Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, is turning 89 this month. Even before the open and pressing question of his successor as the chairman of the PA, his rule is already leaving the Authority in disarray. “The PA is in a state of collapse and dilapidation,” says Lt. Col. (res.) Baruch Yadid. “It doesn’t pay salaries to its employees; the entire Samaria region is no longer under its control; it doesn’t manage to operate as a political entity, and in regards to the Authority’s future – that’s the big question”.

The Lost Generation of the PA

Baruch, in an article you published last April, you mention a survey according to which most Palestinians view the PA as dead weight and demand its dismantling. Is that still true?

“True. But not a single survey – but a series of poles that found that a significantly high number of Palestinians – sometimes as high as 60 or 80 percent of them – view the Authority as a burden and do not perceive it as a historical achievement. They understand that aside from security coordination that serves mainly the IDF – the Palestinian Authority does not serve the Palestinian dream. It is on the background of this unrest that Hamas was able to garner such widespread sympathy”.

Even today, after the war, the organization enjoys such broad support?

“It’s hard and perhaps even impossible to know how much support Hamas currently has in Gaza, however, in Judea and Samaria it is very well supported. The buildup of Hamas in Judea and Samaria on the expense of the PA is a trend that was evident in all of the surveys on the topic from the past five-six years, although one must take Palestinian surveys with a grain of salt as they often distort the data. At any rate, these surveys clearly show what the world already knows: the Palestinian public harshly criticizes Abu Mazen, who originally was elected for a term of only five years, but after nearly 20 years is still in power, without ever having held elections for the presidency of the PA or its parliament”.

Who will step in to fill the vacuum left by the PA?

“At the present, there are some 40 organizations of Hamas, PIJ and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, particularly in the Samaria region and further north. These are young people, the group of 15–30-year-olds, which in regards to the PA are a lost generation. They were born after the Oslo Accords and hate the Authority because nothing in their lives had improved. They view Hamas and the military path as the realization of their ideological aspirations. Add to that the money that Hamas and Hezbollah pour into the region”.

How can the PA restore the public’s trust?

“Fatah members as well as Abu Mazen know that that in the 2006 elections, Fatah got more votes than Hamas, but the votes were distributed among the factions that comprise Fatah – nowadays it has three and a half leaders and several organizations and this is its greatest problem and the reason Hamas won the elections at the time with a landslide. So the solution is a reform, and everyone is pressuring Abu Mazen to introduce reforms; The Egyptians and Saudis also demanded that the PA undergo reform, but Abu Mazen has not complied due to fatigue and conservatism and his unwillingness to open the government to additional players”.

Why has he not complied with the demands?

“Most likely he hasn’t the energy to make reforms and open up the system and prefers to lean of the current situation. He prefers to preserve the current state rather than take risks. Everyone surrounding him is waiting for him to leave. He is more a token leader that a leader in effect. However, it is unclear what the day after will bring in the PA – whether he will be succeeded by another element in Fatah, if his moderate line will remain, or whether his successor will be Marwan Barghouti, who is very close to Hamas and very militant, or another leader that would collaborate with Hamas, and if elections will be held – in the event that Hamas takes over the Authority”.

The Return of the Saudis to the Abraham Accords

So many open questions. And what are the implications for Israel?

“The conclusion is that, in my opinion, Israel cannot rely on the PA as a viable factor.  I believe that the Egyptians and Saudis also realize this. Everyone – including the Americans and Emiratis – are demanding that Abbas carry out the reforms in order to prepare the ground for his successor, and after he steps down, everything will be open to a new reality,  and not necessarily a positive one.”

How should Israel act at the moment?

“It should maintain full security control of Judea and Samaria and Gaza, while at the same time cultivating a Palestinian civilian apparatus that will undertake the care of the population. For the time, under Abbas, this is happening, but there is no guarantee that it will be so in the future, and certainly there is no guarantee that it will be so in the long term. Israel should also try to expand the Abraham Accords, including interim agreements regarding the Palestinian Authority.”

That means agreeing to a Palestinian State, right?

“It will be necessary to give the Sunni states a horizon of some two-state solution, but this doesn’t have to happen at this moment, and is the biggest political challenge, since the Saudis, for example, declare morning, noon and night that without a Palestinian state, there will be no normalization. Although the messages Israel is receiving are different, this is the general direction”.

“At this stage, the model should be one in which Israel does not forgo the two-state option – i.e. does not annex Judea and Samaria and does not dismantle the Palestinian Authority. This would allow Saudi Arabia to enter an agreement. But the implementation of the solution itself will depend on a long-term agreement and will also be subject to changes. We’re talking about a period of 10 to 20 years, during which the Palestinian street will have to undergo significant change, and it also depends on the decline of Iran’s influence. Some sources in the Gulf states say it’s possible.”

Will the PA Return to Gaza?

In  order to understand the relations between the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, we need to go back to 2007, when Hamas deposed Fatah and seized control of Gaza in a series of violent clashes. Until that point, the PA had a bureaucratic apparatus set up in Gaza with its own officials. “Until today the PA claims it still has 18 thousand civil servants and 18 thousand security personnel in the Gaza Strip. In other words – over 30 thousand people that have remained in their positions, even under Hamas rule”.

Is this true?

“It’s unclear, and it is highly unlikely in the case of the security apparatus. Hamas did keep some Fatah members in professional positions withing Gaza’s civil service, and in many cases chose to place its own people in executive positions alone. However, it remains unclear how many Fatah members have actually remained in Gaza after Hamas’ takeover”.

And now the PA is planning its return to Gaza?

“As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned – and this it had stated even before the outbreak of the war – it is still the boss in Gaza. The Authority views its demand for a return to control in Gaza as only natural, thus it endeavored dozens of reconciliation attempts with Hamas. Two months ago, the Authority sent the Americans a 101-page document, in which it claims that it is the governing body of Gaza and that it has a plan for the reinstatement of its governance, such as reopening the hospitals, schools, government offices, and more. The Americans – it must be said – were not convinced”.

What is the position of the Arab states?

“Here things start getting complicated. Naturally the Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis all publicly support the control of the PA in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, as it serves the two-state vision. But under the surface the Egyptians and Saudis have a lot of criticism against the Authority and they are appalled by the corruption and its dysfunction and from the fact that Abu Mazen hasn’t held elections for the chairmanship of the Authority and for its parliament for nearly 20 years. But this is under the surface, and the Saudis still continue to transfer broad financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Only recently Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with the Saudi ambassador to Jodan, who transferred him aid money”.

In other words – the Arab world does not publicly criticize the PA?

“Public criticism of the Palestinian Authority is heard mainly in the Emirates. Two months ago, a proposal was made according to which the UAE undertakes financial support to the Authority, but the UAE rejected the suggestion out of hand, because they object to Abu Mazen heading the PA. This is why in an interview to The New York Times,  Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan proclaimed ‘no Abbas and no Hamas’. I’ve encountered this position on part of many sources in the Authority even before Dahlan. There are other sources that would like to see a governing body in Gaza as well as Judea and Samaria that is neither Abu Mazen nor Hamas”.

Abu Mazen’s Condition: Hamas Acknowledges the Oslo Accords

What is the position of the Sunni Arab states on Gaza?

“Egypt, Jordan and Saudia view Hamas as a terror organization. The UAE has plans for Gaza which designates as Chairman of the PA Dr. Salam Fayyad, former PM of the Authority under Abu Mazen more than a decade ago. Dr. Fayyad is not a member of Fatah or the PLO. He is an expert on economics. The moderate Arab world and the US wish to see him as head of the Palestinian Authority. However, Qatar has a long-standing vision of political Islam, which they hoped Hamas would realize. Already in 2019, the Qataris met with Hamas in Judea and Samaria and offered to fund them in the elections, but they would rather see Khaled Mashal as head of Hamas, They don’t favor Sinwar, who had detested and insulted them. There was no love lost between them– Qatar and Sinwar. Some claim that now the Qataris have the opportunity to try and reassert their influence with the Hamas leadership that resides overseas, but the Iranian’s and Hezbollah also want to maintain close ties with Hamas”.

What kind of relations would Qatar have between Hamas and the PA?

“Qatar would like to see Hamas as part of the PLO, as it would legitimize Hamas, and make it less militant. But Abu Mazen set a condition for this: if you want to be part of the PLO – you have to accept the Oslo Accords, which means the implied recognition in the State of Israel.  Meanwhile, Hamas is led by a council in lieu of a new leader, and it there appears to be a power struggle between the more moderate camp – the Muslim Brotherhood supported by Qatar – and the militant camp, which is close to Iran”.

In April you wrote that Mohammad Dahlan – the Fata leader living in Abu Dabi – is promoting a plan for leadership of the Gaza Strip, with the backing of a Arab Sunni force. Is this still true?

“Yes, he’s still working on it. But he also understands that forming the Arab force he’s talking about can only happen as part of a diplomatic process, and he understands that for the time being, Israel is not seeking any diplomatic arrangement, He understands that he’ll be forced to find a solution in collaboration with the Palestinian Authority. According to my sources, Dahlan’s people have recently  spoke on numerous occasions with Abu Mazen’s people to find a path to reconciliation and unite the forces in Gaza,. Also Israeli Defense Minister Galant’s ‘Security Island Plan’ for concentrating Gaza’s population in ‘humanitarian bubbles’ with a civil apparatus for each such bubble comprising locals that will be armed with light arms – is very acceptable on part of the Emiratis”.

הפוסט Lt. Col. (Res.) Baruch Yedid: “The Palestinian Authority Is In A State Of Collapse” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building—Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, on the erosion of demilitarization.

The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered. Shimon Peres Tomorrow is Now, 1978.

We don’t need to issue a daily report to Israel on the operation [in Sinai] as it is a matter of sovereignty and national security—Egyptian Military, Reuters, August 21, 2012.

As the war rages on unabated in Gaza, the idea of demilitarization has once again taken center stage in the debate on how the fighting is to end. However, its proponents seem blissfully unaware of the fact that Gaza is already supposed to be demilitarized right now under the terms of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords.

A unique context?

The stunning failure of demilitarization in Gaza as a means for attaining peace makes a thorough probe into the notion—its theoretical rationale, its practical feasibility, an analysis of its past practice, and an assessment of its future prospects for success—both timely and apt.

As a cautionary aside, it should be noted that this paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all examples of demilitarization across the globe (such as the Solomon Islands and Costa Rica); or a comprehensive study of the history of demilitarization since the initial implementation of the notion (arguably from the 1856 Treaty of Paris).

Rather, it is meant to be confined to instances where demilitarization arrangements are likely to have policy relevance for Israel, making examples such as the demilitarization of Japan or in the Korean peninsula beyond the scope examined.

Indeed, the policy-pertinence of demilitarization regarding the Middle East conflict, in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, has its own unique characteristics and exigencies. Accordingly, inferences valid in numerous other instances may not be readily transferable for application in this case. Indeed, as a Foreign Policy article correctly underlines:

“None of the existing states and territories without armed forces compare to the uniquely difficult circumstances faced by Israelis and Palestinians, and none offers a model that can simply be adopted to resolve one of the most intractable conflicts in one of the world’s most restive regions.”

The sovereignty imperative

According to Oxford Public International Law:

“The concept of demilitarization denotes the reduction or even total abolishment of armaments…and military presence in a specific geographic area. In operational terms, it implies the dismantlement of arms, ammunition, and armed forces in order to put them beyond military use. Demilitarization also connotes the process of sustained reductions in the influence of the military in a given State and society”.

