3D illustration of chess kings shaking hands, with headline CEASEFIRE.

Calls for a cease-fire are a mistake. For decades to come, October 7 will now shape Israel as the victim of the third-deadliest global terrorist attack since data collection began in 1970[1]. Hamas will not stop and a ceasefire now would send a dangerous message to Iran and its proxies. Hamas have now rejected five ceasefire proposals. At a time of heightened tension in the Middle East, the international community is called to honestly support Israel’s objectives.

The danger of committing to a ceasefire with Hamas

Calls for a permanent cease-fire—as opposed to a short pause in fighting are a mistake. Untold international pressure is put on Israel, by the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and others, unanimous in their determination to see an end to this war without achieving its objectives, and while keeping Hamas the governing entity in Gaza. Calls for a ceasefire fail to appreciate the enormity of what happened on October 7, not just in its barbarity but in its strategic significance. In agreeing to the illusion of a “permanent cease-fire”, that will certainly not be respected by Hamas as history shows, Israel will expose itself, once again, to a deadly security threat metastasizing in the Gaza Strip.

This paper will focus on how historic international pressure on Israel to agree to a cease-fire in Gaza while falling short of eliminating its enemies have led to an unspeakable aggravation of the security threat, and contributed to the forming of the conditions that led to October 7. Despite the Biden administration’s pressure, seasoned with the claim that Hamas “cannot carry out another October 7 at this point”, these deliberately misleading claims aim at luring Israel into going back to square one, and achieving precisely nothing in this war. More dangerously still, it will send a green light to Hezbollah, Iran, and other malign actors whose raison d’être is Israel’s demise, to attack in turn.

Decades of wishful thinking about the meaning of the Hamas charter must come to an end: Hamas is not and never will be a partner for peace, nor a reliable actor for cease-fire. The charter’s call to kill Jews by any means possible has only one meaning: the literal one. Israel has now but one choice: eliminate Hamas, free all hostages, and usher in a new reality in the Gaza Strip that will positively impact Israel’s long-term security.

October 7 has changed Israel’s perspective forever

For decades to come, October 7 will now shape Israel’s character, its politics, the relations with its people, and its neighbors. Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7 was the third-deadliest global terrorist attack since data collection began in 1970[2]. It was the deadliest attack against Israel since the state’s inception in 1948[3] with a rate of slightly over one person killed per every 10,000 Israelis[4]. A massive rocket barrage of more than 3,000 rockets in the first minutes of the war on October 7 that overwhelmed Israeli defenses[5]. At the same time, Hamas’s strike force, led by elite fighters from the Iranian-trained Nukhba unit, penetrated the border fence in tandem with attempts to infiltrate from the sea[6]. More painfully still, the cruelty in which terrorists and everyday Gazan citizens carried out their crimes when invading is blood-chilling: livestreaming beheadings, atrocious sexual violence, egregious scenes of abusing human bodies.

Hamas is widely believed to be holding 124 out of the 250 hostages taken on October 7 in heavily guarded underground tunnels using them as human shields and bargaining tools for the release of Palestinian prisoners. One goal was defined following the attack: the total elimination of the Hamas regime and the return of all hostages. But since October 7, that equation has changed. Because of the sheer savagery of the October 7 attacks, Israel will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to remove the threat. In a society so recently reeling from deep polarization and mass protests, Israelis from across the political spectrum are now fully united in this respect: their desire for the destruction of Hamas.

