Ideally – IDSF HaBithonistim National Security Vision. The Force buildup of the IDF

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s mission is to engage in a comprehensive effort on numerous levels aiming to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations to come. This goal is governed by two guiding principles: first is the acknowledgement of the unique diplomatic, economic and social environments in which Israel exists.  The second is the understanding that informed decisions must lean on a broad strategy that draws it insights from lessons of the past and aims its decisions to the very long term.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. In formulating the national vision, the IDSF HaBithonistim research department examines the security threats on Israel through a magnifying glass, to obtain a comprehensive understanding thereof and yield recommendations for the most effective method of addressing them. Recently an IDSF HaBithonistim research team spoke before the Nagel Commission on Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Building, and presented a detailed opinion paper to the decision makers.

This paper was written with the assistance of six key researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik, Lt. Col. (res.) Shosh Raban, Dr. Yaakov Rimmer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Or Issachar. They elaborate on the current challenges and perceptions that govern the IDF, and detail the steps that must be taken to ensure that the IDF’s force buildup fully responds to the reference scenarios facing the State of Israel.

Reference scenarios as the basis for the IDF’s force buildup

Israel is a small country with little strategic depth, surrounded by a choke ring of enemies and a slew of threats. Many of these threats have existed from the very first moment of Israel’s existence. However, the past decades have seen processes and changes that had bred new trends. If the formative years of Israel saw the young state surrounded by enemy countries, then today, after 75 years of fighting against many of them for its mere existence, Israel is now contending with a pernicious remote enemy in the form of Iran, and with terror militias operating on its borders and in its very midst. Nowadays, Israel is contending with a convergence of theaters, meaning that any conflagration of one almost inevitably sparks a flare-up in another. In this current map of challenges, Israel exists in a permanent state of security volatility that may see unexpected attacks from foreign entities and from hostile elements from within.

In order to optimally deal with such threats, as well as with many others, the IDF’s force buildup must be carefully designed and executed. Traditionally, the Israeli army’s force buildup had stood on six pillars: doctrine, armaments, training, professional advancement, organization and infrastructure. Force buildup has long-term implications on Israel’s military readiness, and demands careful consideration of the current reference scenarios and threats, as well as projections thereof for the future.

Paramount security threats:

• Iran: although almost 1,000 miles from Israel, Tehran operates a vast proxy-terror mechanism across the Middle East, and has succeeded in sending its tentacles into the heart of Israel, into the Palestinian arena. Iran sits on a huge stockpile of missile and drones, developed and dedicated solely to target the civilian heart of Israel. And on top of it all – Iran is now a nuclear threshold state that is dedicated to the development of weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with Iran’s aspirations for instilling global Shi’ite Islam, this places it not only as a major threat to Israel, but indeed a threat to the rest of the world.

• Syria and Lebanon: the conflict on Israel’s northern border is a clear and present danger to Israel as Syria and Lebanon, its neighbors to the north, are enemy states. Syria had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war, and its outcome is not yet clear in terms of the new regime’s stability or long-term intentions towards Israel. Lebanon is for all intents and purposes, ruled by Hezbollah and by proxy – Iran. This state of affairs renders Israel’s northern border highly volatile and demands the constant presence of Israeli forces along that border and a high level of military readiness.

• Egypt and Jordan: the State of Israel does have peace agreements with these two countries. However, they are extremely precarious, and with more than a few inherent vulnerabilities. One is the fact that these accords do not really render redundant the IDF’s activity along the borders with these countries. But they do limit it to a great extent, simply due to the fact that one country cannot operate militarily against an ally in the same manner it can against an enemy. Furthermore, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan do not reflect the current sentiment on the streets of Cairo and Amman. Most of their citizens are openly hostile towards Israel. In the event of a change of governments – a very plausible scenario in both highly unstable countries – their relations with Israel may in all likelihood be impacted. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a reversal of alliances wherein either or both countries become once again enemies of Israel.

• Gaza: the destiny of Gaza in the day after the Gaza War is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, Israel must be prepared for a long period of instability in the Strip. Once the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia of Gaza is completed, the IDF will have to remain deployed in the area to act as a bulwark and ensure the safety of the population along the Gaza border, while crushing further attempts from within the Strip to reignite terror activity against Israe.