For the purposes of this analysis, we distinguish between “Demilitarization,” an externally imposed arrangement (see below), and “Demobilization,” which refers to the voluntary reduction in the size of the demobilizing party’s army.

As such, demilitarization cuts against the grain of the overarching organizing concept of the international system—that of sovereign nation-states existing in an anarchic system in which there is no recognized hierarchical order. It is, thus, a process that is antithetical to the existential nature of a sovereign political organism. Indeed, one might say that it runs directly counter to the “primal DNA” of the nation-state.

Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the political landscape is littered with the burnt-out wrecks of demilitarization agreements that have failed—more often than not, with disastrous results. Indeed, in an analysis of the “special challenges” demilitarization poses, the late Professor David Bederman warns that such attempts are often doomed to failure. He elaborates:

“…the chief reason for the failure of demilitarization is the weakness of institutional mechanisms to effectively encourage and monitor compliance, as well as to punish transgressions.”

Significantly, the same malaise can, to a large degree, be discerned in the events leading up to October 7.

Demilitarization: A violation of the sovereignty imperative?

In essence, “sovereignty” is the supreme authority within a defined territory. As such, it does not recognize the legitimacy of any other source of authority in that territory as superior to it.

Now, any demilitarization arrangement effectively annuls the right of the demilitarizing country to determine what weapons it can deploy, how many it can deploy, and where they can be deployed.

Thus, by its very nature, demilitarization entails a violation—or at least, constriction—of the sovereign rights of the demilitarizing country.

Clearly, there are only two ways such an arrangement can be maintained. Either by the imposition on the demilitarizing country by a more powerful external force (such as an alien state or a coalition of such states); or by the willing acquiescence of the demilitarizing state to refrain from—or limit—the deployment of military forces in that state—or in a portion of the state.

Accordingly, demilitarization, as a stable reality, can prevail only as long as the demilitarizing party continues to agree to be demilitarized. For, if such agreement is revoked, it will either lead to the restrictions previously consented to being thrown off and militarization reinstated, or to their forcible reimposition by external parties.

The history of the past hundred years has included several major demilitarization agreements, few of which instill great confidence in the idea as an effective remedy for conflict.

Arguably, the most significant example—and the one whose collapse precipitated the gravest consequences—was the demilitarization of the Rhineland after WWI and whose violation precipitated WWII.

Demilitarization as a harbinger of war

The gory battles of WWI ended with the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed complex and comprehensive constraints—both quantitative and qualitative—on the German military with the purpose of stripping it of the ability to instigate future offensive action. These also included the demilitarization of the Rhineland, with the demolition of existing fortification 50 km east of the Rhine River, and a prohibition on the construction of new ones.

Germany was severely limited as to the kind and amount of weapons it could possess, manufacture, or store and was even forbidden completely with regard to others, such as submarines (Article 181) and an air force (Article 198).

However, as Germany rebuilt its national capabilities—and the resolve of the Europeans waned—the demilitarization arrangement fell apart.

Indeed, it was Winston Churchill, in his epic chronicle of the history of the outbreak of WWII, The Gathering Storm, who vividly described how the demilitarization conditions were eroded out of existence. He wrote:

“Look back and see what we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building; the Berlin- Rome Axis established; Austria devoured and digested by the Reich; Czechoslovakia deserted and ruined by the Munich Pact, its fortress line in German hands, its mighty arsenal of Skoda henceforward making munitions for the German armies… the services of thirty five Czech divisions against the still unripened German Army cast away… all gone with the wind.”

Indeed, as demilitarization disintegrated, an increasingly confident Germany with its arsenal replenished unleashed a wave of aggression that culminated in the bloodiest war in the history of humanity, in which an estimated total of 70–85 million people perished, or about 3% of the estimated global population of 2.3 billion in 1940.

Sinai: A fraying accord

Another example of a demilitarization agreement, signed to bring hostilities between Egypt and Israel to an end following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was included in the 1979 Camp David Accords.

In recent years, this agreement is also showing signs of strain and is beginning to “fray around the edges.”

For well over a decade, Egypt has been champing at the bit to shake off the restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the Sinai,

Annex 1 of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accords established a system of security arrangements intended to allow Israel to withdraw from Sinai without incurring serious risk. Unequivocal constraints were placed on Egyptian military activities and deployments in the area. The rationale was clear: Should Cairo’s disposition toward Israel change for the worse, Sinai would continue to comprise a buffer between Egyptian forces and the Israeli border. If Cairo deployed any sizeable ground forces or armed aircraft into the peninsula, it would comprise a clear violation of the Accords and provide a warning of aggressive intentions. Thus, should war break out, Egypt’s long lines of supply in Sinai would be vulnerable, particularly to Israel’s powerful air force.

However, with the passage of time and the deteriorating internal situation in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula—given the dilution of military power (due to demilitarization) and the commensurate decline of Cairo’s ability to impose its will in the remote region—became a tempting target of Islamist insurgency.

Insurgency as justification for remilitarization

This provided Egypt with grounds to claim that the demilitarization clauses in the peace accords with Israel denied it sufficient forces to impose law and order in the peninsula.

Indeed, as early as 2007, Israel allowed the Egyptians to deploy additional troops into Sinai to fight weapons smuggling particularly to Jihadi elements.

Since then, at least two processes have fueled the attrition of the demilitarization of Sinai.

The one is the ongoing modernization and acquisition of offensive arms by the Egyptian military; the other is the deeply ingrained animus towards Israel and affiliation with Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. Indeed, as an analysis from the American University in Cairo underscores:

“Even after three decades of formal peace, most Egyptians still view Israel as a threat to national security and as an enemy, not only of Palestinians but of all Arabs.”

As the years passed, Jihadi attacks on Egyptian forces in Sinai intensified. This provided Cairo with grounds for demanding forces beyond those specified in the 1979 peace agreement. Gradually these violations increased—enabled either by ex-ante Israeli approval, or` ex-post Israeli approval, or despite no Israeli approval at all. When Egypt, in 2023, ` eventually managed to rein in the jihadi insurgency, the post-October 7th fighting in Gaza–particularly close to the Southern border of Rafa, gave Egypt fuel for continued allegations to bolster its forces in violation of the treaty.

Thus, in a Foreign Policy analysis, entitled Egypt’s Remilitarized Sinai Is a Future Powder Keg, the Washington Institute’s David Schenker provided a cautionary critique of the developments in the Peninsula up to mid-2022:

“…Israel also allowed Cairo to flood Sinai with troops and heavy equipment substantially in excess of the treaty’s limits…The longer Egypt’s additional forces remain in Sinai, especially now that the Islamic State appears to be under control, the more challenging it will become to revert to the limits imposed by the treaty”.

A poor bulkhead against war

Sadly, Israel’s history provides ample testimony as to the inadequacy of demilitarization as an effective barrier to war—or even as a device for reining in violence.

Indeed, immediately following its inception in 1948, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) established on the Golan as a means to separate Israeli and Syrian forces failed to prevent periodic clashes between the two militaries, which—among other things—eventually led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War.

But quite apart from the manifest difficulty sustaining demilitarization in an area such as Gaza, there are, perversely, no less acute difficulties that could arise if, in fact, it was achieved. Indeed, the possibilities for unintended—and undesired—consequences seem boundless.

After all, if, Israel were somehow to compel the rulers of Gaza to disarm and to deny them the capacity to rearm, this would inevitably undermine, not only their ability to impose law and order internally in the Strip, but externally against more radical opponents from within the adjacent Sinai Peninsula. Indeed, if some future disarmed successor regime were faced with a significant challenge to its rule, whether from domestic or foreign sources, who—would be called upon to defend it?

If some foreign military force, this would imply the remilitarization of Gaza—leaving open the question of to whom such a force would be answerable.

If Israel, it is difficult to conceive of a more absurd scenario than one in which IDF forces need to be mobilized to prop up an Arab regime, so “unsavory” that cannot be trusted with the wherewithal needed to defend itself.

The preceding discussion—both of the political-scientific theory and the empirical case studies—ought to provide Israeli policymakers with sufficient caveats against succumbing to the temptation of a repeat attempt at adopting the failed and fatally flawed formula of demilitarization as a means of inducing—if not peace, them at least stable and durable non-belligerence. This is particularly true when the demilitarizing party is governed by an authoritarian regime that, on the one hand, places considerable stock on martial might and, on the other, has scant regard for implications violation of the demilitarization may have for its own citizenry, (Emmanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 1799).

There appears, therefore, little option but to embrace the dire warning against demilitarization as a prudent policy prescription, once forcefully articulated by the very person who later endorsed it—with calamitous consequences.

This was Shimon Peres, who counseled:

“ …the idea of demilitarization…seems to me a dubious remedy, The principal problem is not reaching an agreement on demilitarization but the honoring of such an agreement in practice. The number of agreements that the Arabs have violated is no less than the number to which they have adhered.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט Demilitarization: Policy pertinent parameters הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, Dr. Omer Dostri looks at Israel’s security doctrine — a doctrine that took form when the state was founded and has not been updated since.

Background — Deterring, alerting, defeating: The current security doctrine of the State of Israel

In the 1950s, David Ben-Gurion formulated Israel’s security doctrine. Ben-Gurion is generally assumed to have based his doctrine on principles that appeared in Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s essay “The Iron Wall.” Ben-Gurion believed that, as the essay says, a strong army must be established, and national power developed, in order to halt the enemy’s attempts to attack until, understanding that we cannot be expelled or exterminated, the enemy finally accepts our existence. Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine, also known as the “security triangle,” included three key components:

• Deterring: The State of Israel must display military superiority in order to deter its enemies and convince them that attacking Israel is not worthwhile. Because Israel is at a geographic and demographic disadvantage, Israeli deterrence is built primarily on significant alliances, a strong economy, and a technological advantage.

• Alerting: The State of Israel must develop intelligence capabilities and use methods of early warning in order to be able to prepare itself in advance of any attack.

• Defeating: Once an attack has taken place or a palpable threat has been discovered, the enemy must be confronted and overcome.

That doctrine, including the sequence that it dictates — first deterring, then alerting, then defeating — may have suited the geopolitical and military situation of the State’s early years, a situation in which we confronted hostile states such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq; but today, aside from Iran, we are hardly obliged at all to deal with hostile states as such. Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with us, Syria and Iraq have been exhausted by civil wars, and Lebanon has fallen to Hezbollah. Thus our enemies today are not states but rather terrorist organizations — and such enemies require a completely different security doctrine.

Over the years, there have been a few attempts to change Israel’s security doctrine. Thus, for example, in 2006 the Meridor Committee expanded the security doctrine, adding the element of protection. But no other significant changes came about in doctrine or in operations, and the State of Israel continues to rely on an erroneous doctrine. The direct result of that error was the disaster of October 7.

In order to prevent an additional disaster, the State of Israel must impose the necessary revisions right away and formulate a new security doctrine that suits today’s reality and can provide a response to the threats currently at our doorstep.

Dr. Omer Dostri: The vision of a new security doctrine for Israel

Deterrence will derive from victory

Current state: The State of Israel has become addicted to the element of deterrence. In recent years, most of our military operations in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have been intended to deter our enemies, not to defeat them. Even in the Second Lebanon War, Israel did not try to defeat Hezbollah decisively and destroy it as a military and governmental factor, but contented itself with instilling fear.