Hamas care only for the annihilation of Israel, not the people of Gaza

Now that the terror group has demonstrated the failure of Israel’s deterrence, it has insisted that it will not allow any more ceasefires in exchange for hostages, but only a complete end to Israel’s offensive[7], which would leave it in full control of Gaza. This would hand Hamas millions of dollars in aid from Western nations, as well as continuing billions from Qatar, Kuwait and other oil-rich countries in the Middle East[8]. While such funds are supposedly intended for welfare distributions and civilian reconstruction, Hamas will use them to rebuild, regroup and fund its terrorist training, propaganda and political units. Israel’s temporary strategy to hold out restoration of food, fuel, and water in the hope of the release of all hostages, if nothing else, confirmed that Hamas once again places more of a priority on maximizing the number of Gazans who suffer or die according to their rules. Hamas has never pretended to be fighting for the well-being of Gaza’s population, or for Palestine as a national cause. It accepts no responsibility for Gaza’s reconstruction. Hence, if there is a permanent ceasefire, Hamas can start to prepare its next surprise attack, hoping for another October 7 of indiscriminate killings. Nor will the terrorist group ever honor international humanitarian law and the international community needs to be pressed to accept that reality.

A ceasefire would further ignite regional tensions

Any ceasefire now would send a dangerous message, particularly to Hezbollah in Lebanon, that a terrorist organization can commit unimaginable war crimes against Israeli civilians without a decisive recompense, namely a removal from power, beyond the heavy casualty toll that was inflicted on the terrorists and their infrastructure. Hamas has a long track record of breaking ceasefires and seizing the opportunity to rearm and regroup, Hamas leaders have made clear that they will strike again and carry out their goal of annihilating Israel. Indeed, Hamas has used Iranian support to launch several wars against Israel from its base in Gaza, including in 2008 Operation Cast Lead, 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, 2014 Operation Protective Edge, 2021 Operation Guardian of the Walls, and now with the October 7 attacks. Trusting Hamas to abide by a unilateral ceasefire is therefore both naive and dangerous. And one has to remember that until October 6th 2023 there was a ceasefire.

Israel must stay protected

The IDF did not believe the terror group was capable of mounting such an effort in October. “The army does not prepare itself for things it thinks are impossible”, said former Israeli national security adviser Yaakov Amidror[9]. Israel had a chance to topple Hamas in 2008-2009 during Operation Cast Lead, and in Operation Defensive Shield in 2014, but stopped before doing so both times[10]. At 8 months now, the Israel-Hamas war is one of the longest the country has ever experienced. This current conflict has far outlasted the Yom Kippur War (19 days), the Second Lebanon War (34 days), and Operation Protective Edge (51 days)[11]. The Israeli government did not take military action to prevent the buildup of Hezbollah’s immense arsenal following the Second Lebanon War in 2006[12]. Throughout their history, Hamas and other Gazan armed factions have since drawn the IDF into prolonged guerilla warfare in Gaza in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021[13]. One of the reasons Israel was not willing to eliminate Hamas then was concern about casualties, combined with hesitation in senior leadership to act in full force, and an extremely heavy international pressure. But now Israel’s position is firm, and backed with untold public support: enough is enough. The threat to Israel must definitively stop[14].

Hamas is greatly reinforced by Iran

Iran and Hamas established connections as early as the 1990s and the Iranian regime remains a key part of Hamas’ strength[15]. It learned to adapt irregular terrorist tactics with the help of Iran for combat in conventional warfare. Iran and Hezbollah, Iran’s powerful Lebanese proxy, also taught Hamas how to conduct suicide bombings[16]. Iranian Hezbollah powered Hamas terrorist campaigns in Israel in the 1990s and through the Second Intifada which killed more than 1,000 Israelis[17]. Hezbollah also provides strategic advice: the October 7 assault largely resembled Hezbollah’s “Conquering the Galilee” plan intercepted by Israel in 2012[18].

Hamas’ capabilities remain a sizeable threat to Israel

Such intensive military training and accumulated weapons have allowed Hamas to gradually organize regional units as large as brigades, with 2,500-3,500 fighters each[19]. Material supplied to Hamas by Iran has helped them to build a sizable rocket arsenal, with more than 10,000 rockets and mortar shells fired in the current conflict[20]. With Iran’s help, Hamas has also developed their own robust rocket-making industry[21]. Although Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system has stopped many such rocket attacks with its 90% interception rate, rockets, together with incendiary balloons, fire-bearing kites, and kamikaze drones, have been a central feature of the group’s arsenal[22]. Intercepting rockets with Iron Dome constitutes the moral limit of Israel’s right to defend itself[23].

