The more we discuss the disengagement from Gush Katif – the 17-community bloc in the southern Gaza strip until its unilateral eviction by Israel in 2005 – we see that it exacerbated the security of the west Negev, to say the very least. Those in support of the move claim that the resources invested in the protection of the Bloc’s residents, as well as the Israeli settlements of north Gaza (the northern perimeter bloc) before the disengagement, were too high and the costs too painful. They maintain had we not left the Gaza Strip, the prices we have paid were have been ten-fold – especially in casualties and military resources, more certainly so if the October 7 massacre would have happened withing a reality of Israeli settlements within the Gaza Strip.
However, many of these seem to have a rather short memory of the pre-disengagement state of affairs, which behooves us to take a trip down memory’s lane and examine in fact how the IDF was deployed in the Gaza Strip and therefor, why the eventuality of October 7 would be highly unlikely before the disengagement. In fact, not only were the Katif Bloc and the northern perimeter communities not a chink in the armor, as claimed, they were in effect a bulwark that served as the west Negev’s security system.
The following analysis is based on military defense doctrine as taught to each officer who is promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the IDF combat forces – principles taught in every military academy. Further input to this analysis is Israel’s national security approach and the importance of the settlement enterprise of Israel.
The security apparatus
The systemic perception of the defense action calls for preemptive measures at the forefront of the defense forces – the security apparatus. The goal of such an apparatus is to create constant friction and interaction with the enemy, which allows the relaying of continuous input to the forces at the rear, on the basis of which to produce situation assessments and adapt them to changing circumstances.
The defense of the Katif Bloc, “beyond the fence”, was a bona fide security apparatus part and parcel of the IDF’s entire security system of the west Negev, for which forces exceeding divisional order of battle were deployed across and into the depth of the Strip, with a large force situated within the parameters of the Gaza Strip, in certain areas on the outskirts of the Palestinian population.
In times of calm, the Gaza Division had two regional brigades, exactly the order of battle in the region on October 7, with one crucial difference – all of the forces were stationed within the Katif bloc community and the northern perimeter communities (Nissanit and Eley Sinai). The basis of action and governing principle was the protection of these communities.
At the time, the Gaza Division invested three battalions that it positioned across the Strip and tasked with the protection of the Israeli comminutes, and an additional two battalions charged with the defense of the Green Line – the border fence. In addition to these forces, a regular “resident” of the area was the Bedouin recon battalion.
In periods of escalation – from the second Intifada, ignited on September 2000, until Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 – an additional battalion was deployed for the protection of the intersecting strip between the Kisufim Kibbutz near the broader fence, and the Kfas Darom Kibbutz , located within the center of the Gaza Strip. In time of heightened escalation, the forces were reenforced with a tank battalion and an offensive brigade headquarter – usually from the Southern Command Givati infantry brigade. This comprehensive effort was placed in the depth of the Gaza Strip; thus the altercations and friction were for the most part had not occurred in the vicinity of the Green Line at all, or as it has been dubbed since the disengagement – the Gaza environ communities (Otef Aza).
The picture of the pre-disengagement western Negev defense system totaled 5-7 battalions, as per demands in the field, 3-4 brigade headquarters, and an additional force invested mostly within enemy territory, partially for the defense of the Katif Bloc residents, and in part designated for offensive maneuvers into the Palestinian territories as dictated by intel and situation assessments.
The holding apparatus
A holding apparatus is the core of a defense array and its aim is the hard defense of vital properties, i.e. the Israeli civilian communities and routs, as well as the strategic home front, where strategic infrastructures such as central commands, power stations, reserve and above all – the population centers of southern Israel – are located.
According to the war doctrine, the defense paradigm dictates the avoidance, to the extent possible, of engagement in an armed conflict within the Gaza area. And subsequently, up to the disengagement, the majority of the IDF’s engagement in armed conflict was held within the Gaza Strip and in the periphery of the Katif Bloc. The communities that are today situated as the Gaza environ, were virtually unthreatened since the mainstay of the military presence was concentrated within the depth of the Strip.
Protection of the comminutes, which are today’s the Gaza environ, to the east of the Gaza border, was mostly stationary – a routine security apparatus of holding an indicative fence array, based mainly on infantry forces and one of the aforementioned tank battalions, for mobile operations, and offensive flexibility that allotted tanks into the forces within the Katif Bloc as well.