Those operations and rounds of fighting have not proven themselves, for the simple reason that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to deter an extremist Islamic enemy. States and organizations with a Western mentality may somehow be susceptible to influence, but enemies such as Hamas and Hezbollah speak a completely different language and cannot easily be deterred, if at all.

Ideally:

• Reverse the sequence: History shows that the best deterrence is obtained by a clear military victory. Thus the sequence of matters must be reversed. First aim for victory, and after victory the deterrence will emerge automatically.

• Defeat Hamas and Hezbollah: The most urgent objective of the State of Israel is the defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah. Such a defeat will not only leave us in the dominant position but also provide us with deterrent power in the region for the next two decades.

Deterrence based solely on intentions is not deterrence

Current state: In order to achieve prior deterrence against attacks, the State of Israel has focused mainly on the enemy’s intentions and tried to assess how likely an attack is. Our enemies’ intentions are indeed important, but it is unreasonable to ignore their capabilities. Over the years, we have seen Hamas grow stronger and stronger, and instead of nipping that process in the bud, we allowed it to continue because we believed that Hamas would not dare attack Israel.

If we continue to base our system of deterrence on the enemy’s supposed intentions, we are likely to overlook many further items of importance.

Ideally:

• Base deterrence on abilities: The State of Israel and the IDF must strongly emphasize intelligence gathering, in order to learn the enemy’s abilities and discern any buildup of strength in advance.

• Take the initiatives: Rather than waiting for the enemy to express the intent to inflict harm on us, Israel should go into action as soon as it sees that the enemy’s strength is sufficient to do so.

Above all else, victory

Current state: Currently the element of victory ranks at the bottom of the national security doctrine. In recent years the State of Israel has stopped short of true victory over the enemy and been satisfied with tightly targeted operations against local threats. That approach enabled our enemies to gather strength and created the circumstances that beset us today.

Ideally:

• The State of Israel should aim for true victory over its enemies. First and foremost, we must defeat Hamas. We must not halt the war in Gaza before we have completely demolished the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, because otherwise Hamas will bounce back.

• The next stage is to defeat Hezbollah at the northern border. A long spell of quiet, such as followed the Second Lebanon War, is not enough. This time we must put an end to the entity known as Hezbollah, even at the cost of an arduous all-out war in Lebanon. If we do not neutralize Hezbollah now, then in another five or ten years we will face an October 7 on steroids.

• After we have finished with Gaza and Lebanon, we must completely clear Judea and Samaria of terrorism. Tightly targeted operations of two or three days will not suffice. A comprehensive operation, a Defensive Shield 2, must expunge all the terrorist nests that have sprung up there. Only complete victory on all fronts will provide us with quiet and safety for years to come.

Giving the geographic component its place

Current state: As soon as the state was founded, its leaders — both left-wing and right-wing — saw clearly that Jewish settlement is the foundation for everything. However, the current security doctrine gives no consideration to the geographic or settlement component. Moreover, in recent decades Israel has taken various steps of withdrawal from territories in the naïve hope that calm and quiet would result.

As history teaches, every retreat from the Jewish settlements exacts a heavy price. We saw it under the Oslo Accords when we left parts of Judea and Samaria, we saw it when we left the Lebanese security zone behind and it turned immediately into a zone of terror, and we are seeing it now in Gaza. Obviously if there had been Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip — as there was before the Disengagement — October 7, in the sickening form that it took, could not have occurred.

Ideally:

• Jewish settlement is the foundation for security, because wherever we are not present, our enemies will be and they will foment terror. We must encourage settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel, with wisdom, with understanding, and with an emphasis on the north, the south, the Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza.

Civilians too have their role

Current state: Before the War of Iron Swords, most of Israel’s citizens were not actively taking part in the national defense effort. There was not enough of a hold on the periphery and on the agricultural expanses at the border. The emergency squads in the border communities were not properly trained and equipped, and only a few civilians carried small arms.

Ideally:

• Extensive occupancy of land: We must firm up our control, and our agriculture, in the outlying areas as part of the extensive occupancy of the land.

• Outlying communities as part of the border security system: We must establish more emergency squads, train them properly, and provide them with weapons and ammunition.

• National guard: A national guard must be established, and it must receive extensive powers and ample budgets in order to assume a significant defensive role in the outlying communities and the mixed cities.

• New gun licensing policy: The process of obtaining a gun license must be made simpler for Israeli citizens. Terrorism is not a problem located across the border, it is happening inside Israel and we see many cases in which armed civilians have taken charge in the face of terrorism and saved fellow civilians.

Reducing military dependency

Current state: Israeli military industry has shrunken in recent years, while the State of Israel has increasingly relied on weapons and other materiel imported from foreign countries. In such circumstances Israel, needing other countries to arm it, loses a great deal of its independence and freedom of action in security matters. It needs to submit explanations that will satisfy the countries on which it depends.

Ideally:

• Independent manufacturing ability: One of the most significant lessons from October 7 is that Israel must base its warfare as thoroughly as possible on its own weapons manufacturing. Granted, the State of Israel is a small country with a limited workforce and apparently we will never fill all our military needs ourselves — but the more we reduce our dependency on other countries, the more we increase our bargaining power and our ability to act independently.

New doctrine — new security: Summary and conclusions

Security is an end, not a means, and its preservation is of paramount importance. However, the State of Israel observes a 75-year-old security doctrine that may have been wise in its early days but has long since lost its applicability. The disaster of October 7 is painful, decisive proof.

In order to successfully answer today’s threats, we must develop a new security doctrine. Whereas the old doctrine included only three components — deterring, alerting, and defeating — the new doctrine must also consider Jewish settlement, the role of the civilians in defense, and Israel’s security independence. In addition, we must not overvalue the component of deterrence, certainly not to the point of ignoring the most important component of all: victory. We must also understand that in order to attain lasting security and stability, we will be paying a heavy price, particularly at the present fateful juncture which may be determining the country’s future for decades to come.

The author is solely responsible for the content of this article, and it does not necessarily reflect the position of the IDSF movement.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: The national security doctrine הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF’s ultimate goal is to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come. Two central understandings underpin this goal: The first is that the security of the State cannot exist in a vacuum; rather, it depends on an extensive system of political, economic, and social factors. The second understanding is that in order to make informed decisions, it is necessary to build a broad strategy that is based on the past and looks to the future.

These understandings have led the IDSF to formulate a clear national vision based on in-depth research and touching on all the areas that shape Israeli society. In this article, we will be focusing — with the help of Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen — on the topic of settlement. With Hacohen’s remarks as our guidelines, we will examine the geographical traits of the country’s various regions, expand on the connection between settlement and national security, and detail the settlement vision that the State of Israel must adopt in order to ensure its security for generations to come.

Background: From the Crusaders to Yitzhak Rabin — The Land of Israel as a strategic asset

The Land of Israel connects Asia to Africa and is linked to Europe by the Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of its location, it has served since ancient times as an important passageway between continents and between great powers, and for that reason many nations have tried to take control of it.

The various conquerors, and the Crusaders above all others, understood that the Land of Israel cannot be conquered and defended by occupying its coastal plain alone. So the Crusaders deployed a network of fortresses not only in the coastal cities but also in Sinai and on the ridges east of the Jordan, such as the Ajloun Castle in the land of Gilead.

Unfortunately, that important concept of breadth is not expressed in the distribution of communities today. On the contrary, more than 60% of Israel’s Jewish residents live on the coastal plain, a strip no more than 15 km wide. Furthermore, most of Israel’s strategic assets — including Ben Gurion Airport, the power stations, Ashdod Port, an office for supervision of banking, and the national headquarters of the various armed services — are all in that same tight space.

Besides being narrow and crowded, the coastal plain is dominated by the Judean Hills and by the Samarian slopes that overlook it from the east along its entire length. Those hills provide a direct view of the plain — and a convenient base for attacking it, whether by short-range rocket fire or by a ground incursion. Thus whoever controls the hills of Samaria and Judea is, for practical purposes, in control of the entire coastal plain.

Many leaders from across the political spectrum have well understood the connection between control of that area and preservation of security, and they have recognized the importance of maintaining defensible borders. That understanding underlay the “Allon Plan,” which Yigal Allon first presented to Levi Eshkol’s government immediately after the Six Day War. And the same understanding was also embodied in Yitzhak Rabin’s policy approach. Rabin’s last speech to the Knesset, in October 1995, outlined his national security policy and put forward four principles of settlement that he saw as vital:

• The first principle stipulated that in order to ensure Israel’s existence as the Jewish state, its population must be 80% Jewish. That was one of the reasons that Rabin placed all the Palestinian population of Gaza and of areas A and B under the Palestinian Authority.
• Rabin’s second principle was that Jerusalem, with Maale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev, must be kept united under Israeli sovereignty.
• The third principle stipulates that the Jordan Valley, in the most comprehensive sense, will be the Israeli side of the security border. That is to say, Israel must maintain possession of the Jewish settlements in every part of the Jordan Valley — from Route 90 westward to the line of ridges.
• According to the fourth principle, a Palestinian entity should be created which is “less than a state.” One practical implication of that principle is that Israel must retain control over the airspace of Judea and Samaria.

It should be emphasized that those principles were set out not by some right-wing faction but by leaders of the Labor movement; and they were expressing a broad national consensus. That fact alone reflects the importance of Jewish settlements in the Land of Israel and it makes clear that before settlements became a political issue, they were already a necessity for survival.

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen: The settlement vision of the State of Israel

Jerusalem: A metropolis, not a border town

The current situation:

The historical, religious, and cultural importance of Jerusalem is clear, but the city also carries critical strategic importance. Jerusalem sits among hills, dominates central traffic arteries, and is also the only place with a Jewish majority on the watershed.

Possession of the Jerusalem area is essential both for ensuring that Jerusalem remains Israel’s capital and a central Israeli metropolis, and for operational and strategic reasons. Because it is close to a large portion of the sources of terrorism, Jerusalem makes a convenient base for dispatching security forces and a hub for intelligence activities.

Moreover, possession of the Jerusalem area is vital for keeping control over the central traffic arteries and over additional areas. It is Jerusalem that makes possible the retention of the Jordan Valley as a buffer zone between the coastal plain and the threats from the east. And the possession of hillside communities such as Na’aleh and Beit Arieh is what provides for control of the central traffic arteries and the strategic assets of the country’s interior, including Ben Gurion Airport. Thanks to possession of the ridge and of the Yatir region’s communities, the valley lands of Beersheba and Arad can be defended, as can the Nevatim airbase.

Furthermore, any territorial concessions in Jerusalem would be considered an Israeli surrender and would only encourage Arab and Muslim extremists to continue gnawing away at the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and in the rest of Israel.

Ideally:

• Strengthening Jerusalem’s standing as a metropolis: Before the Six Day War, Jerusalem was a remove border town, a marginal satellite of Tel Aviv. But since then, it has become an important metropolis. Jerusalem in the form of a metropolis is key to controlling the Land of Israel, and Jerusalem must retain that form. In order to remain a metropolis, Jerusalem requires all its surrounding communities — the Etzion Bloc to the south, Maale Adumim and Mishor Adumim to the east, and the Benjamin district to the north.
• Ruling out the partitioning of Jerusalem: Partitioning Jerusalem would not only endanger its standing as Israel’s capital but also critically harm Israel’s national security. There is no guarantee that partitioning the city would actually end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Apparently terrorism would still continue, and partitioning would merely provide it with far more dangerous opportunities for action. And all that aside, nowhere else in the world has such a large city been divided. Even on paper, the idea is simply not feasible.

