Our tour will focus on Mount Zion and the Old City’s Zion Gate – the battlegrounds where a heroic effort was made by the Jewish forces to prevent the fall of the Jewish Quarter into Jordanian hands in 1948.

Type of tour: walking tour

Estimated duration: 2-3 hours

Difficulty: easy

Starting point: The Begin Heritage Center (Waze: “Begin Heritage Center”). There is free parking in front of the Mount Zion Hotel and blue and white paid parking in the HaTachana compound. While looking over Mount Zion and the Valley of Hinnom, we will learn about the background to the battle for the Old City during the War of Independence.

Those who remained within the Old City walls and those who settled outside of them

After approximately  300 years in which Jerusalem was a non-walled city under Mamluk rule, the Ottomans, who conquered the land in the 16th century,  built a fortified gated wall around the city. One of the entrances through that wall is the Zion Gate, which was built in 1542.

The construction of the wall delimited the built-up area of Jerusalem until the middle of the 19th century, when the “exodus of the walls” began, during which the Mishkenot Sha’ananim neighborhood and its iconic flour mill were built. In the decades that followed, the Jerusalem Jewish, Christian and Muslim populations began to expand outside the city walls, and within a short period the city center moved from the Old City to the New City.

What about those who remained within the walls? The Jews, who until the expansion were the largest demographic among the residents of Jerusalem, became a minority of about ten percent of the residents of the Old City. The Jewish Quarter in the Old City was relatively small, surrounded by a massive Arab population, with not only a deep ravine but also a thick wall separating it from the nearest Jewish neighborhood , Yemin Moshe, which would prove detrimental to its residents in the War of Independence.

On May 13, 1948, following the UN’s vote in favor of the establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel and the termination of the British mandate in Israel, the British took their leave of the Old City, handing over the keys to Rabbi Mordechai Weingarten, who was considered the leader of the Jewish Quarter. At that point, there were approximately 1,700 Jews living in the Quarter, of which 150 of them were the Quarter’s defenders, but possessing very few weapons and little ammunition.

The departure of the British and Operation Shfifone (Viper)

With the departure of the British,  the 150 Jewish fighters within the Old City, launched Operation Shfifon (Viper) to seize the vacated British military posts, take control over strategic areas and demolish houses in the parameter of the Jewish Quarter to create a buffer zone against assault.

Although the force was able to seize the British posts, it could not take over strategic areas mainly due to the lack of sufficient forces. The planned demolition of the parameter houses was scrapped altogether. One – temporary –  achievement the force gained however, was the capture of a church rooftop in the Arminian Quarter, affording the Jewish defenders a line of sight to the Jewish Quarter and the Zion Gate. However, the Armenians requested that the force leave the church and in returned gave their promised the grounds would remain neutral. Within a short while after the Jewish force left the church, the Arabs seized control of it and began sniping at the Jewish Quarter, rendering the now Jewish post at the Zion Gate ineffective as it was in the line of fire, thus the Jewish force retreated. The retreat from the Zion Gate will have a detrimental outcome later in the battle over the Old City.

And then, only two days after the declaration of the State of Israel, on May 16, hostile Arab forces began launching assaults against the Jewish residents of the Old City in the aim of driving them out of the city altogether. By the 17th, a third of the Jewish Quarter had been captured by the Arab forces, and without immediate reinforcements and aid it was soon to fall into Arab hands. In light of the dire situation, The Haganah paramilitary – part of the Palmach force preceding the IDF – decided to break into the Jewish Quarter to reinforce the defending force there. The plan was to break into the Quarter through the Jaffa Gate under cover of a diversion at the Zion Gate to engage the Arab forces. However, as the Zion Gate was held by the Arabs, the Jewish forces first needed to take control of the area immediately outside the gate.

A diversion exceeding expectations: the battle of the Zion Gate

The mission was assigned to Uri Ben Ari, commander of the Palmach Harel Division Fourth breaching Company A. The ensuing events show the  dramatic discrepancy between the orders Commander Ben Ari had received and events on the ground.

Uri Ben Ari recounts:

“At that moment I was interrupted by a knock on the door. Hedva came in and with her a messenger from battalion headquarters. The man handed me a sealed envelope… The envelope contained an order from the battalion: “Company A must depart immediately for the Yemin Moshe neighborhood in the city. It must reach the neighborhood under cover of darkness… The mission: to carry out a diversionary operation on Mount Zion, which would  divert the enemy’s attention from the main effort of the Etzioni Brigade, which will break through the Jaffa Gate to the Old City. The element of surprise is crucial.”

(From Ben Ari’s book “After Me!”, pg. 228)

However, the Palmach refused to play a mere diversional role in the operation, and in light of the situation in the field, Ben Ari decided to change the mission.

“I made my decision. Not a diversion but the conquest of the mountain. It is doable …  a calculated but possible risk. And a little luck wouldn’t hurt either. My eyes met the eyes of the guys with me. Without saying a word, we understood: not a diversion, but full occupation”

(Ibid, pg. 237)

The mission progressed as planned. Toward sunrise the western section of Mount Zion was taken by the Palmach force. It can be said the  mission exceeded expectations, and the last barrier between the Palmach force and the besieged Quarter was the Zion Gate. However, the assault on the Jaffa Gate failed. Uzi Narkis, one of the deputy commanders of the  4th Battalion of the Harel Brigade, later commander of the IDF Central Command, describes the events:

“With a barrage of fire the likes of which Jerusalem had never heard, the battle began. In the morning we found ourselves, almost oblivious to the fact, in control of Mount Zion.”

Before we move on to the next part of the battle story, we will descend from the Begin Heritage Center towards the Sultan’s Pool ravine – Brehat Ha’sultan. We will travel on the road to the other side of the ravine, passing by the Sebil – a gate built on top of the Sultan’s Pool Dam. On our way to Mount Zion we will look left and see the cable car that was used to transport supplies to Mount Zion for 19 years. We will cross the road carefully and reach a tunnel.

This tunnel, similarly to the cable car, was used to secretly transport supplies to Mount Zion. The tunnel has been partially restored and can be walked through. We will enter the tunnel and exit near the Samuel Gobat School on Mount Zion. In the metal roof of the tunnel, the various Hebrew names for the city of Jerusalem were cut out, allowing the sun to shine through and cast the names onto the floor and walls.

On the left of the tunnel there are outdoor stairs, which are called the Beni Marshak staircase, named after the Fourth Company’s culture and education officer, for his contribution in the battle.

On our way to Zion Gate we will look at the Dormition Abby Tower. This is an outstanding illustration of the control and line of fire of those who sat atop the tower.

A near takeover: the capture and the retreat

In light of the failed breakthrough of the Jaffa Gate and the achievements at Zion Gate, it was decided to break into the Jewish Quarter through Zion Gate (this coincided with another attempt to break through Jaffa Gate on May 19, 1948 by the Hagana’s Etzioni Brigade) ). The commander appointed for the force was David Elazar, “Dado”, later to become the IDF’s ninth Chief of Staff. This is how Dado described the events:

“The plan for the break-in was for two combat engineers to approach the gate, place 40 kg of explosives under Zion Gate, which was a large gate; an iron gate. The engineers ran forward and placed the explosives with a delay mechanism – and returned to the force. We waited a bit. Then came the explosion. I shouted: ‘Follow me!’ – and no one got up. It turned out that the soldiers [exhausted from hours of heavy combat] had fallen asleep, and even the huge explosion did not wake them up. I had to go from one to the other and wake them up. Then the first ten soldiers advanced and took control of the gate, immediately followed by the rest of the force, which entered the gate in order to advance along the road to the Jewish Quarter… We accomplished the big task. We reached the Jews in the Old City… 1,700 people were saved… They pounced on us, tore us apart [with joy], kissing us…”

(Dado, “48 Years and 20 Days,” p. 67 of the new edition.)

 

In the same interview Uzi Narkis described the mission:

“At 2:40  after midnight,  the sky turned red from the explosion of the charges placed near Zion Gate. The gate collapsed and an announcement came through the communication system: ‘We’re in.’ Later we heard: ‘We have reached the Jewish Quarter.’ Finally, we heard indistinct noises on the communications. These were the sounds of kisses showered by the defenders of the Quarter on their rescuers.”

 

Meanwhile, an event was unfolding, which would later become the cause for much debate, until this day: the retreat from Zion Gate due to the force’s inability to hold on to the post. After the retreat, and after another failed attempt to break through the Jaffa Gate, the Jordanian Legion returned to lay siege to the Quarter.

According to the Palmach soldiers, the promised reinforcements and replacements for their exhausted men had never arrived, thus there was little choice but to give the order to retreat. Both Dado and Uzi Narkis spoke about the exhaustion of the forces. Narkis claims to have asked for a replacement force, but the force that was sent lacked the training to continue repelling the attacks and hold on to the post, and he ordered the men to join the defenders of the Quarter instead.

Narkis described the events:

“The remainder of the forces retreated and the gate was captured. From that moment until the liberation of the Old City, I went over the events in my head time after time – what could I have done then and did not do? The military considerations were impeccable, but an eternal regret came to be.  The Old City of Jerusalem had fallen.”

