UNIFIL I.D
Full Name: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
Established: 19th March, 1978.
Budget: $551,113,500 (for 2023-24 year, which reflects increase of 9.6% from 2022-23)[1].
Personnel: ~10,000 deployed personnel. While 13,000 authorized uniformed personnel (military & police). | ~800 civilian personnel.
Mission: “To confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area”[2].
“Following the July/August 2006 crisis, the Council enhanced the Force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.” [3].
Participating countries (top 10): Indonesia (1,230); Italy (1,043); India (903); Ghana (878); Nepal (876); Malaysia (832); Spain (676); France (665); China (419); Ireland (351).[4]
Why UNIFIL in South Lebanon Failed, and What’s The Alternative?
Brief Identification of UNIFIL
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in 1978 through Resolutions 425 and 426, represents a pivotal chapter in the UN’s peacekeeping efforts. Initially tasked with overseeing Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and facilitating the restoration of peace, UNIFIL’s scope has expanded in response to the 2006 Lebanon War. Resolution 1701 not only mandated a cessation of hostilities but also positioned UNIFIL as a critical actor in maintaining peace, monitoring the Blue Line, assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in disarming Hezbollah, the Shi’ite pro-Iranian terrorist group and proxy that has been dominating Lebanon and vowing its commitment to Israel’s destruction. Over the decades, however, UNIFIL has found itself increasingly constrained, both operationally and politically, with Hezbollah leveraging its deep integration into Lebanese society to systematically undermine the mission’s effectiveness.
While UNIFIL’s force peaked at over 10,000 personnel, its presence has gradually devolved into a largely symbolic one, unable to meaningfully assert control or influence in southern Lebanon. The mission’s increasing entanglement with political complexities and local power structures has left it as a passive observer—one whose mandate has been repeatedly undermined by Hezbollah’s growing military presence.
UNIFIL’s poor performance led directly to Hezbollah’s unchecked takeover of southern Lebanon, entrenching its infrastructure of rocket launchers and attack tunnels, and deploying its elite Radwan force and militants all across the Israel-Lebanon border, using a civilian environment to conceal ground-to-ground missiles and a host of weapons and armament. This has posed a significant risk of ground invasion into Israel. Hezbollah’s ever-deepened presence in southern Lebanon has played a key role in its attacks on Israel, and has inevitably led to the current war.
UNIFIL’s Challenges: Strategic Failure of Restricted Movement
Broader Strategic Implications
One of the fundamental failures of the UNIFIL mission has been its inability to navigate the systematic obstructions posed by Hezbollah, whose influence in southern Lebanon has rendered UNIFIL effectively powerless. Hezbollah’s control is both overt and covert, using entities such as ‘Green Without Borders’ to disguise military installations under the pretext of environmental work. This deception has allowed Hezbollah to build infrastructure—such as observation posts and arms depots—while cloaking them in civilian operations, making it nearly impossible for UNIFIL to conduct thorough inspections or maintain credible oversight along the Blue Line.
The implications of these restrictions are profound, as Hezbollah continues to expand its influence without consequence (Or at least did so almost before “Swords of Iron War” and Operation “Northern Arrows as part of it). By controlling the narrative and leveraging legal loopholes like property ownership and environmental regulations, Hezbollah has successfully limited UNIFIL’s freedom of movement, ensuring that key strategic areas remain inaccessible. These “no-go” zones, effectively controlled by Hezbollah, have diminished UNIFIL’s ability to perform even the most basic aspects of its mandate—such as disarmament monitoring and ceasefire enforcement—turning the international force into little more than a bystander.
This, however, comes against the backdrop of clear Hezbollah infrastructure being developed in both urban and rural areas, with major attack tunnels and military bases. Hezbollah also began patrolling the border with uniform, unmasked, with no significant or effective counter-action by UNIFIL, which rendered its role in southern Lebanon moot.
Hezbollah’s unchecked growth, bolstered by Iran’s regional ambitions, is not just a local threat—it has broader regional and global implications. The strategic failure of UNIFIL to curb Hezbollah’s military buildup emboldens the group to continue expanding, posing a constant threat to Israel’s northern border while contributing to Lebanon’s ongoing instability. This lack of oversight and deterrence emboldens non-state actors across the region, signaling that international peacekeeping forces can be rendered ineffectual through strategic manipulation and local dominance.
