The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s mission is to engage in a comprehensive effort on numerous levels aiming to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations to come. This goal is governed by two guiding principles: first is the acknowledgement of the unique diplomatic, economic and social environments in which Israel exists. The second is the understanding that informed decisions must lean on a broad strategy that draws it insights from lessons of the past and aims its decisions to the very long term.
These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. The present installment of the Ideally series, IDSF HaBithonistim member, orientalist and expert on cyber terror Assaf Yishai explores Israel-Jordan relations and the ?? between their outward appearance and their true nature.
Disputes and interests: background of Israel-Jordan relations
To truly understand the relations between Israeli and Jordan, one must go back to 1921 – the year of the inception of the Kingdom of Jordan. The foundation of the Kingdon was put down already in 1916 when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the head of the royal Hashemite dynasty of Hejaz, led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This revolt was one of the catalysts of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the Middel East and the rise of the British occupation of the area, and the British promised to reward the Hashemite family for its part.
And reward the British did. Hussein’s sons were crowned over two new ??? entities created artificially by the British: The Transjordan area was given to Abdullah bin Hussein while his brother Faisal received control of Iraq. This arrangement, dubbed “The Hashemite Arrangement”, served Britain well since it allowed it to control its territories through its Arab allies. However, the populations of those areas were loath to accept the ?? of rulers that were not kith and kin.
The Hashemite rule of Iraq was short-lived and ended within 36 years with a revolt and the assassination of the king. Many expected the fate of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan to be more of the same, and even then, Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion said in 1956 “Jordan is an artificial state with no future”.
But despite the somber forecasts, the Hashemite family was able to keep its place on the Jordanian throne for over 100 years now. Protecting the throne is paramount for the Hashemite royal family not only in terms of its own survival but also to ensure the longevity of the entire dynasty. Once the king falls in Jordan – it will spell the end of the Hashemite dynasty.
Milestones in Israel-Jordan relations
Some years after the foundation of the Kingdom of Jordan, the government began establishing relations with the Zionist leaders that were active in pre-state Israel. After the establishment of the State of Israel, its leadership conveyed to King Abdullah not to wage war against the new state, however, he did not heed their warning and Jordan joined the coalition of Arab states that ganged up on Israel in the War of Independence.
In 1952, grandson of King Abdulla, Hussein, ascended the throne from which he ruled the Hashemite Kingdon for 46 years. During his reign, Hussien was able to maintain stability and prevent the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), which was ousted from Israel, to gain a stronghold in Jordan. Hussein cultivated relations with the US and the West and even had secret relations with the State of Israel. Ben Gurion, despite having doubts about the longevity of the Jordanian entity, thought the Hashemite Kingdom could be a strategic asset to Israel and had no problem openly saying so. Other Israeli leaders as well, such as Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, understood the importance of maintaining warm relations with the Jordanian administration, and diplomatic and security sources in Israel proposed viewing Jordan as Israel’s “little sister”.
However, despite the covert relations between Hussien and Israeli administrations, formally the two countries remained enemies and even fought each other in the Six Day War, in which Israel defeated the Jordanian military, and took the Temple Mount from Jordan. This cost the Hashemite family the last holy Muslim asset under its control.
It was only in 1994 that an official peace accord was signed between the two neighbors. As part of the agreement, the relations and the borders between the two were established, and Israel committed to supply Jordan with 50 million metric cubes of water annually. Over the years, Israel has doubled that quantity and to date it still provides 100 metric cubes of water a year to Jordan. Furthermore, both countries have various military and intelligence collaborations, most of which have been secretly established.
Since 1995, Jordan has been ruled by Hussien’s son, King Abdullah the Second. King Abdullah, like his father, maintained good relations with the US, the West and Israel. However, he cannot seem to gain the popularity and legitimacy in the same manner that his father had. He is perceived as disconnected from the people, and someone who lacks the historical roots to the land, being the son of a British mother, and educated in Britain with Western values. He commands the English language better than Arabic – not to mention the local Jordanian dialect, and the Jordanian public frown upon this. Abdullah’s rule once again raised doubts regarding the ability of the Hashemite dynasty to persevere.
