Analysis of the Reconstruction Pilot in the Shiite Village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah

Moran Alaluf, Researcher on Iran and Hezbollah, Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF).

In June 2026, a framework agreement was signed between Israel and Lebanon through U.S. mediation, intended to regulate the ceasefire, a gradual IDF withdrawal, the transfer of exclusive security responsibility in the areas from which the IDF would withdraw, verification that Hezbollah’s weapons and military infrastructure had been removed from those areas, and prevention of its renewed entrenchment. Accordingly, the Lebanese government was given the mandate to carry out civilian reconstruction that would enable residents to return and restore electricity, water, and road infrastructure.

To this end, a government reconstruction program called LEAP was established, funded and supervised by the World Bank, with the aim of promoting the development and rehabilitation of infrastructure and public services. The program has initial funding of up to approximately $250 million, with the possibility of expanding it to approximately $1 billion.

In July 2026, the principles for implementing the arrangement were agreed upon through a limited security pilot in three villages: Zawtar al-Gharbiyah in the Nabatieh District, Froun in the Bint Jbeil District, and Srifa in the Tyre District. The pilot was intended to examine the Lebanese Army’s ability to enforce state sovereignty on the ground as a condition for expanding the initiative to additional areas in southern Lebanon. Accordingly, and as a confidence-building measure, the IDF began withdrawing from Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, and the Lebanese Army began deploying in the village for the first time under the arrangement. In Froun and Srifa, by contrast, Lebanese Army activity continued without the need for an Israeli withdrawal, since those villages were already outside Israeli control.

Zawtar al-Gharbiyah: A Case Study for Southern Lebanon

Alongside implementation of the security arrangement, the Lebanese government began promoting the reconstruction of the village, the rebuilding of homes destroyed during the war, and the return of residents. On September 21, following a decision by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, caravans were placed in the village for families whose homes had been destroyed in the war. The Council for the South transferred the first housing units to the village, in coordination with the local authorities and the village head affiliated with Amal. In addition, it was decided to establish civilian aid organizations and distribute food. On the one hand, subject to the progress and success of the security pilot, the Lebanese government gained American confidence to receive extensive funding and lead the reconstruction process in the village, establishing its authority in an area that had been under the influence of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement for decades, while reducing the population’s dependence on the organizations’ assistance mechanisms.

However, this is where the contradiction at the heart of the case study becomes apparent: the Lebanese government seeks to replace Hezbollah’s mechanisms of control and assistance through state institutions and civil society organizations, while Hezbollah and Amal continue to hold positions of influence within those very institutions and mechanisms. Accordingly, the question arises whether transferring security and civilian responsibility to the state will indeed lead to the dismantling of the organizations’ centers of power and the establishment of effective sovereignty, or whether it will enable them to preserve their influence and even benefit from government reconstruction resources under an official governing framework. Developments in Zawtar al-Gharbiyah may therefore serve as an early indication of the structural obstacles to implementing the arrangement in the two other pilot villages, Froun and Srifa, and to assessing the feasibility of the model throughout southern Lebanon.

The pilot constitutes a security and sovereignty test, but also a civilian and political one: Will the Lebanese state succeed in reestablishing its standing among the Shiite population, carrying out deradicalization, and eliminating civilian dependence on terrorist organizations, which constitutes the root of the problem?

The pilot’s central vulnerability is its focus solely on dismantling Hezbollah’s military power, without addressing the significant implications of the political, economic, and social infrastructure that enabled its development in the first place. For years, Zawtar al-Gharbiyah has been considered a center of political and social influence for Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement.

Three months after the beginning of the pilot, approximately 100 out of 500 families had returned to the village. At first glance, this represents an initial step of strategic importance: the Lebanese government seeks to reduce the population’s dependence on Hezbollah’s dawa, welfare, and assistance networks, through which the organization established its influence over decades, and to transfer responsibility for reconstruction and the provision of civilian services to state institutions. Without its agreement to implement the security pilot, it is doubtful whether the Lebanese government would have received the international legitimacy and support required to advance the village’s reconstruction and the return of its residents.