Furthermore, Hezbollah’s influence extends beyond territorial control; it actively works to erode UNIFIL’s legitimacy on the ground. By engaging with local communities while fostering distrust of international forces, Hezbollah positions itself as the true governing authority in southern Lebanon. This dynamic undermines any potential gains UNIFIL could achieve and entrenches Hezbollah’s de facto control, further complicating any efforts toward long-term peace and stability.
Specific Incidents of Restricted Movement
UNIFIL’s operational failures are not theoretical; they are deeply rooted in specific incidents that have undermined the mission’s credibility and operational capacity. Notably, Hezbollah has orchestrated a series of actions aimed at limiting UNIFIL’s ability to patrol and inspect critical areas. Over the years, peacekeepers have been routinely blocked from accessing key zones, often under the pretense of private property rights or agricultural protections, where Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is known to exist. These obstructions are not isolated but form part of a broader strategy to maintain Hezbollah’s freedom of movement while denying the same to UNIFIL.
Tragically, this obstruction has led to the loss of life among UNIFIL personnel. In 2022, an Irish peacekeeper was killed in a Hezbollah-led confrontation, a stark reminder of the physical dangers that peacekeepers face in this hostile environment. Such incidents are not rare; in 2007, six Spanish peacekeepers were killed in an IED attack orchestrated by Hezbollah operatives. In other cases, UNIFIL convoys have been ambushed or targeted with explosives, resulting in multiple fatalities and severely undermining the morale of the international force. These targeted attacks, combined with Hezbollah’s manipulation of legal and societal frameworks, have created an environment where UNIFIL’s role has become largely ceremonial.
Moreover, Hezbollah’s military entrenchment has continued to grow despite UNIFIL’s presence. The group has expanded its arsenal, constructed fortified positions, and established a robust intelligence network that operates without interference from international forces. UNIFIL’s inability to prevent these activities—due to both operational limitations and political considerations—has rendered the mission ineffective, further emboldening Hezbollah to act with impunity. The stark reality is that, while UNIFIL exists on paper as a peacekeeping force, it is Hezbollah that exercises actual control over southern Lebanon.
Between 2006-2019, UNIFIL reported over 100 violent incidents against it by Hezbollah or their cooperatives. For demonstration purposes to the scale of the problem, we add here just one report of many: Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2023, Annex I: Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 February to 20 June 2023, as a shortlist of examples to UNIFIL restrictions forced by Hezbollah.
Further complicating UNIFIL’s mission were several instances where it was found complicit in withholding critical information. Most notably, in 2000, the abduction of three Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah occurred in full view of UNIFIL personnel, who filmed the abduction without immediately reporting it. UNIFIL not only failed to intervene in real-time but also withheld a videotape documenting key moments of the incident, leading to accusations that the UN had misled Israel. The tape, which was kept secret for months, depicted Hezbollah’s use of UN vehicles in the abduction and contained evidence that could have helped locate the soldiers. This failure to act and the subsequent concealment of vital intelligence became emblematic of the broader ineffectiveness of the mission. UNIFIL’s refusal to release the tape under the guise of neutrality raised serious questions about its commitment to peacekeeping, especially when lives were at risk. Such inaction has contributed to the perception that UNIFIL’s role in southern Lebanon has often been passive, at best, and complicit, at worst, in Hezbollah’s operations.
UNIFIL-Hezbollah Collusion
The former Danish UNTSO soldier’s testimony
On October 20th, 2024, a retired United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) soldier, under the alias “Michael”, testified that UNIFIL was “totally subject to Hezbollah” when he worked in Lebanon 10 years before. The testimony was made in an interview with Danish news site B.T. “Michael” stated that he was speaking for himself as a private individual and not on behalf of UNTSO.[5]
The soldier’s tasks were to observe and report potential violations of the 2006 UN Security council Resolution 1701, which was supposed to remove Hezbollah presence from southern Lebanon.
Here are several quotes from the former UNTSO soldier: “We were totally subject to Hezbollah…We clearly had limited freedom of movement. For example, we never operated after dark for fear of Hezbollah. So they had free time in the evening and night hours.”
“They simply blocked the road. They were not visibly armed but aggressive, and it was quite clear that they were members of Hezbollah. We knew very well who decided things, especially in the Shia cities. They didn’t want us to see what they were doing.”