Relations with Jordan since the outbreak of the Gaza War
The relations between Israel and Jordan have always been complicated, and the Jordanian public has always been hostile to Israel. After the October 7 attack and massacre, the already volatile relations have further deteriorated. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, there have been ongoing riots on the streets of Amman, and the Jordanian administration is overtly hostile towards Israel. Already in November 23 Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel – a move that was aimed – according to Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi “to emphasize Jordan’s opposition and condemnation of Israel’s war against Gaza, and the killing of innocents and the creation of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that could lead to a regional conflict”.
In Israel there was an expectation for Jordan to publicly condemn the massacre of October 7, but to no avail. Moreover, King Abdullah’s wife, Rania, had publicly attacked Israel on numerous occasions. The Jordanian administration also condemned Israel’s attack in Iran and said that it was “a violation of international law, an attack on Iran’s sovereignty and a dangerous escalation that further intensifies tensions in the region”. Jordan even called on the international community to take responsibility and take measures against Israel that “end Israel’s attacks against Gaza, the [West] Bank and Lebanon, as a first step to dial back the escalation”.
September 2024 saw further escalation in the relations of the two countries, when a Jordanian truck driver crossed the border illegally and murdered three Israelis working in the Alenbi border checkpoint. The Jordanian government appointed an inquiry committee to investigate the affair but the public – including members of parliament – celebrated the attack on the streets of Amman.
Despite the open hostility and condemnations, many claim that the situation behind the scenes is quite different. Various sources report that Jordan actually helped Israel intercept both Iranian missile attacks in April and October 2024. Some sources close to the matter claim that King Abdullah’s remarks in public are in stark contrast to what he says behind closed doors.
This discrepancy reflects the complex relations Israel has had with Jordan from the onset. On the one hand, the two countries have deep ideological disputes and clashes. On the other hand, both share common interests. When viewing the relations between both countries over the past decades and its frequent changes, it would appear that this duality is the only constant in these relations.
Assaf Yishai: A Vision for Israeli-Jordanian Relations
Aid in maintaining the stability of the Jordanian government
Current situation:
Since its inception, the Jordanian administration has been plagued by instability stemming, among others, from the varied demographic composition of the Jordanian people. Only a minority of these are loyal to King Abdullah II, while the majority perceives the king as a foreign element who does not belong in Jordan in the first place.
Furthermore, Jordan is plagued by a slew of internal problems – predominantly a serious water shortage – that threaten its internal stability. If that were not enough, the king has recently reformed the method of elections aiming to benefit his own interests but in reality, this played out against him. The reform, the purpose of which was to block the election of local leaders that serve only the interests of their clans, had resulted in a rise in the power of the Muslim Brotherhood movement which poses a major threat to the Hashemite rule.
The recent regional changes have also influenced Jordan’s internal stability. The Gaza War, which ostensibly has no relation to Jordan, caused a 40% decline in tourism to the Kingdom – a main engine of the country’s economy. The revolt in Syria, which toppled the Assad regime, is a Damocles sword hanging over the head of King Abdullah, who fears a similar outcome for his own country.
In light of the above mentioned, the main interest of the King is to ensure that he and the entire Hashemite dynasty survive. A king in a survival state of mind is willing to take irrational measures, like a drowning person grasping at straws. For Israel, this makes him an unpredictable leader and places a question mark on any possibility of stability of the Jordanian government.
Ideal situation:
- Placing more focus on Jordan: Israel must not become complacent and think that simply because it has a peace agreement with Jordan, it can enjoy quiet and stability on its eastern border. Already in the immediate term, Israel must allocate intelligence resources toward the Jordanian issue and keep its finger on the pulse to identify any change that could threaten Israel’s interests in the area.
- Continued support of King Abdullah – to a point: Israel should continue aiding the King, as it has always done, out of the understanding that any alternative regime would be far worse for Israel. At the same time, Israel should be clear about what it is willing to accept and what it is not. It cannot continue protecting the King at any cost, even if his regime no longer serves Israel’s interests.
- Prepare for the fall of the Jordanian regime: the State of Israel must prepare a contingency plan and formulate long-term strategies for the day after the fall of the Hashemite dynasty. These plans must be far-reaching, such as the seizure of the eastern face of the hills of Samaria bordering with Jordan, to prevent the capture by hostile Iranian and ISIS forces of this important strategic asset.