Judea and Samaria: To become Israel’s backbone to the east

The current situation:

In the Oslo Accords, Rabin divided the Judea and Samaria area into areas A. B. and C. Only Area C is fully under the civil and security authority of the State of Israel. Area C currently includes some 120 Jewish communities, with more than 500 thousand residents in all. There are also some 500 Arab communities with roughly 200 to 300 thousand residents.

Although Israeli control over Area C is anchored in the Oslo Accords, many voices around the world are raised against Jewish settlement in that territory. Much is said about the “illegal settlements,” and about the wildcat outposts in Area C, but illegal construction by Palestinians in that territory is in fact immeasurably greater than Jewish construction. As of December 2023, Area C contains roughly 90,000 illegal Palestinian structures; and there is no attempt at removing them.

Another accusation leveled against the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria is that the Jews there burden the Israeli security forces. That accusation is fundamentally erroneous. Above and beyond not being a burden, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria is what provides the IDF with freedom of operation in those territories. The size of the IDF’s deployment in Judea and Samaria is not sufficient in itself to preserve stability in such a complex area. Stability persists only thanks to the weight of half a million Jews who live there.

Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria also provide the security forces with convenient access to areas A and B — a benefit that has served the IDF well in various operations such as the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield.

Furthermore, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria also demonstrates to the Palestinians that our presence there is stable and dominant and that they are obliged to cooperate with us. An Israeli withdrawal of any size would indicate weakness and encourage our enemies’ thoughts of seizing the area and even expanding beyond it.

The settlements in Judea and Samaria also deserve to be credited with contributing to objectives mentioned in the previous section (which dealt with the Jerusalem area), including turning Jerusalem into a metropolis, retaining control over the Jordan Valley, defending the coastal plain and Ben Gurion Airport, defending the valleys of Beersheba and Arad, and keeping constant control over the main traffic arteries. Every settlement and outpost in the Judea and Samaria area is serving at least one of those objectives, and therefore they all are justified on grounds of security.

Ideally:

• World opinion cannot dictate our policy: As even David Ben Gurion understood in his day, Israeli policy cannot address all the objections raised around the world. Cooperating in response to the various rulings handed down by the international court in the Hague would mean a death sentence for all the Jews in Israel, because if we try to survive only inside the Green Line we will not survive at all.
• Driving home the perspective on settlements: As demonstrated, all the territory of Area C is vital to security and must remain in Israel’s hands forever. That understanding must be made clear to all the decision-makers, and preferably to all the country’s residents.
• Development of the settlements in Judea and Samaria: Not only is settlement in Judea and Samaria less than extensive; it is in fact too limited. A backbone of 3–4 million residents is necessary between Arad and the Gilboa, in order to relieve Israel of the crowding in the Dan Bloc. To make that possible, the existing settlements must be enlarged, new ones established, and the system of roadways and trains expanded to connect all those communities to the country’s center.

The Jordan Valley: Apply Israeli sovereignty

The current situation:

The Jordan Valley is Israel’s security border to the east. As of today, the Jordan Valley is under Israeli control but is not officially considered part of the State of Israel. In January 2020, the USA published its “Deal of the Century” peace plan, which gave Israel a historic opportunity to assert its sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and to fully annex the valley and the northern Dead Sea. Unfortunately, Israeli politicians torpedoed the plan and the Jordan Valley remains in a precarious status, exposed to both domestic and international criticism.

To understand the Jordan Valley’s strategic importance, it is first necessary to understand the geography. The Jordan Valley is located 250–400 meters below sea level, while the hills of Samaria and of Hebron rise to an altitude of up to 1,000 meters above sea level. Thus as long as the Jordan Valley remains in Israeli hands, an invasion of Israel from the east is very difficult because there is no easy way to move massive military forces across such steep territory.

Granted, we are at peace with Jordan today and no invasion from there is expected soon. But we must not forget that our eastern border is the most important one for Israel’s defense, both because it is our longest border and because it is the closest to the triangle — defined by Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa — where most of the country’s Jewish residents and its most important infrastructures are located. Moreover, even if relations with Jordan remain stable, it must be understood that without Israeli possession of the Jordan Valley, Iranian militias can quickly move into Qalqilya and Tulkarm to fire artillery at the Dan Bloc. It is not lightly that Rabin called the Jordan Valley, in its most comprehensive sense, the security border of the State of Israel.

Above and beyond its strategic importance, the Jordan Valley also possesses no little residential value. It is a very extensive territory that can, and should, accommodate millions of dwellers. By settling the Jordan Valley, we can balance the geographical distribution of Israel’s citizenry and ease the currently worsening population density of the coastal plain.

Ideally:

• Applying sovereignty to the Jordan Valley: Not only must possession of the Jordan Valley not be waived, but action must be taken to fully annex the area and apply Israeli sovereignty to the valley. Only such action will enable wide-ranging governmental plans to be established, and the valley’s standing as Israel’s security border at the east to be ensured for the long term.
• Expanding the settlements in the Jordan Valley: In order to solve the problem of crowding in central Israel and provide for better geographical distribution of the populace, the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley should be expanded. In addition, new immigrants should be encouraged to settle in the valley rather than in the already crowded coastal cities.

The Galilee: Expand the Jewish communities

The current situation:

In 2005 the Israeli government approved National Master Plan 35, known as Tama 35. In accordance with that plan, it was decided to limit construction and settlement in open areas because of the importance of preserving green spaces. In practice, the plan limited only Jewish settlement and was not applied to Arab communities. In many parts of the country, including the Galilee, it has been impossible to establish new Jewish settlements since the plan’s approval. And it has been very difficult to expand existing communities, because of quotas limiting the number of residents.

Tama 35 created an absurd situation in which Arab communities such as Sakhnin can expand with approval and even double their population whereas a Jewish community such as Yodfat is not allowed to expand beyond the 400 households that it already includes. Furthermore, the land sold to Jews and the land sold to Arabs differ dramatically in valuation. In Karmiel, for example, plots of 350 sq m were marketed in 2021 for 1.2 million shekels. But five minutes’ drive from there, at Deir al-Assad, similar plots were marketed the same year for only 20,000 shekels; and moreover the land development there was subsidized.

Because of those conditions, the Galilean heartland (leaving aside the cities of Nahariya, Safed, Tiberias, and Afula) is only 15% Jewish.

Ideally:

• Change the National Master Plan: The National Master Plan must be promptly changed and a new plan approved that is based on the understanding that an extensive network of Jewish villages must be developed. Thus the Jewish communities must be freed from the limitations imposed only on them and become the basis for an approved expansion.
• Encourage young people to settle in the Galilee: Jewish residents, and especially young families, should be encouraged to settle in the Galilee. To that purpose, they must be offered land at worthwhile prices and with economic benefits; and the vicinity must be developed with convenient roadways, public transportation, workplaces, etc.

The Golan — Hoping for a hundred thousand Jewish residents

The current situation:

The State of Israel wrested the Golan from the Syrians in 1967, and the area has been controversial since then. Many countries around the world see it as “occupied territory,” but most Israelis see it as an integral part of their country. In December 1981 the State of Israel decided to apply Israeli law in the Golan Heights, and that decision remains in force today.

In 1994, in the spirit of the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government took steps toward returning the Golan to Syrian hands as part of an attempt to reach a peace agreement with Syria. The Barak and Olmert governments weighed a similar idea but did not proceed to carry it out.

Meanwhile, over time, the Golan’s standing as Israeli won a degree of acknowledgement in the world; and in 2019 US President Donald Trump signed an executive order declaring that the USA officially recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. However, most of the world’s nations still do not officially consider the Golan a part of the State of Israel, and Israel’s hold on the area is still under threat.

Ideally:

• Quash the idea of retreating from the Golan: International pressures must be withstood, because giving up the Golan Heights would bring terrible consequences. First of all, without the Golan Heights we have no chance of living securely. We would be vulnerable to threats from Syria and Lebanon. Also, giving up the Golan Heights would cost the State of Israel heavily in terms of culture and tourism because the Golan is a beautiful area and one of the country’s few green lungs.
• Enlarge the Jewish population in the Golan: Currently the Golan is home to 23 thousand Jews. In order to anchor our presence in that area, as well as relieving Israel’s overcrowdedness elsewhere, the hope is to settle 100 thousand Jews in the Golan over the next five years. With suitable conditions and proper incentives, such an undertaking is certainly feasible.

The Negev: Extensive rural Jewish settlement

The current situation:

The Negev covers approximately 60% of the State of Israel but it remains one of the country’s least populated regions. David Ben Gurion is remembered as recognizing the importance of developing and settling the Negev. He even called it “a great Zionist asset, with no substitute anywhere in the country.”

Unfortunately, Ben Gurion’s vision has not yet been carried out fully and the Negev still suffers from slow development and scanty Jewish settlement. The volume of settlement no longer depends only on how well motivated the settlers are to move south. It is now also subject to governmental limitations — first and foremost Tama 35, which makes establishing new Jewish communities and expanding existing ones difficult.

The few Jews who already live in the Negev are concentrated in Beersheba and in urban settlements such as Ofakim and Sderot, where they live in apartment buildings. Thus we have no truly extensive presence in the area and consequently no control over the main traffic arteries. The Bedouin population, in contrast, is distributed over broad tracts of land and thus enjoys control over the grounds and over the traffic arteries.

The Negev, it must be understood, is important to the State of Israel not only because of its size. It is home to a number of critical military and strategic assets, including the Nevatim airbase. Because control over the area was lacking, Bedouin rioters during Operation Guardian of the Walls, in 2019, managed to block access to the airbase and thus interfered with the IDF’s freedom of action. That was a severe security incident, and lessons must be learned.

Ideally:

• Extensive rural Jewish settlement: Development of Jewish settlements in the Negev must be encouraged, with an emphasis on rural settlements with single-family houses, in order to cover broad tracts. That is the only way to create balance in the area and ensure security along the traffic arteries. To that purpose, settlement planning in the Negev must be revolutionized to reduce land prices, create proper conditions for settling, and provide incentives for those who will come settle the Negev.

The Gaza Strip: Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities

The current situation:

The Gaza Strip has known many vicissitudes in recent decades. In the 1970s, Israel’s government established Jewish communities inside the Gaza Strip under the “Five Fingers Plan” put forward by Ariel Sharon. However, in 1982, Israel withdrew from the Yamit district and later the Oslo Accords obliged Israel to abandon further implementation of the Five Fingers Plan and waive control over the Philadelphi Corridor as well. In 2005, it will be recalled, the Jewish communities of the Katif Bloc were all evacuated under the Disengagement plan — and thus Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip came to an end.

Aside from the settlements inside the Gaza Strip itself, the Gaza Envelope communities and those surrounding the Gaza Strip in the northern Negev must be borne in mind. Following the Disengagement, those communities became the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from central Israel; and as such, they suffered many attacks — which climaxed on October 7, 2023.

As of this writing, there is no end yet to the Swords of Iron war that was engendered by that disaster; and most of the Gaza Envelope communities have not yet been repaired and fully repopulated. Despite the security threats, the State of Israel must repopulate the area bordering the Gaza Strip. Some of the veteran residents may not wish to return, but there are enough ideologically motivated citizens who understand the area’s importance and will agree to replace them there.

