Striking Alone, Three Times Over

In 1981, Israel made a fateful decision. Flying deep into hostile Iraqi airspace, it destroyed Saddam Hussein’s Osirak nuclear reactor, halting a looming atomic threat before it could explode. The world condemned the strike—but Israel had no choice. Again in 2007, Israel wiped out Syria’s secret nuclear site at al-Kibar, acting alone to prevent another catastrophe. Now, in 2025, Israel has struck deep inside Iran to dismantle the most advanced and dangerous nuclear program on Earth. Three times in half a century, Israel has taken on a task no one else would. It isn’t just the world’s nuclear janitor. It is the last line of defense against the unimaginable.

Warnings and Paralysis: The World Watched

For years, Israel was warned: a strike on Iran would ignite the region, crash economies, and unleash Hezbollah. Media outlets and foreign leaders forecast apocalyptic consequences. International conferences set ever-moving diplomatic conditions. The message was clear: Israel was too small, too isolated, and too late to act. Meanwhile, Iran pressed forward—enriching uranium, digging fortified bunkers, exporting missiles, and arming proxies from Gaza to Yemen. It moved with alarming efficiency toward nuclear breakout whilst the world, paralyzed by fear or apathy, did nothing. Only one nation prepared to act decisively.

Drawing the Red Line

The U.S. issued warnings of “serious consequences.” The IAEA published reports. The EU expressed “concern.” But no one enforced a red line. Israel did. Through intelligence, cyber sabotage, electronic warfare, and precise airstrikes, Israel hit Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—not out of bravado but necessity. Iran’s response was bluster, drones, and proxy skirmishes. The regional apocalypse never came. The strike proved what few dared to believe: bold action could deter chaos rather than cause it.

A Moral Reckoning

The uncomfortable truth? No one else was willing to stop Iran. Not the UN, not Europe, not Washington. Israel’s action wasn’t just strategic—it was moral. It exposed the impotence of international institutions that profess human rights while tolerating tyranny. It revealed a strategic decay in a world where fear of instability outweighs the will to confront evil. Israel acted while others debated. And as always, the cycle repeats: Israel strikes, the world criticizes, then quietly exhales in relief.

Behind the Scenes: The Myth of Isolation

Despite public silence, Israel was not truly alone. Gulf states offered quiet support. European capitals, though critical, now sleep more easily. In Washington, officials voice concern but admit privately: Israel did what others wouldn’t. It took the shot. The others blinked. Even in Germany, some voices spoke out. CDU leader Friedrich Merz said what many only think: Israel acted where others wouldn’t—and the world should be grateful. It’s a rare, public acknowledgment of the hard truth—that Israel did the dirty work others feared. That kind of clarity deserves recognition, not cynicism. This is the myth of Israeli isolation. True isolation is inaction—waiting for green lights that never come. Israel understands sovereign responsibility. When your nation stands between civilization and catastrophe, you don’t outsource defense. You act—decisively and unapologetically.

The Cost—and the Shift

There will be fallout. Iran will retaliate through proxies and cyberwarfare. The UN will condemn. Some allies will call for “restraint.” But a deeper shift has begun. Young Iranians will notice cracks in the regime’s armor. Sunni states will recalibrate. And Western leaders—despite their public handwringing—know this strike may have averted devastation. Israel once again did what no one else dared. It may be criticized now, but history will judge differently. The world will remember the airstrike, but quietly forget the courage and clarity it took to carry it out.

Redefining Deterrence

From Osirak to al-Kibar to Tehran, Israel has reshaped the balance of power through preemptive action. These strikes weren’t just military operations—they were strategic inflection points. While others hesitated, Israel acted. The global order is fracturing. Institutions fumble, alliances waver, and threats multiply. In this dangerous vacuum, Israel has redrawn the boundaries of deterrence: no nuclear program is beyond reach, no threat untouchable when a democracy is willing to stand alone. The world must decide: catch up—or continue to flinch in the face of danger. Because while Israel acts, the rest of the world waits. And waits. And waits.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Alone but Resolute: Why Israel Still Guards the Nuclear Threshold הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Israel’s economy stands predominantly on the country’s prolific high-tech industry.

Some 14% of the country’s economy is made up of the high-tech sector, which is one of the economy’s main engines of growth, and responsible for a major share of government revenues. However, the war in Gaza saw vast numbers of that sector’s employees serve in reserves duty, meaning they were absent from their jobs for prolonged periods of time.

A country’s economy is one of the main pillars of its national security, and thus Israel’s economy is an inalienable link in the very existence of the State of Israel. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement set out to gain better understanding of the implications of the ongoing war on the economy of Israel.

For this end we interviewed senior member of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement – former Director General of the Ministry of Communications and IDF Chief Communications Officer, Brigadier General (res.) Nati Cohen on his views on this matter.

Although Israel is entrenched in a long-term multi-arena war, “we are viewing the return of investor confidence in the Israeli economy, especially because the country is at war”, asserts Cohen.

The economy plays a crucial role in creating optimal conditions for funding the costs of the war as well as in the continued existence of the State of Israel. The necessity to allocate financial support to the reservists and their families, both who bear the main brunt of the fighting, alongside the costs of rehabilitation of the individual in Israeli society are done through the reallocation of budgets from their usual purpose in times of peace, to the emergency channels that have been imposed upon Israel.

It is important to stress that it is only natural for a country dealing with a prolonged acute state of emergency, to experience economic trials. The effect of the economy on a country’s national security and vice versa is not mutually exclusive as the state of a country’s national security and its economy are tied in an interlinked cycle.  One manifestation of this correlation is the steep costs of manufacturing of armaments, which meet higher demand in times of war.

As Israel’s high-tech industry draws heavily on foreign investors, its economy leans on high-tech, and its national security is dependent on the state of its economy – it follows that foreign investment plays a crucial role in Israel’s national security.

The reality at the moment is that by natural cause and effect, Israel’s economy sustained a hit from the war with large budgets allocated to war-related causes such as military activity, financial remunerations for fighters and their families in lieu of lost salaries, and medical and emotional support for the war’s victims. Yet on the other hand, data from the past year show that there is also potential for leveraging the war to sustain economic balance.

Does the war have any positive effect at all on Israel’s economy?

In sharp contrast to all of the negative economic outlooks and the credit downgrade Israel had sustained, it was actually the year of the war that saw a rise of 77% in foreign investments. “This stems from the understanding among investors that every war has a day after the war”, says Cohen. “On the one hand, Israel is in a state of war, but on the other – war is also an opportunity for creativity, innovation, thinking out of the box. Start-ups are born from unanswered needs, and the war in Israel had bred such needs, offering numerous opportunities to entrepreneurs”.

It is important to mention that the above said does not in any manner suggest that war is positive and desired, nor is it a choice made to create opportunities; however, one must not ignore the larger picture that includes a silver lining that should be considered.

Events the likes of war serve as an important test for a country’s capabilities, one which if Israel learns the right lessons could serve to boost its economy, no matter how chaotic and difficult the current situation is.

One engine for such an opportunity for growth is Israel’s world-renowned technology industry.

When and how had Israel become a high-tech superpower?

“The foundation for Israel as a platform for becoming a startup nation , starting 25 years ago, had been laid when Bill Gates visited the country. At the time I was serving in the IDF as a young officer (Major) and was selected to give Gates a tour of the IDF’s school of computer science”.

What was Bill Gates’ impression of the IDF’s technology unites?

Cohen remembers Bill Gate’s impression of the visit as a definitive moment in Israel’s high-tech industry: “The day I visited the IDF I understood why Israel is a start-up nation. When I see these young 18-year-olds learning in about a half a year what takes us four years to learn in university, and then serve another three to four years as they sign on to serve longer, they gain considerable experience which they then bring to the civilian market”.

What is the role of the IDF in Israel’s economy?

“The IDF is a factory of sorts that is like an assembly line for its people. The army provides these people with the knowledge and ability to become future entrepreneurs, found start-up companies and acquire technological prowess while developing creativity, initiative and the ability to think out-of-the-box. This is in fact Israel’s atomic mass and relative advantage”, explains Cohen.

What do foreign investors see as unique to the Israeli market?

“Israel holds favorable objective conditions specifically in terms of start-up entrepreneurship and investments. It is a greenhouse for innovation and academia that nurtures the conditions for the growth and thriving of start-up companies”.

What are the main magnets for investors in Israel?

“Trust and the demonstration of ability”.

What does that mean?

In terms of trust, Cohen says that “since the Second Lebanon War, where the decision was made to develop the Iron Dome air-defense system – four years were needed to create an adequate response. Since the present war is a prolonged campaign, there is the need for quick solutions which are developed on the fly. This is the advantage of the trust in Israel’s military high-tech industry in that context”.

On the one hand, it would appear that a prolonged war taxes Israel’s stability and economy over time. On the other – it produces a slew of opportunities, and hence these fields of development enjoy investor confidence. One example are the reservists, who after months on the battlefield, come back to their technological greenhouses full of creative ideas, and present them in their respective companies. This process elicits the confidence of investors, who understand the unique opportunities that lie in this cycle.

In regards to the demonstration of ability, Cohen cites several cases in point: “Wiz, for example, is an engine of imitation. Investors copy the Wiz investment model in their own investments. Wiz investors had not started to invest in the company a month or two ago, but four or five years ago. A potential investor of Israeli high-tech sees profits only within three to five years and investors understand that cycle all too well”.

Do you have data that supports that claim?

“In 2020 Israel had about 3,000 startups. By 2021 that number grew exponentially to some 6,500. If you compare the size of Israel to Germany and England, although Israel is only about one quarter the size of Germany – that means that withing a year, investments have quadrupled themselves!”

Which companies express the greatest confidence in Israeli high-tech?

“Facebook, Google and Intel have considerable investments in the Israeli market. They establish greenhouses in Israel and invest large amounts of money in the development of R&D centers in the country, which are responsible for the impressive growth over the past years”.

Where there years in which investments ebbed?

“We witnessed a sharp drop in foreign investments, VC funds, banking and other foreign activity in Israel’s financial market during the years of the social protest against the judicial reform that raged up to the war; however, we are currently witnessing an impressive return of confidence during the year and a half of the war”.

How do you explain this?

“The fact that Israeli society as a whole is mobilized to the war effort, and that investors see that at the end of the day, there is a strong sense of solidarity and mutual aid in Israeli society, boosts confidence in Israel’s high-tech industry as a result. It was when investors thought that the country is on route to becoming a non-democratic society according to western standards that they drew their activity from the Israeli market”.

What is important for investors in 2025?

“Regardless of being Jewish or non-Jewish, investors look for a stable government. The protests around the judicial reform [up to the outbreak of the Gaza War] led eventually to the destabilization of Israel’s high-tech ecosystem and in turn – of Israel’s economic stability. This manifested in the choices the investors themselves made. In other words, when we look at the war, it seems that it is actually the years of security instability in Israel that bring in the highest rate of investments in Israeli high-tech. In years of apparent instability of the democracy – investor confidence wavers because at the end of the day, they want to invest in a stable, democratic environment. That is why investments ebbed during the social protest and rose during the war”.

What is the reputation of the IDF among other militaries in terms of technology?

“Case in point: military systems that in the past, in times of relative quiet, have been updated once a year, have been updated no less than 60 times within four months during the war due to demands arising in the ongoing fighting. This is a definitive occurrence as far as the trust on part of foreign militaries towards the IDF. If the Polish army for example, wants to purchase a command and control system, or a drone system, and it has the choice of Israel’s military industry as oppose to other military industries – it would choose a system that had been updated some 40 times, and is at peak performance, even if it is more expensive, as compared with a cheaper system, which can only perform on the bases of preset models, experiments and trials, as oppose to real time data input”.

How do you explain the marked positive change on part of investors’ attitude toward Israel’s defense industry?

“This occurred in light of Israel’s force buildup during the war as well as the fact that Israel had proven its mettle on the battlefield. Israel’s military industry is highly creative and rolls solutions for the battlefield off its production line in real time – this serves as a relative advantage over other military industries. The UCAV and drone attacks, for example, caused considerable damage to Israel, `which was caught without an adequate response in the start of the war. But thanks to the industry’s prowess, it is now only a matter of months until military giants RAFAEL and Elbit will provide laser systems that can terminate that threat”.

The “proof of ability” that Cohen talks about is a very lucrative growth engine for Israel’s economy

Since the start of the war, Israel’s defense industry recorded a steep growth rate, with 2024 marking a record year, with peak revenues amounting to a staggering 70 billion dollars.

The unprecedented arms race forced upon Europe is eying Israel’s battlefield tested and proven military industry.

Many countries in Europe had already acquired Israeli missile systems worth hundreds of millions of dollars and it seems like this is only the beginning for Israel’s economy.

Hence, on the one hand, the war poses difficult challenges for the Israeli economy but on the other – it presents very lucrative opportunities that Israel would be wise to capitalize upon, through which it could expedite its recovery.

But an economy stands not only on its investors, but also on the human capital of its society. In Israel, the majority of society enlisted in the security forces over the past year and a half to protect the country.

How does a large-scale enlistment of reservists affect high-tech?

“The larger companies accept the situation and support those of their employees who serve in reserves’ duty. I myself had to let employees go to serve in combat units as part of their reserves’ duty”.

Who paid the price?

“The small startup companies were the ones who bore the heaviest brunt of their employees’ reserves’ duties– some of them serving as much as four tours. It did not hurt the critical mass, as most employees returned to their jobs sharper and more creative. Since Israeli high-tech has a mixture of populations, it is pretty balanced socially, which compensated for the absence of the reservists”.

In conclusion, Israel has what it takes to manage the required balances to maintain economic growth in order to minimize and recover from the damage sustained by small businesses and the country’s civilians who were hurt financially, emotionally and medically as a result of the war.

This balance can be achieved through the contribution of Israel’s high-tech and military industries, which are yielding very high profits despite the war. Captains of the industry’s large-cap companies have a crucial role in the rehabilitation of the State of Israel through its economy, support and contribution to the general good.

הפוסט The Effects of the Gaza War on Israel’s Economy – Snapshot הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Velvet carpets, exquisite state dinners, Arabian horses and Cybertrucks motorcades – it is impossible to overstate the over-the-top display of opulence and luxury that flanks President Trump at every step of his trip to the region. As in his first term, Trump gave the Saudis and the Gulf states the honor of his inaugural overseas trip. In return, they lavished him with royal gestures, grandeur, and cash – securing eye-popping landmark contracts totaling potentially over $3 trillion.

This breathtaking extravaganza did little to gaslight a broad range of critics, though. Some on the left expressed concern about these deepening economic ties between the US and countries with a checkered human rights record, and raised eyebrows at the 747-plane offered as a gift by Qatar; some on the right reminded the President of the Saudis’ involvement in the 9/11 attacks and Doha’s less-than-ideal ties to terrorism. On the Israel front, however, many rushed to conclude that the President has snubbed Israel in favor of a love affair with some of its rogue neighbors, especially those who harbored Hamas’ leadership and harshly condemned Israel over the course of this war.

The truth, however, transcends all of these concerns. Trump executed an impressive acrobatic feat from his foreign policy playbook with flawless precision. His philosophy came to full display during this trip: strong economic ties, rather than diplomatic pleasantries, as a prescription for forging political and security alliances. Investing in Ukraine’s rare-earth minerals is therefore akin to investing in Saudi Arabia’s energy solutions, Qatar’s counter-drone capabilities, and the UAE’s AI data centers: both serve to entrench American presence and dominance in the region. For Trump, business removes barriers.

When Trump called the region to embrace “commerce, not chaos” and export “technology, not terrorism”, he appealed to this same sentiment: a region redefined by younger leaders who wish to leave past differences behind and develop significant economic powerhouses comfortably cushioned under the auspices of a strong American umbrella. Trump’s background as a real-estate mogul was particularly highlighted as he praised the “majestic skyscrapers”, called to “build cities together”, awed the Sheik Zayed Grand Mosque and even complimented the Qatari palace’s “perfect marble”.

Such utilitarian pragmatism, however, should be taken with a grain, rather a pile of salt in a region rife with ideological fault lines. If Trump expects the former HTS jihadist or the terror sponsors in Doha to somehow neglect their radical aspirations for the prospect of economic prosperity, then he’s in for an overly optimistic illusion that could undermine American interests. Iran has also opened its markets to the world following the Nuclear Deal in 2015, only to use the money for the nuclear program and the IRGC; and Qatar weaponizes its blood money for Hamas, ISIS, and radicalizing the American youth in prestigious universities. However, Trump shows no signs of ignoring these realities – on the contrary, he complements his optimism with waving a big stick.

This change of tune does not imply a change of tone: Trump is far from losing sight of his strategic geopolitical objectives; on the contrary, he doubled down on them. Regarding Iran, Israel’s foremost concern and a regime that poses a real threat to the US and global security – Trump did not disappoint. In his remarks in Riyadh, Trump mentioned Iran no less than 19 times, accusing it of funding “terror and death all over the world” and no less than the “most destructive force” in the region, focusing heavily on its part in wrecking Syria. His remarks triggered an angry response in Tehran.

Crucially, he underscored that the regime “cannot have a nuclear weapon”. Trump said as usual that he would be “happy to make a deal”, and hinted that such a deal could be coming soon, but paired the offer with an equally clear threat, warning that there is no time to wait. During his visit in 2022, then-President Biden simply demanded Iran to go back to its vague commitments under the problematic 2015 Nuclear Deal.

Regarding Gaza, a host of false reporting in the Arab media led some to believe that Trump will somehow throw Israel under the bus or force its hand into capitulating in Gaza or accept a Palestinian state. Yet the war was barely mentioned in the trip, to the point where pro-Palestinian advocates accused the President of forgetting Gaza and pushing it on to the sidelines of US diplomacy. While in Qatar, Hamas’ top sponsor, Trump reiterated his plan to take administrative control over Gaza, making it a “freedom zone”, and advanced his plan to relocate Gazans.

Finally, Trump called upon “all civilized people” to condemn October 7, demanded the release of all hostages, and conditioned Gaza’s bright future on stopping to “kidnap, torture, and target innocent men, women, and children for political ends” – there, in the heart of the Arab peninsula, in front of hundreds of Arab leaders.

Not only did Trump not turn his back on Israel, on the contrary – he used the occasion to advance his vision for the new regional security architecture, one that perfectly aligns with that of Israel: he urged Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords with Israel, forging an American-Arab-Israeli alliance that presents a unified front against Iran. He went a step further by extending the same offer to the once-jihadist Ahmed A-Sharaa, interim president of Syria, shocking the world by removing sanctions, and said he wants to “give them a chance at greatness” and that “it’s their time to shine” – while also urging him to normalize ties with Israel. This could be a bridge too far, but with Trump, surprises are an integral part of routine.

Inasmuch as the trip took place in the Middle East, Trump on his part kept his eye sharp on the far East – and his adversary in Beijing. Over the past decade, China has ramped up its investments in the region, taking advantage of an American disinterest and disengagement from a war-torn Middle East. In 2022, China’s total bilateral good trade volume with the region reached $368.4 billion, more than double than the US’s $144 billion. America cannot play second fiddle to China, and Trump is leaving the region with pockets full of cash and an avalanche of companies signing deals, much to Beijing’s dismay.

Trump articulates a purely pragmatic, common-sense mercantilism that aligns with his utilitarian worldview – embracing prescriptions that work, rejecting premises that fail, and giving a chance for money to speak.

His optimism and economic investment are far from being reminiscent of those of the European Union, in comparison. The EU has long embraced economic power and cultural allure as tenets of foreign policy, yet failed to deliver pragmatism, project military power, or sustain reliable economic infrastructure, with untold debt, painfully slow growth, and crippling regulations. Trump complemented his optimism with the clear commitment of a superpower, and an unprecedented $1 trillion defense budget.

Trump’s worldview is no big mystery, but this trip highlighted it in bright letters. He offered a “strong and steady hand” to the Saudi crown prince and spoke with American troops under the banner “peace through strength”. He exhibited American leadership against the backdrop of those who still believe he is based on isolationism. The President offered a golden tray of opportunity, dreaming of “the dawn of the bright new day that awaits for the people of the Middle East” and giving rogue regimes the chance to “shine”. But unlike appeasing leaders in the past who made promises of a “new Middle East”, Trump carries the cadence of command, and comes with demands.

This renewed American footprint in the region will alienate China, pull Arab countries to the US orbit, cement the unified front against Iran, and design the security architecture that Israel has been advocating for. If he succeeds in making good on his promise to deny Iran of nuclear weapons, cut a peace deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia with no significant perks to the Palestinians, and fundamentally change the security reality in Gaza, he will go down in history as the President who reshaped Israel’s strategic posture in the region. Time will tell.

This article was originally published in Jewish News Syndicate (jns).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Why Trump’s Tour de Force Should Actually Bear Good News for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the Middle East of 2025, changes are unfolding at a dizzying and surprising pace. The recent visit by U.S. President Donald Trump to the region has reinforced the notion that previously unimaginable scenarios might soon become reality. Upon landing in Riyadh, Trump signed weapons and trade agreements worth trillions of dollars. But Trump did not stop there. On the sidelines of his visit, he made a significant diplomatic move by meeting with the controversial and intriguing regional actor, Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Mohammad al-Julani). Trump also announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria, offering them an “opportunity for greatness.”

Has yesterday’s most wanted terrorist suddenly become a legitimate partner today?

The fact that al-Julani, who until recently had a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head, has now received public recognition through a meeting with Trump is nothing short of historic. This is the same al-Julani who joined the Iraqi mujahideen in 2003, inspired by the September 11 attacks, even stating previously, “Anyone in the Muslim or Arab world claiming they were not joyful on that day is lying.”

The Middle East stands at a historical crossroads, seemingly marching towards a new regional dawn. Yet, it appears as though the region is divided into two parallel realities:

In one reality, al-Julani is the leader of a jihadist faction that has become the dominant force shaping Syria’s new regime, aiming to establish an Islamic Caliphate. This new regime openly challenges Iran and Shia influence in the Middle East while gaining international legitimacy.

In the parallel reality, the United States and Iran are engaging diplomatically, negotiating over the Iranian nuclear program, with cautious support from Gulf states wary of direct conflict with Iran.

On the surface, this seems to be an unprecedented diplomatic move. However, beneath this façade, might Trump’s actions be part of a broader U.S. negotiation strategy with Iran? Is Trump leveraging al-Julani as pressure on Iran? Could this represent a calculated strategic signaling, not only regarding Syria’s future but also directed at Iran?

Trump may well be using this as a negotiating tactic, sending Tehran a clear message: “If you refuse cooperation, we will partner with your enemies.”

Through an indirect yet potent message, Trump is signaling the possibility of U.S. collaboration with Iran’s fiercest Sunni adversaries – specifically, Saudi Arabia-backed Syrian jihadist factions. In doing so, Trump underscores strengthening relations not only with al-Julani’s jihadist Syria but also with Iran’s significant regional rival, Saudi Arabia.

Trump’s Strategic Chessboard

Trump, known as a shrewd and tough businessman, employs an approach distinct from traditional diplomacy. Instead of endless dialogue and softening stances, Trump opts for a more forceful approach: forming strategic alliances with actors perceived as Iran’s most hostile adversaries – radical Sunni factions and Saudi Arabia.

This tactic aims to exert immense psychological and political pressure on Tehran by instilling fears of new alliances potentially encircling Iran. The ultimate goal is clear: forcing Iran back to the negotiating table under stringent conditions, opposite to Tehran’s longstanding tactic of “diplomatic attrition,” marked by delays, vague statements, and attempts to control international discourse.

“The Syrian Maneuver”

It is plausible that the “Syrian maneuver” is merely a tactical, temporary, yet focused tool. Its purpose is to alarm Iran by presenting a scenario in which its influence in Syria could be severed, compelling Tehran to accept American terms on the nuclear agreement.

For Trump, this move isn’t merely geopolitical, it is deeply psychological. He recognizes that Iran is especially sensitive to losing its leverage in the Sunni-Shia dynamic, particularly regarding Syria, which has been a critical axis for Iranian proxies and weapon transfers. Losing control of Syria might be perceived in Tehran as a genuine threat to its ongoing ability to rebuild its resistance axis.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to employ the leverage remaining in its arsenal: measured nuclear activities (enriching uranium at so-called civilian levels), maintaining centrifuges within its territory, and waiting for a potential administration change in the White House. Such a change would allow rapid resumption of military-grade uranium enrichment.

From Iran’s perspective, Trump’s actions represent a continual erosion of its regional influence. The collapse of Assad’s Syria has given rise to a new Sunni axis, encompassing al-Julani’s Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey – a “anti-Iranian-Shia alliance” placing Iran on the defensive.

The Houthis – Tehran’s Last Card?

In this intricate geopolitical landscape, the Houthis in Yemen remain one of Iran’s few remaining leverage points. The Houthis represent Iran’s only active proxy aggressively challenging American and Israeli interests in the region, demonstrated by attempts to disrupt Ben-Gurion International Airport operations through missile attacks.

Simultaneously, Iran is pursuing diplomatic strategies to maintain regional influence. Efforts to strengthen ties with Egypt and Bahrain, and renewed outreach toward Saudi Arabia, form part of a sophisticated strategy to counterbalance the growing Sunni axis. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s remarks confirm this: “Relations with Bahrain and Egypt have begun… We are actively working on this, and I hope it will materialize. Our ties with Egypt have never been broader.”

For years, Iran has sought Egypt as a counterbalance to Saudi dominance. Bahrain, with its Shiite majority ruled by a Sunni minority, holds strategic importance for Tehran. Iran views Bahrain effectively as a province and exploits internal tensions due to the sectarian divide. Rapprochement with Bahrain represents a subtle Iranian strategy aimed at weakening the Abraham Accords with Israel.

Ultimately, Iran finds itself under intensifying economic and geopolitical pressure, prepared for almost any step that would lead to sanction relief and the preservation of the Ayatollahs’ rule. In contrast, Trump continues to execute unexpected and unconventional moves as part of a sophisticated diplomatic pressure campaign. In a region where every chessboard movement sends signals and could alter the power balance, Trump strategically maneuvers while keeping the military option open – calculatedly wielding it as a tool to achieve his objectives regarding Iran.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Revolving Doors of the Middle East: How Trump is Cornering Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Over the past year, Hezbollah has faced a growing existential crisis, intensified by the targeted assassinations of senior figures including Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil, Jawad Tawil, and particularly Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and his successor, Hashem Safi al-Din. Once Iran’s most formidable proxy and a significant strategic actor in the Middle East, Hezbollah now contends with depleted leadership, military setbacks, and mounting international pressure. Does this signal genuine weakening within the Shiite terrorist organization?

According to Lebanese sources, Hezbollah is undertaking drastic measures to ensure its survival, notably relocating the families of hundreds of senior commanders to Latin America.

Lebanese journalist Ali Hamadeh recently disclosed in a video published on his X (formerly Twitter) account that the families of approximately 400 Hezbollah leaders have left Lebanon, finding refuge primarily in South American countries like Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador. Hamadeh explains this relocation is driven by the growing recognition that Hezbollah’s military capabilities are deteriorating, and the continued presence of these commanders’ families in Lebanon significantly increases their vulnerability to Israeli or international intelligence operations.

Hamadeh suggests this mass relocation indicates Hezbollah is preparing for an era of diminished direct military engagement in Lebanon, shifting instead towards increased political influence, economic operations, and organized criminal activities abroad.

Hezbollah in Latin America

Hezbollah has long maintained a prominent presence in Latin America. Since the early 1980s, the organization has cultivated extensive networks across the continent, driven by Iran’s aspiration to export its Islamic Revolution. Leveraging sizable Shiite Lebanese communities and the presence of weak or anti-Western governance, Hezbollah has effectively entrenched itself in various Latin American regions.

A significant hub of Hezbollah activity is the Tri-Border Area connecting Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, where the group operates elaborate networks involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. Under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela provided Hezbollah with favorable conditions to expand its influence, capitalizing on the substantial Lebanese community there.

Hezbollah’s activities are also notable in Brazil and Colombia. In 2023, Brazil thwarted a Hezbollah plot targeting its Jewish community. Additionally, Hezbollah was implicated in the devastating 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, prompting Argentina to officially designate the organization as a terrorist entity in 2019.

Strategic Implications of Relocation

If reports of Hezbollah leaders’ families relocating to South America are accurate, this strategic shift could significantly enhance Hezbollah’s continental influence. Establishing new local command structures and embedding deeper into criminal networks would enable the organization to preserve its global threat status, even as its direct military power in the Middle East diminishes.

For Iran, strengthening Hezbollah’s position in Latin America represents a strategic alternative following the collapse of the land corridor linking Tehran to Beirut through Iraq and Syria, a critical route disrupted by al-Julani’s takeover in Syria, which dismantled a primary achievement of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

This strategic pivot could enable Iran to rebuild Hezbollah, transforming it from a direct Middle Eastern military threat into a covert global actor, with Latin America as its new operational center.

These developments align with Iran’s ongoing efforts to reconstruct the fractured “Axis of Resistance” following Assad’s regime collapse, Nasrallah’s assassination, and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas due to targeted leadership eliminations. Iran seeks creative methods to rehabilitate its damaged proxy networks, including establishing new proxies like the “Islamic Resistance in Syria,” leveraging international criminal organizations, and promoting inter-proxy cooperation.

Threats to the United States

Hezbollah’s potential strengthening in Latin America poses serious security threats to both Israel and the United States. With the return of the Trump administration to the White House, renewed American attention to Latin America seems likely.

From a U.S. perspective, Hezbollah operatives migrating to South America pose security risks as well as structural immigration challenges. Countries like Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, with porous borders and weak or corrupt governance, provide ideal conditions for smuggling, document forgery, and evasion of immigration controls.

There is a real possibility that Hezbollah operatives could infiltrate the U.S. via its southern border, using forged passports or alternative identities. Consequently, Hezbollah is viewed not only as a regional threat but as a systemic danger undermining U.S. border control, economic stability, and societal cohesion.

President Trump previously adopted a firm stance against Hezbollah, isolating the group economically and initiating global investigations into its financial networks. Given the potential infiltration of Hezbollah operatives into Latin America under civilian guises, the Trump administration might implement several strategic actions:

• Initiate cooperation with Latin American countries to extradite Hezbollah operatives through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and international legal frameworks.
• Expand surveillance and disruption efforts led by U.S. Treasury, CIA, and FBI agencies.
• Enhance operational oversight and intelligence-gathering by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), reinforcing stringent immigration policies.

Furthermore, addressing Hezbollah as a hybrid entity combining organized crime and terrorism is essential. Efforts should integrate anti-illegal immigration measures with operations targeting organized crime and terrorism emanating from Middle Eastern groups operating through Latin American hubs.

Hezbollah exemplifies Iran’s global ambitions, and its activities across Latin America represent a strategic threat. A coordinated Israeli-American policy could strengthen intelligence cooperation between Jerusalem and Washington, undermine Hezbollah’s financial and logistical capacities, and heighten regional pressure on Iran.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Exile from Beirut: Is Hezbollah Weakening or Opening a New Front? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Amid one of the most dramatic years for Israel’s security and future since its founding, the country’s third Security Conference convened under the banner “The Year of Opportunity.” The main message was clear: this is no time for hesitation – but a time for action.

The conference, organized annually by the IDSF movement, featured prominent figures from Israel’s political and defense leadership. Among the speakers were Minister of Economy and Industry Nir Barkat, Minister of Education Yoav Kisch, Gilad Erdan (Israel’s former Ambassador to the UN and the US), and David Friedman (former US Ambassador to Israel). President Isaac Herzog, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar, and Defense Minister Israel Katz addressed the conference via recorded messages.

True to the broad approach that characterizes the IDSF movement’s work since its establishment, the conference focused on Israel’s national security in the broadest sense. A significant portion of the event was devoted to ways to bolster national resilience, social cohesion, and education toward Zionist values, recognizing these as the foundation on which the nation’s military and diplomatic strength is built.

In addition to lectures and interviews, the conference offered three panel discussions addressing the main opportunities facing Israel at present:

• A diplomatic opportunity panel on “the day after Gaza,” alongside considerations regarding Judea and Samaria.

• A regional opportunity panel dealing with the Trump administration’s policies, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East.

• A social opportunity panel asking how best to seize the potential for victory through settlement efforts and by revitalizing the Gaza border region and Israel’s north.

Participants on these panels included former senior security officials who are also members of IDSF, leading academic researchers and think-tank directors, high-ranking government and local authority officials, social entrepreneurs, and civic activists.

President Herzog: “We Must Emerge from the War Stronger”

President Isaac “Buzi” Herzog welcomed conference attendees, stating:

“We are in a critical period that calls for in-depth rethinking of the security frameworks we have relied upon and the security paradigms that we urgently need to adopt. As part of that, we must also delve into the current state of our society and nation and figure out how to emerge from this war stronger – not only in terms of security and diplomacy, but above all as a stronger Israeli society.”

Herzog also stressed the importance of turning the war imposed on Israel into an “opportunity not only to decisively repel threats posed by Iran and its proxies, but also to develop alliances and agreements across the region – particularly moving toward normalization with Saudi Arabia and extending relationships as far as India – thus reshaping realities for generations to come, integrating us further into the region. Not naively or blindly, but as a cornerstone of fortifying our security.”

He then praised IDSF’s contribution to public dialogue: “We do need not agree on everything – and indeed, I do not always agree with all positions – but I believe it is crucial to have a voice that acknowledges and speaks to Israel’s diversity. And unlike many in the TV studios, that voice is presented with statesmanship and respect, seeking to speak, to engage in discussion, to unite rather than to polarize.”

Defense Minister: “We Will Keep Striking Hard Anyone Who Threatens Us”

Defense Minister Israel Katz summed up a year and a half of sustained fighting on multiple fronts: “There is no doubt our adversaries now receive a loud and clear message: whoever raises a hand against Israel will have that hand cut off.”

Katz reiterated that the IDF and the Israeli defense establishment have inflicted substantial damage on Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian “axis of evil,” thereby undermining Assad’s regime in Syria. He added that they would also deal a decisive blow to the Houthi terror organization in Yemen, “just as we have done in Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and other arenas.”

Katz informed the audience that the defense establishment is currently creating a directorate responsible for facilitating voluntary emigration for Gaza residents who wish to leave, in line with the vision of President Trump. Katz concluded his remarks by expressing appreciation for the IDSF movement.

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, Chair of the IDSF movement, began his talk with a forceful statement: “We are living in a historic, almost biblical era of immense opportunities. Let’s start talking about a vision for the day after the war, and make the most of these wartime opportunities to create a better future for Israel.”

He argued that in the coming months, Israel has an opportunity to secure a clear victory on all fronts – bringing down Hamas’ regime in Gaza, recovering the hostages, and striking a decisive blow (in tandem with the United States) against Iran’s nuclear program.

Avivi also warned about the growth of a radical Sunni axis – Turkey, Qatar, and ISIS – amid Iran’s potential weakening. He believes the solution lies in forming an American–Israeli–Sunni front that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, and other countries. “We want to see Russia and China drawn closer to the West and to us – not to Iran’s side.”

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila: From Collapse to Growth

Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila, CEO of IDSF, opened his remarks by quoting from “In the City of Slaughter,” a poem by Haim Nahman Bialik depicting the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, and drawing parallels to the massacre on October 7.

He noted the crucial difference between the two tragedies was our collective reaction:

“We are no longer the same Jews, no longer a persecuted people hiding behind barrels of oil. We are a people who enlist in an army, who band together, who overcome adversity and gather the strength to fight for our land. We are a people who go to battle to bring back our hostages, and we are also sovereign in our land – free to decide to pay a price for their liberation. Yes, friends, we face problems – but these are the problems of a nation within its homeland. They are the trials and hardships of a growing, developing people – one that argues, but ultimately prevails.”

Or Yissachar: “Israelis no longer chase illusions of a quick fix – they demand action”

Or Yissachar, Deputy Director for Research and Content at IDSF, presented the “IDSF Index” for the first quarter of 2025. The survey explored what the public sees as the top priorities for the nation, comparing the results to a similar poll carried out by the movement’s research department in 2022.

The findings reveal that 51% of Israelis view the Iranian threat as the most urgent challenge today – a sharp increase from 35% in 2022. Only 10% of Jewish Israelis consider peace with the Palestinians feasible, with 80% of Israel’s Jewish population and 68% of the general public opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital. On the other hand, a significant majority – 78% – favor expanding the Abraham Accords and bolstering ties between Israel and other moderate states in the region.

“These numbers,” Yissachar concluded, “reflect not just a shift in public opinion but also a deeper change in mindset: Israelis are no longer chasing illusions of easy solutions – they want action, stability, strength, and security.”

Merav Leshem Gonen: “National resilience is built when it is allowed to hear other opinions”

The conference included panel discussions, lectures, and one-on-one interviews covering a range of topics, with emphasis on the security, diplomatic, and social opportunities that Israel can pursue in the wake of the devastating events of October 7.

Particularly emotional moments came when Merav Leshem Gonen, mother of Romi Gonen – released after 471 days in Hamas captivity – took the stage, alongside entrepreneur and media professional Orit Mark Ettinger, who lost many family members to terror attacks and in the current war over the years, yet in her grief never abandoned hope and faith.

The participants’ personal accounts and expert commentary merged into an overarching vision resting on one core insight: this is the historic moment in which Israel can solidify its position as a regional and global power, deepen its national resilience, and carve from the shock and turmoil of war not only new strength – but genuine hope.

A “Year of Opportunity”: “The nation of Israel needs a rebirth narrative”

Israel’s Third Security Conference differed from its predecessors. The first conference, held several months before October 7, spotlighted IDSF’s clear warning that multiple fronts – stretching from Gaza to Iran – were coalescing against Israel. The second conference took place under the shadow of the war that followed, triggered in part by ignoring IDSF’s alerts about the approaching conflict. The current conference has begun to glimpse rays of light and hope at the end of war.

“It’s no coincidence that we titled this conference ‘The Year of Opportunity.’ Yes, we took severe hits on October 7, and the war continues more than a year and a half later. But we can also see achievements,” noted Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi at the conference’s conclusion. “I keep saying we stand at a historic juncture – ranging from fully dismantling the Iranian threat, through broad regional peace agreements, to the prosperity that lies ahead once Israel takes firm hold of itself. The scale of these opportunities is still hard for us to fathom.”

The conference closed with the singing of Hatikvah – “The Hope”, Israel’s anthem – which perfectly captured the spirit of the event: a profound belief that soon we will see the hostages return home, and that Israeli society will reunite around a shared vision that will propel it into a new and brighter future.

Photo credits: Omri Abuhatzira, Channel 14

הפוסט From Crisis to Opportunity: Israel’s Third Security Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Once Israel began its attacks on Gaza, ISIS sought to exploit the war by recruiting supporters worldwide to fight under the banner of Islam. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda, a rival organization vying with ISIS for primacy among global jihadist groups, also applauded Hamas’s offensive and used it to call on Muslims around the world to seize this “historic moment for global jihad” against the “infidels.” Al-Qaeda views Hamas’s attack as a “historic” turning point, revealing the weakness of the “Crusaders and Jews” and thus presenting an opportunity to strike. Despite being a radical Sunni Salafi group itself, Al-Qaeda differs from ISIS in that it maintains some ties with Shiite elements, such as Iran (reportedly, Al-Qaeda’s current leader, Saif al-Adl, resides in Tehran). In the past year, there have even been reports of a cooperation agreement between the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen and Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, involving collaboration and the supply of weapons. From Al-Qaeda’s perspective, Hamas—acting as an Iranian proxy—managed to disrupt the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a moderate Sunni Arab state and leader of the Sunni world.

