

# Terrorists in Civil Service

**Palestinian Authority's Well-Budgeted and Institutional Apparatus Designed to Incentivize Terrorism and Create Jobs for Terrorists**

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**הביטחוניסטים IDSF**

**Israel's Defense & Security Forum**

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
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# Permission to Kill: Palestinian Authority's Pay for Slay Apparatus

A Codified, Institutionalized **\$370 million/year** terror machine

The Palestinian Authority is operating a well-budgeted apparatus anchored in law, designed to **incentivize Palestinians to choose the path of terrorism**, reflecting its objective to **wage an armed struggle against Israel**.

All **imprisoned Palestinian terrorists and families of "martyrs"** are granted with lavish stipends, while **released terrorists are conferred priority employment placements** across government ministries.

Since 2013, they dedicated for this purpose more than

**\$3,000,000,000USD**

money that could have financed:

**6**

public hospitals

**52 million**

Covid-19 Vaccines

**7%**

of the PA budget

**44%**

of the total global financial aid

The income of a Palestinian terrorist sentenced to life in prison is **4 times** the Palestinian average and **8 times** the Palestinian minimum wage

**370 million USD/year**  
Stipends for terrorists and families of "martyrs"

**80 times** more per capita for terrorism than health

**530 million USD/year**  
Palestinian Health Ministry's Budget (for 5 million residents)

**111.6**

USD per capita/year

**8,820**

**Health first?**


**\$25,000**

Maximum release grant

**3,750**

## Educating to terrorism

The PA's policy makes it 5 times more profitable to become a convicted terrorist than a teacher.



30 years and above

25-30 years

20-25 years

15-20 years

10-15 years

5-10 years

3-5 year

Up to 3 years



A released terrorist is granted **lifelong** economic and employment security:



- ✓ Priority in public job placements
- ✓ Permanent wage
- ✓ Free healthcare
- ✓ Free education

**\$1,875**

Grant for a "martyr"'s family

"The pioneer martyrs are a top Palestinian priority... Even if we were left with just one penny, we would pay it to the families of martyrs and the prisoners."

Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority





## Executive Summary

- **The Palestinian Authority (PA)**, which has crafted an image for itself as a bureaucratic, moderate, pragmatic and civilian-led Palestinian government, certainly when compared to its rival Palestinian organization, Hamas, **plays an active role in the armed struggle against Israel** in multiple ways, including **the administration of a well-oiled and well-budgeted economic apparatus designed to incentivize organized as well as random acts of terror** perpetrated by Palestinians against innocent Israelis. This is the “Pay for Slay” apparatus.
- According to Palestinian law, which designates the terrorists as “the Palestinian people’s combat wing”, imprisoned terrorists are rewarded on a sliding scale, based on the number of years they are serving in prison. **Upon their 30<sup>th</sup> year in prison, their salaries reach \$3,750 USD per month**, equivalent to the salary of the President of the Palestinian Supreme Court, and **eight times the average minimum salary in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria (“the West Bank”)**. It is also **4 times the per capita average monthly salary earned by Palestinians**.
- Incarcerated terrorists who were released after having served more than 5 years in prison continue receiving a salary, even after their release, as well as a **one-time release payout ranging from \$5,000 to \$25,000**.
- PA law mandates employing **released terrorists in government agencies in order to provide them with permanent financial security**, including **fully subsidized healthcare and education**. It also **confers to them priority employment placements across government ministries**.
- Furthermore, **the PA provides compensation, in the form of monthly allowances, through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to the families of the “martyrs”** (terrorists who were killed or wounded during terror operations).
- **On average, the PA spends over \$300 million USD every year on this**, an amount equivalent to about **7% of its annual budget** during most of the surveyed years, and almost half of the foreign financial aid it receives from donor countries and other contributors.
- Approximately 5,000 prisoners, 7,200 released prisoners, as well as 37,500 families of the “martyrs” and wounded terrorists, benefit from the cash allowances and employment opportunities provided through this policy.
- To appreciate the gross incongruity in priorities, in 2018, the budget of the Palestinian Ministry of Health, which is budgeted for 5 million inhabitants, stood at \$530 million

USD (\$112 USD per capita per year), while the terror apparatus budget, which serves 12,200 incarcerated and released prisoners, and 37,500 family members of “martyrs” and wounded terrorists, that constitute a fraction of the population, stands at \$370 million USD (\$8,820 USD per capita per year).

- Among the terrorists receiving these benefits are Omar Abu Jalal, who murdered three members of the Solomon family and is expected to receive about \$2.04 million USD throughout his lifetime; Abdel Hakim Asi, who murdered Rabbi Itamar Ben Gal, and is expected to receive a similar amount; and Amjad and Hakim Awad who murdered the five members of the Fogel family, including a 3-month-old baby, and sentenced to 5 life sentences and another 7 years in prison, and each is expected to receive a combined \$4.26 million USD over the course of their lives.
- Terrorism is considered a legitimate and primary tool in fulfilling the PLO's and PA's ultimate goal of establishing a Palestinian state while eliminating the State of Israel. In this context, the PA views the cash incentives and employment preferences as constituting an important element in **institutionalizing its terror apparatus**.
- This is the Palestinian Authority's explicitly, defined policy as expressed by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who called the “martyrs” “stars in the sky of the Palestinian nation's struggle,” who are the “top Palestinian priority,” and who stressed, on several occasions including to the UN General Assembly, that “even if we were left with just one penny, we would pay it to the families of the martyrs and prisoners.”

### Analysis

- **The PA is incentivizing people to choose terrorism as a course of action** that not only grants its perpetrators with glory and admiration, but rewards them financially, much more lavishly than the average citizen. **This constitutes not only solicitation for murder**, as the money is guaranteed up front, and a **blatant violation of the Oslo Accords**, but also **the systemic and standardized incorporation of the Palestinian armed struggle into the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority**.
- By doing so, **the PA meets the Israeli and international definitions of a terror organization**. Not only does it finance terror and incentivize people to carry out terror through its support for still incarcerated and released prisoners, as well as the families of “martyrs” and wounded terrorists – it also employs many of them as public servants, including, absurdly, **in its security apparatus** entrusted with combating terrorism.

## Legal aspect

- **Relevant legislation passed both in the United States and Israel to address this issue.** In Israel, the funds that the PA transfers to terrorists are withheld by law from the taxes collected on its behalf by Israel. In the United States, American law bans the transfer of financial aid to the PA as long as this policy continues.
- **The response on the part of the vast majority of the international community to this phenomenon has been muted, thereby accepting the PA's victimhood narrative,** despite unmistakable PA policy defying the global struggle against terrorism. Transferring aid money from donor countries to terrorists stands in violation of the laws of the donor countries themselves, as well as international treaties on terror financing. Indirectly, **this foreign aid provides a substantial lifeline to the PA's terror apparatus, which targets innocent Israelis, in the guise of humanitarian aid.**

## Recommendations

- **Designate the Palestinian Authority as a terror-sponsoring entity, including the freezing of international aid and cooperation and the closing of PA global diplomatic missions.** This stems from the recognition that **the PA should not receive any dispensation from laws and treaties concerning the sponsorship and incentivization of. Lifting this sanction will be conditioned on the complete and permanent cessation of this policy on the part of the PA,** including the revoking of relevant laws regarding the stipends to prisoners and killed terrorists' families, and the employment of released prisoners.
- **The Israeli "offsetting law" should be fully enforced, without delay,** at the beginning of each calendar year; **as should the Taylor Force Act in the United States,** such that **the PA would be compelled to choose between complete economic collapse and the maintenance of their terror infrastructure.**
- In this context, it is critical to emphasize that **a scenario in which the PA collapses should not be considered an intolerable threat to Israel's security. There are a number of alternatives to the PA** that could effectively manage the day-to-day affairs of Palestinians residing in Areas A and B, similar, with some modifications, to what existed prior to the Oslo Accords.
- **Other donor countries should be encouraged to adopt this type of legislation.**
- Israel must make it clear to the Palestinian Authority that **it may be exposed to significant legal liability if this policy is not terminated. The United States and other donor countries should be encouraged to adopt this policy line,** in some cases by simply implementing their existing terror financing laws with respect to the PA.
- **The international community should be warned by the United States** (in accordance with the "Taylor Force Act") **and Israel and other involved parties against the granting**



**of aid to the PA, directly or indirectly as it advances the financial terror infrastructure targeting Israel.**

- Israel, the United States, the Quartet and donor countries should make it clear to the PA that abandoning terror is something that the PLO and the PA committed to in the Oslo Accords, and that **any progress in any final status arrangements would be conditioned on the complete and permanent cessation of this policy.**
- The **“moral ambiguity”** intrinsic to turning a blind eye to these activities conducted by the PA should be eradicated. **A fact-based discourse should be encouraged, one that places a focus on the true nature of the PA as an organization that carries out terror against Israelis, regardless of political position on negotiations with the PA or with any other Palestinian entity.**

# Introduction

Or Yissachar

The range of opinions in Israel regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is extensive, and, in broad terms, can be split into two groups: those who claim that a political solution must be worked out with the PA, and those who are skeptical about the Palestinian leadership's capacity in striving for peace. Or simply put, those who say "there is a partner for peace," versus those who say "there is no partner for peace." Yet prior to questioning the price, format, and benefit of peace, one must inquire about the fundamental nature of the specific entity facing Israel today, that for many is poised as the only viable option for Israel to achieve a political settlement. **Therefore, the objective of this policy paper is not to fundamentally rule out the possibility of reaching such a political settlement with any Palestinian leadership down the road** – on the contrary, it is encouraging to consider this prospect; **but rather shed light on some erroneous basic assumptions about today's Palestinian Authority that underpin public discourse and are held by many influential decision-makers.** In particular, it aims to clarify the nature of the Palestinian Authority in terms of **its commitment to the armed struggle against the existence of the State of Israel.**

For a considerable portion of the Israeli and international public, **the PA benefits from a**

**"benign" image of a civilian, bureaucratic, moderate, and pragmatic leadership.** The contrast between the PLO and Hamas, their popular rival, presents the public and decision-makers in Israel with a false dilemma between a murderous organization championing the destruction of Israel, and an organization whose security forces collaborate with their Israeli counterparts, and had even signed political arrangements with Israel in the past, the most important of which being the Oslo Agreements. In contrast to the militant image that adhered to former PA president Yasser Arafat, (with whom Israel had also signed agreements) as well as the leaders of Hamas, from Isma'il Haniyyeh through Yahya Sinwar to Muhammad Deif – Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Alaa, Mohammed Shtayyeh and their colleagues benefit an image of the suit-and-tie-wearing responsible adults, sporting the title of **"the Palestinian Government."**

**This lack of clarity, reached intentionally or otherwise, is a tool used by stakeholders who rely on it to sway public opinion toward the conclusion they find self-evident.** This narrative creates an alternate reality that serves the interests of anti-Israeli entities in Israel and abroad who wish to conceal this designated partner's real identity from the public.

Thus, **the Palestinian Authority is creating a culture that facilitates the creation of a lucrative career as murderers of Jews, which will provide for them and their families financial security for the rest of their lives.** This sliding scale, at its extreme, offers a salary, 8 times above the average minimum wage, or 4 times the typical average monthly income per capita for Palestinians. These sums increase proportionally based on the damage they inflicted upon their victims and commensurate with the sentences that the terrorists were given. Moreover, this policy makes choosing this track far more lucrative than choosing other career types. Instead of creating employment opportunities in the tourism, agriculture, or manufacturing sectors, the PA is creating a stable career path in the terrorism sector. **This is how the Palestinian Authority incentivizes the armed struggle against Israel. It is not substantially different from the struggle that Hamas is waging against them. The only difference is the modus operandi.**

This paper stresses that contrary to widespread belief, **the Palestinian Authority runs an effective and lucrative terror operation.** The PA pays, directly and through the PLO, the salaries of incarcerated terrorists in Israeli prisons, released terrorists and families of terrorists killed in action. While advancing terrorists' image as celebrities and national heroes, **the PA incentivizes the murder of innocents by rhetorical, educational, and financial means.**

**The PA budgets approximately \$300 million USD per year to finance their terror apparatus and the employment of released terrorists.** Between 2013-2020, this amount was equivalent to about 7% of the PA's budget, or about half of the total foreign aid it receives. About 5,000 current prisoners, 7,200 released prisoners, and 37,500 family members of "martyrs" and wounded terrorists are benefiting from these enormous sums of money. Released prisoners are also eligible for **job security for the rest of their lives**, including benefits like health insurance, free dental care, fully subsidized education, and vocational training programs.

This policy stems directly from the Palestinian Authority's commitment to the Palestinian struggle against the very existence of the State of Israel and against the Zionist cause. The ultimate national objective to be achieved is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state replacing the State of Israel. Terrorists from both Fatah and Hamas, residing in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria ("the West Bank"), and East Jerusalem, both Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel, amateur terrorists, and those operating as part of an organized network – all are equally rewarded by the PA. If that weren't enough, the depiction of Palestinian terrorists as "lone wolves," frustrated youngsters who have nothing to lose, is shattered when Palestinian terror is set within the wider context of **the PA and the PLO's institutionalized efforts to coax them into carrying out terror against**



**Israelis using financial incentives that were promised ahead of time.**

Thus, **the Palestinian Authority is creating a culture that facilitates the creation of a lucrative career as murderers of Jews, which will provide for them and their families financial security for the rest of their lives.** This track, at its highest point, offers a high salary, 8 times the average minimum wage in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza, or 4 times the typical average monthly income per capita for Palestinians. These sums increase proportionally to the damage their acts of terror caused, i.e., commensurate with the sentences that the terrorists were given. Moreover, this policy makes choosing this track far more lucrative than choosing other career types. Instead of creating jobs in the tourism, agriculture, or manufacturing sectors, the PA is creating jobs in the terrorism sector. **This is how the Palestinian Authority incentivizes the armed struggle against the lives of Israelis. It is not substantially different from the struggle that Hamas is waging against them. The only difference is the modus operandi.**

In contrast to the terrorist method of pursuing their goals, democracies like Israel pursue their policies through the governance and control of the forces dedicated to the preservation of law and order. This is evident from the fact that any violent actions performed by either citizens or para-military organizations that are not part of the central government's normal law enforcement activities are against the law. They are certainly, not encouraged

and obviously the government would never pay bounties to incentivize violent acts. Furthermore, in democracies, soldiers and the security institutions are not called upon to carry out random attacks on civilian targets and certainly are not given incentives to do so. If anyone oversteps their orders, investigations, criminal charges and disciplinary measures will follow. This is not remotely like a standard operation conducted by one army against another, and its significance is not substantially tied in any way to adopting a particular political narrative. **This approach is completely foreign to democracies that are based upon freedom and the rule of law, democracies whose military power is first and foremost designed to preserve peace, law, and order.**

It would take volumes to review all of the bellicose anti-Israeli, even antisemitic actions of the Palestinian Authority. These include incitement against Israel and the Jewish people that pervades across the education system, through close collaboration with the BDS movement and the delegitimization of Israel in international forums, to the systematic violation of the Oslo Accords by expanding its armed forces, the illegal takeover of Area C, and the filing of lawsuits at the International Criminal Court in the Hague. This policy paper will thus focus on one particular aspect of this activity that **casts serious doubt regarding the Palestinian Authority's peaceful intentions.**

As usual, reality is more complex than a dichotomous division into a peace camp and a warmonger camp. This paper is

expressing that **it is incumbent upon those engaging in public discourse on the Palestinian Authority to appreciate its true nature, rather than a sanitized version** that allows them to be viewed as diplomats leading a civilian-led government.

