In the previous chapter, Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Baruch Yedid reviewed the various causes for the decline of the Palestinian Authority, mostly related to the growing civil-social unrest on the Palestinian streets; the infighting in Fatah and the rise of Hamas, and the loss of the security control over wide sections of the PA’s territory. The recommended course of action for Israel was to maintain the Authority as a framework of governance alone, but not to act towards the reinforcement of its problem-riddles leadership, which is inflicted with incurable ailments and is committed to the struggle against Israel, inter alia by mean of irreversible diplomatic overtures.
This chapter – the second in a series of three – takes a look at the ebbing status of Fatah on the Palestinian street against the soaring status of the Hamas, evident particularly in the events of Operation Guardian of the Walls, wherein the rival movement seized the opportunity to flex its muscles and win over the Palestinian street. As Senior Hamas official Muhammad Dief declared: “If not through the ballot box – then through Jerusalem”. This adverse blow to the Fatah’s foothold in Ramallah is further exacerbated by a slew of other troubles, not the least of which are infighting within the movement, score settling among leadership members, the publication of secret – often embarrassing – recordings of members, and tumultuous leadership meetings and meetings with Jordanian and Egyptian senior officials on the future of the PA.
The author of this article is Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid, former commander and advisor to the Civil Administration and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (COGAT), and currently a commentator for Channel 14. Lt. Col. Baruch Yadid speaks fluent Arabic and his written work draws on his extensive experience in the Palestinian arena, including ongoing contact with sources on the ground as well as with senior Palestinian officials.
A source within the PA security mechanism points to another – rather interesting – telltale sign of the sentiment on the Palestinian street that attests to the advance of Hamas and the weakness of the PA: four funerals, which have been held in the past year. According to the source, “the four funerals showcased the power of Hamas and the weakness of the PA”:
- The funeral of Omar Barghouti, a senior Hamas figure from the village of Kobar in Ramallah – the most significant event in recent years to display the power of Hamas;
- The funeral of Nizar Banat, the political activist who died during his interrogation in the hands of the security forces in Hebron – an event which swept the Palestinian streets against the PA;
- The funeral in Jenin of Wafi Qabaha, Hamas Minister of Prisoner Affairs, during which masked Fatah activists were spotted;
- The funeral of Jamil Kiel in Nablus (a youngster killed during exchange of fire with the IDF), after which security officers “demanded reviewing the orders” given by the PA to dissolve riots by youngsters and Hamas members, indicating a change among PA security officers in Nablus..
It may be noted that this also comes alongside the arrest of Hamas squads in Ramallah, the arrest of hundreds of Hamas officials in Universities around Judea and Samaria in order to restrain the Hamas annual events in December 2022, and the prolonged arrest of Masaab Shtayeh in Nablus in September 2022 by the PA’s security mechanism. All of the above may signal the PA’s abilities to enforce its rule in certain areas and enclaves, in particular in and around Ramallah rather than in Nablus or Jenin.
“Guardian of the Walls” Events – the Succession Battles in Fatah; Hamas Lifts its head
The Fatah – battles over the “lost inheritance” and cancellation of the elections
“Under Abu Mazen, Fatah’s Central Committee has become a slaughterhouse”, a senior Fatah official told us, “The ousting of Dahlan, the overthrowing of Nasser Qadwa and the injustice toward Marwan Barghouti – and the members of the [Central] Committee testify to this,” he asserts. “First it was the role of the Palestinian prime minister – and anyone who recognized him yet was not a Fatah member – was politically eliminated and kicked out. This is how Salam Fayyad and Rami Hamdallah found themselves ousted by senior Fatah figures, falling victim to the conspiracies of senior members of the Central Committee…”
One of the most prominent and current signs to the Fatah’s disintegration was in 2021, when Abu Mazen announced the elections, after his previous elections announcement in 2019 was rescinded.
Toward the elections it became clear just how divided the Palestinians are. Alongside far-reaching demands on part of the Hamas, Abu Mazen was forced to deal with the fragmentation of the Fatah into rival factions. Many saw Muhammad Dahlan’s separate list of candidates as inevitable, but nonetheless hoped that the senior Fatah member, Marwan Barghouti, will accept the movements decisions.
