The current political echelon in Israel is perceived as trying to shirk its responsibility for the events of October 7th. There is a lot of truth in this. The “congratulations” that government officials bestowed upon the resigning IDF Chief of the General Staff, along the lines of “well done, we salute him”, without mentioning in the same breath the great shame and humility that should encompass their every move during this period – are shameful. But the discussion around this issue is not on point.
There is a tendency to divide responsibility for the events of October 7, and also for what happened afterwards – the successes and failures – into military and political domains. But the truth is that the mutual influence the two ecehlons have on each other is too great to separate. The dichotomous separation is the real shirking of responsibility.
Who is responsible for the misconception?
There are too many causes to count for what led to the October 7th misconception. The intelligence responsibility of the Military Intelligence Directorate and the other intelligence agencies is clear and undisputed. But what caused this intelligence failure is the lack of a true critical culture. The responsibility of the IDF, and of the intelligence community in general, is to examine the veracity of their perceptions, which ultimately lead to the intelligence assessments that reach the political echelon. It’s enough to listen to Brigadier General (res.) Itay Baron, who was previously Head of the Research and Analysis Division at the Military Intelligence Directorate and who returned to the position after October 7, to understand that this is not the situation within the army: “If we have such information, and the information is of high quality, then it has greatly strengthened this culture of ‘we know because it’s impossible that we don’t'”[1]. The professional assumption that it is possible to know and understand reality accurately, is what lies at the heart of the failure.
After the Yom Kippur War, the Audits Department, also known as Ipcha Mistabra (Aramaic for “The Devil’s Advocate”) was established at the Military Intelligence Directorate. This department’s role is to challenge the Military Intelligence Directorate and its concepts before they even reach the political echelon. But even this tool, and other tools such as red teams (teams whose job is to think through the enemy’s eyes), have proven ineffective in the face of a culture of arrogance, as evidenced by the IDF’s decision to expand the Audits Department and its authorities after the events of October 7 in light of its failure.
But intelligence responsibility does not stop with the IDF or other intelligence agencies. The political echelon has the responsibility to cast professional doubt on intelligence assessments. The political echelon has the authority and responsibility to demand additional expert opinions, and to place common sense into the mix of considerations. The professional echelons, on the other hand, have the responsibility to provide politicians with any information that may be relevant in order to enable them to make the right decisions, and they should present this information when it is processed from a professional aspect only and not from an ideological aspect.
Who is responsible for meeting the goals?
The political echelon must not only cast doubt on intelligence assessments, but also on everything that comes out of the military: strategic goals and plans of action to achieve these goals must also be put to the test. Statements made during this period by government ministers, accusing the army of trying to evade meeting clear goals, are nothing short of negligence. The political echelon has the duty to define clear goals according to which the military can plan its programs and mode of operation.
Let’s take, for example, the second goal of the Swords of Iron War, as defined by the political echelon: eliminating Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. It’s enough to read a little news to understand that this is not the situation in the Gaza Strip, even at a stage when a hostage deal is already taking place. The claim made by government members is that the military echelon fears control over the civilian population and is trying to avoid it, and as a result, Hamas is still the most powerful entity in Gaza. The failure of the uncontrolled humanitarian aid entering Gaza, and not taking the appropriate political steps to verify who is distributing the food in Gaza, are being blamed by the political echelon on the fact that “the army chiefs are not aggressive enough”, and are therefore demanding their resignation, hence their congratulations to the outgoing IDF Chief of the General Staff.
Who benefits from the current situation?
The truth is that it is the responsibility of the political echelon to audit the progress in achieving the goals it has set. And it has a host of other options to promote this, if the army does not succeed. So where is the gap?
- In the current system structure, the political echelon does not have the professional tools to question what the military says. There is no civil body capable of giving the government alternative plans or additional intelligence assessments. Choosing from among different alternatives is a basic principle in proper decision-making processes, and it cannot exist in such a reality.
- The definition of the term “national security” varies in its scope and content. Some include social domains due to the fact that they also indirectly affect national security, and some narrow the definition to purely security domains. But there is no denying that national security includes more than dealing with military threats. It is standard to view national security as also encompassing diplomatic, political, and economic issues, which have a direct and clear impact on national security. However, despite the complexity of the issue, the person considered to be the “national evaluator” is the Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, even though his considerations are limited to military ones. The monopoly of knowledge that exists in professional bodies pertaining to intelligence, planning, and more is not all that prevents the political echelon from casting doubt and choosing between alternatives, but also minimizes the engagement in national security to the military stratum alone. Even if political steps are taken, they are done so in isolation from military ones, and this is clearly evident in the current situation in the Gaza Strip, where the military actions have not provided leverage for significant political steps that would replace Hamas’ rule.
- There is not enough synchronization between the various security and intelligence agencies. The structure of the Israeli defense establishment is complicated and dispersed. There are intelligence agencies in the IDF, the Israel Security Agency, and the Mossad. There are planning bodies in the Ministry of Defense and the IDF. There are research bodies in the IDF, the Foreign Ministry, and more. However, there is no effective body in Israel that will synchronize these bodies, and more importantly, there is no synchronization between the professional echelon and the political echelon that is responsible for making decisions. The person entrusted with this synchronization is the National Security Council, which has suffered from a lack of efficiency and real authority since its establishment. The separation in the day-to-day work between the profession and the decision-making has been the basis, for many years, for the deficiencies in the defense establishment’s work. Any cooperation is coincidental, circumstantial, and not the result of a well-oiled, efficient system.
- There is an entire stratum, the one between the major goals set by the government (if any) and the military operational plans, which remains a void. The goals of the war, as they were defined, are somewhat amorphous. Cuasing the collapse of Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities is a major goal, the military aspect of which is only one step in achieving it. Although a decisive military victory is indeed a prerequisite for replacing the civil rule, history shows that even after a military defeat, a rapid move must be made to capture the sphere of civilian life without leaving a vacuum. This issue was not properly defined, and this vacuum left Hamas as the most powerful ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.
It is easy to attribute this failure to the raid method adopted by the IDF since March 2024, but this method stems from the lack of clarity of the war’s goals, of a lack of control over these goals, and of course of the absence of the political component of these goals. Without the political component, the military step can never achieve the ultimate goal.
- Convenience. The disconnect between the echelons is convenient for everyone. It’s convenient for the government to have someone to blame, and it’s convenient for the army to set facts on the ground. The government can pride itself on setting goals for the war, even though they are partial, vague, and not enough efforts are made to achieve them. On the other hand, the army can take pride in military achievements, even if these correspond to its goals and not the goals set by the political echelon.
Convenience, in these situations, is the opposite of responsibility. The relationship between the military and political echelons has been structured in a crooked manner since the days of David Ben Gurion. The structure of the security system is inefficient, does not facilitate synchronization between bodies, grants a monopoly of knowledge and opinion to the professional ranks over policymakers, and above all, creates a culture of shirking responsibility. The IDF Chief of the General Staff and the Head of Southern Command did well to fulfill their responsibility, and the government would do well if at some point it also assumed its responsibility. However, responsibility is not a personal matter. Resignation is not the solution to the real problem, just as one or another appointment is not the solution. The real responsibility lies in leaving the defense establishment’s comfort zone, which is to dismantle the structure of the system and reassemble it.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement
[1] From an article in N12 – https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm “Former senior officialhttps://www.mako.co.il/news-military/036814c74a0e1910/Article-ab8e98f4a763391026.htm warns: “October 7 may happen to us again“
