In an interview on May 8th, President Biden proclaimed the following: “I made it clear that if they [the Israelis] go into Rafah… I’m not supplying the weapons…”. He said this a day after the operation in which the IDF took over the Philadelphi Corridor and the city of Rafah. At the time, Israeli was facing an unprecedented international campaign to pressure Israel in order to prevent it from reaching Hamas’s southern stronghold in the Gaza Strip and cut it off, advancing from the Philadelphi Corridor. The international community fumed over the possibility that Israel would “exacerbate the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza”, and further deteriorate the situation, which was already in a state if “catastrophe”.
Today’s public discourse on the Israel’s intention to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor casts light on the prevalence of the state of denial throughout the Israeli security establishment regarding the nature of the Gazan threat before the seventh of October – a pendulum that is now repositioning this issue at the heart of public discourse, and has even managed to infect large swathes of the public. Skeptics of the need to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor are leading certain segments of the population, egged on by former senior officials in the security establishment, to associate this objective, which is unequivocally based on security considerations, with political motives. They even describe it as a “spin designed to scuttle the hostage agreement”, for some unknown reason.
“The entire Philadelphi issue is fake news,” quipped one senior official, stating that there was no need to “overstate the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Netzarim Corridor in preventing Hamas from reconstituting, since it has just been dismantled, and since Hamas has been set back 30 years.” Another official claimed that “control of the Philadelphi Corridor is meaningless”, and even called it “the greatest sham since the establishment of the state.” Using the authoritativeness the comes with their security backgrounds, those former officials are trying to instill fear in the public at the prospect of taking responsibility for 2 million Gazans. They promise that the Gazan problem has been neutralized for the foreseeable future, and call on us to close this chapter in Gaza, and go to elections.
To make matters worse, these irresponsible statements are compounded with the promise that had already been made in the past, according to which the Philadelphi Corridor can be retaken the moment it’s needed to ensure our security. One of those officials even said that it just a “45-minute drive” to retake the 14-kilometer stretch along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The inconsistency reflected in these claims also gives pause for thought. On the one hand, they claim that the Philadelphi Corridor is strategically insignificant, but on the other hand, this insignificant region could easily be retaken when the ceasefire expires.
To be clear, statements like this mislead the general public with false hope, according to which there are “instant”, magical solutions to thorny strategic and security issues. Let’s start with the basics: Hamas has never agreed to release 109 Israeli hostages in exchange for a withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. The corridor was only one of the 29 “amendments” submitted by Hamas to the American-Israeli proposal. The other 28 pertained to the Netzarim Corridor, a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the end of the war, the release of prisoners, the reconstruction of Gaza after the war, among others. Otherwise, one might presume that Israel’s political leadership might have faced an entirely different dilemma.
Moreover, the decision to return to the Philadelphi Corridor after a ceasefire is not and will never be a tactical military decision which could be implemented with ease, based solely on how fast a tank can travel, or how fast three brigades can be mobilized. As in any other wartime decision, it exists within a web of political interests, international pressure, and a strategic objective vis-a-vis Egypt, the IDF, and the Israeli public as well.
Lest we forget, Israel stalled for nearly seven months, until May, to complete the occupation of Gaza from the south. People worldwide reacted hysterically to a possible Israeli incursion into Rafah, as a global campaign aimed at making Israel “stop the massacre in Gaza” was waged through the mass media, the social media, protesters who took to the streets, and decision-makers in foreign governments. Drawn by the “all eyes on Rafah” trend, tens of thousands of demonstrators waving Palestinian flags took to the streets and occupied campuses in Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Not a day went by in which the secretary general of the United Nations didn’t make a declaration peppered with hyperbole on “the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza”, including a statement that “the horror must end”. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, blamed Israel for “provoking famine in Gaza”, and called on the United States to halt arms shipments to Israel. When it came to pressuring Israel to concede and withdraw, it was no holds barred.
On March 25th, ties between the Israel and the United States soured to the point that the US abstained from voting on a UN Security Council that did not tie the ceasefire to returning the hostages. Secretary of State Blinken repeatedly implored Israel not to insist on carrying out the operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, which was allegedly devoid of any strategic logic and for which it would take many months to evacuate the civilian population. Yet the civilians evacuated within days, relocating to humanitarian zones the IDF had set up, as it directed an unprecedented humanitarian relief effort.
This is also where the question of legitimacy plays in. Israel piggybacked on the momentum and legitimacy that followed the October 7th massacre in order to carry out action that would decisively defeat Hamas in Gaza. This opportunity may never return. Starting a war to remove the threat hasn’t been defined as a war objective since the Six-Day War. This is evidenced by the fact that Hamas’s buildup in Gaza and Hezbollah’s buildup in Lebanon were neglected. After the Disengagement, the population was promised that a single rocket fired from Gaza would be met with a tough response, and those same people now feel that we’ll be able to take over the Philadelphi Corridor after the first smuggling operation. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The notion that contrary to what occurred in the past fifty years, this time, Israel would act differently and wage an elective war is a delusion. It deludes the public, since it involves a misunderstanding of the nature of the political and military echelons in Israel. This includes, first and foremost, avoiding an elective war, and preferring pinpointed operations, such that the denial zone expands to the point when we have no other choice – not to mention a significant international arm-twisting effort that could constrain Israel’s freedom of action.
A withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor would run contrary to Israel’s interest of not going from one war to the next, but rather, preserving the conditions for a stable security situation for generations to come. The notion that Israel should be forced to reach a tipping point to reproduce its achievements is indicative of myopic thinking, rather than strategic depth. It would be like turning off all of the traffic lights in Israel, since they could always be turned on again, once an accident occurs. These are not the principles upon which we can guarantee that we’ll control the situation on the ground.
Israel never excelled at insisting on rock-hard principles at the heart of its security concept, and it often preferred either taking the risks involved in withdrawals, in exchange for foreign troops being posted in the area – in the case of the Philadelphi Corridor, 750 Egyptian soldiers were posted, along with helicopters and APCs – or placing its security in the hands of foreigners – in the case of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was empowered to fight terror in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, instead of Israel. During the Disengagement, the IDF aligned its position with Prime Minister Sharon, and supported a full surrender of control of the corridor due to “the operational difficulty involved in controlling the narrow strip” and the fact that weapons were being smuggled through tunnels in any case, so for the IDF, surrendering control of the corridor was “the lesser of two evils”.
If there’s any major lesson that Israel could learn from the October 7th massacre, it’s that metastasizing threats cannot be neglected, and that we can’t remain completely blind to what’s happening in Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, or Iran. The massacre prompted the populace to demand that their decision-makers decisively defeat the enemy and remove the threat – a war objective that hasn’t been set since the Six-Day War. Israel tried to avert war at any cost, following the policy of “quiet in exchange for quiet” and pinpointed operations, with the full blessing of the security establishment, keeping the political echelon in its comfort zone. Our hostages must be returned, while applying massive pressure on Hamas and the Gazan population, clarifying the cost of losing, applying international pressure on Iran as well, and breaking all of the rules that Hamas is trying to keep intact.
The Philadelphi Corridor must remain under Israel’s full control, including above-ground patrols to prevent unrestricted movement, underground detection to combat tunnels, and airborne activity, to prevent the infiltration of drones. This is how we can sever the lifeline used by Hamas and other terror organizations, and fulfill the war objective of destroying the organization in Gaza. Though most Israelis understand the gravity of the situation and rally around this objective, fully recalling the river of blood that flowed in the attempt to fulfill it, it’s unfortunate that this chorus isn’t seeking to remedy this, but rather, to go back to denial.
The article was originally published on ynetnews