• Terror militias: during the past several years, due mainly to misguided concepts, Israel had allowed the terror organizations on its borders to build up their force and stockpile weapons to staggering levels, with the help of Iran. Thus, these organizations – namely Hezbollah and Hamas – have grown to become highly trained and armed terror militaries. The October 7 massacre had made it clear beyond any shred of doubt that Israel cannot allow terror and terror militias to germinate on its borders or anywhere near them, and it must adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards any such attempts.

• The Palestinian arena: this is a pressing challenge for Israel. the Stability achieved by the security forces in Judea and Samaria in the wake of Operation Defensive Shield is wearing thin, and the area has become a hornet’s nest of renewed terror activity, inspired by the October 7 events. The Palestinian Authority is failing – if indeed it even wishes to – conduct effective counter-terror activity in the area against the mounting Islamic terror in its jurisdiction, forcing Israeli security forces to undertake this task in these areas as well.

• Internal arena: the multi-front conflagration is pouring over into the Israeli Arab population. Since the outset of the Gaza War, there has been an awakening of terror activity among the Arab population living within the Green Line and holding a full Israeli citizenship. To contend with this problem without further drawing on the already buckling IDF, Israel must form a national guard to reenforce the civil guard system.

The sad truth of the matter is that the IDF does not have the numbers to address the entire spectrum of threats and reference scenarios with which Israel is currently contending. Therefore, the IDF must build up its force in terms of manpower as well as its operational and firepower capabilities. Some of these changes, such as higher recruitment rates must be executed on a systemic level while others, such as the buildup of new divisions or the incorporation of advance technologies that better enable the designated units to achieve their mission, should be delivered in a manner tailored to the specific needs of each of these units, as detailed below.

The Vision for IDF Force Buildup – A Systemic Point of View

Upscaling manpower

Over the past decades, certain processes have been put in place to downscale the IDF’s manpower, mainly in the ground forces. This led among others to the mustering out of entire divisions, the reduction of mandatory service duration, and increased cuts in mandatory and reserves personnel. These processes were undertaken with the notion that the “army of the people”, as the IDF is perceived in Israel, could be downsized and shaped into a “small and smart army”. However, the outbreak of the Gaza War proved the fallacy of this approach, and has led to the detrimental shortage of regular and reserve manpower with which the IDF is currently struggling.

An additional manpower crisis, dubbed “The Captain Crisis”, referring to the phenomenon in which low raking officers opt to end their military career at the rank of captain, mostly due to better conditions waiting for them in the civilian labor market. This creates a shortage of officers that could have been designated to be the next generation of the IDF’s leadership.

The personnel shortage in the IDF consequent of these cuts, is a significant operational constraint for the IDF, in particular when it must juggle a number of fronts at the same time. Compounding this problem, is the erosion of those of the forces that bear most of the operational brunt due to an unbalanced assignment of the operational load.

Ideal situation:

• Extension of service: in June 2015, the length of the men’s mandatory service – and some of the women’s – was cut from 36 to 12 months. The mandatory three-year term must be reinstated as was the standard for decades – a move that will boost the ranks of the regular army.

• Extension of the reserve service: the increase in the number of reservists is an indispensable element of the buildup of the IDF, such that responds effectively to the current security realities. Recently, the age of discharge from reserves duty was upped by a year, and it may have to be further extended, at least until the army’s manpower had sufficiently been boosted and service exemption policies tightened.
• Expansion of mandatory service to additional demographics: for decades, there have been in Israel’s society entire demographics, which for numerous reasons are automatically exempt from military service – some under the dictates of law and policy, while others slip “under the radar”. This means that there are tens of thousands of able individuals, who are not part of the IDF’s service cycle. In order to address this issue, there are steps that the army can adopt, such as expansion of female induction and the extension of the mandatory induction to “special” demographics such as the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab populations. An additional course of action would be to have soldiers sign on for a short – salaried – extension of their service once their mandatory term is done.

• Improved officer retention: The army must improve the retention of its officers and boost the attractivity of the military careers it can offer young officers, with the aim of keeping them in the system for long-term careers. For this end the military must overhaul and modernize its HR practices and offer terms and conditions of service that can parallel with comparable jobs on the civilian labor market.

