The Israeli public is intensively discussing the priorities of its war objectives. Does bringing the hostages home override defeating Hamas, or vice versa? The answer is to be found in Rafah, because without Rafah and without control over the Philadelphi Corridor, those two objectives will remain unachieved and so will the long-term objective of preventing Hamas from rebuilding its strength in the future.
The retreat from Rafah:
The Philadelphi Corridor and the start of the Tunnel Era
The Philadelphi Corridor stretches for 14 kilometers, with a width of only 100 meters. Despite its small area, the Corridor was one of the central factors enabling Hamas to acquire strength and become a terrorist army, and it is also the key to Israeli victory in the war of Iron Swords.
An understanding of what the Philadelphi Corridor is, and how it is related to control over Rafah, requires an understanding of the Rafah district’s history in the first place, which means going back to 1906. In that year the British were ruling Egypt and increased its territory at the expense of the Gaza Strip. In an agreement between the British and the Ottoman Empire, which was ruling the Land of Israel, the Egyptian border was defined as passing through the city of Rafah — putting half of the city under British rule and the other half under Ottoman rule. Some years later, the British conquered the Land of Israel as well and took over the entire Gaza Strip, so that the border arranged with the Ottoman Empire lost its relevance.
The 1906 border regained importance when Israel signed its peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. That treaty stipulated that the border between Israel and Egypt would be the same as the historic border marked by the British, so that once more Rafah was divided — into Gazan Rafah and Egyptian Rafah. In 1982, when Israel handed Sinai to Egypt under the treaty, a narrow space was created between Gaza and Egypt and received the now well-known name “the Philadelphi Corridor.”
For roughly a decade, Israel controlled the Philadelphi Corridor and the IDF operated freely in the cities of Gaza. That arrangement changed in the early 1990s, with the signing of the Oslo Accords. Those agreements stipulated, among other things, that Israel would withdraw from the cities of Gaza and not re-enter. From the moment that Israel left those cities, a large-scale project of tunneling began but because the Philadelphi Corridor was still in our hands, we were able to maintain a certain level of awareness and influence.
However, the Disengagement that was implemented in 2005 changed the picture completely. Despite many warnings from the security services, the Israeli government chose to withdraw completely from the Gaza Strip and yield control of the Philadelphi Corridor. Expectably, the scope of smuggling there increased exponentially and reached incredible proportions.
The Egyptian government, newly responsible for the Philadelphi Corridor, looked the other way and permitted copious smuggling from Sinai into Gaza, including weaponry, commercial goods, and even people. It was that smuggling that enabled Hamas to turn into a well-armed terrorist army and thus brought about the disaster of October 7.
A smuggling industry with a turnover in the billions:
The present situation at the Philadelphi Corridor
In recent years, smuggling from Egypt into Gaza has become central to the Gazan economy and key to the strengthening of Hamas. Even today the city of Rafah is full of smugglers, who bribe the Egyptian police and run a business sector with a turnover in the billions.
The smuggling still continues during wartime, as war materiel and other goods flow from Sinai into Gaza every day. And there is fear that such smuggling is, or will be, accompanied by smuggling in the other direction. Senior Hamas figures are likely to try to escape into Egyptian territory, with hostages, and from there to Iran. While Egypt certainly has a strong interest in preventing such incidents, which would cause it great embarrassment, still the scenario is undeniably possible and the true question is how much Egypt can do to stop it.
Not only smuggling: To control food distribution is to control Gaza.
Besides the problem of smuggling, absence of Israeli control at the Philadelphi Corridor also causes a severe problem of supervision over the humanitarian aid to Gaza. Since the start of the war, thousands of trucks have entered Gaza with humanitarian supplies and food. The distribution of aid is managed officially by UNRWA and by “charitable organizations,” but in practice, behind all that management, Hamas is pulling the strings. It is important to understand that as long as Hamas wields control over the supplies, they are channeled first and foremost to its own purposes, and in that way Hamas succeeds in operating more forcefully while also gaining the population’s acknowledgement of its authority.
In order to deprive Hamas of its relevance and its ability to regain strength in the future, the State of Israel must exercise supervision over everything that enters Gaza. Among the implications, of course, is that the IDF must assume responsibility for the humanitarian aspect, because to control the distribution of food is to control Gaza.
The defeat of Hamas must take place in Rafah
As mentioned, both the history of Rafah and its current situation show that if Hamas is to be defeated as a governing body, the IDF must control the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel must have full authority over the entry of all goods into Gazan territory, and there must be a ground operation in Rafah.
Such a ground operation is indispensable, because Rafah is the last stronghold of the Hamas leadership and the only place where its battalions still are active as organized military units. Currently the Israeli public is concerned that the IDF, despite attaining many, many successes, has not laid its hands on the senior Hamas figures and has not located the hostages. The entry into Rafah will be the decisive battle, leading us to the top Hamas commanders and to their last military stronghold, and to the hostages. Therefore we must enter the city, and as promptly as possible. Contrary to the widespread conception, Rafah is not a difficult military objective. Tougher places have already been taken, so this task is certainly doable.
Rafah first? Why Israel’s operation didn’t start in the south of Gaza
As of this writing, the military has authorized plans for entering Rafah but the timing depends on the course of negotiations for freeing the hostages and on other operational constraints. The reason that the IDF did not take control of Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor at the outset of the war, even in light of the Corridor’s importance for preventing smuggling, is that Israel’s strategy was first to destroy the government’s primary institutions and military strongholds, which were chiefly in the northern Gaza Strip and Khan Younis, and only then to progress to Rafah, definitively dissolve the last four battalions, and end the rule of Hamas. Time will tell whether that planning was correct.
There is little, in my opinion, to contention that the reason for staying out of Rafah so far has been fear of Egypt’s reaction. The only thing that worries the Egyptians is that Gazan refugees might enter Sinai; and provided that the State of Israel makes clear that no such thing is intended, and makes sure to move the refugees who are in Rafah to other areas such as Khan Younis, there is no reason — despite the harsh rhetoric from Egypt in public — to consider Egyptian interests harmed.
The Day After: Here too, the key is at the Philadelphi Corridor
What can make it possible to ensure that the threat from Gaza will not re-emerge and gain strength after the war? One proposal among others is an underground slurry wall on the Egyptian side of the Gazan border to impair the digging of tunnels. Another suggestion is to install an alarm system along the Corridor, for real-time alerts regarding tunnel-digging and UAVs. Such measures may well be useful, but only as supplementary solutions. They cannot stand alone. The old security strategy, as we all realize, did not prove itself; and whoever thinks that technology can take the place of a significant military presence is still living on October 6. I am gratified that even in the scenario recently publicized by the Prime Minister, Israeli control over Gaza’s southern portal appears to be a fundamental requirement for the Day After.
The bottom line is that the citizens and decision-makers of Israel must recognize conquering Rafah and fully controlling the Philadelphi Corridor as an indispensable element of victory. Otherwise, the attainment of the war’s objectives is in considerable doubt and, moreover, Israel will be unable to prevent Hamas from regaining strength.