The PA invested great efforts into swaying Marwan Barghouti, who is serving a life sentence in an Israeli prison, not to run on a separate ticket, to no avail, and even the visit of Hussein al-Sheikh – with Israel’s permission – to Barghouti in prison, failed to yield the desired result and Barghouti founded a separate list.
And as if that were not enough, another player joined the race creating yet another separate list in direct violation of orders from the leadership – Nasse Qadwa, a nephew of Yasser Arafat, formed a list of his own and even forged a political alliance with Marwan Barghouti.
Operating under these pressures, Abu Mazen resorted to calling off the elections, not before hearing foreboding assessments from his own intelligence apparatus, alongside assessments from Egypt, the Jordanians and the US. His decision played a crucial role in the move on part of Hamas – which had just elected its new leadership – to fire rockets on Jerusalem, which ultimately led to Operation Guardian of the Walls.
The “Guardian of the Walls” Events – an Opportunity for Hamas to Flex its Muscles in the Face of a Floundering PA
Already in mid-April 2021, right before the PA elections were called off, it became evident that the rocket launching from Gaza into Israel (in April), signaled that East Jerusalem was to soon become the main arena of the next battle of attrition between Israel and Hamas. Throughout the international community the misimpression spreading that Operation “Guardian of the Walls” was sparked predominantly by what the Hamas chose to show it: the Jewish annual March of Flags on Jerusalem Day – and event that had been taking place each year, during the past years; or the Israel court’s ordering Palestinian families to evict homes that are owned by Jews in the Sheik Jarrah neighborhood. But the bigger picture is much deeper and revolves around the clash of two giants – Fatah and the Hamas – vying for the hearts of the Palestinian people.
In fact, in February that same year, 3 months before Operation Guardian of the Walls, elections were due to be held in all five Hamas contingencies – overseas, prisons, Gaza, and the General Political Bureau – but they were not held in Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank”). It took Yihya Sinwar four grueling rounds to finally win the elections. The newly elected Hamas leadership made a simple calculation; in the words of senior Hamas figure and Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades commander Muhammad Deif: “If we can’t get in throughout the ballots – we’ll get in through Jerusalem”. The lack of long-term arrangement with Israel in the Gaza Strip, and the cancellation of the elections in Judea and Samaria by Abu Mazen and Fatah (a roadblock in the Hamas’ way to taking control of Judea and Samaria, in addition to its hold on Gaza), Hamas made a calculated evaluation of the situation and prevailed: the issue of the holy sites and Jerusalem will pave its rise to dominance.
Thus, as from April Hamas begun calling on its operatives and on the residents of East Jerusalem to increase their presence in the city and in the al-Aqsa mosque, and even encouraged them to hold public prayers in front of the police barricades, with the aim of ensuring mass participation towards the 28th Ramadan day, which happened to fall on May 9 – the date of Israel’s Jerusalem Day.
That was also the date of the Muslim Qadr Night – the most religiously profound– and as such the most sensitive – night of the Ramadan, in which according to the Muslim faith, the Angel Gabriel bought the world the Quran and in which the heavens open to prayer. Hamas depicted the sensitive date as “the definitive moment in the fight against the (Jewish) settlers and the occupation of Jerusalem”.
Khaled Mashaal, who was elected to head the Hamas leadership oversees, said in an interview: “We are facing a widespread battle in the face of the attempts to control Jerusalem and make it Jewish and to divide the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and May 9 is the definitive moment in the history of the Intifada in the city”.
“We have no future, no state and no self-determination without Jerusalem”, said the Hamas leader, adding: “Israel made a mistake in 2017 when it placed electronic gates (magnometers) and it’ll fail to achieve its plans to conquer Bab Al-Amud – the Damascus Gate (East-Jerusalem entrance to the Old City). The enemy was taken by surprise by the people of Jerusalem who have risen to thwart their designs to Jewify the city, and we must turn the city into the heart of the conflict and to an arena of national unity”, he said.
Hamas called on East Jerusalem residents to form night patrol squads in the East Jerusalem neighborhoods and to prevent the entrance of “Jewish settlers” into their area. Sheikh Akrama Sabri, head of the High Muslim Council, whose movement have been restricted by the Jerusalem police, also called for the formation of defense committees throughout East Jerusalem.