• Modernization of the organizational operation: As a hierarchal structure, the IDF is weighted down by a uniformity of approach and thought and its resistance to creative ways of thought that challenge deep seated conceptions. The IDF must adopt organizational cultures that accept diverse ways of thought and are open to a diversity of opinions and concepts.
• Establishment of an auxiliary national guard force: in tandem with the expansion of the military ranks, the IDF’s areas of responsibility must be streamlined. Currently, beyond its border security and defense of the country, the army is also burdened with the task of internal security, which hinders its capacity to prioritize missions and assign sufficient manpower to this and other tasks. To alleviate this burden and allow the army to focus on the missions for which it exists, a national guard that is subordinate to Israel Police should be formed, responsible for all matters pertaining to internal security threats and sharing the army’s workload.

Optimization of logistic readiness

Current situation:

The IDF’s logistic readiness is part and parcel of its operational readiness, but sadly, it is plagued by various problems mainly in the areas of armaments, maintenance and infrastructure.

In terms of armaments, Israel has been developing an increasing dependance on the import of technology and weapons from foreign countries, mainly the US. The Gaza War made it clear to what extent Israel’s deep dependance on foreign munition supplies is to the detriment of the IDF’s operational flexibility and its freedom of action.

In terms of maintenance, many of the army’s bases and headquarters are in dilapidated condition, and are not fully prepared for internal threats and ballistic attacks. This state of affairs poses a risk factor to IDF’s operational capability. Furthermore, most of the IDF’s infrastructures are above ground, and exposed to threats in scenarios of surface-to-surface rocket and missile attacks.

Ideal situation:

• Upscaling inventory and supervising its integrity: Inventories should be assigned minimal stock threshold as per standardized operational requirements, with mechanisms of timely restocking in times of emergency. Furthermore, munitions and weapons should be inspected regularly to maintain integrity and immediate usability.

• Reinforcement of the security industry: Israel’s security industry must be allotted further investment and developed to reduce Israel’s dependance on imported weapons, lower costs of ammunition, and develop dedicated technologies and systems, while allowing for fast restocking in times of war. A positive by-product of this kind of policy would be the creation of new jobs and a boost to the economy.

• Expansion of international arms supply relations: Alongside the development of a more robust local industry, Israel must establish procurement deals with as many countries as possible, to free it from the shackles of dependency on a handful of leading countries for weapons and ammunitions supply.

• Upscaling and optimization of military infrastructures: The IDSF bases and headquarters are a strategic asset for the State of Israel, and as such they must be maintained and secured to the highest level. The bases should be inspected to determine their level of regular operation and their readiness for a state of war.

• Introduction of underground infrastructures: Important strategic assets must be relocated to underground premises to ensure their protection in the event of missile and rocket attack. Additionally, Israel must be prepared for a contingency wherein it must use underground routes to deploy forces. Alongside the planning of dedicated underground spaces, it is advisable to turn existing civilian infrastructures such as tunnels and public parking lots into dual-use infrastructures that can serve military purposes in emergency times.

Technology & Cyber

Current situation:

Alongside the traditional battlefield exists an emerging crucial theater of battle – the technological arena. Over the past several decades, technology – and war technology – has advanced by leaps and bounds, introducing new weapons and widely used cyber warfare.  Recently, with the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), new, highly sophisticated systems have been introduced that pose even a greater challenge for Israel security establishment.

Israel’s security technology and cyber warfare are some of the most advanced in the world, but there are still significant barriers to the incorporation of these technologies on the battlefield. These are related, among others, to the organization’s resistance to changes, the need to work exclusively with large vendors and the limited access to such technologies for commanders in the field.

Even though technology is by no means a complete substitute for human capabilities and for the value of the national contribution of a people’s army, Israel must ensure technological superiority over its enemies, and remain at the forefront of technological development and progress.

Ideal situation:

• After-action review: the shortcomings that arose during the Gaza War must be studied, such as the shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and uncrewed vehicles, the lack of technologies that would allow the forces to deal with the Hamas tunnels and shortcomings in quick and effective responses to anti-tank rockets.

• Investment in technology: Israel must allocate considerable budgets and manpower for the development of defense technology while at the same time boost existing local industry, with an emphasis on dedicated weapons and systems for the use specified by the IDF.

• Incorporation of robotics: robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive motorboats, can bring a significant advantage on the battle field and considerably reduce the cost in human lives. Therefore, robotics should be incorporated in all of the IDF branches.