While the Palmach was agonizing over the failure, there were those who outright accused them of abandoning the Quarter. The retreat from Zion Gate was strongly criticized by Ezra Yachin, a fighter of another Jewish paramilitary militia, Lehi, who took part in the battle.  Yachin claimed that there was a power struggle between the forces:

“Uzi Narkis announced… that his exhausted men would not stay put, and demanded replacement… He sent a group of young men from the Guard Corps, who were mainly experienced in building fortifications, and did not know how to hold a rifle… Shaltiel [commander of the Palmach’s Etzioni force and commander of the Jerusalem campaign] knew that had he informed our men [from the Lehi] of the need for people to replace the Palmach fighters, we would not have left a single fighter outside the walls. All of us, with our weapons and equipment, would have headed there [to Jerusalem] under any circumstances! This was Jerusalem – the lifelong dream of the Jewish people. And the Etzel organization members, who were eager to reach out and replace the Haganah members in Ramat Rachel, would certainly jump with joy at such a proposal…”

Operation Kedem and the faulty explosives

On May 28, the Jewish Quarter surrendered and its defenders were taken prisoner by the Jordanians. The Quarter will be liberated only after 19 years, during the Six-Day War.

In July 1948, on the eve of the second  hiatus in the War of Independence, one final attempt was made to take over the Old City – Operation Kedem. A force from the Etzioni Brigade was to break through into the old city from the Zion Gate area, a Lehi force was to breach the wall between the new gate and Jaffa Gate, and an Etzel force was to break through the new gate. The Etzioni and Lehi forces were equipped with a special breaching charge prepared especially for the operation. The explosive was called the “cone”, each weighing  150 kg (330 pounds), and was designed to demolish a section of the Old City wall. Despite the difficulties and delays, both cones were detonated. The noise was tremendous, but the cones only breached a small opening in the wall and the forces had to retreat. The explosive agent appeared to be defective or substandard. The fact that both cones failed reinforces this hypothesis. The Etzel force was able to break into the city through the new gate but was ordered to retreat due to concerns that it would be trapped in the Old City

Another planned operation, named Operation Explosive Device, was not executed due to the signing of an “honest ceasefire agreement” between commander of the Haganah forces in Jerusalem and liaison for negotiations with the Arabs, Moshe Dayan and the commander of the Jordanian forces in Jerusalem, Abdullah a-Tal.

Back to our tour: after hearing the story of the capture and retreat, and before entering through Zion Gate, we will turn west (left) and walk a few dozen meters to where the breaching attempt was made in the wall. The site cannot be missed as a large concrete block and a small explanatory sign are telltale signs of the exact location.

We will then turn back and enter the old city through the Zion Gate.

From Zion Gate, we will turn right at the edge of the Armenian Quarter  and make our way to the Jewish Quarter. We will cross the road and reach Chabad Street (which demarcates the border between the Jewish and Armenian Quarters). We will tell the story of the Jews besieged in the Old Quarter another time.

The lessons of the Mount Zion capture and the loss of the Jewish Quarter

In terms of the values that led to the successes, we see commitment to the mission, even in the face of abject exhaustion. This was coupled with creative thinking and the leveraging of gains, when one arena proves to be more instrumental than another, and the battle shifts from a diversion to a successful capture.

What about the failures? It seems that better coordination among the Jewish assault forces and better collaboration among the various forces in the battlefield would have yielded better results.

Together we shall prevail is more than just a saying – it is an edict of the battle field.

הפוסט “An Eternal Regret Had Come to Be”: A Tour Retracing the Mount Zion Battle in the War of Independence הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Today’s tour follows one of the biggest tragedies of Israel’s War of Independence – the fall of the La’med Hei Platoon. For decades, this sad story has been stoking heated debates regarding the necessity, the preparation, the chosen route, the execution and the selection of the platoon members of this operation.

Type of tour: by car

Estimated duration: 4-5 hours

Difficulty: easy

Starting point: Tel Beit Shemesh (Waze: Tel Beit Shemesh)

Gush Etzion: a thorn in the flesh of the Arabs

In order to understand the battle legacy of the La’med Hei Platoon,  one must first understand the importance of the Gush Etzion settlement bloc in the War of Independence. Gush Etzion lies south of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and is situated on the main road to Hebron. This meant that the Jews could launch attacks on  Arab Jerusalem from the south, and disrupt the ability of the Arab population to travel between Hebron and Jerusalem. The settlement bloc consisted of four communities: Kfar Etzion, Massuot Yitzhak, Ein Tzurim and Revadim. Due to its strategic location, the bloc was a thorn in the flesh of the Arab enemy, and the Arabs were determined to remove it, at any cost.

Gush Etzion’s main vulnerability was its distance from any military aid. The nearest Jewish military force was  located in Jerusalem, and the next outpost was in Kiryat Anavim, to the west of the city. Apart from Jerusalem, the closest Jewish settlement was the Hartuv township. Remember this name as it is to play a crucial role in our story.

As part of their scheme to eliminate the hindrance of the Jewish bloc, Arab forces lay siege to  the settlements, which necessitated the transfer of supplies from Jerusalem. The supply convoys to the bloc were routinely attacked by the hostile Arab forces, and the convoy leaders suffered heavy losses. Aside from scant isolated victories, the bloc’s situation became dire. It was clear that without the help of British escort forces, convoys could not make it through to the Jewish settlements of Gush Etzion. The British, however,  were not enthusiastic, to say the least, about escorting the convoys as they were in the midst of withdrawing  from then Palestine.

Hence, at a certain point, a decision was made to aid Gush Etzion by sending reinforcement to boost the bloc’s defense, and to bring to it as much ammunition and equipment as the soldiers could carry on their backs. The mission was assigned to 40 select fighters, commanded by Danny Mass. The platoon, named the La’med Hei referring in numerology to its 40 members,  was equipped with a large quantity of weapons and medical supplies, but did not carry any communications, which would prove to be detrimental.

From 40 to 35 – trouble at the onset

Departure was set to  January 14,1948,  eight  o’clock in the evening. However, after various delays, and the realization that the force had only 38 rifles, departure was delayed to 11 o’clock at night, minus two soldiers, who were dropped from the mission due to the shortage of guns.

The 38 soldiers were driven by bus to the point of departure, however, a short distance from the base, found that the road was blocked with boulders. They decided to disembark and set out on foot at an earlier than planned point in the Refaim ravine. After a long hike, the force fell into discord regarding the right route they should be taking. At about three o’clock in the morning, shots were heard and the force was concerned that it was discovered and decided to head back. At five o’clock in the morning  the force arrived back at the point of departure in Beit Karem in Jerusalem.

As protocol would not allow to return to the original rout the day later, and as the shots heard the previous night caused concerns that they would walk into an ambush, it was decided to use an alternative route. Again there were disputes on the best route and eventually it was decided to depart by foot from the Jewish township of Hartuv, which is relatively close to Gush Etzion.

The route chosen led from Hartuv westward, circumventing the British police station in Artouf (today Beit Shemesh), and the Arab village of Dir Aban (today Moshav Machsiya), and then head south through what is today Moshav Yishi, and through the ravines of Biet Natif and Surif, and finally climb to Gush Etzion. The length of the entire route was only 26 kilometers, with a 600-meter climb, The 40 soldiers departed via bus to Hartuv but again, a shortage of guns left two behind (Yaakov Zarhi and Yigal Butrimovich).

Departure was scheduled for seven o’clock in the evening, with the aim of reaching Gush Etzion around three o’clock in the morning. But as expected, dinner was delayed, preparations were prolonged, and only on Thursday, January 15, at eleven o’clock at night, the platoon set out.

Commander of the Hartuv force, Rafael Ben Aroya, suggested that Danny Mass postpone the departure to the next day because he thought they would not be able to reach Gush Etzion during the nighttime under the cover of dark but in broad daylight. Danny Mass determined that it was possible to cross the territory of both hostile villages of Surif-Jaba under cover of the dark. After that, they would only have five kilometers left on a strenuous ascent uphill, but they will already be in a topographically advantageous territory Arab population and near the Jewish settlement bloc.

Thus the platoon set out, circumventing  Tel Beit Shemesh from the west. One of the fighters, Israel Gafni, sprained his ankle at the Einot Dekalim spring. The force continued east to the area which today is an abandoned settlement. The injured soldier slowed the force, and Danny Mass decided to send him back to Hartuv along with two other soldiers (Uri Gavish and Moshe Hazan) to assist him. They went straight back to Hartuv.

Hence, of the original 38 who set off on the mission, 35 were left to traverse difficult terrain, to say the least, with a large quantity of heavy equipment, and at least another five hours of hiking. Yisral, Ori, and Mosheh are the last Jews who saw their comrades of the La’med Hei platoon alive.

From this point until the discovery of the bodies of the 35 soldiers, it is not known exactly what had occurred.

First stop of the tour: Beit Shemesh observation deck

It would have been fitting to begin the tour at the site of the ruins of Hartuv, however,  unfortunately the site is derelict  with no proper access. We will try to see what we can from the nearby road. Coming from the direction of Sha’ar Hagai, a few dozen meters after the Hartuv interchange, right in front of the Hartuve greenhouses, looking to the right offers a glimpse at  the ruins of buildings and a blue sign of the Council for Conservation of Sites. These are the remains of the Hartuv settlement.

Passing the ruins of Hartuv, we can see on the left, between the trees, the building that housed the Artouf police station, which is now the Beit Shemesh police station.