The firing of rockets into Israel (April) was aimed, on part of Hamas, to convey a message to the Palestinian Authority as well, according to which if Abu Mazen postpones the elections, Hamas will act towards the destabilization of the PA territories by fomenting religious unrest in Jerusalem. In reference to the elections, Mashaal said that the Hamas wants to hold elections in all Palestinian departments – Jerusalem included – and therefore there is no justification for withdrawing the demand to hold them, rather, an alternative must be devised in light of Israel’s ban on holding elections in Jerusalem.
Hamas officials declared that Fatah’ intent on postponing the elections is unacceptable. And furthermore, that the issue of ballot boxes in East Jerusalem is nothing but an excuse for Abu Mazen and an escape route for him from the crises in Fatah – ultimately leading to the unintended consolidation of Israel’s position. “We ask to be part of the political race and the elections should not be hanging in the air”’ says Mashaal. “Putting the Palestinian house in order is a necessity for reinforcing the resistance to the occupation and the rebuilding of the national project upon new foundations”.
Hamas was pleased with the predicament in which the Fatah found itself, and said that its struggle shoulder to shoulder with the Jerusalem residents boosts their image in the Palestinian street and that its willingness to engage in conflict with Israel will ultimately lead to the movement’s victory at the expense of Fatah and the PA. “This is a victory that even the Intelligence in Tel Aviv understands is expected to affect Israel’s security and political considerations, and is an unfavorable outcome for Israel”, wrote Hamas commentators.
Lebanese newspaper, Al Akhbar, which has sources within the Hamas, reported talks between Egypt and the UN aiming at “containing the situation”, however, at the same time, Hamas had rejected the détente as long as Israel sticks to its policy in Jerusalem, and the movement has committed to “prevent the settlers from storming Al Aqsa”.
Thus, the Hamas has demonstrated its clear intention to lock horns with Israel and flex its muscles, thereby chalking up a twofold gain: the cementing of its status on the Palestinian street as the protector of the holy sites and as the warrior on the front against Israel – all on the expense of an ebbing PA and the Israeli security forces, which were forced to deal with widespread riots in a number of arenas at the same time, during Operation Guardian of the Walls.
Tensions In Fatah: Elimination of Rivals, Infighting Over Abu Mazen Succession, Talks with Jordan and Egypt
Means that justify the end – elimination of rivals withing Fatah
The Tawfiq Tarawi affair – The “Arafat Assassination” case
Finger-pointing for the murder of Yasar Arafat, leaking fake news, exploiting the intelligence system for settling political scores, exposure of sex and financial embezzlement scandals – all these are means deemed legitimate in the infighting within the Fatah, as has become apparent over the past years.
Tawfiq Tarawi, senior Fatah figure and former head of General Intelligence, recently denied remarks attributed to him regarding the conclusions in the “Yasar Arafat Assassination” case, which he has been conducting since 2016. Tarawi made it clear that the information that was spread on networks, attributed to him, regarding the identity of Arafat’s murderer are fake, and emphasized that “the investigation is ongoing and the results shall soon be presented to Fatah’s Central Committee and to Abu Mazen”.
Already a few years ago, the investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of Arafat has become a means for political elimination in the Palestinian political top echelon. Ten years ago, Abu Mazen appointed a committee to investigate the murder of Yasar Arafat after rumors and allegations were spread regarding the connection of Israeli and Palestinian elements with his death.
However, there were those within Fatah who did not wait until the source of these rumors on Arafat’s death was discovered and revealed, and sources within the organization claimed that the probability of Tarawi’s removal from the Fatah Central Committee is growing, having become the target of Abu Mazen’s cohorts, among them Hussein al-Sheik – Palestinian minister of civil affairs and secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, and Majid Faraj – who heads the Palestinian intelligence.
The tensions among the senior Fatah officials arise in the wake of recent exposures of recordings in which Tarawi was heard vehemently slamming Hussein al-Sheik, who is considered the closest person to Abu Mazen. Tarawi was recorded claiming that al-Sheik is involved of financial and moral corruption scandals, from which he was pulled out by means of hush money paid with the help of his friend Faraj. Tarawi also alleged that al-Sheik pocketed money he charged for arranging entrance permits into Israel for Palestinian businessmen.