Israel’s Post-Conflict Security Needs

Israel, fearing a repeat of Oct. 7, will fortify its border with Gaza, turning it into something akin to the Demilitarized Zone in Korea—with more walls, obstacles, and minefields. Reconstruction will become significantly more difficult, as Israel will restrict the aid that enters Gaza, tempered by the fear that Hamas will use everything possible to rebuild its military infrastructure[24]. Israel would also likely ban the 18,000 Gazans who had previously worked in Israel from doing so again, given the fears that some of them could be contributing to Hamas’ intelligence-gathering efforts[25], in turn further stifling the chances that the Gazan economy recovers. Ultimately, these conditions would lay the foundations for yet another, potentially even bloodier Gaza war.

Lack of support for Israel at the UN

In spite of this, pressure has been building on Israel at the UN. In December, an UNGA resolution demanding a ceasefire passed with the support of 153 UN members out of 193[26]. On March 25, the UNSC passed for the first time a resolution for a ceasefire in Gaza[27]. In terms of impact on the ground in Gaza, the resolution had no real immediate effect, however. The United States abstained from the resolution that did not condemn Hamas, which the U.S. has been demanding as a precursor for months[28]. At the start of the conflict, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, initially urged the Israelis to reduce their attacks altogether, in order to “win over” Gaza’s population,[29] while leaving out the observation that populations dominated by brutal extremists cannot be “won over”. The move in March at the UN therefore represented a shift for the U.S. as well, marking a U.S.-Israel divide over not just symbolism but substance too. The United States had largely supported Israel’s goals in the war until recently but the Biden administration has also had a strong interest in winding down a war that has divided American voters in this election year[30].

Historical dominance of superpowers over Israel at the UN

As soon as the first of Israel’s wars started on May 15, 1948, the US and the British, imposed their total arms embargo on everyone involved[31]. But then, the unexpected happened: Israel started winning and so the British wanted to save their collapsing Arab allies. On June 11, 1948, the UN Security Council imposed a total ceasefire, with the backing of the British and Americans, after 26 days of fighting[32]. This set a precedent for all subsequent UN ceasefires in the region: as soon as Israel launches a counteroffensive, the UN General Assembly pressures the Security Council to order an immediate ceasefire.

Israel’s Independent Capabilities Today

Now Israel is a stronger, more self-sufficient military power. Only Israel can incapacitate Hamas, by fighting in one backstreet and tunnel at a time, across the Gaza Strip. The Biden Administration has been asking the Israelis to hurry up with their fighting, instead of prolonging the suffering of Gaza’s civilians[33]. Indeed, only by the regrettable route of ground operations—in terms of Israeli soldiers, Palestinian civilians, and hostages—can Israel likely meet the objective of ending Hamas rule in Gaza.

Hamas’ unrealistic ceasefire demands amidst growing regional uncertainty

Until now, Hamas has insisted on a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, demands which led to the failure of securing a deal before Ramadan. Israel, with unfinished military objectives, was never going to agree to that. The new offer from Hamas indicated the group has softened on that position and was now willing to accept an initial temporary ceasefire during which further talks would be held to extend the truce into something permanent. In March, Hamas offered a two-stage agreement where in the first instance Israeli women — including female soldiers — children, the elderly, and injured held in captivity would be released in exchange for more than 700 Palestinian prisoners, including 100 serving life sentences for convictions on terrorism charges[34]. Israel refused this as a ceasefire that does not address the release of all Israeli hostages remains incomplete.

April marked “the fifth time in a row that we have offered new ceasefire suggestions and Hamas have rejected it[35],” Prime Minister Netanyahu said. “It’s about time that the world realized that Hamas does not want to move into a deal and therefore we have to take necessary action in order to bring the hostages back home[36],” he added. On April 19, Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the G7 summit in Italy said, “The world needs to understand the only thing standing between the Gazan people and a ceasefire is Hamas. Hamas continues to “move the goal post[37],” Blinken added. “The rejection of the latest proposal,” said Prime Minister Netanyahu in a statement “proves that Hamas leader Yayha Sinwar is not interested in a humanitarian deal and in the return of the hostages, and continues to take advantage of tensions with Iran to try to unite the theaters and to achieve a general escalation in the region[38].”