• Cyber warfare and AI: the cyber arena is getting more sophisticated by the moment, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is on the increase, posing yet new security threats. In order to ensure it maintains the upper hand in this arena, Israel must continue to invest in research and development of offensive and defensive cyber, and begin incorporating AI in its security needs.

• Tech training: The forces in the field must be trained to use the advanced tech tools that are and will become available to them. This calls for the installation of a whole new training array across all IDF branches and units, and the professional training of all the professional personnel allocated to this end.

• Diversification of tech acquisition portfolio: Israel’s security establishment currently deals with only a handful of large tech vendors, with which it has trade relations for decades. In order to introduce sophisticated tech systems, it must be open to doing business with smaller tech vendors and entrepreneurs.

The Vision of IDF Force Buildup According to Branches and Corps

Ground forces

Current situation:

The State of Israel is often forced to engage in multiple combat arenas, wherein the escalation in one often leads immediately to a domino effect conflagration of others. As demonstrated throughout the Gaza War, the battle of order of the IDF’s ground forces proved too short to cover more than one broad campaign in a single arena, while holding a defensive position in others. This also means that in the event of unexpected developments, the army does not have enough reserves to deploy.

In light of existing and projected threats outlined by reference scenarios, the State of Israel must boost its capabilities such that it can engage in high intensity combat in at least two fronts simultaneously, while assuming a broad defensive position in others.

Ideal situation:

• Overhaul of readiness protocols: the IDF must ensure that regular and reserve forces incorporate improved readiness protocols –in terms of quantity and quality of combat gear and weaponry, and in terms of the professional and physical operational readiness of troops and commanders, in order to allow short response times in a reality where surprise terror attacks have become part and parcel of daily life.

• Augmentation of forces by one regular service division and several reserves’ divisions: The IDF should add at least one more regular army division and two more reserves maneuver enhancement divisions to its personnel headcount. These divisions will include a full divisional structure and auxiliary units including tanks, artillery, engineering and logistics. One should be deployed at Israel’s northern border and the other in the Jordan Valley. This is a necessity in order to deal with the operative shortcomings in some arenas, and will additionally serve as reserve forces when needed.

• Establishment of a dedicated standalone combat auxiliary force: a reserve force at the level of at least a division, under the command of General HQ, should be formed to provide operational flexibility and provide relief to forces in the event of unexpected or prolonged events. The reserve force may be kept at a lower level of readiness and mid-level operational fitness, ensuring that these can be brought up to par quickly in times of need.

• Formation of a tunnel capture-and-destroy combat unit: In light of the growing tunnel warfare threat on Israel’s borders, the security establishment must seriously consider the formation of a new dedicated army corps specializing in the detection and destruction of tunnels and subterranean warfare.

• General internal audit of IDF units: The IDF must conduct an in-depth audit of relevant units to asses manpower, equipment and armament needs and shortages. For example, it has become clear in the current conflict that there is a pressing need to increase the numbers of tank in the armored units. Also, in the current climate in Israel’s multiple arena reality, special units such as the Oketz canine unit and the Yahalom combat engineering unit, must be augmented.

• Improvement of mobilization and deployment mechanisms and procedures: The convergence and interconnectivity of arenas in Israel demand that the army install a streamlined mobilization and deployment system and procedures to enable the swift reallocation of forces from one front to another. For this purpose, the army would have to create a dedicated road and rail infrastructure as an alternative to the congested civilian routes, and upscale its fleet of heavy carriers to included armored vehicles. To streamline quick force deployment and movement, civilian infrastructure, such as railways, should be considered for use as supplementary systems.

The Air Force: Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles

Current situation:

The Israeli Air Force is charged with three main missions: The protection of Israel’s areal space, offensives in enemy territories, and the support of ground campaigns. In order to accomplish these missions to their fullest, the IAF is required to have extremely complex and resource-intensive capabilities. It must be understood that no matter how supreme an army’s air force is – it cannot compensate for inadequate ground forces. It can, however, provide operational flexibility to its counterparts on the ground and in the ocean. This can be further boosted by newer advanced drone technology, which aside from expanding military capabilities, help reduce the cost in human lives.