We will pass the Beit Shemesh junction and reach Tel Beit Shemesh. The site has a fascinating biblical history, including the story of the return of the Ark of the Covenant from the Philistines back to Israel. We will visit the observation deck.

At the top of the hillock there is a modern concrete observation deck. From  here, looking north, we can see the Sorek stream flowing below. The Beit Shemesh–Tel Aviv railway is visible as well. Across the tracks adjacent to the road is a grove partially hiding the remnants of Hartuv, the place from which the La’med Hei platoon embarked on its mission. They circled the hillock, on which we are standing, and walked towards Moshav Yeshay, which we can see if we turn our gaze southward. About two kilometers south is the Ein Dekalim spring, where platoon member Yisrael Gafni sprained his ankle.

Second stop: the La’med Hei monument

We will continue driving until we reach the Ella junction, where we turn left onto Route 375 and drive until the entrance to “Netiv Ha-La’med Hei”. Just before the entrance, turn right to the Netiv Ha-La’med Hei monument (write in Waze “Ha-La’med Hei Memorial”).

Kibbutz Netiv Ha-La’med Hei, established in 1949, commemorates the soldiers of the La’med Hei platoon.

The platoon seemed to have navigated well, but the delays proved to be detrimental to them. It was towards six o’clock in the morning, on Friday, 16.1.1948, when the sun was already shining, that the platoon, overburdened with heavy equipment, found itself caught between the two Arab hostile villages of Surif and Jaba’, in a vulnerable position – the worst possible scenario, which led to their discovery in a particularly exposed position.

The account of the discovery of the force and the ensuing battle is based on Arab sources, information from the Haganah’s intel unit,  and most of all on the testimony of the British commander of the Hebron police at the time, Hamish Dugan.

As mentioned above, apparently around six in the morning the force patrols were discovered. The version that was publicized sever days after the battle was that is that the patrol encountered an old Arab shepherd and spared his life. The Arab fled, alerting the people of Surif, and thus the battle began. However, Testimonies from Arab sources indicate that the patrol in fact encountered women at the river drawing water or collecting fire wood, and they were the ones who alerted the villagers. The patrol reported the encounter to Danny Mass, who decided to forge forward at a quicker pace before the villagers issued a  “Fazah” (an alert conveyed by shouts from one post to another throughout the village). He believed that the more territory the platoon covered, the better its topographical situation would be, and it is possible that if they had been close enough to the Gush Etzion settlements, they would have received help from there.

News of the Jews roaming the area reached Ibrahim Abu Dia, who was the deputy of Abd Qader al-Husseini’s, one of the leaders of the Arab forces in the Jerusalem area. Abu Dia was in Surif as part of  commanders’ training for the “Holy Jihad” militia. Meaning that the platoon faced skilled fighters with training and experience, and not just an angry mob of villagers.

Abu Dia sent several fighters to engage the La’med Hei force with suppressive fire, but between eight and eleven o’clock in the morning, the platoon advanced to the area of today’s Jaba’ checkpoint, from where they descended northward to Nahal Etziona, in order to disengage with the attacking force. The first phase of the battle had ended, but in the meantime the Arabs had seized command of the hills north of the possible retreat route. It is unclear why the force did not split up or wait until the cover of dark to extricate themselves. Some speculate that the fighters did not know they were surrounded by thousands of Arabs.

Before moving on to the next point on the tour, we will visit the monument itself, which has an audio guide.

The monument is built of 35 concrete pillars representing the 35 fallen, and has an unfinished path, symbolizing the incomplete mission, and a stone wall with the names of the fallen.

Standing at the monument, we will look south (to the road from which we came) and look east (to the left), where beyond the hills is the village of Surif. Right below us,  we can see the route the fighters took on their way to the village. This view from the observation deck clearly illustrates the topographical disadvantage in which the platoon found itself against the Arab forces.

Third  stop: The La’med Hei lookout

From the monument we return to Route 375, turn left and at the Etziona junction turn right to Route 367 on which we will drive 6 km to the La’med Hei lookout (Waze: “La’med-Hei Lookout”).

We return to the plight of the platoon, who managed to evade their attackers in the first part of the battle. At around 14:30 in the afternoon, commander Danny Mass decided to climb Hill 573 (later known as “Battle Hill”). Until today, it is not known why Danny Mass decided to ascend this hill; Perhaps he hoped to break through the siege and go northward or improve the platoon’s position to continue on the route to Gush Etzion. While climbing,  the force was sighted by the Arabs, who were already in control the surrounding elevation points, and an exchange of fire began. At that point, several fighters were already wounded while climbing the hill.

When the platoon reached the top of the hill, the fighters discovered that they were surrounded by an angry Arab mob. The Arabs fired at them from several surrounding points, but mostly from Hill 603, which dominated the assault on Battle Hill. The Arabs charged wave after wave, but were repelled again and again – until the platoon ran out of ammunition. According to testimonies, the last fighter was killed before dark, around five o’clock, when he threw his last grenade at the attacking Arabs.

As mentioned, the platoon set out on its mission without taking communications, thus,  it was unknown what was happening to the platoon in real time. The Gush Etzion communities knew that the platoon was on its way, but when it didn’t arrive in the morning, they sent a message alerting there was a problem. At around one o’clock in the afternoon, members of Massu’ot Yitzhak moshav heard shots coming from the direction of Zurif, but did not attribute the shots to the platoon. Light planes patrolled the area in an attempt to find the platoon, but found nothing (it is likely that the platoon members were hiding in a cave or crevice at the time and were not seen by the pilots). Patrol forces were dispatched from Gush Etzion in an attempt to find the platoon – but to no avail.

In the afternoon of Friday, 16.1.1948, rumors reached the Hebron police that there was “trouble” in Zurif. Station commander Hamish Dugan went out to the area, but found nothing out of the ordinary. The next day (17.1) he went to the Battle Hill, where he found the bodies of the Jewish force. News of the discovery of the bodies were passed on to the Haganah headquarters in Jerusalem. Dogen began collecting the bodies. In the evening he left, after the Arabs had promised not to desecrate the bodies. According to his own account, he promised 500 mils for each body.

On Sunday (18.1), Dogan returned to the village, where he learned of a “Jewish attack” on Zurif; These were two British soldiers whom the villagers considered Jews, and were about to kill them. Dogan saved the British soldiers from death. Rumors of the “Jewish attack” spread quickly, and the body collectors broke their promise, mutilating the bodies.

The bodies were transferred to Kfar Etzion. The next day, several of the deceased’s parents arrived to identify their loved ones, and Rabbi Aryeh Levin prepared the bodies for burial in Kfar Etzion.

In October-November 1949, Rabbi Shlomo Goren piloted an operation to retrieve Jewish war casualties buried in enemy territory. 323 fallen soldiers were exhumed and buried in a mass ceremony on Mount Herzl on 17.11.1949. Among those were soldiers of the La’med Hei platoon.

Back to our tour:  from the lookout we will view the battle hill, and understand the topographical disadvantage the platoon was trapped in, surrounded by enemy forces positioned on the surrounding hills.

Now is the time to listen to Haim Guri read the poem he wrote the day after the battle: “Here Lie Our Bodies” (starting at minute 04:11)

The poem:

Fourth stop: the lone oak tree

We’ll set out in the car and turn left onto Gush Etzion, towards the lone Oak (Waze “The lone oak”). This single oak is an ancient tree that was at the center of the old Gush Etzion community bloc. After the fall of the bloc, the people of Gush Etzion used to stand at Mevo Beitar or Nes Harim and look out onto the oak. It signaled their longing to return to Gush Etzion. After the Six-Day War, the settlement of Alon Shvut was founded, its name roughly translating to “The return to the oak” and the tree being the symbol of the settlement. At the site of the oak, we can see the monument that was erected in memory of the fallen of Gush Etzion.

The large plaza near the oak is where we end our tour in the footsteps of the heroes of the La’med Hei platoon.

At the site of the lone oak we will discuss the army values at the core of the IDF,  which were present in the story of the La’med Hei platoon:

• Duty and courage: Commander Danny Mass showed unwavering commitment to the mission. Even when the departure was delayed by a day or hours – he still set out, placing the mission above all. Danny Mass had every reason in the world to abort the mission, but he was committed to delivering the critical supplies and equipment so desperately needed by the besieged people of Gush Etzion.

• Initiative and response, unaccepting defeat: more than a few obstacles stood in the way of Commander Mass and his platoon – from the shortage in weapons for his men, faulty transportation, an injured soldier, navigation difficulties, and retreat under fire from an exposed position. Commander Mass did not remain passive, but led the force through every obstacle, took initiative and came up with solutions on the go. Even when the force was discovered by the enemy he swiftly responded, commanding a repel and retreat battle to lead his men to a better position in a challenging terrain.

הפוסט Here Lie our Bodies: A Tour in The Footsteps of the La’med Hei Platoon הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The present tour differs from the rest of the tours in our series in that most of the tours in the Heritage Tour series are associated with a single battle. This tour will visit three battle sites that together comprise the tale of one battle to halt the Egyptian enemy in its invasion of the newly founded State of Israel, with the aim of ensuring that no Jewish state will ever come to be.

Our tour will visit the battle sites of Ad Halom Bridge, Kibbutz Yad Mordechai and Kibbutz Nitzanim. This triple-site tour will give us an in-depth understanding of the southern front of Israel’s Independence War, that prevented the Egyptian army from arriving at the outskirts of the central metropolis of Tel-Aviv.