Any political, military or civilian discourse regarding the Palestinian Authority should be based on these facts. **Regardless of the conclusion drawn from these facts** – i.e.,

whether there is or is not a partner – **the discussion should be founded on the reality as it is: the PA is a terrorist organization actively participating in the armed struggle against Israel.**

The PA's ultimate goal of destroying Israel, or at least gnawing away at its resilience and the security of its citizens, is manifested in this **“Pay for Slay”** policy.

## Rationale

In order to understand the reason for which the Palestinian Authority incentivizes terrorism against Israelis through its employment and payment of salaries to terrorists, it is imperative to get to the bottom of the rationale behind the Palestinian narrative and ideology.

The PLO's, and, by extension, the PA's most fundamental tenet is **the negation of Zionism, and ultimately, the establishment of a Palestinian state while eliminating the State of Israel**. This is what is stated in the Palestinian charter, publicized by the PLO in 1968. According to the charter, Zionism is an illegal expansionist movement. Thus, the PLO underscored its aspiration of negating the existence of the State of Israel in the Land of Israel, arguing that Judaism is a religion, not a nationality, and therefore should not be eligible for self-determination. Israel's demand to cancel the charter or parts thereof when the Oslo Accords were signed was never met, and today, the charter still serves as the PLO's and the PA's foundational document.<sup>1</sup>

The former chairman was not the only one who underlined these goals; the current chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, did so as well. For example, in 2013, he said the following: "All of our holy places are under occupation, and we haven't liberated an inch of Palestinian land. All Palestinian land is occupied. Gaza is occupied, the

[West] Bank is occupied, pre-1948 land is occupied, and Jerusalem is occupied."<sup>2</sup>

To accomplish this goal, the PLO and the PA support waging a multifaceted struggle, including a violent struggle against Israel, which means using terror against innocent Israeli civilians and soldiers. In English, the PA conveys messages in the spirit of international reconciliation and opposition to terror: "We, the State of Palestine, are convinced that terror must be fought everywhere, and we have at least 83 protocols with various countries all over the world in order to fight violence and terror (2017).<sup>3</sup> In certain interviews, PA Chairman Abbas has voiced a commitment to the world not to allow an armed Intifada, calling for liberation not by using military force, but through the use of peaceful means, gradually, in light of the failure of armed combat until the Oslo process.<sup>4</sup> When speaking to a domestic audience in Arabic, Abbas conveys the opposite message, like in a speech he made in 2019: **"We'll enter Jerusalem – millions of fighters! We will not accept the presentation of the martyrs as terrorists.** These are martyrs of the motherland. We won't reduce their salaries by a penny... They are the most sacred thing we have."<sup>5</sup>



In practice, the PA encourages ordinary Palestinians utilizing both rhetoric and policies, to choose the path of terror:<sup>a</sup>

- It fails to denounce terror attacks in which Israelis were murdered (some of which were carried out on the same days as the opposite messages were publicized in English).
- It incites terror through its educational system, from kindergarten, through schools, summer camps and institutions of higher learning.
- It lauds the “martyrs”, terrorists that were killed while carrying out an act of terror, including the annual marking of the 6<sup>th</sup> of January as the “Day of the Palestinian Martyr.” The “martyrs” are referred to as “the candles lighting our path,” trees are planted in their memory and roads, village squares and schools are named after them. Several prominent terrorists are among those so honored, like Fathi Shqaqi (the previous chairman of Palestinian Islamic Jihad), and Dalal Mughrabi (who participated in the “Coastal Road Massacre” in 1978, in which 37 Israelis were murdered), and terrorists like Bilal Adnan Rawajbeh, a Palestinian police officer who carried out a shooting attack in 2020.<sup>6</sup>
- It refrains from including Israel in its official maps, instead designating Israeli territory as the “State of Palestine”.

- Worst of all, it runs one of the most extensive and well-budgeted terror financing apparatus.

Most importantly, **the PA is essentially subordinate to the PLO**, which was recognized as “the sole representative of the Palestinian people” by the Arab League and the United Nations (UN) in 1974, and also recognized as such in the framework of the Oslo Accords by Israel and the United States in 1993. Its state of being subordinate to the PLO is underscored in the text of the Oslo Accords, inter alia, by referring to the Palestinian Authority as the “elected council” that lacks any authority on foreign affairs (Clause 9) and is essentially used to administer internal affairs within its jurisdiction. Under this logic, the agreements were signed between the Israeli government and the PLO, not the PA.

**Outwardly, the PLO, and the PA which is subordinate to it, took a more pragmatic, realpolitik approach toward Israel and Zionism than Hamas and other extremist organizations.** It signed peace agreements with Israel, and the security forces of both sides cooperate. According to the accepted perception, the PA essentially refrains from using terror and violence to achieve its goals. This strengthened the PA's image as a “default” option or the least objectionable, “lesser-evil” option among the other Palestinian entities, a “moderate” and “pragmatic” entity that it is possible to do business with. This

<sup>a</sup> For more information, please see <https://www.memri.org/reports/palestinian-authority-fatah-continue-official-support-and-encouragement-armed-struggle>

perception grew stronger once Hamas was excluded from the PA's governing bodies infrastructure after winning the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, and when the Palestinian arena was reframed as a struggle between Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, supported by the West and the Quartet, and Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, supported by Iran.

However, this depiction is completely debunked by taking note of the type of motives behind this temporary pragmatism, and secondly, upon reviewing the PA's conduct in practice. Firstly, it is the **"Phase Plan"** that led the PLO to adopt a more "dovish image" on the international stage. This plan argues that since Israel can't be defeated militarily in one fell swoop, the national Palestinian objective to achieve sovereignty over all of mandatory Palestine – including the State of Israel – can be achieved gradually, without giving up on "resistance" and the ultimate means of achieving this goal.<sup>b</sup> Secondly, **recruiting the PA's governmental bodies in the struggle against Israel**, from intense antisemitic and anti-Zionist incitement in the education system, through delegitimization in UN agencies and partnering with the BDS movement, to

promoting a popular struggle using primitive arms such as Molotov cocktails, stones, knives and others, demonstrated that it remains a substantial and strategic security threat to Israel and an entity that promotes a violent struggle against that state and its citizens.

The terror financing and terrorist employment policy, nicknamed "Pay for Slay," is the best indication of the fact that a policy of terror is deeply engrained in the very fabric of the PA and its actions. This is an enterprise that began in 1965 with the PLO and continued into the era of the Oslo Accords signed with Israel and up to today, while capitalizing on the sense of heroism surrounding the image of the "prisoner" (the Arabic word literally means "prisoner of war"), and the "martyr," as a central part of the violent Palestinian struggle against Israel.



Facebook post by the Fatah movement headed by Mahmoud Abbas encouraging targeting Jews as an act motivated by national religious Palestinian reasons, with a knife carrying the PLO flag

<sup>b</sup> This doctrine, which was adopted by the PLO in 1974, when Yasser Arafat subtly resonated it even after signing the Oslo Accords, when he referred to those agreements as "Khudeiba Agreements." The message was voiced more bluntly by other senior Palestinian officials. For more information, please refer to the following: [https://www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?fi=157&doc\\_id=9403](https://www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=9403)

## ■ The Palestinian Authority Is Open About This Policy

This policy was not kept under wraps. It was formulated into law through the formal legislative procedure and constitutes an overt and manifest Palestinian policy. From PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to members of the Palestinian government, consultants and civil servants, members of the PA have clearly expressed this policy in various forums, including the UN General Assembly, open conferences, and press statements.

Mahmoud Abbas (“Mahmoud Abbas”), the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, has spoken about it on a number of occasions, and openly declared that he had no intention of stopping to pay allowances to the “martyrs” and prisoners, even if he needed to pay them out of his own pocket; he even said so to Jared Kushner, the advisor to former US President Donald Trump. He emphasized the following in 2018, as well: **“The martyrs and their families are sacred, as are the prisoners and those wounded [in terror operations]. We must pay for all of these. The salaries of the martyrs, the prisoners, and our wounded are a red line. They [Israel] are pressuring us, in every way possible, saying ‘you must not pay it.’ They will even offset the amounts we pay to martyrs from our money, which is in their possession. We won’t let that happen. Even if we were left with just one penny, it’s for them, and not for the living.”**<sup>7</sup> He described payments to terrorists and terrorist employment as a subject that is “at the top of the Palestinian national priorities,” and exalted terrorists as “pioneers” and “stars in the sky of the



PA Chairman Mamhoud Abbas in a speech to the UN General Assembly (top) and in a rally near Ramallah encouraging terrorism and pledging to “pay to the last dime” they have to the terrorism funding apparatus  
Source: PMW, MEMRI

Palestinian nation's struggle.” **He even set the goal of this enterprise as “paving the road to the liberation of Palestine.”**<sup>8</sup> In 2020, he lashed out against the freezing of funds by Israel: “We swear to our honorable martyrs and our brave prisoners – [the Israelis] asked the banks not to pay prisoners, [but] we will pay prisoners, even if they disapprove!”<sup>9</sup>

In 2019, **speaking from the podium of the UN General Assembly**, President Abbas declared: “We say to them, to the families of the martyrs, that we will defend their rights regardless of the price we’ll have to pay.” I won’t submit to what Israel has requested. Even if I’m left with one penny,

I'll pay it to the families of the martyrs, to the prisoners, and to the wounded, and I won't withhold this from them."<sup>10</sup>

In 2018, the Director of PLO Commission of Prisoners' Affairs, Minister Issa Qaraqe, stated: **"I will quote President Abbas: 'Up to my last days, we shall not stop this support, it's important'... the families of each Palestinian prisoner receive social assistance. We are proud of this. We are not ashamed of it, and we say this openly, for it is our national, moral and human duty, and the duty of the struggle. It is supported by the Palestinian leadership and government."**<sup>11</sup>

In the Palestinian media, senior Palestinian officials speaking openly about this declared policy are often quoted. For example, on December 12th, 2013, WAFA, the Palestinian Authority's official news agency, published an article written by Justice Ali Abu Diak, the director of the Legal Advisory and Legislation Bureau, a government body run by the PA, which provides advice on legislation. Diak described how the then Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah had publicized the amended law on released prisoners and stressed the importance of adding new regulations that will sort out the issue of

salaries paid to released prisoners as well as employment grades. He stressed that before that amendment, the PA "stopped paying salaries to prisoners when their jail term was over, and this did not provide a solution for the payment of salaries to released prisoners, absorbing them into public service institutions, and their preferential treatment in employment opportunities after being released from captivity. This presented the new Palestinian government with a formidable challenge. The government understood how important it was to sort out this issue in the context of the national struggle, and it understood the need to enshrine in law prisoners' salaries, their ranks, and **the procedures used to absorb them into public service after their release."**

In July of 2021, Qadri Abu Bakr, the director of the Palestinian Authority's Authority for the Handling of Prisoner Affairs, stated as follows: "Our position regarding the payment of allowances and salaries to prisoners and their families remains unchanged. It is their right, which is enshrined in all of the international treaties and agreements, for our prisoners are prisoners belonging to a movement of liberation and freedom fighters."<sup>12</sup>



## ■ Conclusion

Against this backdrop, terrorism is considered a legitimate and key tool used to fulfill the PLO and PA's ultimate goal of establishing a Palestinian state to replace the State of Israel. The deeper rationale at its core is applying pressure on Israel and adversely ruining the morale of the Israeli public through a violent armed struggle. In this context, **the PA views the terrorist employment and payroll policy as constituting an important element in preserving its terror machine.**

All of the above fundamentally shatters the Palestinian Authority's benign image as a civilian, bureaucratic "Palestinian government" whose goal is achieving nothing other than an Israeli pullout to the 1967 lines, and consequently, an

organization that promotes a moderate approach that opposes violent resistance to Israel. Understanding the rationale at the foundation of the PA's realpolitik, and by analyzing their investments in antisemitic and anti-Israeli incitement, in delegitimizing Israel, and most importantly, in their tremendous economic project of encouraging and incentivizing terror against innocent Israelis, the PA has demonstrated that it poses a risk to Israel's security and that it is a major player in the violent opposition to Israel's very existence. By so doing, **the PA complies with the Israeli and international definition of a terror organization and constitutes a major player in the armed Palestinian struggle against Israel.**


## The Palestinian Authority's laws and PLO Regulations on terrorist salaries and the families of “martyrs”

The PA enshrined the payment of salaries to incarcerated and released terrorists in a series of laws and government edicts, particularly **Laws 14 and 19, from 2004, and Law 1, from 2013**. According to these laws, the prisoners are a “fighting sector, an inseparable part of the fabric of the Palestinian people,” and the financial rights of prisoners and their families must be guaranteed. The PA shall provide an allowance to every prisoner, without prejudice, a monthly allowance paid while the prisoner is incarcerated, and salaries and jobs after the prisoner is released. The prisoners are also eligible to receive an exemption from paying for education and health care, as well as vocational training.