Against Tarawi are also his harsh remarks against Jibril Rajoub and Mahmoud al-Aloul, Mahmoud Abbas’ deputy in Fatah. Among other things he said against his rivals, Tarawi accused Rajoub of lying and attempts to hide the fact that he was embroiled in inner conspiracies in the Fatah. Tarawi claimed that Rajoub himself accused Faraj of being a British agent and received a monthly pay of £3,000 in the past for these services. There are those in the Central Committee who attribute the leak of information on Arafat’s murder to Tarawi himself – an allegation Tarawi immediately denied– and regard Tarawi’s allegations as an implicit threat towards Abu Mazen.
Tarawi was extremely close to Yasar Arafat, however, ever since Abu Mazen was elected to head the PA and Fatah, he was ousted from the inner circle of the decision-makers in the Palestinian leadership and recently, was even dismissed as chairman of the board of trustees of the Military Academy in Jericho, “Al Istiqlal” (The Independence).
Palestinian sources claim that this was a heavy blow to Tarawi, who’s lost an income of over $73,000 from his chairmanship of the board. Senior level sources – most probably from the top tier of Fatah – had even leaked a “secret report” to a Saudi media site, in which they expose embezzlement of the military academy’s money, nepotism, and the use thereof to acquire real estate on part of Tarawi.
On the other side of the divide, the opposition to the Abu Mazen camp raises claims of grave happenings involving people close to the Palestinian Chairman, including sizzling affairs in Jordan, payment of hush money and even testimonies of alleged rape cases.
The Hussein al-Sheik Affair: The “Prince” Seeks to Get Rid of Abu Mazen
While the Palestinian Authority is struggling on the political level against Israel and at the same time is plagued by a long list of internal strife, it is Hussein al-Sheik, a close confidant to Abu Mazen’s, who promoted him to Secretary General of the PLO Central Committee, who is taking a stand against the PA chairman.
The succession battles have come to light recently in full force through recordings, in which Al Sheik was caught in a rare instance of critizing Abu Mazen. These recordings were released by the Shihab news agency which is aligned with the Hamas. In the recordings, al-Sheik is heard attacking the Palestinian leader and accusing him of the anarchy which we are reviewing here, and even cursing him. Although al-Sheik denies this to his inner circle of acquaintances – it will be hard for him to refute the evidence.
The recordings reveal difficult and complex relationships in the Fatah leadership, against the backdrop of the battles over the succession of Abu Mazen, as well as the – mostly hushed – internal criticism within the Fatah Central Committee against Abu Mazen. In the opinion of some in Ramallah, al-Sheik is revealed in the recordings as someone who is seeking a way of ousting Abu Mazen, and his remarks indeed indicate that he is in fact in the process of planning this move.
“I’m telling you that Abu Mazen is partner to the present anarchy. He’s partner to the anarchy and has an interest in perpetuating it”, says al-Sheik. “. I’m sorry to say this, but today the process of succession is totally different than it was after Arafat’s death. Abu Mazen’s has lost grip of his senses. How can we operate properly when he informs us of the decisions without sharing the reasons behind them?”
“Not everything he wants – we want to give him. I know the workings of his brain; anyone riding Abu Mazen’s brain, one, two, three, four” says al-Sheik. He adds that Abu Mazen “caused the fight over the throne, involving Jibril Rajoub, Azzam al-Ahmad, Tawfiq Tirawi and Mahmoud al-Aloul, and this is going to bring about the end of the game…Hamas is taking advantage of the PA’s lack of decisiveness, and it’s clear that Hamas is capitalizing on the current situation”. In these words, he corroborates this analysis of the decline of Fatah in face of a rising Hamas.
Al-Sheik himself described the events in Fatah as “the battle over the succession of Abu Mazen”, saying that the battle involved many contenders. From his remarks it could be understood that “there is a set plan” for these battles. Al‑Sheik admits in his own words: “the security mechanisms and part of the Fatah leadership are involved in the Abu Mazen succession battles and are partaking in this game”.
Al-Sheik attacks other contenders to the throne, saying even that for his part, Majed Faraj, head of PA General Intelligence – with whom he shares exclusively close ties with Abu Mazen – could go “f**k himself”. Al-Sheik further inquired “why did he even open a dialogue with the Egyptians in Gaza?” He was also incensed over Abu Mazen’s decision to take Faraj along on his private jet to one of his foreign visits. “When I learned that he’s planning to take Majed along on the plane – I decided not to go, to tell you the truth. Why and for what reason would he bring Majed Faraj along?”