Yet this is where the strategic paradox lies: the very initiative intended to dismantle Hezbollah’s grip on the area could enable the restoration of its civilian and political power base, this time through state institutions, under international auspices and with external funding. This raises the concern that the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty will serve as a cover for preserving the existing balance of power rather than changing it.

Herein lies the pilot’s central vulnerability. The return of residents and reconstruction of infrastructure could, in practice, help restore Hezbollah’s civilian-military operational environment, even without its overt return as the governing authority. This could create a situation in which the Lebanese state assumes responsibility for and bears the costs of reconstruction, while Hezbollah and Amal continue to benefit from local influence and resources flowing into the area. In such a situation, the pilot could present an apparent institutional and security success without bringing about any substantive change in the balance of power on the ground.

Findings from the Pilot

Despite the deployment of the Lebanese Army and the transfer of funding and responsibility for reconstruction to Lebanon, evidence is accumulating of continued Hezbollah and Amal activity in the local council, and even of involvement in international funding and reconstruction processes. In addition, Hezbollah and Amal hold five significant portfolios in the Lebanese government that are directly related to the reconstruction program: health and labor are held by ministers representing Hezbollah, while finance, environment, and administrative development are held by Amal.

This creates a fundamental and substantive gap and contradiction between the pilot’s objectives and its implementation mechanisms: representatives of Hezbollah and its allies are the very individuals heading those institutions and occupying decision-making positions concerning the reconstruction program. The result is that Hezbollah receives reconstruction and funding under the seemingly legitimate pretext of an official state framework serving as the public face of the process. In practice, the channels of funding, reconstruction, and assistance ultimately lead into its hands.

Although three months is too short a period to determine whether the pilot has failed or succeeded, the findings accumulated in this article require an examination not only of the progress of the security pilot and civilian reconstruction, but also of the actors involved in managing it, those to whom funding is actually transferred, who actually provides services to civilians, and whether the Lebanese government’s declarations correspond to the reality on the ground and to the desired outcome for the security of Israel and the entire region.

The reconstruction pilot in Zawtar al-Gharbiyah is an important step in the attempt to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty, but its success depends on the government’s ability to distinguish between rebuilding civilian life and restoring Hezbollah’s power mechanisms through the same civilian environment from which it operates.

First Vulnerability: The Return of Hezbollah Operatives to the Threat Area Under the Cover of Humanitarian Reconstruction

For decades, Hezbollah established a military-terrorist apparatus in southern Lebanon that included advanced weapons, offensive tunnels, launch systems, and elite forces intended to conquer the Galilee. Its entrenchment relied on political, civilian, economic, and logistical infrastructure that enabled the establishment of an extensive military apparatus. Hezbollah’s operations from within a civilian environment that provides it with political support, physical space, intelligence, and logistics constitute a significant engine for the organization’s reconstruction and military buildup, even after military damage to its infrastructure, assets, and fighters.

This gives rise to the risk inherent in the pilot, which includes the return of the same human resources to areas adjacent to Israel’s borders under a humanitarian cover: in practice, a large proportion of the returning residents are Hezbollah supporters and operatives. Therefore, the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, including residential buildings used by Hezbollah, roads, electricity, water, and communications, could also restore the conditions that previously enabled the organization’s activities against Israel.

The risk also includes the possibility of renewing intelligence networks, financing, equipment transfers, and logistical assistance under the cover of reconstruction and civilian frameworks, from which Hezbollah operates as part of a systematic and strategic pattern. Restoring this capability to Hezbollah constitutes a security risk.

Therefore, one of the Lebanese government’s main challenges, which can sometimes be difficult to identify, is detecting the return of Hezbollah operatives and fighters who operate without visible military insignia, under civilian cover, and return to the Lebanon-Israel border as part of reconstruction efforts.

Accordingly, the reconstruction of southern Lebanon and the return of residents do not, in themselves, indicate the restoration of state sovereignty or the elimination of the security threat. Close examination and strict enforcement are required regarding the identity of those returning to the area under the cover of reconstruction.

