Recently, the Houthi threat from Yemen has continued to exact a heavy toll on Riyadh. Effective drone and missile attacks, alongside significant ground achievements along the Yemen-Saudi border—including raids, the capture of outposts, destruction of military hardware, and the taking of Saudi soldiers as prisoners—have embarrassed the Saudis while exposing the ineffectiveness of their military response to the escalating Houthi threat. Even the ostensibly strategic defense alliance recently signed by the Kingdom with Pakistan and Turkey proves to be an illusion at its very first practical test—mere paper, raising the question once more as to why and against whom this alliance was formed in the first place.
Faced with this reality, some might argue that this represents a golden opportunity for Israel: Israeli military assistance to Riyadh against the common enemy in Yemen could serve as a confidence-building measure to jumpstart normalization, a goal long desired in Jerusalem and Washington.
In response to this argument, the question arises: Is this truly an opportunity? And if so, at what cost and with what consequences? A sober strategic perspective clarifies that embarking on a military adventure on behalf of the Saudi regime, especially at the present time, would be a reckless step and a grave mistake for Israel.
First, Israel must remain focused on its core objective: the Iranian threat. The IDF must be prepared, both defensively and offensively, for continued strikes in Iran to ensure the elimination of the nuclear and conventional threats and to weaken the regime in Tehran alongside the heavy economic pressure applied by the United States. Such a window of opportunity may open following the U.S. midterm elections, and Jerusalem must not be dragged into peripheral adventures that distract from the main threat. Beyond that, the IDF has far more critical and urgent operational missions in closer arenas against Hezbollah and Hamas—in Lebanon, Gaza, and Judea and Samaria.
Second, Israel appears to have established continuous deterrence against the Houthis and the Iranians, and disrupting it would be a strategic blunder. Even if we avoid self-deception and recognize with a clear eye that this may only be a temporary, opportunistic pause in fire against Israel by the Shiite axis rather than deep, long-term deterrence—would it be right to return Israeli citizens to an “active” war status on the home front, running to bomb shelters and disrupting daily life during the holiday season or an already sensitive election period? Entering the fray would inevitably trigger missile and drone strikes, and potentially additional threat scenarios such as Houthi “expeditionary forces” sent to the region or terror operations. It is far better for the home front, the military, and security forces to utilize this period to prepare for the missions that truly matter to Israel’s security.
Above all, however, stands the fundamental political issue. The Saudis have turned their backs on Israel in recent years—in stark contrast to the United Arab Emirates, which stood by our side and preserved the alliance of the Abraham Accords. Normalization with Saudi Arabia is indeed a desirable goal, but only as a “peace through strength.” We have paid more than enough for the “price of peace”—no more dangerous compromises in the Palestinian arena, no more painful concessions, no agreement to Saudi strategic capabilities such as an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and certainly no use of IDF soldiers as “mercenaries” to satisfy the Royal Court.
A political settlement is necessary and vital only at eye level and based on mutual interests. It is precisely Saudi Arabia’s solitary struggle against the Houthis and the Iranian axis, without backing from the Sunni world, that will drive home to the Royal Court the conclusion that Israel is the only real partner in the region upon whom they can truly rely. Thus, if the Saudis take an active and public step toward peace without preconditions—including a clear statement in plain Arabic regarding the non-conditioning of a Palestinian state solution on the path to normalization with Israel—a joint defensive posture against regional threats could be considered for the future.
Until then, no free gifts should be given. No more aid missions to Erdogan’s Turkey, no more allocation of intelligence and security resources for countries that promote the delegitimization of Israel, and certainly no risking our soldiers in vain for those who turn their backs on us and actively work against Israeli interests. Ultimately, this is the language that must be spoken in the Middle East, both military and diplomatically: a durable and stable peace comes from strength, not subservience; from long-term interests, not ad-hoc fixes to temporary distress.