Securing the border with Jordan
Current situation:
The border with Jordan is Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country, stretching over 309 kilometers (192 miles). Due to the peace accord between the two countries and the relative quiet between them, the border is ostensibly calm – but in reality, it is far from it. The border with Jordan had always been troublesome, among others due to the lack of a regular security force. Throughout the years, this border has become a hotbed of drug and weapon-smuggling as well as infiltration of terrorist into the territory of Israel – much of this under the auspices of Iran, and ever since the smuggling routes through Syria were closed in the wake of the revolt, the incidents on the Jordanian border are increasing. Furthermore, the closing of the border with Egypt due to the Gaza War, places more criminal and terror demand on the Jordanian border, which remains one of Israel’s last unsecured borders.
Over the past years dozens of arms-smuggling attempts into Israel have been made on this border. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 2023, when a Jordanian MK attempted to smuggle 200 guns into Israel. Aside from the rife smuggling activity, the terror incidents are on the rise as well – the Jordanian truck driver, who crossed the border and murdered three Israelis and a month later – two other terrorists crossed the border illegally in the Dead Sea area and shot and wounded two Israeli soldiers.
To date, Israel’s border with Jordan is full of breaches and not sufficiently secured. Part of the border is fenced but other areas, such as the Negev Desert valley – have no physical barrier. Furthermore, Israel does not allocate sufficient forces to secure the border. It is possible that this laxity stems from complacency and a false trust of the Jordanian peacekeeping abilities and willingness, or it may be pure negligence. Whatever the reason, the current strategy represents a real strategic threat to Israel. Even if most of the illegal activity across the border is criminal, it is important to remember that terror characteristically rides on criminal activity to achieve its ends.
Ideal situation:
- Hermetically sealing the border: The Israel-Jordan border must be hermetically sealed for its entire length to ensure zero breaches. Furthermore, electronic surveillance should not be seen as the only security solution, rather the border must have a physical barrier such as a fence or a wall.
- Reinforcement of the border forces: the IDF should deploy a division to act as a security force on the Jordanian border, creating large-scale surveillance and establishing quick response capabilities. Naturally, the IDF will have to considerably boost its ranks in order to have the manpower for said division.
Keeping Iran out of Jordan
Current situation:
One of Iran’s common stratagems in the Middle East in service of its global-Islamic vision, is to meddle in the affairs of other countries – especially the unstable among them – and identify the cracks through which it can cause chaos and wield its influence. This is what it had done until recently in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. This is what it had done in the Gaza Strip. Now, having lost most of its hold in the area, it may very well try to reclaim it by taking over Jordan.
Iran may do so with force, for example with pro-Iranian militias operating in neighboring Iraq. However, the King himself might opt to cooperate with Iran, if he believes that Iran would be more conducive to the survival of his reign more than Israel. The connection between Jordan and Iran is not self-evident to say the least, but even Saudia Arabia, Iran’s bitter enemy, chose to sign in March 2023 an agreement for the renewal of diplomatic relations, once it realized that the western axis is growing weak.
Ideal situation:
- Display of power and military prowess: The Middle East is a place that sets great store by strength; hence it behooves the State of Israel to demonstrate its military prowess and impress upon the King of Jordan that he can lean on Israel. If the King feels that Israel cannot guarantee his safety, he might seek another ally to do so, which most likely would be Iran.
- Preparation for an Iranian takeover of Jordan: Israel must prepare for any scenario wherein Iran will try to install its control in Jordan and summarily and decisively thwart any threat on part of pro-Iranian elements in Jordan.
Settlement of the Jordan Valley
Current situation:
The Jordan Valley is a territory under dispute in terms of international law. Many in Israel and the world see the area as an integral part of Israel while others claim it to be an occupied territory that is not part of Israel’s sovereign state.
The Jordan Valley has great security and strategic importance as it is the only stretch of land that protects Israel’s eastern border. Since the establishment of the State, most of Israel’s leadership acknowledged its significance, and even late PM Yitzhak Rabin in his last speech before the Knesset declared that the security protective border of Israel will be charted in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of the term.
Beyond its significance to Israel’s security, the Valley also has a geographic and economic importance, as it is a large swath of land that can be populated and developed. Furthermore, it carries great historic and cultural significance as it is home to numerous Jewish heritage sites.