According to the laws of the Palestinian Authority, all Palestinians incarcerated in Israel for carrying out acts of terror, including Arab citizens of Israel and residents of East Jerusalem, are included

on the list of those eligible to receive a monthly salary from the Palestinian Authority. It should be stated that prisoners serving a life term for civil offenses, such as automobile theft, are not eligible for this allowance. Terrorists from Jerusalem and Israeli Arabs receive a slightly higher salary.

Moreover, **in order to incentivize more lethal acts of terror against Israelis, the actual monthly salary paid to terrorists, the grants disbursed to released prisoners, the benefits to the families of incarcerated terrorists and the awarding of military or civil ranks to terrorists are based on a tiered system corresponding with the time they serve in prison.** Longer prison sentences earn prisoners’ higher salaries. For example, according to the decisions of the Palestinian government, the allocation given to a prisoner during his first three years in prison begins at \$431



**In comparison to the world average, the income level of a Palestinian terrorist serving 30 years in prison and above is ranked the 18<sup>th</sup> in the world. He/she earns 4 times the average Palestinian salary and 8 times the average Palestinian minimum wage**

Source on the world average income: International Labor Organization

USD per month and escalating to \$3,750 USD per month at the commencement of the 30<sup>th</sup> year of the sentence. A released terrorist continues to be granted an identical wage level as s/he received upon release from prison for the rest of his/her life. Should the released terrorist secure employment in the Palestinian civil service at a lower wage – the PA compensates them for the discrepancy (see next chapter).

Given that the average per capita monthly salary in the Palestinian Authority and Gaza totals approximately 905 USD, **a terrorist's income beginning in his 30<sup>th</sup> year in prison is four times higher than the average monthly salary for the average Palestinian, and 8 times higher than the average minimum wage in Judea & Samaria and Gaza** (while 27% of Palestinian employees earn less than this level). **Beginning on the 5<sup>th</sup> year of their incarceration, terrorists earn more than the average Palestinian salary, and far above the minimum wage.**<sup>13</sup> Moreover, **this is one of the highest salaries in the world: it amounts to an annual salary of \$44,100, and only 17 countries have higher average per capita salaries.**<sup>14</sup>

**According to data from the World Bank, salaries in the public sector in the PA are inflated in comparison with those of the rest of the Palestinian public.** For instance, by measuring the average monthly salaries in the public sector as opposed to the general GDP per capita, it is discernable that in 2013, the average per capita annual salary for workers in the public sector in the PA totaled \$11,059, which is **3.5 times**

**higher than the per capita Palestinian GDP that year.**<sup>15</sup> Still, **the salaries of terrorists in their 30<sup>th</sup> year of incarceration are almost 4 times higher than that.** These salaries are substantially higher than the base salaries of junior-level PA employees, like security guards and couriers (\$385 USD per month), higher than the next three ranks, which include the engineering and medical professions (up to \$617 USD per month), deputy ministers (about \$1,234 USD for a junior prosecutor, \$1,192 USD for magistrate court judges, and \$3,470 USD for the president of the Supreme Court).<sup>16</sup>

**The World Bank found that the ratio of the PA's spending on salaries in the public sector to its GDP is among the highest in the world. In the PA it is 17% of the GDP** while in most countries, this spending doesn't exceed 10%. The main factor behind this astronomical ratio is high salaries, particularly those received by the staff of the central government, rather than the size of the public sector. Even if we include Hamas employees, those employed by the central government constitute less than 5% of the population, a substantially lower percentage than in most countries. This inflated apparatus has been enhanced over the years, with the introduction of raises (8.4% in 2004 and 12.3% in 2006), and automatic rank promotion, which leads to a high pay grade. **The gap between the wages of employees in the public sector in the Palestinian Authority and the general public is much higher than that of any other region in the world, except for Africa,** and is even higher than the average gap throughout the

Middle East. The World Bank determined that “at the current rate, salary payments in the Palestinian Authority are clearly unsustainable.”<sup>17</sup> The astronomical salaries paid to terrorists constitute a


central component of these enormous amounts, increasing the social gaps in the PA such that Palestinians are incentivized to choose terror as a more secure career path.

## ■ Additional benefits

**Release grant:** According to the tiered system mentioned above, every released prisoner who had served at least one year in prison is eligible for a **one-time release grant**, commensurate with time served in prison, which ranges from **\$1,500 to no less than \$25,000**.

**Rank:** Furthermore, according to the tiered system, each released prisoner who had served at least 5 years in prison receives a military or a civil service rank, ranging from department head to minister in the civilian rank system, and senior lieutenant colonel and up in the military ranking system.

**Social benefits:** Security prisoners and released prisoners are also eligible for certain social benefits. PA law determines that **the prisoner and his children shall be eligible for access to education** (apparently elementary and high school education for children, and academic education for fathers), **tuition-free education at schools and universities, full coverage of health care, and full coverage of tuition for all vocational training programs that the relevant official entity offers** (Section 6 of the 2013 amendment).



**According to the tiered wages system, a terrorist earns more than the Palestinian average salary from the 5<sup>th</sup> year of their time in prison and far above the minimum wage.**

**From the 30<sup>th</sup> year of their prison sentence, a terrorist earns one of the highest wages in the PA territories and in Gaza**



**The following is a table listing the complete allowance scale according to the laws of the Palestinian Authority:**

Monthly salary, based on prison sentence		Grants to released prisoners	
Length of incarceration in years	Monthly salary in USD	Number of years in prison	Payment in USD
Up to 3	437	1-3	1,500
3-5	625	3-5	2,500
5-10	1,250	5-8	3,500
10-15	1,875	8-11	4,500
15-20	2,187	11-15	6,000
20-25	2,500	15-18	8,000
25-30	3,175	18-21	10,000
Over 30	3,750	21-25	12,000
		25-30	15,000
		30 and above	25,000

**Index detailing Employee Promotion by Military Rank:**

Number of years in prison	Civilian rank	Military rank
5-6 years	Department Head	Lieutenant
6-8 years	Class 3 manager	Captain
8-10 years	Class 2 manager	Major
10-15 years	Class 1 manager	Senior Lieutenant Colonel
15-20 years	General Manager	Colonel
20-25 years	Assistant Brigadier General	Brigadier General
25-30 years	Deputy minister	Major General
30 years and above	Minister	Senior Major General

## Examples of terrorists and the families of "martyrs" eligible for allowances:

Among the terrorists receiving these benefits are:

- **Omar Abu Jalal**, who murdered three members of the Solomon family and is expected to receive about \$2.04 million USD throughout his lifetime.
- **Abd Al-Hakim Asi**, who murdered Rabbi Itamar Ben Gal, and is expected to receive a similar amount.
- **Karem Fathi Lutfi Razeq**, who murdered Eitam and Na'ama Henkin and received 2 life sentences plus thirty years, and is expected to receive about \$2.04 million USD over the course of his life.
- **Maher Hamdi el-Hashlamoun**, who was sentenced to 2 life terms for the murder of Dalia Lemkus in a ramming and stabbing attack, and is expected to receive about \$1.76 million USD over the course of his life.
- **Amjad Awad and Hakim Awad**, who murdered the five members of the Fogel family from Itamar, including a 3-month-old baby, and received 5 life sentences and 7 additional years in prison, are expected to receive about \$2.13 million USD each over the course of their lives.



Amjad and Hakim Awwad, who murdered the five members of the Fogel family, are expected to receive about 2.13 million USD each over the course of their lives

## ■ Testimony of Terrorists Who Were Incentivized By The Policy

We have collected multiple testimonies of terrorists who testified that **this policy of the Palestinian Authority, combined with their poor financial situation and their desire to participate in the Palestinian armed struggle, impelled them to choose the path of terror.**

One such testimony is that of Hosni Najar, a 24-year-old laborer in a shoe factory in Hebron, who was arrested in 2013 on suspicion of conspiring to obtain firearms

to carry out terror attacks against Israeli targets, conspiring to carry out crimes alongside others, receipt of monies from Hamas in Gaza and recruiting others to form a paramilitary unit in order to carry out shooting attacks against Israeli targets. He had previously been imprisoned on charges of belonging to a paramilitary unit of Hamas and planning shooting attacks as well as suicide bombings.

He testified: "I had financial difficulties. I was engaged, and after my release (from prison) I started to work in a shoe factory for a (monthly salary) of \$475 USD."; Najjar had also received a "salary from the Office of Palestinian Prisoners" following his previous incarceration as well as a salary from the Hamas-backed Al-Nour organization. "I was \$9,500 USD for my wedding in September. Because of my difficult financial situation, I decided to arrange an imaginary situation with the

Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) so that I could get arrested and spend more than 5 years in prison, **so that I could receive a fixed salary from the PA stipend budget, so as to cover by debts** and (have some money left over) for my wedding. After I spend 5 years (in prison) I will have a (monthly) salary of \$1,250 USD, and that amount for 3 years (will reach) \$45,000 USD, and that's how I'll close my debts, so **this whole issue was a financial (savings) plan**".

שם באזהרות לטיוטות		שם משפחה/ שם המלא		שם פרטי/ الاسم الشخصي		מס' זהות/ رقم الهوية	
נגאר		נגאר		חוסני		[REDACTED]	
מין/ الجنس		מצב משפחתי/ لحالة اجتماعية		שם ביטוי/ لقب		שם קודם/ اسم سابق	
זכר		רווק					
דת/ الدين		מסל/ مذهب		מקום לידה/ مكان الولادة		תאריך לידה/ تاريخ الميلاد	
מוסלמי		רווק		גדמ"ע		1989	
מסל/ مذهب		טל. בית / تلفون البيت		מקום מגורים/ اسم وعنوان مكان العمل		מקום מגורים/ اسم وعنوان مكان العمل	
[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]		חברון		[REDACTED]	
שם האב/ اسم الأب		שם סבו/ اسم الجد		שם האב/ اسم الأب		שם סבו/ اسم الجد	
עאליה		חליל		מחמד		[REDACTED]	
טלפונים גוסמים/ تلفون إيماني آخر		מקצוע/ المهنة		פועל		פועל בנעליים בחברון	

ראית את הנ"ל בפני ואמרתי לו אני חוקר משטרה ושמי זאכי ברצוני לחקור אותך תחת אזהרה  
 חשוד ב: תכנון עם נוספים להשגת נשק בכדי לבצע פיגוע טרור נגד מטרות ישראליות, קשר  
 לבצע פשע עם נוספים, קבלת כספים שמקורם מחמאס בעזה, גיוס נוספים לחוליה צבאית  
 במטרה לבצע פיגוע ירי נגד מטרות ישראליות, ופגיעה בביטחון האזור.

ש: מה קרה אתך אחר כך?

ת: בגלל מצבי הכספי הקשה כפי שאמרתי לך, החלטתי לסדר איזה תכנית דמיונית אצל  
 השב"כ הישראלי בכדי שאני איעצר ויהיה לי יותר מ-5 שנים בכלא וזה בכדי שאקבל  
 משכורת קבועה ככספי קצבה מהרש"פ וזה בכדי לחסות את החובות והשלמה לחתונה,  
 אחרי שיהיה לי 5 שנים יהיה לי משכורת בערך 4000 שקל והסכום הזה למשך 3 שנים  
 כלומר יהיה סכום 135000 שקל וכך אני אחסה את החובות שלי, כלומר כל הנושא הזה  
 הינו תכנית כלכלית ועשיתי תכנון כניסה לכלא הישראלי, ופניתי למספר אנשים מחברון  
 ובית פגאר ובית לחם ועבדתי עליהם שיש פעילות צבאית מעשית נגד ישראל ועבדתי עליהם  
 שישנה לי כוונה להשיג נשק.

### Terrorist Hosni Najjar's testimony

## ■ PLO Regulations Concerning the Families of Martyrs and the Wounded

According to PLO regulations, the families of “martyrs” will be compensated as well. The family of a “martyr” is granted **\$1,851 USD as a one-time bursary** upon the commitment of the terrorism act, followed by a **base monthly salary of \$431 USD**, as well as **wage supplements** as per the particular case of the individual who carried out the terror act, such as a spouse supplement, child supplement and an additional supplement for residents of East Jerusalem or Arab-Israelis.

The PLO's “**Institute for the Handling of the Families of Martyrs and the Wounded**,” which is responsible for executing this policy, has confirmed that its objective is to provide financial incentives for acts of terror and to promote the Palestinian armed struggle within Israel, and even **refrains to referring to Israel by name**, calling it “the Zionist Entity” instead.

The goals of the office: The Institute strives to guarantee dignified lives for all of the families of Martyrs and the wounded, who were harmed as a result of their participation in the Palestinian Revolution, or were harmed because of the revolution so that they can live comfortably within society. This is done without discrimination based on political or ideological affiliation, and by providing access to social welfare programs, health care, rehabilitation and development for the families of martyrs, the wounded, and the families of the victims of the war against the Zionist Entity. (2014)


The following is a table listing all of the allowances paid to the families of wounded and killed terrorists:<sup>18</sup>

### **Financial allocations to the families of casualties and the wounded, in USD**

	One-time bursary	Base	Supplements
Married KIA – spouse supplement	1,851	431	123
KIA with children			61/child
KIA resident of Jerusalem			92
KIA resident of Israel			92

## Financial allocations by rank, in USD

Rank	Allocation amount	Rank	Allocation amount
Private	401	Lieutenant	635
Corporal	425	Captain	697
Sergeant	450	Major	783
Staff Sergeant	475	Lieutenant Colonel	860
Sergeant First Class	515	Colonel	1,015
Master Sergeant	1,800	Brigadier General	3,590
2nd lieutenant	1,930	Major General	3,990



**A family of a terrorist who died in action receives 1,875 USD as a one-time bursary and a lifelong stipend totaling 437 USD, in addition to wage supplements in particular cases**



## The Palestinian Authority's laws on the employment of terrorists: Terrorists as civil servants

Not only does the PA pay monthly salaries to terrorists and their families, but it also **absorbs released prisoners into the PA's administration, where they work as civil servants.**

According to Palestinian Authority Law, Regulation No. 1 (2013) on the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners (2004), Section 5:

1. **The State [The Palestinian Authority] will guarantee employment to released prisoners,** according to criteria that take into consideration the number of years spent in prison, the prisoner's level of education and his employability.
2. Released prisoners will be given priority in annual job placements in all State institutions, according to the laws that are in force.
3. If the State is unable to guarantee the prisoners employment according to the previous sub-article, it will be obligated to do as follows:
  - a. **Pay a monthly salary** to every released male prisoner who spent five to ten years in prison and every released female prisoner [who spent] two to five years in prison.
  - b. [...]
  - c. A male prisoner who was incarcerated for ten years or more, and a female prisoner who

was incarcerated for five years or more, will be given a salaried position in a state institution, without detracting from the rights of the released prisoners [employed as] civil servants.