Over the past years, significant changes have been occurring in the map of the areal threats. Israel’s enemies on its borders and remotely understand that they cannot contend with the superiority of Israel’s Air Force and thus abandoned the use of fighter jets, instead opting for the development of ballistic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, steep trajectory surface-to-surface missiles, and low-tech warfare i.e. glider terror attacks, and improvised explosive kites and balloons. These new threats demand the IAF to recalculate its offensive and defensive tactics and set in place procedures for force and resource deployment and means and weapons it uses.

Ideal situation:

• Increase of drone warfare: The most important objective for the use of UMAVs is the protection of the lives of soldiers. Even in the event that the use of human forces is unavoidable, drones can support IAF’s strikes in the heart of enemy territory. UMAV’s can assist in the protection of ground sectors and lend significant aid to ground campaigns. It is highly recommended that the IDF invest resources in increasing the use of this means of war.

• Incorporation of a steep trajectory array: the IDF should examine the incorporation of a steep trajectory array with rocket and attack glider capabilities.

• Streamlining Israel’s air defense system: In order to ensure the protection of the Home Front, the IDF’s air defense must undergo a comprehensive inspection to ensure it is able to contend with scenarios of attacks of thousands of rockets and missiles a day. Furthermore, Israel should consider forging regional alliances for the protection of Israel’s areal space.

Navy: Defense as a Priority

Current situation:

Israel’s naval arena is important on a number of levels: security-wise, Israel has expansive maritime borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Egypt. Economically, Israel has prolific maritime trade activities; strategically, the most substantial source of energy in the country comes from the natural gas fields within the country’s territorial waters.

Therefore, the State of Israel must maintain superiority in all naval arenas, securing its maritime supply routes, protect its shores, protect free passage of vessels and maritime trade, and protect its gas fields. However, as the most pressing threats are ground-based and since the military is struggling with manpower deficits, coupled with traditionally high costs of maintaining and operating naval vessels, the IDF must plan how to prioritize the Navy’s needs.

Ideal situation:

• Prioritization of defensive capabilities: Controlling the maritime territory demands superior offensive capabilities from the Navy, however, due to current constraints abovementioned the focus on the IDF’s Navy must be the development of defensive capabilities.

• Integration of unmanned platforms: It is possible, and necessary, to integrate unmanned surface and underwater vessels, which would be deployed primarily for patrolling, guarding Israel’s maritime borders, routine security, allowing the IDF forces to deal with more complex threats.

Home Front Command: Delegating responsibilities effectively

Current situation:

The Home Front plays a crucial role in the protection of the citizens of Israel, but the delegation of responsibilities between the body and the civil defense and rescue forces remains unclear. This unclarity leads to overlapping of responsibilities in some cases, and in others – tasks that fall between the cracks and remain unattended.

Furthermore, the Home Front Command has been red flagging its personnel shortage for some time. Over the recent years this demanded the allocation of IDF combat forces to supplement the Home Front’s search and rescue activities – forces that should have been serving in other critical ground-force missions. This demands the rethinking of the allocation of resources between the Home Front Command and the IDF operational units.

Another issue that demands attention is the auxiliary Territorial Defense array. Nowadays the territorial defense’s main area of operation is centered around the defense against external threats and search and rescue missions. The area of territorial defense that deals with internal threats such as terror attacks remains nearly untreated by the Home Front Command and this requires revisiting to consider including this task in the Home Front’s responsibilities.

Ideal situation:

• Assignation of areas of responsibilities: The responsibilities of the Home Front and the civil rescue bodies must be assigned and delineated in a clear manner, with consideration of the capabilities each body brings to the table, to allow for the most effective fulfillment of each responsibility.

• Improvement of protection of civil structures: In order to improve the protection of the civil Home Front and reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the wake of attacks against civilians, the Home Front must identify the public structures which lack protective areas and spaces, especially those near and in conflict areas.

• Balanced distribution of recruits: Since there are certain units in the Home Front Command that are in need of recruits with the same profile as the IDF’s other ground force units, the assignment of recruits must be based on considerations of operational priorities of each of the units.

• Reinforcement of the territorial defense array: In light of the terror threats against Israel from within the Arab-Israeli population, it is worth examining the integration of Home Front forces in the protection of the communities in conflict areas and border zones.