Al-Sheikh also spoke out against Mahmoud Abbas’ deputy in Fatah – the sole deputy Chairman, who wears three different hats– saying that “Abbas intends to appoint Mahmoud al-Aloul as his successor in the Fatah movement” adding that “on the issue of Fatah, he (Abbas) is leaning towards Mahmoud al-Aloul.”
Efforts to Boost Fatah Against its Loss of Control – Convening the Council and Talks with Jordan and Egypt
Concurrently with its efforts in the security area, now the PA is trying to bolster the Fatah movement and its governing institutions. Senior officials in the organization have been demanding for a while now to convene the eighth conference of the movement leadership, and a senior source within the PA said: “there is pressure on Abu Mazen to in this direction and give a chance to in-house peacemaking efforts, in light of the grave crises on the ground”.
Abbas Zaki, one of the Fatah leaders, told the Palestinian media: “The eighth conference will be held soon so that we can formulate a strategy that corresponds with Mahmoud Abbas’ speech at the UN – according to which there is no Israeli partner for continuing diplomatic negotiations – and to allow us to act towards international protection of the Palestinians.”
In an effort to return Fatah to the playing field, the first conference was held last month in the Jenin district, as part of a move intended to establish regional movement councils that would strengthen the connection between the Palestinian street and Fatah.
These struggles among the rival camps, namely Marwan Barghouti’s camp on one hand, and Muhammad Dahlan’s camp and on the other, and even withing the “Abu Mazen camp” or the Fatah Central Committee – is pushing the PA towards the abyss. The various rivals are scurrying to secure alliances and cement positions of power in preparation for the day after Abu Mazen. However, at the same time, Hamas is positioning itself toward fulfilling its vision of seizing control of Judea and Samaria once Abu Mazen’s gone.
A member of the Revolutionary Council told us that there are pressures from the concerned field operatives to convene the Eighth Assembly in order to act to heal the organization.
At the same time, Lebanese al-Akhbar quotes sources from within Fatah, who claim that over the past several months, a number of meetings were held between Palestinian officials and senior Jordanian and Egyptian officials, aimed at “settling the future of the PA and Fatah”, the sources say.
The newspaper reports that Palestinian officials led by Hussein al-Sheik met with representatives of the Jordanian royal court and the Jordanian intelligence to discuss possible contingencies in the PA territories once Mahmoud Abbas passes away. The discussion mainly focused on the relations between Fatah –from which the PA is constituted – and the rest of the Palestinian political factions, especially the Hamas, as well as on the relations among the Fatah leaders themselves – mainly those engaged in the succession battles.
A similar meeting was held in Egypt, wherein the Palestinians demanded the Egypt help to prevent the PA’s collapse and the damage to the legitimacy of Fatah and the seizure of that legitimacy by rival movements – especially Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PFLP.
Palestinian sources also appealed to Egypt and Jordan for help in controlling the rival factions within Fatah after Abbas’s death and recognize them as “representatives of the Palestinian people” while controlling the funding sources and salaries of more than 150,000 PA employees.
Al-Akhbar’s sources added: “Those who were present at the meetings came to the conclusion that the collapse of government after Abu Mazen’s departure must be prevented, and that Arab support for one Fatah leader must be ensured, once he is elected with the consent of the movement’s leadership, which will convene the day after Mahmoud Abbas’ departure to agree on its internal terms”. It was further agreed that the rift in Fatah should be ended by accepting back into the fold officials who have defected from the movement, the likes of Muhammad Dahlan, Nasser al-Qadwa, and Marwan Barghouti, and hold an internal reconciliation conference and appoint roles by consensus.
Al-Aloul on his part is endeavoring to reinstate all the members of the Fatah’s inner opposition faction and the distribution of offices among the various leaders, while al-Sheik is aiming for perpetuating Abu Mazen’s modus operandi , i.e controlling all of the movement’s positions. Against this background claims al-Akhbar, al-Sheik has been especially active recently, holding meetings with US government officials, among them the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack Sullivan, discussing options for the reinforcement of the PA and the risk of its collapse.
The following – and last – chapter reviews the Palestinian Authority’s loss of control over the security in wide swaths of the Judea and Samaria region, and how this affects its status on the Palestinian street and among the political factions, and accelerates its disintegration.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.