Section 8 states the following:

3. The State [The Palestinian Authority] will continue paying the salaries of released prisoners [employed as] civil servants.
4. If the salary of a released prisoner [employed as] a civil servant is lower than the salary he received in prison, **the State will make up the difference.**

It should be noted that the PA calculates terrorists' years of imprisonment as years counting toward their seniority in public service. Anyone sentenced to at least 5 years in prison is eligible for a job, and the longer that person spends in prison, the higher the pay grade. This means that **the PA gives preference to terrorists over ordinary citizens who had not chosen the path of terrorism when hiring staff for its governmental administration and is an entity that hires convicted terrorists. These form an inseparable part of its ongoing activities, including, absurdly, the Palestinian security forces** who are responsible for maintaining law and order. Some of them are even involved in the

aforementioned cooperation with their Israeli counterparts.

**The scope of the actual employment of released terrorists within the PA's composition, as proscribed by law, is unknown, and it seems that it was minimal until recently.** Most of them received the lavished salaries that they were promised but were not employed by the PA. According to Qadri Abu Bakr, the Head of the Authority for the Handling of Released and Incarcerated Prisoners, during 2020, this reality led to financial pressure on the PA, and consequently, it struggled to pay all of its debts to the universities on account of tuition for released and incarcerated terrorists. To cope with this hardship, Mahmoud Abbas, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, established a committee whose role was to assess the PA's capacity to meet its commitment to integrate released terrorists into the PA's institutions es, with an emphasis on the security forces. The rationale behind the approach was budgetary as it would allow for most of their salaries would not be paid by the PA government agencies which would absorb them, rather than the Commission for Prisoners' Affairs. As such, those released terrorists would not be unemployed but rather be given jobs and work – purportedly, at least.

Indeed, the committee recommended employing released terrorists within the PA's apparatuses, including security forces. The director of the Commission for Prisoners' Affairs, Qadri Abu Bakr, argued

at several opportunities that the new arrangement will enter into force immediately, but as of now, we have nothing that verifies that the committee's recommendations are truly implemented. **Their implementation may lead to an absurd reality in which released terrorists hold senior positions in the PA, including the security forces, which are responsible for, inter alia, fighting terror.**

Abu Bakr also publicly expressed his support for employing released prisoners in the PA's security establishment: "A prisoner that is released from prison received the salary of a released prisoner, without working, without doing anything. We discussed the need to employ them with the president [Abbas], that is, to employ the [released] prisoners, so that no one feels as though he is high-ranking, and is sitting around [without doing anything]. We have [released prisoners] with matriculation certificates, bachelor's degrees, master's degrees, and even doctorates. **Why should we not incorporate them into the Palestinian Authority's governmental agencies?** Several days ago, the president accepted this suggestion, and formed a very high-level committee headed by the prime minister, Mohammed Shtayyeh, to begin incorporating these prisoners... We have between 7,000 and 8,000 released prisoners receiving this salary. [They can be given] security jobs in the security establishment, or government ministries, in the PA's agencies and its commissions."<sup>19</sup>

## In Numbers: The PA's Payments To Terrorists

The implementation of this policy illustrates how hard the Palestinian Authority has been trying to promote violent resistance to the very existence of the State of Israel, and to **incentivize the murder of innocent Israelis – that is, to carry out terrorism.**

Since 2013, the PA dedicated **more than \$3 billion USD** for this purpose.


For instance, in 2018, the total budget allocated to the financing of salaries of incarcerated prisoners, released prisoners and the families of “martyrs” and the wounded was **\$380 million USD**, which constituted about **7.4% of the PA's budget**, or about **44% of the total foreign aid budget** which it was due to receive from

donor countries and others. **This is an extensive terrorist infrastructure, which constitutes a vital part of the overall activities conducted by the Palestinian Authority.**

Currently, **5,000 prisoners and 7,200 released prisoners receive these payments, as well as 37,500 family members of “Martyrs” and the wounded.**<sup>20</sup>

<sup>21</sup>

Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority budgets another \$930 thousand USD per month to be used on shopping at the prison shop (the “Cantina”), equivalent to about \$123 USD per incarcerated prisoner per month.



**Since 2013, the PA has allocated more than 3 billion USD to the stipends and employment apparatus for terrorists and the families of the “martyrs” and wounded.**

**The average annual amount allocated for this purpose totals over \$300 million USD.**

*\* Estimated supplement to 2019-2020 – see table below*

**The following is comprehensive budget data that lists payments made by the Palestinian Authority to terrorists and their families since 2013 (in USD):<sup>c</sup>**

	2013 <sup>22</sup>	2014 <sup>23</sup>	2015 <sup>24</sup>	2016 <sup>25</sup>
<b>1. Salaries paid to incarcerated terrorists and released prisoners</b>	130.27 million (a total of 163.07 million, including management costs)	136.11 million	147.95 million	150.13 million
<b>2. Salaries paid to the families of "Martyrs"</b>	185.54 million	190.15 million	190.71 million	203.99 million
<b>Total salaries supporting terror (line 1-2)</b>	315.8 million	326.27 million	338.66 million	354.12 million
<b>Percentage of the foreign aid budget</b>	20%	24%	14.8%	29.6%
<b>Percentage of total budget</b>	7%	7%	7%	6.9%
<b>Total budget of the Palestinian Authority</b>	4.42 billion	4.54 billion	4.83 billion	5.1 billion
<b>Total foreign aid</b>	1.51 billion 1.39 billion – current budget, 118.04 million - development budget)	1.35 billion (1.13 billion – current budget, 223.17 million - development budget)	2.28 billion (960 million – current budget, 1.32 billion - development budget)	1.19 billion (899.13 million – current budget, 293.87 million - development budget)
<b>Funds transferred from the Palestinian Authority to the PLO ("Transferred Expenses")</b>		27.79 million	166.95 million	191.94 million
<b>Total transfers from the Palestinian Authority to "PLO Agencies"</b>		101.01 million	246.19 million	276.25 million

<sup>c</sup> It should be noted that some of these amounts are based on the Palestinian Authority's planned budgets and are inconsistent with the summation of those line items in the PA's end-of-year performance reports. Those line items vary dramatically from year to year, and reflect a liquid and dynamic apparatus, which also makes it possible for dozens of millions of USD to "disappear" during that time.

The number of released prisoners currently employed in the PA's apparatuses is unknown.

	2017	2018 <sup>26 27 28</sup>	2019 <sup>29</sup>	2020 <sup>30 31</sup>
<b>1. Salaries paid to incarcerated terrorists and released prisoners</b>	169.07 million	169.07 million Of which: ~70 million is salaries to incarcerated terrorists ~54 million is for released prisoners ~29.5 million for continuing education and other benefits	159.05 million*	137.9 million*
<b>2. Salaries paid to the families of Martyrs</b>	211.18 million	211.18 million	45.7 million*	45.77 million*
<b>Total salaries supporting terror (line 1-2)</b>	380.25 million	380.25 million	204.82 million*	187.73 million*
<b>Percentage of the foreign aid budget</b>	52.6%	44%	41.6%	36.4%
<b>Percentage of total operating budget</b>	8.1%	7.47%	4.06%	3.75%
<b>Total budget of the Palestinian Authority</b>	4.64 billion <sup>32</sup>	5.09 billion	5.04 billion <sup>33</sup>	4.89 billion <sup>34</sup>
<b>Total foreign aid</b>	720 million <sup>35</sup>	860 million	490 million <sup>36</sup>	504.13 million <sup>37</sup>
<b>Funds transferred from the Palestinian Authority to the PLO ("Transferred Expenses")</b>	193.8 million	40.64 million	49.5 million	207.12 million
<b>Total transfers from the Palestinian Authority to "PLO Agencies"</b>	282 million	128.9 million	138.94 million	310.4 million (6.25% of the budget)

\*The data is based on the NBCTF's partial and conservative estimates, based on earmarked items within the Palestinian Authority's budget.

The 3 first months of 2020 were paid in advance, in December of 2019.



## 80 times higher investment in terrorism than in health

In 2018, the budget of the Palestinian Ministry of Health, which is responsible for the health of 5 million inhabitants, stood at \$530 million USD (\$111.6 USD per capita per year), while the budget paying beneficiaries of terrorists, which serves 12,200 incarcerated and released prisoners, and 37,500 family members of “martyrs” and wounded terrorists, which constitute a minuscule part of the population, stands at \$370 million USD (\$8,820 USD per capita per year). This means that the PA allocates 78.98 times more budgets per capita for terrorism than for health.

**370 million USD/year**  
Stipends for terrorists and families of “martyrs” (several thousands)



**8,820**

**Health first?**



**530 million USD/year**  
Palestinian Health Ministry's budget (for 5 million residents)

**111.6**

USD per capita/year

\* Although the law determines that the allocations will be distributed “without prejudice,” in practice, the PA cut about one-third of the salaries of released prisoners from Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in December of 2015. Later, following tensions with the PFLP, allocations paid to incarcerated terrorists affiliated with that organization were reduced as well. Issa Qaraqe, the PA Minister of Prisoners’ Affairs, railed against this, exclaiming: “It’s unacceptable that the ministry of finance would cut prisoners’ salaries.” In this statement, the minister confirmed that the PA is the one funding terror and that if it wished, it could cut that financing as well – as it already had.

### ■ Expenses of the Commission of Prisoners and Released Prisoners' Affairs

The PA's efficient bureaucracy dedicates substantial sums of money to the operation of the terror financing apparatus itself. For instance, in 2018, about \$5.8 million USD were allocated for the salaries of the employees of the PLO Commission of Prisoners and Released Prisoners' Affairs, in addition to amounts loosely distributed between the terrorists themselves and the PA's public servants.

#### Expenses (USD) of the PLO Commission of Prisoners and Released Prisoners' Affairs

Direct transfers	Social payments	Ministry employees' salaries	Expenses for goods and services	Capital expenditures	Total expenses
154,525,790.2	64,805,312.4	5,832,484.2	1,135,511.5	166,914.6	<b>226,465,705.8</b>

Source: National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, the Ministry of Defense, from a budget execution report for 2018, prepared by the Palestinian Authority, as published on the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Finance and Planning.<sup>38</sup>

## The structure of the terrorist financing apparatus

The bureaucratic apparatus in the PA that oversees the implementation of the law has undergone overhauls over the years, while concealing and disguising large-scale corruption. For instance, between 2014 and 2020, responsibility over the terrorist salary and employment apparatus was transferred from the Palestinian Authority's "Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs" (later dubbed by the PA "Commission for Detainees' Affairs") to the PLO's "Commission of Prisoners' Affairs," and later, in 2018, it reverted back to the jurisdiction of the Institute for the Handling of Incarcerated and Released Prisoners, under the PA. The substantial budgetary anomalies that occurred during this period, which reached hundreds of millions of USD, demonstrate how arbitrary this apparatus is, as well as the fact that **the PA is exposed to international pressure, and in some cases, it takes symbolic steps to create the facade that this institution is indeed disconnected from the PA's agencies.**

In 2014, 2018 and 2019, the PA's "Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs" paid terrorists directly and openly, while in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2020, payments were transferred through the Palestinian National Fund (PNF), which transferred those funds to the PLO's "Commission of Prisoners' Affairs."<sup>39</sup> This, for instance, is how the "transferred expenses" in the PA's budget, i.e. the funds transferred to the PLO, skyrocketed by no

less than 300% between 2019 and 2020, following these bureaucratic changes.


Indeed, following pressure on the part of the international community, in 2014, PA Chairman Abbas issued a presidential decree, according to which **the terror financing apparatus would be removed from the PA's Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs and placed under the PLO's Commission of Prisoners' Affairs.** This was meant to placate the donor countries and create an artificial separation between the terror financing bodies and the PA itself. Abbas even used this argument at a 2017 meeting with President Trump, who was visiting Ramallah, in an attempt to drive a wedge between the PA and the terror incentivizing system that consistently threaten Israelis. However, the funds for these allowances come directly from the Palestinian Authority's budget. The PA is the one overseeing the finances of the PLO's National Fund, and the official responsible for those payments is the same official who was responsible for the payments when they were disbursed by the PA directly.

Senior PA officials vocally admit that this artificial separation, which ended blatantly in 2018 following the legislation of the Taylor Force Act, was nothing but lip service. For example, in September of 2014, Ibrahim Najjara, who was the officer in charge of detainee affairs in Hebron,

stated that the transfer from the PA to the PLO's committee "will not detract from the value of the prisoners or their legal, moral or political status, since the services provided to them are enshrined in law," and that President Abbas will personally oversee this. In December of 2015, Ali Abu Diak, the secretary-general of the Palestinian government, explained that the PA (and not the PLO) is duty-bound to transfer the payments "to the incarcerated fighters, due to their national struggle," and

to the families of "martyrs" and the wounded.

It should be noted that the sums transferred to the PLO amount to millions of USD, and reached over \$300 million USD 2020. In fact, since 2011, the PA has transferred the astronomical amount of over \$2.47 billion USD to the PLO. Many of these budget line items often remain under vague and problematic titles.<sup>d</sup>



**"Transferred Expenditures" in the PA's budget (in ILS), including payments to terrorists**  
Source: PalWatch<sup>40</sup>

<sup>d</sup> For more information, see "Palestinian Media Watch" (PalWatch):  
[https://www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?fi=157&doc\\_id=27840](https://www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=27840)

## ■ ATM Cards

In July of 2021, the PA announced a new policy of making it easier for prisoners and the families of “martyrs” to claim their benefits. The payments would be conducted using ATM cards, and to that end, dozens of ATMs were installed throughout Palestinian Authority-controlled territory, and thousands of cards were distributed to prisoners and their families.

