The October 7 failure is not rooted in technology. Rather, it occurred despite technology. The failure on that fateful day was the performance of the high-command in the IDF and the Shabak – Israel’s General Security Services, who were bogged down by a dated security concept and thus failed to put the advanced military technology in their hands to the full use for which it was developed. Recent allegations claim that the military debacle of October 7 was caused by the overreliance on technology, and those who subscribe to this notion are demanding that the IDF roll back its methodology and invest more in boots on the ground and less in futuristic weapons and systems.
The author of this document aims to show that these claims are misguided and to assert Israel’s imperative to maintain technological superiority in dealing with its enemies. This in fact, is nonnegotiable. Indeed, is there really anyone who would contend that Israel can prevail in the fight for its existence without technological prowess in the air, cutting edge drone technology, superior intelligence capabilities, advanced tunnel-detection systems, and a decisive advantage on the ground campaign, to name but a few?
We will begin with a review of some of the misguided applications of the technology, that had led to the October 7 failure, and how this is related to the mistaken concept that is prevalent among Israel’s security apparatus’s command. All the information henceforth has been publicized even before official inquiries have been ordered.
We will then suggest several causes for these failures and explore them. Finally, the article will present suggestions for avoiding these kinds of failures in the future.
A. The Misguided Use of Technology During the Events of October 7
Over the past decades, Israel’s strategy for dealing with Gaza focused mainly on containment. The decision makers did not view the Strip as any kind of significant threat, but rather a persistent nuisance, a pebble in Israel’s shoe. The captains of Israel’s security establishment were bound by the misconception that Israel could actually live alongside Hamas, the power that has been controlling Gaza since its violent takeover of the Strip in 2007. These captains preached a gospel according to which if Israel simply extended Hamas economic and financial gifts, complemented by diplomatic pressure, the next confrontation could be held off indefinitely. Puzzling, as it was common knowledge that regardless of these efforts, Hamas is continuing to build up its force and acquire new and alarmingly advanced capabilities in the hiatus between confrontations.
As part of this containment paradigm and the shadowing of Hamas’s advancements with ever increasing technological capabilities on part of the IDF, Israel had diligently added to its hailed “Iron Dome” aerial rocket-interception system a cutting- edge and staggeringly costly underground barrier to prevent the tunneling into Israeli territory. To that it added a highly sophisticated border fence that was armed with some of the world’s most advanced surveillance systems to alert in the event of breach attempts.
Tragically, we have all witnessed on October 7 the crushing failure of this advanced and supposedly unbreachable barrier, when Hamas terrorists were able all too easily to cut through it with the use of rudimentary methods such as explosives, bulldozers and planks of wood, after using simple cheap drones to take out the state-of-the-art surveillance system in a matter of minutes.
Indeed the Iron Dome system is an impressive achievement on a global scale, and has save hundreds, if not thousands of lives, since it was put into use. Yet, on the downside, it also facilitated a growing adoption of the containment concept in the decision-making echelons of security and government. The capabilities in Israel’s hands with the Iron Dome had also tipped public opinion in Israel and the world against the need for measures against Hamas and The Islamic Jihad on the ground, the general consensus being “If you have Iron Dome to minimize the damage, why risk losses among the IDF soldiers and the innocent in Gaza?”.
Alongside the colossal failure of the underground barrier and the military forces in the protection of the Gaza envelop communities, we have witnessed an utter failure on part of the IDF Intelligence Directorate and the General Security Service to raise a red flag in the days before the October 7 attack – including blatantly ignoring the plethora of alarming developments on October 6. For decades the Intelligence Directorate has been the most technology-intensive branch of the IDF, alongside the Air Force. In recent years, the intel collecting network of the IDF Intelligence and General Security have become increasingly reliant on advanced technology, and there are many who claim that this came at the expense of classic indispensable human intelligence, or HUMINT.
Moreover, the IDF intelligence unit 8200, had completely forgone the gathering of electronic intelligence – SIGINT- such as radio interception for the sake of the latest technological “hit” – collection by cyber technology. Thus, 8200 had stopped altogether intercepting the Hamas tactical radio transmission. Albeit the undisputable value of cyber collection, it cannot remain a single tactic. A tragic proof was the failure of these sophisticated means employed by the IDF to provide the security establishment and the Israeli nation with the critical warning before October 7.