Throughout the months of this war, both ISIS and Al-Qaeda have engaged in propaganda calling for attacks against Jews and Christians worldwide, focusing on Jewish and Israeli institutions such as synagogues, Jewish community centers, and embassies. These organizations maintain cells in various parts of the world and routinely disseminate extremist incitement online, increasing both the lethality of their activities and the threat posed by unaffiliated individuals who adopt their ideology.

This intensified activity by global jihadist organizations has accelerated the rise of “lone wolf” terrorists, who consume incitement materials, pledge allegiance to these groups, and set out to commit acts of violence. Over the past year, several such attacks have occurred in Western countries and also in Israel. Global jihadist influence has reached both the Palestinian Authority and within Israel, creating a support network fueled by severe jihadi incitement on social media and contributing to a surge in “lone wolf” attacks after the events of October 7. For example, a planned ISIS attack at Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem was thwarted a year ago; all members of the cell were terrorists from East Jerusalem.

In addition to this growing phenomenon of individual attackers, there are also organizations such as ISIS’s Khorasan Province, which has increased its activity over the past year. This branch has carried out deadly attacks—including the bombing at a Moscow concert hall—and attempted attacks that were foiled (such as a planned assault in Vienna during a concert by the well-known singer Taylor Swift).

Implications and Possible Courses of Action

1. Shared Threat to Israel and the West
   The most immediate consequence for Israel and the West is that Israel stands on the front line against radical Islam as part of the broader clash between Western civilization and radical Islam. Both Israel and Western nations are in the same boat, deemed enemies by the global jihad movement.
2. Complexity of Muslim Immigration
   A further necessity is recognizing the complexity surrounding Muslim immigration from the Middle East to Western nations. Mass Muslim immigration to Western countries has shown the risk that jihadist elements may infiltrate host societies. Many have established themselves in Western states, seeking to undermine them from within in the name of Islam. This dynamic affects not only the immigrants themselves but also their children—who become American or European citizens but can be drawn into radicalization. Grasping this complexity is crucial for Western nations to effectively address the security threats it poses.
3. Technological Tools and Social Media
   Global jihadist groups have always excelled at exploiting technology. Now that many of their supporters live in North America and Europe, they can readily adopt Western technological tools, complicating matters even further. Over the past decade and a half, these groups have extensively used social networks for propaganda and incitement, and with the advent of artificial intelligence, they have further refined their capabilities, utilizing various AI tools. Israel and Western nations must recognize that global jihadist organizations exploit their familiarity with Western culture and its vulnerabilities to tailor propaganda campaigns precisely. This reality requires fresh strategic thinking and close monitoring to counter jihadist propaganda and remove inciting content before it inspires a lone attacker.
4. Maintaining Technological Superiority
   Consequently, it is incumbent upon Israel and the West to maintain technological superiority: they must remain one step ahead of these organizations rather than lag behind. This includes strengthening oversight of social networks and open-source intelligence channels that daily transmit terror-promoting messages.
5. Financial Tracing
   Tracking the flow of funds that sustains these organizations is another vital step. Understanding jihadist networks’ financial channels can yield significant intelligence and deal an economic blow to terror groups. Western nations should intensify efforts to trace the funding sources for these groups, mindful that they increasingly employ modern techniques such as digital currencies. Technological superiority is likewise crucial here for thwarting this challenge.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Challenges Facing Global Jihad After October 7 הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s mission is to engage in a comprehensive effort on numerous levels aiming to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations to come. This goal is governed by two guiding principles: first is the acknowledgement of the unique diplomatic, economic and social environments in which Israel exists.  The second is the understanding that informed decisions must lean on a broad strategy that draws it insights from lessons of the past and aims its decisions to the very long term.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. The present installment of the Ideally series, IDSF HaBithonistim member, orientalist and expert on cyber terror Assaf Yishai explores Israel-Jordan relations and the ?? between their outward appearance and their true nature.

Disputes and interests: background of Israel-Jordan relations

To truly understand the relations between Israeli and Jordan, one must go back to 1921 – the year of the inception of the Kingdom of Jordan. The foundation of the Kingdon was put down already in 1916 when Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the head of the royal Hashemite dynasty of Hejaz, led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This revolt was one of the catalysts of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the Middel East and the rise of the British occupation of the area, and the British promised to reward the Hashemite family for its part.

And reward the British did. Hussein’s sons were crowned over two new ??? entities created artificially by the British:  The Transjordan area was given to Abdullah bin Hussein while his brother Faisal received control of Iraq. This arrangement, dubbed “The Hashemite Arrangement”, served Britain well since it allowed it to control its territories through its Arab allies. However, the populations of those areas were loath to accept the ?? of rulers that were not kith and kin.

The Hashemite rule of Iraq was short-lived and ended within 36 years with a revolt and the assassination of the king. Many expected the fate of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan to be more of the same, and even then, Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion said in 1956 “Jordan is an artificial state with no future”.

But despite the somber forecasts, the Hashemite family was able to keep its place on the Jordanian throne for over 100 years now. Protecting the throne is paramount for the Hashemite royal family not only in terms of its own survival but also to ensure the longevity of the entire dynasty. Once the king falls in Jordan – it will spell the end of the Hashemite dynasty.

Milestones in Israel-Jordan relations

Some years after the foundation of the Kingdom of Jordan, the government began establishing relations with the Zionist leaders that were active in pre-state Israel.  After the establishment of the State of Israel, its leadership conveyed to King Abdullah not to wage war against the new state, however, he did not heed their warning and Jordan joined the coalition of Arab states that ganged up on Israel in the War of Independence.

In 1952, grandson of King Abdulla, Hussein, ascended the throne from which he ruled the Hashemite Kingdon for 46 years. During his reign, Hussien was able to maintain stability and prevent the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), which was ousted from Israel, to gain a stronghold in Jordan. Hussein cultivated relations with the US and the West and even had secret relations with the State of Israel. Ben Gurion, despite having doubts about the longevity of the Jordanian entity, thought the Hashemite Kingdom could be a strategic asset to Israel and had no problem openly saying so. Other Israeli leaders as well, such as Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, understood the importance of maintaining warm relations with the Jordanian administration, and diplomatic and security sources in Israel proposed viewing Jordan as Israel’s “little sister”.

However, despite the covert relations between Hussien and Israeli administrations, formally the two countries remained enemies and even fought each other in the Six Day War, in which Israel defeated the Jordanian military, and took the Temple Mount from Jordan. This cost the Hashemite family the last holy Muslim asset under its control.

It was only in 1994 that an official peace accord was signed between the two neighbors. As part of the agreement, the relations and the borders between the two were established, and Israel committed to supply Jordan with 50 million metric cubes of water annually. Over the years, Israel has doubled that quantity and to date it still provides 100 metric cubes of water a year to Jordan. Furthermore, both countries have various military and intelligence collaborations, most of which have been secretly established.

Since 1995, Jordan has been ruled by Hussien’s son, King Abdullah the Second. King Abdullah, like his father, maintained good relations with the US, the West and Israel. However, he cannot seem to gain the popularity and legitimacy in the same manner that his father had. He is perceived as disconnected from the people, and someone who lacks the historical roots to the land, being the son of a British mother, and educated in Britain with Western values. He commands the English language better than Arabic – not to mention the local Jordanian dialect, and the Jordanian public frown upon this. Abdullah’s rule once again raised doubts regarding the ability of the Hashemite dynasty to persevere.

Relations with Jordan since the outbreak of the Gaza War

The relations between Israel and Jordan have always been complicated, and the Jordanian public has always been hostile to Israel. After the October 7 attack and massacre, the already volatile relations have further deteriorated. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, there have been ongoing riots on the streets of Amman, and the Jordanian administration is overtly hostile towards Israel. Already in November 23 Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel – a move that was aimed – according to Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi “to emphasize Jordan’s opposition and condemnation of Israel’s war against Gaza, and the killing of innocents and the creation of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that could lead to a regional conflict”.

In Israel there was an expectation for Jordan to publicly condemn the massacre of October 7, but to no avail. Moreover, King Abdullah’s wife, Rania, had publicly attacked Israel on numerous occasions. The Jordanian administration also condemned Israel’s attack in Iran and said that it was “a violation of international law, an attack on Iran’s sovereignty and a dangerous escalation that further intensifies tensions in the region”. Jordan even called on the international community to take responsibility and take measures against Israel that “end Israel’s attacks against Gaza, the [West] Bank and Lebanon, as a first step to dial back the escalation”.

September 2024 saw further escalation in the relations of the two countries, when a Jordanian truck driver crossed the border illegally and murdered three Israelis working in the Alenbi border checkpoint. The Jordanian government appointed an inquiry committee to investigate the affair but the public – including members of parliament – celebrated the attack on the streets of Amman.

Despite the open hostility and condemnations, many claim that the situation behind the scenes is quite different. Various sources report that Jordan actually helped Israel intercept both Iranian missile attacks in April and October 2024. Some sources close to the matter claim that King Abdullah’s remarks in public are in stark contrast to what he says behind closed doors.

This discrepancy reflects the complex relations Israel has had with Jordan from the onset. On the one hand, the two countries have deep ideological disputes and clashes. On the other hand, both share common interests. When viewing the relations between both countries over the past decades and its frequent changes, it would appear that this duality is the only constant in these relations.

Assaf Yishai: A Vision for Israeli-Jordanian Relations

Aid in maintaining the stability of the Jordanian government

Current situation:

Since its inception, the Jordanian administration has been plagued by instability stemming, among others, from the varied demographic composition of the Jordanian people. Only a minority of these are loyal to King Abdullah II, while the majority perceives the king as a foreign element who does not belong in Jordan in the first place.

Furthermore, Jordan is plagued by a slew of internal problems – predominantly a serious water shortage – that threaten its internal stability. If that were not enough, the king has recently reformed the method of elections aiming to benefit his own interests but in reality, this played out against him. The reform, the purpose of which was to block the election of local leaders that serve only the interests of their clans, had resulted in a rise in the power of the Muslim Brotherhood movement which poses a major threat to the Hashemite rule.

The recent regional changes have also influenced Jordan’s internal stability. The Gaza War, which ostensibly has no relation to Jordan, caused a 40% decline in tourism to the Kingdom – a main engine of the country’s economy. The revolt in Syria, which toppled the Assad regime, is a Damocles sword hanging over the head of King Abdullah, who fears a similar outcome for his own country.

In light of the above mentioned, the main interest of the King is to ensure that he and the entire Hashemite dynasty survive. A king in a survival state of mind is willing to take irrational measures, like a drowning person grasping at straws. For Israel, this makes him an unpredictable leader and places a question mark on any possibility of stability of the Jordanian government.

Ideal situation:

• Placing more focus on Jordan: Israel must not become complacent and think that simply because it has a peace agreement with Jordan, it can enjoy quiet and stability on its eastern border. Already in the immediate term, Israel must allocate intelligence resources toward the Jordanian issue and keep its finger on the pulse to identify any change that could threaten Israel’s interests in the area.

• Continued support of King Abdullah – to a point: Israel should continue aiding the King, as it has always done, out of the understanding that any alternative regime would be far worse for Israel. At the same time, Israel should be clear about what it is willing to accept and what it is not. It cannot continue protecting the King at any cost, even if his regime no longer serves Israel’s interests.

• Prepare for the fall of the Jordanian regime: the State of Israel must prepare a contingency plan and formulate long-term strategies for the day after the fall of the Hashemite dynasty. These plans must be far-reaching, such as the seizure of the eastern face of the hills of Samaria bordering with Jordan, to prevent the capture by hostile Iranian and ISIS forces of this important strategic asset.

Securing the border with Jordan

Current situation:

The border with Jordan is Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country, stretching over 309 kilometers (192 miles). Due to the peace accord between the two countries and the relative quiet between them, the border is ostensibly calm – but in reality, it is far from it. The border with Jordan had always been troublesome, among others due to the lack of a regular security force. Throughout the years, this border has become a hotbed of drug and weapon-smuggling as well as infiltration of terrorist into the territory of Israel – much of this under the auspices of Iran, and ever since the smuggling routes through Syria were closed in the wake of the revolt, the incidents on the Jordanian border are increasing. Furthermore, the closing of the border with Egypt due to the Gaza War, places more criminal and terror demand on the Jordanian border, which remains one of Israel’s last unsecured borders.

Over the past years dozens of arms-smuggling attempts into Israel have been made on this border. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 2023, when a Jordanian MK attempted to smuggle 200 guns into Israel. Aside from the rife smuggling activity, the terror incidents are on the rise as well – the Jordanian truck driver, who crossed the border and murdered three Israelis and a month later – two other terrorists crossed the border illegally in the Dead Sea area and shot and wounded two Israeli soldiers.

To date, Israel’s border with Jordan is full of breaches and not sufficiently secured. Part of the border is fenced but other areas, such as the Negev Desert valley – have no physical barrier. Furthermore, Israel does not allocate sufficient forces to secure the border. It is possible that this laxity stems from complacency and a false trust of the Jordanian peacekeeping abilities and willingness, or it may be pure negligence. Whatever the reason, the current strategy represents a real strategic threat to Israel. Even if most of the illegal activity across the border is criminal, it is important to remember that terror characteristically rides on criminal activity to achieve its ends.

Ideal situation:

• Hermetically sealing the border: The Israel-Jordan border must be hermetically sealed for its entire length to ensure zero breaches. Furthermore, electronic surveillance should not be seen as the only security solution, rather the border must have a physical barrier such as a fence or a wall.

• Reinforcement of the border forces: the IDF should deploy a division to act as a security force on the Jordanian border, creating large-scale surveillance and establishing quick response capabilities.  Naturally, the IDF will have to considerably boost its ranks in order to have the manpower for said division.

Keeping Iran out of Jordan

Current situation:

One of Iran’s common stratagems in the Middle East in service of its global-Islamic vision, is to meddle in the affairs of other countries – especially the unstable among them – and identify the cracks through which it can cause chaos and wield its influence. This is what it had done until recently in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. This is what it had done in the Gaza Strip. Now, having lost most of its hold in the area, it may very well try to reclaim it by taking over Jordan.

Iran may do so with force, for example with pro-Iranian militias operating in neighboring Iraq. However, the King himself might opt to cooperate with Iran, if he believes that Iran would be more conducive to the survival of his reign more than Israel. The connection between Jordan and Iran is not self-evident to say the least, but even Saudia Arabia, Iran’s bitter enemy, chose to sign in March 2023 an agreement for the renewal of diplomatic relations, once it realized that the western axis is growing weak.

Ideal situation:

• Display of power and military prowess: The Middle East is a place that sets great store by strength; hence it behooves the State of Israel to demonstrate its military prowess and impress upon the King of Jordan that he can lean on Israel. If the King feels that Israel cannot guarantee his safety, he might seek another ally to do so, which most likely would be Iran.

• Preparation for an Iranian takeover of Jordan: Israel must prepare for any scenario wherein Iran will try to install its control in Jordan and summarily and decisively thwart any threat on part of pro-Iranian elements in Jordan.

Settlement of the Jordan Valley

Current situation:

The Jordan Valley is a territory under dispute in terms of international law. Many in Israel and the world see the area as an integral part of Israel while others claim it to be an occupied territory that is not part of Israel’s sovereign state.

The Jordan Valley has great security and strategic importance as it is the only stretch of land that protects Israel’s eastern border. Since the establishment of the State, most of Israel’s leadership acknowledged its significance, and even late PM Yitzhak Rabin in his last speech before the Knesset declared that the security protective border of Israel will be charted in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of the term.

Beyond its significance to Israel’s security, the Valley also has a geographic and economic importance, as it is a large swath of land that can be populated and developed. Furthermore, it carries great historic and cultural significance as it is home to numerous Jewish heritage sites.

Currently, the Jordan Valley is not included in Israel sovereign territory, thus Israeli law does not apply in the area as it does in the rest of the country. This sets an obstacle to the settlement and development of the Valley area, and ties Israel’s hands in dealing with violations in the area such as illegal Palestinian construction.

Ideal situation:

• Encouragement of Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley: Over the years Israel has proven that anywhere it creates Jewish settlements – security is higher, whereas areas with no or sparse Jewish population terror hotbeds germinate. Hence, the Jewish settlement of the Jordan Valley is a sine qua none for ensuring the security in that area. Beyond that, the development of the Valley could serve as a response to high housing demands that many families in Israel are contending with, and can deepen the connection of Israelis to some of the most important Jewish heritage sites that are in that locale. For this end, Israel must encourage young people and new immigrants to make their homes in the Jordan Valley, among others by way of favorable terms for land acquisition and housing, and the development of local communities.

• Action towards securing Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley: For years there have been many attempts by Israel to gain sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, similarly to what it had achieved in the Golan Hights. This move first and foremost sends out a clear message that Israel is here to stay. Furthermore, once Israel gains sovereignty over the area it will be able to develop it as it sees fit, and establish institutes and infrastructures. Gaining sovereignty may pose a diplomatic issue for Israel, mainly vis a vis Europe, however as it has been proven time and time again – when Israel presents a united and unyielding front, the world remains silent. If Israel can gain consensus in Israeli society for such a move, making it clear that this is a security imperative and not occupation for the sake of occupation, it is highly likely that the international community will fall into line as well.

Condemnation of the Condemnations

Current situation:

Despite the Israel-Jordan peace accord, many people in Jordan openly condemn Israel. Since the outbreak of the Gaza War, this state of affairs has only grown worse, until now, there are many anti-Israel protests throughout Jordan.

Even the Jordanian administration, despite its cooperation with Israel and its dependance on its neighbor to the west, exhibits an anti-Israeli front. The King failed to condemn the October 7 massacre, and his wife Rania even disputed it had even truly happened and attacked Israel from every global platform. In an interview to CNN, she spoke of the pain of the babies and children of Gaza, not once mentioning the dozens of innocent Jewish children Hamas heinously butchered. In another interview to CNN she insinuated that the massacre was not on the scale Israel and the US claim, saying that “President Biden did not witness with his own eyes the harsh things that had occurred in Israel, as he himself said”.

A short while after the Gaza War broke out, King Abdullah II sent two air shipments of humanitarian aid to Gaza. He also sent a third plane, whose cargo was deployed by his daughter, Princess Salma of Jordan, as a symbolic gesture to the children of Gaza.

Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, a close associate of the King, has also attacked Israel more than once since the outbreak of the war. Safadi also tried to promote anti-Israel measures at the United Nations, and recommended that Jordan join in the prosecution of Israel at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Even though the Jordanian King’s statements are merely lip service, as apparently, he sings a completely different tune behind closed doors –nevertheless, his statements and those of his family influence the mood on the streets of Jordan as well as the relations between the two countries.

Ideal situation:

• Demand the King moderate his rhetoric: although it is understandable to an extent that the ruler of an Arab state would have to display animosity toward Israel, his current condemnations are beyond the pale. The State of Israel must use the leverages it has on the King and the Jordanian administration – e.g. water supply and military aid – and demand he moderate his and his family’s statements, and halt the anti-Israel measure undertaken and the UN.

There is a lot more than meets the eye: conclusions

The relations between Israel and Jordan can be sketched with a single word: contrast. Contrast between the attitude of the Jordanian administration and the public; contrast between its public statements and what it says behind closed doors; and most importantly – contrast between the quiet on the surface and the threats brewing underneath. Israel must understand that its border with Jordan is not secure and the stability of the government there is not ensured. In the immediate-term, Israel must employ whatever leverages it has on the Jordanian administration – namely the water supply and military aid – to solidify its relations with the Kingdom. In the long term, Israel must create a contingency plan that charts courses of action for possible scenarios such as the ousting of the ruling Hashemite family and a takeover of Jordan by radical elements such as extremist Sunni militias or pro-Iranian forces.

Above all – Israel must populate the Jordan Valley and place it on par with the rest of its geographic strategic assets, both in terms of national security and development.

The state of affairs between Israel and Jordan, wherein the two are at loggerheads on the one hand, but cooperate on the other, can hold only to a certain point. What with the recent changes washing over the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder whether this point has now been reached, and if so – what is in store from now on.

הפוסט Ideally – Vision of the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A combination of recent events has influenced the mood and outlook of both Americans and Israelis.  Donald Trump won the election for President of the United States, and Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu and his government adopted a new strategy, using pre-emptive war as a form of national self-defense against regional aggressors and naming victory as a strategic goal. These developments are directly and indirectly related. The basic facts are known, but the environment of politics and ideas has changed. Factors such as public morale and self-image cannot be quantified but must be taken into account. How a country sees its place in the world determines a nation’s purpose and what it is capable of accomplishing. When a mood of national pride and purpose prevails over a mood of demoralization and defeatism, one may speak of a different reality.

This degradation of national purpose took place in the United States when former President Barak Obama rejected the traditional ideal of American exceptionalism and its long-standing roots in religious values.  In contrast, President-elect Donald Trump adopted the slogan, “Make America Great Again,” which embodies the idea of greatness and renewal.  The idea is should be familiar to us.  It comes from the Hebrew Bible, Lamentations (Lamentations 5: 21: “Renew our days as of old.”

When President Trump announced his choices for cabinet members, we heard a new melody which indicated that greatness and renewal had again become national goals.  By presenting this prospect in credible terms, the Trump administration changed the mood of the present for the majority of Americans. While some of the administration’s nominations were the subject of public controversy, they indicated the presence of a coherent program and the intention of implementing it.  It is noteworthy that some of the nominees for cabinet positions, without being prompted, publicly declared their support for Israel and condemned the use of political antisemitism in American life.  This shift in the consensus reflects a positive development.

Several months earlier, a significant event contributed to this shift in the national consensus. At the invitation of Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson of Louisiana, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress on July 24, 2024. The Prime Minister used this extraordinary opportunity to speak directly to the American people (and the world) and vigorously defend Israel’s case. In fact, his audience enthusiastically embraced his message.

The world has changed and, more than ever, American legislators understand the dangers of terrorism.  A substantial number of Congressmen (and women) have served in the in the American armed services and know firsthand the ways of the Middle East.

After the Hamas attack on Israel of October 7, 2023, a global intifada broke out in which “pro-Palestinian” sympathizers aggressively dominated public spaces, especially university campuses.  These purportedly “spontaneous” demonstrators resulted in the open expression of anti-Israel hostility and antisemitism, intimidating and bullying Jewish students. Part of the problem was the intentional passivity and permissiveness of several university administrators.

Congressmen and women have the authority to consult their own sources of information and draw their own conclusions. In December 2023, the House Education Committee held hearings on antisemitism on the campus.  The Chair of the Committee was Virgina Foxx of North Carolina, and Representative Elise Stefanik of New York, a member of this committee, conducted a devastating interrogation.

In his address, Netanyahu boldly called this war “a clash between barbarism and civilization,” and declared that the United States and Israel must stand together, because we have the same enemy.  He defiantly proclaimed, “We will win!”

According to Caroline Glick, the meeting with President Biden, the following day [July 25] ended in a bust–up.  The President warned the Prime Minister that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!”  Glick noted that the Prime Minister represents the majority of the Israeli public which support his position.

When speaking about greatness and renewal, we should remember another event which took place on the evening of the very same day.  House Speaker Mike Johnson led a delegation of Congressmen to Union Station in Washington, D.C., in a symbolic act of rededication and renewal.  In the quotation from his Xpost, Johnson reported that “Earlier today, pro-Hamas protesters took down the American flags at Union Station, burned them and raised Palestinian flags. Tonight, we righted their wrong. American flags are once again flying over Union Station. We will not let the terrorist mob win.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט America and Israel Choose Greatness and Renewal הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

While the last echoes of battle are dying in the fields of Ukraine, the shape of a new world order is beginning to emerge. The peace accord between Russia and Ukraine, with the determined mediation of President Trump not only spells the end of a bloody war, but also signals a dramatic shift in the balance of world powers. Behind the diplomatic move is a broad American strategy aiming to sever the connection between Russia and the Chinese-Iranian axis and the reinstitution of American supremacy. Israel may just find itself in an unprecedented strategic footing in the emerging new world order. However, it must not lose its bearings and should remember that the road to a promised future goes through its independence and ability to protect itself – by itself.

The victor – Russia

On a local level, the agreement is a clear victory for Russia, which is ending the war after having attained most of the war objectives it had set for itself: blocking the membership of Ukraine in NATO, the weakening of Ukraine, and the gaining of huge swaths of land in the south and east of Ukraine (Donbass) it captured at the onset of the war in 2022, that the peace agreement leaves in its hands – alongside the Crimean Peninsula, that Russia had annexed in 2014.

Even the objective that Putin seemingly failed to achieve – the replacement of the Ukrainian government with a Russian puppet government – seems to be within his reach, at least partially. There is a reasonable chance that this agreement will undermine Ukraine President Zalenski and lead to the rise of pro-Russian, or at the very least – elements tolerant of Russia – in Ukrainian politics.

However, on a geopolitical level and in a global point of view, this move has ramifications that are much more far-reaching and is part of a broader strategy of the new American administration. The main American interest behind the uncompromising negotiations the administration conducted is simple – and is in reality no about Ukraine.

Pulling Russia away from China and Iran tp promote regional peace

The determined manner in which Trump foisted the agreement on both countries attests to how resolute the US is to pull Russia away from China and dismantle the China-Russia-Iran axis. On part of the US, the worse side effect of the current war is that the sanctions imposed – justly – on Russia, had pushed it into the arms of China. On the general geo-strategic level, the partnering of Russia to China posed a real threat to the US’s global hegemony.

To draw Russia over to the West, Trump capitalized on both side’s weaknesses – both being fatigued from three years of war, Ukraine’s total dependence on military aid from the US to continue fighting the war, and Russia’s desire to protect its gains – to force them into an agreement. In return for the hefty diplomatic (territorial???) gains Trump is bestowing on Russia, the latter will reciprocate by choosing America’s side and pull away from China and Iran.

Over 200,000 people were killed in recent years in conflicts around the globe, as a result of the US’s withdrawal from areas under its control. Now it is moving to restore its status as a global super-power and is taking it upon itself to fashion a new world order that aims to prevent a third world war and promote peace over war and anarchy. Trump understands all too well that the US cannot affect this change from a position of weakness and that any aspiration to reconcile Russia and Ukraine must come only from a position of power.

Tight Russia-Iran relations hurt Israel

What does this entail is far as Israel is concerned?

Trump’s move may have positive ramifications on Israel’s national security – both on a global level of a shift of powers between west and east and regionally.

In the years prior to the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, Israel enjoyed collaborations with Russia in several critical areas. One of them was the security coordination mechanism between the two in Syria that allowed Israel to push back any attempt by Iran to gain a foothold in the country and Hezbollah to operate there, without friction with the Russian forces deployed in Syria. Thanks to these relations, Israeli had free rein to act against Iranian arms convoys and terror infrastructures, without risking any deterioration with its relations with Moscow.

Moreover, on the international stage Russia maintained a balanced attituded toward Israel and even refrained from voting against it in the UN’s anti-Israel resolutions. Even if it was nowhere near unconditional support of Israel, its position gave Israel a certain diplomatic shield in face of international criticism. In addition, the leaders of Israel and Russia had direct ongoing dialogue that contributed to mutual understanding and the assuaging of tensions around regional issues, while preserving Israeli critical national security interests.

However, since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Russia’s attitude toward Israel has markedly changed. It had significantly tightened relations with Iran, whose status received a considerable upgrade as a military partner of Moscow. Iran supplies Russia with suicide drones and additional weapons, which Russia used in its war against Ukraine. In return, Russia supports Iran in international institutions and supplies Iran with advanced military technology. Moscow’s support of Tehran boosted Iran’s confidence, prompting it to take action against Israel.

In the diplomatic arena, Russia no longer takes a balanced stand on Israel as it did. Thus, for instance, on October 2023 it promoted a draft resolution in the UN Security Council for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, in which it refrained from condemning Hamas. This move reflected just how much Russia’s attitude had changed and the waning of its international support of Israel.

Israel can gain from Russia’s renewed presence in the region

In this context, the tightening of relations between Russia and the US could benefit Israel strategically. The less Russia is dependent on Iran – militarily and economically – the more its interests in collaborating with hostile elements to Israel are likely to wane. A renewed collaboration between Moscow and Washington could relax the tensions in the international arena and bring Russia back to its balanced stance toward Israel.

Moreover, it is even likely that Russia would renew its presence and involvement in the Middle East, under the auspices of the US. The creation of a Russian sphere of influence in the Allawi area of Syria could contain any radical Sunni element and thwart Turkey’s expansion aspirations by buffering between it and Lebanon and part of Syria.

US–Russian cooperation may even lead Russia to reverse its position against Israel in the UN Security Council, at least partially, whether actively or by abstaining from voting for resolutions against it. Hopefully, the US will demand that Russia – in return for handing them the victory over Ukraine – will act seriously toward the promotion of America’s interests, including the strengthening of Israel.

Beyond that, Trump’s rejection of Ukraine made it clear to European countries that they can no longer bank on America’s military protection, and that they will have to double their efforts to arm themselves so that they are prepared for every contingency – wither through Russia or otherwise. Europe has some of the world’s largest weapons industries, however, its countries may acquire arms, weapons and military technology from Israel’s defense industry, which would boost Israel’s economy and diplomatic status.

The key to realizing Trump’s vision is in Israel

Israel can benefit not only from Trump’s move with Russia and Ukraine, but also from the consequent world order that can be expected from this move. The new administration in America made it clear that it is determine to jettison any extra weight, like its unbeneficial relations with Ukraine, and shift its focus to more favorable sources such as Israel.

The reason that although the US is no longer interested in continuing arming Ukraine it sends large shipments of arms to Israel, is that Israel is not only a more attractive and profitable investment in Trump’s mind – but also a pivotal element in his overall strategy.

The new order Israel is generating in the Middle East stems among others from its weakening of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas and its protection of the Druze in Syria, which serves America’s interests without it having to put in the work itself, thus saving hundreds of billions of dollars. Hence, for every dollar the US invests in Israel, it yields hundreds of percent in profits. The obvious conclusion is that Israel must end the multi-arena conflicts in which it is currently engaged in a clear and decisive victory, thereby proving to the US that it is in its interests to continue its investment in Israel.

It seems that Trump realized that the State of Israel is key to the realization of his vision for the Middle East. The dramatic geopolitical changes that are taking shape under his leadership have the potential to make Israel a global key player, a “Singapore of the Middle East” – a state that serves as a main route for all global transport. The realization of this vision would award Israel not only with supervision and energy security, but also would seriously boost of its international status.

Israel will protect itself – by itself

And yet, America’s cold shoulder to Ukraine is a harsh reminder that if a nation cannot protect itself – no one will do so for it. For Israel the conclusion is clear – just like the Zionist movement understood in its inception over 100 years ago, the Jewish nation and the State of Israel must defend themselves by themselves.

What does this mean in practice?

This means that the State of Israel must reduce to the greatest possible extent any dependence it has on the foreign arms and energy supplies, and geopolitical security. It must develop a large-scale production line of armaments to ensure its independence and flexibility of not having inventories dictate its abilities. The IDF must regain its large scale, and reestablish itself as a powerful military that is ready for any contingency. At the same time, Israel must ensure it has a diversified and robust energy economy and it must reinvest in its agricultural sector to ensure its food security.

In tandem with reenforcing its independence in these areas, Israel must expand its collaborations with countries with common interests and become a regional and global player, while unwaveringly defending the Jewish people’s sovereignty over the Land of Israel. Israel must acquaint itself deeply with the motivations of every player in the regional geopolitical field, and identify which countries it can establish cooperations toward common causes, and which moves on that field can serve it and which must be blocked.

“It was only the audacity of the Jews that established the State of Israel”, famously said Israel’s founding father, David Ben Gurion. It is clear that still today, only the audacity of the Jews will ensure the lasting existence of the state, even as a pivotal player in a new world order.

הפוסט US Turning a Cold Shoulder to Ukraine Heralds a New World Order – With Israel as a Key Player הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The End of the Sherman: Do It Yourself

The Armored Corps is currently considered one of the main and most important forces in the IDF, but this was not always the case. During the War of Independence, the State of Israel relied mainly on infantry forces and possessed only 15 tanks. Over the years, the number of tanks gradually increased, and with it the scope of involvement of the armored forces in the IDF’s operational activities. In Operation Kadesh (the 1956 Sinai War), Israel already operated 200 tanks, in the Six Day War (1967) it operated about 1,000 tanks, and in the Yom Kippur War (1973) the number of tanks in use had already risen to 2,000.

Despite the quantitative increase, the quality of the tanks at Israel’s disposal barely improved. Due to various diplomatic motives, countries around the world refused to sell Israel new tanks, and the fledgling country was forced to rely on old and incompetent tanks such as the Shermans from World War II and the British Centurions that had become obsolete. The IDF and the Israeli defense industry made great efforts to rehabilitate and improve those old tanks, but it was clearly impossible to rely on such improvisations in the long run.

During the 1960s, two turning point events occurred that pushed the State of Israel to find a solution to the tank crisis. The first event was the news that Arab countries were expected to receive T-62 tanks from the Soviet Union, which were considered the most advanced tanks in the world at the time. The second event was the Chieftain tank affair, when England withdrew at the last minute from its commitment to sell advanced tanks to Israel. These two events made Israel realize that it had to catch up in the armor race vis-a-vis enemy countries, and that it had no choice but to do this on its own.

Getting the caterpillars moving: The development process begins

In 1969, subsequent to the collapse of the deal to purchase tanks from England, the possibility of Israel producing tanks itself was first considered. To examine the feasibility of this, a committee was formed, comprised of professionals and security experts, headed by Major General Israel Tal, later nicknamed the “Father of the Merkava.” The committee was required to examine both the State of Israel’s technological and infrastructural capabilities, as well as the economic viability of the move. The committee’s conclusions were that the State of Israel is capable of establishing a tank industry and that such an industry would provide a solution to its military needs, reduce dependence on other countries, and even benefit the country economically. A few months later, in August 1970, the official decision was made, and the State of Israel embarked on this ambitious project.

In order to promote the project, the Merkava Tank Planning Directorate was established, which bore overall responsibility for development, and the Tank Development Authority (TDA), which dealt with engineering planning. To save time and costs, it was decided to rely as much as possible on infrastructure that already existed in the IDF and the defense establishment. This is how the IDF Tank Rehabilitation and Maintenance Center (RMC), which until then had been used to improve tanks, became the assembly plant for the new tank. Similarly, the IDF’s Equipment and Spare Parts Center and the Procurement and Production Directorate were modified in order to meet the needs of the project. Another decision made was to make tank production a nationwide project, and for this purpose about 200 factories in the defense and civilian industries were converted into factories to manufacture tank parts. The Ardan foundry, for example, began producing heavy armor castings that were used for the turret and the chassis (the bottom portion of the tank), and the IMI factories began producing tank cannons.

The Israeli tank production process lasted a total of about nine years, and on February 20, 1979, the long-awaited moment arrived and the first Merkava tank entered operational use in the 7th Armored Corps Brigade.

Improving and perfecting the Merkava

The first Merkava tank, known as the Merkava Mark 1, was considered a modern and advanced tank at the time. It boasted unprecedented defense capabilities and high survivability, made possible in part by the revolutionary decision to move the engine to the front of the tank.

Since then, the Merkava tank has undergone a series of modifications, which improved both its defense and performance on the battlefield. The Merkava tanks were equipped with fire control systems, night vision devices, and improved firepower systems. Over the years, more advanced models were also developed, and the most advanced – the Merkava Mark 4 – entered IDF service in 2003. Today, the improved models of the Merkava Mark 4 tank benefit from advanced command and control systems, and are equipped with the Wind Jacket active defense system that facilitates maximum protection for the soldiers inside the tank.

Over the years, the State of Israel has produced thousands of Merkava tanks, and these have been used in all the campaigns and wars that have erupted since: In the First Lebanon War, the Merkava Mark 1 tank was used against Syrian armored forces; during the Second Intifada, the Merkava Mark 2 and 3 tanks were used for patrols in dangerous areas and to support infantry forces; during the Second Lebanon War, three armored divisions entered Lebanese territory; and during the Sword of Iron War, the tanks – mainly the Merkava Mark 3 and Mark 4 models – played a central combat role and greatly assisted in ground operations in Gaza and Lebanon.

Only in Israel: Sales prohibited to foreign countries

The Israeli Merkava tank is currently considered the most advanced tank in the world, and few tanks manage to come close to its capabilities. One might expect that the State of Israel would want to exploit the inherent economic advantage of this and export the tank to other countries, but from the very beginning of Merkava tank production, its sale to foreign countries was prohibited in order to maintain the Israeli Armored Corps’ unique advantage.

It was only in 2010 that the Ministry of Defense decided to permit, in principle, the sale of the Merkava Mark 4 tank to “select customers”. In 2014, the Ministry of Defense signed the first Merkava export deal with a foreign country, whose name is prohibited from publication. In 2023, negotiations were held to sell Merkava Mark 2 and Merkava Mark 3 tanks, which are retired from IDF service, to a European country and a South American country whose names were also not disclosed, but these plans were halted due to the Swords of Iron War. So, to date, the State of Israel is probably the only country in the world, or one of the few, in possession of the Merkava tank.

Besides its uniqueness, another source of pride lies in the fact that approximately 80% of the tank’s components are manufactured in Israel, so the project provides a source of livelihood for tens of thousands of Israelis in more than 200 factories nationwide. Nowadays, when there is much talk about the importance of self-development of weapons and combat equipment, it is good to remember the strength of the Israeli defense industry and the immense potential of domestic production.

הפוסט 46 years ago today: The Merkava tank entered operational use in the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dearborn, a city with a predominantly Arab and Muslim population, recently made headlines when most of its residents voted for Trump. It has long been known as “America’s Jihad capital“. This Detroit suburb is infamous for its widespread support for the Palestinians and Iran’s proxy organizations, which are designated as terrorist groups by the United States. However, Dearborn has a twin city right next to it, just as extreme: Meet Dearborn Heights.

Dearborn Heights, a newer Detroit suburb, also has a significant Muslim population, primarily Shiite, which supports Iran and Hezbollah.

In July, Shiite ceremonies were held at the Islamic House of Wisdom in Dearborn Heights. During these events, local Islamic scholar Hussein Al-Nashed praised Iran and Hezbollah. Al-Nashed stated: “It is only with the Islamic Revolution that our lot has changed.” He went on to praise Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the revolution, saying, “(Khomeini) taught you dignity… and honored your religion (as a Shiite).” Al-Nashed further claimed that in America, there is no freedom of thought. “If I want to think for myself… and I say ‘you know what, Hezbollah is actually not bad, Hezbollah is a very good thing’, next thing I know, the FBI is at my doorstep. Is that freedom of thought?“

Al-Nashed argues that the problem lies with the United States itself, which opposes states and entities like Iran and Hezbollah. This is just one example of the rhetoric within Muslim communities that encourages resistance to democratic regimes in Western countries while supporting extremist, anti-Western Islamic elements like Iran and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s Stronghold in the U.S.