Although seven decades have passed since that battle, we’ll see that its narrative is still relevant to modern Israel, reminding us of the importance of the settlement of the country as a crucial component of the country’s defense, and how winning a war could save hostages.

Type of tour: walking + car

Estimated duration: 4-6 hours

Difficulty: easy

Departure point: The Ad Halom bridge

A state is born: buying precious time in the midst of a war

With the termination of the British mandate in Israel, Egypt wasted no time in invading the newly founded state, aiming for the bustling metropolis of Tel-Aviv at its heart, to forcibly prevent the establishment of a Jewish State in the Land of Israel.

Facing a large trained Egyptian army was only a small untrained Jewish force.

For the leaders of the Jewish settlement – now heads of the newly-born State – it was clear that the young State needs time to find its bearings, and to mobilize a proper army to withstand the Egyptian assault. Being a precious commodity during wartime, one way to buy that time was by means of what is called in military lingo  a holding action.

The first battle: the demolition of the Ad Halom bridge

(Waze: Ad Halom bridge – unnamed rode, not to be confused with a street in Ashdod with the same name)

We’ll park in the site’s parking lot and head north to the obelisk – a tall stone column, which commemorates the importance of the site not only to Israel but also to the Egyptians, with the names of four fallen Egyptian soldiers inscribed in Hebrew, Arabic, English and Hieroglyphics on the obelisk. The monument was erected in the wake of the peace accord between Israel and Egypt, which led to the erection of two monuments for Egyptians soldiers on Israeli soil in return for the preservation of two monuments for Israeli soldiers in Egypt’s Sinai, dating from when Israel controlled the area.

From the obelisk we will continue to the bend in the road and walk down the path that forks to the right, leading to the observation deck and the British pillbox – a round concrete guard post from the Mandatory Palestine era. Further on we can see the Givati Brigade monument.

From the monument we continue walking for a short distance to the restored Ad Halom bridge. The bridge was built by the Ottomans in the late 19^th century, on the original structure dating from the preceding Mamluk Empire. In 1948, the bridge was a necessary crossing for those traveling from Gaza to Tal-Aviv, thus with the objective of preventing the Egyptian forces from reaching Tel-Aviv, the Givati Brigade demolitionists set out on May 12, 1948 to blow up the bridge.

The story of the demolition is a perfect “Murphy’s Law” tale, with everything possible going wrong. Company commander from the Givati Brigade 53d Battalion, Shimon Margolin was tapped to run the operation. Margolin recounts that the plan was to make it to the site with the explosives carried by two pack mules, and blow up the bridge at 2:00 in the morning. But Margolin realized that he lacked sufficient arms for the allotted force, hence he had to request guns from the surrounding settlements. In addition, the soldiers appointed to the task force were mostly administrative personnel who lacked proper warfare training.

A short while after departure, the mules stalled and would not budge, and Margolin’s men were forced to carry the heavy load themselves. Once at the bridge, the force planted the explosives on the piers (the bottom supports) and detonated the charges, causing a massive explosion, but not the collapse of the bridge. A quick examination revealed that one of the charges failed. Margolin and one of the demolitionists had to backtrack to the bridge and repeat the entire process, finally succeeding, and the bridge came crashing down.

Margolin and his force exhibited unwavering commitment to the mission and to its success, despite the many obstacles. Mosheh Harpaz describes in his website and book “The Givati Brigade in The War of Independence”: “An order is an order, and for Margolin and his soldiers, it was only natural to place the mission above all. Margolin decided to proceed with the mission, come what may”.

The destroyed bridge was what the Egyptian force found when they finally arrived at the site two weeks later, on May 29. While the force deliberated how to cross the Lakhish river, it was attacked by a quartet of Israeli Air Force planes. One of the planes was piloted by no other than Ezer Weitzman, later to become Israel’s seventh President. The airstrike caused only limited damage to the enemy force but its psychological effect was immense: it was the moment that the Egyptians realized that the young state had a functional air force.

The following day, two Givati companies launched an offensive against the Egyptian force situated near the bridge. Again, they were able to inflict relatively little damage. However, the assault put the enemy force into a state of defense. Several days later, Operation Pleshet was launched to drive the Egyptians out of the area. This operation failed – the area would be liberated only in Operation Yoav in the following October- but it established Egypt’s defensive doctrine in its wars against Israel. This was the northernmost point in Israel that the Egyptians had been able to reach ever since, thus the bridge’s name – Ad Halom, i.e. “Until here”.

Why have the Egyptians stalled? To understand this, we will proceed with our tour.

Yad Mordechai: Five Precious Days

(Waze: “Battle reconstruction site”)

From the parking lot we head to the entrance to the site. After paying the admission fee we will climb the battle hill. We can roam the communication trenches and view the weapons on display there. We will then climb the observation area and look out on to the battle field.

Yad Mordechai is a kibbutz south of Ashkelon, founded in December 1943. The kibbutz was named after the heroic Mordechai Anielewicz, leader of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in the Holocaust, who was presumably killed by the Nazis only weeks before the kibbutz was founded. The kibbutz’s vantage point allowed it to control and fire at the Gaza-Majdal (today’s Ashkelon) road as well as the adjacent railway. The Egyptian army was hesitant to forge northward with a Jewish force positioned at its rear, controlling the main route to the north.

Thus, on May 19, 1948, at 7:15 in the morning, the Egyptians launched an assault on Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, demanding an hour into the assault the surrender of the kibbutz defending force. The defenders rejected the Egyptian’s demand and they renewed the assault, storming the parameter fence three times at noon. The defenders allowed the enemy to approach then fired at it from close range. Over the next several days, they doggedly repelled the Egyptians’ repeated attempts to take the hill on which the kibbutz resided.

On Thursday, the Egyptians launched a new offensive – this time launching a combined effort of ground troops and artillery, which delivered a particularly heavy barrage followed by an attack of more than a thousand Egyptian troops under the cover of the artillery fire. The Egyptian tanks stormed the kibbutz and one of them, under the cover of the noise and smoke, was able to breach the hill parameter and reach stronghold 1. For an unknown reason the tank stopped dead in its tracks but the supporting infantry troops infiltrated the communications trench; however, the defenders waged a determined struggle and were able to repel the enemy.

At the end of the fight, it was clear that the besieged kibbutz members are in a dire condition. What little heavy weapons the defending force had were hit, the mine fields around the kibbutz were destroyed by the enemy artillery and the number of wounded was growing at a steady pace. The commanders realized that without significant reinforcement of fighters and weapons, they would not survive even another day of fighting, and announced that if reinforcement would not arrive by three o’clock that afternoon, they would give the command to retreat. The force was ordered not to retreat, nonetheless, at a quarter after three, the force began its retreat.

In their retreat, most of the Jewish force, carrying the wounded that were not evacuated earlier, was unable to make it through the enemy line, and when the force regrouped, it had discovered that three of them were missing: Yitzhak Rubenstein and Livkeh Shefer along with the wounded soldier they had carried on a stretcher – Benjamine Eisenberg, were unaccounted for. Several years later it was discovered that the three were captured by the Egyptians and slaughtered. In 2018, the body of Shefer was discovered in a mass grave in Kibbutz Nitzanin and only in 2022, Rubenstein’s and Eisenberg’s bodies were finally identified among the bodies found in the grave.

The story of the Yad Mordechai battle, where a small Jewish force with little arms, cut off from support, stood its ground in the face of an entire trained and skilled Egyptian division with heavy artillery, had since become in Israel’s military history an icon of bravery, commitment to the mission, and the sacrifice of life for the protection of Israel.

In 1968, the kibbutz founded the “From Holocaust to Revival” (Me’suah Le’tkuma) museum, with exhibitions on the Holocaust and the historical events that led to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, as well as a monument commemorating Mordechai Anielewicz. In the museum are a diagram of the battle between the Egyptian army and the kibbutz we’ve visited earlier. Outside the museum building is the water tower with holes caused by the Egyptian artillery . The tower had since become an icon identified with the kibbutz.

Nitzanim: The battle page of Abba Kovner

(Waze: Old Nitzanim site)

From the parking lot of the old Nitzanim site, we will walk through an archway carrying the name of Yitzhak Pundak – the commander of the southern front in the War of Independence – and reach a structure known as the “Castle”, which we will view for a few moments before circling around it and turning right to the monument for the fighting Hebrew women, where we will hear the tale of the battle.

Back to the battle: after wasting precious time at the battle of Yad Mordechai, the Egyptian force continued northward, without attempting to seize the Jewish settlements on the way, which had now become besieged and isolated. On May 28, the Egyptians passed by kibbutz Nitzanim and were halted at the demolished  Ad Halom bridge.

Following the failure of Operation Pleshet, aiming to contain the Egyptian expeditionary force on the southern coastal plain, the Egyptians decided to clear their rear of Jewish forces and solidify their control of the area. Their first objective was Kibbutz Nitzanim, which was a hindrance to their campaign.