Reconstructing the village without dismantling these mechanisms could restore Hezbollah’s operational environment that enabled its buildup in the first place. The risk is heightened by Hezbollah and Amal’s continued presence in governmental and municipal centers of power, which gives them influence over enforcement mechanisms and the distribution of reconstruction resources according to the loyalty of their supporters.

Thus, Hezbollah could benefit on all fronts: southern Lebanon, a Hezbollah stronghold, receives international legitimacy for economic reconstruction under the auspices of Lebanese Army deployment and a humanitarian program involving “innocent civilians” returning to their homes, alongside an IDF withdrawal from the area, while Hezbollah continues to control the political, civilian, and economic branches that serve as a force multiplier for military buildup. These would enable Hezbollah to rebuild its strength and prepare undisturbed for the next war.

The Lebanese Army as a Case Study Within the Pilot

Transferring security responsibility to the Lebanese Army requires clear-eyed caution, given that many of its members are Shiites and previous case studies have already demonstrated a genuine inability to fight Hezbollah, even after the army previously received extensive international assistance in logistics, funding, armaments, and training.

More seriously, over the past three years, cooperation between elements of the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah has been reported. Therefore, it is too early to determine whether the Lebanese Army is capable of changing and now fulfilling its mission.

The World Bank’s oversight mechanisms are no substitute for security supervision. They are designed to examine the integrity of tenders, expenditures, and implementation, but cannot, in themselves, ensure that terrorist infrastructure is not being established above or below ground through the reconstruction program and the pilot.

The pilot’s success cannot be measured solely by the number of caravans installed and the number of families that have returned to the village, but rather by the continued presence of Hezbollah and Amal, despite the positive steps the Lebanese government is demonstrating outwardly.

In the absence of genuine dismantlement of Hezbollah’s political, civilian, and economic power structures, the next war may be built not despite international reconstruction, but under its auspices.

Second Vulnerability: The Political and Economic Wings as Levers of Control over Southern Lebanon’s Civilians and Obstacles to Restoring Lebanese Sovereignty

The inherent contradiction in the reconstruction mechanism is that, on the one hand, the Lebanese government seeks to dismantle residents’ dependence on Hezbollah and Amal by undermining the dawa network and transferring civilian dependence to Lebanon’s official institutions, while, on the other hand, Hezbollah and Amal themselves head some of those government institutions.

The International LEAP Reconstruction Project and Its Implementing Arm, CDR: Who Manages the Reconstruction Funds?

LEAP – Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project

An emergency reconstruction program for Lebanon approved by the World Bank with initial funding of $250 million, with the possibility of expanding funding to $1 billion, subject to the mobilization of additional resources. The program is intended to clear rubble and rehabilitate infrastructure damaged during the war in southern Lebanon, including roads, water and electricity systems, and public buildings.

CDR – Council for Development and Reconstruction

The government body responsible for implementing the program in practice, also known as the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction, headed by Mohammad Ali Qabbani. The council is responsible for planning and executing reconstruction projects, managing tenders, and contracting with contractors and suppliers, as part of the Lebanese government’s program and subject to the World Bank’s monitoring and oversight mechanisms.

Involvement of the Finance Minister, Affiliated with Amal and Hezbollah, in the LEAP Program

The Lebanese Ministry of Finance, headed by Yassin Jaber, who is affiliated with Amal, Hezbollah’s ally, which maintains economic ties with Iran and works to keep Hezbollah in the government, is an official partner in the funding mechanism and strategic direction of the reconstruction program. Alongside it operates the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, headed by Fayez Rasamny, who is responsible for overall supervision of implementation.

The Amal Movement’s involvement in the reconstruction mechanism is not limited to political representation in the government. Yassin Jaber, the finance minister affiliated with Amal; Fayez Rasamny, the minister of public works and transport responsible for overall supervision of the project’s implementation; and Mohammad Ali Qabbani, chairman of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), jointly signed a subsidiary agreement concerning the implementation of the LEAP program.

This sharpens the question of how independence and effective oversight of reconstruction funds can be guaranteed when Hezbollah’s political ally is represented at the government level participating in the funding mechanism.