The situation is similar in Dearborn, its twin Jihad Capital. Here too, an agenda is being promoted that opposes the United States or any other Western entity for that matter, while glorifying extremist elements. In the case of the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, these are individuals who were directly responsible for harming American civilians and soldiers. In July, a large gathering commemorated the memory of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent Lebanese Shiite scholar, regarded as a spiritual leader of Hezbollah. His writings were instrumental in shaping the ideological foundations of the Lebanese terrorist organization.

Fadlallah issued a fatwa (religious decree) authorizing the suicide bombing of the multinational force barracks in Beirut in October 1983. That attack killed 241 American Marines, 58 French soldiers, and six civilians. Despite his pivotal role in authorizing this horrific attack by issuing the fatwa, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah is now honored with memorials on American soil.

Annual memorial services for Fadlallah have been held since his death in 2010. These ceremonies are organized by a local charity associated with Hezbollah, known as Al-Mabarrat Charitable Organization. In 2006, Al-Mabarrat was accused of being part of a global fundraising infrastructure for Hezbollah, including operations in the United States and Canada.

Further evidence of Al-Mabarrat’s deep ties to Hezbollah lies in the fact that Fadlallah personally managed the organization until his death in 2010. Today, his son, Ja‘far Fadlallah, leads the charity and also serves as its “General Religious Supervisor.”

Dearborn and Dearborn Heights are majority-Muslim cities that promote a quiet jihad within America. Both cities have significant ties and deep connections to Iran and Hezbollah. Numerous charitable organizations in these communities have been advancing an anti-American, anti-Western agenda for many years.

President Donald Trump garnered significant support from Muslim voters, who were protesting President Biden’s administration’s backing of Israel during the war in Gaza.

Trump thus became the first Republican candidate since 2000 to win a majority of votes in Dearborn. It is no coincidence that the person scheduled to speak at Trump’s inauguration was the extremist Shiite imam, Husham al-Husseini, a Hezbollah supporter from the Karbala Shiite Islamic Center in Dearborn who holds strongly anti-Israel views. It should be noted that in the end, it was decided that in light of al-Husseini’s factional views and his support for the terrorist organization Hezbollah, he would not speak at Trump’s inauguration.

After Trump appointed a strongly pro-Israel cabinet, Muslims referred to it as a “cabinet that supports extreme Israel.”

These reactions reveal the interests of the Muslim community in the United States and its efforts to influence American policy in favor of Arab interests. The new administration must be attentive to the motives of Islamic entities, like those in America’s jihad capitals, whose goals conflict with American interests. This marks another phase in the process of silent jihad, as America’s two jihad capitals—strongholds of Iran and Hezbollah—lead a direct anti-American agenda.

This article was originally published in–ynetnews.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Twin Cities: Two Jihad Capitals in America הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Since its inception, the Zionist movement has striven to gain Arab understanding and acceptance of the idea of the Return to Zion: That Jews have legitimate claims to the Land of Israel, that they wish to establish a national home in cooperation with the Arabs, and that the Jews’ return to their homeland will greatly benefit the Arabs and bring them development, and progress.

The Arabs, who, as a result of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, gained several states, stretching from the borders of Iran to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, firmly and resolutely refused to listen to the Zionist claims and vehemently opposed any affirmation to any Zionist claim.

The Arabs also exhibited this strong and determined opposition to all Zionist compromise proposals and concessions, such as the various partition plans, which left the Zionists with a very small area of land compared to the Zionist demands regarding the National Home area, as presented at the Peace Conference held in Paris in 1919.

The Arabs did not even respond to any of these attempts at compromise. For them, it made no difference whether the Jewish state, if established, is large or small. They fundamentally opposed the notion of such a state being established at all. In various Zionist circles, especially among the “peace seekers”, the illusion prevailed that if the Zionist movement gave up some of its demands, it would elicit a desire for peace among the Arabs, as existed among the Jews.

From the beginning, the Arab governments or the Palestinian Arab leadership never intended to engage in negotiations or bargaining diplomacy. From the beginning, they pursued a policy of violence against the Jewish community in the Land of Israel. This was the case throughout the years of British Mandate rule and since the establishment of the State of Israel, and continues to this very day.

The intensity and sophistication of Arab violent resistance varied according to circumstances, but it has persisted until today. This resistance to Zionism reached its peak in the series of military campaigns in which the regular armies of Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan participated. In all of these military campaigns, the Arab armies suffered severe and humiliating defeats, but the IDF victories were not enough to cause the Arabs to surrender. Between the campaigns, the Arabs engaged in small-scale fighting, which we call terrorist acts. It is not easy to fight a war against terrorism, and it may also be impossible to achieve complete victory in such a war. This is a war that has been going on, in various forms, for many long years and it may continue for many more.

The Arabs were not satisfied solely with violent military combat against Israel, whether by regular armies or religiously inspired terrorist organizations. They have terrorized Israel in many other domains, provided they do everything possible to make life miserable for Israel and to weaken it. Many probably remember the period of the economic boycott against Israel, which was not very successful, but caused Israel considerable inconvenience and damage.

We are currently in the midst of a broad-scale political-social campaign, encompassing many countries and international organizations, aimed at boycotting anything Israeli, delegitimizing Israel, and creating a hostile international environment that legitimizes Israel’s destruction.

Recruiting the Diaspora for public diplomacy

Strong Arab propaganda, inspired by intense hatred and a heavy reliance on lies, aimed at harassing and weakening Israel, undermining its legitimacy in the world, and tarnishing its image, has accompanied the Zionist enterprise almost since its inception. This propaganda operates in tandem with all other Arab efforts: military violence, political and economic boycott, and any other means capable of harming Israel. Arab anti-Israel efforts are absolute.

It should be mentioned that the domestic crisis in Israel, with its accompanying hatred and uncivilized internal debates, lends a helping hand to Arab propaganda. What more could hostile Arab propaganda ask for than hate speech from a former Chief of the General Staff or other senior figures against their country?

This Arab propaganda has had periods of success and periods of failure, but it seems that it has never had such a successful time at Israel’s expense as since October 7th.

The incomprehensible paradox here is difficult to explain: Israel was the one that suffered a surprise attack by a terrorist organization who slaughtered about 1,200 people in the Gaza Envelope that day and perpetrated monstrous acts of cruelty; kidnapping about two hundred men and women, children and the elderly, the sick and the healthy – which in itself is considered a crime against humanity. How is it possible that Israel, who was surprised, beaten, and bruised, is being condemned from all sides, and not the murderers? How is it possible that the vast majority of the world’s countries did not condemn the murderers and did not even ensure that the Red Cross could visit the hostages? The UN and its agencies, including the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which has long since become an arm of Arab anti-Semitism, also did nothing to help rescue the hostages. And when the IDF began hitting Hamas, how come the masses took to the streets in various places around the world, in mass demonstrations against Israel and not against Hamas? And why did political leaders and the International Criminal Court in The Hague accuse Israel of genocide and not the Gazan terrorist organization?

There are explanations for this phenomenon, and for the alliance that has been formed between the large Arab communities around the world and various anti-Semitic circles, and between extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing circles. This is not a pleasant or easy situation, and it is difficult to deal with.

The savage Arab propaganda currently being waged in various forms against Israel has various advantages, but it is also possible to oppose it and try to weaken it. Israel has many allies that should be recruited and activated in a systematic and coordinated manner to weaken the power of that propaganda.

In places where there is a Jewish community, action should be taken to utilize the community, its institutions, and appropriate individuals from within it to coordinate counter-actions, in each place according to its conditions. Many places have friendship associations with Israel, Jewish professional associations such as doctors, lawyers, and the like. Many of these will join in counter-action. The major Jewish donors to universities and cultural institutions will definitely be eager to cooperate; after all, the clear anti-Semitic threat posed by the Arab movement against Israel endangers them as well.

Such actions, and many other similar ones, have also been taken in previous times of crisis, with varying degrees of success. There were successful precedents for this, especially during and after the Yom Kippur War. A system of organizations and aggressive public diplomacy campaigns against Arab propaganda must be reorganized. Its success depends on coordinated and vigorous organizational action. The natural entity to coordinate such actions is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Public Diplomacy Division, which has representative offices deployed in dozens of countries worldwide, and has also carried out such actions in the past. There is no point in entrusting this task to a special government public diplomacy ministry, headed by a minister who lacks any understanding of the subject.

Religious ruling recognizing Israel

On the surface, the picture is bleak. Israel is surrounded by enemies on all sides and there is no end to the bloodshed in sight, despite its military achievements and victories, and its accomplishments in so many other areas as well.

Although Israel has signed peace agreements with its two neighbors – Egypt and Jordan – we should not delude ourselves again and not see these agreements for what they are not. Both are important agreements that are highly beneficial, in various domains and for all the signatory countries, but they all lack one clear thing – they do not bring true peace, as we, in israel, had hoped. It could be said that these peace agreements more closely resemble armistices than peace treaties. In any case, this is better than a state of war.

And yet, although it seems that true peace is unlikely in the foreseeable future, there is something worth trying. Maybe it will bear fruit.

Let us first explain that in Arab and Islamic countries, even those considered secular, religion and those holding senior religious positions are held in high regard. In these countries, senior religious figures and those with the authority to issue religious rulings (“muftis”) are treated with great respect. Such a legal ruling is called a “fatwa”, and the more esteemed the mufti who issues it is, the greater influence it has on public opinion. Such muftis are found in all Arab countries, and there have previously already been those who have issued fatwas that are relatively positive or sympathetic to Israel. The most important Muslim institution in the Arab world for such religious scholars is Al-Azhar University in Cairo. The religious rulings that are issued on various topics by the heads of this institution carry great weight.

Israel’s goal should be to obtain such a fatwa, which recognizes the Jews’ right to the Land of Israel and recognizes Israel as the land of the Jewish people.

Is this possible? It’s hard to know. The chances seem negligible, but we should attempt to develop dialogues with every Muslim religious scholar wherever such a connection can be made. This can undoubtedly be done; such connections have already been made in various places. This is not the place to detail how to try and develop such an operation, which must be conducted wisely, cautiously, and quietly. The chances may be very slim, but it is still worth trying. Without religious sanction for peace with Israel, the longed-for peace will not be achieved.

About the author:
Dr. Moshe Yager. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 40 years and held ambassadorial positions in Sweden and the Czech Republic.

The text is solely the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the movement’s opinion.

הפוסט War and Peace: The Arab Propaganda Assault Against Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A New World Order. These grand words take on a new meaning these days, with President Donald Trump stepping into office for his second term.

Having driven a spoke in Tehran’s wheels as well as those of its vassals to an unprecedented level – complemented by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria – Israel has left the Shi’ite axis all but paralyzed. Were it the US’s current administration’s wish to topple the Ayatullah regime, it could deliver a coup de grace in the form of a quick, targeted air strike to crush the skull of the Iranian snake, and in the same breath, take care of the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

Time to conclude the tale of Iran’s nuclear program

This rare and favorable window of opportunity represents a historic moment in which a coalition of the West, Israel, and moderate Sunni states, led by the US can and must bring a decisive end to the Iranian threat. However, one of the largest obstacles on the US’s way to green-lighting an overseas campaign is the public opinion on its streets.

The American public is weary and wary at any prospect of an overseas war, especially in light of the accumulative high death toll of the wars and engagements in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the staggering resources they drained. However, in this instance, the US would not actually be forced to initiate war – but to end it. The Israeli blitz airstrikes left a devastated Iranian air force, shattered many of the Republic’s strategic assets and delivered a crippling blow to its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Ayatullah reign is now more exposed than ever.

Hence, all that is required is a swift targeted move – a devastating airstrike on Iran’s nuclear sites, missile sites and military facilities, delivered by strategic bombers, without the need for boots on the ground, similarly to Israel’s attack last October. A campaign of mere days could bring the Shi’ite axis to its knees, and change the political map and balance of powers in the entire Middle East.

That same coalition should also launch a campaign against the reign of Houthi terror in Yemen, in collaboration with Saudia Arabia and the country’s internal opposition forces. The Houthis, as a proxy of Iran, have made themselves into an all-global nuisance with their disruptive attacks on international trade vessels in the Red Sea. If the US indeed does decide to exercise its full military might – it will have effected dramatic changes in that area within a very short period of time.

The attack against Iran is not only advisable – it is a sine qua non. Because Iran understands that it had lost significant assets such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, it will in all likelihood try to compensate and attempt by all means at hand to break out to a nuclear weapon. If the West cherishes its survival – it behooves it to prevent this at all costs.

Trump understands: the key to peace is might

The election of Trump to the presidency could not have come at a better time for Israel.

Over the past years, , the US has been gradually paring down its presence and involvement in the Middle East, leaving a vacuum into which Russia and China were all too happy to step. As a result of America’s wanning status in the region, an increasing number of countries are aligning themselves with the East. China, the main trade partner of the KSA and Iran, had already brokered an agreement between the two. China’s trade agreements in the Middle East have ballooned to seven times the current volume of the US’s – after it had cut its trade activity and reduced its dependance on Arab oil. The one thing the US can offer Middle East countries in order to reinstate its status as a dominant player in the region is military might.

Trump understands this all too well. He knows that peace and stability can come about only in the presence of military might and not appeasement. The mere fact that even before taking up residence in the White House, Trump declared  that he was interested in making Canada the 51st state of the US, and that he is interested in taking over Greenland and the Panama Canal, indicate that he views the United States as a super power that bears the task of reshaping the global map – and has no qualms about using the necessary force to make America great again.

An opportunity for new world order

Israel is quite literally handing the Middle East to the US on a silver platter.  After pulling the rug of hegemony in the Shi’ite axis from under Tehran’s feet and incapacitating its allies, the US can now step into the frame and reestablish its dominance on the chessboard with a move that would entail minimal effort, restoring its deterrence against the Chinese-Iranian-Russian syndicate.

Admittedly, it would be unwise of the US to ignite a direct military confrontation with the China-Russia sisterhood in the eastern theater. On the other hand – the weakest link in the chain, i.e. Iran, can be flicked off the gameboard almost effortlessly, thereby creating a strong deterrent for US’s adversaries in the region, and bulwarking the Middle East from China’s overtures.

This tactic would pave the road to broad regional peace accords, from Saudia to Indonesia, churning a tailwind for positive moves in the Middle East such as the formation of a moderate Sunni coalition with Israel in partnership with UAE and KSA.

Such a coalition, alongside Israel, moderate Sunni powerful countries and the West led by the US, coupled with normalization with the rest of the Sunni world, can stem the spread of the radical Shi’ite axis, including Turkey, Qatar, Afghanistan, and terror organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaida. The western coalition would prevent the Shi’ite axis from toppling the governments in countries such as Egypt and Jordan and seizing control thereof, and can form a new balance of power in the Middle East region.

This moderate alliance can potentially attract unaligned countries, such as Lebanon, which is controlled at present by Iran through Hezbollah; Iraq, which is partially controlled by Iran, and Libia, Egypt and Saudia. Taking Tehran out of the equation will leave the US alone at the top of the Middle East totem pole, which will in turn bring the unaligned countries – and perhaps more – to choose to align themselves with the moderate coalition, and perhaps even in a year or two, Lebanon will come around and sign – under the influence of Saudia – a peace accord with Israel.

Israel is the key

In a new regional alliance that would deepen and grow stronger with time, Israel would play a central role. Israel is the key that connects West to East, and is the crossroads in which new trade routes can be charted to provide land and maritime trade routes among India, the UAE, KSA and Israel. Israel has already set in place a network of mega-harbors, each under different supervision (The Sinai, Indian, European and Israeli) in preparation for this eventuality, with the aim of creating a global interest in using that network for trade and shipping activity. Making Israel into a global Singapore – a world trade center – is well within the country’s reach.

With new trade routes, regional peace and commercial cooperation with Saudia and other countries in the Middle East, coupled with the security and diplomatic support on part of the US, Israel would be able, for the first time in its history, to do what it has to do in order to ensure the future existence of the State for generations.

Fundamental dictate: maintaining sovereignty

After dealing with the Shi’ite axis and signing regional peace and normalization agreements, Israel will be required to present to the US administration a definitive resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, that must include the crucial elements that will ensure the long-lasting security of Israel.

Such a plan must include Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and most of the C areas in Judia and Samaria, cleared of Palestinian presence that might compromise the Jewish demographic hegemony in the State of Israel. It should outline a definitive solution of the conflict, such that does not allow for a Palestinian state and surely removes any possibility for the rule of terror organizations such as is the situation currently with Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah.

This is an opportunity to snuff out the Oslo Accords, dismantle the Palestinian Authority – a body that is in effect governed by a murderous terror organization that is actively pushing for the global delegitimization of Israel – and adopt an alternative model, to mention a few are: cantonization; emirate-style decentralized “Hamula” (family) government; a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or a Palestinian autonomy in the Sinai Peninsula under Egyptian supervision. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has presented to the Israeli governments various blueprints for this end. The choice of each specific model would depend on shifting circumstances. For example, a future scenario of the collapse of the Jordanian regime would push toward a Jordanian-Palestinian solution, whereas a willingness on part of Egyptian President el-Sisi to play an instrumental role in the stabilization of the Middle East would allow for a Palestinian autonomy in northern Sinai and Gaza.

The common ground for all these prospective solutions is the governing principle that the Zionist claim to the right of the Jewish people to the State of Israel and sovereignty thereof are non-negotiable. Cementing Israel’s right over the State of Israel is crucial spiritually and for its security – both aspects indivisibly interlinked. Israel cannot be completely secure without the spiritual conviction in the justness of this cause, and there is no understanding the security of cities in the heart of Israel without acknowledging the importance of settlements in Judia and Samaria.

Learning the lessons of October 7

A new plan to resolve the conflict would be different than that ideated by President Trump in his previous term. Trump’s Peace for Prosperity demanded painful concessions on part of Israel. But the October 7 attack made it clear that there is no room for such concessions. Any new plan must acknowledge Israel’s overall responsibility for the security of the entire area of the State of Israel. In the past round, Israel abstained from exercising sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and C areas, at Trum’s behest. Today, the public in Israel is more than ever ready for this step, that would anchor the eastern border belt as an integral part of the land of Israel, similarly to the southern and northern envelope areas. Trump’s current presidency is a historic opportunity to right this wrong and proclaim Israeli sovereignty – even unilaterally – in the territories over which the US acknowledges Israel’s right.

At the same time, Israel must present an exhaustive long-term plan for Gaza and Judia and Samaria. After learning the hard way over the past twenty years that the terror and Gaza cannot be eliminated solely with air strikes, precise as they may be, it is now clear that the Gaza Strip must have the presence of Israeli security forces – this is a unnegotiable condition if Israel wishes to see the objectives of the Gaza War materialize, among others affording Israel the freedom of immediate action in the event that terror – in any form whatsoever – lifts its head once again in the Gaza Strip.

It also must be acknowledged that a threat of territorial losses is a strong deterrent for organizations such as Hamas, since the loss of lives – even in the tens of thousands – and destruction have no meaning to the proponents of such ideologies. To ensure a long-lasting deterrence in the Gaza Strip, a portion of its territory must remain under Israel’s control. One such possibility that would gain wide support among Israeli public, is a militarized security zone along the parameter of Gaza under the control of Israel. These swaths of land can be used for cultivating agriculture by the communities that were the victims of the Hamas October 7 attack and breath life where Hamas has strewn death. This not only makes sense in terms of Israel’s security – it brings with it the much-needed historic justice.

Optimism is not enough

Trump’s reelection is a rare historic opportunity for Israel. With the support of a strong, realistic leader that had proven himself a true friend to the Jewish people, can the picture of the Middle East be radically changed, from which both Israel and the US can gain considerable – and crucial – advantages.

In order to ensure this historic opportunity is not missed, Israel must do two things. The first – enhance the cooperation with the US in a joint aim of eliminating the Iranian nuclear program.

The second is the formulation of a clear and definite long-term solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict that cements Israel’s security and diplomatic status in the Middle East region, and has zero tolerance for any approach that does not acknowledge Israel’s inalienable right over the land of Israel and its uncompromising right to maintain the security of the State and its citizens, ensuring the Trump administration’s full support of this aim.

Will Trump move the first piece on the board and launch an attack against Iran? Trump is a well-seasoned business mogul, who is very adept at identifying opportunities. However, at the end of the day, it is up to him and Israel to put forth proof of intent. In light of what is known about his previous term in the Oval Office, his recent appointments, and his guiding world views, it is likely that he will give Israel his security and diplomatic support and spearhead an attack on Iran.

One way or another, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement leads a steady clear line:

Israel’s national security leans on the State’s national ethos, the justness of the cause and its ability to protect its own security by itself with defensible borders and the understanding that the long-term security and the prosperity of Israel lies only in Israe’s hands.

This understanding must first and foremost stem from a common faith in the justness of Israel’s path, remembering the truth that has been at the foundation of Zionism since its inception – that if Israel does not take care of itself, no one else will.

Not even Donald Trump.

הפוסט Trump’s Second Presidency: A Critical Opportunity on a Silver Platter הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The campaign for the eradication of the murderous Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip had placed the IDF in a humanitarian conundrum: on one hand, there are over a million displaced who are in need of aid and housing. On the other hand, Hamas pillaged the humanitarian aid and is fortifying itself in areas of dense population.

At present, Israel is facing a triple challenge: it is demanded to provide the population with humanitarian aid, but must do so without the unintended consequence of boosting Hamas in the Strip. Is there a way to ensure the population has a roof over its head without having to rehabilitate the stronghold of terror in the Strip? How can Israel install the future civil leadership that would replace Hamas and the Palestinian Authority?

The Humanitarian Islands Plan, authored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement research department, led by researchers Adv. Yifa Segal, Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid, and contributing researcher Mrs. Jennifer Thiel, provides an answer to all these questions, which could change the face of Gaza.

A dangerous problem – Hamas takes advantage of humanitarian aid

The humanitarian aid predicament is a direct result of the October 7 massacre, that had brought Israel to launch the war in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has instructed the civilian population to evacuate the areas of fighting to eliminate the risk of hurting innocents, and allow the army to conduct operational activities against terror infrastructures that Hamas operated from within these areas. As a result of this activity, large areas were left either razed to the ground or unfit for habitation. To date, there are over one million Gazans that are considered displaced after having evacuated the battle areas.

Naturally, these displace are in need of humanitarian aid. And indeed, since the outbreak of the war, large-scale aid has been continuously shipped into the Gaza Strip, totaling as of now some one million tons. However, the displaced also need proper housing as well.

With that said, there are two prominent obstacles for the supply of this aid and housing. The first is that Hamas pillages huge amounts of food and equipment that arrive into the Strip for its own survival, on the expense of the lives of its own people.  The other challenge is that the people cannot return to their homes and rehabilitate the pre-war centers of population because here too, Hamas – concerned solely with its own preservation at whatever cost – had established its terror network above and underground in these areas.

The question is: how may Israel help the displaced citizens of the Strip while refraining to indirectly aid the terrorists?

The humanitarian islands – no entrance for terrorism

In order to untangle this predicament, a solution is called for, such that will allow for the flow of aid to the citizens to prevent a full-fledged humanitarian crisis in the strip, while ensuring Hamas does not gain control over the population centers and the aid, and expediting its eradication.

The most effective manner of achieving the aforementioned is by the establishment of displaced cities only in the Strip’s open areas rather than in the populace centers controlled by Hamas. Each city would be under Israeli supervision, without access by UNRWA or Hamas. This can be instrumental in the eradication of the pernicious presence of these two organizations in the Strip. The authority to distribute the aid would be in the hands of a new body that would be established in the Gaza Strip – the Humanitarian Administration of the Gaza Strip.

The role of that body will be the close supervision over the distribution of aid and ensuring these cities are clean of Hamas – or any other organization – terrorist. The displaced cities and the aid they receive will be managed autonomously, with the involvement of local public and aid organizations, without Israeli intervention in their daily operation.

How does it work?

Each displaced city will collaborate with the General Humanitarian Coordination Administration. The Administration’s role will be to ensure that the IDF has cleared the area of underground and other terrorist infrastructures even before the establishment of the new cities, to supervise their construction and lists of eligible residents, to ensure they remain clean of Hamas members, and to coordinate the arrival of supplies.

Entry to cities will be possible only with biometric entry documents specific to each city, and through security checks and metal detectors, which will prevent terrorists or gangs from infiltrating the cities or bringing in weapons.

At the same time, the IDF’s perimeter security force in the area and a system of routes and crossings will enable Israel to dissect the Gaza Strip into separate units, and will increase Israel’s control over the Strip and its ability to prevent Hamas from regaining control of the territory.

The goal – creating an alternative government to Hamas

The proximity to the population and control over aid supply will make it easier for Israel to cultivate a positive and peace-oriented local leadership that will assume only civilian powers. This leadership will be an alternative to both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which has proved to be a weak, corrupt and terror-supporting body that must not rule Gaza again.

To ensure that the local administration does not undermine Israel, it will be given only civil and humanitarian powers – not political or policy-making authorities. Although the IDF will not have a role inside the cities, it will have the full freedom to operate within them when the need arises in order to cleanse them of terrorists and terrorist infrastructure.

The best solution – safe, efficient and cost-effective

The “Humanitarian Islands” program has distinct advantages over other solutions – it is based on a well-known international model of creating displaced persons cities, which has been successfully implemented many times over the years across the world, e.g. in Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as on the experience gathered from the creation of improvised displaced cities in the Gaza Strip today.

In light of the extensive and successful experience with similar initiatives, it is possible to implement the program already in an efficient and gradual manner. It is worthwhile to start by establishing displaced towns in the northern Gaza Strip, where Hamas has relatively little military and civilian control, and later to establish additional cities in other parts of the Strip.

Another significant advantage of this plan is that the cost will not fall on the Israeli taxpayer. As is already the case in Gaza today and in similar situations around the world, funding will come only from international sources and will be budgeted for the various aid agencies.

In contrast to military rule or any form of Israeli control, a temporary humanitarian administration, which will hold no political authority and is operated by the local population, will encourage cooperation and reduce resistance.

The bottom line: The Humanitarian Island Plan will allow Israel to isolate Hamas, deny it access to aid and population centers, and eradicate it as a governing force, while at the same time cultivating local representation in the cities as an alternative leadership for the day after the war. All of this makes its implementation a necessary condition for the Gaza War to end with a real and decisive victory for Israel over Hamas.

For the full study >>

הפוסט Aid Displace, Cripple Hamas: A Humanitarian Solution that Could Change the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Days away from President-Elect Trump’s inauguration, a clear foreign policy vision is shaping around who used to be considered as a supposed isolationist-in-chief. In spite of his clear domestic priorities on the economy and mass migration, Trump wisely realized what his predecessor and ideological forebear, President Reagan, did: keeping the American people safe means maintaining a “margin of safety” for America. This, in a nutshell, is the doctrine of Peace Through Strength: muscling up American effort abroad to keep peace at home.

There is no greater arena where this margin has been gradually waning than the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis, that I would dare to refer to as CRIN. As Trump is calling out China for its malicious trade practices and grave danger to the US national security; vowing to end the Russian invasion to Ukraine; and threatening to take military control over the Panama Canal and Greenland “for national security purposes”, as he did during this week’s press conference. Trump is certainly not signaling he is only introspective as 2025 begins.

Yet one weak link is standing out in this axis, an opportunity to make good on Trump’s pledge to “stop the chaos” in the Middle East that ensued the Hamas horrific October 7 attacks on Israel: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran with its nuclear weapons program has become the number one destabilizing force in the Middle East, rendering Trump’s much-sought-after stability and prosperity so elusive. Its Leader Ali Khamenei is committed to destroy Israel, a major US ally, openly marking it in his crosshairs as a “cancerous tumor that needs to be removed”. Khamenei envisions bringing Israel’s unceremonious end while destabilizing the Sunni regimes in the Arab countries that neighbor Iran, uniting the Middle East under his rule. And he laid out a multi-billion-dollar plan to do just that.

Yet now, as Israel is methodically toppling the Iranian domino stones, Khamenei’s vision and aggression are backfiring. That represents an unprecedented opportunity to take a limited, pre-emptive military action against the Iranian nuclear danger, taking it off the table for good – with a relatively low cost. One of the very first decisions the newly-elected President will have to make is how to finally bring stability to the Middle East, and the key lies not in Gaza, but in Tehran.

The nuclear gun on the table

There are two main reasons why this crossroads represents a viable opportunity to take action against Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

First, Iran is more dangerous than ever before. Iran has been fast-tracking its nuclear weapons program over the course of Biden’s presidency with little international scrutiny. According to the recent report by the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Iran is a mere nod away from acquiring a sufficient amount of weapon-grade enriched uranium for a dozen nuclear devices. The only thing standing in its way is a green light by Khamenei and his cronies – and the Middle East and the world will face red alert.

Secondly, however, is that Iran is less ominous and more vulnerable than it is ready to admit. Its regional proxy strategy to checkmate Israel has gone on a downward spiral since the horrific October 7 atrocities. Its protégés Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen – all suffered heavy blows by Israel’s military efforts. Meanwhile, Assad fled Syria, leaving it at the mercy of HTS’ jihadists. This frontal defense has collapsed, and can no longer protect the Iranian homeland.

That, while Israel’s first-ever retaliation on Iranian soil in October reportedly eliminated much of Tehran’s much-dreaded air defense systems. It highlighted Tehran’s cluelessness in thwarting attacks on its well-protected, most-valued strategic assets.

Finally, even as Tehran was determined to avenge Israel for the series of humiliating blows it was inflicted by, it failed. In both April and October, Iran launched hundreds of missiles and attack drones, only to be mostly derailed by Israel’s tip-of-the-spear air defense and F-35 squadrons. That, on top of regional cooperation under MEAD (Middle East Air Defense) by stealthily supportive Arab countries, that shared critical intelligence, under the auspices of the United States Military’s Central Command.

Removing the Iranian cloud, gaining regional cooperation

The real tie-breaking Iranian gun on the table is the one with nuclear bullets. Especially now, as the Assad regime fell, Iran might conclude it has no other choice to secure its regime but to break out to a bomb, to compensate for its perceived weakness after all the blows it has suffered.

Trump, much like Reagan, despises the idea of nuclear proliferation. His continuous alerts again a possible Russian use of nukes against Ukraine and his graphic, somber descriptions of the terrible human tragedy that might ensue teaches that he considers global security much more ominous than the way he is usually described.

Removing the Iranian shady cloud over the Middle East will also obtain large-scale regional shifts: Saudi Arabia, and many other pragmatic countries in the Arab world, preferred to sit on the sidelines at best, or alienate themselves from the United States and warm up relations with Iran at worst. Iran’s threats on their sovereignty were well received, and short of any meaningful support from Washington, they preferred to equip themselves with an insurance policy, and side with the regional bully. Without this threat, the path for Israeli-Arab normalization and for long-term stability in the Middle East will be wide-open.

On the global level, this heavy blow to Iran will also significantly weaken its superpower patrons, Russia and China. Those continue to support Iran, whether its Russia’s continued purchasing of military equipment like drones and missiles that fuel the war in Ukraine, or China’s circumvention of American sanctions in buying massive amounts of oil barrels from the Ayatollahs, saving the Iranian petro-state from economic collapse.

Only inches away from clinching nuclear weapons, Iran does not stop threatening the US and its allies. Especially since October 7, Israel and the world have learned the hard way that their enemies should be taken at their word. Should not be taken lightly. The disastrous results of allowing Iran to nuclearize cannot be overstressed.

Trump is now facing a golden opportunity to take the Iranian gun off the table, and deny Khamenei of his radical vision. The new reality in the Middle East renders limited pre-emptive military action – no boots on the ground – much more realistic. This option used to be considered risking regional war, yet the Iranian gates of hell have already broken on the region, and backfired. Iran’s newfound weakness invites American leadership, not against the regime – but against its capabilities to threaten the region and the world.

Recently Trump declared he was looking to establish “long-lasting peace” in the region. Now it is his time to greenlight the strike that will close the Iranian nuclear program and open the door for this very peace. Weakened proxies and air defenses, a readier-than-ever region, and gains that clearly trump the cost. Checkmate.

The article was originally published on the Jerusalem Post

הפוסט Trump’s Golden Opportunity to Checkmate Iran and Stabilize the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

When Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Yaron Buskila, Director General of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, ended a 24-year term of service in the IDF where he served as a combat soldier and commander, he traveled to South America, and found himself one day on a volcano in the middle of a storm, with a group of hikers in need of rescue.

“There was a hail storm and heavy fog”, he recalls, “and we just couldn’t find our way back. I tried to get on the internet to report our location, and when I connected, a Facebook post immediately popped up about the new movement called the IDSF HaBithonistim, founded by General (res.) Amir Avivi, whom I had never met. From that stormy mountain, I wrote to Avivi: “Amir, this is exactly what I need. The minute I land in Israel, I want to meet you”.

If you’re wondering what happened to the group – Yaron navigated and led it back to the point of departure and all its members were rescued.

“I Came to The Understanding That I’m Discharged from The Army – Not the Country”

The announcement on the foundation of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement reached Yaron at an opportune moment, after deliberating during the months before leaving the army what he wishes to do going forward.

What where you deliberating about?

“I was offered a variety of positions in the private sector, with remunerations that I could only have dreamt of previously. But something weighed down on me. I had to ask myself: ‘after dedicating my life to the protection of the country, is my sole purpose in life now merely making money?’ I am being discharged from the army but not from the country. I want – and must – continue to make a difference through my work”.

What about Amir’s message caught your attention?

“Amir talked about giving security issues a platform that had not been voiced until then – despite the sentiments on the streets of Israel. I felt there was something very right about what he was doing. The army has its perspectives that are not necessary correct many times, not to mention biased often by foreign considerations and oriented towards professional considerations alone. There are not enough voices challenge the military chiefs. I myself had experienced this when serving in the army, when, for example, I would try to raise the need for better security of the IDF’s military basis, or about the professional level of the reserves array, or even about the rules of engagement that in their present form – require soldiers to place themselves in harm’s way to protect the enemy”.

So, you bring it up to the command. How do they react?

“The tell me that it’s not my role to talk. Even in my last position – a base commander – I witnessed how the poor state of preparedness of the base was glossed over. I said to myself that something must change here because one day we’ll really find ourselves in a state of war, unprepared, and will have to deal with the consequences of the negligence and lack of professionalism”.

Is the security misconception an army issue or is it more widespread?

n the days and indeed years leading to the October 7 massacre, the leadership of the security and political system, was caught in what was dubbed in Israel “the (mis)conception” – The absolute, unchallenged uncertainty in these circles on the military superiority of Israel, which included the belief that the border with Gaza is impermeable thanks to a cutting edge multi-billion/million security system. This rigid change-resistant approach was oftentimes blind to oppositional or simply different approaches and ideas, even when all evident painted a clear picture, thus the system failed to raise the alarm bells on the night of October 6.

“Before I blame the government, the IDF and the General Security Services for the October 7 attack, I first blame us, society. We took to the streets to protest the economic reforms, the cost of living, of houses, of cottage cheese. But never have we protested in earnest about the ongoing suffering of the Negev communities from the rockets and explosive balloons, or about the fact that children in in Kibbutz Nir Oz play in a kindergarten that is completely surrounded by concrete safety structures, and about the mounting danger growing right under our noses. We’ve chosen to put up with this, instead of conveying incontrovertibly to the decision-makers that the current situation is unacceptable”.

“Thank You For Being a Voice”

Upon arriving back to Israel from South America, he met with Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi and asked him how many members the movement has. The answer at the time was ten. Since that meeting a decade ago, the number soared exponentially and is now 35,000 officers, soldiers and civilians.

Today, do you feel that the security voice that was absent receives an appropriate platform?

“Not a week goes by without a senior officer telling me – ‘good for you. I cannot speak out (as a member of the military), so thank you for being a voice for me’. I even had generals telling me – ‘it’s good you’re doing this because you’re saving the army’”.

What makes the IDSF HaBithonistim movement succeed where others failed?

“The important thing is that the Movement approaches the military profession and Israel’s security needs without bias and without a political agenda whatsoever. In order to truly and fully understand the security situation and formulate a suitable strategy, one must rely on facts rather than self-serving needs and personal believes, which cloud the ability to make an objective analysis of the situation. Israel’s security apparatus, the media and part of the public base their perception of the situation on concepts that are either misguided or based on hopes and believes that ended crashing into the wall of reality, time and time again. The IDSF HaBithonistim movement has the knowledge and hands-on experience coupled with a clearly defined goal of knowledge–sharing to state exactly what is needed to safeguard the security of Israel to ensure its existence down the generations in the chaotic and volatile geopolitical environment of the Middle East, based not on pipe dreams and believes but on the understanding that our enemies will forever strive to harm Israel and create the opportunity to annihilate it”.

What does it mean to act without bias or political agenda?

“It means that in the IDSF HaBithonistim movement there is simply no room for politics, but only for approaches that come from a fact-based and professional thought. The Movement’s position is, that Israel needs defendable borders and the freedom to defend itself, and this calls from a strategy that is based on facts on the ground. We have room for all opinions, so long as they are based on professional, objective and verified facts”.

Were you able to sidestep the misconception?

“No. I can tell you that as far back as January 2022 we raised the alarm to the command of the security establishment that Hamas is not deterred – far from it, sitting in wait for the opportune moment. We put the limelight on the convergence of arenas that Iran is aiming at through its proxies. We even said that it is advisable to thwart Iran’s schemes from within Gaza. Amir Aviv had even warned that if we don’t do so – then in a year or two down the road, we’ll encounter a Hamas that is at the peak of its power, saying in the following words: ‘if we fail to take initiative, we will find ourselves in a Yom Kippur [War] scenario’. Tragically, all these forecasts, which were based on an exhaustive paper we had authored and presented to the government, have come true”.

“Remembering What We’re Fighting For”

And indeed, the misconception red flagged by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement before the political decision makers, came crashing tragically on Israel’s head with the horrific events of October 7 In the outbreak of those events, Yaron spend an entire day driving from one battlefield to another, cobbling together control teams, rescuing and evacuating as many survivors of the attacks as he could. By the end of that day, he was on the verge of physical and emotional collapse.

“After I saw what I did on October 7, my eyesight literally became black”, he recounts the difficult moments from that day. “Then, on October 8, I drive to a mission in one of the main roads of the Gaza envelope communities, and see before me a huge traffic jam that ran from Be’er Sheba to the Ze’elim military base. Tens of thousands of cars – all reservists who didn’t wait to be summoned and came to volunteer, without anyone telling them to do so. I looked at this and told myself that this is cause for optimism”.

What epiphany did you have at that moment?

“That in the end of the day, despite the deep social chasm in Israel on October 6, after the disaster the day later, the nation understands that it’s time for unity. In other countries, harsh wars rip apart entire nations, topple governments and wreak havoc. In Israel, it’s the other way around – when the sword is on our neck we unite, fight – and win. That bloody Saturday had proven in a stellar manner that the Israeli nation is stronger than we had ever could imagine”.

What is the IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s most important achievement since October 7?

“We’ve contributed to promoting the belief among Israeli society and government, that it is possible – and crucial – to enter the Gaza Strip and overthrow Hamas. We’ve voiced a clear and uncompromising stand for the moral imperative to engage in a war to crush Hamas and return the Israeli hostages. We encouraged the people and the leaders of Israel and changed the public discourse through the media”.

In what fashion did you encourage the Israeli leadership?

