The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.
“Unfortunately, I am not able to be with you as I would have wished, to share your joy at the “Brit Mila” [circumcision] ceremony of your son, the first child of the restorers of the Jewish settlement in Hebron…I wish you all, the parents and the entire tribe of settlers, great blessing and joy in raising your son…Bringing your son into the covenant of the Patriarch Abraham, in the city of Abraham after forty years of separation from it, has a special symbolic significance. It bears testimony to our continuous connection to this place, to which we have returned, never to leave.”
From a letter to the Nachson family, in Hebron, from senior Labor Party member, Yigal Allon, then Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Absorption, 29 January 1969
Yigal Allon was one of the most substantial figures in the nation’s pre-state years, as well as in the first three decades of post-independence. He was commander of the Palmach, the elite strike force of the Haganah underground organization, the predecessor of the IDF, and served subsequently in various senior positions including Acting Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
“Darling of the doves”
During the 1948 War of Independence, Allon led several major operations on all three fronts, in the Galilee in the North and the.Negev in the South, as well as in the Center. After independence, with the establishment of the IDF, he was assigned the rank of General and commanded the Southern Front, playing a key role in defeating the Egyptian forces and establishing Israel’s control over the Negev.
Allon retired from the military in 1950 and entered politics, being elected to the Knesset in 1954, serving as an MK until his death 25 years later. He held several ministerial portfolios (on behalf of the Labor Party—in its various configurations)—including Minister of Education (1969-74) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1974-1977). Allon served as Deputy Prime Minister from 1968-77 and briefly as Acting Prime Minister of Israel in 1969.
In 1980, Allon’s political career was cut short by his sudden death–at the age of 61—while he was competing with Shimon Peres for the leadership of the Labor Party.
The epitome of sober moderation—even dubbed the “darling of the doves” by the New York Times—Allon’s views on the strategic significance of territory are of particular interest today—especially since the Biden administration has revived the idea of Palestinian statehood and its accompanying corollary of “land-for-peace”—entailing far-reaching territorial concessions by Israel.
As Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, he expressed these views in a comprehensive article in the prestigious journal, Foreign Affairs (October 1976), entitled Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders.
The asymmetry of the Arab-Israeli conflict
In it, Allon addressed the dramatic asymmetry of the Arab-Israel conflict, which tilts initial odds strongly against Israel: “It is impossible to plumb the depths of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to speak of formulating proposals for its solution, if no true understanding exists of the full significance of its cardinal characteristic—the extreme asymmetry of its two sides. This asymmetry is manifest not merely in one or two, but in all, of its aspects.”
In Allon’s view, the asymmetry is particularly stark regarding the ramifications of military defeat: “Military defeats, indeed, cost the Arab states losses in lives, destruction of equipment, political setbacks, and damage to national prestige—and perhaps even danger to their regimes. However, such defeats have never been, nor ever will be, a threat to their very existence as sovereign states or to the lives of their civilian populations.”
For Israel, things are vastly different.
Allon highlighted this ominous difference: “In contrast, a military defeat of Israel would mean the physical extinction of a large part of its population and the political elimination of the Jewish state. In highly realistic and clear terms, therefore, the Arab states can permit themselves a series of military defeats while Israel cannot afford to lose a single war. Nor does this reflect a historical trauma in any sense. To lose a single war is to lose everything, and this is a most real and stark fact “
The strategic significance of territory
Allon then proceeded to trace the crucial importance of territorial depth and topographical dominance, rebuffing the claims of those who would dismiss their strategic value: “[T]here are some who would claim that in an era of modern technological development such factors are valueless. In a nutshell, their claim is that the appearance of ground-to-ground missiles, supersonic fighter-bombers, and other sophisticated instruments of modern warfare has canceled out the importance of strategic depth and topographical barriers…”
He asserted: “[T]his argument is certainly invalid regarding Israel, and within the context of the Middle East conflict, where the opposite is true. Precisely because of dramatic developments in conventional weaponry the significance of territorial barriers and strategic depth has increased”
Firmly, Allon reiterated: “[T]he innovations and sophistication in weaponry…that have taken place, therefore, not only fail to weaken the value of strategic depth and natural barriers but in fact enhance their importance. This is even more true given Israel’s difficult geographic position.”
