jewish settlement, without exception, is illegal. Every Jew putting down stakes in Jerusalem or in the Judea and Samaria area is committing a war crime. What the ICJ is in fact calling for is a complete ethnic cleansing of Jews. All Jews must leave and all Palestinians must be permitted a “return” to their homeland. It is important to note that there is no comparable instance in the world with human beings, on the basis of their religion or ethnic origin, being utterly condemned for their very existence in a given territory, and with their subjection to ethnic cleansing fully supported.

And this is without invoking the historical aspect and the deep connection of the Jewish nation to its historic capital of Jerusalem, including the Old City and holy places, not to mention other places throughout the Judea and Samaria area, which is full of rich Jewish history. The decision expends many words on the Palestinian right to self-determination but does not refer at all to any Jewish right to self-determination — not in Jerusalem, not in Judea and Samaria, and not in any other part of the Land of Israel (or elsewhere). The decision discusses the need to maintain territorial contiguity for a Palestinian state, referring to Gaza as well, and it naturally remains unclear where, if at all, the ICJ envisions the Jewish State in this picture.

It must be stressed that this is not a political decision on the question of which state should ultimately rule the territory. The ICJ’s excuse for demanding a “Judenrein outcome” is ostensibly based on law. The ICJ declares that Jewish settlement is in itself a crime — and not merely that the territory must come under the jurisdiction of another country together with the Jews who live there, as would be expected when, in any other case of a territorial dispute between two states, the court rules in favor of one rather than the other.

In addition, the ICJ pronounced an extremely strange ruling which, once more, is without legal precedent among the international institutions except in the realm of the Palestinian issue. The ICJ ruled that Palestine is a state that came into existence during its own occupation. Simultaneously, Israel was occupying the land of Palestine and a Palestinian state with full privileges was born. There are hundreds of other communities around the world that would also like to enjoy independence or secession.

In conclusion, the ICJ advisory opinion is just that. An advisory opinion. It is not binding under international law and it is incapable of generating rules or legal realities. It actually constitutes a sort of extension to the 2004 opinion against the security barrier, in which the court deemed Jewish settlement illegal. However, the ICJ is now ruling for the first time that the State of Israel is an apartheid state, and it does so without feeling obliged to undertake any discussion of facts or of legal claims. It traverses that matter with amazing brevity but the ruling is there. Since 2004 there have been many citations of the opinion regarding the fence, mainly by enemies of Israel and by other international institutions. It is difficult to quantify the resulting damage because the harm is primarily to reputation. A seal of approval from an international legal institution still carries considerable weight around the world, to our regret, and Israel confronts such institutions from a position imposed on no other country.

Although the State of Israel maintains strong bilateral ties with many other countries and possesses significant strategic assets, its standing in the international arena is notably feeble even in comparison with weak countries bereft of strategic resources. The reason is simple. Israel belongs to no bloc of nations that protect it (and that it protects) in the international establishment. Therefore, until forces realign within the international establishment, Israel may expect many more unfavorable decisions. We must strive to expose the true face of the international establishment, apply means of bilateral pressure in order to minimize damage, and more. But most of all, we must explain ourselves domestically and ensure that our course of action, ethical as it is, meets with understanding and defense. The corrupt international establishment must not pry strategic concessions from Israel, especially not during a multi-front war for the country’s survival.

הפוסט The continuation of war by other means — Exploiting the international courts as a weapon against Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDF’s current military operation to eliminate the remaining terror cells in Shejaiya neighborhood in Gaza City is part of Phase III of the war. This phase involves raids by IDF forces into specific centers and compounds identified by the Israeli intelligence for various reasons, including the presence of hostages, senior Hamas military and governmental officials, field terrorists, and remaining Hamas terror infrastructures that have yet to be addressed or have been reorganized after IDF forces went from the area.

The Shejaiya operation is a raid into the neighborhood after the IDF determined that Hamas had re-established itself there both militarily and governmentally. Additionally, the IDF appears to be planning an operation in Khan Yunis, as it recently called for residents there to evacuate.

Previously, the IDF completed a similar operation in Jabalia, in northern Gaza, where Hamas had reorganized and turned civilian areas into combat zones while restoring terrorist infrastructure above and below ground. This operation lasted about three weeks, during which IDF forces eliminated hundreds of terrorists, destroyed numerous terror infrastructures and combat complexes, and located hundreds of weapons.

It is vital to note that the IDF has conducted operations in these locations multiple times since the war began, including during the extensive ground maneuver phase.

Reality repeatedly shows that Hamas forces return to these and other locations in the Gaza Strip after the IDF withdraws at the end of operations. In a raid, the army gains tactical control and inflicts casualties on the enemy before retreating, unlike an attack where the army conquers and holds the area.

The raid strategy has its advantages, such as deception operations. For instance, the IDF might withdraw from a location to lure back the terrorists, then launch a swift and decisive attack when the terrorists are unprepared. However, raids should be part of a comprehensive attack strategy, where the IDF has the capability to stay and hold strategic areas and focal points in Gaza.

Without a strategic shift, the IDF will continue to revisit and reoperate in the same places. During each raid, some Hamas terrorists manage to escape or hide, only to return after the operation ends, recruit more members, and restore their organizational and infrastructural strength.

Only a military occupation and sustained control by the IDF, especially in Hamas strongholds like Jabalia and Shejaiya, can prevent Hamas from regrouping and lead to relative stability in the area.

Regarding aid entering Gaza, most of it is currently seized by Hamas members who take control of the goods. The solution is for the IDF to oversee aid distribution by establishing a temporary civilian administration, in cooperation with international organizations and regional countries, to ensure the welfare of the civilian population (without Israeli funding, but with Israeli leadership and management).

In any post-war scenario, it is clear that Israel cannot transfer civilian control of the territory to any party until the IDF has established control and militarily defeated Hamas.

The IDF must learn from the developments in northern Gaza to inform its actions in the south. It is crucial to maintain a continuous presence of IDF forces in the Rafah area, along with the Philadelphi Corridor. As the operation in Rafah began, many terrorists fled or hid in the city. So far, the IDF has eliminated only a few hundred terrorists out of an estimated 3,000-strong Hamas brigade. Therefore, it is likely that once the IDF announces the end of the operation and withdraws, most of the terrorists will re-emerge to assert Hamas’s dominance both civilly and militarily.

The IDF has also yet to take decisive action in central Gaza. Even though Israel may soon declare the end of the “intense” phase of the war in Gaza, it is clear that the IDF still faces a significant amount of work. This work, expected to last at least two more years, involves continuing to cleanse Gaza of Hamas and other terrorist organizations, including locating and destroying tunnels, rescuing hostages, and eliminating Hamas leadership.

Therefore, the IDF must prepare for a prolonged stay in Gaza, which includes taking control over civilian mechanisms to prevent Hamas from regaining power or threatening civilians, as well as blocking the return of the Palestinian Authority to control Gaza. This should be done in cooperation with local leadership in Gaza, which should be organized into districts with separate local leaders for each region.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The IDF must achieve a permanent presence in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.