“We tried to get them to rise to the importance of the emerging opportunity to change the map. In my first meeting with PM Netanyahu the day after the October 7 attack, I said to him: ‘I can tell you one thing – at this point in time, the people are not behind Benjamin Netanyahu, but the entire nation stands behind the Prime Minister. Launch this attack’”.

Did you conduct activities with the troops in the field?

“Yes. We endeavored to lend as much support as possible to the commanders in the field. Similarly to the political leadership, it is important to continue inspiring the belief in their mission. I remember getting into a motivational talk with my division commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, after which he hugged me and thanked me, saying that he needed that moral boost. Every commander needs to feel that their subordinates are with them”.

You had said that in order to win – one must remember the cause. What cause do you fight for?

“I’ll tell you something. When taking over Beit Hanoun in the northeast tip of the Gaza Strip, an amazing thing happened. Normally, when choosing the location of the brigade commander’s HQ in the field, the first order of the day is to put up a sandbag wall around the parameter to protect it against snipers. But the commander of the 5th Brigade, Colonel Tal Koritzky, doesn’t do that, but something completely different. He orders the soldiers to pull out the letters they received from children from their vests, and hang them on the wall – right in front of their eyes. I ask him why this is his first order, and he explained: ‘I want my soldiers to remember why we’re here. Not to conquer Gaza or kill, but for the protection of future generations.’ So that’s what I’m fighting for – for the next generation.”

“Winning In the Hague Won’t Beat Terror”

The IDSF HaBithonistim’s third arena of activity aimed at boosting national moral during the Gaza War is the media.

Your media-footprint has increased exponentially since October 7. What do you think caused this?

“This happened because we’ve introduced another voice into the public discourse. The public wanted answers, and the media finally started giving a platform to those who do not parrot the usual political rhetoric. Also, thanks to our work and media presence, the tone of the discourse has changed and shifted to a language of strength which calls for the elimination of the enemy until victory, instead of opinions that try to walk on eggshells. Until then, we always tried to win at the Hague international court. The problem was that if you win at the Hague – you don’t beat terror. Anyhow, chances are of winning in the Hague are slim”.

“Cooking For Soldiers Is No Less Significant Than a Commander’s Motivational Talk”

Nearly all the Movement’s veteran members reported for prolonged reserve’s duty following the October 7 attack. As an officer of the Gaza Division’s Operations Directorate, Yaron served in the reserve duty for 150 successive days, while at the same time leading the Movement and together with the many other members stepping up to help the soldiers in the field.

“We set up a whole system of logistic support and the transfer of combat equipment to the soldiers,” he says. “The contribution of this to morale on the ground is enormous, and I emphasize morale – because when a soldier gets a tactical helmet, it’s not only that he receives grade A equipment, but he also knows that he is being thought of and supported. This kind of mobilization in Israeli society really exists across all walks of life throughout the entire country. In my community, for example, all the women have been cooking, every single week, for the fourteen months since the outbreak of the war – and every week a military Hummer comes and collects the food for the soldiers in Gaza. This is no less important for motivation than a battalion commander’s motivational talk.”

“Cultivating A Generation of New Commanders”

Perhaps the most important way in which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is boosting national resilience in the long term is through education. In the coming years, the Movement intends to establish a network of pre-military preparatory programs, the first of which will operate in Moshav Tekuma in the Gaza envelope – in part to assist with the rehabilitation and support the communities there, especially the moshav itself, which was severely damaged on October 7.

How did the military preparatory program initiative come about?

“During the Gaza War we saw the strengths of the commanders and leaders, but we also saw shortcomings and understood that this is something that must be addressed among others, by cultivating a future generation of commanders instilled with the values of Zionism on which the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is based. We are getting a deluge of astonishing positive feedbacks and are witnessing a huge demand for such programs across the country”.

What other educational activities does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement conduct?

““We are sent on part of the IDF to give talks in educational institutions and conduct recruitment conferences. We are now the leading organization in Israel that engages in the motivation of youth to enlist to military service. We also plan to expand our educational enterprise to Jewish youth overseas, with the aim of encouraging Alyia (immigration to Israel) and cultivating a strong Zionistic identity, and if God is willing – we aim to expand our activity to academic institutions as well”.

Was there any particular moment that had shown you the power of education?

“While I was in the field, fighting, Amir had met up with me at the Nova festival area. A male and female officer approached us and said: ‘We heard you talk when we where at the military preparatory program at Be’er Orah’, and they asked whether we would be willing to come speak to their soldiers. We both had spoken in the program at lease once. I said to Amir: ‘Look at that. A one-year preparatory program, endless lectures and talks, and they say that meeting us had such an effect on them. And that’s only after one talk. Imagine what can be accomplished with a half a year or year in a military preparatory program; the effect this could have on the youth”.

“Charting the Day After the War”

Alongside its activities for cultivating the future generations of determined Zionists, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement is driving change in the immediate term as well. Throughout the year, the Movement’s research department has been publishing policy studies and position papers on a variety of local and foreign security-related topics, which are submitted to decision makers. Some of the studies and papers become initiatives promoted by the Movement on an individual project basis. These include housing benefits to reservists, advocating minimum prison sentences for stone-throwing terror, and the prevention of the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to terrorism.

Two of the Movement’s new initiatives, published in December 2024, are the “8000 Plan” for recruiting the ultra-Orthodox community for mandatory service in the security forces and the “Islands Plan: Humanitarian Administration as an Interim Stage in the Gaza Strip,” which deals with eradicating Hamas while preventing a humanitarian crisis and preparing the ground, i. e. Gaza, for the day after the war.

Beyond specific initiatives, do you see that the Movement was able to affect change in the decision-making echelons since you were founded?

“Absolutely. We see a marked change. The members of Knesset had stopped taking at face value what every military, police or GSS member say, and they now want to hear additional views. Most normative people ask for second opinions before opting for surgery, so it’s surely time for MKs to demand second opinions before they make crucial decisions pertaining to the entire nation’s security. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – is a reflection of Israeli society in its entirety, which is no longer willing to automatically accept the decisions of their public elects. The credit for this goes to those who dared to speak out and voice a different opinion – even if it’s unpopular”.

Does the IDSF HaBithonistim movement have future plans in the area of research?

“Yes. One of our goals for the coming year is the upscaling of our research department into a research institute for all intents and purposes, which will collaborate with international researchers, including those who specialize in specific countries such as Russia and China. This networking is important in order to deepen our positioning as a leading research authority that should be taken seriously.”

United Against Misconception

As mentioned, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement already has more than 35,000 members – but Yaron wants more. Many more.

Why is it important for you to grow the Movement?

“Because the movement is only as strong as the general public behind it. The IDSF HaBithonistim is a social movement even before being security-oriented. Our goal is to give all walks of Israeli society the power to make a difference, including those who until recently found themselves silenced. This is not a movement for any political or academic elite, but for everyone. We invite anyone who wishes to contribute to Israel’s security and not just sit at home worrying about it to join and choose the way they want to make an impact.”

And what if I identify with the Movement’s messages but don’t have time to join its activities?

“There’s still a lot you can do: share our posts, articles and videos and expand the circle of our followers on social networks, and thus support and influence. Our content on the website and on social media creates many ripples that change perceptions and outcomes, and those who share them help us ensure that Israel does not get caught up in misconceptions again. Think about it – preventing the next misconception and realizing Israel’s security are right at the tip of your fingers.”

Image credit: Personal album Yaron Buskila / Shutterstock

הפוסט Lt. Col. (res.) Yaron Buskila: “Our Society Is Stronger Than We Could Ever Believe” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 27, 2024, the day the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect, the Syrian rebels took advantage of the opportunity and launched an attack against Bashar al-Assad’s army. After only 11 days, their forces had taken control of Damascus and completed the conquest of Syria. Assad himself fled to Russia.

Many were amazed at the dizzying speed with which the Syrian regime fell, and at the depth of hatred among the enraged crowd that wrecked the statue of the elder Assad and dragged it through Damascus.

The person least surprised was Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a member of the IDSF movement and one of the leading experts in Middle East studies. His analysis seems to imply that the Baath regime in Syria could have come to no different end.

Greater infidels than Jews and Christians

“The rebels succeeded in taking control of Syria so quickly because Syria is a hollow country. The people don’t believe in it and the army isn’t willing to die for it,” Kedar said in a special conversation with Or Yissachar, head of the IDSF research department, after the dramatic developments in Syria. “My book ‘Assad in Search of Legitimacy’ (2005) proves what other Orientalists have tried to deny or ignore,” claims Kedar, “which is that Hafez Assad, and later his son Bashar, tried in vain all these years to become legitimate rulers in the eyes of the public. They never succeeded. They didn’t have a nickel’s worth of legitimacy. Nothing, zero, nada. They ruled by force. Everything was phony, and that’s why it fell apart so quickly.”

Kedar explains that this is a chronicle of a collapse foretold. “Syria’s biggest problem is that in 1966 it was taken over by members of the Alawite religion, a minority who are considered by the country’s Sunni Muslim majority to be infidels – idolaters whose fate is to either convert to Islam or be slaughtered. The renowned medieval Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyyah called the Alawites ‘greater infidels than the Jews and Christians.’ Therefore, from the perspective of Muslims, an Alawite cannot be a ruler.”

Brutal repression and strategic surprise

“To deal with the hostility of the Muslim majority towards them,” says Kedar, “the Alawite leaders from the Marxist faction of the Baath Party – the secular nationalist party that has ruled Syria since taking over in 1966 – established a terrible dictatorial regime. It suppressed rebellions brutally. In 1976, the Muslim Brotherhood mounted an uprising in Syria and thousands of Sunni rebels fought against the government. The uprising ended in February 1982 with the Great Hama Massacre, where between 20,000 and 40,000 people were murdered. Military forces under the command of Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother, blew up houses with the residents inside – including old people, women, and children – and they killed other victims with gas. About 20,000 more people, who were taken into custody, were murdered in Palmyra prison.

“The next round began in March 2011, with a wave of anti-government protests that erupted as part of what was then called the ‘Arab Spring.’ Then too, in various regions, the rebellion was suppressed with deadly force. Many Syrian Muslims fled north to the Idlib region, close to Turkiye. The Turks helped them arm and equip themselves, organize, train, and prepare for the great day when they would break out and liberate the country from the rule of the Assad family.”

For 14 years, the rebels in the Idlib region waited, gathered strength, armed themselves, and watched for the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow to the Assad regime. “The turning point,” explains Kedar, “came with the end of Hezbollah’s war against Israel, which left the regime especially weakened.”

How did the rebels mount their surprise attack?

“Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – an Islamist organization formerly called Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated with al-Qaeda – was the first to attack, under the command of Muhammad al-Julani. The other rebel organizations quickly followed suit, to take advantage of the strategic surprise that wound up costing the Assad regime its life.”

Kedar describes the course of the battles: “First the rebel forces attacked in Aleppo, and a few days later they proceeded south to Hama and later to Homs. After that area was conquered, the Druze in As-Suwayda and the Bedouin in Daraa also joined the rebellion against the government. Then it was a short path to the conquest of Damascus and the final defeat of Assad.”

We will have won when Israeli flags are hoisted over former Iranian embassies

Although the rebels fought as a single front in the recent campaign, in reality they are a variety of organizations and their agendas differ and sometimes clash. “In the Idlib region, refugees from Daesh, Al Qaeda, and other organizations have accumulated over the years, especially after 2018. In contrast, there were also secular and multi-ethnic organizations without any religious agenda. They included Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawites, and members of other groups. These organizations appear more moderate and pragmatic, and at least two of them accept Israel. I know this because I’m in contact with their leaders,” Kedar reveals.

Does the agenda of most rebels actually appear to be relatively moderate?

“The statements that most organizations are issuing are quite positive. Some even say that Israel has nothing to fear. One of the organizations I’m in contact with wrote to me that for them the great victory over Assad, the Iranians, and Hezbollah will be when the Iranian embassies in Damascus and Amman have Israeli flags flying, meaning those buildings have become the Israeli embassies.”

It would be better for the rebels to establish a liberal regime

“There is no unified Syrian people,” explains Kedar. “Syria is an artificial state. It’s deeply divided ethnically, into Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Armenians – and religiously, into Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Alawites – and tribally, into powerful clans and extended families, many of them armed and valuing their internal loyalties and their own agendas. Those groups were together only because of the arbitrary border that France established when it concluded its mandate in the region. The gaps and tensions along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines have prevented a true Syrian people from forming.” According to Kedar, this is precisely the reason that it would be beneficial for al-Julani to establish a relatively liberal regime.

“If Syria becomes an Islamist state like Daesh or a dictatorship that tries to impose a unified national identity, it could fall apart – because the Druze, Kurds, and other minorities would not want to live in such a state.” On the other hand, if Syria were a pluralistic state as it was in the 1950s, intervening less harshly in the lives of its citizens, then all sorts of forces that want independence – such as the Alawites in the coastal region – could very possibly be content with what they have and not try to dismantle the country.”

If the alternative is Iran – I prefer Daesh

When asked whether the disintegration of countries like Iran or Syria will negatively affect stability in the Middle East, Kedar replies surprisingly that on the contrary, it will only improve stability.

“Only the Emirates, which are homogeneous countries, have remained stable over many years in this region. In contrast, countries made of several groups, heterogeneous countries, are very unstable. Consider, for example, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. They each include ethnic, religious, and tribal groups that don’t associate with each other, so why force them to live in a single framework?

If an extremist Islamist state like Daesh is established, is it still good for Israel that the Assad regime has fallen?

“Even the worst militias in Syria pose a threat that is primarily tactical – automatic weapons and heavy machine guns mounted on Toyotas. If I have to choose between that and a strategic threat from Iran in the form of ballistic missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons soon, then I prefer to deal with Daesh. Of course I really want to avoid that. But if the alternative is Iran, I prefer Daesh.”

Israel is ready for any scenario

Is uncertainty about the nature of Syria’s emerging regime the reason for the preventive measures that Israel has taken in recent weeks?

“Exactly. Israel is preparing for the worst-case scenario, in which extremist Islamists have control of Syria. That’s why we’re seeing a very large concentration of forces in the Golan. For the meantime, until it becomes clear where the new government is headed, the IDF has captured the Syrian side of Mount Hermon – which is higher than the Israeli side – and has also improved the Israeli positions on the Golan itself. These steps are important and it’s good that they were taken as a way of warding off danger and ensuring that we don’t relive October 7th – this time on the Golan – with military forces entering the State of Israel because it fell asleep on the watch.

“It’s impossible to know what will happen in Syria,” concludes Kedar. “It could be an Islamist terrorist state like Daesh, or an open, modern, liberal state like Syria was in the past. We have to wait and see. We can only hope that a reasonable, normal government will be established there that Israel can reach a dialogue with, so that we all can feel calmer about what’s happening across the border.”

הפוסט “Syria was always a fake – that’s why it fell apart so quickly” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In September 2024, the Swedish authorities accused Iran of responsibility for thousands of text messages sent to residents of Sweden in 2023 and calling to avenge a Quran burning that had occurred in the kingdom. According to official Swedish sources, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had penetrated the Swedish text messaging system in a cyber attack and sent approximately 15,000 text messages in Swedish regarding the Quran burning. The Iranian embassy in Sweden characterized the accusation as “baseless” and as fabricated to “poison” relations between Tehran and Stockholm. For his part, the operational chief of Sweden’s security services (Säpo), Fredrik Hallström, said that the text messages were intended “to paint the picture of Sweden as an Islamophobic country” and “to create division in Swedish society,”

As early as August 2023, Swedish media reported that many people across Sweden had received text messages in Swedish calling for vengeance against those who burned the Quran. According to senior Swedish prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist, the messages were sent by a group that calls itself the Anzu Team. The messages’ content, as broadcast on Sweden’s SVT television network, said that “Those who desecrated the Quran must have their work covered in ashes” and called the Swedes “demons.” The public demonstrations that included Quran burning were covered by freedom of expression as protected under the Swedish constitution and therefore permitted by the police. However, those demonstrations did touch off a storm in the Middle East and brought threats from various sources, including Muslim states, against Sweden and against its citizens.

The storm surrounding the Quran burning began after Rasmus Paludan, a right-wing extremist with Danish and Swedish roots, set fire to a Quran outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm in January 2023, and outside the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen later during the same month. Paludan’s actions were copied by others such as Salwan Momika, an Iraqi refugee in Sweden who had prior connections with Christian militias in Iraq. Momika, demonstrating outside a Stockholm mosque in June 2023 during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha holiday, began setting a Quran afire.

As a result, several Arab countries — including the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia — summoned Swedish diplomatic representatives for reprimands. Iraq went so far as to break off relations with Sweden after a second Quran burning included setting the Iraqi flag on fire as well. In an additional response, crowds of Shiites torched the Swedish embassy in Baghdad. In Iran, the US flag was burned opposite the Swedish embassy and Sweden was warned that it would “suffer consequences.” A spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, summoned the Swedish ambassador for a reprimand and announced: “We strongly condemn the repeated desecration of the Holy Quran … in Sweden, and we hold the Swedish government fully responsible” for events that are “inciting the feelings of Muslims around the world” and for the consequences.

Further to the Iranian reprimand, the Hezbollah organization — a very close proxy of Iran’s — held a demonstration against Sweden in Beirut, in which it brandished a picture of the assassinated commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. In Malmö, Sweden’s third-largest city and home to a large Muslim population, many confrontations broke out as a result of the Quran burning. Many immigrants living in the city’s Rosengård neighborhood threw stones and torched tens of autos in an extremely violent riot. The Quran burnings frightened leaders in Western and Northern Europe. Following the events, the Swedish Prime Minister even added that “We are currently in the most serious security situation since the Second World War,”

In light of the unrest generated by those demonstrations, plus the rage among the Muslim immigrants throughout Sweden, Iran decided to “retaliate” in Sweden by the same method that it has long used against its opponents: intensifying the schisms in the local society. That tactic takes the spreading of the Iranian revolution several steps onward, not only by instigating terror attacks but also by enlarging Iran’s sphere of influence and creating social chaos. First, Iran infiltrates the country’s local Shiite community, if one exists, and then it proceeds into other population sectors or radical elements that can destabilize the country’s government, Iran’s hope being to intensify societal tensions in the case of a western state or to topple the regime in the case of a Mideast state such as Iraq. Spreading disinformation is an established Iranian method of operations in Israel, but now Iran is trying to employ it in countries across the ocean such as the USA, and in European countries such as Sweden.

The Iranians are not only advancing as the main opponent in their rival countries but also advancing against their enemies, or representative offices of their enemies, in third countries — including Israeli missions abroad. Thus, for example, last May the Swedish internal security agency accused Iran of employing criminal organizations in Sweden to attack Israeli or Jewish targets in Swedish territory. Security sources in Sweden confirmed an announcement from the Mossad that the Ayatollahs’ regime was using criminal gangs in European countries, including Sweden and Belgium, to attack Israeli and Jewish targets.

In fact, Iran was behind three unsuccessful attacks against Israeli targets in Sweden and Belgium between January and May 2024. On January 31, a hand grenade was thrown at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. The grenade did not explode. On May 16, shots were fired at the embassy in Stockholm. Subsequently, on May 24, two grenades were thrown at the Israeli embassy in Brussels. Investigation of the incidents revealed that Iran was behind the attacks, having enlisted criminal organizations that, at the same time, were at odds with one another. It appears that even in its relations with criminal organizations, Iran applies a method based on the dynamics between the parties in order to exploit the advantage of one organization over the other or to exploit the rivalry.

The use of criminal organizations for terrorism coincides with Iran’s policy of trying to promote terrorist activity against its enemies without leaving traces of its own involvement. The Iranians fund and direct criminal organizations around Europe just as they fund and direct Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Houthis of Yemen, and others. Iran avoids leaving its national fingerprints, in order to minimize political and legal repercussions that could lead to international sanctions against Tehran.

One of those Swedish criminal organizations is Foxtrot, considered the country’s largest criminal network. Its members have been responsible for many murders and for extensive drug trafficking. The organization’s boss is Rawa Majid, a Swedish citizen of Kurdish origin who is wanted by Interpol and who, on instructions from Iran, instigates attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe. However, a number of young people arrested following the shooting attack at the Israeli embassy in Stockholm were Iranian by background and were connected with the Rumba criminal gang, which is led by Ismail Abdo, a former associate of Majid’s at Foxtrot who is now his greatest rival.

The Ayatollahs’ regime directly threatens Sweden’s national security. Iran spies against Sweden’s industries, research institutes, and universities. Last June a strategic agreement was exposed that enables the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to exploit cooperation between Iranian and Swedish universities in order to advance Iran’s military programs.

That agreement, which until then was unknown to the Swedish authorities, permits the Revolutionary Guards to exploit academic cooperation between Swedish universities and their Iranian counterparts in order to acquire technological knowledge in fields such as UAVs, artificial intelligence, and advanced electronics. There are at least eight Swedish universities with ties to Iranian universities. The agreement threatens the national security not only of Sweden but also of all the other NATO countries. Sweden joined the transatlantic alliance in March 2023, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who for a time had vetoed its membership in the wake of Quran burning and anti-Turkish demonstrations in Stockholm, withdrew his objection. A strategic agreement of this kind serves the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, accentuating the threat of espionage and the infiltration of foreign forces into a NATO country.

Still, the main target of Iranian espionage is the Iranian opposition groups in Sweden. Like other European countries, Sweden has become a base of operations where Iranian agents plan their espionage and their attacks. One example involves Asadollah Asadi, an Iranian diplomat whom a Belgian court sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for terrorism. Asadi, who was third secretary at the Iranian embassy in Austria, was arrested by German security forces on a Bavarian highway in 2018, mere days after passing explosives to two Iranians in Belgium. The explosives were intended for an attack on members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organization — opponents of the Iranian regime — at a rally in Paris where then US Vice President Mike Pence was also in attendance. Although Asadi was posted to Austria and his crime was planned for France, interrogation and confiscated materials showed he was closely connected to Iranian agents in Sweden. The German police confiscated a notebook in which Asadi had recorded 289 sites, in 11 European countries, where he met Iranian agents. Among those countries was Sweden. This proved that the Iranians had active agents there — a fact further emphasized in December 2019 when an Iraqi citizen living in Sweden was convicted of spying for Iran against Iranian exiles who were Swedish residents. In May 2023 Asadi was released in a prisoner swap between Iran and Belgium, in return for Olivier Vandecasteele, a humanitarian worker whom Iran had arrested in 2022.

Europe and the international community must take note of Iran’s behavior, which threatens not only the countries of the Middle East but also those countries of the West that maintain diplomatic ties with Iran. Because of Iran’s extensive network extending into many of the world’s nations, Tehran can enlist local extremist elements or even, if it wishes, local criminal gangs as in the case of Sweden. With its subversion, Iran attempts to deepen the crises and conflicts in many countries, to widen societal rifts in order to topple governments, and to fragment nations. The widening of rifts and disagreements contributes to Iran’s efforts at weakening the West and strengthening its claim that western democracy is fundamentally flawed. The flourishing of local criminal organizations, alongside disinformation campaigns that poison the public discourse, could bring anarchy to the western nations and crumble them from within while the Muslim world grows stronger — with Iran seeing itself as the spearhead leading the Shiite alliance toward a Shiite Islamic hegemony.

The Iranians rule no tactics out. They use various organizations, but in similar methods: exacerbating societal rifts and disagreements, exploiting local groups to advance Iranian interests, using cyber tools to increase Iranian influence, and more. What Iran is doing in Israel, it also does in the western countries. Sweden is a single case among many in which Iran is waging dangerous subversion throughout the West. The Scandinavian countries, and the West in general, must understand that in the face of the Iranian threat, they share an interest with Israel. For a long time now, Iran has been threatening more than just the Middle East. Its subversion has made it a threat to security everywhere in the West.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Iran’s subversive activity in Sweden הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

On November 5th, during a press conference at Parliament Hill in Ottawa, the UN special rapporteur, Francesca Albanese once again accused Israel of the usual, which means genocide in Gaza, apartheid, atrocities, tortures, occupation, mass arrests and even of executing Palestinian children.

After citing the view of one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party, Antonio Gramsci, regarding the role of financial power in cultural hegemony, she accused the pro-Israel lobbies, quoted as “very vocal, virulent and aggressive”, of pressuring governments to boycott her.

One of the journalists attending the press conference asked her for clarifications, if she really thought that meetings and events were cancelled “because of the pro-Israel groups pressure”.

Albanese replied that she could not tell what the causes behind the withdrawal of the invitations and meetings were and added: “I only know, I mean, I base myself on facts. It happened after pro-Israel groups and pro-Israel individuals started to accuse me of the usual and I won’t repeat the accusations because they are extremely defamatory…”.

She then accused Israel of taking “the land of historical Palestine as it has been doing ever since, even before its existence”.

When asked by one of the reporters if she believed in the right of Israel to exist, Albanese dodged the question by saying:

“Israel does exist, Israel is a recognized member of the UN. Besides this, there is no such thing in international law as the right of a State to exist…It’s not up to us”.

Albanese provided a colorful example saying that “Italy exists, but if tomorrow Italy and France merged and formed “Itafrance”, fine” and she then brought the issue back to “the right of the Palestinians to exist”.

It is worth recalling that on October 14^th 2024, Francesca Albanese, found herself at the center of a media storm after a series of aggressive anti-Israel posts, published in the previous days on her social media accounts, where she compared Israel to Nazi Germany, sparking outrage from several Jewish organizations, including the World Jewish Congress (WJC), which called for her immediate dismissal from the United Nations.

Appointed in May 2022 as special rapporteur, Albanese has used anti-Semitic stereotypes and legitimized support for terrorism in her criticism of Israel. In addition to regularly portraying Israelis as Nazis and reiterating that “Hamas has the right to resist,” since October 7^th , 2023, Albanese has systematically downplayed the atrocities committed by Palestinian terrorists by denying that the pogrom targeted Jews as such and it was rather a consequence of Israel’s aggressions.

Alleged problematic financial issues

Moving to the recent financial controversies, Article 3 of the Special Procedures Code of Conduct expressly forbids Albanese from accepting remuneration from any governmental or nongovernmental source for activities carried out in pursuit of the mandate. In June 2024, UN Watch called for an investigation into Albanese for “illegally requesting payments for work performed in her official UN capacity” over alleged payments for speaking events and honorarium for a fake lecture; specifically, by circumventing this prohibition, by requesting that, in exchange for her lectures, payments by external groups be made to her research assistant.

The following month, the UN launched an investigation into allegations that Albanese illegally accepted funding from the Australian Friends of Palestine Association (AFOPA) and other pro-Pal groups to fund an estimated $20,000 trip to Australia and New Zealand, in which she lobbied a major pension fund to divest from Israel.  Those groups initially stated that they “sponsored” and “supported” her trip, violating the UN’s rules forbidding remuneration from non-governmental sources.

Albanese denied that AFOPA sponsored her trip, claiming that it was funded by the UN. However, the complaint argues that the UN lacks any legal basis to fund trips by its experts beyond their area of investigation.

On July 12^th 2024, the UN Human Rights Office told JNS that the global body paid for the trip. However, these trips did not appear in the mandated UN special procedures annual report because “it was not a designated ‘country visit’ per se.”

“Only official country visits aimed at assessing the human-rights situation in that country itself, and that are followed by a country visit report to the Human Rights Council, are included in this list,” the UNHRO added.

Ideological issues and problematic statements

Going beyond Albanese’s financial controversies, her extreme ideological positions are obvious, and it is not by coincidence that in July 2024 the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, called for Albanese’s removal from the international body:

“There is no place for antisemitism from UN-affiliated officials tasked with promoting human rights. While the United States has never supported Francesca Albanese’s mandate, it is clear she is not fit for this or any position at the UN.”

The statement was posted on X in reaction to Albanese’s post comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler.

United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Michele Taylor tweeted: “Special rapporteurs should be striving to improve human rights challenges, not employing dehumanizing rhetoric.”

The French representative to the UN called for her immediate dismissal and a thorough investigation into the influences to which she was potentially subjected, arguing that Albanese: “By comparing the defensive operations of Israel – at war for its own survival after the pogroms of 7 October – to the expansion of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, she has crossed a new red line. Her violently anti-Israel and anti-Semitic statements, which have been spreading for years, seriously damage the credibility of our international organizations.”

The German representative, for his part, said that Albanese’s remarks were “a disgrace” and that it was “appalling” that the Special Rapporteur appeared to “justify the horrific terrorist attacks and ‘deny their anti-Semitic nature’.”

Albanese is the first special rapporteur to be condemned by Germany and France for anti-Semitism. Indeed, she replied that “the US, Germany and France are clearly involved and supporting what Israel is doing”.

Before her 2022 UN appointment, Albanese had said that Israel was “keeping captive millions of civilians,”; she organized a panel on “Israel Apartheid,” she campaigned for an arms embargo against Israel and argued that the “Jewish lobby” was in full control of the United States.

After the outbreak of war in the Middle East, Albanese went so far as to deny that the Hamas massacre of October 7th was anti-Semitic: “the worst anti-Semitic massacre of the century? No, Mr. President. The victims of 7/10 were killed not because of their Judaism, but in response to Israel’s oppression.”

These comments prompted the International Legal Forum, a body of more than 4,000 lawyers, to address a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, in February to be the first to call for Albanese’s resignation.

Nevertheless, Albanese continued her anti-Semitic propaganda, voicing her support on X for a post published by human rights official Craig Mokhiber in which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was compared to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler: “That’s exactly what I think.”

In November 2023, in a speech to the National Press Club in Canberra, Australia, Albanese said that Israel cannot claim the right of “self-defense” under international law because Gaza is a territory which it occupies. The statement caused the immediate reaction of the Director of Touro Institute of Human Rights and the Holocaust, Anne Bayefsky, who slammed Albanese’s comments, saying they go “hand-in-hand with all her other legally indefensible claims” regarding the conflict.

In August 2024 Albanese once again denied Israel’s right to self-defense citing the West Bank “occupation” and the “unlawful use of force” in one of her tweets. On another occasion, she even admitted that her personal views on the Palestinian issue could compromise her objectivity.

In addition, Francesca Albanese also omitted the fact that her husband, Massimiliano Calì, worked as an economic advisor for the Palestinian Authority and authored a report entitled “The economic costs of Israeli occupation for the Palestinian occupied territories”.

Why didn’t the UNHRC properly scrutinize her background before hiring her?

Albanese’s anti-Israel propaganda in Italy

While maintaining her position as UN special rapporteur, Albanese was busy spreading anti-Israel propaganda on the Italian media.

On September 11^th 2024, Francesca Albanese was hosted on Alessandro Di Battista’s YouTube channel where she once again accused Israel of “genocide”, of dropping the equivalent of “5 nuclear bombs” in Gaza and claimed that the destruction caused by Israel on Gaza is greater than the one occurred during World War 2, citing Japan and Germany.

Di Battista, on his behalf, stated that Israeli settlers are “fundamentalists who believe that only the creation of a Great Israel can bring to the return of the Messiah” and defined them as “the new Ku Klux Klan…because they behave in the exact same way”.  On this occasion, Albanese once again denied that Hamas slaughtered Israeli children and perpetrated mass rapes, stating that they were “fabricated”.  This is just part of the 58-minute-long video where other concerning statements were made by the two.

Di Battista is well known within the Italian pro-Pal area. A former 5 Star Movement MP, he was exposed on several occasions by the Italian press for being close to Mohammad Hannoun, the Genoa-based Palestinian architect who was recently sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for being a member of Hamas and for collecting and sending funds to the Palestinian terrorist organization. According to the United States, Hannoun has solicited funding for Hamas with senior Hamas officials and sent at least $4 million to Hamas over a 10-year period. Di Battista also traveled with Hannoun to Lebanon, taking part in the architect’s “humanitarian” activity, and spent time in Iran in 2020.

Francesca Albanese has also been invited several times to the Italian TV show “Piazza Pulita” on the LA7 channel where she called for “immediate sanctions against Israel” and she accused Israel of not being a democracy because of the “mistreatment of minorities” and of ruling the West Bank through a “military dictatorship”.

In May 2023, Albanese was interviewed by the HRCM MA director of the already cited Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, for the Peacekeeping International Day, where she once again attacked the “Israeli military presence in the occupied territories aimed at protecting the colonial presence”.

In January 2024, Albanese’s husband used his Facebook account to publicly accuse the Italian Democratic Party of silencing a “sacrosanct debate on the extermination Israel is committing in Palestine, to continue protecting the egregious violations of international law of a criminal state”.

In March 2024, Albanese stated that “the Italian government should sanction Israel” and in May of the same year she gave a long interview to the Italian Communist newspaper “Il Manifesto”, where she once again attacked the Jewish state claiming that “Israel did not want to stop its Gaza operations and accept a truce because it was afraid to see what it had done there”. Among other things, she also accused Israel of immediately striking places of Palestinian identity: churches, mosques, cultural centers, universities, instead of military targets.

UN at its lowest in history

All this can be classified as the activity of a propagandist, a militant, and very far from the necessary impartiality and moderation of a special rapporteur. Overall, the extensive work provided by UN Watch will further compromise Albanese’s position as rapporteur and the UN for having appointed her regardless of her views and propaganda activity.

It is also worth pointing out that Rep. Andre Carson (D-IN) had invited Francesca Albanese to Capitol Hill to brief congressional staff at the end of October 2024, but later canceled the event.

One cannot help but wonder how the situation got to this point. UNRWA working as a front for Hamas in Gaza; the UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres, lamenting the elimination of Hamas terrorist and Nukhba commander Mohammad Abu Ittiwi, cited as “UNRWA colleague”; the UNIFIL-Hezbollah scandal and, last but not least, Albanese’s appointment as special rapporteur regardless of her propaganda and networking and activity. This is indeed the darkest time for the UN since its formation in 1945, after World War 2.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Francesca Albanese is at it again and laments “persecution” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

As we count the days until the inauguration of President-Elect Donald Trump, we should devote careful thought to Israel’s future relations with the new administration and to attaining Israel’s long-standing strategic objectives.

The president-elect describes his personal approach, as follows: “In my life, there are two things I’ve found I’m very good at: overcoming obstacles and motivating good people to do their best work. One of the challenges ahead is how to use those skills as successfully in the service of others as I’ve done, up to now, on my own behalf.” Trump made this statement in 1977, in his best-seller, The Art of the Deal. At the end of 2024, it is clear that he has remained consistent throughout his election campaign and in his choice of nominees for the new cabinet.

Furthermore, as far as Israel is concerned, we must recall President Trump’s past accomplishments. He kept his promise and moved the American embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and sponsored the Abraham Accords. As a leader and entrepreneur, he is accustomed to thinking big, on a large and ambitious scale. For example, his vision includes the rebuilding of American industry, the exploration of space and space travel.

What does this mean for the Jewish State and its strategic needs? According to the fifteenth-century Florentine political thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli, one should ask powerful men for big things, because it is just as easy for them to grant large requests as small ones.

An episode in our history proves this point, namely, the meeting on March 18, 1948 between President Harry S. Truman and Dr. Chaim Weizmann. President Truman’s grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, tells the story, as follows: “…. On May 14, 1948, President Harry S. Truman made one of the most momentous decisions of his presidency: recognizing the new state of Israel just minutes after its founding. My grandfather is justly celebrated for providing the legitimacy this nascent democracy required to survive, but his WWI buddy and former business partner, Eddie Jacobson, deserves credit, as well. This installment of ‘First Family Stories’ is dedicated to a friendship that changed the world.”

It is well known that President Truman overcame both the opposition of Secretary of State George Marshall and the long-standing hostility of the American foreign policy establishment. Over the years, such attitudes have persisted. Most recently, the Obama/Biden foreign policy, while nominally positive toward Israel, has been ambivalent and, on occasion, downright nasty.

A recent example was President Biden’s arm twisting of

Israel to end the Hamas war by accepting a ceasefire and a compromise, which drew a false equivalence between a terrorist aggressor that had launched a war against a legitimate state and an American ally.

On July 24, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker of the House Mike Johnson of Louisiana. On the following day [July 25], the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Biden ended in a bust up. The President warned Netanyahu that “the time has come to end this war,” to which he replied, “Mr. President, we will end this war when we win it!”

From a historical perspective, this type of episode was not an isolated occurrence. American policy makers have frequently misunderstood the ways of our region and, consequently, have made costly mistakes that have harmed their own interests as well as those of Israel.

II.

The careful study of our past, particularly the Israeli decision-making process before the Six-Day War, provides valuable insights for the present and the future. The late Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto (1926-2015) was Chief of Planning and Operational Requirements of the Israel Airforce (IAF) prior to the Six-Day War (1967) and a well-informed insider. Several years before the Six-Day War, he visited France, which supplied Israel with Mirage jet fighters. On one of his visits, his colleagues discreetly informed him that the French government planned to end its special relationship with Israel. Subsequently, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol authorized Tsiddon-Chatto to negotiate Israel’s first purchase of an American light attack aircraft, the A4 Skyhawk, manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. Furthermore, it was Tsiddon-Chatto who discovered the American spy-ship, USS Liberty, standing still in the Mediterranean off Sinai during the Six-Day War.

As a military strategist, Tsiddon-Chatto made several basic observations: 1) America failed to distinguish between its friends and its enemies; 2) America refused to let Israel win a war; 3) When writing about pro-active defense and the decision in June 1967 to preempt the war, he emphasized the crucial importance of the dimension of time.

While the circumstances have changed over the past decades, Tsiddon-Chatto’s description of Israel’s situation is timely, as for example, President Biden’s forceful demand of July 25, 2024, that Prime Minister Netanyahu accept a ceasefire in Gaza instead of a decisive victory.

His statements have been gently edited as follows:

…. Since the ‘Czech arms deal’ of 1955, and the Soviet position [of] consolidation in the ME following the Eisenhower / Dulles handling [of] the Anglo-French in the Suez Crisis of 56/7, there was no question in the ME who is on the US and who on the Soviet side. The US seemed to be the only ones oblivious of reality, thus unwittingly reinforcing Soviet penetration in the ME. Moreover, the US, which related to Israel as if it were a millstone on its neck until the Six Day War … [The Americans] “discovered” only as a result of this war that Israel is the major regional power, unconditionally pro-US, and an inexhaustible source of intelligence on Soviet assets, captured in large numbers and handed over. [Author’s bold].

Tsiddon-Chatto had a basic complaint regarding American policy toward Israel, namely, that the U.S. consistently prevented Israel from achieving a decisive victory on the battlefield in order “to placate Arabia which, as it proves since 9/11, is implacable…. It should make sense to see the US picture of Vietnam and [the] ME as just two interacting sectors of the Cold War. There is abundant evidence to prove this, and that the US has, and probably is to this day, misunderstanding the Arab manipulative ways.”

Writing in general terms about the task of the strategist, Yoash describes his methodology and then emphasizes the dimension of time as the most important factor in the decision to preempt a war:

Planning must relate to all possible scenarios. The plan … must respond to the scenarios [which have] the highest probability of materializing, while assuring a response to the most pessimistic scenarios.

The dimension of time is a matter of decisive importance. If the threat increases and becomes more acute with time, it means that the danger grows every day, and it is possible that there will be a time when our weakness will compel us to take the initiative to the point of a preemptive strike, even if the preparations for war have not been completed. (Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Be-Yom, be-Lail be-Arafel [By Day, By Night, through Haze and Fog] (Jerusalem: Keterpress, 1995, in Hebrew): 306.