On the night between June 6-7, the Egyptians began raining a barrage of mortar shells on the kibbutz. The attack tore down the phone lines and took out some of the kibbutz’s machine guns, and communications with the brigade headquarters became intermittent at best. The first attack came in the morning, but was repelled by the Jewish force. At 11 in the morning, another attack by the Egyptian force seized the water-tower hill, and the defending force retreated to the “Castle”. At four in the afternoon, the kibbutz commander, Avraham Schwartzstein decided that the force can no longer withstand the enemy and commanded his fighters to surrender. Schwartzstein and his radio operator, Mira Ben Ari, came out to the Egyptians, waving a white cloth in surrender. Upon reaching the enemy one of the Egyptian officers drew a pistol and shot Schwartzstein. Mira Ben Ari immediately shot the officer and was killed on the spot. The rest of the Jewish defense force surrendered and were not shot.

The battle of Nitzanim was over.

The battle of Nitzanim in itself is not unusual among the Independence War campaigns: the Egyptian enemy attacked Jewish settlements and townships, with the Jewish forces withstanding these attacks with valor until the arrival of reinforcement or surrender. However, the “Battle Page” affair in the wake of the Nitzanim battle caused a heated debate that still reverberates till this day.

The poet and author, Abba Kovner, formerly a leader of the Vilna Ghetto and a partisan in the Holocaust, served as the Givati Brigade cultural officer. Following the Nitzanim battle he published the “Battle Page” – an account of that battle’s events – in which he wrote:

“In Nitzanim [battle], the enemy might learn – for the first time – a grave and surprising fact: the Jewish settlement’s defense line can be breached, suppressed and taken prisoner within hours”. Abba Kovner resolutely stated that it is better to fall in the trenches of one’s home than surrender to a murderous invader; “to surrender – as long as the body lives and the last bullet breaths in its chamber – is shameful; walking towards the enemy capture – dishonor and death!”

Granted, Kovner stated at the opening of his essay that he lacked a credible account of the battle and specific details thereof, and assured that he does not aim to raise allegations against anyone, yet points an accusing finger at the people of Nitzanim who chose surrender over death. The Battle Page was widely circulated and created the wrong impression that the defenders of Nitzanim did not give their all in the battle. His words tainted the memory of the battle’s dead and the prisoners who returned from the Egyptian captivity received a cold and hostile welcome.  The people of Nitzanim were furious that their kibbutz received special treatment in the form of the Battle Page that flung dirt at them for surrendering. Much of the anger was aimed at the commander of the 53d battalion and commander of the Nitzanim sector, Yitzhak Pundak, who, they claimed, failed to send them the critical reinforcements during the battle.

In response to these remarks, IDF Chief of Staff Yaakov Dori addressed a letter to the kibbutz members, saying:

“The difficult circumstances of the Nitzanim members’ struggle, the bitter isolation of the fighters, the lack of contact with the home front, the shortage of ammunition and food, and on top of it all – the many losses in that defense force, are faithful testimony to a desperate battle such that honors all those who fought there until the last bullet.”

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion also wrote about the people of Nitzanim:

“No lofty tale fails. Even if at that moment it does not bring the desired results. The fearless stance of defenders who risk their lives and die for their calling, is in itself a supreme human victory. And together with the whole Nation of Israel, I bow my head before the heroes of Nitzanim who fell. Their death was not in vain.”

As oppose to the large publicity of Abba Kovner’s Battle Page, these letters of the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister were private and were not published for years to come, and the people of Nitzanim struggled for many years with that label of traitors.

Thirty-five years after the Battle of Nitzanim, in 1983, Yitzhak Pundak and Shimon Avidan (who was the Givati brigade commander during the War of Independence and signed Abba Kovner’s Battle Page) visited Kibbutz Nitzanim. In a discussion with kibbutz members, some of whom fought in the battle, Avidan refused to apologize for publishing the Battle Page, claiming that its purpose was to prevent a decline of the morale in Israel’s public. However, he agreed that the headline should have been: “The Fall of Nitzanim – Givati’s Failure.” Pundak fostered a warm relationship with the kibbutz, and in 1991 (at the age of 73) wrote to the kibbutz members asking their permission to be buried in the kibbutz cemetery:

“I am approaching the age of eighty, and I thought to myself that if I did not succeed in properly protecting Nitzanim when it was fighting for its life, isolated and forgotten from the hearts of all, it is only fitting that at least when my day comes, I should be at the side of soldiers who fell in the cruel battle.”

In addition, at the age of 91 Pundak donated an archway to the old Nitzanim site in memory of his wife. In 2017, Yitzhak Pundak passed away at the age of 104. He was laid to rest in the cemetery of Nitzanim near his wife and his fallen soldiers.

This visit in Kibbutz Nitzanim was an opportunity to address the heavy responsibility resting on the shoulders of the commander, who must determine when the achievement of a mission is necessary even at a great cost, or not, with the underlying principle for such a decision being that the commitment to a mission is not an end onto itself, but a means to achieving an objective and completing a mission.

Three battles – crucial contribution

The three battles made a decisive contribution to determining the nature of the campaign on the southern front during the War of Independence. The three battles gave the Jewish community the vital time to equip, arm and mobilize. During the battles, regardless of their outcome, the fighters showed commitment to the mission, a drive for victory, the ability to face danger and the willingness to sacrifice their lives for the newborn homeland.

Moreover, the battles underscored the importance of the Jewish settlement enterprise in the Land of Israel – they were the key to delaying and halting the Egyptian army, and had it not been for the settlements, which fiercely defended the borders, the War of Independence could have ended very differently.

The Egyptian army planned to capture Yad Mordechai within just three hours, but found itself stalled for five days. During this time, a shipment of Messerschmitt planes arrived in Israel, which were sent forthwith to attack the stalled Egyptian forces as they reached the Ad Halom bridge. At the same time, the battle of Nitzanim delayed many Egyptian forces in the kibbutz area – forces that were planning to break forward towards Tel Aviv and prevent the implementation of the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel.

At the end of the war, the State of Israel was able to leverage its victory and had all of its soldiers and civilians who had been captured by Egypt return in exchange for the release of prisoners from the Arab armies in Israeli hands.

הפוסט When Israel bought Time: The Battles of Ad Halom, Yad Mordechai and Nitzanim הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

How is a heritage site born? It seems like this requires a combination of a strategic location, a unique story of heroism, and the time that passes until these are fixed in the national consciousness as stories worthy of commemoration. True, Israel has no shortage of battle lore sites. From the Bible, 1948 to the present day, the Land of Israel is replete with tales of heroism, but the events of October 7 seem to be in a class of their own. Such a vast collection of hair-raising, heart-wrenching heroism stories, that have made their way into the national psyche in such a short timespan – this is all something we have never known.

This time we are devoting our section to a battle lore tour of the Gaza Envelope, to come close to what happened that fateful Sabbath. We will visit the Black Arrow memorial, a long-time memorial site that on October 7 became a battleground in itself. From there we will continue to the Cars Memorial near Moshav Tekuma and to the commemorative installations at the site of the Nova festival.

Before we get going – two important points: first of all find out whether the sites are open to the public, since from time to time the IDF might declare them off-limits as closed military zones while the war in Gaza continues. Second, do not enter the Envelope settlements – it’s fascinating, it’s important, but the local residents themselves need peace and quiet. We are sure that proper memorials will be built in future, at which we will be able to pay our respects and commemorate, without encroaching on the local population’s privacy.

Tour mode: by car and on foot.

Tour duration: 1-2 hours.

Black Arrow Memorial: “If we had had such a unit in 1948, we would have taken Jerusalem”

The Black Arrow memorial is accessed near the Sha’ar HaNegev Junction, south of Sderot, via Road Highway 34 or Road 232. The memorial commemorates the battle lore of the paratrooper unit during the Reprisals Period against the Fedayeen infiltrators from Egypt between 1953-1956 before the Sinai Campaign. These reprisals shaped the IDF combat doctrine to this day, including its values: dedication to the mission, never abandoning casualties on the battlefield and camaraderie.

The memorial is named after Operation Black Arrow, which took place on the night of February 28, 1955 in the Gaza Strip, which at the time was under Egyptian rule. The background for this operation was a series of attacks carried out by the Fedayeen infiltrators, including the murder of an Israeli citizen in Rehovot, 45 km inland from the border. The goal was to enter the Strip, destroy an Egyptian army base near Gaza City and to blow up the water works and train station there. The mission was assigned to a paratrooper force commanded by Ariel Sharon. Taking part were commandos who would go on to become part of the main command backbone of the IDF. They included Mota Gur and David Elazar (Dado) who both went on to be Chiefs of General Staff, Shimon Kahaner (Katcha), Danny Matt, Uzi Eilam, Tibi Shapira, Levy Hofesh and Moshe Yanuka.

The mission experienced several mishaps. The commandos had to overcome several problems – the advance intelligence, identifying the base, the withdrawal and the medevac (shortage of stretchers, difficulties coordinating with ambulances after crossing the border) – and our casualty count was high: 8 dead and 13 injured. However, thanks to their boundless resiliency, their heroism and determination, the commandos succeeded in accomplishing their mission despite all the obstacles: the waterworks were destroyed, the base was occupied and damaged and the Egyptians lost 37 soldiers. Three of the commandos were awarded the Medal of Valor: Se’adia Elkayam, posthumously, who was killed in action, and Aharon Davidi and Uzi Eilam. Ben-Gurion praised the paratroopers after the operation: “If we had had such a unit in 1948, we would have completed the battle for Jerusalem and we would have taken Latroun.”