The regional and global impact of the Iran attacks

The direct attack on Israel by Iran left the world fearful of what another regional war could do to an already devastated region. Any regional Iranian-Israeli conflict could pull in the Gulf countries – Qatar has declared that it is now reconsidering its role as key mediator between Israel and Hamas.[39] But tensions with the US, Russia and China, could also potentially create an explosive global confrontation. Those superpowers are reluctant to see an empowered Iran threatening regional stability, so the events of April 13 appeared to have re-positioned Israel somewhat closer to a critical international community.

American ceasefire announcement on May 31st

In a turn of events from the Americans, President Biden said in a surprise announcement on May 31st that he was outlining a proposal for a permanent end of hostilities based on a deal to release the hostages that had been made by Israel and passed by mediators to Hamas[40]. In the same announcement, President Joe Biden said that Hamas was no longer capable of launching an attack on Israel akin to the October 7 attack and that it was time for the war to end[41]. The statement from President Biden came during Jewish Sabbath when Israel’s political class goes largely silent. U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby reiterated on June 2nd the claim on Hamas’ current capabilities, and that Israel had put forward the cease-fire proposal[42]. Needless to say, these claims are deliberately misleading: they do not take into account how Hamas can re-obtain such capability in due course, and carry out, as promised by its leaders, another October 7 once and again.

The proposal did not come from Israel, as suggested

While the White House described the plan as originating from Israel, it was in fact a proposal put forward by mediators to which Israel had made amendments and changes[43]. Israel has not agreed to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip as part of any deal to free the remaining hostages there. Nor has Israel changed its conditions to reach a permanent cease-fire. That will only happen after Israel’s objectives are met to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities.

Hamas still poses a significant danger to Israel

In response to President Biden’s suggestion that Hamas was now significantly depleted, Prime Minister Netanyahu said Israel remains true to its original objectives – that it would not agree to a permanent cease-fire until “the destruction of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities, the release of all hostages and the removal of the threat that Gaza poses to Israel[44].” The eradication of Hamas is incomplete, with battalions of Hamas terrorists remaining in the southernmost city of Rafah, whilst fighting still continues in Gaza’s north. Hamas continues to launch rockets into Israel and the current extent of the group’s governance across the strip is unclear. The full withdrawal of Israeli forces called for in this agreement could therefore well allow Hamas to claim victory and reconstitute itself.

The proposed ‘deal’ has many grey areas and will likely be rejected by Hamas

U.S. officials and President Biden himself have admitted that the deal proposed on May 31st contains significant gray areas, particularly in the second and third phases of the agreement which call for “a permanent end to hostilities” and “the major reconstruction of Gaza” without imposing strict timetables[45]. The ambiguity in the proposed deal appears to intentionally allow enough interpretation by both sides of the conflict to implement an agreement. Hamas has yet to respond to the deal[46] but has until now spurned all offers that do not ensure their longtime survival inside Gaza — and it is unlikely that they will be persuaded that this proposal is any different.

The American plan is unlikely to work without diplomatic pressure

The goal of the Americans appears to spotlight stonewalling by Hamas and right-wing members of the Israeli government as key roadblocks to a diplomatic settlement. Whether such a strategy ultimately succeeds will depend on the Biden administration’s ability to apply significant, consistent pressure to both sides. For this plan to work will require the U.S. to double down on diplomatic and political efforts in the Middle East, even more so than it already has in the past few months as it is not enough to make one-time public statements and expect results. The likelihood of such sustained diplomatic pressure from the U.S. at election time remains in doubt.