Tsiddon-Chatto describes the public mood in Israel at the end of May 1967, during the days prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. The Egyptian army was waiting on Israel’s border and the civilian reserves had been mobilized. This state of affairs could not be maintained for too long and paralyzed Israel’s economy. Thus, the dimension of time became the key variable in the equation: “… Were the Arab Coalition to open hostilities first, using their much superior air forces in the way we foresaw, the State of Israel would have ceased to exist….”

It is not well known that, at this critical moment, the U.S. vigorously opposed a pre-emptive strike. (See [Meir] Amit’s report of his meeting of May 25, 1967, with [John] Hadden, the CIA man in Israel. (Rosh be-Rosh (Head On), [Or Yehuda: Hed Arzi, 1999, Hebrew]: 235).

Meir Amit, Director of the Mossad, gives the real backstory of this episode. He wrote that a “tough conversation” took place at midnight in his home. [Also present were Efraim Halevy, a senior member of the Mossad, and Brigadier General David Carmon, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence.] There was shouting, and even shots of whisky did not calm the tense atmosphere. Amit tried hard to convince Hadden that the situation was really critical and that Israel would have to act as soon as possible. But Hadden threatened that if Israel pre-empted the war, America would send forces to fight on the Egyptian side. He held the firm conviction that we had to wait and warned: “Don’t create a situation in which we will be forced to go against you.”

Meir Amit describes how his urgent mission to Washington ultimately resulted in the decision of the government to pre-empt the war:

On the morning of May 29, we gathered [as we did] every day in the office of Eshkol to discuss the ongoing situation. Abba Eban participated at this meeting; as well as the Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Yaakov Herzog; the Head of Military Intelligence, General Aharon Yariv; and I. All of us had the feeling that things had gone too far, and it was necessary to do something to break the stalemate in which we were stuck. During this discussion, the head of military intelligence proposed that the head of the Mossad go to Washington immediately in order to bring us a reliable picture of what is going on.

‘Meir,’ Areleh [Aharon Yariv] said: ‘You are a member of the household there. Dick Helms, Head of the CIA is a personal friend of yours. In an informal chat, you will be able to hear directly from him what is really happening.’ (Amit, 237).

When he arrived in Washington, Amit discovered that his professional colleagues were understanding and well disposed. Meeting with Richard Helms, he learned that his assessment of the facts coincided with those of the CIA. Helms arranged an appointment for Meir Amit with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who grasped the situation immediately and made an important recommendation.

During this meeting, McNamara received two phone calls from President Johnson, asking to be updated on these talks. At a certain point, Amit asked the Secretary of Defense for advice:

‘What should I do now? Wait here a day of two?’

‘He cut me short with a brief sentence, “Go home, your place is there now.”’

Amit learned that America had no intention to help and concluded that time was against Israel. He recommended that Israel open hostilities immediately. (Amit, 241).

Amit added a most important fact — that precisely during the time he was in Washington, it became known that President Johnson received a message from former President Eisenhower reminding him that the Americans had a moral obligation to Israel which was given at the time of its withdrawal from Sinai in 1957. The Americans had undertaken to preserve the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and to assure freedom of navigation through the Straits of Eilat. (Amit, 242).

III.

As we look forward, it is possible to make several cautious predictions based upon past history and recent experience. We can return to the stated preferences of President-Elect Donald Trump and take note of his choices. Frequently, there is a link between domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, we may try to understand the outlook and policy goals of the new administration, and, at the same time, consider some recent changes in Israel’s defense policy.

As he has proclaimed, Donald Trump’s big idea is to “Make America Great Again.” Interestingly, his model has been the promising economic reform program of Javier Milei, President of Argentina. One of Milei’s innovations was to launch a Ministry of Deregulation, an idea which Trump adopted enthusiastically. His new approach embodies the rejection of the hard-left policies of the Obama/Biden administrations. Among his policies are: achieving American energy independence; rebuilding American industry; ending unrestricted immigration; and fighting rampant crime. It is a matter of record that Trump plans to end the Obama/Biden policy toward Iran, which had been consistently lenient and uncritical. It would be reasonable to expect that the new administration would continue some of the policies in our region and expand the framework of the Abraham Accords.

After the Hamas invasion and atrocities of October 7, 2023 and the war which followed, it is clear that Israel will have to be prepared to defend itself on its own and invest in its armaments industry. The entire situation has been transformed by the fact that war has been forced on Israel as an unavoidable policy option, that is, “diplomacy by other means.” This implies a change of approach. Israel must defend itself proactively, as was the case with the recent initiatives in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out that the United States could change its policy and help Israel decisively win this war (in which America has a vital interest).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel and the Second Trump Presidency: The Long Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Yesterday, the Syrian state founded in 1946 ceased to exist. This is the downfall not only of the Assad regime but of the state of Syria as a political framework that can impose order and structure. In this connection, it must be noted that the collapse of Syria, and of its Assad regime, is part of the same regional upheaval that began in 2010 and that has, in fact, not yet ended.

Since 2010, the Middle East has undergone a transformation out of the modern era where the region was organized under the “logic” of states as political frameworks. It has reverted to the pre-modern era of a different “logic” where the region is defined by communities, ethnic groups, transnational structures, and borderless ideologies.

With the developments in Syria, the Middle East is currently continuing a sort of backslide into the pre-nationalist, pre-modern era. In a way, this can be seen as a kind of revenge by the East against the West. The East is breaking away from the foundations of modernism and nationalism that the Europe of the late 19th century and early 20th century forced on it.

But the breakaway and the reversion to pre-nationalism are far from enough for the Middle East. Accompanying the breakaway process, it must be noted, is a quiet, creeping conquest of Western Europe by the pre-modern East through various agents — primarily through immigrant groups who never abandoned the ideological beliefs that they brought from the East and who are undermining the foundations of the modern, European-style order.

It may be said in general that the Middle East now speaks in a neo-olden language of politics and culture — one that is new in that it overrides its previous, European-made nationalist-modernist predecessor but is old in that it connects to the foundations of pre-modern political culture. The message is very difficult to define in simplistic terms of the positive and the negative.

From this standpoint, it must be granted that in the Middle East’s internal power struggle, the Shiite “Axis of Resistance” has suffered a critical blow. To that extent, Israel can claim a significant victory in this year’s battle against that axis’s representatives and proxies. But on the other hand, the collapse of Syria, and of the Assad regime, contains the seeds of a new Mideast reality full of dangers and complexities.

This reality has two immediate implications. The first concerns the situation in Syria, which is no longer Syria as we once knew it. At this stage, it is difficult to define the emerging new entity, which is evolving into a mix of sectarian power centers (Kurds, Druze, Alawites), transnational jihadist power hubs driven by an anti-Israel worldview no less than an anti-regime one, and the presence of actors like Turkey, whose transnational agenda is not far removed from that of Iran.

Practically speaking, the entire system of arrangements on the ground — as worked out between Israel and Syria after the war of 1973 and based on the logic of arrangements between states — is thus called into question and is little protected from those sources of power that do not at all think in terms of the “borders” that characterize a state. Consequently Israel must define red lines of its own befitting the situation, and strive especially to set up an iron wall preventing the “little jihad” against the Assad regime from turning into the “great jihad” against Israel.

But the second immediate ramification, which is even more significant, has to do with Iran — which has lost its Shiite axis, or at least two elements of it (Hamas and Hezbollah). Iran is at a strategic crossroads. It may be pushed into crossing the nuclear threshold in a sort of tit for tat, even before the US president-elect enters office. That move would leave little sand in the hourglass for an Israeli reaction against the prospect of an “Iranian Auschwitz.”

From that standpoint, Israel may possibly be said in general terms to be entering the third stage of its current war in the Middle East. The first stage was the illusory stage between May 2021 (Operation Guardian of the Walls) and October 7, 2023. The second stage proceeded intensively from October 7, 2023, into December 2024. But now Israel is entering the third stage of the war. In the shadow of a changing Mideast reality, Israel faces both veteran players — such as Iran, where the systems of ideology are eroding; and Turkey, which is turning from a shadowy enemy into a much more significant threat — and other players who are newcomers as Israel’s neighbors to the north.

But it is impossible to conclude without one important remark regarding Israel’s domestic arena. The currents of the Middle East have not bypassed Israel. Israel is part of the enormous process that the Middle East has experienced since 2010. In recent years it has also begun to budge away from its clearly state-centered foundations toward definitions of identity based on tribes and communities (haredi, secular, religious Zionist, Arab, and more) who, in their way, are battling for power.

The statehood concept championed by Ben-Gurion, which relied on elements such as the centralization of governmental power, the establishment of a politically neutral civil service, defined rules of governance, and respect for political authority, is undergoing significant erosion. This process is approaching a state akin to an undeclared civil war. So Israel must not only re-establish and rebuild the boundaries between itself and its obvious external enemies, but must also establish the political and cultural boundary between itself and the Middle East in order not to descend to the same condition in which the Middle East as a whole is thickly stewing.

This article was originally published in  Makor Rishon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Assad Regime Fell: Israel is Heading Toward a Third Campaign? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The situation in Syria over the past decade has been characterized by significant regional and international interventions, which have played decisive roles in shaping the current map. The “Arab Spring”, which began in late 2010, initially promised democratic reforms across the Middle East, but met with fierce opposition in Syria. There, the Assad regime, with the support of Iran, Russia, and Shiite proxies, managed to maintain its power despite widespread resistance and a significant number of casualties.

Iran’s involvement in Syria has been presented as a defense strategy against extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, which Tehran views as direct threats to its national security. This intervention was part of a broader regional strategy by Iran, often described as its own “war on terror.” The stabilization of the Assad regime, which depends to a large extent on Iranian and Russian support, has come at a considerable cost, both in human and economic terms. However, this stability was fragile, dependent on the continued presence and support of these foreign powers.

Recent regional developments have further complicated the situation in Syria. Russia’s military focus has changed significantly due to its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which has reduced its ability to maintain the same level of involvement in Syria. At the same time, Hezbollah, a decisive Iranian proxy actor, suffered significant losses due to Israeli military operations during 2024. These factors weakened the basic pillars of Assad’s stability, creating a vacuum that rebel groups in Syria were quick to exploit.

The resumption of rebel activity, especially in the ‘Idlib’ province, highlights the fragility of the current stability in Syria. The rapid collapse of the Syrian army in response to these attacks highlights the ongoing vulnerabilities in the regime’s military infrastructure. This instability has inevitably led to increased Iranian and Russian involvement, as they seek to re-establish their influence and restore a semblance of control.

The geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey further complicates the situation in Syria. The two countries have pursued different strategies, often finding themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. While Iran has focused on supporting the Assad regime, Turkey has conducted a number of military operations in northern Syria, ostensibly to combat cross-border terrorism, but has in fact established a Turkish zone of influence. This competition has the potential to escalate tensions, especially when both countries seek to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of the other.

Despite the establishment of the Astana peace process in 2017, which was intended to manage the conflict in Syria, the reality on the ground indicates that it was mainly used to demarcate areas of control between Iran, Russia, and Turkey, and not to foster a comprehensive peace. As the Assad regime gradually gained territorial control, Iran’s influence increased, while Turkey established its presence in the north. This distribution of influence underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in Syria, Especially in light of the weakening of the “chief groomsmen”, Russia and Iran’s proxies.

The current situation in Syria presents a complex set of opportunities and risks for Israel and for the entire Middle East. While various factions, especially Iran and its proxies, are refocusing their efforts on the internal conflicts in Syria, there is a temporary decline in their attention to Israel. This shift in focus gives Israel strategic breathing space in the short term. However, this reality entails significant risks, especially the potential for instability on the Syrian Golan border, which could expand into the Israeli Golan Heights. This instability could escalate regional tensions and drag the Middle East into a broader conflict.

Historically, the borders of the Middle East were determined after World War I through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided control between France and Britain and granted political sovereignty to various tribal leaders. This division has created countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, which are characterized by ethnic and religious diversity with little common ground between different groups. This situation has led to deep hostility, especially among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, Christians, and others, exacerbated by strategic interests in the region’s oil resources.

The gradual erosion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement over the past decade has intensified the search for a new regional order, manifested in violent clashes and episodes of genocide such as those perpetrated by ISIS, for example. The involvement of world powers such as the United States and Russia has led to temporary stability, but in some ways has further complicated the situation. It is worth noting that stability in Syria during the Trump administration has occurred through coordination with Russia, suggesting that future interventions may work similarly.

The critical question is whether such international interventions can provide long-term stability in the region. The ongoing negative energies and hostility among the peoples of the region indicate that a local response, even if coordinated between major powers such as Russia and the United States, may not achieve sustainable stability. Instead, it is likely that these interventions will only be able to offer temporary relief without addressing the underlying tensions.

From an Israeli perspective, the most urgent concern is Jordan’s stability. Unlike other neighboring countries, Jordan remains relatively affected by the “Arab Spring” or the so-called “Islamic Winter.” However, the current regional dynamics pose significant challenges to Jordan’s stability, which some analysts say is precarious. The potential for chaos in Jordan is a realistic scenario for which Israel must prepare. This includes a strategic reassessment of the IDF’s position along the Jordan Valley, emphasizing the need for a strong and flexible security infrastructure on Israel’s longest border with a neighboring country.

In conclusion, while the internal conflict in Syria offers a temporary reduction in direct threats to Israel, it simultaneously poses significant risks to regional instability. The historical context of arbitrarily established borders and ongoing ethnic and religious hostility underscores the complexity of achieving lasting stability in the Middle East. For Israel, Jordan’s stability is becoming a critical concern, requiring comprehensive security measures and a proactive defense strategy. Future international interventions, while potentially beneficial in the short term, are unlikely to resolve deep regional tensions, underscoring the need for a multi-layered and long-term approach to regional stability.

This article was originally published on Ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Back to the “Islamic Winter” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

These understandings prompted the IDSF HaBithonistim movement to formulate a definite vision for the State of Israel. This national vision, based solidly on extensive research touching upon all the formative areas of Israeli society. In formulating the national vision, the IDSF HaBithonistim research department examines the security threats on Israel through a magnifying glass, to obtain a comprehensive understanding thereof and yield recommendations for the most effective method of addressing them. Recently an IDSF HaBithonistim research team spoke before the Nagel Commission on Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Building, and presented a detailed opinion paper to the decision makers.

This paper was written with the assistance of six key researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Col. (res.) Dr. Ronen Itzik, Lt. Col. (res.) Shosh Raban, Dr. Yaakov Rimmer, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Or Issachar. They elaborate on the current challenges and perceptions that govern the IDF, and detail the steps that must be taken to ensure that the IDF’s force buildup fully responds to the reference scenarios facing the State of Israel.

Reference scenarios as the basis for the IDF’s force buildup

Israel is a small country with little strategic depth, surrounded by a choke ring of enemies and a slew of threats. Many of these threats have existed from the very first moment of Israel’s existence. However, the past decades have seen processes and changes that had bred new trends. If the formative years of Israel saw the young state surrounded by enemy countries, then today, after 75 years of fighting against many of them for its mere existence, Israel is now contending with a pernicious remote enemy in the form of Iran, and with terror militias operating on its borders and in its very midst. Nowadays, Israel is contending with a convergence of theaters, meaning that any conflagration of one almost inevitably sparks a flare-up in another. In this current map of challenges, Israel exists in a permanent state of security volatility that may see unexpected attacks from foreign entities and from hostile elements from within.

In order to optimally deal with such threats, as well as with many others, the IDF’s force buildup must be carefully designed and executed. Traditionally, the Israeli army’s force buildup had stood on six pillars: doctrine, armaments, training, professional advancement, organization and infrastructure. Force buildup has long-term implications on Israel’s military readiness, and demands careful consideration of the current reference scenarios and threats, as well as projections thereof for the future.

Paramount security threats:

• Iran: although almost 1,000 miles from Israel, Tehran operates a vast proxy-terror mechanism across the Middle East, and has succeeded in sending its tentacles into the heart of Israel, into the Palestinian arena. Iran sits on a huge stockpile of missile and drones, developed and dedicated solely to target the civilian heart of Israel. And on top of it all – Iran is now a nuclear threshold state that is dedicated to the development of weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with Iran’s aspirations for instilling global Shi’ite Islam, this places it not only as a major threat to Israel, but indeed a threat to the rest of the world.

• Syria and Lebanon: the conflict on Israel’s northern border is a clear and present danger to Israel as Syria and Lebanon, its neighbors to the north, are enemy states. Syria had been in the throes of a prolonged civil war, and its outcome is not yet clear in terms of the new regime’s stability or long-term intentions towards Israel. Lebanon is for all intents and purposes, ruled by Hezbollah and by proxy – Iran. This state of affairs renders Israel’s northern border highly volatile and demands the constant presence of Israeli forces along that border and a high level of military readiness.

• Egypt and Jordan: the State of Israel does have peace agreements with these two countries. However, they are extremely precarious, and with more than a few inherent vulnerabilities. One is the fact that these accords do not really render redundant the IDF’s activity along the borders with these countries. But they do limit it to a great extent, simply due to the fact that one country cannot operate militarily against an ally in the same manner it can against an enemy. Furthermore, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan do not reflect the current sentiment on the streets of Cairo and Amman. Most of their citizens are openly hostile towards Israel. In the event of a change of governments – a very plausible scenario in both highly unstable countries – their relations with Israel may in all likelihood be impacted. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a reversal of alliances wherein either or both countries become once again enemies of Israel.

• Gaza: the destiny of Gaza in the day after the Gaza War is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, Israel must be prepared for a long period of instability in the Strip. Once the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia of Gaza is completed, the IDF will have to remain deployed in the area to act as a bulwark and ensure the safety of the population along the Gaza border, while crushing further attempts from within the Strip to reignite terror activity against Israe.

• Terror militias: during the past several years, due mainly to misguided concepts, Israel had allowed the terror organizations on its borders to build up their force and stockpile weapons to staggering levels, with the help of Iran. Thus, these organizations – namely Hezbollah and Hamas – have grown to become highly trained and armed terror militaries. The October 7 massacre had made it clear beyond any shred of doubt that Israel cannot allow terror and terror militias to germinate on its borders or anywhere near them, and it must adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards any such attempts.

• The Palestinian arena: this is a pressing challenge for Israel. the Stability achieved by the security forces in Judea and Samaria in the wake of Operation Defensive Shield is wearing thin, and the area has become a hornet’s nest of renewed terror activity, inspired by the October 7 events. The Palestinian Authority is failing – if indeed it even wishes to – conduct effective counter-terror activity in the area against the mounting Islamic terror in its jurisdiction, forcing Israeli security forces to undertake this task in these areas as well.

• Internal arena: the multi-front conflagration is pouring over into the Israeli Arab population. Since the outset of the Gaza War, there has been an awakening of terror activity among the Arab population living within the Green Line and holding a full Israeli citizenship. To contend with this problem without further drawing on the already buckling IDF, Israel must form a national guard to reenforce the civil guard system.

The sad truth of the matter is that the IDF does not have the numbers to address the entire spectrum of threats and reference scenarios with which Israel is currently contending. Therefore, the IDF must build up its force in terms of manpower as well as its operational and firepower capabilities. Some of these changes, such as higher recruitment rates must be executed on a systemic level while others, such as the buildup of new divisions or the incorporation of advance technologies that better enable the designated units to achieve their mission, should be delivered in a manner tailored to the specific needs of each of these units, as detailed below.

The Vision for IDF Force Buildup – A Systemic Point of View

Upscaling manpower

Over the past decades, certain processes have been put in place to downscale the IDF’s manpower, mainly in the ground forces. This led among others to the mustering out of entire divisions, the reduction of mandatory service duration, and increased cuts in mandatory and reserves personnel. These processes were undertaken with the notion that the “army of the people”, as the IDF is perceived in Israel, could be downsized and shaped into a “small and smart army”. However, the outbreak of the Gaza War proved the fallacy of this approach, and has led to the detrimental shortage of regular and reserve manpower with which the IDF is currently struggling.

An additional manpower crisis, dubbed “The Captain Crisis”, referring to the phenomenon in which low raking officers opt to end their military career at the rank of captain, mostly due to better conditions waiting for them in the civilian labor market. This creates a shortage of officers that could have been designated to be the next generation of the IDF’s leadership.

The personnel shortage in the IDF consequent of these cuts, is a significant operational constraint for the IDF, in particular when it must juggle a number of fronts at the same time. Compounding this problem, is the erosion of those of the forces that bear most of the operational brunt due to an unbalanced assignment of the operational load.

Ideal situation:

• Extension of service: in June 2015, the length of the men’s mandatory service – and some of the women’s – was cut from 36 to 12 months. The mandatory three-year term must be reinstated as was the standard for decades – a move that will boost the ranks of the regular army.

• Extension of the reserve service: the increase in the number of reservists is an indispensable element of the buildup of the IDF, such that responds effectively to the current security realities. Recently, the age of discharge from reserves duty was upped by a year, and it may have to be further extended, at least until the army’s manpower had sufficiently been boosted and service exemption policies tightened.
• Expansion of mandatory service to additional demographics: for decades, there have been in Israel’s society entire demographics, which for numerous reasons are automatically exempt from military service – some under the dictates of law and policy, while others slip “under the radar”. This means that there are tens of thousands of able individuals, who are not part of the IDF’s service cycle. In order to address this issue, there are steps that the army can adopt, such as expansion of female induction and the extension of the mandatory induction to “special” demographics such as the ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arab populations. An additional course of action would be to have soldiers sign on for a short – salaried – extension of their service once their mandatory term is done.

• Improved officer retention: The army must improve the retention of its officers and boost the attractivity of the military careers it can offer young officers, with the aim of keeping them in the system for long-term careers. For this end the military must overhaul and modernize its HR practices and offer terms and conditions of service that can parallel with comparable jobs on the civilian labor market.

• Modernization of the organizational operation: As a hierarchal structure, the IDF is weighted down by a uniformity of approach and thought and its resistance to creative ways of thought that challenge deep seated conceptions. The IDF must adopt organizational cultures that accept diverse ways of thought and are open to a diversity of opinions and concepts.
• Establishment of an auxiliary national guard force: in tandem with the expansion of the military ranks, the IDF’s areas of responsibility must be streamlined. Currently, beyond its border security and defense of the country, the army is also burdened with the task of internal security, which hinders its capacity to prioritize missions and assign sufficient manpower to this and other tasks. To alleviate this burden and allow the army to focus on the missions for which it exists, a national guard that is subordinate to Israel Police should be formed, responsible for all matters pertaining to internal security threats and sharing the army’s workload.

Optimization of logistic readiness

Current situation:

The IDF’s logistic readiness is part and parcel of its operational readiness, but sadly, it is plagued by various problems mainly in the areas of armaments, maintenance and infrastructure.

In terms of armaments, Israel has been developing an increasing dependance on the import of technology and weapons from foreign countries, mainly the US. The Gaza War made it clear to what extent Israel’s deep dependance on foreign munition supplies is to the detriment of the IDF’s operational flexibility and its freedom of action.

In terms of maintenance, many of the army’s bases and headquarters are in dilapidated condition, and are not fully prepared for internal threats and ballistic attacks. This state of affairs poses a risk factor to IDF’s operational capability. Furthermore, most of the IDF’s infrastructures are above ground, and exposed to threats in scenarios of surface-to-surface rocket and missile attacks.

Ideal situation:

• Upscaling inventory and supervising its integrity: Inventories should be assigned minimal stock threshold as per standardized operational requirements, with mechanisms of timely restocking in times of emergency. Furthermore, munitions and weapons should be inspected regularly to maintain integrity and immediate usability.

• Reinforcement of the security industry: Israel’s security industry must be allotted further investment and developed to reduce Israel’s dependance on imported weapons, lower costs of ammunition, and develop dedicated technologies and systems, while allowing for fast restocking in times of war. A positive by-product of this kind of policy would be the creation of new jobs and a boost to the economy.

• Expansion of international arms supply relations: Alongside the development of a more robust local industry, Israel must establish procurement deals with as many countries as possible, to free it from the shackles of dependency on a handful of leading countries for weapons and ammunitions supply.

• Upscaling and optimization of military infrastructures: The IDSF bases and headquarters are a strategic asset for the State of Israel, and as such they must be maintained and secured to the highest level. The bases should be inspected to determine their level of regular operation and their readiness for a state of war.

• Introduction of underground infrastructures: Important strategic assets must be relocated to underground premises to ensure their protection in the event of missile and rocket attack. Additionally, Israel must be prepared for a contingency wherein it must use underground routes to deploy forces. Alongside the planning of dedicated underground spaces, it is advisable to turn existing civilian infrastructures such as tunnels and public parking lots into dual-use infrastructures that can serve military purposes in emergency times.

Technology & Cyber

Current situation:

Alongside the traditional battlefield exists an emerging crucial theater of battle – the technological arena. Over the past several decades, technology – and war technology – has advanced by leaps and bounds, introducing new weapons and widely used cyber warfare.  Recently, with the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), new, highly sophisticated systems have been introduced that pose even a greater challenge for Israel security establishment.

Israel’s security technology and cyber warfare are some of the most advanced in the world, but there are still significant barriers to the incorporation of these technologies on the battlefield. These are related, among others, to the organization’s resistance to changes, the need to work exclusively with large vendors and the limited access to such technologies for commanders in the field.

Even though technology is by no means a complete substitute for human capabilities and for the value of the national contribution of a people’s army, Israel must ensure technological superiority over its enemies, and remain at the forefront of technological development and progress.

Ideal situation:

• After-action review: the shortcomings that arose during the Gaza War must be studied, such as the shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles and uncrewed vehicles, the lack of technologies that would allow the forces to deal with the Hamas tunnels and shortcomings in quick and effective responses to anti-tank rockets.

• Investment in technology: Israel must allocate considerable budgets and manpower for the development of defense technology while at the same time boost existing local industry, with an emphasis on dedicated weapons and systems for the use specified by the IDF.

• Incorporation of robotics: robotic systems such as uncrewed vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and explosive motorboats, can bring a significant advantage on the battle field and considerably reduce the cost in human lives. Therefore, robotics should be incorporated in all of the IDF branches.

• Cyber warfare and AI: the cyber arena is getting more sophisticated by the moment, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is on the increase, posing yet new security threats. In order to ensure it maintains the upper hand in this arena, Israel must continue to invest in research and development of offensive and defensive cyber, and begin incorporating AI in its security needs.

• Tech training: The forces in the field must be trained to use the advanced tech tools that are and will become available to them. This calls for the installation of a whole new training array across all IDF branches and units, and the professional training of all the professional personnel allocated to this end.

• Diversification of tech acquisition portfolio: Israel’s security establishment currently deals with only a handful of large tech vendors, with which it has trade relations for decades. In order to introduce sophisticated tech systems, it must be open to doing business with smaller tech vendors and entrepreneurs.

The Vision of IDF Force Buildup According to Branches and Corps

Ground forces

Current situation:

The State of Israel is often forced to engage in multiple combat arenas, wherein the escalation in one often leads immediately to a domino effect conflagration of others. As demonstrated throughout the Gaza War, the battle of order of the IDF’s ground forces proved too short to cover more than one broad campaign in a single arena, while holding a defensive position in others. This also means that in the event of unexpected developments, the army does not have enough reserves to deploy.

In light of existing and projected threats outlined by reference scenarios, the State of Israel must boost its capabilities such that it can engage in high intensity combat in at least two fronts simultaneously, while assuming a broad defensive position in others.

Ideal situation:

• Overhaul of readiness protocols: the IDF must ensure that regular and reserve forces incorporate improved readiness protocols –in terms of quantity and quality of combat gear and weaponry, and in terms of the professional and physical operational readiness of troops and commanders, in order to allow short response times in a reality where surprise terror attacks have become part and parcel of daily life.

• Augmentation of forces by one regular service division and several reserves’ divisions: The IDF should add at least one more regular army division and two more reserves maneuver enhancement divisions to its personnel headcount. These divisions will include a full divisional structure and auxiliary units including tanks, artillery, engineering and logistics. One should be deployed at Israel’s northern border and the other in the Jordan Valley. This is a necessity in order to deal with the operative shortcomings in some arenas, and will additionally serve as reserve forces when needed.

• Establishment of a dedicated standalone combat auxiliary force: a reserve force at the level of at least a division, under the command of General HQ, should be formed to provide operational flexibility and provide relief to forces in the event of unexpected or prolonged events. The reserve force may be kept at a lower level of readiness and mid-level operational fitness, ensuring that these can be brought up to par quickly in times of need.

• Formation of a tunnel capture-and-destroy combat unit: In light of the growing tunnel warfare threat on Israel’s borders, the security establishment must seriously consider the formation of a new dedicated army corps specializing in the detection and destruction of tunnels and subterranean warfare.

• General internal audit of IDF units: The IDF must conduct an in-depth audit of relevant units to asses manpower, equipment and armament needs and shortages. For example, it has become clear in the current conflict that there is a pressing need to increase the numbers of tank in the armored units. Also, in the current climate in Israel’s multiple arena reality, special units such as the Oketz canine unit and the Yahalom combat engineering unit, must be augmented.

• Improvement of mobilization and deployment mechanisms and procedures: The convergence and interconnectivity of arenas in Israel demand that the army install a streamlined mobilization and deployment system and procedures to enable the swift reallocation of forces from one front to another. For this purpose, the army would have to create a dedicated road and rail infrastructure as an alternative to the congested civilian routes, and upscale its fleet of heavy carriers to included armored vehicles. To streamline quick force deployment and movement, civilian infrastructure, such as railways, should be considered for use as supplementary systems.

The Air Force: Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles

Current situation:

The Israeli Air Force is charged with three main missions: The protection of Israel’s areal space, offensives in enemy territories, and the support of ground campaigns. In order to accomplish these missions to their fullest, the IAF is required to have extremely complex and resource-intensive capabilities. It must be understood that no matter how supreme an army’s air force is – it cannot compensate for inadequate ground forces. It can, however, provide operational flexibility to its counterparts on the ground and in the ocean. This can be further boosted by newer advanced drone technology, which aside from expanding military capabilities, help reduce the cost in human lives.

Over the past years, significant changes have been occurring in the map of the areal threats. Israel’s enemies on its borders and remotely understand that they cannot contend with the superiority of Israel’s Air Force and thus abandoned the use of fighter jets, instead opting for the development of ballistic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, steep trajectory surface-to-surface missiles, and low-tech warfare i.e. glider terror attacks, and improvised explosive kites and balloons. These new threats demand the IAF to recalculate its offensive and defensive tactics and set in place procedures for force and resource deployment and means and weapons it uses.

Ideal situation:

• Increase of drone warfare: The most important objective for the use of UMAVs is the protection of the lives of soldiers. Even in the event that the use of human forces is unavoidable, drones can support IAF’s strikes in the heart of enemy territory. UMAV’s can assist in the protection of ground sectors and lend significant aid to ground campaigns. It is highly recommended that the IDF invest resources in increasing the use of this means of war.

• Incorporation of a steep trajectory array: the IDF should examine the incorporation of a steep trajectory array with rocket and attack glider capabilities.

• Streamlining Israel’s air defense system: In order to ensure the protection of the Home Front, the IDF’s air defense must undergo a comprehensive inspection to ensure it is able to contend with scenarios of attacks of thousands of rockets and missiles a day. Furthermore, Israel should consider forging regional alliances for the protection of Israel’s areal space.

Navy: Defense as a Priority

Current situation:

Israel’s naval arena is important on a number of levels: security-wise, Israel has expansive maritime borders with Gaza, Lebanon and Egypt. Economically, Israel has prolific maritime trade activities; strategically, the most substantial source of energy in the country comes from the natural gas fields within the country’s territorial waters.

Therefore, the State of Israel must maintain superiority in all naval arenas, securing its maritime supply routes, protect its shores, protect free passage of vessels and maritime trade, and protect its gas fields. However, as the most pressing threats are ground-based and since the military is struggling with manpower deficits, coupled with traditionally high costs of maintaining and operating naval vessels, the IDF must plan how to prioritize the Navy’s needs.

Ideal situation:

• Prioritization of defensive capabilities: Controlling the maritime territory demands superior offensive capabilities from the Navy, however, due to current constraints abovementioned the focus on the IDF’s Navy must be the development of defensive capabilities.

• Integration of unmanned platforms: It is possible, and necessary, to integrate unmanned surface and underwater vessels, which would be deployed primarily for patrolling, guarding Israel’s maritime borders, routine security, allowing the IDF forces to deal with more complex threats.

Home Front Command: Delegating responsibilities effectively

Current situation:

The Home Front plays a crucial role in the protection of the citizens of Israel, but the delegation of responsibilities between the body and the civil defense and rescue forces remains unclear. This unclarity leads to overlapping of responsibilities in some cases, and in others – tasks that fall between the cracks and remain unattended.

Furthermore, the Home Front Command has been red flagging its personnel shortage for some time. Over the recent years this demanded the allocation of IDF combat forces to supplement the Home Front’s search and rescue activities – forces that should have been serving in other critical ground-force missions. This demands the rethinking of the allocation of resources between the Home Front Command and the IDF operational units.

Another issue that demands attention is the auxiliary Territorial Defense array. Nowadays the territorial defense’s main area of operation is centered around the defense against external threats and search and rescue missions. The area of territorial defense that deals with internal threats such as terror attacks remains nearly untreated by the Home Front Command and this requires revisiting to consider including this task in the Home Front’s responsibilities.

Ideal situation:

• Assignation of areas of responsibilities: The responsibilities of the Home Front and the civil rescue bodies must be assigned and delineated in a clear manner, with consideration of the capabilities each body brings to the table, to allow for the most effective fulfillment of each responsibility.

• Improvement of protection of civil structures: In order to improve the protection of the civil Home Front and reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the wake of attacks against civilians, the Home Front must identify the public structures which lack protective areas and spaces, especially those near and in conflict areas.

• Balanced distribution of recruits: Since there are certain units in the Home Front Command that are in need of recruits with the same profile as the IDF’s other ground force units, the assignment of recruits must be based on considerations of operational priorities of each of the units.

• Reinforcement of the territorial defense array: In light of the terror threats against Israel from within the Arab-Israeli population, it is worth examining the integration of Home Front forces in the protection of the communities in conflict areas and border zones.

The Intelligence Directorate: Collaboration with Civil Bodies

Current situation:

The security intelligence establishment is a critical component in Israel’s security, strategically and tactically. However, Israel had developed over the recent years a dangerous dependence on its intelligence deterrence – the full implication of which was revealed in the October 7 disaster.

Therefore, the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence establishment must be further expanded and maintained but at the same time the security establishment’s other capabilities – especially in the operational field – must be boosted. Furthermore, the intelligence apparatus is currently plagued with some deeply engrained problems that pose a challenge to Israel’ superiority in the field, such as inadequate investment in diverse fields of intelligence, and the brain drain of the system due to much more economically gratifying jobs in the civilian job market.

The ideal:

• Recruitment of speakers of foreign languages: In order to respond to the current operational needs, the Intelligence Corps must augment the ranks of its foreign language speakers through a specially tailored recruitment and training program.

• Reinstatement of an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) array: The Israeli Intelligence OSINT array plays a critical role in the understanding of the broad political landscape in Israel and is indispensable for monitoring unforeseen sudden events, identifying information leaks, producing projections and for influencing public opinion. Therefore, the OSINT array in the intelligence establishment must be rehabilitated and further cultivated.

• Social networks as a viable source of intelligence (SOCMINT): Intelligence gathering from social networks should be increased as it is an indispensable source of intel yielding platform.

• Collaboration with civilian market: It is worth examining the integration of capabilities from Israeli high-tech and local industry. This kind of collaboration can allow the IDF Intelligence Corps to adopt advanced civilian technologies to maintain superiority in the field. Furthermore, it is worth considering opening some of the career military jobs in the Intelligence Corp to the civilian job market to obtain additional professional expert manpower from outside of the military system.

IDF Force Buildup Vision – Decision Making Processes

Improvement of decision-making processes

Current situation:

The security and strategic decision-making processes, including those that pertain to the IDF force buildup and budget allocation, mostly happen in the military executive branch, and are not always transparent to the relevant political and public factors. The limited number of participants in these processes often lead to perceptual shortcomings in the absence of broad perspectives and different points of view.

Another issue regarding decision making processes is related to control and monitoring processes. Currently, most if the control and monitoring of the Israel’s security establishment and the IDF’s activity are internal and are not transparent to the political system, not to mention to the public, which subjects them to a risk of partiality and bias.

Ideal situation:

• Transparent decision-making: The IDF must incorporate non-military professionals, such as public representatives and suitable professionals from each relevant field in its strategic decision-making processes, such that allows for decision-making that is based on multiple opinions and perspectives through organizational processes such as brainstorming sessions.

• Introduction of “red teams”: The intelligence analysis process often uses “red teams” – which simulates hostile attacks with the aim of detecting vulnerabilities and flaws in existing systems and responses. Many times, these teams comprise non-military professionals who bring knowledge and perspectives from outside of the military system. To improve decision-making across the entire security system, red teams should be incorporated in every branch and arm of the IDF.

• Bi-annual Cabinet updates: The Cabinet should hold bi-annual briefings focusing on various aspects of the IDF’s force buildup – including threat assessments, manpower allocations, operational readiness, procurement and armament. These meetings should be anchored in appropriate legislation, and the consequent decisions should be shared with the public. Furthermore, the security establishment should be required to present to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee all information pertaining to changes in the IDF force buildup.

• Establishment of independent supervisory committees: Independent supervisory committees comprising public and civilian representatives are needed to examine the IDF force buildup and report to the government and official control bodies. The government’s security cabinet will be obligated to discuss the committee’s findings and include civilian representatives to partake in discussions on unclassified findings.

Thought on Israel’s security: conclusion

The dynamic map of the security challenges characteristic to Israel and the Middle East region demands constant scrutiny of the present and future threats. Only with a broad understanding of the reference scenarios Israel faces, its military force can be built up in a proper and informed manner.

Nowadays, Israel is forced to contend with a long list of threats, spearheaded by Iran, which can turn into a nuclear state at any moment. Additionally, the current reference scenarios point to a multi-arena war placing Israel on several fronts at the same time, as well as a surprise attack that could be launched by any one of the terror organizations operating on Israel’s borders.

The Gaza War has proven that Israel and its security establishment must recalculate its route forward and methodically and skillfully plan the force buildup across the system. This is the only way to ensure a strong army that could protect Israel security now and in the future.

הפוסט Ideally – IDSF HaBithonistim National Security Vision. The Force buildup of the IDF הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Gaza war has been raging in a number of arenas, and accordingly has a number of objectives. On the southern front, reportedly, the objectives are the elimination of Hamas as the governing militia in the Gaza strip, the return home of all of the Israeli hostages from Gaza with no exception, and ensuring that no army of terror could resurface and take control of Gaza again. On the northern front, the objective is to deliver a devastating blow to Hezbollah, ensuring that it no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel. However, there is another, less reported front, that does not make headlines like its counterparts but in effect, it holds sway on all the above and more – the global theater.

Israel’s broad strategy extends far beyond the borders of Lebanon and Gaza. The overall objective is the dismantling of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis as the controlling element of much of the Middle East. Local processes such as ceasefires and the separation of fronts, alongside the imminent administration change in the US, offer a valuable opportunity to drive change such that will not only decide the outcome of the current war but has the potential to reshape the entire  balance of power in the Middle East.

As proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles.

Israel has achieved everything. Almost.  Overview of the agreement terms

To better understand whether the ceasefire with Hezbollah is beneficial to Israel, we should first review its terms. Admittedly, it is all too easy to spot some loopholes, but it did hand Israel a few  extremely important achievements.

The first is the divorce between the war in Gaza and the conflict with Hezbollah. This separation has significant ramifications for Hezbollah and Hamas. At the time, Nasrallah proclaimed the Hezbollah’s mission was to come to the aid of their Palestinian brethren and made a commitment to continue the fighting on Israel’s northern border until the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Yet we see how Hezbollah has gone back on its promises, which in its own perception is a terrible humiliation.  This was a debilitating blow to Hamas, which has now been left to its own devices.

An additional achievement produced by the agreement is the demilitarization of southern Lebanon. If properly enforce, this clause will make it very hard for Hezbollah to rebuild its force on the border with Israel.

The third and perhaps the most significant achievement, is that Israel gains complete freedom of action in Lebanon which allows it to act against Hezbollah the moment it threatens Israel. This teaches the heads of Hezbollah that the moment they raise their heads – it will come rolling off. It could be said that Israel had achieved everything it wanted. Nearly. The problem with the agreement though is that it fails to chart a DMZ along the Lebanese border with Israel. In its current form, the agreement allows the population that lives near that border to return to their homes – some of which are located  just hundreds of yards from Israel. The problem is that as proven in the present conflict, with documented findings of the IDF in hundreds of “civilian” homes – many of these people are either Hezbollah terrorists or local Hezbollah sympathizers who allow the terror organization to take advantage of their homes and premises to conceal weapons and missiles. Once they return to their villages, Israeli intelligence will have a difficult time discerning which of them is an innocent civilian and which is a terrorist.

There is no doubt that this state of affairs will pose a challenge for Israel when coming to identify irregular activities  and stanch terror activity on the border. Nonetheless, there are three points to consider: Firstly, every negotiation by default entails concessions by all stakeholders, and perhaps this is a bitter pill that Israel has no choice but to swallow. The other point is that even if the population of south Lebanon does return to its villages on the border, Israel now has more tools and experience, and a stronger drive to eradicate terror. Thirdly, this is an interim agreement, meaning that Israel still has a chance to change it. The 60-day period set for the withdrawal and with the eminent entrance of the Trump administration into office, there is a fair chance that Israel could insist on creating a crucial DMZ along the border.

At the bottom line, on paper it appears that for the most part, the agreement is favorable for Israel – but of course, the soundness of these conditions will have to stand the test of enforcement. The US and France are involved in the agreement but at the end of the day, it is up to Israel and its security forces to prove the agreement productive. In the wake of October 7, the decision-making levels in Israel politics and military have come to understand that the international peacekeeping forces cannot be relied upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah. Israel has no choice but to take its own security fully in its own hands by any means necessary and impress upon Hezbollah that it is willing to jump right back in the fray if so pushed.

Upon in light of their staggering failure to enforce Security Council resolution 1701 that was to keep Lebanon south of the Litani River clean of Hezbollah.

Why now? The timing of the signing in security and diplomatic terms

The signing of the ceasefire agreement had not materialized out of thin air. The timing was carefully selected with various security and diplomatic considerations. In terms of Israel’s security, the objectives set for the war in the northern border, i.e. the paralyzing of Hezbollah, was achieved to a large measure. Israel had catapulted the terror organization twenty years back in terms of its military prowess, and brought it to a state in which it is no longer a strategic threat on Israel. Admittedly, one can always claim that there was a lot more that Israel could have done to strike an even harsher blow against Hezbollah. Which is not wrong. However, insofar as the military objectives, they were realized for the most part, and the signing of the agreement marked the appropriate point in time to cease the IDSF HaBithonistim  activity in Lebanon.

Diplomatically speaking, it would seem that the timing of the ceasefire is opportune as well. Israel needs the support of the international community to legitimize its actions and to receive weapons and ammunition. The ceasefire agreement allows Israel to improve its position with the UN Security Council and in turn improve its diplomatic relations with the international community.

An additional diplomatic consideration that plays an important part in the timing of the ceasefire agreement is the forthcoming change of administrations in the United States – similarly to the last months of the Obama administration, the support of the US administration in Israel is ebbing. The timing of the agreement allows us to ride out the relations with the current Biden administration and prepare to forge relations with the incoming Trump administration.

Beyond all the above mentioned, the timing carries a critical operational advantage. Israel’s decision to take its foot off the pedal in the north means that it can focus militarily and strategically in its next two crucial objectives: bringing down Hamas and the overturning of the Shi’ite axis.

As per the first objective, a ceasefire up north allows Israel to shift its ground forces back into Gaza and return to high intensity fighting and thus increase the chances of crushing Hamas and returning the hostages. As for the second objective of overturning the Shi’ite axis – more will be detailed below.

The systemic solution is not in Lebanon: the global importance of the agreement

In the Middle East, there are three main forces vying for control of the region – the Shi’ite-Iranian axis, the radical Sunni axis, and the moderate Western-Sunni axis. In recent years, the Shiite axis led by Iran and its proxies was able to gain the upper hand to become the dominant force in the region. However, various processes that have unfolded over the past year have sent this dominance into decline, and if the US plays the right policy cards, the region just may witness the breakdown of the radical Shi’ite machine.

As the Shi’ite axis is yielding to pressure, the radical Sunni axis is coming into the center of the stage, led by Turkey together with extreme Suni terror organizations the likes of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The axis will prove to be no less pernicious than its Shi’ite counterpart if it grows stronger and will pose no less a threat to Israel and the West, and thus merits a red flag as well. Case in point is the recent events in Syria that led to the toppling of the Assad regime. The rebel forces were able to prevail among others thanks to a weakened Hezbollah, proving yet again the interconnectivity of events in the Middle East. For the moment, the fall of the historically hostile Assad regime may be taken as a favorable development for Israel, it is yet to be determined what kind of regime will step into the vacuum and what – if any – kind of threat it might pose to Israel. This means that Israel must not take its eyes of the radical Sunni axis that could be the biggest winner from the fall of the Shi’ite axis and might be no less evil-intentioned toward Israel.

Therefore, the State of Israel must keep a close eye both on the Shi’ite and Sunni axes while at the same time  act toward solidifying the third axis – the moderate West-Sunni axis. For that end, Israel needs to form a coalition with the US, western countries and Sunni countries such as Saudia Arabia, UAE, Indonesia, Malesia and Pakistan. Such a coalition, if strong enough, may even draw other countries to join forces, such as Lebanon and even Iraq. In tandem with this effort, Israel must strive to forge normalization agreements with moderate Sunni countries in the Middle East that will perhaps lead to regional and global peace agreements.

One way or another, Israel must condition any move in the Middle East on a combined offensive against Iran. Once the head of the snake is removed – all the rest will fall into place.

Forward looking: the day after the ceasefire

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is for a 60-day term – but in terms of Middle East security, this is ample time for things to change. There is no way to predict if indeed the ceasefire will be implemented verbatim, or what will transpire once the term is out; Hezbollah may very well breach the agreement, forcing Israel back into battle, and equally possible is that the agreement may lead to a permanent settlement that allows Israel to begin rehabilitating the north and return the evacuated citizens to their homes.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement wishes to see a rehabilitated and healing north. This is a complex process, but with smart resource allocation and oversight, this part of Israel can very soon be on track to recovery. Once this is underway, we can then turn to the next task at hand – the increase of the Jewish population in the north. The IDSF HaBithonistim sees this as a national imperative of top priority. A two-fold increase would make it clear to our enemies that they cannot push us back from our own borders, as well as contribute to the settlement of the land in agency of Israel’s security doctrine.

In order to realize these objectives, IDSF HaBithonistim has been engaging with policy-makers and is founding educational and pre-military programs designed to strengthen the settlements within Israel’s borders. These days the movement is in the midst of developing the “Ha’Tkuma” pre-military preparatory program that will operate in the Gaza border communities. In the future more of such programs will be founded in the north of Israel.

For many, rebuilding and resettling the communities in the ravaged north seems like a distant goal, but we are getting closer – and the ceasefire agreement is the first step in this direction. Despite some of the agreement’s downsides and the concessions Israel is required to make, it is important to understand that the State of Israel is now facing a historic opportunity to realize all of its aspirations. If we take advantage of this opportunity skillfully, we can change our security reality for generations to come and even stabilize the balance of power throughout the Middle East.

הפוסט “Analyzing Lebanon Not Within the General Context Is a Big Mistake” – The Broad Implications of a Ceasefire on Israel’s Northern Border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The trial of the Knave of Hearts scene in “Alice in Wonderland” oddly mirrors the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) unprecedented ruling against Israel. The court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Defense Gallant for alleged war crimes in Gaza. Had proper due process been put in place, surely this outcome would not be reminiscent of the Queen of Spades’ immortal dictum: “Sentence first – verdict afterwards.”

It would not be far-reaching to describe this ruling as initiated and abated by politically-appointed judges and prosecutor with a long anti-Israeli track record. They somehow wish to be believed that this warrant is the result of an evidence-based fair process, rather than reverse engineering a PR decision. They seek to arrest individuals over whom they have no legal jurisdiction, over crimes in a non-existent country invented for the sake of protocol, while ignoring any evidence that runs contrary to the tunnel vision. This is a pre-determined ruling that was backfilled with arguments.

Israel, a country that has thus far provided its enemy in Gaza with over 1 million metric tons of aid during wartime, is now accused of committing “starvation”. The humanitarian aid operation it orchestrated in cooperation with UNRWA – even while its school textbooks teem with anti-Semitic caricatures and many of its employees are on Hamas’ payroll – is described as war crimes. 2 billion dollars were donated by worldwide contributors to provide every Gazan with over 3,400 calories per day. All of that, after having suffered October 7 – the deadliest massacre of Jewish people since the Holocaust, and as 101 Israeli hostages are still unlawfully held in Gaza.

No real evidence has ever been provided for well-recorded starvation cases in Gaza – only smoke and mirrors. UN agencies largely rely on bogus data provided by Hamas, whitewashed as the “Gaza Health Ministry”. The “Ministry” provides the bricks that construct the anti-Israeli edifice, claiming that over 43 thousand Palestinians were killed. No real effort was carried out to validate the authenticity of that data, nor verify how many of those killed were militants. That, in stark contrast to skepticism over other types of disinformation, from Russia’s Sputnik News to ISIS’ Amaq.

During the war, millions of Palestinians were ordered by the IDF to get out of war zones and into safe zones, as Israeli tanks safeguarded them from Hamas sniper fire, fearing evacuation could help Israel defeat it. Gaza’s population continues to grow at an estimate 2% annual rate. This would be a particularly bizarre and inefficient way to carry out a genocide.

It was also the lack of relevant process, not merely evidence, that rattled Jerusalem. Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC, nor does it have jurisdiction in countries with an independent judicial system, as per the principle of complementarity. Only in cases such as Yugoslav strongman Milošević’s war crimes, where local courts are “unwilling and unable” to prosecute, can the ICC move on to intervene.

The opposite party to the ruling would be “Palestine”, which was admitted to the ICC in 2015, in stark violation of the Palestinian Authority’s Oslo Accords with Israel. Since the court cannot discuss unrecognized territories, it agreed to define one for the sake of protocol in 2021. Hungarian Judge Péter Kovács issued a dissenting opinion, criticizing the court for its lack of proper legal basis. Yet the ICC continued to paint the dartboard after the dart hit.

Much like the USSR’s sham trials, the ICC also reflects a deeper and alarming insight into a once-respected international institution. It seems that the media’s limelight rather than real criteria determines its outreach. There is simply no other way to characterize how Gaza’s relatively negligent and unreliable number of fatalities gets much of the attention, while objectively severe war theaters such as the war in Yemen (400 thousand killed and starved and 16 million at the brink of starvation) or the war in South Sudan (7.7 million projected to face acute food insecurity) get practically none. No other way to explain how 156 resolutions passed against Israel at the UN General Assembly since 2015, with Russia far second at 24 and none passed against Qatar or Venezuela.

In the words of prosecutor Khan’s predecessor at the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo: “Everyone knows starvation happened” in Gaza, while falling short of providing evidence. This “everyone knows” attitude determined the court’s proceedings, not evidence.

Legal acrobatics and confirmation bias only help making Israel’s case against the ICC, creating personally-customized law, rather than international law. This is why the ICC’s override managed to set off alarms not just in Jerusalem, but in Washington, and for a good reason. Both President Biden and President Elect Trump strongly condemned this move. They are fully aware that allowing a precedent on Israel would be allowing it on the United States as well. It has been scorched before: in 2020, the Trump administration laid sanctions on ICC officials following the court’s decision to launch a probe into American servicemen in Afghanistan. The court then backed down and “deprioritized” the US case. Then in 2022, during the Biden administration’s tenure, the ICC resumed its investigation. If Israel’s gold standard of 1:1.2 military to civilian ratio is considered “genocide”, now imagine how could the ICC describe the US’ record in Afghanistan.

There is a simple way out of this imbroglio: degrade and defund the ICC. Like any institution, the ICC is only as strong as its legitimacy and its funding. European countries who wish to keep their sovereignty would be wise to pull out funding and opt out of the ICC. Rather than announcing they will respect the ruling, they should be leading the opposition to it. They may gloat over seeing Israel in the hot seat, and may look up to the ICC with awe and reverence, but they could well be next. A real international setting to prosecute war criminals should be set, rather than a kangaroo court. The credibility that the ICC has been selling was exposed as window dressing. Now European countries should stop buying it.

הפוסט The ICC has been selling credibility. Now it’s time to stop buying it. הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The fall of the Assad regime should signal to Israel that, amidst the chaotic sequence of events, it must uphold two critical interests. The first is to destroy the capabilities of the Shiite Ring of Fire. The second is to avoid being trapped in a Sunni Ring of Fire.

The Shiite Ring of Fire was first breached with the downfall of Hezbollah and Hamas. Breaches continued with an Israeli strike that stripped Iran of its air defense capabilities, and with the rapid collapse of the Assad regime — a development echoing across the Middle East. This is not merely the fall of a regime that was hostile to Israel and was part of Iran’s Sunni Ring of Fire. It is also a psychological game-changer that could reinvigorate the Iranian rebels.

In an effort to fortify itself, Iran is accelerating the development of its nuclear weapons. A report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the U.S. indicates that Iran has speeded up its uranium enrichment so that it will potentially be able to manufacture 12 nuclear bombs.

Russia, too, has a stake in Iran’s nuclear progress, raising concerns that Russian technologies could be transferred to Iran to shorten the time required to manufacture a nuclear bomb and strengthen the resistance from the Axis of Evil.

In the face of Iran’s rush toward nuclear armaments, Israel is counting the days until Trump enters the White House. The question is how many days we have left in our quiver before Iran achieves a bomb that could, Heaven forbid, once more reverse the region’s momentum.

Therefore Israel must act immediately to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and, along with it, the remnants of the Ring of Fire that Iran has constructed around Israel.

The second interest that Israel must uphold is rooted in an ancient Machiavellian principle that says every change begets another change.

It is already evident that Iran’s decline paves the way for Turkey’s rise. Erdoğan is lurking around the corner in hopes that Israel will mount the attack and that the Iranian regime will falter. He would then seize the opportunity he has been awaiting and attempt to position himself as the region’s Islamic power.

Whether actively encouraged or passively approved by Turkey, the offensive from Syrian rebels under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was made possible by Turkish financial and military support. It not only benefits Erdoğan strategically by advancing his regional hegemony, but also benefits him tactically by weakening the Shiite axis, pushing the Kurds away from Turkey’s borders, and returning Syrian refugees who have been burdening Turkey’s economy.

Israel’s understanding of its own future interests on the battlefield against the Turks must therefore prompt it to strike inside Syria now. During the current war Erdoğan, an extreme jihadist who seeks Israel’s destruction, has taken every step to label Israel as an enemy and display his practical intent to harm it. In July, for instance, he spoke of invading Israel the way he invaded Karabakh and Libya: “Just like we entered Karabakh and the way we entered Libya, maybe we’ll do the same thing. …We have to be strong.”

Unlike Iran, Erdoğan possesses a modern, well-equipped military. This includes twice as many enlisted troops as Israel, approximately 10% more fighter jets, nearly twice as many tanks, four times as many warships, and more than twice the number of submarines (!).

Although Israel holds military superiority over Turkey in quite a few aspects, one of the challenges in confronting Turkey could lie in a preemptive Israeli strike because Turkey is a NATO member. Under the NATO framework, an attack on one member state is considered tantamount to attack on them all.

In conclusion, it is a necessity — and an obligation — for Israel to complete the destruction of the Shiite Ring of Fire. At the same time, its operations in Syria against Erdoğan-aligned rebels must be subject to a calculated assessment of Israel’s future interests in a possible war against Turkey as well as to a resolute decision that the Shiite Ring of Fire must not be replaced by a Sunni equivalent.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Israel Must Not Replace a Shiite Ring of Fire with a Sunni Ring of Fire הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The brutal pogrom in Amsterdam against the Israeli fans of Maccabi Tel-Aviv soccer team in early November, with news broadcasts showing Arab-Muslim rioters violently attacking helpless Israeli soccer fans – prove that Israel is dealing with an additional front in its current war. But more then all, it casts a blinding limelight on the snowballing Islamstic threat to Europe’s public domains.

An undeniable fact – Europe is currently undergoing a gradual takeover by Islam. The immigration-wave from Muslim countries to Western Europe was so massive that it had effected a radical change in the very landscape of European countries. The familiar faces and scenes of Europe are increasingly being lost to entire neighborhoods and sections of cities awash with the Muslim Thawbs, Hijabs and Burkas, and store signs in Arabic. Reportedly, over the past years, many churches in Europe – mainly in France – are being purchased by Muslim organizations and converted into Mosques.

This is what religious takeover looks like.

Along with this cultural occupation, among  these immigrants there are many who bring with them from the Middle East a vitriolic and violent breed of antisemitism. Many of the vicious rioters in Amsterdam that night hail from Morocco and Algeria – one of the most antisemitic countries in the world, and these Algerian-Dutch have been weaned on antisemitism since birth.

The Amsterdam events should be a wake-up call for Europe. The Muslim rioters set out to harm Jews in that particular event, but next time – they might very well set their aims on Christians.

European countries such as Holland  are home to very large Muslim communities of Algerians and Moroccans. These communities are growing exponentially while the non-Muslim communities are shrinking. The total population of Holland and Belgium together does not exceed 30 million – 17.8 million in Holland and 11 million in Belgium. A 10-year projection of population growth estimates that in major cities, such as Brussels, the Muslim population will become the majority. They may even become a majority in Belgium as a whole, within several decades. After taking over the public domain in the liberal and multi-cultured BENELUX countries, next in turn will be France, Germany, Sweden and Great Britain – all countries with large Muslim communities. France, for example has the largest Muslim community in Europe, with over 8.5 million people.

Global Intifada

The well-planned pogrom of the Dutch-Muslims against Israelis, who had arrived in Amsterdam simple to watch a soccer game between Maccabi Tel Aviv and Ajax Amsterdam – reminded Israelis and Jews across the world of the October 7 massacre, as well as Kristallnacht of the Holocaust, the 86^th anniversary of which was the next day, ironically.

The pogrom in Amsterdam included very harsh scenes of Israelis being bludgeoned with bats, threatened with knives and some even pushed into the cold night canal waters. The Arab rioters coordinated the attacks through their social networks and with the aid of information they had received on the whereabouts of Israelis in various locations in Amsterdam. The city’s mayor Pamke Helsma even knew to report that “…taxi drivers of Muslim origin participated in the lynch”. Several of the rioters had even hunted down Israelis to the hotels in which they were staying, and the Israeli guests were instructed to remain in their rooms with the doors locked.

The law enforcement forces and the Dutch police demonstrated abject incompetence in seizing control over the event and preventing injury to the Israeli soccer fans. Yet, Amsterdam Police Chief, Peter Holle claimed “…we’ve been planning for weeks, we foresaw the risks to the public order”. After the pogrom, many videos were released on social media showing Arab rioters beating Israelis, and forcing them to repeat the slogan “Free Palestine”. These videos were later used in the Palestinian propaganda channels to mock the Israelis who repeated the slogan under duress, in hopes of being spared by their attackers.

The Amsterdam pogrom is not a singular event restricted only to Holland – this is a red flag to what may very well turn into a wave of similar events in the rest of the Western world. The fact that in many cities in the West, the US included, Arabs poured out into the streets cheering the attack against the Israelis in Amsterdam, just as they had done in the wake of the October 7 massacre – should be a huge red flag for these countries. For some time now, Arabs and Muslims have been calling for a “Globa Intifada” against Jews around the world. Antisemitism is soaring and Muslims in western countries are enjoying immunity under the auspices of western tolerance.

The war’s eighth front

The Amsterdam events and the violent protests across Europe have once again proved that Israel faces yet another front – an eighth front of a violent uprising of Muslims and pro-Palestinians throughout the world; When a crowd of Arab Muslims riots in the streets of Europe and North America, it does so not solely out of solidarity with the Palestinians, but out of zealous antisemitic hatred toward Jews, calling for their slaughter, supporting Hamas and openly and unashamedly holding up the picture of formally designated global terrorist – mass murderer, war criminal and architect of the October 7 slaughter, Yahya Sinwar.

Israel has been forced to deal with this eighth front, as part of the war declared against the State, and thus has experience in this arena. Europe, however, may well find itself for the first time facing this kind of war against a Jihadi movement that had sprouted in its own back yard, bent on taking over the very countries that opened their doors so generously to them.

These events also cast a glaring light on a truism that the Europeans would rather deny: that Europe is more threatened by the Muslims and thus prefers to remain passive rather than protect its law-abiding Jewish citizens. Admitting this would force Europe to face the fact that they are in the same boat as the Jews.

But make no mistake: Islam is spreading all over the world, and we are witnessing the first signs of its designs to take over Europe.

Holland and Belgium first.

This article was originally published in Makor Rishon.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Holland & Belgium First הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The crises around the recruitment, or lack thereof, of Haredi – ultra-orthodox – men, the imperative to secure Israel’s military needs, the economic crises, and the declining support of Israel in the international community – how can all these converge to a golden opportunity for Israel that would allow it to cross several hurdles with one leap?

Four hurdles, to be precise. The solution on the table is the foundation of local Israeli arms production, with manufacturing and operational personnel recruited from the Haredi community, who would be employed under conditions of military or national service. Israel’s government had already agreed on the imperative to increase Israel’s self-production of arms and munitions in light of growing dependance mainly on the US, and other countries, for the supply of arms and munitions, which significantly increased since the onset of the war. This project would afford Israel critical independence, while diminishing its dependence on the good will and political motivations of other countries and one administration or other. The military salaries paid to the recruits employed in this project would ensure its economic viability. Moreover, the global shortages in inventory and growing demand for ammunition will enable Israel to enjoy another source of revenue and a geopolitical status of an arms exporter, rather than an importer.

The crises of the military service objection in the ultra-orthodox community

Much can – and should – be said about the issue of the recruitment of young men from the ultra-orthodox community to the IDF, and an overview consisting of a handful of sentences cannot begin to touch upon the complexity of the issue. But it must be said that the solution above mentioned does not seek to serve as an overall response for the demand for equal participation of the ultra-orthodox sector in civic duties, nor can it create sufficient placements for the entire group. Rather, it offers a partial solution, such that could respond to the genuine concerns regarding the ability of Haredi recruits to aptly preserve their way of life – be it gender separation, kosher food, and daily religious studies – all obstacles to the recruitment of Haredis to the IDF today.

These munitions employees would have to be manned exclusively by male recruits, including professional positions such as managers and engineers, among others, whom also can be recruited from the Haredi community, but not necessarily. The operational workers can be recruited from special recruitment rounds of young men from the ultra-orthodox community. As part of their service, the recruits would be provided with kosher meals, communal prayer services either in the barracks or in a synagogue specially built for that purpose, and even religios studies in their downtime. This model can address many of the concerns of potential recruits from the Haredi community while at the same time provide a solution for a pressing strategic military need in Israel.

Economy of munitions

There is no doubt that Israel has been required to adhere to a well calculated munitions economy since the outbreak of the Gaza war. Although there is no doubt as regards to Israel’s military capabilities – especially thanks to the American supply train that provided Israel with hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment since the war began. However, there are numerous variables in this economy that Israel has to consider, and it cannot always trust that this supply effort will endure. Over the past months the government had held frequent discussions on the issue, with recommendations from the military and political echelons to put into action plans to cut Israel’s dependence on foreign supply and increase the capacity of its independent arms production. This is in the face of high risks of embargo against Israel, or the conditioned or delayed shipments Israel is currently contending with. Furthermore, the arrival of these shipments is subjected to the positions and interests of the various administrations with which Israel has weapons trade agreements. This is compounded by the growing global demand for weapons and ammunition, driven among others by the war in Ukraine which has no conclusion on the horizon, and many countries are now in a race to build up and improve their military power, both in Europe and in Asia, where many countries are concerned about China and North Korea, and of course in the Middle East too. Production is falling short of the growing demand and serious backlogs and delays are becoming a matter of routine. Thus, the decision to increase local production and ensure self-sufficiency is hardly exclusive to Israel. For instance, in March the European Commission presented a plan to cut arms imports from outside the EU and increase production on the continent.

Israel’s economic crisis

There is no doubt that the Gaza war has served Israel with a steep bill and is expected to continue exacting huge costs from the Israeli economy. The military technology is a relatively lucrative endeavor for Israel’s economy and it represents a significant portion of Israel’s exports with trail-blazing Israeli technologies demanded globally at considerable costs. The abovementioned proposal departs from the usual focus of the technology-intensive defense industry by broadening its portfolio to “low-tech” munitions manufacturing, and it offers the potential for a historic turning point in the industry, which could expedite the military and economic advantages for the country and pave the way into new markets where Israel’s reputation in the field of defense production would surely serve to lend credibility to and create demand for its new munitions products.

Israel’s international status

A point to consider is that Israel’s dependence on imported weapons and ammunition might compromise its foreign relations with other countries. This places political power over Israel in the hands of the suppliers and oftentimes is leveraged to dictate preconditions for the supply of weapons to Israel – even to the point of influencing Israel’s policies and decision-making processes, particularly in critical time such as wars. Israel, however, has a golden opportunity at present to turn the tables and gain exactly that kind of influence vis a vis other countries, when they come knocking at the door, wishing to purchase Israeli munitions. This potential says something about the influence Israel wields in the field of advanced military technology exports.

In conclusion, this type of munitions industry could manufacture a wide range of arms and ammunition. Naturally, the feasibility and requirements for each plant and assembly line would have to be established. It may be that certain factories would demand more unprofessional manpower while others may be technology-intensive and demand skilled employees. Differences in the cost of salaries might be significant. The State would of course determine whether it would subsidize these factories and recruit manpower at market salaries, even if it means financial losses. But the proposed model provides a cost-effective solution which is highly competitive, and can create attractive export opportunities, not only in regards to the quality of the output but also in prices.

Lastly, an additional important point is the potential abundance of unskilled manpower for this purpose, in a country where there is a shortage of this type of worker, especially in a sensitive military industry. Case in point – in other industries that are mainly based on manual labor such as agriculture and construction, it is hard and even impossible to find Israeli workers, and manpower there almost exclusively comprises of foreign workers. The situation is marginally better in the manufacturing sector. However, when considering the fact that military industry is highly sensitive, it is clear that the benefits of relying on the Haredi community for manpower may create opportunities and remove hurdles that are currently hard to clear.

This article was originally published in Now 14

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Two Hurdles with One Leap? A Proposal for the Recruitment of Haredim to New Arms Industry הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Analysis: US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon face hurdles as Hezbollah de facto controls Lebanon; Israel must choose between a limited agreement or continued warfare, balancing military success with the need for regional security and international support

The contacts between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States, illustrate the main difficulty of a settlement reality in an era in which a sub-state terrorist organization controls a supposedly sovereign state de facto. The American-mediated contacts are supposed to lead to understandings on the basis of which quiet will be maintained on the border between Israel and Lebanon, but in a situation in which Lebanon is de facto controlled by a terrorist organization whose fingerprints are evident in the negotiations, not to mention the escalation process it led, it is difficult to understand how such an agreement can last, for how long and if at all.

The alternatives available for Israel on the Lebanese border are divided between two options – a local arrangement that does not fundamentally change the geostrategic situation, or the continuation of the war to destroy the Hezbollah terrorist organization. The reality that Israel reached after a year of fighting in the Gaza Strip, while fighting defensively on the Lebanese border, led it to a significant operational achievement vis-à-vis the terrorist organization, both in terms of damage to infrastructure, damage to the top command and control leadership, damage to weapons stockpiles and harm to fighters. Above all, neutralizing Hezbollah’s operative ability to implement the plan it has been working on for years, which is a ground-intensive operation to conquer the Galilee – Hezbollah has lost this capability.

If Israel reaches an arrangement vis-à-vis Lebanon, and assuming that Iran, which controls Hezbollah and indirectly Lebanon, where the radical ideology of the Ayatollahs’ “umbrella” will not change, under this assumption it can be assumed that such an arrangement will last for a short period of time, and certainly will not prevent the strengthening of the terrorist organization, a clear Iranian proxy in Lebanon.

In fact, as far as Israel is concerned, and certainly in today’s public opinion, expects Hezbollah not to regain strength, and certainly not to cross the geographical border of the Litani River, in order to prevent the reestablishment of the option of occupying the Galilee, as well as removing the communities in northern Israel from the direct threat of anti-tank weapons.

The alternative, from the Israelis’ perspective, and among a wide Israeli consensus, even a preferred alternative, is for the IDF to enforce the agreement, i.e., the IDF to prevent Hezbollah’s renewed buildup in the area south of the Litani River. This demand is fraught with a paradox, since Lebanon is a sovereign state, and there is no bilateral rationale whatsoever for a neighboring country to operate on the territory of a sovereign state defined as an enemy, this is a violation of sovereignty and Lebanon will not accept it, certainly not the Iranians.

Hence, the two real alternatives are a limited liability arrangement, or ongoing warfare. With the understanding that Israel will not be able to impose military control of the IDF on the ground on Lebanon, and assuming that Iran will not accept this under any circumstances either, Israel must demand two critical dimensions in the arrangement agreement: first, freedom of action in order to prevent Hezbollah’s buildup, which includes neutralization the smuggling routes – such an action also requires intelligence coverage, and this must be demanded by Israel, even if the visual intelligence is transmitted through an American intermediary, At the CENTCOM level.

On the operational level, Israel must demand a buffer zone into which no weapons will enter, just as defined in the separation of forces agreement between Syria and Israel after the Yom Kippur War (1974). The combination of a buffer zone, legitimacy to act against the axes of buildup, and an informed security assessment on the Lebanese border, which is also based on quality intelligence – are the best guarantee Israel can receive, and this guarantee will also be limited.

There should also be an understanding among the international community that agreements between a democratic state and a state ruled by a terrorist state such as Iran cannot be trusted. As long as Iran seeks to expand in the Middle East, it will find a way to strengthen its destructive arms in the region, including Lebanon. Therefore, the arrangement between Israel and Lebanon is a very likely short-term operation, and no more than a few years until something significant happens in Iran – if it continues its radical strategy, all the peoples of the region, and certainly Israel, will suffer from this.

Therefore, the international community, and certainly Israel, must act immediately for a strategic change vis-à-vis Iran – its different conduct can provide a more realistic guarantee of agreements, especially when the Russian axis, which has a clear interest in the northeastern Mediterranean basin, is integrated into this story.

Can Israel afford to wait for a change of government in the United States?

In general, Israel can suspend negotiations with Lebanon and wait for the Trump administration, which appears to be clearly pro-Israel compared to the Biden administration and in general. At the same time, it is worth being realistic – such a wait means continuing the fighting for at least another year in Lebanon, which means: increasing the burden on IDF reserve duty, continuing the lives of those evacuated from northern communities in the existing format, i.e., another year away from home, which has deep and problematic consequences.

The fighting as it stands these days is characterized mainly by “counter fire,” i.e., the firing of missiles and rockets, combined with unmanned aerial vehicles that violate the security of Israel’s civilian home front several times a day. The IDF, on the other hand, continues to “clear” the Lebanese territory, destroying additional Hezbollah capabilities. On the face of it, time seems to be working against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena – the Israeli home front is showing greater resilience than the Iranians thought, and with each passing day Hezbollah is getting closer and closer to breaking. It is possible that from this perspective, it is convenient for Israel to actually “play the game” according to the current rules, and in this way bring Iran, Hezbollah and Lebanon to an arrangement that is much better for Israel in a few months, certainly under the auspices of a sympathetic American administration – Reaching an arrangement when the terrorist organization is defeated is infinitely more credible than the agreement currently proposed.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Arrangement or escalation: Security alternatives on the Lebanese border הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For years now, there are voices which would have the world view some of the most bloodthirsty and cruel terror organizations the world has ever known, i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah, not as the terrorists they are, but as “freedom fighters”. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, this bias has been pushed even further. They are being chanted in pro-Palestinian rallies, openly declared on banners on campuses of the most prestigious universities of the world, and are even heard in certain Israeli circles.

This paper reviews the goals that govern these organizations and their methods of operation and shows beyond doubt that equating terrorists and their organizations with freedom fighters is nothing short of fallacious. Aside from being a falsehood, this is a grave claim that harbors very dangerous consequences. When terrorist perpetrating war crimes are called freedom fighters, they are in effect gaining license to commit criminal activities and even immunity from the consequences thereof, and moreover, such claims breed further problematic misconceptions that view terror organizations as legitimate resistance movements, and the acts of terror themselves – as brutal and bloody as they might be – as legitimate means of popular struggle.

Therefore, any claims to that effect should be categorically denounced. At the same time, a comprehensive endeavor should be undertaken to debunk this narrative and reinforce the true understanding of terrorism and its overall end, for which any means are exploited: the annihilation of the Jewish state and its Jewish citizens.

In the name of enlightenment: how have terrorists become to be known as “liberators”?

The fictitious claim according to which terrorists are freedom fighters draws on an anti-Zionism narrative, according to which the Jews are colonialists that have seized control of a country called Palestine, with the aim of taking over a land with which they have no connection whatsoever. This contrived narrative is wrong on two accounts: the so-called state of Palestine had never existed, and secondly, the connection of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is undisputable and is established both historically and legally. The people of Israel are not foreign colonizers – they are a people returning to their rightful land after 2,000 years of unjust exile, which forced upon them an existence as mostly unwanted foreign elements in their hosting countries.

It follows that anyone who supports the Palestinian narrative is refuting the national rights of the Jewish people and disputing major legal rulings made by the international community, such as the British Mandate, granted by the League of Nations and the Partition Plan by the UN from 1947.

Although such claims have been voiced since the establishment of the State of Israel, they have been regaining tailwind under the auspices of radical progressive movements that had risen from the radical left in the Unites States such as the WOKE movement. WOKE and its counterparts are governed by the undiscerning principle that the weak are invariably in the right and victimized, and tend to turn what it perceives as the victim into the hero of the story. As part of this paradigm, the so-called struggle of the Islamic terror organizations for the “liberation” of “oppressed” minorities and the right to self-determination is perceived in some circles as a valiant post-modern struggle, and from there only a short leap was needed to view such terrorists as would-be freedom fighters.

The question of goals: what really motivates terrorists?

The raison d’etre of true freedom fighters is the liberation of their people and land from foreign conquerors that have invaded and seized it by force. A prime example of this is Mahatma Gandhi, who led a peaceful struggle against the British Empire’s rule in India and for national independence. In stark contrast, even a cursory examination of the stated objectives of some terror organizations clearly yields a completely different picture.

A quick look at the Hamas charter, for example, reveals that the organization makes no qualms about stating its overall goal – the all-out, end-justifying “Holy War” (Jihad) against the State of Israel, and the absolute rejection of any agreement or arrangement that would recognize the right of Israel to exist. The charter even quotes Hasan al-Banna ,the founder of its ally movement, The Muslim Brotherhood, who said: “Israel will rise and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it”.

As for Hezbollah, it too does not march under any banner of liberation – neither of people nor of country. It operates out of Lebanon – an independent state with no permanent Israeli  presence within its sovereign borders, and with no land dispute whatsoever with its southern neighbor such that calls for an irridentist agreement. Moreover, Hezbollah operates in Lebanon as a proxy and under the auspices and military support of another sovereign country, Iran, which resides 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Israel, and non-democratically forces its presence on the Lebanese people solely for its proclaimed purpose of annihilating the State of Israel and its citizens.

Another manifestation of the true non-peaceful intentions of terror organizations the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah – and indeed even official Arab organizations such as  the Palestinian Authority – is the fact that for decades, they have been rejecting out of hand nearly every solution or offer that Israel and Western administrations have brought to the table to bring the conflict to a resolution, thus proving that they are not motivated by the desire for emancipation. The underlying reason they have not accepted any diplomatic solution thus far is that all of these recognize the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. In other words – they strive only for a resolution that ensures the eradication of Israel from the map.

The question of operating method: how do terrorists differ from freedom fighters?

In 1984, acclaimed historian, Professor Benzion Netanyahu spoke at the second international conference of the Jonathan Institute for the study of terror. He spoke of the urgent need to fight the misconception regarding the true nature of terrorism, and in particular the perception of terrorists as “freedom fighters” or “protectors” of oppressed people. Professor Netanyahu addresses the manner in which freedom fighters operate and how it vastly differs from that of terrorists. He mentions three points of comparison that still hold true today, even after forty years:

Operating against civilians

Professor Netanyahu points to the fact that freedom fighters wage their struggle for a political or social end, with a fundamental respect to human rights of innocents. In stark contrast, terrorist make it a point to target innocent civilians as a means with which to foment fear and achieve their self-serving political interests.

Looking at the long list of terrorist attacks that have plagued Israel through recent decades – including the October 7 massacre in 2023, it is clear that terrorist organizations are systematically and deliberately targeting the civilian population as well, including the elderly, children and babies.

The installation of totalitarian regimes

Freedom fighters are committed to ensuring universal liberties and rights, says Prof. Netanyahu, which terrorists habitually ignore and violate – even the most basic of human rights – and propagate oppression in territories under their control. In the case of Hamas and Hezbollah, it is common knowledge that they use their own people as human shields and ensconce themselves in densely populated areas, often causing intentional harm to innocent people on their side in self-protection or as a means of swaying public opinion with publicized propaganda. Furthermore, terrorist organizations violently oppress weak groups within their own population  such as women, minorities and members of the LGBTQ community. Hence, it would be absurd to present these organizations as champions of human rights and liberties.

Relations with dictatorships, oppressive regimes and organizations

The third point mentioned by Prof. Netanyahu relates to the connection frequently seen between terror organizations and violent groups and oppressive regimes. He explains that the aid terrorist often receive from these sources underscores their affinity to aims of oppression rather than values of liberty.

This connection is particularly evident with those terror organizations that operate on Israel’s borders. Hezbollah is an arm of the Shi’ite Iranian regime – a totalitarian state that had set its sights on orchestrating a world-wide Islamic revolution, and openly proclaims its intention of annihilating the State of Israel.   Interestingly, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), although members of the historically rival Islamic Sunni stream, are willing to benefit from Iran’s sponsorship just to further their cause against Israel, and view themselves as an affiliate of another extremist group – the Muslim Brotherhood – a  fundamentalist Sunni Islamist movement that calls for the eradication of the State of Israel, and is designated as a terrorist group in many countries.