Currently, the Jordan Valley is not included in Israel sovereign territory, thus Israeli law does not apply in the area as it does in the rest of the country. This sets an obstacle to the settlement and development of the Valley area, and ties Israel’s hands in dealing with violations in the area such as illegal Palestinian construction.
Ideal situation:
- Encouragement of Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley: Over the years Israel has proven that anywhere it creates Jewish settlements – security is higher, whereas areas with no or sparse Jewish population terror hotbeds germinate. Hence, the Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley is a sine qua none for ensuring the security in that area. Beyond that, the development of the Valley could serve as a response to high housing demands that many families in Israel are contending with, and can deepen the connection of Israelis to some of the most important Jewish heritage sites that are in that locale. For this end, Israel must encourage young people and new immigrants to make their homes in the Jordan Valley, among others by way of favorable terms for land acquisition and housing, and the development of local communities.
- Action towards securing Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley: For years there have been many attempts by Israel to gain sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, similarly to what it had achieved in the Golan Hights. This move first and foremost sends out a clear message that Israel is here to stay. Furthermore, once Israel gains sovereignty over the area it will be able to develop it as it sees fit, and establish institutes and infrastructures. Gaining sovereignty may pose a diplomatic issue for Israel, mainly vis a vis Europe, however as it has been proven time and time again – when Israel presents a united and unyielding front, the world remains silent. If Israel can gain consensus in Israeli society for such a move, making it clear that this is a security imperative and not occupation for the sake of occupation, it is highly likely that the international community will fall into line as well.
Condemnation of the Condemnations
Current situation:
Despite the Israel-Jordan peace accord, many people in Jordan openly condemn Israel. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, this state of affairs has only grown worse, until now, there are many anti-Israel protests throughout Jordan.
Even the Jordanian administration, despite its cooperation with Israel and its dependance on its neighbor to the west, exhibits an anti-Israeli front. The King failed to condemn the October 7 massacre, and his wife Rania even disputed it had even truly happened and attacked Israel from every global platform. In an interview to CNN, she spoke of the pain of the babies and children of Gaza, not once mentioning the dozens of innocent Jewish children Hamas heinously butchered. In another interview to CNN she insinuated that the massacre was not on the scale Israel and the US claim, saying that “President Biden did not witness with his own eyes the harsh things that had occurred in Israel, as he himself said”.
A short while after the Gaza War broke out, King Abdullah II sent two air shipments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. He also sent a third plane, whose cargo was deployed by his daughter, Princess Salma of Jordan, as a symbolic gesture to the children of Gaza.
Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, a close associate of the King, has also attacked Israel more than once since the outbreak of the war. Safadi also tried to promote anti-Israel measures at the United Nations, and recommended that Jordan join in the prosecution of Israel at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Even though the Jordanian King’s statements are merely lip service, as apparently, he sings a completely different tune behind closed doors –nevertheless, his statements and those of his family influence the mood on the streets of Jordan as well as the relations between the two countries.
Ideal situation:
- Demand the King moderate his rhetoric: although it is understandable to an extent that the ruler of an Arab state would have to display animosity toward Israel, his current condemnations are beyond the pale. The State of Israel must use the leverages it has on the King and the Jordanian administration – e.g. water supply and military aid – and demand he moderate his and his family’s statements, and halt the anti-Israel measure undertaken and the UN.
There is a lot more than meets the eye: conclusions
The relations between Israel and Jordan can be sketched with a single word: contrast. Contrast between the attitude of the Jordanian administration and the public; contrast between its public statements and what it says behind closed doors; and most importantly – contrast between the quiet on the surface and the threats brewing underneath. Israel must understand that its border with Jordan is not secure and the stability of the government there is not ensured. In the immediate-term, Israel must employ whatever leverages it has on the Jordanian administration – namely the water supply and military aid – to solidify its relations with the Kingdom. In the long term, Israel must create a contingency plan that charts courses of action for possible scenarios such as the ousting of the ruling Hashemite family and a takeover of Jordan by radical elements such as extremist Sunni militias or pro-Iranian forces.
Above all – Israel must populate the Jordan Valley and place it on par with the rest of its geographic strategic assets, both in terms of national security and development.
The state of affairs between Israel and Jordan, wherein the two are at loggerheads on the one hand, but cooperate on the other, can hold only to a certain point. What with the recent changes washing over the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder whether this point has now been reached, and if so – what is in store from now on.