Organizational structure of Lebanon’s reconstruction program

The concern is not merely that Hezbollah will benefit from the results of reconstruction, but that it will be able to influence the process from within while the international community finances it and its operatives. The following examples illustrate the extent to which Hezbollah and Amal representatives are involved in discussions concerning reconstruction and its implementation:

– Ali Hamieh, the former minister of public works and transport affiliated with Hezbollah, serves as an adviser to the president of Lebanon on reconstruction affairs.

– Meeting of the Ministerial Committee for the Reconstruction of Southern Lebanon on November 11, 2025, with the participation of Hezbollah and Amal ministers.

The meeting, chaired by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, addressed reconstruction in southern Lebanon and the mechanism for mapping areas and residents eligible for assistance. Participants included Ali Qabbani, chairman of CDR; Hashem Haidar, chairman of the Council for the South; and representatives of Hezbollah and Amal: the labor and health ministers representing Hezbollah, as well as the finance minister and the environment minister representing Amal.

– Working meeting on October 13, 2026, concerning implementation of LEAP (the reconstruction program), with Hezbollah and Amal representatives participating in discussions with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the chairman of CDR.

The meeting was attended by three members of parliament representing Hezbollah and four representing Amal, together with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Zahi Shaheen, director of the Central Operations Room at the Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office, and CDR Chairman Mohammad Ali Qabbani. The discussion concerned projects and tenders under LEAP.

According to the official announcement, the topics included reconstruction of damaged areas, tenders for projects under LEAP, road rehabilitation, water networks, and public services. Salam also noted that contracts totaling approximately $70 million from the project loan were expected to be signed by the end of 2026.

Third Vulnerability: Preserving Control over the Population Through the Dawa Network

The dawa network established by Hezbollah over decades, which includes religious, educational, healthcare, and welfare institutions, is one of the principal engines of its military buildup.

Research by Professor Melani Cammett, University of Chicago Press Journals, 2015

Based on interviews with Hezbollah representatives and Lebanese residents, the research revealed that Hezbollah’s dawa network does not operate separately from its political power (which is involved in the reconstruction program in southern Lebanon). The following are the study’s four findings:

  • Hezbollah operates an extensive network of hospitals, clinics, schools, and assistance programs.
  • Families of the organization’s operatives and terrorists receive priority in assistance.
  • Evidence of political conditionality in assistance: a Shiite resident of the Nabatieh area testified that he was referred elsewhere for assistance because he had not demonstrated support for Hezbollah and was not considered sufficiently religious.
  • The study explains how party representatives provide their supporters with direct access to services and public entitlements.

This mechanism is neither theoretical nor limited to a particular period:

Activities of the Islamic Health Organization and the “Wata’awanu” Association in Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, July 2026

Following the IDF’s withdrawal from the outskirts of the village, and around the time the Lebanese Army entered, the Islamic Health Organization and the “Wata’awanu” association, both affiliated with Hezbollah, had already begun operating in the village.

While the former provided medical services, the association installed two mobile structures that served as a temporary office for the local council and as a service and food distribution center. At the same time, it operated a kitchen that provided meals for approximately 150 families while mapping residents’ needs.

Thus, the entity providing essential services, accompanying residents’ return to their villages, understanding their needs, and holding levers of influence over their daily lives is the terrorist organization Hezbollah, rather than necessarily the Lebanese government as the sovereign authority.

And this is the illusion: the Lebanese government stands at the forefront externally as the body responsible for reconstruction, receives international funding, and gains legitimacy for the IDF’s withdrawal, while Hezbollah hides behind it, deceives the world, and rebuilds its strength.

Thus, reconstruction funds channeled through the West to the Lebanese state may reach Hezbollah and affiliated actors under the cover of “front companies” in the form of contractors, suppliers, and aid-distribution mechanisms.

This is compounded by the organization’s influence over state institutions themselves, from which it draws resources, budgets, and influence over the civilian environment being reconstructed in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese Ministry of Health is headed by Rakan Nassereddine, who is affiliated with Hezbollah, while the Ministry of Labor is headed by Mohammad Haidar, who is also affiliated with the organization.

Both ministries operate in areas that directly affect the population’s needs: healthcare services, employment, and employment-related welfare.