Emphatically, he pointed out: “One does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967. A considerable part of these lines is without any topographical security value; and, of no less importance, the lines fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth.”
As for the territory usually designated for a Palestinian state, he noted: “The gravest problem is on the eastern boundary, where the entire width of the coastal plain varies between 10 and 15 miles, where the main centers of Israel’s population, including Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated, and where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. “
The purpose of defensible borders
Highlighting the potential perils of the pre-1967 borders he explained: “Within these lines a single successful first strike by the Arab armies would be sufficient to dissect Israel at more than one point, to sever its essential living arteries, and to confront it with dangers that no other state would be prepared to face. The purpose of defensible borders is thus to correct this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic significance.”
For Allon, other areas such as the Golan Heights were also of critical strategic importance. He wrote: While the strategic zone in the central sector is crucial to Israel’s security, so, too, is a zone on the Golan Heights. As past experience has demonstrated, a border not encompassing the Golan Heights would again invite the easy shelling of the villages below in the Huleh Valley, the Galilee Basin and eastern Galilee.
Distinguishing between the tactical and strategic significance of the Heights, he stressed: “More important than the danger of renewed Syrian shelling and sniping at Israeli villagers and fishermen below, which is basically a tactical question, is that Israel needs an effective defense line on the Golan Heights for two cardinal strategic reasons: first, to preclude any new Syrian attempts to deny Israel its essential water resources and, second, to prevent a massive Syrian attack on the whole of Galilee, either independently or in coordination with other Arab armies on Israel’s other frontiers.”
International guarantees: A caveat
Allon also expressed grave skepticism as to the efficacy of international guarantees, frequently presented as a possible inducement for Israel to agree to perilous territorial concessions. He remarked: “Another argument presented to counter Israel’s claim to defensible borders is that Israel should be satisfied with guaranties from a single power or a number of powers to ensure its existence. Without detracting from the value of such guaranties, I would not suggest that any country make its very existence dependent upon guaranties of any kind in this changing world.”
Allon issued a stern warning against reliance on such international pledges: “If the reference is to diplomatic guaranties only, these are devoid of any real deterrent value; they are lacking in teeth. And should Israel’s enemies be tempted to attack it anew, such guaranties would be of little value in their considerations. Military guaranties, however, can be of some value, but to rely exclusively upon them would be a critical error. Not only might the effectiveness of such a military guaranty prove to be short-lived, but the guaranty itself might hand over almost totally to the guarantor the recipient’s power of independent action.”
Of course, history is replete with examples affirming Allon’s dismissal of international guarantees as a reliable assurance for a nation’s security. For example, America’s 1967 repudiation of pledges, given to Israel in 1957, ensuring it freedom of navigation to its southernmost port, Eilat, as a precondition for the withdrawal of IDF forces from Sinai following the 1956 Operation Kadesh. Or more recently, the failure of the signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum—Russia, the USA, and the UK—to fulfill their commitments to “[r]espect [Ukraine’s] independence and sovereignty in the existing borders” and “https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances [r]efrain from the threat or the use of force against [Ukraine]”—given in exchange for Ukraine’s relinquishing its nuclear weapons capabilities.
Impotence, indolence or impudence
Given Allon’s position of seniority and the widespread perception of his moderation and dovish inclinations, his positions on the crucial importance of territory are of particular interest. For in today’s political climate, there is little doubt that many would consider his views excessively hawkish—even extreme.
It is difficult to account for the disturbing sea-change in the political discourse on national security in Israel other than by the indolence and/or the impotence of the Israeli Right, who purportedly oppose significant territorial concession, or by the crass ignorance and/or cynical impudence of the Israeli Left, who still cling dogmatically to them—despite all the past perils they have precipitated.
Accordingly, for Israel’s long-term security—indeed, survival—it is essential to restore awareness of the critical role territory plays in determining the fate of the nation. Indeed, as Allon observes, Israel’s territorial concerns are not the product of any “historical trauma” but of very “real and stark fact”.
Clearly, as the nation-state of the Jewish people, Israel has no room for error. After all, “to lose a single war is to lose everything”
