The Palestinian Authority’s Involvement in Terrorism and the Imperative for Root-Level Treatment

Introduction

The terror attack that took place last week (July 23, 2026) in the Ganim area of Samaria illustrates once again the direct involvement of the PA. Operatives of the Fatah movement were involved in the circumstances of the incident, including a member of the Palestinian security forces. The official statement by the Fatah movement, which mourns the death of the four attackers from the village of Till and praises Farooq Adnan Ramadan, the attacker who snatched a weapon and opened fire, and praises their actions, constitutes an institutionalized declaration of intent. This statement reconfirms that the Palestinian Authority is not a moderating factor or a partner for an agreement, but rather a hostile entity actively operating against the State of Israel.

These terror attacks are a direct product of an entire institutionalized system that educates toward hatred, consistently incites against the Jewish people and the State of Israel, and provides a direct and institutional financial incentive for acts of murder. This mechanism, known as the “Pay for Slay” model, anchors support for terrorists and their families as a foundational pillar in the Authority’s budget.

The Palestinian Security Forces: Dual Functionality and the “Turning of the Barrels” Phenomenon

Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Accords, the activities of members of its security forces have been intertwined with direct acts of terrorism against Israeli civilians and IDF forces. While the original expectation was that these forces would serve as an effective arm for maintaining public order, thwarting terrorism, and tightening security coordination, in practice a dynamic of dual functionality has developed. Under this pattern, members of the security forces serve during daytime hours in the official policing and enforcement systems of the Authority, and during nighttime hours actively integrate into terror infrastructure, terror attacks, and fighting against Israeli security forces.

Comprehensive research conducted by the research department of the ‘Regavim’ movement sheds light on the broad scope of this phenomenon. The data show that between the years 2020 and 2025, at least 118 members of the security forces were identified as directly involved in terrorist activity. The vast majority of these operatives were killed during the commission of terror attacks, and after their deaths received official recognition and exaltation as “martyrs” (Shahids) on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement. These data lead to the inevitable conclusion that the scenario referred to in the security establishment as “turning of the barrels” is not a future, theoretical, or abstract threat, but a factual reality taking place at varying intensity for many years.

The structural depth of the problem is compounded given that the Palestinian Palestinian security forces constitute a massive employer operating under considerable numerical ambiguity. According to various estimates, the Authority pays salaries to approximately 65,000 security force personnel. However, an examination of the active personnel roster in Judea and Samaria reveals significant gaps, with numbers ranging between 32,000 and approximately 60,000 active personnel on the ground. The lack of clarity regarding the actual extent of service and the division of roles highlights the destructive potential inherent in these organizations, whose weapons, training, and authority are repeatedly directed against the State of Israel.

The Institutionalized Mechanism: From Normalization of Incitement to Official Exaltation

The phenomenon of involvement in terrorism does not remain at the personal level of the individual fighter or police officer, but receives a broad envelope of institutional and ideological backing. The Palestinian Authority does not condemn security force personnel convicted of terrorism, but rather turns them into cultural heroes and role models for future generations. An analysis of the Authority’s behavioral patterns reveals an organized policy consisting of three central levels:
First, at the symbolic and educational level, the Authority exalts the memory of the attackers through lavish military funerals, commemorating their names in public institutions, erecting monuments, and extensive coverage of official condolence visits by senior officials. Through these means, a battle heritage is imparted that encourages the younger generation to see terrorism as a path of national and personal fulfillment.

Second, at the organizational level, there is an ongoing attempt by various elements in the political and security establishment in Israel and around the world to present organizations like the ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ as a “rogue faction” disconnected from the PA leadership. However, an analysis of the official statements of the Fatah movement—the central political institution at the core of the Authority, shows that this distinction is entirely artificial. The movement openly embraces the actions of the military wing, praises its attacks, and unifies the ranks of the official security forces with the fighting organizations.

Third, at the economic level, the Authority maintains a direct reward mechanism that grants huge salaries to imprisoned terrorists and to the families of terrorists killed during the commission of attacks. These payments, derived from the severity of the attack and the number of casualties, are not merely social assistance, but a proactive, institutionalized economic incentive that encourages embarking on terrorism.

Failure of the Israeli Perception and International Discourse

In light of this reality, the gap between what is happening on the ground and the way things are mediated to the Israeli public and the international community is striking. While in the Gaza Strip the State of Israel acts with determination to dismantle terror infrastructure and eradicate Hamas rule, on the forward front of Judea and Samaria a policy exists of recognizing the largest terror establishment in the region, the Palestinian Authority. Israel continues to maintain official cooperation and dialogue with forces whose members are actively involved in terrorism in large numbers.

The public discourse in Israel is hardly exposed to the full extent of the phenomenon, as official reports following terror attacks place primary emphasis on aspects of operational thwarting, while the relational and organizational affiliation of the attackers to the Fatah movement and the PA security forces frequently remains on the sidelines. This lack of prominence helps, in practice, to preserve the perception promoted by international and local actors regarding turning Fatah and the Palestinian Authority into a legitimate governing body. This receives added validity in political discussions regarding the “day after” in the Gaza Strip, in which transferring the reins of control to these same bodies is being considered.
Relying on the Palestinian Authority as a stabilizing factor in Gaza or continuing to turn a blind eye to its actions in Judea and Samaria is nothing short of a direct return to the conception of turning a blind eye that collapsed on October 7. The factual data prove that the Authority does not constitute a security solution, but rather a fundamental part of the problem.

Summary and Policy Recommendations

Recent events in Samaria and the cumulative data on the involvement of the security forces in terrorism mandate a deep conceptual and operational shift on the part of the State of Israel. Public and political debate must be conducted on the basis of facts as they are, recognizing that the Palestinian Authority in its current format is incapable and unwilling to serve as a security partner.

In order to address this threat at its roots, the Government of Israel must take the following steps:
The government must lead a firm diplomatic campaign among the international community and donor countries, demanding that any financial aid to the Palestinian Authority be conditioned on the immediate and absolute cancellation of the “Pay for Slay” mechanism and the dismantling of the economic framework supporting terrorism.

Firm action must be taken, through legal, economic, and operational means, to cut off the institutionalized incitement mechanisms in the education system, in the media, and in official PA statements. The granting of legitimacy to events of exaltation and military funerals for terrorists must be stopped.

The perception viewing the ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ or the attacking members of the security forces as “bad apples” or “rogue factions” must be abandoned. Full command and political responsibility must be applied to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority for these acts.

The security establishment must recognize that the “turning of the barrels” scenario is not a future reference threat but a factual reality in the making, and adjust force deployment, rules of engagement, and situation assessments accordingly.
In conclusion, the continued denial and blurring of the Palestinian Authority’s involvement in terrorism provide a tailwind to terror infrastructure and directly endanger Israeli civilians and security forces. Outlining a sober security and political strategy is the necessary first step to preventing the next disaster.