In fact, up to the disengagement, security events east of the Green Line were few and far apart – along the entire border fence from Kerem Shalom on the triple Gaza-Israel-Egypt border, up to Netive Ha’asara community, on the northern Gaza border. The communities along the border fence were categorized as conflict area communities, and since 2005 have been living under the mortal threat mainly from the homemade short-range Qasam rockets against which the IDF operated continuously within the Strip, mostly through missions to destroy the metal workshops which are used as rockets manufacturing facilities.
Reserve forces
The reserve forces assigned to the region are tasked with three missions, as per demands on the ground – the quick response to border breaches, reinforcement of forces in situations of significant fighting, and assistance in a offensive effort to push the fighting into enemy territory. The pre-disengagement Gaza Division – and surely since 2002 – included a standby offense brigade, which when summoned for duty, reenforced the existing forces either in routing security missions or in offensive operations, as per needs.
Such a mobile reserve force is a critical condition for the defense apparatus’ ability to perform its mission, if only by virtue of the historical hypothesis that “the front line can always be breached”. Given this state of affairs, that occasionally occurred along the pre-disengagement Green Line, but not on a daily basis – the reserves forces, on brigade, division and command levels, provided an immediate response to any escalation.
Post disengagement
During the IDF’s presence in the Katif Bloc inside the Gaza Strip, the defense apparatus driven from the military doctrine was tailored according to all the principles abovementioned. The disengagement and the eviction of the Katif Bloc communities fundamentally changed tipped the scales on the ground in the Gaza Strip environ.
Following the disengagement, the Gaza Division’s two regional brigades were redeployed to the east of the Gaza border and the battle order was shaved to 3-4 battalions, at the most, under command of the Gaza Division. When necessary, such as in times of escalation along the border, reinforcement was brought in in the form of one offense brigade, used over the years as a provisional force for ad hoc missions in the southern command. In the new reality, which emerged in the wake of the disengagement, it was the Gaza environ communities that have now become a front-line population belt, devoid of a fixed security apparatus that interacts with the enemy deep within the latter’s territory.
In fact, the defense array that was put in place only partially responded to the demands of the aforementioned defense doctrine principles, lacking a routine security array and ongoing interaction with the enemy, with fewer reserve resources, and with the entire apparatus invested in what was till then the holding arena, which has now de-facto become a frontline with the enemy.
The increased use of technology – as effective as that technology may be – is in no way a satisfactory substitute for the lack of presence in the depth of enemy territory, where in fact our forces have hardly operated in, with the exception of special retaliatory operations such as Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge, and subsequentially, human intelligence (HUMINT) was drastically decreased.
In effect, every IDF offensive operation in the Gaza Strip since 2021 demanded a battle order of three divisions, i.e. three times more than that of the Gaza Division’s pre-engagement battle order, despite superior intel gathering and attack capabilities, a smart border fence, massive engagement by the Israeli Air Force and artillery forces.
The battle order demanded on the Gaza border post disengagement has scaled up to a de facto level of an entire corps, i.e. 2-4 divisions, in times of more frequent conflict with a higher number of casualties – surely in the October 7 event, but not only. On top of this, the defense lineup includes a huge investment in the Iron Dome rocket interception system and the interception auxiliary array.
In conclusion
In 2005, the State of Israel had drawn back from a highly developed populated system, at the cost of a historic and grave social and national crisis and the undermining of the enterprise of the settlement of the land. Moreover, the defense of the west Negev was devoid of its territorial depth – contrary to the dictates of defense doctrine. All this was affected without a dramatic change of the total order of battle but the cost in lives and material damage increased considerably – without yet taking into account the Hamas’ force buildup to a real rocket threat on the civilian home land, all the way up the Haifa.
Thus one cannot claim that the disengagement benefited us, at the very least. What may be said is that we paid – and continue to pay – an inconceivable price, despite having invested increased resources and forces to protect the western Negev. It follows that any claim in support of the disengagement from Gaza, citing Israel’s improved strategic position and comparing the “costs” and resources invested by the IDF before and after the disengagement, should be treated with skepticism, not to say rejected out of hand. This is a false myth.
It is best to remember that until 1995, during the period of the reshuffling of the IDF forces as per the Oslo Accord, the Gaza Division dealt mostly with civil protests and riots in the Gaza Strip. A decade later, that same division exchanged the marshaling of civil unrest with responding to the threat of an increasing force buildup of terrorist organization, first and foremost Hamas, such that demanded a three times increase of the order of battle in the Gaza border.