The Intelligence Directorate: Collaboration with Civil Bodies

Current situation:

The security intelligence establishment is a critical component in Israel’s security, strategically and tactically. However, Israel had developed over the recent years a dangerous dependence on its intelligence deterrence – the full implication of which was revealed in the October 7 disaster.

Therefore, the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence establishment must be further expanded and maintained but at the same time the security establishment’s other capabilities – especially in the operational field – must be boosted. Furthermore, the intelligence apparatus is currently plagued with some deeply engrained problems that pose a challenge to Israel’ superiority in the field, such as inadequate investment in diverse fields of intelligence, and the brain drain of the system due to much more economically gratifying jobs in the civilian job market.

The ideal:

• Recruitment of speakers of foreign languages: In order to respond to the current operational needs, the Intelligence Corps must augment the ranks of its foreign language speakers through a specially tailored recruitment and training program.

• Reinstatement of an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) array: The Israeli Intelligence OSINT array plays a critical role in the understanding of the broad political landscape in Israel and is indispensable for monitoring unforeseen sudden events, identifying information leaks, producing projections and for influencing public opinion. Therefore, the OSINT array in the intelligence establishment must be rehabilitated and further cultivated.

• Social networks as a viable source of intelligence (SOCMINT): Intelligence gathering from social networks should be increased as it is an indispensable source of intel yielding platform.

• Collaboration with civilian market: It is worth examining the integration of capabilities from Israeli high-tech and local industry. This kind of collaboration can allow the IDF Intelligence Corps to adopt advanced civilian technologies to maintain superiority in the field. Furthermore, it is worth considering opening some of the career military jobs in the Intelligence Corp to the civilian job market to obtain additional professional expert manpower from outside of the military system.

IDF Force Buildup Vision – Decision Making Processes

Improvement of decision-making processes

Current situation:

The security and strategic decision-making processes, including those that pertain to the IDF force buildup and budget allocation, mostly happen in the military executive branch, and are not always transparent to the relevant political and public factors. The limited number of participants in these processes often lead to perceptual shortcomings in the absence of broad perspectives and different points of view.

Another issue regarding decision making processes is related to control and monitoring processes. Currently, most if the control and monitoring of the Israel’s security establishment and the IDF’s activity are internal and are not transparent to the political system, not to mention to the public, which subjects them to a risk of partiality and bias.

Ideal situation:

• Transparent decision-making: The IDF must incorporate non-military professionals, such as public representatives and suitable professionals from each relevant field in its strategic decision-making processes, such that allows for decision-making that is based on multiple opinions and perspectives through organizational processes such as brainstorming sessions.

• Introduction of “red teams”: The intelligence analysis process often uses “red teams” – which simulates hostile attacks with the aim of detecting vulnerabilities and flaws in existing systems and responses. Many times, these teams comprise non-military professionals who bring knowledge and perspectives from outside of the military system. To improve decision-making across the entire security system, red teams should be incorporated in every branch and arm of the IDF.

• Bi-annual Cabinet updates: The Cabinet should hold bi-annual briefings focusing on various aspects of the IDF’s force buildup – including threat assessments, manpower allocations, operational readiness, procurement and armament. These meetings should be anchored in appropriate legislation, and the consequent decisions should be shared with the public. Furthermore, the security establishment should be required to present to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee all information pertaining to changes in the IDF force buildup.

• Establishment of independent supervisory committees: Independent supervisory committees comprising public and civilian representatives are needed to examine the IDF force buildup and report to the government and official control bodies. The government’s security cabinet will be obligated to discuss the committee’s findings and include civilian representatives to partake in discussions on unclassified findings.

Thought on Israel’s security: conclusion

The dynamic map of the security challenges characteristic to Israel and the Middle East region demands constant scrutiny of the present and future threats. Only with a broad understanding of the reference scenarios Israel faces, its military force can be built up in a proper and informed manner.

Nowadays, Israel is forced to contend with a long list of threats, spearheaded by Iran, which can turn into a nuclear state at any moment. Additionally, the current reference scenarios point to a multi-arena war placing Israel on several fronts at the same time, as well as a surprise attack that could be launched by any one of the terror organizations operating on Israel’s borders.

The Gaza War has proven that Israel and its security establishment must recalculate its route forward and methodically and skillfully plan the force buildup across the system. This is the only way to ensure a strong army that could protect Israel security now and in the future.