The sight is an observation point and lookout over Gaza City and the Gaza Strip, where most of the operations took place. At the entrance to the site plaza is a small statue of two figures, representing the camaraderie. Around the site are four audio stations that tell the story of the operations. There is also a map of the battles. The memorial presents 11 select operations out of the 70 that were carried out over those years. At the center of the site are plaques with the names of the fallen, with the following verse inscribed above them: “And stay ye not, but pursue after your enemies, and smite the hindmost of them” (Joshua 10, 19).

At the site inauguration ceremony in March 2003, Ariel Sharon quoted Moshe Dayan, who said in 1955:

“We cannot protect every water pipe against sabotage or every tree from being uprooted. We cannot prevent workers from being murdered in the orchard or families from being slaughtered as they sleep, but we can exact a heavy price for our blood, such a heavy price that it will cease to be worth the while of the Arab populace, the Arab army and the Arab governments to pay it.”

On October 7 this site once again became a battlefield. The Hamas Nukhba Forces, which consisted of some 20 vehicles and hundreds of terrorists, converged at the site and prepared for an organized assault on Kibbutz Kissufim and maybe also on Kibbutz Nir-Am. When the Yamam (National Counter-Terrorism Unit) and Shabak (Israel Security Agency) squads arrived on the scene, the terrorists spotted one of the vehicles and critically injured the four Shabak agents who were in it. The reinforcements that arrived included soldiers from Duvdevan and Maglan units, and the Air Force was also put to use by Shabak. The reinforcements managed, within a short space of time, to neutralize 40 terrorists, as can be seen in the video released on October 8 in which Major-General (Res.) David Zinni showed the results of their counterattack. Following fierce fighting, which lasted several hours, some 200 terrorists were killed and the rest fled back to Gaza. A document was found on the body of one of the terrorists, which contained the operation plan for the “Kibbutz Mefalsim Mission”.

The Vehicles Memorial: The Inanimate Objects that Tell the October 7 Story

From the site we continue south and turn left at Sa’ad Junction onto Road 25, where we will come to the Vehicles Memorial near Moshav Tekuma. When one experiences a large-scale catastrophe, one cannot imagine or comprehend the numbers. The Vehicles Memorial, which at first sight seems like an enormous junk yard, manages to convey the scale of the disaster.

The memorial is actually a concentration of the vehicles that were destroyed on that Black Sabbath. They are stacked one on top of and beside the other. Burnt, riddled with bullet holes, squashed. Some bear a sticker – “Released – Inspected and Cleaned by the Zaka Volunteers”. These vehicles tell the October 7 story: some of them turned into death traps at the Nova Festival in Re’im, others were gutted on the roads themselves and some were squashed by tanks in their rush toward the settlements. Each vehicle has its own individual tale of heroism, each one is a whole world that was lost.

Among other things, there is an ambulance from the Nova site that had been set alight and was completely gutted. In one corner are the vehicles used by the terrorists: the white pickup trucks, a heap of motorcycles, and jeeps – some of which were modified to function as war machines.

The burnt vehicles are the responsibility of the Ministry of Heritage, which is planning to build a memorial site here to remind us who our enemies are, and what must be done to prevent such a horrific event from ever recurring, to make sure we guarantee Israel’s security for future generations.

Re’im Recreational Area: The Smiling Faces from the Pictures

From here we shall backtrack a short distance and drive south on Road 232. This is where we see the Nova Festival site between Kibbutz Beeri and Kibbutz Re’im. Drive slowly! Road 232 is rutted after hundreds of tanks drove over it on their way into Gaza. You might hear rumblings from your tires, which sound like you have a flat.

The Nova Festival has been transformed into a national symbol. Young people converging to have a good time, to bond with their inner self and with nature, who all of a sudden find themselves in the midst of an impossible battlefield facing hundreds of heavily-armed terrorists. Along the dirt road leading to the memorial you can look around and see just how flat and open the area is, a fact that made it virtually impossible to find cover. In some of the places there are small gullies with sparce scrub and trees. These are the places the youngsters tried to seek refuge.

The memorial itself instills an aura of sanctity. It is closely reminiscent of memorials to Holocaust victims. It consists of stakes bearing large pictures of the victims. The site attracts many visitors, including those with no direct connection to those  victims, but who share the need to get a sense of the place and bond with the deceased. Some of the pictures have various texts and objects attached to them. Wandering among the pictures alludes to the worlds that have been lost.

The encounter with the victims’ pictures at the memorial reminds us also of what we are fighting for: the faces gazing at us from the pictures are smiling, infused with an inner light; some of them are depicted with their partners and families. It is almost impossible to reconcile these pictures from joyful occasions with the appalling events that unfolded here. The pictures do, however, remind us why despite it all, we have got to be strong. They remind us of what we are defending here. Together we shall prevail.

הפוסט Face to Face with Heroism: Self-Guided Tour Through the Death and Heroism of the Gaza Envelope הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Nature of the Tour: On foot

Length of the Tour: 1-2 hours

Degree of Difficulty: Easy

Starting Pointing: The Monument for Brigade 8 at the foothills of Tel Nitzana.

Background: Auja al-Hafir from 1906 to 1948

The area of Nitzana, also known as Auja al-Hafir, is one of the least central locations in Israel, yet it enjoyed glory in the past. The reason for this is its being an important border crossing to Egypt in the early 20th century, which led the Ottomans to establish a Control Center and hospital there, the ruins of which exist to this day.

After the Ottoman Empire joined World War One on the side of the Axis Powers, the importance of Auja al-Hafir increased even further, as a launching point for attacks on the British stationed in Egypt. Among other things, the ottomans laid down train tracks in the area, as part of the Germans and Ottoman preparations to invade Egypt and seize control of the Suez Canal. Thus, Auja al-Hafir Became an administrative center both for trains and army units. The water tower of the train can be seen to this day just south of the mound.

Auja al-Hafir fell from grace after the San Remo Conference, which gave the Land of Israel to the British as a mandate. Due to British control of Egypt, the importance of the location as a border crossing declined. According to the Partition Plan adopted on November 29, 1947, Auja al-Hafir was part of the Arab state. Immediately after the Declaration of Independence, the Egyptian Army invaded the Land of Israel and seized control the location.

Operation Horev: Expulsion of the Remaining Egyptian Forces from the South

Even after “Operation Yoav”, which was conducted in October 1948 and forced the road into the Negev, significant Egyptian forces remained in the area between Gaza and Be’er Sheva. Operation Horev, which began in late December 1948 and ended in early January 1949, was intended to expel the remaining Egyptian forces within the Land of Israel, including the area of Auja al-Hafir. Many forces participated in the operation, including the Golani Brigade, Brigade 8, the Alexandroni Brigade, the Negev Brigade and the Harel Brigade. The operation was commanded by Yigal Allon, and the operations officer was Yitzhak Rabin.

A Moment Before the Attack, Get Acquainted with the Blond Company Commander: Yaakov Granick

The IDF force, which prepared to capture Auja al-Hafir, was based upon Brigade 8, the first armored brigade of the IDF. The lead regiment was Regiment 82 with four tanks and 12 armored vehicles and additional forces, including Regiment 89. The commander of Company A in Regiment 89 was Yaakov Granick, whose nickname was “Dov” (bear).

Yaakov Granick was born in Poland in 1923. He volunteered to defend Warsaw during the German invasion at the start of World War Two, was taken prisoner but managed to escape. In 1940, he made Aliya by a circuitous route and joined the Lehi, where he received the nom de guerre “Dov”. Granick participated in some of the Lehi’s most daring operations, among them the (failed) assassination attempt of the British High Commissioner Harold MacMichael, breaking Israel Eldad out of prison, the robbery of Barclays Bank and the robbery of the Polish Bank. After the Lehi merged with the IDF, Granick went to officers’ school and was appointed as a company commander in Regiment 89, under the command of Moshe Dayan. He was called “Dov the blonde” or the “blonde captain” by his subordinates.

Course of the Battle: The Fall of Dov and Adherence to the Mission

The first attack occurred on December 26, 1948, but it encountered fierce Egyptian resistance, described by Binyamin Ze’ev von Weisl, the Commander of the Artillery Regiment that provided artillery support to the force: “Meanwhile, the battle for Auja itself rages on… An Israeli vehicle managed to breach the perimeter of the village but took fire from an antitank cannon and Piats. The armored vehicles have been hit again”. Eventually, the force had to retreat while sustaining several losses, most prominent of which – the company commander Yaakov Granick, who took a bullet to the neck and died on the spot.

The fighter Yosef Evron described the fall of Dov:

“The entire company passed before us, faces smiling, hands waving in greeting, with the image of Dov, tall and inspiring a sense of security around him, was prominent in his height on the command vehicle. A chain of daring operations in his past, beginning with the war against the British in the period of the underground and up to the breach of Fort Iraq Sueidan, with all the previous attempts to capture it failing. Dov’s company road towards the peak of the Auja hill; bullets and shells ceaselessly fired at it. Dov’s image was prominent on the command half-track, standing tall as always and speaking commands calmly, when suddenly his voice went silent. A bullet had struck his neck. It turned out, that the company had entered an open field, well targeted by the Egyptians. The order to withdraw was given, and a short time after the charge the company had turned back, without its commander, and with 12 more casualties piled on the half-track”.