In July of 2021, Qadri Abu-Baker, Director of the Palestinian Authority-funded PLO Commission of Prisoners' Affairs, announced a new policy: this guaranteed that a “simpler system” would be created, one that would “preserve the dignity of the prisoners and their families. Now, the prisoners' relatives can receive their salaries and grants without crowding in line, effortlessly, and without wasting lots of time... using ATM cards.”

The official Palestinian media outlet announced the new plan to distribute ATM cards. The Palestinian minister of communication and information, Ishaq Sider, announced the following: “We have created a **comprehensive banking arrangement** which is a cash management system that transfers information between us and the ATM machines. We have already installed 20 ATMs in residential areas, in which the beneficiaries of these services reside, and with Allah's help, we'll have 30 ATMs installed within the coming days.”<sup>41 42</sup>

After the entry into force of Ordinance 67 on the “Order on Security Directives” in Judea and Samaria, which may expose banks involved in this process to liability in Israeli courts because of the policy that prohibits the facilitation of financial rewards for terrorism, 35,000 bank accounts were closed. The PA decided to pre-empt the ordinance through the issuance of an advance payment for the months of January and February of 2021, and by calling on **the Palestinian Postal Bank** to distribute payments to terrorists and their families in cash. This led to complaints by the terrorists and their families, who claimed to have been treated “like beggars.”<sup>43</sup>

On April 5th, 2021, the Commission of Prisoners published an announcement regarding the change, which, according to the statement, was a **temporary change, until the released terrorists were officially integrated into the PA's administration, so that these salaries could be paid to them in the form of an innocent-looking standard public servant salary**: “The released prisoners will receive a payment this month through the post offices, **until their integration process into state institutions is concluded**. Those of them who will work and be integrated into the official institutions, both civilian and military, will receive their payments through the institution they belong to, and through smart cards.”<sup>44</sup>



## Legal aspects of the PA's terror apparatus, and the relevant American and Israeli offsetting laws

A legal opinion by **ambassador Adv. (ret.) Alan Baker**, the director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, greatly contributed to this chapter. Adv. Baker served as the legal advisor and deputy director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the Israeli ambassador to Canada, and he represents Israel at international conferences and negotiations tied to aspects of international law.

This conduct on the part of the Palestinian Authority constitutes a flagrant violation of international norms and its commitments toward the international community and Israel. As was mentioned above, the PLO is an umbrella organization under which several organizations operate, including the PA, and as such, the Oslo Accords were signed between Israel and the PLO. For this reason, the PA is nothing more than a “creature of the PLO-Israel agreements,” and accordingly, the obligations to refrain from, to act against, and to discourage terrorism are equally applicable to the PLO and the PA.

The PLO's commitment to act against terrorism, violence, and incitement first appears in an exchange of letters between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, dated September 9, 1993: “The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, **the PLO renounces**

**the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility for all PLO elements and personnel** in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.”

The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as Oslo II, sets forth the relations with donating countries in its “Protocol concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements (Annex I),” second article on “Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence.” It was agreed that agreements between the PLO and countries donating funds for the PA are to be limited to implementing arrangements for assistance to the PA in the fulfillment of its functions. **Payment of salaries and benefits to prisoners who committed acts of terrorism are clearly incompatible with this requirement**, whether such payments are channeled through the PLO or directly the PA.

Therefore, **the transfer of funds from donor countries for this purpose is a clear violation of Palestinian commitments to their agreements with Israel.**

## ■ International Law and Norms

Preventing terror financing stands at the forefront of international efforts to combat terrorism. The duty to take measures to prevent terror financing was included in all of the relevant international and regional treaties, as well as UN resolutions, particularly when it promotes and supports terror, practically and morally.

On the international level, the **1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism** to which the United States is a party since 2002 is one of a series of international counter-terror conventions. It **criminalizes** the provision of funding, directly or indirectly, for any use connected with terrorism.

The 1994 UN Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (General Assembly resolution 49/60) calls upon states to refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, encouraging, tolerating, and financing terror activities.

UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted following the 2001 World Trade Center attacks (9/11). This obligatory resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which addresses threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, recognized "the need for states to

complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing, and preparation of any acts of terrorism." It **criminalized all provision of funding for terrorist use, instituted a freeze on, and prohibition of transfer of funds and assets of persons who commit terrorist acts.**

The 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Plan of Action (annexed to General Assembly resolution 60/288) repeats the resolve of member states to prevent and combat terrorism, including through refraining from financing terror and specifically encourages states to implement international standards on money laundering and terrorist financing.

On the regional level, the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, as amended, reaffirms all the counter-terrorism conventions, including the 1999 Terrorism financing convention. The 2002 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which contains a specific Article 4 detailing measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the financing of terrorism, Article 5 on the seizure and confiscation of funds or other assets, and Article 6 relating to money laundering.

## ■ US Law and Its Enforcement

Over the years, the United States has taken judicial measures to freeze aid money transferred to the Palestinian Authority, due to its financial support for terror.

The US aid to the Palestinians can be roughly divided into two components: the first component is **bilateral aid** which includes the Economic Support Fund (ESF), **Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement** (INCLE); and aid provided for **Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs** (NADR). The ESF aid accounts for the vast majority of the aid. The US has donated over \$5 billion USD to the PA since 1994 for these purposes. The second component is **aid to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)**, which has totaled over \$6 billion USD since 1950, of which around \$4.5 billion USD since 1994.<sup>45</sup>

Following the uproar caused by statements that were publicized on the PA's terror financing policy, in 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (2016) was passed in the US Congress, which obligates the Secretary of State to **"reduce the amount of assistance** made available by this Act under the heading 'Economic Support Fund' for the Palestinian Authority by an amount the Secretary determines is equivalent to the **amount expended by the Palestinian Authority**, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and any successor or affiliated organizations with such entities **as payments for acts of terrorism by individuals who are imprisoned** after being fairly tried and convicted for acts of

**terrorism and by individuals who died committing acts of terrorism** during the previous calendar year."<sup>46</sup>

As a result of a misleading report issued by the US State Department, which claims that the Palestinian Authority is to introduce the required changes in this area, US aid continued to flow.

The most significant step taken until today with regard to the American posture toward the Palestinian Authority's incentivization of terror as a function of US foreign aid is the Taylor Force Act, passed in March 2018, which is named for a discharged American officer who was murdered by a Palestinian terrorist during a terrorist act in Tel Aviv, in March of 2016. The act **completely freezes aid money to the PA under the ESF until the complete cessation of the Pay for Slay apparatus**, as well as "taking credible steps to end acts of violence against Israeli citizens and United States citizens," investigating them, and bringing those responsible to face justice. The bill was introduced by Congressman Doug Lamborn in February of 2017. It cleared the House of Representatives in December of 2017 and was then presented to the Senate by senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC), Dan Coats (R-IN) and Roy Blunt (R-MO). It was passed in the Senate in March of 2018 and signed into law by President Trump the very same day.<sup>47</sup> Sander Gerber, the CEO of Hudson Bay Capital and a consultant on international terror financing, alongside Stuart Force, the father of U.S. Army Capt. Taylor Force,

were among those who spearheaded this legislation.

In the United States, this PA policy was called “the epitome of Palestinian Authority incitement through generous incentives to carry out acts of violence.”<sup>48</sup> Just before signing the bill into law, President Trump made the following announcement: “...the practice of #PaytoSlay must be stopped.”<sup>49</sup>

The Palestinian Authority and the PLO publicly condemned this legislation and made the following statement: “In the eyes of our people, our nation, and our cause, the “martyrs” and prisoners are sacred symbols of freedom, struggle, protecting human dignity, and resistance to submission and humiliation. All of these titles are noble titles, and an anchored right of all humans, which cannot be bought or sold for any fortune in the world.” Husam Zomlot, the Head of PLO General Commission in the US, declared that the Palestinian leadership will not submit to financial “extortion.” Moreover, after the Anti-terrorism Clarification Act (ACTA) was passed, in 2018 – an act that determined that any body in receipt of US aid must agree to the jurisdiction of the US courts to adjudicate claims by victims of acts of terror caused by its actions, and that may have fateful repercussions on US aid to the PA, Palestinian Prime Minister Shtayyeh wrote a letter to US Secretary of State Pompeo in which he requested that the United States cease all financial assistance to the PA. **When faced with the**

**decision to choose either terror financing or receiving foreign aid, the PA chose terror financing.**<sup>50</sup>

It should be noted that in the meeting that eleven Republican and Democratic congressmen had with Mahmoud Abbas, on July 8, 2021, in Ramallah, the congressmen raised the issue of the transfer of funds to prisoners and families of the “martyrs” to PA Chairman Abbas. The congressmen made clear that they found these transfers completely unacceptable, as they violate the Taylor Force Act of 2018 which prohibits the administration from providing financial assistance to the PA as long as it continues paying salaries to terrorists and fails to cancel the law that regularizes this. The congressmen said that Abbas defended this policy, claiming that these were welfare payments to needy families, yet this claim by Abbas alongside other Palestinian participants was met with a great deal of skepticism by these members of congress. The subject came up against in a meeting with Hady Amr, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs at State Department, with Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh. Responding to the congressmen's question regarding whether cancer patients also receive this type of support from the PA, Abbas responded that the creation of support apparatus for this type of needy individuals is currently under way.<sup>51</sup>

## ■ Israeli Law and Its Enforcement

Over the years, on an official level, the State of Israel refrained from taking concrete measures to combat the Palestinian Authority's terror incentivization apparatus, beyond the rhetorical level. In July 2018, **the law to freeze funds that the Palestinian Authority transfers to terrorists**<sup>52</sup>, was submitted by MK Elazar Stern and MK Avi Dichter and passed in the second and third readings. According to the law, Israel must offset an amount equal to the monthly sum the PA transferred to the terrorist salary apparatus in the previous year from the money it transfers monthly to the PA, pursuant to the agreements between them. By law, the Ministry of Defense must issue a report, at the end of each calendar year, stating the amount the PA allocates to the terror financing apparatus, and, subject to the approval of the Security Cabinet, Israel shall offset 1/12 of this amount from the funds it transfers to the PA in the subsequent year.

When the law was passed, MP Stern said that the law "reduces terror and promotes peace, simultaneously." The following appears in the explanatory notes:

"Every year, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organization disburse exorbitant sums to those involved in acts of terror against Israelis and their families in the form of salaries and benefits to Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli prisons (during and even after their incarceration), and an allowance grant to Palestinian families whose relatives were killed or wounded in the said acts. **Transferring these payments is tantamount to expressing support for acts of terror.**

This means that **the State of Israel is indirectly funding the said payments**, through the transfer of funds to the Palestinian Authority. No country

could agree to such a thing. Therefore, it is proposed to offset the amount of financial aid to terror operatives and their relatives in the previous year from the funds transferred to the Palestinian Authority, in accordance with the said laws. This amount shall be determined in the annual report published by the Minister of Defense."<sup>53</sup>

The Palestinian Authority responded harshly to this step, and for a certain time period, even refused to receive the tax revenue that Israel needed to transfer to it, to avoid implying that it recognizes the reality that the Israeli law wishes to dictate, i.e., the need to offset terrorist salaries from the funds being transferred to the PA.

**For various reasons, the implementation of this law has faced snags since it was passed.** In February of 2019, an amount equal to 1/12 of the amount determined by the Ministry of Defense, which was allocated by the PA to the terror financing apparatus, was offset for the first time. During 2020, however, Israel was accused of failing to enforce the law, fearing a change in the status quo and the collapse of the PA, or of providing compensation for the offset in other ways. Sure enough, in July of 2021, the IDF reported to the Security Cabinet that the offset for 2019 had not yet been completed,<sup>54</sup>, i.e., the 2019 offset had been delayed, and the 2020 offset had not been executed at all. A meeting in the Security Cabinet regarding the offsetting of 2019 funds was held as late as November 2020, for various reasons, including political instability and the COVID-19 crisis, and approval was given for the offset of 187 million USD from the funds that Israel transfers to the PA.



The following meeting was held in December of 2020 regarding the freezing of funds for that year.

It should be stressed that **the offset law was passed despite stark opposition by the security establishment, including the IDF and the Israeli Security Agency ("Shin Bet"). In Security Cabinet meetings, the security establishment repeatedly warns that implementing the report jeopardizes the stability of the Palestinian Authority and may cause its collapse while disregarding the rampant corruption in the PA's governmental agencies involving hundreds of millions of dollars per year, and without providing an alternative that would change the current dire situation.** For example, in July of 2021, during a cabinet meeting, when the Ministry of Defense's report was presented, the security establishment supported the ministers opposed to the setoff. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories ("COGAT"), Major General Ghassan Alian, expressed his reservations to the ministers regarding the freezing of funds at the current time. He said that the PA was in the midst of a domestic financial crisis and needed those funds. Since the 2019 offset had not yet been fully implemented, a simultaneous double offset would confound its situation, though it was not predicted to collapse due to this measure. Shin Bet representatives seconded COGAT's position, expressing their reservation regarding the timing of this measure, suggesting that it be

postponed. The Minister of Defense backed up these recommendations, stating that the timing of the offset "is unfavorable, and it should be postponed." Ministers were quite confounded by the conflicting recommendations by the security establishment: on the one hand, they suggested offsetting funds being transferred to the PA, while on the other hand, they recommended strengthening the PA, at the expense of Hamas.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, following an order signed by the commander of the Central Command, **Ordinance 67 of Order Concerning Security Provisions** [consolidated version] (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1651), 5770-2009, the main security-criminal codex in the military government of Judea and Samaria, came into force. **It adopts extensive sections of the Israeli 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law.** After several delays, all of the clauses of the ordinance came into force in December of 2020. The Ordinance includes a prohibition to carry out any "act by the means of property" that may provide compensation to those carrying out acts of terrorism. According to the Israeli attorney general's expert opinion, **the payment of salaries to incarcerated terrorists by the PA constitutes a violation of the Counter-Terrorism Law.** This infers that banks in Judea and Samaria which are used to transfer the PA's terror funds are now in violation of the law.<sup>e</sup>

<sup>e</sup> For further reading: [https://www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?fi=157&doc\\_id=27907](https://www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=27907), <https://palwatch.org/Storage/Documents/לצו-בדבר-הוראות-בטחון-67-דרישה-לפעול-לאכיפת-תיקון-.pdf>

### ■ Donor countries' reaction to the PA's overt policy

The donor countries accepted the image of victimhood that the Palestinian Authority tried to depict, often publishing severe condemnations of Israel, while failing to take legislative measures to freeze financial aid as long as those funds are used for the terror financing apparatus and the employment of terrorists. It should be mentioned that transferring aid money from donor countries for this goal violates the laws of the donor countries themselves, as well as international treaties on terror financing. **Indirectly, this foreign aid from donor countries provides a substantial lifeline to the PA's terror apparatus, which targets innocent Israelis, in the guise of humanitarian aid.**

After the existence of this apparatus was brought to light, some of the donor countries preferred to adopt a stance of

looking the other way, while accepting the PA's misrepresentation to them portraying these funds as "social welfare" for "victims of occupation," i.e., families who had lost their breadwinners.<sup>56</sup> For its part, the PA refrained from officially "whitewashing" the apparatus's finances. The Palestinians even bluntly refused a request from the UK to publicly portray the support for terrorists as support of a social nature. Issa Qaraqe, the Minister of Prisoners' Affairs, even ridiculed the donor countries during a rally in 2013, under the auspices of Chairman Abbas. He stated that "the Europeans want the funds they are giving us to be 'clean'... that the funds not be transferred to the families of those they call 'terrorists.' They need to abandon this occupation mentality. These prisoners are heroes. They sacrifice themselves ("Fedayoun") and have fought so that we can live with dignity."