Ideally:

• Strengthen the Gaza Envelope communities: The Gaza Envelope communities must be repopulated, whether by returning residents or by newcomers. The area is vital to Israel’s security and must not be abandoned. Even leaving aside Zionist pioneering ideology, it is a beautiful area suitable for a balanced lifestyle close to the land. The Gaza Envelope communities are actually not far from the center of Israel. Most are an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv and are well connected to public transportation, so that life there is definitely convenient.
• Jewish settlement in Gaza: Although valid in principle, this idea must be weighed against other national priorities and it may be that efforts should concentrate not on settling inside the Gaza Strip but on settling other areas in the Land of Israel.

There is no security without settlements: Summation and conclusions

The country’s first leaders, foremost among them Ben Gurion, appreciated the close connection between possessing and settling the land on the one hand and national strategy and security on the other hand. Subsequent leaders across the political spectrum, including leaders of the left such as Rabin, also understood that territory may be conceded only up to a certain point.

In practice, under cover of “green” programs, a National Master Plan has been adopted that prevents the plan of settlement from being fulfilled. Tama 35 limits the development of the State of Israel and weakens its security. The Master Plan must be revised. Among other things, Judea and Samaria must be regarded as strategic, economic, and security assets for Israel, and their development should be given consideration accordingly. In addition, the Jerusalem metropolis should continue being built extensively; the Jordan Valley, Galilee, and Golan should be settled; and the intolerable concentration of most of Israel’s assets and residents in a certain narrow district.

The drawing of Israel’s boundaries is a decision of concern to future generations, and so it must reflect more than the current situation. Our responsibility is to draw secure boundaries for the State of Israel — borders that can withstand the political upheavals of the Middle East and the changes in technology. Any policy that fails to consider possible threats to Israel’s future security is a policy of irresponsibility toward the nation.

And finally, it must be remembered that programs at the national level are carried out by the citizenry. At the cutting edge of any settlement plan stand the settlers who build the houses, plant the trees, bond with the land and the location, and are ready to fight for them as necessary.

הפוסט Ideally – The Vision of the Israel Defense and Security Forum Featuring: Settlement and Security הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Italy seems to encounter difficulties in dealing with pro-Hamas hate preachers attacking the Jews and Israel on social media and at public rallies. Some could say that it’s something quite common now in the West; we have all seen hateful demonstrations on US campuses and in central London, but that is exactly the problem, because what we are seeing is a normalization of hateful narrative against the Jews, often disguised as “antizionism”.

But what is Zionism after all, if not the right for the Jews to live in their historical land, to have their nation? How come we haven’t seen such full support, like the one provided to the Palestinian cause, to other ones such as the Kurdish cause, the Tibetan, the Uyghur, the Rohingya, and so on? It seems like the Jews are always the preferred target.

Additionally, some Italy-based preachers did not have an issue verbally attacking the Jewish people for being Jews, for instance, in May 2021, during a street speech in Bologna’s main square, “Piazza Maggiore”, Pakistani preacher Zulfiqar Khan stated that:“…Jews are cruel and they use intelligence to harm others”.

In November 2023, during the Italian mainstream TV show “Dritto e Rovescio”, Khan stated: “The Israelites are terrorists and deceivers according to the Bible,” adding that “deception with the aim of self-interest is part of the Jewish faith.”

Isn’t this antisemitism? It is worth recalling that in Italy the Mancino Law has been in force since 1993 and establishes severe penalties for those who promote racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination. Khan also glorified Hamas and the Houthis on several occasions during his sermons and posted images of Hamas terrorists on his Facebook account.

Khan also defined Joe Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu “the two horns of Satan” on plenty of occasions and in June 2024 he accused Israel of murdering on purpose Palestinian children and pregnant women, of burning them alive and he stated that the only terrorists are the Zionists.

In June 2024, during an interview with local TV, he refused to condemn the October 7th massacre.

In July of 2024, Khan posted two fatwa-like videos on the Islamic Center’s Facebook page where he verbally attacked Italian-Egyptian Allam, accusing him of slandering Islam, apostasy and for speaking at a pro-Israel conference. Allam has been under police protection for many years following his criticism of Islam and his conversion to Christianity.

It is worth noting that on July 9th, during a response to a parliament inquiry on Khan’s activity, the Minister of Interior, Matteo Piantedosi, referred to the preacher’s positions as “intransigent”:

“…he has often expressed intransigent positions regarding issues on the West, on homosexuality, on the role of women and, after the attacks of 7 October, also on the Palestinian people and the Israeli Government, demonstrating appreciation for the actions carried out by Hamas”.

Minister Piantedosi must understand that Khan’s positions are not “intransigent”, they are hateful and extremely dangerous.

In addition, Piantedosi stated that “from 1 January 2023 to 5 July, 22 people linked to religious terrorism/extremism circles were arrested”. It is unclear what the term “religious” means.  If they all were radical Islamists, why not state it clearly?

Let’s move on. On October 10th, 2023, just three days after the October 7th massacre, Palestinian activist Mohammed Hannoun (imam in Genoa and president of the Association of Palestinians in Italy, who was photographed years back with moth, Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal), stated that the attack perpetrated by Hamas was “self-defense”. Such claims were made in an interview with the Italian State TV Rai3.

On January 4th, 2024, Hannoun glorified Yahya Ayyash, Hamas’ notorious bombmaker, sadly known for both developing Hamas’s use of suicide bombings and building many of the explosives used in the attacks, and Saleh al-Arouri, a senior Hamas leader in Lebanon who was killed by Israel in Beirut in a drone strike on January 2nd, 2024.

On March 30th, 2024, during a pro-Palestinian demonstration outside Milan’s Central Station. Hannoun, microphone in hand, concluded his speech inciting to turn all Israeli embassies into centers for Palestinian resistance.

In July 2024, Hannoun praised Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades former commander, Emad Akel, and Mohammad Abu Salmiya, director of the al-Shifa hospital. He also invoked freedom for “all Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons”. On July 19th, during a sermon he held as imam of a mosque in Genoa, he accused Israel of destroying hospitals, schools, and mosques in Gaza.

On July 25th he published a post calling for protests against the upcoming meeting between Italian PM, Giorgia Meloni, and Israeli President, Isaac Herzog.

It is important to recall that in 2021, after several reports to the Anti-Money Laundering Office, Hannoun’s charity ABSPP had its bank accounts frozen due to a series of anomalies. From failure to register in the Revenue Agency register to the massive movement of cash, in some cases to subjects registered in the blacklists of European databases. However, according to the Italian media, the indictment that was launched by the judicial office did not lead anywhere due to the lack of verifiable elements in the Palestinian territories.

In July 0f 2023, the Israeli Ministry of Defense asked the Italian police to seize Hannoun’s money. From the investigation conducted by the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic intelligence agency, it emerged that 500,000 euros were available to the architect who in the past was accused by Israel, without any criminal repercussions, of hiding financial support to Palestinian suicide bombers.

Despite the accounts being frozen, in June 2024, Hannoun opened a new charity named “Golden Dome” and started to collect funds once again.

Despite all this, both individuals are still preaching and active on social media platforms.

Hannoun received support from Italian left-wing political figures such as Laura Boldrini, Nicola Fratoianni, Michele Piras, Alessandro Di Battista, and Stefania Ascari, as indicated on several occasions by the Italian press, but this whole situation does not seem to be exclusively political.

On January 27th, 2024, the Shoah Memorial Day, a pro-Palestinian unauthorized demonstration led by Hannoun and other well-known Palestinian activists, was held in Milan’s via Padova, a street with a high presence of Muslims.

During the demonstration, a resident of the street, 25-year-old Mihael Melnic, opened the window of his apartment and exposed a cardboard sign with the writing “Free Gaza from Hamas”, which immediately caused a wave of insults and threats from the crowd. Incredibly, shortly after, his flat was raided by the plainclothes police who questioned Melnic, tried to confiscate his sign (without success), and attempted to intimidate him. Melnic told his story in an interview with the Times of Israel. Melnic exposed the violent nature of certain “pro-Palestinian” demonstrations and their sympathy for Hamas, and some may not have appreciated this.

Taken singularly, these cases may not seem too significant, but once connected, many questions arise. The impression is that things are being dealt with differently if compared to cases regarding ISIS or al-Qaeda because the Palestinian cause is at stake. While the Italian authorities have been swift and strict in taking measures against ISIS supporters (often through deportations), things seem to be different when it comes to the Palestinian cause, especially Hamas.

Since October 7th, the Meloni-led Italian government has shown support for Israel, unlike other European executives; therefore, could this situation rather originate within the internal mechanisms of timeworn risky agreements with inappropriate interlocutors and perpetrated by deep intel apparatuses that go beyond the governments that come and go?

There are two points to keep in mind: the first one has to do with internal security: in the 1970s Italy set an underground agreement with Palestinian terrorist formations, known as “Lodo Moro”, following the Fiumicino massacre in December 1973, in which Italy guaranteed freedom of passage to Palestinian terrorists on their national territory; in exchange, the Palestinians ensured not to strike on Italian soil. Obviously, this does not mean that the agreement is still in force, but it is fair to ask whether some semblance of an approach like the “Lodo” may be active today with the Palestinians.

It is also important to recall that Italy has been very open and tolerant of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is present and active on Italian soil. The concept could be summarized in the mantra “They are extremists but not terrorists”, which could be translated as “as long as they spread extremism in certain directions, but do not engage in violent actions against us, it is tolerable”.

Hamas is, after all, the Palestinian branch of the MB and it is well-known how Hamas’s electoral victory in 2007 helped the group to transition from a terrorist organization to a recognized political actor. Additionally, the legitimation, during the Arab Spring, of political Islam through the MB only made things worse, since the Islamists have proven to be way far from democracy and the safeguard of political opposition.

The second point has to do with foreign policy, since Italy’s presence in Libya and Somalia has been closely related to the Islamists and those Middle Eastern countries supporting them. For instance, as exposed in November 2020 by Israeli intelligence analyst Oded Berkowitz, Italy provided the Islamist-led GNA government in Tripoli with diplomatic, intelligence, and counter-terror assistance, side to side with Turkey, while Qatar provided the GNA with economic support. The table shared by Berkowitz came from the US AFRICOM data.

Another interesting issue is the one concerning the liberation of Silvia Romano, an Italian charity worker kidnapped in Kenya in 2018 by al-Shabab terrorists and taken to Somalia. In May 2020, Romano was freed under unclear circumstances, and a photo of her wearing a Turkish special forces vest sparked controversies, with some Italian media accusing the government of having relied on Turkey. The Italian authorities claimed that Romano was recovered by their intelligence and that the photo was fake. However, the Turkish media reported otherwise, publishing the photo and stating that its intelligence (MIT), was primarily involved in the operation.

It is well known that Qatar and Turkey are, together with Iran, the main sponsors of Hamas. The declarations of Turkish President Erdogan and the role played by Doha in supporting the Palestinian terrorist organization leave no doubt. The massacre of October 7th upsets the political-strategic balance between the West and the Middle East. Anti-Semitism has emerged, side by side with hatred towards the Jewish state; Hamas showed its real face as a ruthless, Nazi-sympathizer, terrorist organization deserving to be dealt with as such, rather than as a legitimate political interlocutor, just like ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Unfortunately, until now, unlike what happened over the years with ISIS, very few interventions have been seen against Hamas supporters. The only known case is the deportation of 56-year-old Algerian citizen Amor Branes, in April 2024, for sharing pro-Hamas and jihadist content on social media. Therefore, it would be appropriate to see more arrests and expulsions of Hamas supporters, because its ideology and operational activity is not less dangerous than the one carried out by ISIS or al-Qaeda.