It is evident that these terror groups enjoy the backing of powerful elements with a clear ideology of world dominance, and not only do they have no agenda of liberation – they are motivated by a desire to control and oppress.

Debunking a claim of equivalence: Jewish resistance vs. Islamic terror

There are those who would equate the terror organizations threatening Israel to the struggle of the pre-state Jewish resistance, such as the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and Etzel (the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel). They claim that the members of these groups were no less terrorists than the members of Hamas or Hezbollah today, or alternatively – that the terrorists of the latter two are no less freedom fighters than the members of the Jewish resistance.

However, this comparison disregards all the points mentioned above, and fails to consider that different nature of these resistance movements and the terror organization in terms of objectives and methods of operation.

As far as the objectives of the Jewish resistance – as oppose to the terror organizations, they indeed were committed to true liberation and independence. In 1922, the predecessor to the UN – the League of Nations – ratified the British mandate. This was an international accord standing on solid legal ground that cemented Britain’s commitment to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel. In effect, the British blatantly violated this accord and banned the entrance of Jews in to Israel while at the same time encouraging the settlement of Arabs in the area and transferring territories from Israel to the Emirate of Transjordan. Thus, the Jewish resistance movement did indeed fight for the legal right given to them, and more importantly – once this aim was achieved, the resistance was disbanded or assimilated into the new state’s formal military.

The terror organizations, as above demonstrated, demand independence for a state that does not exist and had never existed. And still, they had received numerous offers over the course of the past decades but rejected any compromise, calling for the destruction of the State of Israel – an objective that has nothing in common with those of the Jewish resistance movement or any other freedom fighting movement for that matter.

A comparison of the methods of operation shows fundamental differences between the two: as oppose to the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, the members of the Jewish militias targeted the British military personnel in the country and not civilians of any nationality. Furthermore, they did all in their power to protect the Jewish population, even at the price of their own lives. Moreover, the fighters of the Jewish resistance did not operate under the auspices or with the support of any state or global organization, and were not affiliated with dictatorships or totalitarian regimes.

The attempt at attributing any equivalence between the pre-state Jewish resistance and the terror organizations is nothing more than a populistic ruse motivated by the aim of creating a distorted picture of reality, or at the very least – it stems from pure ignorance.

A policy of zero tolerance: conclusion and insights

Equating murderous terrorists with freedom fighters is not only fallacious and indeed offensive on many levels – it is downright dangerous. This comparison awards terrorists with justification for their actions, including murder, rape, torture and kidnapping innocents. Statements in support of such actions cannot be accepted, not even in the name of tolerance and freedom of speech, as they legitimize violence against and the murder of Jews. When the equation of terrorists with freedom fighters is heard from sources within Israel itself – not to mention on part of  Israeli officials – they are tenfold graver.

Sadly, these terror organizations have learned and perfected the art of propaganda and disinformation, and their abilities in this area are boosted by the skillful use of internet and AI. They are also very adept at  exploiting Western values and ways of thought to sway public opinion in the West and even in Israel, citing duplicitous pretexts of “human rights”.

Hence, it behooves Israel and the Jewish nation to conduct a holding action and do their share in informing and shaping public opinion – in Israel and the world.

The IDSF HaBithonistim movement was formed precisely out of the need to bring the truth and advocate Israel and Zionism to the public. Our organization believes in the imperative of educating on the Jewish national ethos as it is our believe that first and foremost – it is the bedrock of Israel’s national security.

For this end, the IDSF HaBithonistim conducts various activities such as excursions to historic heritage sites across Israel and talks and conferences on Zionism. Recently we have established the pre-military program “Ha’tkuma” that is situated in the Gaza envelop area and held in collaboration with the communities there.

The IDSF HaBithonistim website provides a wide range of content, from commentary on current affairs to opinion pieces and analyses – all with the aim of providing a broad perspective rooted in facts and truth, reinforcing the conviction in the justness of the Zionist cause and above all – to stand as a reminder that in the story of the Jewish people and Zionism – the Jewish nation and the miracle that is the State of Israel are the true heroes.

הפוסט “Freedom Fighters”? Hamas and Hezbollah Are Terrorist Organizations; Any Attempt to Claim Otherwise is Condemnable הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The organized pogrom perpetrated against the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, in which Jews were humiliated and assaulted on European soil, sounded alarm bells this week. It must be said, however, that these came on top of countless red lights indicating the growing radical Islamic threat germinating European soil. Painful motifs, such as the timing of this pogrom – just moments before the anniversary of the Kristallnacht, the brutal violence, the hurling of Jews into the gracht waters or the blind eye turned by the authorities, made this event all the more outstanding and horrific. In view of the surge in anti-Semitism in Europe throughout the war and the increasing frequency of demonstrations and violent disturbances, one arrives at an unmistakable conclusion: these are no isolated incidents. Rather, this is a new, undeniable reality on European soil. In extreme scenarios, it could amount to fundamentally alter Israeli-European diplomatic and defense relations.

This new reality poses us a clear mirror: the classical continent, which is portrayed as a peaceful Western territory filled with picturesque villages, Gothic cathedrals, steam trains and iconic tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, the Schoenbrunn Palace and London Tower, is gradually undergoing a transformation. The change in the demographics and in the civilization itself in Europe has been taking form over past decades and at an accelerated pace this past decade. Faced with this reality, Europe, for the most part is helpless, slow to respond, and has yet to fully realize the magnitude of the threat that has entered into the belly of the beast.

Aided and abetted by the authorities, millions of immigrants from the Islamic world have been arriving, reshaping the continent with their feet. It is not uncommon nowadays to walk around Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris, Barcelona or London and feel how these so closely-familiar cities, touted as tourism and culinary hotspots, are being enveloped with entire ghettos and filling with large immigrant communities that are tightening their grip on these places. Cultural artifacts like billboards in Arabic and mosque minarets are increasingly becoming a feature of everyday life. “We have become the Gaza of Europe”, lamented Dutch leader Geert Wilders bitterly. “I refuse to accept this.”

But the reality is that 30% of Birmingham’s population is Muslim, some half of Brussels’ is of non-Belgian descent, and the most commonly-given name to newborn children is Muhammad. All of this dovetails with the reality in many other European cities, yet are met with a deep culture of denial among Europeans.

The last time demographic data on Islam’s prevalence in Europe was released was in 2016. For some reason, in the past eight years there has been no release of updated figures. In a conference I attended, a senior European Union official voiced her surprise at the complaints voiced by the “radical right” regarding mass immigration into Europe. She made comparisons to the massive presence of Venezuelan refugees throughout South America, or Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon – to the situation in Europe, which according to her was negligible. Another speaker, a senior NATO official, insisted – mistakenly – that the immigrants were not responsible for even a single terrorist attack in Europe. None other than French President Emmanuel Macron spoke about “séparatisme”, but stressed that the terrorist attacks are perpetrated by French people – not by immigrants – since they are French citizens, totally sidestepping the issue of the civilizational shift underway in his own backyard.

Incidents like the Amsterdam pogrom ought to shake even nationalistic governments out of their doldrums in reaction to these “Wir schaffen das”-type policies of former Chancellor Angela Merkl, but they are slow to react. Laws allowing for revocation of citizenship and deportation of inciters and terrorists are being hollowed out. Thus is the extradition of the “Jihad Widow” in Brussels being delayed for years as the legal wrangling drags on, and the Hamas-sympathizing agitator Muhammad Hanoun in Italy is still leading anti-Semitic demonstrations without his citizenship being revoked or him being deported – even though the US State Department has imposed sanctions against him. The Meloni government in Italy is still working on its Albania Plan without any tangible results, and even the newly-installed right-wing governments in Austria and the Netherlands are slow in implementing an effective immigration policy.

Countries such as France or Switzerland prefer, on the one hand, to pass laws outlawing burkas or mosque minarets in the public space, while on the other hand allowing hundreds of thousands of immigrants to enter their countries and remain there permanently. The European Union’s 2020 counter-terrorism strategy included a pitiful few measures aimed at tightening border security or deportation of agitators. They included mainly measures for strengthening “community resilience” through sport, intelligence cooperation, and removal of youths from the path toward radicalization through soft means.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the only countries that refuse to go along with the family reunion policy and with the pro-immigration policies of the rest of Europe, policies that have seen the admission of millions of immigrants into the continent with the world’s lowest average birth rate. The results are plain to see – an almost total absence of anti-Semitic incidents, even in view of the war in the Middle East, in stark contrast to the surge in such incidents throughout the rest of Europe.

The Amsterdam events are consistent with the European attitude toward the war in Israel. This begins with a profound denial of the root cause of the problem and the preference for “band-aid” solutions – in Israel’s case, Europe’s failure to call out Iran’s hegemonistic motives and Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s anti-Semitism, while focusing on the territorial dispute with the Palestinians and on the “two-state solution”. In the Amsterdam case, this means “severely punishing” the culprits or “strengthening security” – instead of addressing the broader threat from radical Islam. This is also the case when it comes to media coverage – although for the most part it reflected the reality on the ground, it did blow out of proportion isolated incidents perpetrated by “Jewish hooligans”, who had rioted and were arrested, or “Maccabi fans tore down Palestinian flags and provoked riots”. This skewed view of reality is nothing new for Israelis in the context of the war here in the Middle East, where headlines decry “massacre of civilians” or the “catastrophic famine” within the Strip.

Europe is still deep in denial. Around half of the teachers in France avoid discussing certain issues for fear of provoking Muslim students, particularly after the appalling murder of teacher Samuel Pati. The terrorist attacks in Paris, Barcelona and London, the assassinations of artists critical of Islam, as in the case of Dutch director Theo Van Gogh, or the attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, all these still meet a complacent European public, where only 32% of surveyed citizens are prepared to fight to defend their country. The rest of those surveyed are more worried about climate change than security issues.

The first signs of change in the European political landscape have begun to appear – right-wing governments, sometimes radical right-wing, are ascending to power. There is a marked drop in voting for green parties in favor of nationalist parties, and many constraints that have been stifling public debate are now crumbling. This denial has ushered in an ambiance conducive to immigration and radical Islam. Its dismantling is the first step toward confronting these issues.

Absent a change in trajectory, this might force Israel to regard Europe as more of a threat than a partner. Europe might come to be considered a hostile Arab space, and travel there could be categorized at a risk level equal to that of travel to Arab countries. Israelis, who have so far made do with a few simple measures like avoiding speaking Hebrew in public or not wearing anything indicative of their Jewish identities, will be compelled to further recalculate their moves. They might choose to avoid traveling to Germany, the same way they avoid traveling to countries like Egypt. One can only imagine a worst-case scenario in which these elements seize the centers of power, and the political and security implications Israel will have to deal with regarding this nearby, powerful continent. The European states had better wake up and outright reject this shifting cultural orientation, before it is too late.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

הפוסט The Amsterdam Pogrom: Europe could eventually be considered hostile Arab territory for Israelis הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

After the Taliban extremists took over Afghanistan in August 2021, they announced that they hoped to continue good relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors: China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and the Gulf states as well. However, existing conditions made direct contacts difficult and the country chosen as principal intermediary — which was thus enabled to fill a significant role in shaping Afghanistan’s regional policy — was Qatar. Qatar had already constructed a relationship with the Taliban years before, when in 2013 it allowed the Taliban to open a diplomatic mission in Doha with support from the US government.

Washington had been looking for a neutral location for holding negotiations with the Taliban in preparation for withdrawing American forces from Afghanistan. It opened the diplomatic mission after finding that direct negotiations, with the Taliban on one side and Afghanistan and the NATO of the time on the other side, were a failure and concluding that a clear alternative channel was needed. The Doha mission would enable the Americans to communicate secretly with the Taliban while officially continuing to support the Afghan government. Qatar was ostensibly the go-between in those talks, but in practice it served as the Taliban’s patron. In the negotiations, the Americans agreed to release imprisoned Taliban members; and among those freed was a founder of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. He would become the head of the organization’s diplomatic mission in Qatar.

On the basis of the US support for Qatar as go-between in talks with the Taliban, Qatar was positioned to take on a broader role in matters touching on Afghanistan. Even after the Doha talks between the Taliban and the former Afghan government collapsed in 2020, western countries — and, especially, international organizations — accepted Qatar’s legitimacy as an intermediary and a point of contact with the Taliban. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and foreign ministers from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy arrived in an aerial caravan to Qatar, emphasizing the country’s importance — in comparison with other countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia — as an intermediary with Afghanistan.

In February 2020, the USA signed a historic peace agreement with the Taliban, including a commitment to gradually withdraw from Afghanistan and lift the sanctions against the organization. The Taliban, for their part, agreed to respect human rights, not to permit terrorist activity from the area under their control, and to open a dialogue with the Afghan government in order to find a solution for Afghanistan. Shortly afterward, when Abdul Ghani Baradar — head of the Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Qatar — landed in Afghanistan to take office as the new President on the Taliban’s behalf, he disembarked from a Qatar Emiri air force plane made in the USA.

Since most of the world’s nations do not officially recognize the Taliban regime, and most of the western embassies have left Afghanistan, intercession by a third party is required; and Qatar is in place as the natural candidate for that role. Qatar’s main interest in Afghan affairs, as in other matters, has to do with entrenching itself as the regional intermediary. Qatar advances its regional and international influence by means of the prestigious intermediation that positions it as a central player in the eyes of the world powers and international organizations. Thus, for example, Qatar intermediated between Germany and the Taliban during 2024 for the return of Afghan emigrants to Afghanistan.

However, some international players see Qatar as offering a platform for the extremism of the Taliban organization, which even cooperates directly with Al-Qaeda and assists in international terrorism.

Qatari policy is basically driven by a combination of political Islam and a business agenda. That policy includes granting material assistance, such as funding, favorable publicity, and even armaments, to various recipients. Thus, for example, for years the Qatari television station Al Jazeera, based in Doha, has given the Taliban a platform for addressing the world. The Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Doha underwent a quick process of branding and was presented as the legitimate representative of the Afghan nation — a sort of shadow government as against the government that sits in Kabul.

An example of Qatar’s deep ties in Afghanistan is that shortly after the attacks of September 11, Qatar’s Al Jazeera network was the only mass communications medium that succeeded in interviewing the number one suspect of the day, Al Qaeda commander Osama Bin Laden, at his hideout in Afghanistan. Thus Qatar’s policies advance its interests indirectly while exploiting its close alliance with the USA.

Qatar appears untroubled by its ties with disreputable players such as Hamas, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, it is such connections that have elevated it as the sole, key player that can lessen the distress of the west in the face of those enemies. Thus Qatar exploits the conflicts of the region and the problems of the west in order to propose a solution tailored by the wealthy little emirate itself. Qatar’s strategy displays more business thinking than ideological determination. However, Qatar’s approach is not pure business; it does also involve making western players dependent on its services so that it may be continue as a central player and as the exclusive address for solving problems with the anti-western elements of the Middle East.

This article was originally published in ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Business Islam: On Qatari–Taliban relations and Qatar’s regional agenda הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the past year, anyone who has given even a cursory glimpse at the newspapers knows that Israel has been fighting a multi-theater war on its borders in Gaza and Lebanon, and overseas against Iran and Yemen, but many are not aware of the fact that this is a multi-dimensional war, says Yishai Gelb. “We’re fighting in a number of theaters, but also in several dimensions”, he clarifies. “Aside from the battles in the field, the State of Israel is also waging battle in international courts, and also over public opinion in the international community. It’s important to understand that a positive public opinion is critical for the overall war effort, as Israel is in the midst of a prolonged campaign and needs diplomatic and economic support from the countries of the world”.

Since the outbreak of the Iron Swords war (Gaza war), Yishai Gelb has been spearheading the War in Israel initiative, which is part of the IDSF HaBithonistim website. This is a comprehensive data base, updated on a daily basis, which provides reliable data on the war and its casualties. The website was founded and sponsored by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, after it had become clear that the Foreign Ministry and the IDF spokesman unit are overloaded with the public diplomacy demands. The website hit the air already in November 2023, in Hebrew and English, becoming a pioneer in the private sector of Israeli public diplomacy.

“Our enemies are sharing information through a host of platforms, and a very large portion of this information is false and is contrived for the purpose of establishing and promoting an anti-Israel narrative”, says Gelb. “Our aim is to provide an alternative source of information that is based on credible and verified facts, and to mobilize the international public opinion to support Israel, advocate the justness of Israel’s actions, and afford the world access to reliable information on which they could base their support of Israel”.

Debunking disinformation begins with hard, cold facts

Yishai Gelb and his team of data workers collect large volumes of information, some is basic, statistical data such as numbers of casualties on both sides, numbers of wounded and the number of hostages still held in Hamas tunnels; other information is operational – the Israeli cities and villages targeted, the number of shells fired into Israeli territory and the number of targets that the IDF had eliminated in Gaza. Additional data provides a broader outlook with which the current war can be compared with other conflicts around the world, both current and from modern history e.g. the Cambodian Civil War, and the ongoing armed conflict in Darfur. This data examines among others the ratio of soldiers to casualties recorded during various wars and armed conflicts.

“We’ve created a database of figures from many wars and conflicts across the world that have occurred since the establishment of the ‘New World Order’ in 1945, and are comparing these figures to those of the Gaza war”, explains Gelb. “Our goal is to project a broad and clear picture that reflects Israel’s status as oppose to other conflict zones and prove beyond doubt just how groundless the accusations hurled at Israel are”.

The data collected in the IDSF HaBithonistim database shows among others that the current war in Gaza has claimed the lives of 22,000 civilians – both on Israel’s side and the reported casualties in Gaza. This admittedly, is a regretfully high number; however, a comparison with the numbers of casualties in other recent conflicts casts this figure in a rather different light. Case in point: The ongoing civil war in Yemen has claimed to date some 150,000 casualties; the Nigerian civil war – claimed the lives of about 225,000 civilians, and in Syria – approximately 206,000 civilians had lost their lives in the civil war there. These figures are instrumental in fighting the false allegations, such as the claim that Israel is committing genocide.

Similarly, the figures in the database irrefutably disprove the claim that the State of Israel is deliberately causing  mass starvation of the Gaza population. A look at starvation casualties of other conflicts shows that in Yemen, 85,000 died of starvation; in Somalia – 260,000, and in Congo – four million. In Gaza, according to the highest end of estimates – 33 people have died of starvation, hence debunking the claim of deliberate mass starvation by the hands of Israel.

Furthermore, claims of humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip due to insufficient aid – whether on Israel’s part of the international community – take on a different perspective when comparing the two-billion-dollar aid sent into the Gaza Strip for its 2 million citizens, to the Ukraine – which had received humanitarian aid in the value of two billion dollars as well – for a population of over 40 million people.

“The debunking of myths is one of the most important tools in the shaping of public opinion”, explains Gelb. “When you see the figures relating to Israel as oppose to the global numbers, it’s plain to see that the war in Gaza is certainly nearly not as horrific as some are attempting to portray it. Moreover, it shows the world’s hypocrisy that is all too happy to hurl accusations at Israel while remaining silent about the horrible war crimes other countries are committing”.

Credibility above all: challenges in the age of fake news

In the current digital age, we are all constantly inundated with information, and it is hard to tell what is true and reliable and what is biased, false, or downright lies. This challenge is keeping the War in Israel research team busy at their desks. In order to tackle this issue and ensure that the data in the database is reliable, they check and recheck every piece of information, and cross-reference the data with different sources. The main sources of information that are used to glean data are the official reports of Israel’s General Security Service and the IDF, authorized research institutes such as Israel’s Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the broad proprietary IDSF HaBithonistim database, which also collects discrete data such as every fallen Israeli soldier and every senior terrorist operative eliminated. Furthermore, the researchers themselves engage in data collection, diligently laboring for long hours each day.

On the other side of the divide are information sources that the  IDSF HaBithonistim research team steer clear of, like the media and social platforms and of course information published by Palestinian sources or platforms such as  Al-Jazeera, since they tend to propagate mis- or disinformation. Furthermore, the team will not use data from classified sources as it cannot be revealed and therefor verified. They are able to verify to a high degree a large majority of the data they collect, and in the few cases in which the information could not be fully validated – it is mentioned. Furthermore, each data that is presented with references to its sources and explanations on how the research was done, to allow the reader to independently determine whether they view the information as reliable or not.

“Sadly, it’s very easy to fabricate information today”, says Yishai Gelb. “There are many sites, such as the “Betzelem” organization website, that operate huge databases, but refrain from referencing their sources of information, thus, it is virtually impossible to determine how they obtain the data they publish. Additionally, there are reputed bodies that albeit a credible reputation at first glance, are found upon a more circumspect examination to rely on biased sources. One prominent example is the UN, which adopts resolutions and decisions based on data published by the Gaza Ministry of Health, which is in reality controlled by no other than Hamas – in other words, even data published by the UN’s official bodies must be taken with a grain of salt, and such data published on the War in Israel is accompanied by a disclaimer mentioning this. An additional issue in this field is the problem of cyclic requoting, when for example, the UN quotes a certain organization that had quoted the UN to begin with, creating a closed circuit of sorts, making it hard to discern the original source”.

Artificial intelligence (AI) tools, which are multiplying and becoming increasingly sophisticated by the day, do significantly contribute to the work of data-gathering, but also open the door to  irresponsible and even intentionally malicious use of information, and at times actually make it even harder to corroborate information.  “We use AI tools quite a lot, mainly for cross-referencing information”, explains Gelb. “Until these tools were introduced, we would have to first find the information, determine the source and then cross-reference it with other data and sources. AI tools actually reverse the process by starting with cross-referencing, thereby considerably streamlining the work. Nonetheless, these tools must be used with circumspection because as tempting as it may be to use them, the information they present must be carefully inspected”.

Not a lie, but not exactly true: crafty methods of misrepresenting information

The credibility of sources and figures is a complicated issue, but the validity of the information in itself is hardly an assurance to the overall integrity of the report, as even true facts can be introduced in a biased manner to serve agendas. According to Yishai Gelb, there is no shortage of website that do in fact present verified and true information, yet manage to portray a biased picture.

One method often employed by such sites is selectively presenting certain facts while omitting others. Many niche sites do exactly that. A prime example is the website called “Israel Palestine Timeline”, which shows a timeline of the figures of casualties in each side of the Gaza war, however, the information in the site shows a much higher casualty-count of Palestinians as compared to Israelis. Hence, when such information is presented without any context or background, it immediately achieves the impression of injustices committed on part of Israel.

Another method of misrepresentation of  true facts to convey a one-sided and skewed impression is optics. Yishai explains that any body that engages in data collection knows that presentation is everything, and not the facts themselves. Terminology is also a tool that is used deliberately and discerningly in support of the presentation. For this reason, databases put a lot of effort into planning the presentation of the facts. Information appearing at the head of the page, or presented through graphics, for example, carries more weight, while information that appears in small letters in text form, or at the bottom of the page – is often overlooked or ignored. Additionally, the segmentation of the information, i.e. the breakdown of a information into smaller units according to specific criteria, is another method with which to formulate intentional messages and create desired  impressions.

Not only with tanks: Israel’a all-out campaign

The data Gelb and his research team use, are posted in the website on a regular basis, with an exposure of some 30-30 thousand views a month, in addition to exposure on various social networks. Furthermore, they are published on the IDSF HaBithonistim weekly report, which is submitted to diplomats and members of government across the world, and presented in the movement’s various conferences and events. Oftentimes, the data is used for research purposes, and researchers from the IDSF HaBithonistim research department and from other research institutes, such as the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), rely on them regularly for their research. Much of this data is also often used by leading media outlets in Israel, such as Ynet and Channel 14, and appears in newspaper articles and investigative stories.

Gelb welcomes any publicity the information receives but expresses his desire to gain even more exposure. “It makes me very happy to read reports that are based on data we’ve collected, and I feel especially pleased to see researchers using this data because it lends them validity and credibility”, he says. “Now our challenge is to connect this data to other bodies that present data on Israel, and expand to additional platforms such as more research institutions and social networks”.

The waves that the information in Gelb’s website created, reinforce his sense of mission that comes with his job. “All my activity is centered around supporting the Israeli narrative, and with that, the collection of data stems from my desire to promote the interests of the State of Israel”, he says. “It’s true that data collection is a very technical endeavor, but it’s not the be all and end all of the work. A lot of marketing skills and psychology are needed  to optimally determine how to present each piece of data, how to turn data into infographics or articles. In a nutshell – my job is to take numbers and use then to support Israel in the campaign over the local and international public opinion  – and viewed through that lens, the entire endeavor takes on a whole new meaning”.

Yishai Gelb is determined to collect data so long as the Gaza war is raging, and plans to continue maintaining the website after the war ends, and to make it into a vast and rich database with information pertaining to Israel’s security situation. However, it is clear to him that his activity and that of other similar NGO websites is not enough. “Israel’s war is not restricted to the use of tanks, planes and submarines”, he states. “To win this campaign, the State must take the war over public opinion seriously, as it directly affects the support and legitimacy Israel gains. It cannot be that Israel’s public diplomacy has become the task of the private sector alone, and the government and its official agencies must take this matter seriously and invest the appropriate resources and effort into it”.

Iron Swords War (Gaza War) database

הפוסט Through the Statistics: The “Dry” Figures that Promote Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the Gaza Strip during the Swords of Iron War, the IDF found large quantities of weaponry apparently made in North Korea. Militarily, Hamas — like Iran’s other proxy organizations — is directly or indirectly connected to North Korea in various ways, such as weapons trading, training, and exercises.

North Korea’s primary news agency, KCNA, rejected such contentions and called them “a baseless, mendacious rumor.” The agency furthermore accused the USA of spreading a conspiracy theory designed to divert attention from its participation alongside Israel in the Gaza warfare. However, the findings proved otherwise as the IDF discovered North Korean RPG F7 among the weapons captured from Hamas, as well as North Korean Bang122 artillery shells. How would weaponry from North Korea have reached Hamas in the Gaza Strip?

North Korea’s relations and deep partnership with Iran and Syria cover a history of many years, and so its military technology has reached Iran’s proxy organizations: Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas. In addition, North Korea’s ties with the Palestinians go back many years — to the beginning of the 1960s. During those early years, North Korea began providing financial assistance and military training to PLO personnel; and later, during the 1970s and 1980s, Yasser Arafat and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine met separately with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Those meetings resulted in a constant supply of North Korean weaponry to the Palestinians. After the Cold War ended, ties between North Korea and the Palestinians dwindled; but in 2007 with the ascendancy of Hamas in Gaza, the ties were revived.

In July 2014, when Israel embarked upon Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Hamas requested military aid from North Korea. In that arrangement, Hamas received rockets and military communications equipment; and besides providing weaponry, financial aid, and military training, North Korea may have also helped Hamas build its Gazan “Metro” — the network of Hamas tunnels — just as it helped Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Hostile though it is to the West and Israel, does North Korea assist terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah for ideological reasons alone? Despite its long-standing support for members of the “Axis of Resistance,” apparently North Korea is primarily motivated — aside from ideology — by economic considerations. North Korea lives under heavy international sanctions, but by its involvement in activities such as sales of weaponry to terrorist organizations it can obtain income to fund its own weapons programs.

North Korea is also pleased by the founding of an anti-American, anti-Western block which consists of Russia, China, and Iran. After Russia invaded Ukraine, North Korea sought a way to leverage strategic accomplishments in expanding its cooperation with Russia while interfering with US efforts in Ukraine. Now, as in Ukraine, North Korea is seeking an opportunity to undermine US interests in the Middle East as well while profiting economically from the conflicts there, such as Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These circumstances increase North Korea’s chances of expanding its sales of weaponry to the terrorist organizations, and to Hamas in particular, following a special decree from Kim Jong Un, as early as November 2023, in support of the Palestinians.

The North Korean angle is not well enough publicized, but it is dangerous and its shadow could darken the war. North Korea’s illegal sales of weapons to Hamas could help that terrorist organization recuperate more quickly than expected after the critical blow of the war in which most of its leadership in Gaza was eliminated — including the commander, Yahya Sinwar — and much of its war materiel and terrorist ground force was destroyed. Standing with Iran, which is also suffering heavily in the current war, North Korea may profit economically and strategically as it improves the condition of the terrorist organizations during the war and especially afterward.

“This article was originally published in ynetnews.”

הפוסט The North Korean Angle: On North Korea’s relations with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Dr. Moshe Yegar’s home, in Jerusalem, tells a story. There are photos from diplomatic occasions around the world. There are certificates of appreciation and prizes relating to his diplomatic and academic work, including the Jabotinsky Prize for Literature and Research and a special prize for his part in establishing Israeli–Indian relations. In his rich library, 20 books may be found that he wrote in Hebrew. Several of them have been translated into other languages, and four more were written originally in English. Most of them deal with history and with the diplomatic side of Israel’s international relations.

A new immigrant who spoke Hebrew better than the sabras

Dr. Moshe Yegar was born in 1930, and at age 94 he still has his vim. We met him at his home to hear about his 40 years of service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and about his perspective on the present situation. It was a special interview with a special person who had occasion to work under such figures as Golda Meir, Abba Eban, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yitzhak Shamir, among others. But we should start at the beginning.

Moshe, let’s go back to 1935. You arrived in Israel from — where?

We came from Argentina when I wasn’t yet five. My father was a Hebrew teacher, and he was sent to teach in Zichron Yaakov. I started kindergarten as a new immigrant, but my Hebrew was correct and graceful thanks to my father. From the day I was born, he’d spoken only Hebrew to me, even before we came to Israel. We lived in Zichron Yaakov for five years, and those years left a deep impression on me.

Did you join the Haganah?

I was a member of the youth brigades in the Haganah for two years. When the War of Independence began as soon as independence was declared, my fellow members and I were recruited into the IDF. I was one of the trainers for the scouts movement, and we were among the founders of the Nahal — together with the United Nahal Movement. We also founded Kibbutz Tel Katzir.

Did you consider continuing into a military career?

At a certain point I left Tel Katzir and went back to being an enlisted man in the IDF. I was in the Nahal’s first NCO course. I also took a Master Sergeant course and I was appointed master sergeant for the Nahal’s first company of privates. I was also sent for paratrooper training, and then to the eighth round of the officer training course. Afterward I was discharged from the IDF and I went to study at the Hebrew University.

And then it was straight out of the university into a diplomatic career?

After my bachelor’s degree in modern Middle Eastern history, political science, and general history, I went on to study for a master’s. But I wanted to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the end, I passed the qualifying exam for cadets. That was the third time it was given, in 1956. In the next 40 years, I held various positions in Israel and in Israeli missions abroad. I finished up my master’s while I was an emissary in Burma.

So was it your time in Burma that prompted you to become an expert in Asian Islam?

Because the Hebrew University wasn’t teaching Asian Islam at that time, I received special permission to write a thesis on Burma’s Muslim minority. Afterward, I researched Islam in British Malaya, which is Malaysia today. That was my doctorate. I worked for about twenty years, in my spare time, on a comparative study of Muslim uprisings in Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The Bible as key to diplomatic ties

During his 40 years of diplomatic service, Dr. Yegar filled significant roles around the world. After his service in Malaysia, he was a consul in Los Angeles and consul general in Philadelphia. Among his various assignments in Israel, he was head of public diplomacy and of the Asian division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He participated in Operation Solomon (the airlift of Ethiopian Jews) and played a central role in establishing Israel’s relations with India and other Asian and African nations, besides serving terms as ambassador to Sweden and to the Czech Republic.

You held positions under several Foreign Ministers. What are the specifics?

When I was deputy head of the Asian division and Abba Eban was Foreign Minister, he appointed me to head the training department. When Yigal Alon was Foreign Minister, he appointed me department head for public diplomacy, and when Yitzhak Shamir was Foreign Minister, he appointed me division head for public diplomacy. I held that job for five years.

You developed a special cultural project in the Czech Republic. Tell us about it.

After the communist regime collapsed, the Czech Republic was very friendly toward Israel. I dreamed up a large festival focusing on the Bible as it’s reflected in various art forms. The festival was a year and a half or so in the making, and in the end it included 71 musical events, theatrical performances, art exhibits, academic seminars, and art competitions for schoolchildren — all based on biblical topics. It was a large display of culture in Prague and it made a significant contribution to Israel’s reputation. Everyone understood that the Bible was the gift of the Jewish people to human civilization.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, why are artistic and cultural ties important?

After World War II, technology surged forward and brought a complete change in the diplomatic profession. It’s no longer merely negotiations between the leaders of different countries, but also a means of creating broad-based ties between populations that had lived for generations without caring about their countries’ foreign relations.

Today’s communications media have given very large sectors of the public an interest in the diplomatic relations between countries and peoples. For that reason, there’s a new diplomacy with a new face. Today various countries engage in presenting their culture and their language to other populations in an effort to make friends with them. That’s a different kind of diplomacy, and a very interesting kind. It brings many challenges and it requires appointing diplomats who fit such a job. For example, diplomats today need a wider-ranging education — far beyond what was expected from them in past generations.

When other countries receive more extensive knowledge and understanding of the diplomat’s home country, a friendly atmosphere is created. That atmosphere can contribute directly to deeper economic ties, to security, and to all the other factors that mutually benefit the countries involved.

So there’s special importance to Israel’s integration of the Bible into public and cultural diplomacy in Christian regions, which recognize the Bible as an element of their own culture — the USA, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and even Asia’s sole Christian country, the Philippines.

Zionism should free itself of illusions and think straight

What’s your opinion on Israel’s current diplomatic and security situation?

We need to break free from illusions. At first, Zionism was looking for ways to come to an agreement with the Arabs. We hoped they would yield a little piece of their vast territory and allow the Jewish nation return to its historic homeland. The various streams of the Zionist movement made countless attempts to reach an understanding, an agreed compromise with the Arabs — including partition proposals — but they all failed. Now, after October 7, it’s clearer to us than ever. Likely not many of us still suffer from the illusions of the past. Zionism tried to win the understanding and consent of the Arabs by offering various suggestions, such as territorial compromise, or by advancing the idea that the homecoming of the Jews would bring benefits to the Arabs’ economy, their health system, their educational system, and so on. Nothing helped.

The Arabs received proposals for establishing their own “Palestinian” state, but they showed no interest in those proposals. The most prominent proposals that come to mind are those from the Peel Commission in 1938, the UN in 1947, and Oslo in 1993. There were other attempts as well, but the Arabs, the “Palestinians,” never showed interest in setting up a state of their own. Instead, they were determined and consistent in their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, be it big or small. They used every violent means at their disposal to prevent the birth of the State of Israel and they sank to inconceivable levels of barbarous, monstrous cruelty. Their determination has continued for almost 120 years now, coming to expression in what we call terrorist movements. The Arabs see them differently.

We’re at war now with two cruel terrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah. They both are managed and supported by our great enemy Iran. How do you expect this to end?

This war has gone on too long but it can be expected to end eventually with the destruction of those two movements. Still, we shouldn’t suffer any further illusions. The Arabs can be expected with some certainty to continue their violence and terrorism against us. They can set up new organizations, and many members of Hamas and Hezbollah will continue their activity against us as individuals or small squads. They’re not short of weapons.

In practical terms, what should be the final objective regarding Hamas and Gaza?

As a lesson to other Arab states, Israel should destroy Hamas, wipe out every trace of its presence, and complete the job by taking over the entire Gaza Strip. Israel defeated the Arab armies in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, but despite all its superiority, it hasn’t managed to defeat a terrorist organization like Hamas.

But what’s the definition of defeating Hamas?

We and the other side conceive of victory quite differently. The difference has reappeared in each round of conflict. Each time, I felt afterward that we hadn’t achieved much. From their point of view, they’ve won if their leadership survived and they have the ability to regroup. The loss of life, the destruction of Gaza, the civilian distress aren’t a consideration for them. There’s no deterrence. They believe they have a holy mission to exterminate Israel. As long as we leave them the ability to regroup, even if it takes them years, and as long as they have outside support, they’ll persist. Their ability to regroup needs to be rooted out completely.

Is your outlook, with the benefit of such age and experience, optimistic?

October 7 was a severe event, but yes, I’m optimistic despite our current situation. Throughout history, our enemies have always risen up against us and the Jewish nation has a special resilience even after suffering the greatest damage, such as the loss of six million lives in World War II when European Jewry was slaughtered by the Germans and their accomplices. We need to understand that our presence here is not to be taken for granted, and to remember at the same time that despite the difficulties, the Jewish nation has a certain internal energy, a rare self-healing power. We shall win out.

הפוסט “The nation of Israel has self-healing power. We shall win out.” An interview with Dr. Moshe Yegar הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In mid-July 2024, the Azeri Embassy in Tehran was reopened after a year of negotiations to relieve the tensions between the two countries.

Relations soured between Iran and Azerbaijan after an armed assailant stormed the Azeri Embassy in Tehran in January 2023, killing the security officer and injuring two other guards. Despite Iran’s adamant denials, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, called this a “terrorist attack”.  Relations between the two countries deteriorated still further After Azerbaijan decided to open an embassy in Israel in March 2023. This infuriated the Iranians, since while their relations with their northern neighbor hit a new low, Baku’s relations with Jerusalem kept warming up.

It is no surprise the opening of an official Azeri presence in Israel caused the Tehran-Baku relations to sour. This being said, following the October 7 massacre by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two Iranian proxies, and the war in Gaza that ensued – the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan assumed yet another dimension.

In November 2023, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called on all Muslim countries to sever all their diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, given the war in Gaza. Khamenei even stressed that “oil and food export routes to Israel ought to be blocked”. Khamenei attempted to lead an anti-Israeli Islamic resistance front, however it seemed like this initiative failed to produce actual results on the ground.

This was due to the fact that two countries, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), were supplying oil to Israel: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Of these two oil-rich countries, Azerbaijan is the more important for Israel. Azerbaijan provides Israel with some 40% of its oil consumption. In return it is a recipient of advanced Israeli weaponry worth billions of dollars.

The Israeli armaments have enabled Azerbaijan to achieve a military advantage over its adversary, Armenia. On the other hand, Israel is given a foothold in a strategically important region. It uses the area for intelligence operations against Iran, Azerbaijan’s neighbor.

From the Iranian perspective, the close ties between Baku and Jerusalem mean an increased Israeli presence in the region – a presence that includes weapons and economic and security ties. However, the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship is just one factor impeding Tehran’s relations with Baku, a Shiite-majority country. Ever since Azerbaijan became independent with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has regarded it as a backyard of sorts for expanding its Shiite religious and political influence in its quest for regional hegemony.

Iran has always worked to recruit Shiite communities into its “Axis of Resistance”. This began with its strategy of warfare by proxy, which focused on Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Additionally, Iran sought to penetrate the Shiite community in Azerbaijan. In 2013, Iran established the Husayniyun – the Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan – in an effort to form a powerful proxy organization in the Caucasus. The first recruits to the Husayniyun were six Azeri citizens who left for Syria to defend Shiite shrines against Sunni opponents during the civil war against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Qasem Soleimani, the then-commander of the Quds Force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elite unit, personally declared the establishment of the new proxy unit in 2017.