To conclude

It would now be a mistake to apply pre-October 7 rules— the pursuit of an elusive, false calm—to the post-October 7 reality, especially given the heightened tension from the April Iranian attacks. If Israel fails to do so, terrorist attacks will become Israel’s new normal and eliminating invading killers will be the limit of Israel’s internationally acceptable response. The West needs to appreciate that the absence of decisive action by Israel in the weeks following the Iran missile attacks will invite more attempts in the future — attempts that are more sophisticated and lethal. The international community must act decisively and in co-operation. Futile attempts to falsely cajole Israel into action when the threat is still very much active are counterintuitive to our future security. There is only one sustainable trajectory in this war, especially as Iran is becoming bolder and more aggressive, and Hezbollah mounts up its aggression as well: win over Hamas in Gaza, return all the hostages, and usher in a new reality in the Gaza Strip that will guarantee Israel’s long-term security needs, without Hamas in power.


[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:~:text=The%20October%207%20Attack%20in,worst%20mass%20fatality%20terrorist%20attack.
[2] https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:~:text=The%20October%207%20Attack%20in,worst%20mass%20fatality%20terrorist%20attack.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/missile-defense-in-the-israel-hamas-war
[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/27/hamas-attack-israel-october-7-hostages/
[7] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/20/hamas-leaders-arrival-in-egypt-suggests-second-hostage-deal-imminent
[8] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/24/business/hamas-secret-investment-portfolio-israel/index.html
[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/30/world/middleeast/israeli-military-hamas-failures.html
[10] https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-778418
[11] Ibid.
[12] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf
[13] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-built-army
[14] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/2/7/israels-war-on-gaza-live-israel-pounds-gaza-as-truce-diplomacy-continues
[15] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-built-army
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] https://www.voanews.com/a/is-israel-iron-dome-missile-defense-system-ironclad/7327930.html
[23] https://apnews.com/article/iron-dome-missile-defense-israel-palestinians-rockets-hamas-f57508d0e53945d1071d4582fcdae8d2
[24] https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/22/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-truce-pause-war/
[25] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/12/the-trouble-with-a-cease-fire.html
[26] https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144717
[27] https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931
[28] Ibid.
[29] https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SsI2qA0sv5aTgX5HJNmj-WSJNewsPaper-11-21-2023.pdf
[30] https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/02/06/democracy-policy-under-biden-confronting-changed-world-pub-91540
[31] https://www.jstor.org/stable/2150455
[32] https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-184863/
[33] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/02/politics/biden-administration-warning-israel-gaza-civilians/index.html
[34] https://www.ft.com/content/be12aa70-b105-41ea-ad11-a9621b63d8d7
[35] https://allisrael.com/its-time-the-world-faces-this-empire-of-evil-in-tehran-israeli-president-herzog-tells-sky-news
[36] Ibid.
[37] https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-797937
[38] https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-spurns-latest-hostage-deal-proposal-demands-permanent-ceasefire/
[39] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/18/middleeast/qatar-reconsidering-mediation-role-gaza-hostage-talks-anlysis-mime-intl/index.html#:~:text=The%20Arab%20nation%20of%20Qatar’s,to%20the%20Palestinian%20militant%20group.
[40] https://news.sky.com/story/israel-hamas-gaza-latest-ceasefire-biden-announcement-sky-news-live-blog-12978800
[41] https://apnews.com/article/gaza-hamas-israel-netanyahu-biden-resettlement-war-796948b31c7aa8ed90c51edb41738eef
[42] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/biden-cease-fire-offer-not-accurate-israel-netanyahu-hostages-hamas-rcna155129
[43] https://www.state.gov/?post_type=state_briefing&%3Bp=92333
[44] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/03/gaza-hamas-israel-netanyahu-biden-resettlement-war/99faefd0-21d9-11ef-bc8d-a8ae61b84dde_story.html
[45] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-hamas-stands-cease-fire-questions-israel-remain/story?id=110786109#:~:text=U.S.%20officials%20and%20the%20president,Gaza%22%20without%20imposing%20strict%20timetables.
[46] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-hamas-stands-cease-fire-questions-israel-remain/story?id=110786109