The risk is that Hezbollah representatives will exploit their government positions to promote priorities that strengthen the organization’s support base while blurring the distinction between public services provided by the state and the organization’s networks of influence.

Without an independent state alternative to healthcare, education, employment, and welfare systems, the return of residents alongside reconstruction of the physical environment from which Hezbollah operated will allow continued civilian dependence on the organization and the restoration of its military strength.

Hezbollah’s Announcement of an Economic Assistance Program

On October 13, 2026, Hezbollah announced a new assistance program for families whose homes had been destroyed or severely damaged, offering amounts ranging from $12,000 to $14,000, depending on the area of residence.

First, the question arises as to where the organization obtained the funds, and particularly whether there is a connection between them and Lebanon’s official reconstruction program.

Second, the announcement itself demonstrates Hezbollah’s ambitions for civilian control and the genuine need for effective enforcement concerning Hezbollah’s political, economic, and security branches within the reconstruction area.

The Intelligence Gap

An examination of developments in Zawtar al-Gharbiyah does not, at this stage, indicate any proven change in the village residents’ political loyalty to Hezbollah.

The 2025 local elections primarily reflect internal power struggles within the Shiite camp, rather than necessarily indicating ideological distancing from the organization.

At the same time, assistance mechanisms affiliated with Hezbollah continue to operate in the village, and the local council cooperates with both the government and the Council for the South.

There are reports of criticism of Hezbollah in other villages in southern Lebanon, primarily due to fears of further destruction resulting from its military activities. However, criticism of the price paid by the population does not necessarily constitute ideological distancing from the organization.

On August 3, 2026, the head of the local council, Abd Ezzedine, who is affiliated with Amal, met with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the heads of the reconstruction bodies.

In September 2026, officials linked to Hezbollah were identified within the local council, the assistance apparatus, and the organizational liaison network in the village. In any case, longstanding political ties exist between the village leadership and both Amal and Hezbollah, and Ezzedine had been affiliated with the Amal-Hezbollah list since the 2016 elections.

In addition, an investigation from September 2026 revealed, based on local testimonies, that Ali Abd al-Hadi Allawa, Hezbollah’s representative on the local council, maintains connections between local actors and Hezbollah’s assistance network.

The concern is that reconstruction funds are flowing directly into the hands of Hezbollah representatives within the village’s local authority.

Conclusion and Strategic Assessment

The reconstruction pilot in southern Lebanon constitutes a positive and significant step in the Lebanese government’s attempt to restore its sovereignty over the area after decades of Hezbollah entrenchment.

The IDF’s withdrawal, the deployment of the Lebanese Army, the reconstruction of infrastructure, and the return of residents could lay the foundations for an initial strategic change.

However, the initiative’s success depends not only on dismantling Hezbollah’s military power, but also on reducing the political, economic, and civilian mechanisms of influence that enabled its buildup in the first place.

Accordingly, the success of the pilot must be measured according to four central indicators: continued dismantlement of terrorist infrastructure and prevention of its reestablishment through continuous security enforcement; ensuring the independence of reconstruction mechanisms and preventing Hezbollah and Amal from distributing assistance funds; transparency and oversight throughout the entire chain of funding, tenders, contractors, and service providers; and a demonstrable reduction in residents’ dependence on welfare and assistance networks affiliated with Hezbollah (dawa), through an accessible and effective state alternative in which Hezbollah and Amal do not participate.

Trend Assessment

It is too early to determine the success or failure of the three-month pilot, but at this stage, based on the findings, the emerging trend appears to be progress in physical civilian reconstruction and the formal transfer of responsibility to the Lebanese government, at least at the declaratory level.

Alongside this, however, there is continuity in Hezbollah and Amal’s centers of political, economic, and civilian influence.

The Lebanese government’s very willingness to assume security and civilian responsibility for the villages is a development that inspires cautious optimism. Nevertheless, evidence of continued activity by actors affiliated with Hezbollah and Amal requires a clear-eyed examination of the initiative’s actual results.

The strategic test is not whether the Lebanese government is capable of reconstructing the villages through international funding and thereby restoring its sovereignty, but whether it can do so while denying Hezbollah the ability to restore its full strength within them.