The failure of the first attack, and especially the fall of Granick, had impacted the fighters’ morale, but their resolve was unbroken. They reorganized in the rear and prepared for an additional assault, displaying impressive perseverance to the mission. They decided to focus their efforts on an Egyptian weak point, which was identified during the first assault.

This time, the artillery regiment commander described an entirely different reality – victory:

“At first light, at 06:00, the cannons and mortars began a rapid-fire barrage… With the assistance of the artillery, the armored vehicles from Regiment 82 move forward towards the village and seized one strongpoint after another. The enemy surrendered after some of them ran off, in the pre-noon hours… In the afternoon, the Egyptians evacuated the strongpoints west of Auja. In the final hours, the 75 mm cannons opened rapid and intense fire. The shelling managed to stun the enemy completely. The Arabs ran away; at 17:30 after the capture of Auja, the cannons ceased firing. During that day, 734 shells were fired”.

The victory in battle brought about the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from the space (excluding the Al-Faluja Enclave) and enabled the IDF to invade eastern Sinai and reach all the way to al-Arish. Although the IDF eventually withdrew from Sinai, but the Egyptians withdrew from the Al-Faluja Enclave in return, which completed the capture of the Negev.

The cost, as stated, was heavy. The poet Uri Zvi Greenberg eulogized Yaakov Granick, who fell in battle:

“A lament for the Sicarius who was Captain ‘Dov’ in the army of Israel. He was a fiery tree, which none of the waters of his haters could extinguish”.

At the end of the tour, you should play for the family the song “The Ballad for Yitzhak Sadeh”, written by the poet Haim Gouri. The song also mentions Auja al-Hafir:

“They rode a light Jeep that galloped in the storm,
loping on the road to Auja al-Hafir.
And the tanks rush after him with his men,
and his beard grows grayer.”

What else is there to do in the area?

The area of Nitzana presents additional sites of interest for hikers, among them Tel Nitzana, which includes findings from the Byzantine Period and the Ottoman Period, the Nitzana Curves – a rock and sand formation that are pleasure to the eye and heaven for children, the ancient ruins of the City of Shivta, the Ezuz Grove and the Thermo-Solar Power Station in Ashalim.

הפוסט The Blonde Captain: A Tour in the Footsteps of Brigade 8 and Yaakov Granick Towards Nitzana הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Nature of the Tour: On foot

Length of the Tour: 1-3 hours

Degree of Difficulty: Easy

Starting Pointing: Put “Ammunition Hill” (5 Shlomo Zalman Shraga Street) in Waze. It can be reached via light rail (Ammunition Hill Station) or by bus from the central bus station via Line 66, and from the Downtown Jerusalem via Line 19, 34 and 34A.

Operating Hours: 09:00-17:00 (Friday and Holiday Eve: 09:00-13:00).

Entry to the site is free of charge. Tickets may be purchased for a tour in the museum, including the audiovisual display, as well as an option for a daily guided tour. For details and prices, go to http://www.g-h.org.il/

“Ammunition Hill”: What is it Exactly?

In the 1930s, the British, who controlled Israel at the time, had established a Police Academy (which is currently in the neighborhood of Ma’alot Dafna). Next to the Academy, on a nearby hill, they established ammunition warehouses, hence the name “Ammunition Hill”.

Ammunition Hill: The Strategy of Maintaining the Mount Scopus Enclave

On November 30, 1948 (a day in the year after the UN Resolution of November 29 on the Partition Plan), the “Honest Armistice” was signed between Moshe Dayan and Abdullah El Tell, in a tete a tete meeting. This agreement divided Jerusalem into a Jewish city and an Arab city, with the dividing line being called the “City Line”.

Within the Arab city was a Jewish enclave – the Mount Scopus Enclave. Under the agreement, every two weeks a convoy would depart western Jerusalem to Mount Scopus. It was clear to Israel that in any future confrontation, Mount Scopus would become the Jordanians first target. Therefore, special emphasis was given to linking up with Mount Scopus in any plan whatsoever. The Jordanians were aware of the Israeli desire to link up with Mount Scopus and therefore established 3 outposts that guarded the road: Ammunition Hill, Givat HaMivtar and French Hill. A reinforced company of the Legion (around 120 fighters) was stationed on Ammunition Hill.

As such, Ammunition Hill became a strategic point that was addressed in every IDF battle plan, as one of the key positions on the road to Mount Scopus.

Jordan Joins the War

On June 5, 1967, the Six-Day War began in the Egyptian theater. Despite diplomatic efforts, King Hussein opted to join the war alongside Egypt and the canons of the Jordanian Legion began shelling Western Jerusalem. In the Jerusalem theater, three reserve brigades and various auxiliary forces operated:

1. Brigade 16 halted the Jordanian attack in Armon HaNetziv, captured the Pa’amon Fortifications and blocked the Jerusalem-Bethlehem Road.
2. Brigade 10 operated from the north to Jerusalem along the Nebi Samuel Ridge, blocking the Jerusalem-Ramallah Road.
3. Brigade 55 was supposed to operate in Sinai, but the collapse of the Egyptian line in Sinai and the IDF’s rapid progress rendered their participation in the Sinai campaign redundant. The brigade was diverted to Jerusalem, there it operated in the north of the city for the purpose of linking up with Mount Scopus.

The Police Academy and the Breach

The Commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, Motta Gur, ordered the capture of Ammunition Hill and the seizure of the Sheikh Jarrah Neighborhood. The plan was to breach the Police Academy to Ammunition Hill, and that the various companies of the regiment seize various parts of the compound.

The compound was comprised of a central trench, as well as an eastern and western trench that connected in the northern side of the compound. On the southern side, there was a relatively shallow trench that connected the various trenches. The plan was simple: one company would capture the access trenches to the outpost and one company would capture the various parts of the outpost, after which the force would continue to Sheikh Jarrah. In addition, six tanks were attached to the force as backup.

Surprises in the Field: Narrow Trenches and Mistaken Identification

After arriving at the entrance structure, we will go out into the courtyard. The courtyard is on the southern side of the site. The current site only reflects the part of the outpost during the Six-Day War. The eastern trench was covered, only a few parts of the eastern trench have survived, and only the western trench remains mostly intact.

The battle began at 2:20 AM within artillery shelling of the Police Academy and Ammunition Hill. The breach of the Police Academy succeeded without a hitch, since the Jordanians evacuated the structure, upon the start of the shelling, and moved to Ammunition Hill. At the beginning of the battle, it turned out that the trenches of the compound were very narrow and that only one fighter could fire while moving, as well as the difficulty of moving through the narrow trenches for a fighter in full gear.

Company D was divided into three secondary forces: A platoon to the eastern trench, a platoon to the western trench and a platoon to the central trench. However, the darkness and chaos caused a mistake. Two platoons entered the central trench, and one entered the eastern trench. The western trench, the most heavily fortified, remained without any IDF forces. Initially, everything went smoothly. The company commander believed that the plan was working properly and announced that there is no need for the reserve. However, upon their arrival to the northern side, they discovered that the bulk of the Jordanian force was fortified on the western side. The number of dead and wounded increased with each passing moment.

In the meantime, the sun rose, and the paratroopers were exposed to the Jordanians, who fired from outside of the trench at the paratroopers in the trench. One of the commanders decided to send a fighter to cover the fighters in the trench. Israel Tzuriel sprinted out and covered his friends until his ammunition ran out, and he jumped into the trench. Naftali Cohen took his place, also covered them, was injured and extricated himself. The machine gunner Eitan Nava was sent to cover and was killed while covering them. Eitan’s actions were immortalized in the song “Ammunition Hill” by Yoram Taharlev (quoting the deputy company commander Nitzan Nir, who sent Eitan out):

“I didn’t have time to ask for a volunteer, I sent Eitan. Eitan didn’t hesitate for a moment, went up and started operating the machine gun. Sometimes he would pass me, and I had to yell to him to remain in my line. In that way we passed some thirty meters, Eitan was covering from above and we were purifying the bunkers from inside. Until he was hit in his head and fell in.”

While standing in the courtyard we look northward to the water tower, and we understand the inferiority of the IDF fighters and the elevation advantage of the Jordanians. Since staying in the open during the battle was very dangerous, we will enter the nearby western trench and move northward (up). Pay attention how narrow the trench is! If you have a backpack, try turning back without touching the walls… now imagine darkness, dust, the sound of gunfire and the screams of wounded and you can understand the physical and mental difficulty of the soldiers.

The Bunker and Conclusion of the Battle

At a heavy cost in blood, the paratroopers slowly approached the central bunker. We will proceed along the western trench to the large bunker.

We walk in a slight upward incline. When we get to a 3-way junction, we will turn left and wind along the trench rightward. Please note the “rabbit warrens” (firing positions along the perimeter trench in which we are walking) in which the legion soldiers had been fortified. Every “rabbit warren” was captured after fierce resistance. As we walk along the trench we will occasionally peek outside. On the right we see bullet-riddled water tower, and further on we will see the monument for the IDF soldiers who fell here. We will look at our leisure but during the battle, anyone who raised his head risked being hit immediately. After several tens of meters of slow walking in cramped confines, we will reach the main bunker.

The bunker was a machine gun position made of fortified concrete 40 cm thick, and its structure was a room within a room. Therefore, the grenades tossed into the bunker did not eliminate those within, who would simply move to the inner room, and would return to fire after the explosion. An attempt was made to hit the bunker using two “bazooka” rockets (an antitank weapon), but as the words of the song “Ammunition Hill” tell us,

“We decided to try to blow their bunker with a bazooka. The bazooka left a few scratches on the concrete.”