The aforementioned would ostensibly indicate that the October 7 attack was a result of technological failure, but this article aims to disprove that claim.
B. Possible Causes for the Failure
The misconceptions and overconfidence of the senior command
October 7 did not come to pass because of technology, rather, it happened in spite of technology. The surveillance system along the border fence functioned appropriately, timely transmitting warnings to the system operators. However, what is the use of all the costly sophisticated technology if the chiefs of intelligence and the General Command blatantly choose to ignore its input?
For over an extensive period of time, a number of analysts in the Intelligence Directorate raised the alarm regarding Hamas’s intentions. Several of these warning attempts have been made public in the wake of the attack, and it seems that those were just the tip of the iceberg in the body of evidence that was collected and presented to the commanders. One staggering example of the overconfidence and inaptitude of the IDF and GSS senior command, was the intel showing that dozens of Israeli SIM cards were activated at once from within the Gaza Strip. Even the most low-ranking intelligence analyst knows that this is a clear red flag that demands alerting the entire Gaza region command. The intel was based on the most advanced monitoring technology that can intercept such irregularities and alert the system. But again – similarly to the surveillance soldiers at the border fence – although the technology performed as it was designed to do, its was the senior Intelligence and GSS command that chose not to heed the unequivocal and resounding warning.
These responses can only be explained by an over confident leadership that is bound by unrealistic concepts according to which:
- The Hamas is deterred and cannot breach the physical border fence.[i]
- The Gaza economy is more important to Hamas than fighting Israel and the organization has no intentions on engaging in a conflict for the foreseeable future.[ii]
- Israel’s intelligence capabilities are superior and can not be taken by surprise such as what happened in the Yom Kippur War in 73.[iii]
- All the indications observed ahead of October 7 were simply Hamas’s military exercises.[iv]
All the questionable statements above were made by heads of Israel’s security establishment, present and past, in the months leading to the October 7 massacre.
Even the most advanced technology does not stand alone. The more the failures are uncovered in the wake of the attack, the more it seems that the operation of the border fence surveillance system left much to be desired. If the system’s maintenance is poor, it cannot come as a surprise when it does not operate as designed in real-time. Moreover, the designers of the particular system on the Gaza border fence underestimated Hamas’ capabilities, and failed to thoroughly address the need for critical operational systems that could withstand attempts to destroy them, i.e. alert, command and control systems. One example is the alert system, which was designed without any protection from drone attacks. Moreover, the alert systems in the 8200 unit, which designed the system, were not online in the hours before the attack. Furthermore, another no less critical system did not produce critical data ahead of the attack because it was shut down due to the Sukkot holiday.
At the end of the day, any physical security barrier, sophisticated as it may be, requires protection by an adequate military force. However, the misguided concept and a large measure of complacency on part of commanders provided an extremely small force to protect the border fence. Clearly even a state-of-the-art fence cannot stave off an assault by thousands of Hamas terrorists, particularly when the chiefs of military and security brush aside all the preliminary clear warnings that the technology provided in abundance, to the extent that they failed to demand even the lowest level of alertness from the border forces.
Overly reliant on technology; understaffed in the field
Those who point the blaming finger at the shortcomings of technology, use what was dubbed after the Second Lebanon War “the plasma screen failure”( wherein commanders chose to command the forces from their plasma screens in the headquarters rather than from the field) to illustrate their point. This is nonsense. Are monitors the cause for the military failure of that war? Obviously not. The failure was the lack of planning, and the misguided belief that commanders can control their forces without actually being in the battle arena.
The problem is not the technology. It is the human misuse thereof.
In recent years the IDF has greatly improved the cooperation between its intelligence gathering elements and the combat units in the field. This is an important step in the right direction, proof of which is the outstanding results in the continuous fighting in Gaza and in Lebanon. This synergy is possible thanks to skillful use of the technological means.
However, in recent years, the IDF Intelligence Directorate has unfortunately become out of touch with the enemy – its intentions and modes of thought and even its language. Just to illustrate: there is an increasing reliance on automatic translation technology to understand the intel. Although this is a good solution what with the lack of soldiers who speak the Arabic language, it is a double-edged sword that hinders the Intelligence’s ability to have an in-depth understanding of the enemy. Every soldier dealing with intelligence from Israel’s Arab enemies must have a profound understanding of them and their culture – language included. At least at a fundamental level. Thus, means such as automatic translation may play an instrumental role in intel gathering, but cannot be the main pillar of any SIGINT collection effort.