It must also be noted that al-Aqsa Brigades member (leader of the “Rapid Response-Tulkarem Unit”), Yaesh Anan, and two accomplices, were arrested in central Italy in January 2024 only after a request for extradition forwarded by Israel. Anan was directly in touch from Italian soil with Al-Aqsa chief commander in Lebanon, Mounir al-Maqdah, with whom he frequently talked on video call using the Whatsapp application. The investigation papers indicate that Anan and his cell were collecting funds and planning a series of attacks against Israeli politicians, the former war cabinet, and an armed assault like the one that occurred in southern Israel on October 7th, 2023, this time against the Israeli settlement in Avnei Hefetz. The judges of the Italian Appeal Court of L’Aquila refused Israel’s request for extradition, “due to the difficult conditions of Israeli prisons”.

The issue of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli narrative and activity being spread on behalf of Islamist preachers and activists involves the whole European continent, and not just Italy.

European authorities have been tightening the net on Islamist extremist groups, with high-profile raids, deportations, financial restrictions, and a crackdown on their online activities. France and Germany seem to be the two countries that have so far taken a tougher stance on this type of activity.

For instance, in February 2024, Mahjoub Mahjoubi, an imam in the small southern French town of Bagnols-sur-Ceze, was deported to Tunisia, less than 12 hours after his arrest. In his sermons, the preacher encouraged discrimination against women, radicalization, and he referred to Jewish people as “the enemy”.

In April 2024, Algerian citizen Mohamad Tatait, who held the role of imam at a mosque in Toulouse, was expelled from France after being accused of incitement to hatred and discrimination against Jews.

In July 2024, a 37-year-old Senegalese citizen was arrested in Aube before being expelled. The individual was known to French authorities for his radical speeches and caused unrest in Troyes mosques and relayed, on his social networks where he was followed by thousands of people, messages inciting intolerance and hatred.

In Germany, authorities have taken strong measures against pro-Hamas and pro-Hezbollah supporters, limiting pro-Palestinian marches, while schools have been granted the power to place bans on Palestinian flags and keffiyeh scarves. Across the country, using the pro-Palestinian slogan “From the river to the sea” is a criminal offense. In addition, recent arrests have also been made against Hezbollah cells, while the Shia Islamic Center in Hamburg was shut down.

It would be desirable to see a tougher hand from Italy towards those who support and flank Palestinian and Islamist terrorism, and against those who spread hate speech towards Jews and Israel, because otherwise the situation will very likely get worse in the coming months.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט The timid Italian approach in tackling Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

If you read IDSF HaBithonistim movement’s statement of beliefs you will find among other the following principle: “The IDSF HaBithonistim is not a political movement. It is open to any person who believes in its founding principles”. And what are these principles? The principles of the movement’s activity are exclusively anchored in Israel’s security concerns. Why then is the movement occasionally pegged as a “right-wing” movement? Because nowadays in Israel, Zionism has become a political concept. But it is precisely with the aim of debunking this misconception that the movement was founded.

The ideology tier vs. the action tier: do not mix them

The principle of neutrality is an important factor for the IDSF HaBithonistim movement in its dealing with the most important question of all: how to safeguard Israel’s security for generations to come. This type of issue cannot be pegged as politics, simply as it is an existential question that has a bearing on the lives of all Israelis and Jews across the globe.

According to the movement’s approach, the rationale at the basis of the question of Israel’s security is the fundamental belief in the rightful claim of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. In other words, this fundamental belief has no affiliation or leanings neither to the left nor to the right of the political map.

The politicization of Zionism stems from the unfortunate marriage in recent decades of these two tiers that ought to have remained separate – ideology and action. the ideology level may absolutely subscribe to the notion that the Jewish people are entitled to the entirety of the land of Israel whereas the action level may offer pragmatic solutions such as the withdrawal from parts of that land, so long as such a measure is deemed material for the long-term security of the State. However, once the notion of parting with sections of Israel rests on the fundamental assumption that the Jewish people had no right over that land to begin with, Zionism begins to disintegrate.

An illuminating example of the disparity between ideology and action is the story of the destruction of the Second Temple. Raban Yohanan Ben Zakai upon viewing the ruins of the temple chose to leave Jerusalem and in its stead, set the city of Yavneh as the Jewish spiritual center. Some sixty years later, Rabbi Akiva viewed those same ruins and as oppose to Raban Ben Zakai, concluded that in the face of such a reality of oppression, the Jews must revolt.

Looking at these two historic giants, can any one of them truly be accused of non-Zionism? The answer of course is no. Both Raban Ben Zakai and Rabbi Akiva had no qualms as to who has the rightful claim to the land of Israel, but each chose to respond and act in a different fashion.

This lesson is applicable to Israel today. We can uphold Zionism as our common cause as a people yet still support different diplomatic and security solutions. Once we come to realize that there is no contradiction between Zionism and opposing politics, and understand that Zionism is an ideology and not a political statement, we can bridge the gaps that are tearing us apart.

Leave politics at the door: the politicization of Zionism

At its inception, Zionism bred many approaches, the most prominent of which were the spiritual Zionism, diplomatic Zionism and religious Zionism. However, despite the differences among the various approaches, they were all driven by a common cause: the foundation of a national home for the Jewish people in the land of Israel.

In the formative years of the State of Israel, Zionism was at the consensus of the nation, and any opposition to this notion, if at all, was at the fringe of the discourse. It was only during the seventies and eighties of the 20^th century that politics were attributed to Zionism and claims were voiced that it is not an ideology but a political statement.

The Politicization of Zionism also forced a shift in the public’s perception of the Israeli Defense Forces. If until this change the IDF was seen as a liberating army, once politics were attributed to Zionism many had begun to view the army as an occupying military. It is important to understand that this shift is not just semantic, but a deep perceptional shift with regard to the legitimacy of the Jewish people’s claim over the land of Israel.

If there is one thing that the opposition to Zionism had succeeded in doing was to put the notion that Zionism is not a fundamental ideology but a political stand in the minds of Jews themselves. This notion is an existential threat to the State of Israel for the simple reason that when the Israeli nation forgets why it is in the land of Israel, it can not muster the strength it needs to sacrifice and fight for its country.

That notion also drives wedges among the diaspora Jews. Presently, there are thousands of Jews around the world that are turning their backs on the State of Israel and its fundamental values. Zionism must return to center stage and the global Jewish community must be made to understand that they do not have to reject their Jewish identity in order to see a resolution of problems In fact, they must not do so.

No such thing as half an ideology: Zionism is a complete narrative

Many citizens of Israel attests that they “are Zionist, but…” Reservations are perfectly acceptable, and there is room for a variety of opinions on core issues pertaining to Israel and the Jewish diaspora. However, one cannot be half Zionist. Zionism is an acknowledgement of the rightful claim of the Jewish people over the land of Israel. One may either support this notion or oppose it – there is no middle ground here.

When there is an understanding that Zionism is a complete narrative, then it cannot be argued that the core of the land of Israel, which was the setting for the Jewish people’s ancient history, is an occupied territory over which Israel has no legitimate claim. This approach is dangerous ideologically and security-wise. Ideologically, it is a threat to the Zionist notion since how can it be claimed that only part of the land of Israel belongs to the Jews, whereas another part of it does not? In terms of Israel’s security, an immediate withdrawal from entire crucial swaths of land would leave Israel exposed without maneuvering space and the ability to undertake actions to ensure the country’s security and existence.

Is it rational to assume that Tel Aviv is rightfully a part of Israel whereas Shiloh in Judea and Samaria does not belong to it? A point to ponder for those who would uphold a partial view of Zionism – what difference should it make it the former was taken by Israel in 1948 while the latter – in 1967? The post-war borders of Israel are nothing but arbitrary. Would the claims regarding Judea and Samaria be any different if Israel would have taken over the area in 1948 as it did Tel Aviv? Or alternatively – what would be the claims if Israel had taken Tel-Aviv – and Jaffa at that – only in 1967? Would the bustling Israeli metropolis be considered an occupied territory as well? This notion is a fallacy.

As oppose to Zionism, which is a complete and sound ideology, anti-Zionism is full of holes; a flawed unmarketable product.

The question of Israel’s security is not political – it is existential

The perception according to which we are demanded to separate between our identity and values and the problems at hand and the solutions thereof is the bedrock of the IDSF HaBithonistim’s existence. This is the reason behind the movement’s non-political nature. This fundamental principle is also manifested legally, otherwise the movement could not have been registered as a non-profit foundation.

In order to comply with its stated political neutrality, the members of the IDSF HaBithonistim movement, although no longer in active military service, use their expertise that won them their ranks solely to comment on matters of national security without digressing to politics. We expect the same from Israel’s security establishment, whose task it is to ensure the security of Israel and the safety of its citizens, and thus must cleanse its hands of the political discourse. Sadly, many still choose to attribute questions of national security to left or right-wing politics, thus, rather than engaging in a true and sincere debate, a shallow and cliché-ridden exchange is forced upon us without any real solution. Rather than considering the structured and research-supported security approach as presented by the IDSF HaBithonistim regarding the proper measures to safeguard Israel’s security, the conversation centers around whether the movement is affiliated to the political right or not. For this reason precisely, the movement takes pains to remain politically neutral.

In the name of said neutrality, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement does not welcome into its ranks people who hold positions in the civil service. Granted, two members of the movement were recently appointed to important government roles – Maj. Gen. Yiftach Ron-Tal was appointed as project manager for the rehabilitation of the north, and Maj. Gen. Eli Marom (Cheney) was appointed as project manager for the rehabilitation of the south. Accordingly to the movement’s nature, the two are no longer active members of the movement.

Further proof of the movement’s neutrality can be found in the military security principles that guide it. Albeit at first glance these principles may seem as if they resound those of the political right, a review of public opinion shows that they in fact reflect the sentiments of the majority of the Israelis. Moreover – these same principles were upheld by more than a few past leaders of the political left.

Furthermore, as the IDSF HaBithonistim movement deals only in matters of security and does not engage in social, economic or legal issues, it is open to members of the public from the entire political gamut and as such may have members who identify with the movement’s national security agenda while at the same time subscribe to left or right wing social and economic beliefs. This diversity allows for a pluralistic movement.

Being the heroes and not the villains: conclusion

The Zionist ethos is a story, and every story has a hero and a villain. What our enemies are systematically trying to do is to change the narrative wherein the Jews are the heroes of our story, and make them the villains. Sadly, there are those among us who are beginning to adopt that narrative and view Israel as the villain. Who would wish to be part of such a narrative?

The people of Israel must remember that they are the heroes and not the villains. Israel is the liberator – not the occupier. Once we truly and fully understand this, we can be free to engage in pragmatic matters from a healthier point of departure and explore what must be done to contend with Israel’s challenges and produce true coexistence. But if we begin to doubt ourselves and our rightful claim over the land of Israel in its entirety, once we start seeing ourselves as occupiers – not only does our foundational ideology of Zionism begin to disintegrate, but Israeli society – and the Jewish people as a whole – begin to loss their common ties.