The request for assistance from the tank was refused, since the tank was unable to lower its cannon to the desired angle. It was eventually decided to blow up the bunker and everyone in it. With great effort and under fire 16 kg of explosives were placed near the bunker. The explosives did the trick, the bunker blew up and the battle had ended. Although the force was harassed by gunfire from Givat HaMivtar, forces from brigade 10 captured the outpost on Givat HaMivtar and paralyzed the sources of gunfire. On the day after the battle, a company of Magav had arrived and retook the outpost, while gathering 60 Jordanian POWs.

36 IDF soldiers gave their lives to capture and Ammunition Hill. 15 soldiers received commendations.

Song:

“Ammunition Hill”, Lyrics: Yoram Taharlev, Music: Yair Rosenblum.

הפוסט “Maybe we were lions”: A Tour of (Givat Hatachmoshet) Ammunition Hill הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Nature of the Tour: On foot

Length of the Tour: 2-3 hours

Degree of Difficulty: Easy

Starting Pointing: Put “Post 16 Site in Ha-Masrek Reserve in Waze

Background: David Ben-Gurion and the Campaign for Jerusalem

“Almost from the very first moment, Jerusalem stood at the center of the campaign for Israel’s revival and was the focal point of the War of Independence” (David Ben-Gurion)

The War of Independence, which lasted over a year and a half, is divided into two central parts. The first part began immediately after the UN resolution on the partition plan on November 29, 1947, and was characterized by a civil war between the Jews and Arabs within Israel. The second part began after the Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948 and was characterized by the invasion of the Arab armies into Israel.

In the first phase of the war, Arab Israelis focused most of their efforts in blocking roads to isolated towns. The Arab operations focused upon the road to Jerusalem. The reason: the Arab military leadership understood what David Ben-Gurion understood: Jerusalem is the beating heart of the Jewish people. Without Jerusalem, the idea of a Jewish state would sustain a critical, perhaps even deadly, blow.

The central goal of blocking the road to Jerusalem was to prevent the arrival of food supplies to the city, thus starving it into surrendering. Central focus of the struggle was on the road that passed through Sha’ar HaGai (“Bab al-Wad” in Arabic) and the attempts by the Hebrew Yishuv to get supply convoys through it to Jerusalem.

During our tour today, we will focus upon the area of Sha’ar HaGai and particularly its strategic weak points, which are revealed when visiting the ridges that were controlled by the Arabs, who blocked the road to Jerusalem.

Ducks in a Shooting Gallery: what did it mean to be a driver in a convoy to Jerusalem?

In order to reach Ha-Masrek Reserve and Post 16 Site, we will drive down Hwy 1 towards Shoresh and Beit Meir. As you can see, we are in the connecting point between the Shephelah (Judean Foothills) and the Mountains of Jerusalem, that are above us. The road we are driving on passes on the bottom of the ravine, in a topographically inferior area relative to the ridges around it, so that anyone sitting on the ridge controls the road as well without being physically present on it.

Indeed, according to the testimonials of the convoy drivers, who risked their lives in attempts to maintain the flow of food and supplies to Jerusalem, the main weak point was Sha’ar HaGai, as told by Yona Golani, a truck driver on the convoys to Jerusalem:

“The main difficulty began at Sha’ar HaGai, with the climb up the mountain, with the road winding between forested mountains, which served as excellent observation and hiding places for the gangs. They poured down concentrated fire upon the overloaded trucks, crawling slowly up the mountain.”

Some of the convoys managed to make it to Jerusalem and provide it with the oxygen it needed. The price was high. The attacked convoys were often looted, and the equipment wasn’t merely lost but rather strengthened the Arab enemy. March of 1948 was a particularly grim month for the convoys, which sustained heavy losses, prompting Ben-Gurion to decide on a change in approach. No more heavy convoys crawling up inferior ground, but rather seizing the road to Jerusalem, and controlling the ridges that control the road.

“Operation Nachshon” was conducted as part of the effort to break through to Jerusalem. Although the operation was successful, the Arabs returned afterwards and seized control of the road. An additional operation, “Harel”, was stopped midway due to the need to divert forces to another theater, and the road to Jerusalem was blocked yet again. The next operation that was launched was Operation “Maccabi”, which we will speak of at the first stopping point.

Start of the Route: Operation Maccabi Launches

We turn from Hwy 1 to Road 3955 towards Beit Meir. A little before the entrance to Ha-Masrek Reserve, we will see the sign for “Burma Road”, and we will leave the road to a dirt parking lot on the right side of the road.

A trail (going downhill) comes out of the parking lot, which we will walk on. The trail splits after a few minutes. The left trail (marked red) goes to the Mahal Memorial (which may also be reached on the trail we will use). We will continue right and follow the green marking (and at times, the blue-white-orange marking of the Israel National Trail as well, which overlaps the green trail here). We are headed to Post 16 Site, yet along the way we can also enjoy the Mediterranean grove that surrounds us, and in the months of March and April we will see spectacular blossoming. After a few minutes of moderate walking, the trail turns left (westward). Near the turn, there is a large tree under which we can stop briefly for refreshments. From there the trail continues slightly uphill towards Post 16 Site. In order to understand what Post 16 Site is, we must first understand what “Operation Maccabi” was.

Operation Maccabi, which began on May 8, 1948, lasted 10 days. The operation was named for Maccabi Mutzery-Mani, who had fallen several weeks before on the road to Jerusalem. The goal of the operation was to seize permanent control of the ridges on both sides of the road to Jerusalem, thus allowing a smooth flow of convoys to besieged Jerusalem. In order to seize key points that control Sha’ar HaGai, the Palmach forces not only had to seize the area, but also remain there and repel counterattacks. To that end, the “posts” were built.

A “post” was a defensive array comprised of several positions, similar to an “outpost”. The posts were given names according to an ascending number, beginning in Post 1 on the northern spur (the Posts Spur) up to the southern spur, we are on and on which we shall visit the Post 16 Site.

Post 16 Site: A Microcosmos of the War Over the Road to Jerusalem

With the launch of Operation Maccabi, a company under the command of Uri Ben Ari managed to seize, without a battle, the hill on which Post 16 is located. This takeover was supposed to be a springboard to the continue the capturing of the ridgeline, with an emphasis upon the enemy village of Bayt Mahsir, located at the edge of the ridge (currently, the location of the moshav of Beit Meir). Due to the lack of heavy weaponry (the Davidka Mortar had not arrived in the field), and the desire to not reveal the goals of the operation in order to prevent the arrival of reinforcements, the force received the order to withdraw from the hill.

On the following day, another attempt was made to capture the location, but this time the force encountered resistance by Arabs, who understood what was going on and the military value of the location, and the Palmach force retreated. The following day another attack was carried out, reinforced with weapons and soldiers, and Post 16 was retaken. The Arabs, who understood the importance of the location and its excellent control over the road both to Jerusalem and Bayt Mahsir, quickly organized a fierce counteroffensive, which the force managed to repel while sustaining losses. After repelling this attack, both the nearby Post 17 and Bayt Mahsir were captured, the latter being found abandoned.

Currently, there is a memorial at Post 16, comprised of several pieces, which commemorates the Palmach fighters who fell in the campaign for Jerusalem. A short walking distance from the Post, we can carefully approach the edge of the cliff and get one perspective of Hwy 1 below us, that tells the entire tale, or in the words of the writer Amos Ayalon: “it was clear above all else that the campaign for Jerusalem would not be won in the Old City… rather on that narrow strip of asphalt connecting Jerusalem with Tel Aviv”.

The narrow and winding strip of asphalt below us is exposed in all its strategic vulnerability from the height of Post 16, illustrating the power of the Arab fighters’ vantage point, who sat on the ridge and controlled the road to Jerusalem with gunfire. Don’t let the site of the broad highway fool you. In 1948 it was a road with only one, narrow and winding lane in either direction, with dense vegetation surrounding it on both sides. It is appropriate to recall the words of Benny Marshak, the Culture Officer for the Harel Brigade (“the politruk”): “In all of military history, no other military unit was established for whom the width of its front wasn’t even the width of a road, and it was this width that determine the fate of the country”.

There is no more perfect place to listen to Chaim Guri’s song “Bab al-Wad” (who paradoxically did not fight here at all but rather in the Negev Front).

Heroes of 1948-5708: Not Just the Fighters at the Front

From the observatory, we can return to the path towards Post 16 Site and from there to the vehicle, in the same way we came in. Alternatively, we can continue towards Army 21 Site going downhill. This post is closer to Sha’ar HaGai and is therefore lower. This post was captured on the second night of Operation Maccabi. Operation Maccabi also did not resolve the supply problem to Jerusalem, but we will speak about that on another tour.

On the way back to the vehicle, we can connect with the generation of 1948, a generation in which truck drivers in various convoys stood at the forefront of the fighting, exposed in the cabins, with the fighters dug in in the posts protecting the critical road to Jerusalem with their bodies.

In the vehicle, we may hear the song “Ya Mishlati”, and also connect with the Palmach way of life and the fighters who held the posts, called in the song “my home without walls”.

הפוסט “My Home Without Walls”: A Tour through Post 16 Site on the Way to Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.