A love story with technology
Many times, the issue is not the over reliance on technology but rather the excessive passion towards it, often regardless of the actual benefits it may or may not offer. This is largely prevalent in the army’s technological units, where the young soldiers prefer to work with the latest and “coolest” technology, even when it has no evident operational value. This is evocative of NASA, which developed impressive technology to produce a pen that can write in zero gravity and be used in space. The Russians simply used a pencil.
There are more of such examples in the IDF that are classified and thus cannot be discussed in the present paper, however one example that should be mentioned due to its relevance to the current conflict is the Trophy, aka Windbreaker, armored vehicle protection system. This is a very advanced and highly demanded technology, no question about it. But the IDF neglected to provide the technology to protect tanks against armed drones, although the ongoing conflict both in Syria and the Ukraine prove that this is a prevalent and significant threat on tank maneuverability. Could it be that this consideration was swept aside because the easy solution of mounting an awning on the tank turret is simply not technologically “sexy” enough?
C. The imperative to maintain technological superiority
The pages of history prove that he who holds technological superiority on the field – be it war elephants in the ancient world or advanced weapons in modern times – controls the battle arena. This has been true since the Iron Age and throughout all mankind’s wars. However, technological superiority did not always guarantee victory. Trained fighters, suitable doctrine and stratagem have always been necessary to complement technology, and in fact on many occasions, were instrumental in prevailing over the enemy’s technological advantage. Such was the case of Alexander the Great’s famous victory in the Battle of Gaugamela against a far superior numbered Persian army and the Persian scythed chariots, due to the Macedonian leader’s clever tactics.
Unfortunately, Hamas was able to marginalize some of the IDF’s technological advantages by employing primitive means such as planks of wood to breech the border fence. But as we have seen above, this was possible due to the unskilled use of the border-fence technology and the insufficient deployment of troops to guard the border. This in no way suggests that technological superiority is unimportant – it was and still remains a crucial component in the IDF’s ability to deal with the vast armies of Israel’s enemies.
Even after the shock of October 7, many cases illustrate this. The superiority of the IDF in the air, on land, at sea and in intelligence gathering is a crucial factor in its ability to deal with many simultaneous arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Iran. Anyone with a modicum of sense understands that no significant achievement can be made in these arenas without aerial superiority (especially against anti-air systems) sophisticated drones, advanced intelligence capabilities, tunnel detection technology, and clear technological superiority on the battle field. Yet technological superiority – as crucial as it may be – is not enough on its own and must be complemented with a fighting spirit, ever-adapting doctrine, leadership on the battle field, and human intelligence and creativity. This is what wins a war – not technology alone.
D. Recommendations for the future
As stated, the IDF must maintain technological superiority in the conflict against our enemies. Thus it would be gravely misguided to reduce investments in technology; however, at the same time, the IDF is required to instill in all technological units the perception that technology is a means and not an end. Technological developments must always adapt to the needs of the units for which they are developed. IDF commanders must be educated on the technologies placed in their hands – how to use them to their maximum capabilities, and no less – about its limitations. This requires more extensive technological training for all senior commanders, including those in the field units.
Moreover, it is imperative to develop the right doctrine for the use of technology. If offensive technology is used, it is imperative to formulate a doctrine that implements the technology such that it becomes instrumental in defeating the enemy. And if defensive technology is involved, it is necessary to ensure that a doctrine is put in place that complements the technology with appropriate human forces and decision-making procedures.
In recent years, the use of artificial intelligence for evaluation and decision-making processes on various intelligence issues has also been examined. For example, the use of large language models (LLM). This field is still in its infancy, and for now there is no sufficient substitute for a skilled intelligence analyst. However, already there is great value in using artificial intelligence to challenge the conclusions and decisions of intelligence analysts and commanders. This measure may help prevent the future misguided and detrimentally limiting conceptions, and in turn – another tragic outcome such as October 7.
The article was originally published on “Maariv”.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement
[i] https://www.mako.co.il/news-columns/2023_q2/Article-c822771c6c90881026.htm
[ii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4Vj8vI4TJQ
[iii] https://dyoma.co.il/military/2364
[iv] https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/sk931aez6