## Recommendations

By playing such a major role in terror against Israel and operating such a large-scale organizational effort in terror financing and incentivizing, the Palestinian Authority has reaffirmed its commitment to the violent struggle against Israel. This requires a **reassessment of the Palestinian Authority's image in public discourse and drawing the necessary political and security conclusions.**

The way to deal with this begins with increasing awareness of the existence and extent of these payments in Israel and

abroad, and then, to **make it clear to the Palestinian Authority, using diplomatic, judicial, economic, political, and practical tools, that the ideology and policy of paying terrorists are unacceptable and have to change. This change must be an essential condition for financial aid to the Palestinians, and a milestone if a political process is underway.** If this is ignored, the Palestinians will be able to amplify terror, which will lead to an intensification of conflict, along with all that entails. In short, **it must be made clear to the Palestinian Authority that terror financing has a price.**



### Designation of the PA as a terrorist entity

- **Designate the Palestinian Authority as a terror-sponsoring entity**, given its massive organizational effort and significant swath of its budget designated for terror financing, alongside its pledge to absorb released convicted terrorists into its bureaucratic apparatus and policing force. This stems from the recognition that **the PA should not receive any dispensation from laws and treaties concerning the sponsorship and incentivization of terrorism.**

This will entail the following:

- **Immediate freezing of international financial aid and cooperation;**
- **Immediate closing of PA global representation offices**, be it embassies or other liaison bureaus, as well as foreign representations to the PA.
- Failing to do so may be considered by Israel, the United States, nations around the world as well as international organizations as **collusion with a terror-sponsoring entity**, with all the legal ramifications this entails.
- **Ceasing this sanction will be conditioned on the complete and permanent cessation of this policy on the part of the PA**, including the revoking of relevant laws regarding the stipends to prisoners and killed terrorists' families, and the employment of released prisoners.

- In this context, it is indispensable to emphasize that **a scenario in which the PA collapses should not be considered a no-go. There are a number of alternatives to the PA** that could effectively manage the day-to-day affairs of Palestinians residing in Areas A and B, similar, with some modifications, to what existed prior to the Oslo Accords.

### **Enforcement of economic sanctions**

- **The Israeli “offsetting law” should be fully enforced without delay** at the beginning of each calendar year; **as should the Taylor Force Act in the United States**, such that **the PA would be compelled to choose between complete economic collapse and the apparatus for terrorists’ employment and financial reward.**
- It should be stressed that the **rampant corruption** in the Palestinian Authority, including the embezzlement of hundreds of millions of USD every year and the enormous salaries of public servants, debunk the claim that the PA's financial situation could not withstand an offset of the funds transferred to terrorists. Indeed, the law should be strictly adhered to, without fearing that this might lead to the PA's economic collapse.
- **Other donor countries should be encouraged to adopt this type of legislation.**
- In addition, a **coalition of taxpayers** from the donor countries should be established to apply pressure to decision-makers to change their policies regarding this issue, in the spirit of the Taylor Force Act.

### **Law enforcement**

- Israel's **Ordinance 67** of the security-criminal codex in Judea and Samaria should be strictly enforced, including **the arrest of individuals in the PA and the Palestinian Postal Bank involved in the terror financing apparatus. Those funds should be seized and relevant bank accounts closed.** Israel should **take actions against the financial systems involved in this funding mechanism in order to enforce its cessation.**
- Foreign banks operating in Judea and Samaria should be made to close bank accounts that constitute a link in the chain of this apparatus, and it should be clarified that if they continue turning a blind eye, that could expose them to legal liability in the Israeli judicial system.

### **Legal steps**

- Israel must make it clear to the Palestinian Authority that **it may be exposed to significant legal liability if this policy is not terminated.** The PA continues to pay

salaries to terrorists, and the Israeli government, as well as the governments of the other countries, must take on this issue as a challenge, and determine that these payments violate the rights of their citizens, and most of all, the victims of terror.

- **The Israeli legislator should empower Israeli courts to have jurisdiction as a venue to pursue legal claims against the PA** on the part of victims and their families who were inflicted with harm as a result of its policy.
- **The United States and other donor countries should be encouraged to adopt this policy line**, in some cases by simply implementing their existing terror financing laws with respect to the PA.
- **The international community should be alerted** by the United States (in accordance with the "Taylor Force Act"), Israel and other involved parties **against the repercussions of taking part, directly or indirectly, in promoting terror against Israelis financially**. Providing aid to Palestinian security forces staffed, inter alia, by released terrorists, alongside providing financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority, is **akin to abetting terror against innocent citizens and soldiers**.



## Peace process

- **On a political level**, Israel, the United States, the Quartet and donor countries should make it clear to the PA that abandoning terror is something that the PLO and the PA committed to in the Oslo Accords, and that **any progress in any final status arrangements would be conditioned on the complete and permanent cessation of this policy on the part of the PA**. Israel must stress that this apparatus, alongside Palestinian incitement and delegitimization, is the main obstacle in the path to peace through negotiations, and that it **creates a culture of hate and terror within Palestinian society**.



## Public awareness

- Disregarding these acts of terror committed by the Palestinian Authority due to a lack of recognition or turning a blind eye would mislead donor countries and public opinion in Israel and elsewhere in the world. This is predicated on misinformation according to which the PA has chosen the pragmatic path of realpolitik, does not participate in the armed struggle against Israel, and that its political struggle is confined to the territories captured by Israel in 1967.
- This practice of turning a blind eye is supported by considerations such as global sensitivity to the Palestinian struggle along with fear in Israel of a scenario in which the PA collapses financially, and cooperation with security forces is stopped, which could lead to a renewed Israeli takeover of Areas A and B. **Thus, a fact-based**

**discourse should be encouraged, one that places a focus on the true nature of the PA as an organization that carries out terror against Israelis regardless of political stances on negotiations with the PA or with any other Palestinian entity.**

- In this spirit, the **“moral ambiguity”** intrinsic to turning a blind eye to these activities conducted by the PA, which undermine the global struggle against terror, should be eradicated. There cannot be a sense of “business as usual” with the Palestinian Authority as stipends are being paid and terrorists being employed. This ambiguity erodes the ability of Israel and others in the international community to demand to exercise their appropriate moral right and serve as a moral role model in the struggle against terror.



# Appendix I: Full Text of the Palestinian Law on Incarcerated and Released Terrorists

## Amended Palestinian Prisoners Law No. 19 (2004)

Palestinian Authority Chairman

After examining the amended Basic Law and in accordance with what was ratified by the Palestinian Legislative Council in its session on December 22, 2004, we have issued the following Law:

### Article 1: Definitions

The following terms and expressions have the specific meaning defined below, unless the context indicates otherwise:

The National Authority: the Palestinian National Authority.

The government: the government of the National Authority.

The ministers: the Ministry of Prisoners and Released Prisoner Affairs or [any other] ministry dealing with [prisoners and released prisoners].

Prisoner: anyone incarcerated in the occupation's prisons for his participation in the struggle against the occupation.

Released prisoner: any prisoner released from an occupation prison.

### Article 2: The right to a dignified life

The prisoners and released prisoners are a fighting sector and an integral part of the fabric of the Arab Palestinian society. The provisions of this Law guarantee them and their families a dignified life.

### Article 3: The National Authority's duties towards the prisoner

To actualize the objectives of this law, the National Authority will take every possible measure to do the following:

1. Release the prisoners from the prisons of the occupation.
2. Extend every legal aid to the prisoner.
3. Grant the financial rights of the prisoner and his family as specified in the provisions of this Law and in accordance with the salary chart that is in force.
4. Enable the prisoner and his children to obtain an education.
5. Rehabilitate released prisoners.
6. Guarantee [released prisoners] positions according to the length of their imprisonment and their level of education, as will be specified in a regulation to be issued by the government.

### Article 4: The release of prisoners is a fundamental condition in a peace agreement

The National Authority is prohibited from signing or participating in the signing of a peace agreement to resolve the Palestinian problem without releasing all the prisoners.

## **Article 5: Preferential treatment for released prisoners**

1. Any released male prisoner who was incarcerated in an occupation prison for five years or more, and any female prisoner who was incarcerated for three years or more, will be exempt from the following:
  - a. Tuition fees at government schools and universities.
  - b. Health insurance payments.
  - c. Tuition fees for all professional training programs offered by the relevant official bodies.
2. The government will stipulate the exemptions set out in the previous sub-article in a regulation to be issued on this matter.

## **Article 6: Monthly salary and clothing allowance**

The National Authority will grant every incarcerated prisoner a monthly salary, without discrimination, and twice annually a clothing allowance, in accordance with a regulation to be issued in this matter.

### **Article 7: Monthly salary**

1. The National Authority is obligated to pay every prisoner a monthly salary as specified in the regulation [to be issued in this matter]. The sum will be linked to the cost-of-living index.
2. The prisoner's family will receive a portion of his salary, according to the legal criteria that are in force.
3. The prisoner will choose his representative for the purpose of collecting his monthly salary or [the portion] that remains of it.

## **Article 8: Years spent in prison recognized as tenure**

1. A released prisoner working as a civil servant, the years spent in prison will be calculated [as part of his tenure] as defined in Article 107 of the Civil Service Law of 1998 and related regulations.
2. A released prisoner working as a civil servant, the National Authority shall pay his social security and pension fees to the social security and pension fund for the years he spent in prison.

## **Article 9: Preparing a prisoner database**

The [Prisoner Affairs] Ministry, in cooperation with the relevant bodies, will prepare a document-based database on prisoners and released prisoners, including [information on] the grounds for their arrest, the circumstances of their arrest and the crimes of the occupation against them.

#### **Article 10: Filing lawsuits regarding the occupation's crimes against the prisoners**

The National Authority will be entitled to file lawsuits pertaining to the occupation's crimes against the prisoners and demanding reparation for damages caused to them as a result [of these crimes]. Every prisoner or released prisoner is entitled to file such lawsuits.

#### **Article 11: Issuing regulations**

The government will issue the regulations necessary for implementing the provisions of this Law.

#### **Article 12: Eliminating contradictions**

Any article that contradicts the provisions of this Law shall be [considered] null and void.

#### **Article 13: Action and implementation**

All relevant parties are obligated to carry out the provisions of this Law. The Law shall come into force 30 days after its entry into the register.

Published: Gaza, December 27, 2004.

Rouhi Fatouh, Palestinian Authority Chairman



## List of Decrees, Decisions and Laws on Prisoner Affairs

1. Presidential Decree No. 2 (1998) announces the establishment of a government that includes a Ministry of Prisoners Affairs. Hisham 'Abd Al-Raziq is appointed Minister of Prisoners Affairs.
2. Presidential Decree No. 9 (2002) on the establishment of a General Commission for Prisoners and Released Prisoners Affairs.
3. Presidential Decree No. 17 (2002) on the forming of the government names Hisham 'Abd Raziq as the Minister for Prisoners and Detainees Affairs.
4. Presidential Decree No. 7 (2003) on the forming of the government names Hisham 'Abd Raziq as the Minister for Prisoners Affairs.
5. Presidential Decree No. 21 (2003) on the forming of the government names Hisham 'Abd Raziq as the Minister for Prisoners Affairs.
6. Government Decision No. 27 (2004) on granting urgent financial aid to the Palestinian prisoners who would be released in the prisoner exchange deal between the Lebanese Hizbullah and Israel. The decision states further that the government would allot NIS1.5 million monthly to a financial aid fund for prisoners incarcerated in Israel.
7. Government Decision No. 87 (2004) increases the monthly sum dedicated to meeting the prisoners' needs from NIS1.5 million to NIS2 million, and states that every PLO prisoner will receive a monthly sum of NIS800.
8. Government Decision No. 155 (2006) dedicates a sum of \$5,200,000 for the Palestinian prisoners' monthly canteen allowance in August and September.
9. Government Decision No. 156 (2006) on payment of expenses for prisoners' families in June 2006.
10. Government Decision No. 159 (2006) on jobs for Palestinian prisoners who were incarcerated for over five years.
11. Government Decision No. 19 (2010) exempts released prisoners from tuition fees in schools and professional training courses and from health insurance payments.
12. Government Decision No. 21 (2010) on meeting all the needs of prisoners incarcerated in Israeli prisons.

13. Government Decision No. 22 (2010) on granting legal aid to prisoners.

14. Government Decision No. 23 (2010) on monthly salaries for prisoners, according to the chart below:

Sentence	Monthly salary in NIS
3 years or less	1,400
3-5 years	2,000
5-10 years	4,000
10-15 years	6,000
15-20 years	7,000
20-25 years	8,000
25-30 years	10,000
Over 30 years	12,000
Additional payment for married prisoners	300
Additional payment for prisoners with children	50 per child
Additional payment for prisoners from East Jerusalem	300
Additional payment for Israeli Arab prisoners	500

# Decree Law No. 1 (2013) on the Amendment of the Prisoners and Released Prisoners Law No. 19 (2004)

According to the provisions of the Amended Basic Law of 2003 and its amendments, in particular Article 43; following an examination of the Prisoners and Released Prisoners Law No. 19, of 2004; based on the government recommendations of June 19, 2012 and in accordance with our powers; in the interest of the public good and on behalf of the Arab Palestinian people, we issue the following Decree Law:

## Article 1

For the purpose of this amendment, "the original law" refers to the Prisoners and Released Prisoners Law No. 19 of 2004.