After Azerbaijan emerged victorious against Armenia in the 2020 war, and having regained control of the Nagorno Karabakh region, Azeris in Iran began identifying more strongly with Azerbaijan. At the same time, shortly after the war, Iranian proxy groups, including the Husayniyun, flooded the social media with videos in Azeri, promoting their radical religious ideology. They called for the local Shiites to rise up against the government and attack government buildings in Azerbaijan.

Later on, Iran stoked the unrest against the Azeri government. In response, Baku embarked on a mass oppression drive against pro-Iranian networks in the country. In November 2022, five persons were arrested and charged with spying for Iran. The detainees were accused of having provided the Iranian security agencies information harmful to Azerbaijan’s security.

In July 2023, an Afghani national Pavzan Musa Khan, was detained in Baku by Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX). He was suspected of conspiring to conduct a terrorist attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku. Khan was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison.

Khan mentioned “other brothers” that have attempted to commit such terror acts. This very fact traces back to Tehran and implies on Iranian involvement, as all previous attempts to attack Israeli targets in Baju were plotted by Tehran.

From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, activities by pro-Iranian forces in the south Caucasus region might potentially exacerbate regional tensions. For this reason, Iran has tried to use the Azerbaijan Husayniyun to deter Azerbaijan and lower the level of relations with Israel.

As Iran shifted its focus toward using its proxies against Israel in the Swords of Iron War, it appears that it has for the time being abandoned its strategy of influencing the Shiite communities in Azerbaijan and that it is now more intent on strengthening its ties with that country. As part of Iran’s fight against Israel through its proxies, it is attempting to isolate it regionally and internationally, meaning that improving its relations with Azerbaijan is now a high priority. Therefore, despite the tensions between the two countries, Iran and Azerbaijan have begun developing their economic ties, and in particular the trade and transport corridor that is also of interest to the northern neighbor, Russia.

Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan are tense and volatile. It is attempting to exert pressure on Baku following the war in Gaza and the widespread international condemnation of Israel. This being said, it appears that the Iranians do not have sufficient leverage to persuade Azerbaijan to sever its relations with Israel, thereby leaving it alone in the face of the threat from Tehran. In contrast to the other Shiite regional players, Iran is being unsuccessful in expanding its influence in a large Shiite country like Azerbaijan, as opposed to the successes it has had among Shiite communities throughout the Middle East, harnessing them under its control through local front-line franchises, as is the case in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The Azerbaijan Shiite Challenge: On Iran-Azerbaijan relations and the Israeli Angle הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In an interview on May 8^th, President Biden proclaimed the following: “I made it clear that if they [the Israelis] go into Rafah… I’m not supplying the weapons…”. He said this a day after the operation in which the IDF took over the Philadelphi Corridor and the city of Rafah. At the time, Israeli was facing an unprecedented international campaign to pressure Israel in order to prevent it from reaching Hamas’s southern stronghold in the Gaza Strip and cut it off, advancing from the Philadelphi Corridor. The international community fumed over the possibility that Israel would “exacerbate the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza”, and further deteriorate the situation, which was already in a state if “catastrophe”.

Today’s public discourse on the Israel’s intention to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor casts light on the prevalence of the state of denial throughout the Israeli security establishment regarding the nature of the Gazan threat before the seventh of October – a pendulum that is now repositioning this issue at the heart of public discourse, and has even managed to infect large swathes of the public. Skeptics of the need to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor are leading certain segments of the population, egged on by former senior officials in the security establishment, to associate this objective, which is unequivocally based on security considerations, with political motives. They even describe it as a “spin designed to scuttle the hostage agreement”, for some unknown reason.

“The entire Philadelphi issue is fake news,” quipped one senior official, stating that there was no need to “overstate the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor in preventing Hamas from reconstituting, since it has just been dismantled, and since Hamas has been set back 30 years.” Another official claimed that “control of the Philadelphi Corridor is meaningless”, and even called it “the greatest sham since the establishment of the state.” Using the authoritativeness the comes with their security backgrounds, those former officials are trying to instill fear in the public at the prospect of taking responsibility for 2 million Gazans. They promise that the Gazan problem has been neutralized for the foreseeable future, and call on us to close this chapter in Gaza, and go to elections.

To make matters worse, these irresponsible statements are compounded with the promise that had already been made in the past, according to which the Philadelphi Corridor can be retaken the moment it’s needed to ensure our security. One of those officials even said that it just a “45-minute drive” to retake the 14-kilometer stretch along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The inconsistency reflected in these claims also gives pause for thought. On the one hand, they claim that the Philadelphi Corridor is strategically insignificant, but on the other hand, this insignificant region could easily be retaken when the ceasefire expires.

To be clear, statements like this mislead the general public with false hope, according to which there are “instant”, magical solutions to thorny strategic and security issues. Let’s start with the basics: Hamas has never agreed to release 109 Israeli hostages in exchange for a withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. The corridor was only one of the 29 “amendments” submitted by Hamas to the American-Israeli proposal. The other 28 pertained to the Netzarim Corridor, a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the end of the war, the release of prisoners, the reconstruction of Gaza after the war, among others. Otherwise, one might presume that Israel’s political leadership might have faced an entirely different dilemma.

Moreover, the decision to return to the Philadelphi Corridor after a ceasefire is not and will never be a tactical military decision which could be implemented with ease, based solely on how fast a tank can travel, or how fast three brigades can be mobilized. As in any other wartime decision, it exists within a web of political interests, international pressure, and a strategic objective vis-a-vis Egypt, the IDF, and the Israeli public as well.

Lest we forget, Israel stalled for nearly seven months, until May, to complete the occupation of Gaza from the south. People worldwide reacted hysterically to a possible Israeli incursion into Rafah, as a global campaign aimed at making Israel “stop the massacre in Gaza” was waged through the mass media, the social media, protesters who took to the streets, and decision-makers in foreign governments. Drawn by the “all eyes on Rafah” trend, tens of thousands of demonstrators waving Palestinian flags took to the streets and occupied campuses in Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Not a day went by in which the secretary general of the United Nations didn’t make a declaration peppered with hyperbole on “the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza”, including a statement that “the horror must end”. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, blamed Israel for “provoking famine in Gaza”, and called on the United States to halt arms shipments to Israel. When it came to pressuring Israel to concede and withdraw, it was no holds barred.

On March 25^th, ties between the Israel and the United States soured to the point that the US abstained from voting on a UN Security Council that did not tie the ceasefire to returning the hostages. Secretary of State Blinken repeatedly implored Israel not to insist on carrying out the operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, which was allegedly devoid of any strategic logic and for which it would take many months to evacuate the civilian population. Yet the civilians evacuated within days, relocating to humanitarian zones the IDF had set up, as it directed an unprecedented humanitarian relief effort.

This is also where the question of legitimacy plays in. Israel piggybacked on the momentum and legitimacy that followed the October 7^th massacre in order to carry out action that would decisively defeat Hamas in Gaza. This opportunity may never return. Starting a war to remove the threat hasn’t been defined as a war objective since the Six-Day War. This is evidenced by the fact that Hamas’s buildup in Gaza and Hezbollah’s buildup in Lebanon were neglected. After the Disengagement, the population was promised that a single rocket fired from Gaza would be met with a tough response, and those same people now feel that we’ll be able to take over the Philadelphi Corridor after the first smuggling operation. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The notion that contrary to what occurred in the past fifty years, this time, Israel would act differently and wage an elective war is a delusion. It deludes the public, since it involves a misunderstanding of the nature of the political and military echelons in Israel. This includes, first and foremost, avoiding an elective war, and preferring pinpointed operations, such that the denial zone expands to the point when we have no other choice – not to mention a significant international arm-twisting effort that could constrain Israel’s freedom of action.

A withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor would run contrary to Israel’s interest of not going from one war to the next, but rather, preserving the conditions for a stable security situation for generations to come. The notion that Israel should be forced to reach a tipping point to reproduce its achievements is indicative of myopic thinking, rather than strategic depth. It would be like turning off all of the traffic lights in Israel, since they could always be turned on again, once an accident occurs. These are not the principles upon which we can guarantee that we’ll control the situation on the ground.

Israel never excelled at insisting on rock-hard principles at the heart of its security concept, and it often preferred either taking the risks involved in withdrawals, in exchange for foreign troops being posted in the area – in the case of the Philadelphi Corridor, 750 Egyptian soldiers were posted, along with helicopters and APCs – or placing its security in the hands of foreigners – in the case of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was empowered to fight terror in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, instead of Israel. During the Disengagement, the IDF aligned its position with Prime Minister Sharon, and supported a full surrender of control of the corridor due to “the operational difficulty involved in controlling the narrow strip” and the fact that weapons were being smuggled through tunnels in any case, so for the IDF, surrendering control of the corridor was “the lesser of two evils”.

If there’s any major lesson that Israel could learn from the October 7^th massacre, it’s that metastasizing threats cannot be neglected, and that we can’t remain completely blind to what’s happening in Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, or Iran. The massacre prompted the populace to demand that their decision-makers decisively defeat the enemy and remove the threat – a war objective that hasn’t been set since the Six-Day War. Israel tried to avert war at any cost, following the policy of “quiet in exchange for quiet” and pinpointed operations, with the full blessing of the security establishment, keeping the political echelon in its comfort zone. Our hostages must be returned, while applying massive pressure on Hamas and the Gazan population, clarifying the cost of losing, applying international pressure on Iran as well, and breaking all of the rules that Hamas is trying to keep intact.

The Philadelphi Corridor must remain under Israel’s full control, including above-ground patrols to prevent unrestricted movement, underground detection to combat tunnels, and airborne activity, to prevent the infiltration of drones. This is how we can sever the lifeline used by Hamas and other terror organizations, and fulfill the war objective of destroying the organization in Gaza. Though most Israelis understand the gravity of the situation and rally around this objective, fully recalling the river of blood that flowed in the attempt to fulfill it, it’s unfortunate that this chorus isn’t seeking to remedy this, but rather, to go back to denial.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Retaking the Philadelphi Corridor will not be measured by the tank’s driving speed, but international pressure and Israeli denial הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Egypt, with its steadily growing population of some 113 million people (estimated to reach 160 million by 2050), is currently in the throes of a deep economic crisis, manifesting in a high inflation rate – approximately 34% as of 2023; a steep poverty rate at 29.7% as of 2019; a devaluation of the Egyptian Lira and a staggering debt to the tune of 165 billion dollars.

A new study by the IDSF HaBithonistim movement explores the causes of this crisis, Israel’s economic relations with Egypt and the potential opportunities lying therein for Israel.

One of the main threats to Egypt’s economy is the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on one of the Nile river’s sources. This project might cut off part of Egypt’s water supply, floating concerns of already soaring unemployment rates climbing even higher, as some 20% of the country’s population makes its living in agriculture. This also might deliver a blow to Egypt’s ability to produce food and supply electricity for its population, sinking the country’s GDP to a debilitating low. In turn, Egypt will find itself relying heavily on foreign import, increasing its already staggering debt and drag it into a whirlpool of financial crisis.

If that were not enough, Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, has been fostering various grandiose projects that are costing the Egyptian tax-payer billions of dollars. He is expected to continue pouring funds into these initiatives over the next few years, which will demand additional economic aid that will dig the economy into even deeper debt.

One such undertaking is the construction of the New Nile Delta project, aiming to enhance the country’s agricultural capacity to service its rapidly growing population. Egypt hopes that upon the conclusion of the Nile Delta expansion it will be able to independently produce vaster quantities of food at lower costs, while at the same time create jobs for millions of citizens.

Another such project is The New Administrative City – a new state-of-the-art capital located between its current capital of Cairo to Suez. The new city is expected to sit on an area of some 725 square kilometers (280 square miles) and become home to millions of people. The estimated cost of this project is approximately 58 billion dollars. An additional 14 cities are currently under construction across the country. Despite the fact that large swaths of the new city have already been completed, they remain unpopulated for the time being, and it is estimated that by the end of 2024, some 10,000 families will have relocated to the city.

At the same time, El-Sisi is pushing the construction of a new coastal city on an area of 170 square kilometers (66 square miles), which is planned to include new residential buildings, hotels, tourist attractions, hospitals, universities and more. This project aims to increase the country’s inflow of tourism, investments and foreign currency as a means with which to boost its economy. For this project, Egypt had signed in 2024 a financing agreement with the UAE  to the tune of 35 billion dollars. Estimates in Egypt are that total investments in this endeavor will amount to at least 150 billion dollars.

Another problem for the Egyptian economy is its debt crunch, wherein the country’s foreign debt now exceeds 165 billion dollars. In the 23-24 fiscal year, approximately 56% of the budget costs were allocated to covering past loans and interest, and to date, about 49% of the government’s revenues come from new loans. This creates a state of affairs in which Egypt is taking out gargantuan new loans to repay old debt and is in effect digging itself deeper into its financial hole. In light of this crisis, on December 2022 Egypt reached an agreement with the IMF for a 3-billion-dollar loan against a commitment to overhaul its economy and instate an economic reform. Despite less than adequate performance on this issue on part of Egypt, the IMF had agreed on March 2024 to increase the loan by another 5 billion dollars, and compromised on the execution of the reform, that would stand on four main pillars: an alternative and more flexible rate of exchange system; a tightening of the monetary and fiscal policies; earmarking a budget for supporting under the poverty line households; and attaining a healthy balance between the public and private sectors of the country.

Egypt’s economic relations with Israel

While Egypt is contending with its economic crises, Israel continues  its relatively steady trade relations with the Arab country. These ties are a ray of light in Egypt’s dismal economic situation.

One positive aspect of these relations is the Israeli tourism to the land of the Pharaohs. Every year, a large number of Israelis visit Egypt – mainly in the Sinai – boosting Egypt’s tourism. It is important to note though, that the outbreak of the Gaza war had significantly stemmed that flow.

In addition, the annual trade volume between the two countries is at hundreds of millions of dollars. These prolific relations bred joint trade meetings and conferences to expand economic collaboration and had even led to a plan to increase trade to 700 million dollars over the next several years. Just for comparison – in 2021, the volume of trade between Israel and Egypt – excluding gas – was at some 330 million dollars.

The main engine of the economic relations between the two countries is the gas export from Israel to Egypt – the mainstay of the trade relations. According to an agreement signed in 2018, Israel is to supply Egypt with 15 billion dollars’ worth of gas over a period of ten years. This gas is intended mainly for Egypt’s energy needs but some of it is exported by Egypt to Europe, after being processed by Egypt’s LNG plants, and is an important source of revenue for the government. Later, another agreement was signed between both countries in 2022, for the expansion of the supply from Israel. Additionally, in 2023, Egypt had pressured Israel to increase the supply. The outbreak of the Gaza war significantly reduced the supply of gas from Israel and in Egypt grievances were voiced on the frequent power cuts and the waning revenues from the LNG gas exports. Nonetheless, Israel continues to uphold its end of the deal and the partners of the Tamar gas field had even announced an increase of gas exports to Egypt starting 2025. It is safe to assume that in light of these developments, Egypt’s dependency on Israeli gas will deepen.

In conclusion, in the current state of affairs, Egypt is entrenched in a near-crippling economic crisis which is not expected to end in the next several years. Additionally, since the start of the Gaza war, Egypt has been adopting actions and rhetoric that are contradictory to Israel’s interest. In response, Israel can – and must – bring into play the leverages it possesses in the form of control over the gas tap, its relations with the US and its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, in order to advance Israel’s interest in the current armed conflict, i.e. the  seizure of Rafah, the elimination of Hamas, the return of the Israeli hostages and the control over the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border, and ensure Egypt’s support of these interest, while receiving aid from Israel.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Egypt’s Faltering Economy – A Local Crisis; An Opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The United Nations’ Secretary General, Antonio Gutteres, made a speech to mark one year to the October 7 massacre in Israel. Though he made the most compelling call for condemnation of Hamas, he failed to call upon his organization to recognize it as a terror group, to condemn Iran’s multifront campaign on the Jewish State, as well as touch upon the unprecedented anti-Israeli campaign he and the UN have been engaged in over the past year.

Here is an alternative speech that could still be delivered, if Guterres so choses.

The decision is his to make.

***

Distinguished delegates,

It has been one year since Iranian protégé Hamas’ horrible and inhumane massacre of innocent Israelis on October 7, and the Iran’s ensuing multifront campaign against Israel. It pains me to report, however, that the United Nations so far failed to take the most basic step and condemn this atrocity. One does not need to take sides to outright reject the human suffering caused by these enemies of civilization.

Over the past year, I made 37 work-related trips around the world in my capacity as the United Nations’ Secretary General. My unwavering commitment to the international community that entrusted me with this sacred mission is to be an honest broker, while insisting on fundamental values we should all share. I therefore traveled to all seven continents but Australia and Antarctica, and above all, the Middle East, in an attempt to bring the world together. Yet I regret to inform you that I preferred to skip over Israel, despite the fact that this long-standing member of the United Nations has just suffered the deadliest terrorist attack in its history.

However, I have taken the trouble to repeatedly talk at Israelis, rather than with them. I skipped no superlative in laying out my accusations of Israel, rushing to be “horrified” by Israeli airstrikes on Hamas compounds and averting against “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza. My deputy and a commission I appointed accused Israel of committing “war crimes”, my envoy to the Middle East claimed Israel had “no right of self-defense”, and my organization, the United Nations, still refuses to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. I myself invoked Chapter 99 for the first time since coming into office and only for the fourth time in history, citing concerns on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Yet I failed to explain how Gaza outperforms Yemen, with 400,000 dead from starvation, Syria, Ukraine, drug wars in Mexico, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, theaters that summon frail international reaction.

I repeatedly condemned Israel by name, accusing it of everything from deliberate starvation to genocide, with no evidence but Hamas’ bogus data (the “Gaza Ministry of Health”), ignoring over 1 million aid trucks that entered Gaza this year. Yet when Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles at Israeli cities, I never mentioned the Ayatollah regime by name, simply making a general reference to “escalation in the Middle East”, as if talking about the weather.

I have to admit that under my reign, I continued a UN tradition of anti-Israel bias. Already on October 19, before any Israeli troops ever entered Gaza, I traveled to Egypt and accused Israel of “starving” Palestinians in Gaza. “For nearly two weeks, the people of Gaza have gone without any shipments of fuel, food, water, medicine and other essentials,” I stated at the El Arish airport, as a 747 cargo was landing behind me, carrying 65 metric tons of humanitarian supplies on its way to Gaza.

I was oblivious, perhaps willfully, to the fact that since October 7, Israel remained the only country in the world to supply its enemy with food and fuel during wartime, with a great risk to its soldiers: over 60,000 trucks and airborne deliveries have shipped over 1 million tons of humanitarian aid into Gaza, supplying as many as 3,400 calories per day to every Gazan citizen. This policy remains highly unpopular among the Israeli public, as hostages are still being held in sub-human conditions in Gaza. Israel allowed and facilitated this despite clear indications that Hamas uses much of it to its own advantage.

I came back to Egypt in March, while flagrantly skipping over Israel once again. I did not skip over superlatives, though, claiming it was “monstrous” that “Palestinians in Gaza are marking Ramadan with Israeli bombs still falling, bullets still flying, artillery still pounding and humanitarian assistance still facing obstacle upon obstacle.” However, I made no request to Egypt, my host country, to stop blocking Palestinian refugees from fleeing into its territory or hurdling humanitarian aid, given it shares a border with Gaza. Egyptian President Al-Sisi even fenced out an enclave to block refugees in case the border is breached through the Rafah area. I would have never accepted such a situation had Moldova, Poland, or Romania ever blocked Ukrainian refugees from escaping a war zone.

I also failed to recognize how my own UN agencies actively colluded with Hamas. UNRWA facilitated the murder of Israelis with its teachers participating in the October 7 massacre, holding hostages, and over 400 of its members being part of Hamas’ Al Qassam Brigades. That did not stop me from claiming “188 UN workers” were killed in Gaza, outcrying how the “horror must stop,” while ignoring the oldest trick in the Hamas manual – registering terrorists as UN workers.

My agency UNOCHA, on its part, continues to whitewash Hamas’ disinformation. Figures neatly presented in charts and infographics illustrated how 42,000 Palestinians were allegedly killed in Gaza, based on bogus data provided by Hamas’ “Gaza Ministry of Health” and “various media reports”. I reiterated those figures, while professing to alert against “grave global harm” caused by other types of disinformation. Scores of violent protesters blocked Jewish students from entering campuses and attacked Jewish people on the streets around the world based on these false claims, that my own UN has slashed by half ever since.

Disinformation has even become normalized under my reign – though only when Israel is concerned. 35 Palestinians were never killed in an UNRWA school by an Israeli airstrike on June 6, yet my UN News agency rushed to report just that, and my spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric claimed that the incident was “another horrific example of the price that civilians are paying” in Gaza. Later I found out that 17 Hamas militants used the compound as a military site, a legitimate target according to any international law – with no civilian casualties. 500 Palestinians were never killed in the Al Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza on October 17, yet I rushed to announce I was “horrified” and “shocked” by the incident. Had I awaited the facts, I would have known that this was yet another Hamas fake news. In reality, a misfired PIJ rocket landed in the hospital’s parking lot, all but burning a few cars.

Israel was even excluded from the UN’s report on sexual violence despite multiple evidence on such crimes by Hamas on October 7, while we falsely accused Israel of committing such sexual crimes on Palestinians without a shred of evidence, simply for the sake of false balance.

Unlike my focus on Israel, I never made any significant appeal on Iran to cease funding terrorism, illegally developing nuclear weapons and publicly calling for the annihilation of Israel, while violating practically all of its international obligations. The Iranian regime instigated the October 7 massacre and continues to wreak havoc around the region and the world. I only mentioned Iran when paying tribute to its notorious president Raisi, in a special visit to Tehran, mourning the death of a mass murderer who made a mockery of international law and minority rights I care deeply about.

In general, I cannot report to you that I’m proud of my record from the past year. Rather than harshly criticizing Israel based on cooked numbers and partial reports, or only expressing empathy with Israeli victims within a “yes, but” context (as my famous speech shortly after the massacre, saying it “did not happen in a vacuum”), I should have rallied the international community against the clear and present threats aimed at the only Jewish state.

While Israel is fighting an existential war and is subject to attacks on multiple fronts, I failed to meet my obligations to it. I presided over a UN that according to my predecessor Koffi Annan, is “misused to constantly vilify the Jewish state and, in so doing, damage the world body itself and its universal values.” Its General Assembly dedicates 85% of its annual resolutions to Israel, while its Human Right Council’s infamous Article 7 singles Israel out for no apparent reason. No other country suffers this level existential threat while being in the crosshairs of the international community.

Going back to where I started – I did pay a visit to Israel during my tenure, albeit not in the past year, but in 2017. I stressed my commitment to combat anti-Semitism in the Yad Vashem holocaust memorial, while failing to meet that promise. I then visited the kibbutz of Nahal Oz, who borders Gaza and “heard from them of their fears of rocket attacks from Hamas, as well as tunnel infiltration”. I commended the residents’ will “to see Palestinians and Israelis living both in peace and both well.” I then toured a Hamas attack tunnel crossing the border. I failed to appreciate how this will evolve into an all-out massacre of 1,200 innocent Israelis, of which 16 were murdered and 8 taken hostage in the same Nahal Oz.

I realize my tenure will go down in history as a particularly shameful period as it relates not only to treating Israel, but any freedom-seeking nation. But now we have an opportunity to correct that record. Iran’s campaign of terror, rape and hostage taking must stop. Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire but to be encouraged to do justice with humanity’s most abominable enemies. We should all also appreciate the heroism of Israeli combatants who put their lives on the line not only for the defense of Israel, but all of us in the free world. Israel managed to channel unspeakable suffering into encapsulating human destiny with the spirit of its people and the ferocious Jewish belief in an ultimate good. For failing to meet my commitment, I ask Israel and my Jewish friends around the world for your forgiveness. May we leverage this war to vanquish evil, rather than appeasing it, and empowering Israel, rather than disavowing it.

Thank you.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט The Speech UN’s Guterres Should Have Given on October 7: “Time to Correct Our Record” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In recent years new concepts have been emerging in the global discourse, relating to the psychological warfare both within the cyberspace and beyond. Concepts such as Fake News, Disinformation, and Deep Space have entered popular jargon and brought to light  the gargantuan influence games raging between various global forces. One of those is Iran.

Iran has been waging ongoing sophisticated disinformation campaigns, aiming to sway public opinion against its enemies – namely Israel and the US. But Teheran can take a page out of the playbook of an old hand in sowing disinformation to influence public opinion – Russia.

For instance, Iran is attempting to intervene and influence the results of the upcoming presidential elections in the US. The Washington Post reported that the artificial intelligence (AI) developer OpenAI, announced in August 2024 that it had intercepted attempts by Iranian sources to use its famous chatbot ChatGP to manufacture online content to sow discord and widen the polarization in US society to influence the results of the elections this November. The network disseminated disinformation regarding both candidates – Democratic Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. The fake news aimed to increase the social discord in the United States by stoking social controversy. The Iranian network produced content mainly in the topic of the war in Gaza, LGBTQ rights and of course, the two presidential candidates.

According to intel in the US, the Iranian network, known as “2035-storm” operated a number of new websites and social networks. Iran’s primary objective in the information ecosystem is to stoke existing controversy in American society on particularly sensitive issues, propagate social chaos and undermine America’s political and social order from within. Presumably, even if the Iranians are able to foment discord even on a small scale, they will have considered this testimony to the long-standing claim championed by Iran that democracy is a flawed Western concept.

It seems that one popular topic utilized by the Iranian network is the current war in Gaza, which it frequently addresses. Thus for instance, it operates a website under the name Even Politics.com in which it publishes content on the ongoing Gaza war, the influence of religious groups and threats against American democracy. It is evident that most of the content of the site is biased against Donald Trump.

According to many experts in the field,  this method of disseminating disinformation is not the domain of Iran, and its attempts to sway the elections in the US seems to reflect the methodology employed by Russia, which operated a troll farm – an organized group engaging in the dissemination of disinformation – to flood the social networks with divisive content, ladened with disinformation. The telltale characteristic of the Russian methodology  apparent in the Iranian activity in the cyber ecosystem is the targeting of groups on both sides of the political divide in the US. The disinformation Iran uses aims to radicalize the political discourse, deepen the social discord and undermine the fabric of society in America.

Iranian efforts to influence the presidential elections in the US were evident already in 2018, when they set up a sophisticated system of fake accounts supposedly belonging to US House candidates and journalists. The Iranian campaign, which began in 2018, scaled up following the elimination of Qassem Soleimani, former Qods Force commander in Iraq in January 2020, under the order of then President, Donal Trump. Thus for instance, two Iranian nationals were charged in the US of involvement in the cybernetic disinformation  campaign targeting American voters ahead of the 2020 elections. Iranian perpetrators also sent threatening emails to voters during the 2020 campaign. Iran also used websites such as Even Politics to try and sway the 2022 midterm elections as well.

In addition to its use of social platforms, Iran utilizes other cyber instruments such as hacking and phishing, to try and throw the November elections into disarray. On August 10, officials in Trump’s campaign accused Teheran of hacking parts of its internal communications, leading to a federal investigation in the US. On August 19, the American federal Intelligence officials released an assessment confirming that there was “increasingly aggressive Iranian activity during this elections cycle”, which included “the recently reported activities targeting former President Trump’s campaign”. The intelligence assessment came after U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines suggested that Tehran’s efforts to influence the U.S. election were likely “because Iran’s leaders want to avoid an outcome that they believe would increase tensions with the United States,” i.e. Trump.

Iranian disinformation targeting Israel

Iran’s hostile interference activity in the cyberspace targets Israel as well. In the wake of October 7, Iran stepped up its activity aimed at spreading disinformation among the Israeli public. It was also recently revealed that a Telegram channel disguised as pro-Israel, “Tears of War”, has published dozens of messages since the beginning of the war, including heartbreaking posts pushing for the return of the hostages from Hamas captivity in Gaza. The posts were designed to convey a clear message: the Israeli government is to blame for the ongoing suffering of the hostages, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions were to blame for undermining prospects of a ceasefire. These are just a few examples of how this channel, along with others, is trying to deepen the discord in Israels’ political-social discourse on loaded issues that concern the Israeli public, such as the hostages and the ceasefire.

In all likelihood, the Tears of War account is operated by someone connected to Teheran and is used as a bellow with which to inflame tensions in Israel’s public. Through this and other channels, the Iranians are undermining the official Israeli narrative regarding the issue of the hostages and the war in Gaza in order to influence and manoeuvre the campaign according to Iranian interests. However, this devious campaign is just part of the picture of Iran’s network of activity in the information ecosystem against Israel.

From 2021 to date, Iran has been operating a widespread campaign in the digital ecosystem aiming to psychologically manipulate the Israeli public and further tear at the social and ideological conflict, particularly evident following Israel’s Operation Guardian of the Walls that year. Tehran’s ultimate goal is to turn the public in Israel against the government, to undermine the government and affect anarchy that would serve to weaken Israel.

To this end, Iran employs advanced tactics and methods, such as digital email campaigns, social media landing pages, and the dissemination of deep fake AI-generated content designed to reach more accurately segmented audiences and increase engagement.

The Iranian activity in the cyberspace has three discrete phases, each with specific objectives:

The escalation of tensions between the various groups from all sides of the social divides in Israel, e.g. religious groups and the LGBTQ community; religion and non-religious etc. The next step is fomenting pollical discord between the right and left of the political map. The third stage, of which Iran is presently engaged in, is to saw discontent in the Israeli public with regards to the Israeli government’s response to the actions of Hamas.

Teheran’s expansive use of the digital ecosystem is intended to create a skewed perception of reality among Israel’s public to the extent that they cannot discern between fact and fiction; victim and aggressor. Thus, the Iranians try to swamp the web with disinformation and distorted intentional narratives by exploiting – often unwitting – local resources to spread this content, amplified by of local content in leading channels.

Case in point: last May, the abovementioned “Tears of War” telegram channel paid for sponsored promotion on a Telegram channel of an Israeli blogger, Daniel Amram,  called “Uncensored Daniel Amram”, which has 378 thousand followers. The posts on Daniel Amram’s  channel gave the Iranian’s access to the mobile devices of thousands of Israeli followers and disseminate content calling for the cessation of the war. The use of local channels to promote fake narrative through such content is one instrument Tehran utilizes to saw confusion in the Israel’s public, obscuring the boundaries between what is in effect occurring and cyberspace. The disparity between the misguided perception and reality provides a convenient platform for mind engineering and influencing campaigns and for collecting data on followers, even for the recruitment of civilians for their cause. Iranian cyber networks use fake accounts to contact Israeli civilians by sending them private messages on social networks such as Telegram, WhatsApp etc. The use of content-intensive networks, which are full of fake accounts the respond to or upload posts lend a veneer  of credibility that allowד spreading messages to users, who are contacted through private messages, unaware that they are being recruited.

On January 2024, the Israeli General Security Services announce that fake accounts operated by an Iranian network posted fake job offers and surveys to recruit Israelis to carry out various tasks. These privately-sent requests included, among others, prompts to hang signs with slogans phrased by the Iranians, surveys, photographing protesters and so on. The Iranian network operated to recruit Israelis by deceit, and to use them for purposes of intelligence collection, such as photographing houses of anti-Iranians and individuals belonging to the Israeli security establishment.

In conclusion, it seems that the Iranian networks operating in the Israeli and American digital ecosystem have a deep understanding of the public discourse of both publics. The use of the various social networks and other means of dissemination, such as emails, is spreading by exploiting the ease with which massive numbers of users can be reached privately to deceitfully collect intelligence.

Furthermore, it seems that the Iranian methods of operations are becoming increasingly streamlined and Tehran’s influencing campaigns are able to hit upon exposed nerves in the social rift both in America and Israel. Moreover, the daily interaction with citizens affords Iran with comprehensive social insights, enabling it to analyze the social discourse and accordingly modify the messages it seeks to promote and advance its strategic objectives through instant messaging to users.

The US is heading toward its presidential elections, while Israel is in a state of a multi-theater war, and events are developing at breakneck speed. A  large part of the population uses social networks to stay abreast on current events, mainly on Telegram and -X (Twitter). This increased dissemination of content is a fertile ground for Iran’s frequent disinformation and mind engineering campaigns.

This sophisticated method of spreading messages and content via social networks serves Iran’s long-term strategic goals. The disinformation foments distrust in the governing institution of its enemies and disintegrate their societies – Israeli and American – from within.

Additionally, all this cements Iran’s status as a powerful player in the digital ecosystem and offensive cyber, increasing its ability to collect intelligence and hurt civilians. Teheran’s deep understanding of the main issues of social discourse in Israel, and its ability to influence sentiments in Israel’s public reflect an escalation in its ability to orchestrate influencing campaigns and spark social discord and controversy.

Moreover, the Iranian disinformation campaigns are greatly accelerated with the help of artificial intelligence, which they even use to produce deepfake videos, increase the quality of their fake content and mislead public officials, media outlets and many citizens. Teheran’s use of fake, manipulative content produced by artificial intelligence is expected to further expand, to increase the output and dissemination. The use of artificial intelligence will also contribute to the fine-tuning of messages to increase their influence on the public discourse, in Israel, the United States, or any other country Teheran considers its enemy.

Examples of posts from the “tears of War” Telegram channel

Many of the channel’s posts contain the hashtag #Its All His Fault! referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, aiming to widen the divide in Israel’s society and increase opposition to the government and its system:

This is one of many posts on the ‘Tears of War’ Telegram channel with the hashtag #It’s All His Fault, aiming to increase social controversy and opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government through an image insinuating the situation of the hostages in Gaza, depicting a drawing of the radar operators while being kidnapped from their base on October 7. The post aims to counter balance the shift of attention to the fighting in the northern arena against Hezbollah and Lebanon.

Some posts focus on Iran, suggesting that the channel’s operators are of Iranian source. Below is an example of such two posts published during the 2024 Paris Olympics, emphasizing that Iran has won more medals than Israel:

הפוסט Games of Influence: Iranian Disinformation in Israel and the USA הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Israeli military response against Hamas in Gaza, following the October 7^th massacre, and the current campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah has also sparked criticism, even ire, on the part of a significant part of the international community. This phenomenon has not skipped several Latin American governments, especially those belonging to the “Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas” (ALBA), which includes Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia. Shortly after the October 7^th massacre, when Israel began striking Hamas in Gaza, La Paz cut diplomatic ties with Israel and presented a request to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to “investigate the situation in Palestine”, while the governments of Colombia and Chile recalled their ambassadors on the same day and later backed South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICC, together with Brazil and Mexico.

In early October 2024, Nicaragua also announced plans to cut diplomatic ties with Israel. The move is essentially symbolic, since relations between Israel and the central American country are nonexistent. It is worth recalling that, in June 2023, Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, welcomed former Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Managua.

Nicaragua had already broken relations with Israel two times, once in 2010 under Ortega, and previously in 1982 under the Sandinista revolutionary regime.

On the contrary, Argentina’s newly-elected President, Javier Milei, as well asEl Salvador’s Nayyib Bukele, confirmed their support for Israel, with the latter comparing Hamas’ violence to the one perpetrated by the Maras and praising the liberation of the Palestinians from Hamas’ clutches.

Paraguay is also backing Israel while planning the relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem. In 2019, Paraguay also added Hamas and Hezbollah to its terrorist blacklist, along with ISIS and al-Qaeda.

This general situation generates concern, considering that Latin America has been a hub for terror activity for the last four decades, with its long history of terrorist attacks by local groups, including the FARC and ELN guerrillas in Colombia, and the Shining Path in Peru, as well as the longtime presence of Hezbollah, as explained by Jennifer Teale of the IDSF.

Hezbollah is not the only terrorist organization that found a safe harbor in Latin America. Starting in the 1990s, several other groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Group, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al-Qaeda, and more recently the Islamic State (ISIS) have all found footholds in Latin America.

The reason why Islamist terrorism is widely present in Latin America is due to a series of reasons such as the possibility of exploiting illicit trafficking networks, especially for drugs and money laundering, porous borders, inadequate law enforcement, and lack of proper counter-terror laws.

There is no doubt that the undisputed Islamist organization who dominates Latin America is Hezbollah, which has been present and operational in the continent since the early 1980s. It has been relying mostly on a vast networking operation, implemented by Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah has also been widely involved in drug trafficking and money-laundering activities, especially from its base in the Triple Frontier: the intersection point where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet.

Iran and Hezbollah’s current spearhead in Latin America is Venezuela, due to the strong links between Maduro’s regime and Teheran. Iran has invested heavily in Venezuelan oil refineries and assisted President Maduro’s regime in reviving their struggling oil industry. Maduro’s Venezuela has practically aligned with Iran’s radical axis, ramping up its vile rhetoric against Israel and the West, its accusations against Israel of “genocide” on the UN stage, and Maduro’s open anti-Semitism, accusing “international Zionism” of anti-government protests in his country.

Hezbollah managed to root itself on Venezuelan soil and establish networks that can operate throughout Latin America, taking advantage of the sizable Lebanese community in the country. A similar situation occurred in Brazil, another country with a vast Lebanese presence and it is not by coincidence that, in November 2023, the Brazilian security services unfoiled an attack against the country’s Jewish community, which was planned by Hezbollah.

In 2021, Colombia’s security apparatus thwarted an Iranian plot to assassinate two Israeli businessmen in the country and expelled two Hezbollah operatives.

In March 2024, the Peruvian police arrested an Iranian and a Peruvian national who were planning an attack on an Israeli person at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), scheduled to be held in November in the Andean country.

In addition, on August 16, Argentina’s Federal Police thwarted an Islamist terror plot reportedly linked to ISIS and the Taliban to murder Jews in Mendoza, the second such plot uncovered in Argentina this year.

While these plots were exposed in time to be thwarted, they are a proof that the Jewish communities and Israelis in Latin America remain a primary target of both Sunni and Shia terrorist organizations that, until recently, have been able to operate with impunity.

Potential threats

Regarding potential targets, another aspect that must not be underestimated is the flourishing Israeli tourism industry in Latin America, with post-military “mochileros” who travel to these areas for long periods of time, often in remote parts, and could become a target of terrorists.

Given the current situation in Lebanon, with Hezbollah brought to its knees by the Israeli offensive and with Iran appearing hesitant to actively enter the field in support of its Lebanese proxy, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian regime and Hezbollah may try to strike where they still have operational networks, and attempt to target Jewish communities and Israelis abroad. In September 2023, Mossad chief David Barnea announced that the Israeli intelligence organization has managed to thwart 27 attempted terrorist attacks by Iran over one year alone, including in Latin America. The normally quiet continent could be one of the most suitable areas, considering the huge gaps in the security sector both on the legislative level and on law enforcing.

One must not forget the difficulty of the authorities in controlling vast areas of the “selva”, the “sierra”, and the long, often impervious borders, such as the one between Colombia and Venezuela, whose neighboring areas have become strongholds for the FARC and ELN terror groups. Other problematic areas are the Vraem in Peru, where Sendero Luminoso is based, and the borders connecting Brazil with Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay, not difficult to cross and major transit points for drug traffickers, often linked to the Iranian terror network.

Extreme caution is therefore recommended when traveling throughout Latin America, not just in cities but also in the more remote natural areas, and avoid those countries hostile to Israelis and Jews.

This article was originally published in Jewish News Syndicate – JNS.org

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט How safe is Latin America for Israelis and Jews? A few thoughts הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.