“When we patrolled the Blue Line, we often saw ‘civilians’ very close to the Israeli military installations taking pictures. When that happened, we withdrew and observed from a distance; we were simply instructed to do so”.
The UN soldiers were not allowed to take photos or videos:
“It was forbidden to film and take pictures. And if we did, we could end up with the locals confiscating our cameras. It happened to my colleagues in UNIFIL and UNTSO”.
Regarding the presence and territory control of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and near the Israeli border, the witness said: “The civilians who did not care about Hezbollah, especially the Christians, were afraid to speak out against them. There was a widespread fear of them. But at the same time, we experienced cooperation with the Shia Muslims. For example, we had a number of interpreters who were indoctrinated into Hezbollah. I ended up throwing one of them out of my car once while he was praising Hassan Nasrallah. I simply didn’t want to listen to it”.
Michael cited the inaction taken against the violations of U.N. Resolution 1701:: “We reported daily violations of Resolution 1701 to our superiors, including restrictions on our freedom of movement, and we were instructed to report all violations regardless of number. But nothing ever happened,” he said. “We did not hear back from them, and nothing was initiated. It was wildly frustrating and only confirmed what I had experienced in other countries I was posted to: The U.N. is incompetent.”
UNIFIL and Hezbollah – The unknown ties?
Regarding the Italian UNIFIL activity in Lebanon, it is worth recalling what Francesco Cossiga[6] said during an interview with the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot, 2008: “Cossiga to the Italian Jews: We sold you out.”
According to Cossiga, Italy implemented an agreement with Hezbollah that would enable UNIFIL forces to move freely in southern Lebanon, without fear for their safety, in exchange for a closed eye and the possibility of rearming given to Hezbollah. The former President further added that he was certain about the existence of the agreement and that he would be willing to testify before the judges that it was a state secret and he would not be required to reveal his sources.[7]
Moreover, the Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani, stated in April 2024, following Iran’s first missile attack against Israel:
“The Iranians have assured us that our Italian soldiers in the area will be respected…The Italian contingent in Lebanon is under the aegis of the UN, it is in a condition to be protected, I don’t think there are any dangers either for the Italian soldiers or for the Italian citizens in Israel and Iran”. As for the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the minister explained how he was assured that “only ships that bring weapons to Israel would be attacked”. (Agi, Apr 14,2024). [8]
Tajani’s statement indicate that the Italian government interacted with Iran to ensure the safety of the Italian UNIFIL troops and that can be considered in line with Cossiga’s statement regarding an agreement with Hezbollah, which is Iran’s proxy in Lebanon.
In addition, on April 14th 2024, Germano Dottori, a professor of Strategic Studies at Rome’s Luiss Univ argued that Italy had given up its freedom to express itself on Iran at the very moment in which, in 2006, it deployed in the lair of Hezbollah a thousand soldiers. [9]
An April 17, 2024, Startmag article highlighted the failure of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah. It criticized Italy’s subservience to the group, noting that Hezbollah is now more armed and dangerous than in 2006, continuing to destabilize the region as an Iranian proxy. [10]
Furthermore, since the land maneuver of the IDF against Hezbollah, evidence of UNIFIL’s failure came from the recent interrogations of Hezbollah terrorists, who testified that the terror group paid UNIFIL members to use their positions for surveillance and military operations. In several testimonies the admit that Hezbollah also took control of UNIFIL cameras near the Israeli border.
Conclude UNIFIL’s Mission
UNIFIL’s mandate should be terminated immediately, as it no longer provides tangible benefits for either Lebanon or Israel. The mission, once envisioned as a stabilizing force, has instead become a mechanism through which Hezbollah consolidates power. Rather than continuing to fund and support an ineffective peacekeeping mission, the international community should shift its focus toward direct diplomatic and security initiatives that address the root causes of instability in Lebanon.
UNIFIL’s repeated failure to act decisively, coupled with its misleading of Israel and complicity in Hezbollah’s activities, underscores that it has long ceased to be a force for peace. Its inability to prevent Hezbollah’s military buildup, coupled with its refusal to cooperate even when lives at stake, not only undermines its mandate but also raises the question of whether it has betrayed its role in Lebanon.