## Article 2:

Article 1 of the original law shall be amended as follows:

The following terms and expressions have the specific meaning defined below, unless the context indicates otherwise:

The State: The State of Palestine.

The government: the government of the State of Palestine.

The ministry: the Ministry of Prisoners and Released Prisoners Affairs, or the relevant ministry.

The minister: the Minister for Prisoners and Released Prisoners Affairs, or the relevant minister.

Prisoner: anyone incarcerated in the occupation's prisons for his participation in the struggle against the occupation.

Released prisoner: any prisoner released from an occupation prison.

House arrest: a decision by the occupation to place a person under house arrest and prevent him from leaving his home or place of residence for a specified period of time, for resisting the occupation.

Expulsion: a decision by the occupation to expel any Palestinian by force from his usual place of residence [to a location] inside or outside Palestine.

The prisoner's family: the [prisoner's] father, mother, spouse, children and any dependent member of his household.

Period of incarceration: the time actively spent in prison, whether continuous or intermittent.

Unemployment benefits: regular monthly payments provided for a specified period of time in accordance with the regulation issued pursuant to the provisions of this Decree Law.

## Article 3:

All references to "the National Authority" in the original law shall be replaced with the term "State of Palestine"



#### Article 4:

Article 3 of the original law shall be amended as follows:

To actualize the objectives of this Decree Law, the State will take every legitimate measure to do the following:

7. Release the prisoners from the prisons of the occupation.
8. Extend every legal aid to the prisoner during his incarceration.
9. Grant the financial rights of the prisoner and his family, and every other right that can be granted to him in accordance with the provisions of this Law and the regulation issued pursuant thereto.
10. Enable the prisoner, his spouse and his children to obtain an education.
11. Rehabilitate released prisoners according to the provisions of the regulation issued pursuant to the provisions of this Law.
12. Provide health insurance to the prisoner and his family.

#### Article 5:

A new article shall be added to the original law, after sub-article 3, whose number will be 3', as follows:

1. The State will guarantee employment to released prisoners, according to criteria that take into consideration the number of years spent in prison, the prisoner's level of education and his employability.
2. Released prisoners will be given priority in annual job placements in all State institutions, according to the laws that are in force.
3. If the State is unable to guarantee the prisoners employment according to the previous sub-article, it will be obligated to do as follows:
  - a. Pay a monthly salary to every released male prisoner who spent five to ten years in prison and every released female prisoner [who spent] two to five years in prison.
  - b. In the event of the death of a released male or female prisoner mentioned in clause (a) of this sub-article, the State will undertake to provide for their families, in accordance with the regulation issued pursuant to the provisions of this Decree Law.
  - c. A permanently disabled male prisoner will receive 50% or more [of the sums specified] in clauses (a) and (b) of this sub-article, providing he spent two and a half years in prison, or one year in the case of a female prisoner.
  - d. A male prisoner who was incarcerated for ten years or more, and a female prisoner who was incarcerated for five years or more, will be given a salaried position in a State institution, without detracting from the rights of the released prisoners [employed as] civil servants.
4. A prisoner who was incarcerated for one to five years and did not receive benefits under the previous articles will be entitled to unemployment benefits for a period equal to the period of his incarceration.
5. Every prisoner who was incarcerated for one year or more is entitled to a one-time release grant upon his release.

6. The provisions of this Article will be [implemented] according to the regulation issued pursuant to this Decree law.

#### **Article 6:**

3. Sub-article 1 of Article 5 of the original law will be amended as follows:

Any released male prisoner who was incarcerated in an occupation prison for a year or more will be wholly or partially exempt from the following payments:

- d. Tuition fees at Palestine universities.
- e. Health insurance payments.
- f. Tuition fees for all professional training programs offered by the relevant official bodies.

#### **Article 7:**

A new article shall be added to the original law, after Article 5, whose number will be 5', as follows:

1. A prisoner who dies in prison will be recognized as a member of the Martyrs' Families Institution and will receive an augmented salary, according to the time he spent in prison and according to the Palestinian Security Service Law that is in force.
2. The provisions of sub-article 1 will [also] apply to any released prisoner who died within a year of his release of a health problem related to his incarceration.

#### **Article 8:**

Two sub-articles will be added to Article 8 of the original law, after sub-article 2, as follows:

3. The State will continue paying the salaries of released prisoners [employed as] civil servants.
4. If the salary of a released prisoner [employed as] a civil servant is lower than the salary he received in prison, the State will make up the difference.

#### **Article 9:**

A new article shall be added to the original law, after Article 10, whose number will be 10, as follows:

1. The provisions of this Decree Law will [also] apply to persons who have been expelled and to those under house arrest.
2. [In addition,] the provisions of this Decree Law will apply to members of PLO factions arrested outside of Palestine for participating in the struggle for the independence and liberation of Palestine.

#### **Article 10:**

According to the Minister's recommendation, the government will issue the regulations necessary for implementing the provisions of this Law.

**Article 11:**

Any [article] that contradicts the provisions of this Decree Law shall be [considered] null and void.

**Article 12:**

This Decree Law will be submitted to the Legislative Council for ratification at its next session.

**Article 13:**

All relevant parties are obligated to carry out the provisions of this Decree Law. The Decree Law shall come into force 30 days after its entry into the register.

Published: Ramallah, January 8, 2013.

Mahmoud 'Abbas, President of the State of Palestine, PLO Chairman

The goals of the ministry: the institution strives to ensure a dignified life for all the families of the martyrs and wounded who were harmed as a result of their participation in the Palestinian revolution or were [otherwise] harmed as a result of the revolution, so that they can live in comfort in society. This, without discrimination on the basis of political or ideological affiliation, and by means of providing access to social, healthcare, rehabilitation and development programs to the martyrs' families, to the wounded, and to the families of the victims of wars with the Zionist entity.

Article 4402 [of the Institute's charter:] protection, care and empowerment of the martyrs' families inside and outside the homeland.

Goal #2 of Article 4402 is to coordinate with governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to rehabilitate the families of the martyrs and wounded in the course of the budgetary year 2014. The coordination of activities [planned] for this year are described on p. 485 of the Budget.

P. 485 of the Budget specifies the ministry's operational expenses, including [expenses for] rent, salaries [according to p. 487 of the Budget the ministry employs 113 workers], for travel expenses, bonuses, currency exchange fees, and payments [for the families], which come to 611,547,000 [the currency is not specified, presumably NIS].



# Martyr Payment Schedules

Allocation based on familial status of the martyr (in NIS)

2010



الأكادر المالي الجديد لمخصصات أسر الشهداء والجرحى بالشيكال

الشهيد المتزوج	
أساسي	1300
علاوة الزوجه	100
علاوة كل ابن تحت الإعاالة	25

الشهيد الأعزب	
أساسي / ويدون أي علاوات	1000

الشهيدة المتزوجة	
أساسي / ويدون أي علاوات	1000

الشهيد المدني المتزوج	
أساسي	650
علاوة الزوجه	100
علاوة كل ابن تحت الإعاالة	25

الشهيد المدني الأعزب	
أساسي / ويدون أي علاوات	400

الشهيدة المدنية المتزوجة	
أساسي / ويدون أي علاوات	400

الشهيد الذي يحمل رتبة عسكرية :- يتقاضى مخصصه بناءً على رتبته العسكرية حسب النظام المالي الجديد للرتب العسكرية

Ramallah-Tel/Fax : 02-2986268

Gaza - Tel Fax: 08-2824727

رام الله - تلفاكس : 02\_2986268

غزة - تلفاكس : 08 - 2824727

<https://www.aman-palestine.org/data/itemfiles/b3dd98a029db76be614d1a64dd10604e.pdf>

# Martyr Payment Schedules

Allocation based on military rank of the martyr (in NIS)

2010



النظام المالي الجديد لمخصصات الشهداء المتزوجين والجرحى العسكريين المعتمدين بالمؤسسة

الرتبة العسكرية	أساسي الراتب
جندي	1300
عريف	1380
رقيب	1460
رقيب أول	1540
مساعد	1670
مساعد أول	1800
ملازم	1930
ملازم أول	2060
نقيب	2260
رائد	2540
مقدم	2790
عقيد	3290
عميد	3590
لواء	3990

المتزوج : تضاف العلاوات الإجتماعية إلى أساسي الراتب على النحو التالي :-

- علاوة الزوجة : 100 شيكل .

- علاوة كل ابن تحت الإعاقة : 25 شيكل .

تم تطبيق هذا النظام على مخصصات الجرحى اعتباراً من: 2008/5/1، وعلى مخصصات الشهداء المتزوجين اعتباراً من: 2009/1/1



Ramallah-Tel/Fax : 02-2986268

Gaza - Tel Fax: 08-2824727

رام الله - تلفاكس : 02\_2986268

غزة - تلفاكس : 08 - 2824727

<https://www.aman-palestine.org/data/itemfiles/b3dd98a029db76be614d1a64dd10604e.pdf>



## Palestinian Authority 2014 Budget

According to the PA's 2014 budget, NIS 442,807,000 (approx. \$124 million) has been allocated to the budget for the **Prisoners and Released Prisoners Ministry**.

442,807.000	وزارة الأسرى والمحربين			06
398,607.200	توفير الحماية والرعاية للأسرى وأسراهم وللأسرى المحررين		0601	06
398,607.200	توفير الحماية والرعاية للأسرى وأسراهم وللأسرى المحررين	060104	0601	06
44,199.800	برنامج تأهيل الأسرى المحررين		0602	06
44,199.800	برنامج تأهيل الأسرى المحررين	060204	0602	06
2 494 355 000	موازنة التتبع			07

According to the PA's 2014 budget, NIS 618,720,000 (approx. \$173.4 million) has been allocated to the **Institution for the Care for the Families of the Martyrs**.

	والاداري			
618,720.000	مؤسسة رعاية أسر الشهداء			44
618,720.000	حماية ورعاية وتمكين أسر الشهداء والجرحى داخل الوطن وخارجه		4402	44
613,954.500	المساعدات المالية وغير المالية لأسر الشهداء والجرحى في الوطن وخارجه	440201	4402	44
4,765.500	البرنامج الإداري لمؤسسة رعاية أسر الشهداء والجرحى	440202	4402	44
22,896.000	سلطة الأراضي			45

2014 average exchange rate (0.280241)

## Palestinian Authority 2016 Budget

According to the PA's 2016 budget, NIS 530,539,497 (approx. \$138 million) has been allocated to the budget for the Prisoners and Released Prisoners Ministry.

برنامج: برنامج حماية و رعاية الأسرى و أسرهم و دعم و تأهيل الأسرى المحررين  
تكلفة الموازنة التشغيلية والرأسمالية 2016

بند الموازنة	الاسم	موازنة 2016
رواتب وأجور		36802.280
211	الرواتب والأجور	36,802.280
مصاريف تشغيلية		5165.411
221	السفر والمهمات الرسمية	400.000
222	النفقات التشغيلية	1,690.000
223	إيجارات	1,200.000
224	أخرى (تشغيلية)	510.000
225	بدل تنقل	1,265.411
226	مكافآت للموظفين	100.000
مصاريف تحويلية		488371.806
212	المساهمات الاجتماعية	2,371.806
272	منافع المساعدات الاجتماعية	486,000.000
مصاريف رأسمالية		200.000
311	الأصول الثابتة	200.000
اجمالي		530539.497

According to the PA's 2016 budget, NIS 663,595,128 (approx. \$ 173 million) has been allocated to the Institution for the Care for the Families of the Martyrs.

State of Palestine  
Ministry of Finance & Planning  
Directorate General of Budget



دولة فلسطين  
وزارة المالية والتخطيط  
الإدارة العامة للموازنة العامة

### أبعاد الموازنة للوزارة للسنة المالية 2016

بند الموازنة	الاسم	مؤسسة / وزارة	مؤسسة رعاية أسر الشهداء	برنامج	برنامج	اجمالي
44			4403	4402		
211	رواتب وأجور	الرواتب والأجور	5,735.000	2,685.697	3,049.303	
222	النفقات التشغيلية		590.448	590.448		
223	إيجارات		460.000	460.000		
224	أخرى (تشغيلية)		100.000	100.000		
225	بدل تنقل		381.552	151.499	230.053	
226	مكافآت للموظفين		50.000	50.000		
212	المساهمات الاجتماعية		594.000	278.228	315.772	
272	منافع المساعدات الاجتماعية		660,000.000		660,000.000	
312	مصاريف رأسمالية	مخزون	50.000	50.000		
	اجمالي		667,961.000	4,365.872	663,595.128	
4402	حماية ورعاية وتأمين أسر الشهداء والجرحى داخل الوطن وخارجه					
4403	البرنامج الإداري لمؤسسة رعاية أسر الشهداء والجرحى					

2016 average exchange rate (0.260571); figures include associated administrative expenses

## Palestinian Authority 2017 Budget

According to the PA's 2017 budget, NIS 580,334,432 (approx. \$ 161 million) has been allocated to the budget for the Prisoners and Released Prisoners Ministry

برنامج: برنامج حماية و رعاية الأسرى و أسرهم و دعم و تأهيل الأسرى المحررين  
تكلفة الموازنة التشغيلية والرأسمالية 2017

بند الموازنة	الاسم	موازنة 2017
رواتب وأجور		22423.490
211	الرواتب والاجور	22,423.490
مصاريف تشغيلية		5011.518
22	استخدامات السلع والخدمات	5,011.518
مصاريف تحويلية		552399.424
212	المساهمات الاجتماعية	2,399.424
27	المنافع الاجتماعية	550,000.000
مصاريف رأسمالية		500.000
31	الاصول غير المالية	500.000
المجموع		580334.432