It is our hope that the Jewish people in Israel and the diaspora will come to understand what is crystal clear for the IDSF HaBithonistim movement: Zionism is a value and not an opinion; Israel’s security is an existential – not a political – matter. We can feel a through and through connection with the land of Israel and its people and still uphold pragmatism and an approach that at times may lead to compromises such as the one chosen by Raban Ben Zakai, while in other occasions – to resistance, such as the path chosen by Rabi Akiva.

הפוסט “Zionism Must Stop Being Treated as a Political Issue” – Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi on the IDSF HaBithonistim Movement and Unconditional Zionism הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Establishment of a provisional civil administration in the Gaza Strip at the end of the war is the State of Israel’s legal and ethical imperative. Without it, Gaza will descend into anarchy and we will all be paying the price.

At the end of World War 2, Germany surrendered to the Allies. Who governed Germany in the immediate aftermath? From the moment Germany surrendered in 1945 until 1949, Germany was under a civil administration imposed by the Allies. Japan, which surrendered shortly after Germany, was also governed by a United States civil administration. This lasted for six years. The civil administrations in these two countries managed all the civilian aspects and saw to the rehabilitation of the affected areas. This was not done out of the kindness of the hearts on the part of the Allies. It was done because this was the civil practice necessary in such situations.

When an army conquers land and topples the local regime, a vacuum is created in the leadership and the conquering country is ethically and legally responsible for managing the population within the conquered area. The civil administration is by its very nature a stopgap solution, the intention being that the conquering state will rule the area until a suitable local leadership will emerge.

A look at world history and regional history shows that most civil administrations did indeed end within a few years. The State of Israel also installed provisional civil administrations during several transitional periods. This is exactly what has to be done in the Gaza Strip following the toppling of Hamas.

This is what the provisional civil administration will look like in Gaza

The Swords of Iron war will only come to an end after the Hamas regime has been toppled. We will then have to examine who will rule the Gaza Strip in its place. From the security standpoint, there is no question – the State of Israel will have to continue ruling the Strip. Such a rule could last forever. From the civilian perspective, on the other hand, the goal is to gradually install a local government.

Anyone that thinks local rule can materialize out of thin air the day after Hamas has been vanquished is having a pipe dream. This is a lengthy process. It will take years and until this happens it will be the State of Israel that will have to take care of managing civilian affairs in Gaza.

The provisional civil administration in Gaza ought to be provided by Israel through cooperation between the Security Forces and the Operations, Intelligence and Civil Administration units in the IDF. The first order of the day for the administration that will be set up will be to provide basic humanitarian solutions. These will be delivered with assistance from local players and international organizations. Such organizations cannot be of the contrarian type like UNRWA. At the same time, the lengthy process of finding a local leadership will need to proceed one step at a time.

The concept of a civil administration is perceived mostly as a negative idea, however such an administration has many advantages and it can also be strategically beneficial for Israel. A provisional civil administration will allow the population to disengage from Hamas. It can promote deradicalization processes and it can provide accessibility to significant intelligence that will be helpful in dismantling the Hamas infrastructures. In addition, the State of Israel will be able to continue to use the funds and resources at its disposal as leverage in leading in-depth processes that will create a new reality in the Strip.

Israeli rule over Gaza will also be helpful in terms of the voluntary emigration issue. There are today hundreds of thousands of people who would like to emigrate from Gaza to other countries but are unable to do so. Since Israel would also prefer as few as possible inhabitants in the Strip, there is a clear convergence of interests here. Under the provisional civil administration, the State of Israel will be able to assist all those interested in emigrating from the Strip.

Is the civil administration going to violate the Palestinians’ rights? Quite the opposite

The advantages of a civil administration in the Strip are clear. This being said, there are those that cling to lame excuses in an attempt to portray this as a horrific idea. One claim being made is that such an administration will drain considerable funds from the State budget. One need not look far to see the flimsiness of this claim. When looking at the current state in Judea and Samaria, one can see that the money from the local population and the international aid payments cover all of the expenses. This is also going to be the case in the Gaza Strip.

Another claim is that a civil administration going to violate the rights of Palestinians living in the Strip. Here, too, this is a mistake. Before a civil administration was set up in Judea and Samaria, the region had not a single university. Now every city in the region has universities, hospitals and advanced infrastructures.

The Israeli administration in Judea and Samaria has contributed much more than the corrupt Palestinian Authority has to the local population, and certainly more than what entities the likes of Hamas and Islamic Jihad will. Similarly, while Israel installed a civil administration in Gaza, we witnessed an improvement in the standard of living, which consistently deteriorated under the Palestinian Authority and subsequently under Hamas. This being the case, not only would Gaza’s residents not be harmed by an Israeli-dominated provisional civil administration, they stand to gain from it.

De-Nazification, Gazan style: the change begins with education

Besides the humanitarian civilian aspects, the greatest challenge Israel will be facing with the provisional civil administration is managing education in the Strip.

Israel has never made a significant difference in the Palestinian education system. Even in the education of the Israeli Arabs,, the State does not intervene. In Gaza, however, one must understand that the state of education is extremely problematic. Education in Gaza has been controlled by UNRWA, which blatantly incites and educates its public to annihilate Israel. This being the case, education there has got to undergo fundamental changes, exactly the way education in Nazi Germany was transformed in the process of denazification led by the Allies.

One must understand that if the State of Israel does not assume responsibility for education in the Strip, it will perpetuate the same cesspool that has produced such a catastrophic crop of terrorists. The change in the education has to be under our responsibility, however it is advisable to be assisted by external bodies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which understand the culture and the language and have already carried out a similar process. It is also advisable to make the funds coming in from these countries and the international aid moneys conditional on the actual roll-out of the new education programs. At the end of the day, it is only through controlling the money that the reality on the ground can be changed.

The day after the provisional civil administration: the future leadership in the Gaza Strip

After rehabilitating the Gaza Strip, civilian rule must be assigned to a competent body. To understand what kind of leadership will be established in the Gaza Strip going forward, one has to first understand what kind of leadership is not going to be established there – and this is the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. This is not an option because the Authority is no better than Hamas and  the State of Israel cannot afford to assume such a risk. Another possibility is to assign control to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This possibility might have been suitable but it is inapplicable because there is not a single Arab country that has any interest in taking over management of the Gaza Strip.

The desirable course therefore is for civil management to be assigned in full to local leaders, who will evidently be selected from among the leaders of the large clans. Hamas is extremely fearful of the clans since they pose a serious threat to its existence, especially now that they are once again coming to life and are beginning to assert themselves on the ground. As opposed to Hamas, the clans seek stability in the strip, they have an interest in developing the region, and they have legitimacy from the local population. Therefore they are the entity with which Israel can and should engage. In any case, transfer of civil rule will be gradual with Israel finding the most suitable course through a process of trial and error.

Either Civil Administration or Anarchy

Certain quarters regard the idea of a provisional civil administration in Gaza to be a malicious whim of the State of Israel, the occupier. In fact this is a legitimate, commonly-accepted military solution. It is even a moral obligation. Should Israel fail to put together a systematic, gradual plan for ruling the Gaza Strip, the situation there will very quickly descend into anarchy and the rest of the world will blame us. Anarchy will first and foremost be detrimental to the Strip’s population. It will also be fertile breeding ground for re-emerging terrorism, which in turn will pose a threat to the State of Israel.

Any way one looks at it, the establishment of a provisional Israeli civil administration is the moral, much-needed solution for restoration of the Strip and for restoring calm to the region. The time has come to jettison unfounded allegations and erroneous concepts, the time has come to stop fearing the concept of a “civil administration”.

הפוסט Who’s Afraid of a Provisional Civil Administration? The civilian solution in Gaza the day after toppling Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Reality proves: Wars don’t die

With the fall of the World Trade Center towers in September 2001, Huntington’s theory was irrefutably proven to be right, and that religion-based and culture-based wars would continue to pitch civilizations against one another in new forms. Since then, we have been given more and more painful reminders that warfare anywhere around the world is nowhere near coming to its end, and might never end – and despite all this, many people persist in clinging to Fukuyama’s delusional theory.

Within Israeli society, too, there are groups that have for years been driven by religious-messianic thinking, according to which world peace will come within reach only if we subject ourselves to security and political concessions.

The unspeakable tragedy that engulfed us on October 7 has, admittedly, profoundly tarnished this concept; the majority among the populace have come to their senses and realized that the old doctrines are no longer realistic. At the same time there are still groups that are unwilling to let go of their naive concepts, and continue to believe that Israel must take the path of withdrawals and compromise instead of caring for its security. These groups, while not being very large, are part of the elites and wield considerable influence within Israeli society.

Leaders: Give the people some credit

The yearning to rest each man under his vine and under his fig tree is the most natural of human aspirations, however when it fails to resonate with reality, it can lead to dangerous decisions – as we saw in the early 1990s, with the signing of the Oslo Accords.

One of the reasons that drove the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to sign those accords and to commit to far-reaching concessions detrimental to Israel’s security to this day, was the belief that Israeli society was tired of fighting and was prepared to pay any price for peace.

Then, as now, this was a gross underestimation of just who the people of Israel really are. We see that the people are far more resilient and determined than its leaders. The Israeli public as a whole wants one thing – victory. Civilians and soldiers are also prepared to pay a heavy price to achieve this victory, provided the State of Israel makes no concessions, and this is something the leadership elites have got to understand. Thus for example, a recent IDSF Index survey found that 78% of those polled from within the Jewish population in Israel believe that defeating Hamas is the primary goal of the war, and that hostage releases should take place provided they do not interfere with this goal.

Regrettably, despite the strength and resiliency the people are exhibiting, some within the leadership elites still persist in sending contradictory, counterproductive messages. We are hearing calls for a compromise that will end the war, since Israel does not have any chance of winning. Some of our leaders believe there is no military solution to the problem. They suggest dangerous political solutions in the form of establishing a Palestinian state, or the handover of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority that is intent on annihilating us. Such statements imply feebleness, weakness, and pessimism, which are dispiriting to the public. Never has the chasm between the battlefield achievements and resoluteness on the ground – and the leadership – been so wide, so far removed from its people.

How can we preserve unity and lead Israel to victory?

The people’s unity depends on us. I am greatly encouraged by the way Israeli public has conducted itself these past months, however to achieve victory, the leadership and the media have to toe the line and project stability and resiliency.

Let’s start with the political leadership. The main, most pressing role for the government is to maintain unity, to lead the State of Israel toward victory. I take a very dim view of the calls for elections in the midst of the war. Political squabbles while sending our soldiers in harm’s way are irresponsible. Instead of taking the path of elections, all the Zionist parties should unite and join the war cabinet.

The army and its commanders also play a role in shaping the victory mindset. The army’s role is to continue to push for victory. It is important to understand that the government is influenced by the messages coming from the army. What we, in Israeli society, must do to strengthen the army is to set aside the preoccupation with investigating the October 7 military lapse, and stand behind the soldiers and their commanders. Once the war is over, the time will come for inquests and committees of inquiry, and those who have to will be subject to accountability for what went wrong, but now is the wrong time to deal with this. So long as the war continues, the people have to continue pushing the IDF forward, and the IDF, in turn, will push the government toward a clear victory in the war.