Ending UNIFIL would also remove a key element of Hezbollah’s manipulation, forcing both the Lebanese government and the international community to confront the realities on the ground. For Israel, terminating UNIFIL’s mandate would eliminate the false sense of security that the mission provides, allowing for a more realistic approach to border security. Similarly, for Lebanon, it would offer an opportunity to reclaim sovereignty over its southern region, free from the constraints imposed by Hezbollah’s military apparatus.
The Lebanese people, particularly those living in Hezbollah-controlled areas, also deserve the chance to live without the looming threat of violence and conflict. By removing UNIFIL and placing the onus on local and regional actors to address the security situation, there is potential for a recalibration of Lebanon’s internal dynamics. Ending the mission would mark the first step toward a more durable peace, one that is not built on international intervention but on the accountability of the region’s true stakeholders.
Specific recommendations for effective optional substitutes for UNIFIL may be found in the following paper by the IDSF Research Department: Turning Point in the North: Prospects for the Israel-Hezbollah War.
Conclusion
After more than four decades of operations, it is clear that UNIFIL has failed to fulfill its mandate in southern Lebanon. The mission’s inability to counter Hezbollah’s military buildup, combined with restrictions on its movements and the growing danger to peacekeepers, has rendered it ineffective. By terminating UNIFIL’s presence, both Israel and Lebanon can begin to address the root causes of instability in the region.
A Hezbollah-free southern Lebanon is not just in Israel’s interest, but also in the interest of the Lebanese people, who deserve to live free from external interference and conflict. Only by confronting the realities on the ground and ending a failed peacekeeping mission can real progress be made.
Key Question that should be noted
- UNIFIL was establish in March 1978, to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli troops. The IDF withdrew from Lebanon in August 1978. What was the justification for UNIFIL onwards?
- Another objective was to “restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area”, if so, why UNIFIL failed to do so between August 1978 to 1982 and allowed the presence of the PLO in south Lebanon?
- Also, how it allowed the establishment of Hezbollah and the Iranian influence inside Lebanon? Which is the direct opposite to “assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority”
- In continues, how it allowed the Syrian involvement in Lebanon during the 1980’s?
- How it allowed the 1982 War between Israel and Lebanon?
- How has it allowed the formation of the South Lebanon Army? In total contradiction with the “assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority”?
- How come UNIFIL became enabler and even cooperative force for terrorism?
- How is it possible that after all these failures, after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, UNIFIL still operates and increased its budget each year?
- Why after all these failures, the UN administration keep putting in risk the troops on ground, in many times for vain, and why does the international community stick with UNIFIL to the point they stress it has no viable alternative?
[1] UN. Secretary-General. (2023). Budget for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024: report of the Secretary-General. In United Nations Digital Library System (A_77_740-EN). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4008431
[2] United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.). UNIFIL Fact sheet: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Retrieved November 11, 2024, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unifil
[3] See 2.
[4] Top 10 contributers out of 48 countries as of 22th Oct., 2024. UNIFIL Troop-Contributing Countries. (2024, October 22). UNIFIL. https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-troop-contributing-countries
[5] See Jotam Confino, B.T., “Michael var FN-soldat i Libanon: ‘Vi var totalt underlagt Hizbollah’”, October 20, 2024, https://www.bt.dk/udland/michael-var-fn-soldat-i-libanon-vi-var-totalt-underlagt-hizbollah
[6] Prime minister of Italy from 1979-1980 and the president of Italy from 1985-1992.
[7] Focus on Israel, “Cossiga agli ebrei italiani: “Vi abbiamo venduto”, Oct 6, 2008 – https://www.focusonisrael.org/2008/10/06/cossiga-ebrei-italiani-vi-abbiamo-venduti-lodo-moro/
[8] Agi Press Agency, “Tajani, “segnali incoraggianti da Iran e Israele. La diplomazia è al lavoro”, Apr 14, 2024 – https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2024-04-14/attacco-iran-israele-medio-oriente-tajani-26026362/
[9] https://x.com/GermanoDottori/status/1780185313278582842?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1780185313278582842%7Ctwgr%5E5cd465fb019c7da8f7f919db8294c3bb82bfaa49%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.startmag.it%2Fmondo%2Fitalia-sovranita-limitata-hezbollah%2F
[10] Marco Orioles, “L’Italia è un Paese a sovranità limitata su Hezbollah?”, Startmag, April 27, 2024 – https://www.startmag.it/mondo/italia-sovranita-limitata-hezbollah/