According to the PA's 2017 budget, NIS 690,606,140 (approx. \$191 million) has been allocated to the Institution for the Care for the Families of the Martyrs

### أبعاد الموازنة للوزارة للسنة المالية 2017

44	وزارة / مؤسسة	مؤسسة رعاية أسر الشهداء		
بند الموازنه	الاسم	برنامج 4402	برنامج 4403	المجموع
211	الرواتب والاجور	3,273.000	2,820.000	6,093.000
221	السفر والمهمات الرسمية		60.000	60.000
222	النفقات التشغيلية		519.013	519.013
223	إيجارات		460.000	460.000
224	أخرى (تشغيلية)		64.000	64.000
225	بدل تنقل	204.140	155.847	359.987
226	مكافآت للموظفين		50.000	50.000
212	المساهمات الاجتماعية	356.000	268.000	624.000
272	منافع المساعدات الاجتماعية	686,773.000		686,773.000
312	مخزون		46.000	46.000
	المجموع	690,606.140	4,442.860	695,049.000
4402	حماية ورعاية وتمكين أسر الشهداء والجرحى داخل الوطن وخارجه			
4403	البرنامج الادارى لمؤسسة رعاية أسر الشهداء والجرحى			

2017 YTD average exchange rate (0.277158); figures include associated administrative expenses



## Palestinian Authority 2018 Budget

According to the PA's 2018 budget, NIS 580,154,130 (approx. \$ 162 million) has been allocated to the budget for the **Prisoners and Released Prisoners Ministry**

أبعاد الموازنة للوزارة للسنة المالية 2018

هيئة شؤون الأسرى والمحررين					وزارة / مؤسسة	06		
المجموع	برنامج 0601	برنامج 0602	برنامج 0605	برنامج 0603	الاسم	بند الموازنة		
22,353.100	2,772.070	1,805.180	6,996.670	10,779.180	الرواتب والاجور	211	رواتب واجور	
350.000	50.000	30.000		270.000	السفر والمهمات الرسمية	221		
1,565.000	135.000	75.000		1,355.000	النفقات التشغيلية	222		
1,305.000	145.000	20.000		1,140.000	إيجارات	223	مصاريف تشغيلية	
590.297	70.300	40.000		479.997	أخرى (تشغيلية)	224		مصاريف جارية
1,245.853	296.700	165.000	67.000	717.153	بدل تنقل	225		
150.000	25.000	15.000		110.000	مكافآت للموظفين	226		
2,094.880	259.810	169.190	655.620	1,010.260	المساهمات الاجتماعية	212		
550,000.000	543,200.000	6,800.000			منافع المساعدات الاجتماعية	272	مصاريف تحويلية	
500.000	100.000	50.000		350.000	مخزون	312	مصاريف رأسمالية	
<b>580,154.130</b>	<b>547,053.880</b>	<b>9,169.370</b>	<b>7,719.290</b>	<b>16,211.590</b>	<b>المجموع</b>			

According to the PA's 2018 budget, NIS 691,315,100 (approx. \$193 million) has been allocated to the **Institution for the Care for the Families of the Martyrs**

أبعاد الموازنة للوزارة للسنة المالية 2018

مؤسسة رعاية أسر الشهداء			وزارة / مؤسسة	44		
المجموع	برنامج 4403	برنامج 4402	الاسم	بند الموازنة		
6,259.000	2,822.600	3,436.400	الرواتب والاجور	211	رواتب واجور	
60.000	60.000		السفر والمهمات الرسمية	221		
595.354	595.354		النفقات التشغيلية	222		
566.808	566.808		إيجارات	223	مصاريف تشغيلية	
68.838	68.838		أخرى (تشغيلية)	224		مصاريف جارية
360.000	156.600	203.400	بدل تنقل	225		
50.000	50.000		مكافآت للموظفين	226		
620.000	266.700	353.300	المساهمات الاجتماعية	212		
687,322.000		687,322.000	منافع المساعدات الاجتماعية	272	مصاريف تحويلية	
46.000	46.000		مخزون	312	مصاريف رأسمالية	
<b>695,948.000</b>	<b>4,632.900</b>	<b>691,315.100</b>	<b>المجموع</b>			

2018 YTD average exchange rate (0.278745); figures include associated administrative expenses

## Headline: "Spotlight on the Regulation Securing Jobs for Released Prisoners"

Article written by Judge Ali Abu Diyak, head of the Consulting and Legislation Office, a Palestinian Authority governmental body providing consultation on matters of legislation

"[PA] Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah published the Regulation Securing Jobs for Released Prisoners in [the PA] Government, Decision No. 15 of 2013 on Nov. 12, 2013. It took effect beginning on the date of its publication in the Records, and it was published in issue 103 of the Records, which was published on Dec. 8, 2013. This regulation was based on Decision with Legal Validity No. 1 of 2013 regarding the amendment to the Prisoners' and Released [Prisoners'] Law, which President [Mahmoud Abbas] of the State of Palestine issued on Jan. 8, 2013, and which was published in issue no. 99 of the Records, which were published on Feb. 27, 2013.

The importance of this amendment lies in the fact that it set into law additional directives to standardize the salaries of the released prisoners and their employment ranks, and it filled the vacuum that was created as a result of the previous regulations that fixed in law the salaries of the prisoners while they were still in captivity (i.e., imprisonment), but did not address their salaries after the release from captivity.

Government Decision No. 23 of 2010 regarding a regulation of the payment of a monthly salary to a prisoner was published relying on the Prisoners' and Released [Prisoners'] Law No. 19 of 2004, and it had great influence on everything related to the standardizing and raising of salaries of prisoners while still in prison. It constitutes a qualitative addition to the legislation that standardizes the rights of the prisoners, and it set a minimum wage of 1,400 [Israeli] shekels for a prisoner when he enters captivity, which rises gradually to 12,000 shekels in accordance with the years he remains in captivity. To this is added an addition for a wife and children linked to the cost-of-living index.

**However, the aforementioned Decision No. 23 of 2010 determined in clause 10 that the salary payment will be stopped when the prisoner is released from captivity, and it did not address the [released] prisoners' salaries, their absorption into civil service, and their employment ranks after their release from captivity. This constituted a great challenge for the new Palestinian government, which understood the importance of standardizing this matter of the national struggle, and the need to fix in law the prisoners' salaries, their ranks, and the procedures for absorbing them into civil service after their release, according to clear and defined criteria and in accordance with Decision with Legal Validity No. 1 of 2013 regarding the amendment of the Prisoners' and Released [Prisoners'] Law.**

I will relate to the most important directives that appeared in Regulation: Securing Jobs for Released Prisoners No. 15 of 2013, which took effect on Dec. 8, 2013.

### Granting priority in employment

The second clause (the writer did not review all the clauses - Ed) in this regulation established that priority should be given to the employment of released prisoners in the civil service. It established that every released prisoner who was in captivity for at least a year, who submits a request for employment in the civil service, and meets the legal conditions according to the relevant laws and regulations, receives 10 points out of the total points as priority, plus one point for every year of imprisonment up to a maximum of 20 points.



### Ranks and salaries

The third clause in this regulation determines that the released prisoner who is employed [by the PA government] will receive the ranks detailed in the table appended to this regulation, taking his education into consideration. He receives a salary according to the pay scale of civil or military employees that is customary in the State of Palestine. For released female prisoners three years are to be subtracted from the periods noted in the table appended to this regulation...

Number of years in prison	Civil rank	Military rank
5-6 years	Department Head	Lieutenant
6-8 years	Director Rank C	Captain
8-10 years	Director Rank B	Major
10-15 years	Director Rank A	Lieutenant Colonel
15-20 years	Director General Rank A4	Colonel
20-25 years	Deputy Minister's Aide A2	Brigadier General
25-30 years	Deputy Minister	Major General
30 years and above	Employed at rank of Minister	Major General (senior)

### The fixed salary

Clause four in this regulation determined that the released prisoner will benefit from a fixed salary if there is no vacant position that is suitable to the qualifications of the released prisoner who sat in prison for over five years and less than ten years, and of the released female prisoner who sat in prison for over two years and less than five years. This is on condition that the male or female prisoner does not have any [other] source of fixed income of more than 1,450 shekels a month...

In the regulation it is determined that the base fixed salary is 1,500 shekels, with an addition of 100 shekels for every year that the prisoner was in captivity ... with an addition of 300 shekels for a wife and an addition of 50 shekels for every child under the age of 18. The fixed salary will be linked to the cost-of-living index.

### Budgeted employment

The eighth clause in this regulation dealt with fixed budgeted employment of the released prisoner who sat ten years or more and of the released female prisoner who sat five years or more. They will be employed in a budgeted manner in the state institutions in accordance with the aforementioned table appended to this regulation. All of the laws and regulations regarding civil employees apply to the released prisoners who were mentioned in the previous sub-clause of this clause, including promotions and [salary] additions for which they are eligible.

Likewise, this regulation standardized the rights of the prisoners who were injured during the arrest and the percentage of disability. In addition, it standardized the rights of the inheritors and the rights of the dependents regarding the fixed salary that was paid to the prisoner, after his [the prisoner's] death.

### Unemployment payments

Clause 13 of this regulation deals with the unemployment allowance received by the released prisoner who was in captivity between one and five years, [which he receives] for a period equal to the time he was in captivity. The monthly unemployment benefits will be paid based on the last monthly payment that the released prisoner received in prison before his release.



#### Grants upon release [from prison]

Likewise, clause 15 standardized the grants upon release [from prison]. Every released prisoner who was in captivity for one year or more will receive a one-time release grant upon his release, after the regulation's coming into effect, as follows:

Period [in prison]	Amount in American dollars
1-3 years	1,500
3-5 years	2,500
5-8 years	3,500
8-11 years	4,500
11-15 years	6,000
15-18 years	8,000
18-21 years	10,000
21-25 years	12,000
25-30 years	15,000
30 years and above	25,000

[...]

#### The released Arab prisoners

Clause 17 of this regulation determined that the directives will apply to released Arab prisoners (i.e., not Palestinian or Israeli Arab), wherever they may be after their release. All of the correspondence and administrative and legal documents that are required will be arranged through the Palestinian embassies abroad, in accordance with their location and the procedures in law.

#### The prisoners outside of Palestine

Clause 18 of the regulation determines that its directives will apply to members of PLO factions who were arrested outside of Palestine due to their participation in the struggle for the independence and freedom of Palestine, and that their status will be arranged in accordance with what is determined in the Regulation. All of the correspondence and administrative and legal documents that are required will be arranged for those of them who are in Palestine, and the matter will be conducted through the Palestinian embassies abroad for those who are outside of Palestine, in accordance with their location and the procedures fixed in law."

*Emphasis added throughout*

# **Country Reports on Terrorism 2017**

## **September 2018**

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United States Department of State Publication  
Bureau of Counterterrorism  
Released September 2018

*Country Reports on Terrorism 2017* is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.

## DOS COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2017

### The West Bank and Gaza

**Overview:** The Palestinian Authority (PA) continued its counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts in the West Bank, where Hamas, PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine remained present. The PA Security Forces (PASF) constrained the ability of those organizations to conduct attacks, including through arrests of Hamas members planning attacks against Israelis. Per Oslo-era agreements, the PA exercised varying degrees of authority over the West Bank. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Shin Bet arrested members of terrorist organizations operating in the West Bank.

The United States assisted the PA's counterterrorism efforts by providing training, equipment, and infrastructure support to the PASF. U.S. training and support assisted in the PA's continued development of professional, self-sufficient, and capable security forces. The United States also assisted the PA with criminal justice investigations and prosecutions of terrorist financing and terrorist-related activity.

Palestinians committed acts of violence and terrorism in the West Bank in 2017. The heightened period of violence from October 2015 to April 2016 decreased in 2017. However, Palestinians continued to commit stabbings, shootings, and vehicular attacks against Israelis.

Israelis, including settlers, committed acts of violence, including "price tag" attacks (property crimes and violent acts by extremist Jewish individuals and groups against Palestinians) in the West Bank in 2017.

Hamas maintained security control of Gaza. Several militant groups launched rocket attacks against Israel from Gaza. The primary limitation on PA counterterrorism efforts in Gaza remained Hamas' control of the area and the resulting inability of the PASF to operate there.

The PA and PLO continued to provide "martyr payments" to the families of Palestinian individuals killed carrying out a terrorist act. The PA and PLO also provided payments to Palestinians in Israeli prisons, including those convicted of acts of terrorism against Israelis. Israeli government officials criticized this practice as incentivizing acts of terror. These payments and separate canteen stipends that the Israeli government allows for prisoners were first initiated by the PLO in 1965 and have continued under the PA since the Oslo Accords with Israel.

....

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The PA is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. The Palestinian Financial Follow-Up (FFU) Unit is the PA's financial intelligence unit. Banks file suspicious transaction reports and currency transaction reports electronically through the FFU computer system. In 2017, banks filed 118 STRs compared to 117 in 2016.



The Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) increased regulations and restrictions on the more than 300 money changers in the West Bank. For example, the PMA increased the capital requirement from US \$250,000 to US \$500,000 for money changers to register with the PMA before they are allowed to operate. Additionally, the PMA imposed reporting requirements in 2017 on money changers for amounts over US \$7,000. The PMA also required that money changers have US \$1 million in capital before the PMA will authorize international transactions. Money changers in Gaza were licensed and regulated by Hamas. According to business contacts in Gaza, Hamas does not impose reporting requirements on Gaza-based money changers.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see *the 2018 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*.

**Countering Violent Extremism (CVE):** The PA's Palestinian Broadcasting Company's code of conduct states it does not allow programming that encourages "violence against any person or institution on the basis of race, religion, political beliefs, or sex." Some official PA media channels, as well as social media accounts affiliated with the ruling political movement Fatah, have featured content praising or condoning acts of violence. Palestinian leaders did not always publicly condemn individual terrorist attacks nor speak out publicly against members of their institutions who advocated for violence. PA President Abbas maintained a public commitment to non-violence, however.

The PA maintains control over the content of Friday sermons delivered in approximately 1,800 West Bank mosques to ensure that they do not endorse incitement to violence. Weekly, the PA Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs distributed approved themes and prohibits incitement to violence.

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Pages 135 - 137, emphasis added

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Financial reports, press articles, social media reviews as detailed in the endnotess

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