The missile barrage launched from Iran into Israel (June 7) is tied this time to the recent developments in the Lebanese arena, rather than the economic pressure or the military threat facing Iran proper.

The agreement between Israel and the Lebanese government, alongside the announcement (June 4) of a ceasefire in Lebanon, provided Israel with legitimacy—even if partial—to continue its military operations in southern Lebanon. Alongside this, it gave a limited green light for strikes deep within Lebanon should Hezbollah continue to launch rockets and drones toward northern Israeli communities.

The trigger was not long in coming. On the morning of June 7, Hezbollah launched rockets toward northern communities. The IDF’s response followed swiftly, featuring a targeted airstrike by the Israeli Air Force on Hezbollah infrastructure apartments in the Al-Mreijeh neighborhood of the Dahiyeh district in Beirut.

Iran immediately realized that without a significant response from the “Axis,” this would lead to a slippery slope, allowing Israel to seize the opportunity and intensify its high-intensity strikes against Hezbollah deep inside Lebanon. This could deal the organization another severe, and perhaps decisive, blow. The Iranians likely understand Hezbollah’s true situation better than anyone, recognizing the immediate need to halt what they perceive as the beginning of an Israeli plan to escalate military action against Hezbollah—under the umbrella of Lebanese, and perhaps American, legitimacy granted by the ceasefire agreement.

Under these circumstances, Iran felt compelled to throw Hezbollah a lifeline, which arrived shortly after in the form of a missile barrage, currently limited, aimed at northern Israel. The Iranian objective is clear: to establish a deterrence equation that restricts Israel’s freedom of action in Lebanon, with Iran’s leverage aimed primarily at Washington rather than Jerusalem. According to this logic, Iran would prefer to suffice with a limited barrage on the north, expecting the U.S. to step in and swiftly de-escalate the situation. Even if Israel responds in a limited fashion, potentially leading to an “exchange of blows” lasting a few days, Iran is willing to pay that price—and not just to save Hezbollah.

In effect, while launching missiles at Israel, Iran simultaneously sent a message to the Americans:

  • American strikes on targets in the Gulf will be answered by targeted Iranian strikes on Gulf targets (Kuwait, Bahrain).
  • Israeli strikes on Hezbollah’s core infrastructure (in Beirut and the Beqaa Valley) will be answered by Iranian strikes on Israel.

The Iranians, for their part, are gambling on Trump this time. This is likely based on their assessment that the Americans will not rush back into a war against Iran, preferring instead to exhaust economic pressure—including sanctions and an economic blockade—in an attempt to squeeze a nuclear compromise out of Iran and reach a diplomatic settlement.

This is an equation that Israel must break—swiftly and decisively. To achieve this, Israel must enlist the Americans, deliver a painful blow in Iran (and perhaps also in Lebanon), and make it unmistakably clear that while the equation is understood, it is entirely unacceptable.