And this is where we come to the role the media must play. True, it is up to the media to ask questions and present a plurality of opinions, but these days, while we are fighting for our lives, the media have another role, which takes precedence over all their other roles. The media have got to mobilize in favor of the war effort, to highlight the soldiers’ heroism, and to strengthen the people’s spirit. This is not to say that we gloss over problems. It is not to say questions must not be asked. But the way this is done must be conducive to reinforcing, toward cautious optimism. The reality is that many media outlets choose to ask questions in a manner that projects cowardice. Some media organizations choose to highlight yesterday’s people, who have been left behind with the October 6 concepts, expressing agendas harmful to national morale, making defeatist statements playing into our enemies’ hands. So long as Israel is subjected to an existential threat, we – all of us – are all called upon to mobilize, at least in terms of the way we approach the conversation about the core issues.

Before reaching the boiling point: the frog jumped out of the cauldron

About two years ago we presented our IDSF strategic situation picture, in which we likened the State of Israel to the frog in the cauldron, swimming while the water is imperceptibly heating up and cooking it. The events of October 7 alerted the frog.

The horrific tragedy we endured on October 7 exacted an incredibly high price from Israeli society. This being said, it is possible that with a long-term historical perspective, we will find that this jolt has saved us from an even worse process of total annihilation.

We must not allow the frog to jump back in the cauldron. We have got to mend our ways and leverage this threat in order to emerge victorious against our enemies and guarantee the State of Israel’s security for generations to come. To get there, the road must pass through a sober look at reality, through realization that there are concepts that cannot be resurrected, and through admiration of our people, who are proving outstandingly resilient, which fills us all with great hope.

הפוסט The people are strong and the soldiers resolute – so why is the messaging from our leadership elites so feeble? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Of all the blood-soaked months of the second Intifada, March 2002 was the deadliest of them all. In fact, this was the deadliest month in the entire history of Palestinian terrorism until October 2023, with the lives of 105 civilians and 26 soldiers lost. Barely a day went by that month with out a terrorist attack, culminating in the attack on the Park Hotel in Netanya on the Passover Eve, which claimed the lives of 30 victims and injured 160 more.

Following this brutal attack, in which many family members and elderly people were murdered, some of whom were Holocaust survivors, the Government decided, in a meeting the day after the holiday, to embark on a comprehensive operation to eradicate terrorism in Judea and Samaria. This began immediately on the morning following that meeting, on March 29, 2002.

The Goal: “Hit anyone that takes up arms”

The then-Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, defined the operation’s goals:

“To enter the towns and villages that have become terrorist safe havens; to capture and arrest terrorists and in particular those who send them and those financing them and providing them  with cover; to capture and seize weapons and munitions aimed at attacking Israel; to expose and destroy terrorist infrastructures, bomb-making labs, weapon-making facilities and hide-outs. The orders are clear: to hit anyone taking up arms and to neutralize whoever attempts to resist the forces in their tasks and put them in harm’s way, and to avoid harm to the civilian population.”

The operation was given its name by Colonel Gal Hirsch, who was then the Operations Officer in the Central Command. It was taken from a poem by Poet Haim Heffer, “Between Boundaries”: “To the Poor and the Aged / we are a Defensive Shield”. Some 25 thousand soldiers were called up under “Order 8”, and the response rate exceeded 100% with soldiers competing for rides to the rallying centers.

How Marwan Barghouthi was Captured

Where did the IDF wage battle? In all the Judea and Samaria cities with the exception of Jericho and Hebron.

In Ramallah the IDF laid siege to the Mukataa complex – the government complex and official residence of the Head of the Palestinian Authority – which resulted in Yasser Arafat barricading himself within the compound along with a few wanted men. When the forces combed the building, they found a large arms cache and documents indicating Arafat himself had approved terrorist attacks. Among the documents was also a document which became known as the Shobaki Document – an invoice written out by the Authority’s financial official, Fouad Shobaki and signed by Arafat himself, containing direct payments made for launching terrorist attacks and also financial support for shahid families. The document was one of many found, which were indicative of the deep involvement of the Palestinian Authority in terrorism.

Following the IDF siege, the Americans intervened and an arrangement was reached according to which those wanted for the murder of Minister Rehavam Zeevi would be turned in and transferred to a prison in Jericho. Besides that the entire fighting apparatus of the terrorist organizations in Ramallah collapsed and, toward the end of the operation Marwan Barghouthi was also captured. Barghouthi had been leader of the Tanzim – the military wing of the Fatah organization – an organization that had orchestrated many terrorist attacks within Israeli territory. Barghouthi is still imprisoned in Israel after having been sentenced to five life sentences.

“Walking through walls”

In Nablus, the IDF purposely began operations belatedly, on April 5, so as to attract to it terrorists who thought the IDF was avoiding operations in the city. To deal woth the threat of snipers and ambushes in the crowded narrow alleys in the Nablus kasbah, the IDF developed a new strategy of “walking through walls”. This involved breaking through house walls using cold means (sledgehammers, for example) and hot means (explosives), thereby advancing through the homes rather than through the streets and alleys. The bulk of the fighting in Nablus was conducted this way. The operation ended with a decisive IDF victory with dozens of dead terrorists, dozens more in custody and large quantities of weapons and munitions captured.

In Jenin, on the other hand, the bitterest of battles took place. The terrorist organizations had booby-trapped the camp with IEDs and had prepared ambushes in the town’s narrow alleys. The IDF suffered many casualties and progress was slow. Following a deadly ambush on April 9, which cost the lives of 13 reserve soldiers from the Nahshon battalion, a decision was made that when a home was suspected of harboring terrorists, warning would be given to enable the terrorists to turn themselves in. Following that the house would be demolished using armored D9 bulldozers. This tactic smoked out dozens of terrorists, including some senior ones, who turned themselves in to the IDF forces.

In Bethlehem, after the city was captured and many wanted men were arrested, a group of 38 wanted men barricaded themselves inside the Church of the Nativity which, according to Christian tradition is located above the manger in which Jesus was born. The armed men took with them as hostages dozens of monks and some 200 civilians, including children. The world issued condemnations and warnings to Israel not to harm the site, which is one of Christianity’s holiest. Following a stand-off that lasted more than a month agreement was reached in which the 13 senior wanted men would be exiled, the 26 others would be banished to Gaza and the hostages would be released.

The achievement: restoring the IDF’s freedom of operation

The operation lasted six weeks until May 10, 2002. It resulted in the destruction of the operational infrastructure of the Tanzim and the Hamas in Judea and Samaria. Additionally, the Palestinian Authority was disarmed and the symbols of its authority, including the Mukataa, were demolished. The main accomplishment, nevertheless, was the restoration of the IDF’s freedom to operate throughout the entire area of Judea and Samaria and improvement of the intelligence grip on the ground.

After the operation, the members of the Tanzim told their Shabak interrogators that they had no idea of the true force of the IDF until they confronted its soldiers face-to-face. Until then aerial bombing was proof to them that the Israelis were too scared to fight them (from: Ofer Shelach, Maariv, December 26, 2008).

The operation cost the lives of 28 soldiers and members of the security forces in Judea and Samaria. Three more were killed in the Gaza Strip. 185 were injured, seven severely. Some 200 Palestinians were killed, 56 wanted men were captured, ten potential suicide bombers and thousands more suspects were arrested. 50 bomb-making labs were destroyed and large quantities of ammunition were seized.

הפוסט 22 Years Ago Today: Operation Defensive Shields Begins הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

With G–d’s help

Adar 4, 5784

February 13, 2024

In a well-timed move, the United States, Britain and France, separately, imposed economic sanctions on four Israeli citizens living behind the Green Line. The sanctions were imposed as part of the “Settler violence” campaign. This campaign might be ramped up a notch sometime soon, once the sixty days the Israeli government was given to respond to the allegations of soldier brutality in Judea and Samaria will expire. Before they, too, our IDF soldiers that were fulfilling their duties, become subject to sanctions.

Newsmen Kalman Liebeskind in Maariv, and Ariel Kahane in Israel Today exposed the lie underpinning the campaign and refuted the claims on which it stood, to the extent that the IDF itself retracted some of the things they had said. It’s not that there is never any anti-Arab violence perpetrated by Jewish settlers. It’s just that the facts fall far short of what is being reported. The incidents are investigated with prejudice and get classified erroneously, falsely, and that “worrying escalation” we are hearing about is a total fallacy.

We must, therefore, ask ourselves: if the campaign is based on distortions and lies, how is it that not only does it get taken off the air, and instead the opposite happens – it continues to be parroted by media reports and “expressions of concern” on the part of American and European officials?

The roots of the “settler violence campaign” are described succinctly in the book written by former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Dr. Michael Oren. The book, entitled Ally: My Journey Across The American-Israeli Divide, focuses on Oren’s tenure as ambassador under Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama.

Oren describes how the murder of the Fogel family was received with shock and fear among Americans. The White House sharply condemned the murder. But, as in the case of the October 7 events, this shock wore off soon enough. The community at Itamar, being right-wing religious, writes Oren, had been identified with the “settler violence campaign”. The settlements, which are regarded as “illegitimate” by the Obama administration, and which are held to be illegal by the United Nations, were perceived by broad swathes of international organizations to be fair game for attack.

Oren tells how he expressed his concerns to his advisors in the embassy. Concerns that the entire settlement population had undergone a “Fogelization”, and had been stigmatized as “occupiers that deserve what they get”. Oren’s fear was that Israel’s entire population might gradually undergo “Fogelization”, and would come to be perceived as “deserving the rockets being fired at it”.

This fear might have sounded far-fetched back in 2011, but merely 13 years later every Israeli citizen found out that this fear was far from being unfounded.

Obama’s belated response for the massacre, 3 whole days after October 7, already included a reference for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as he wrote: “we must keep striving for a just and lasting peace for Israelis and Plestiinians alike”.  Amonth later he sums up the concept quite lucidly on a podcast: “What Hamas did was horrific, and there’s no justification for it,” said the former boss of most of President Biden’s administration, and the man that brought the “Arab spring” to the Middle East, and – he stressed – “what is also true is that the occupation and what’s happening to Palestinians is unbearable.. There are those who hear, in this statement, the precursors of the Hamas-progressive propaganda strategy to the tune that “Gaza is an open-air prison”, and some would draw a straight line between this concept and the concept that “Palestinian resistance is left with no other option”.

It also seems that, to the former president’s chagrin, Israel and the Jewish People are too preoccupied with perpetuating the lessons from the Holocaust and with viewing the videos of the October 7 horrors, therefore “we will not stop those (Palestinian – RKA) kids from dying”. What was it Mohammed Darawsha told Channel 14’s newsman Yishai Friedman? “The religious Zionism… is dripping an ideological drug throughout the country”. Except that now it’s not just the religious Zionists. Just as Oren foresaw, it’s anyone seeking to remember the October 7 events and draw actionable conclusions from them.

If anyone concludes from what I’m saying that this is merely a cognitive war, they’re wrong. This is deliberate propaganda with a very tangible goal, which is to legitimize a Palestinian state throughout the territories of Judea,Samaria and Gaza, which will involve evacuation of Jews from their homes. Once again.

Quite clearly in order to realize such a hallucinatory scenario, extensive cognitive priming is required, and this is taking place by means of two strategies.

One strategy is the strategy of “incrimination”. A tried and true strategy. It’s been working for years already. There are two target audiences for this strategy: The first one is – the Israelis Incrimination of the settler population through a “settler violence campaign” is intended to make the Israeli public forget that these settlers are the first line of defense for Kfar Sava, the Sharon Plain and the entire center of the country. The expected cognitive illusion is agreement to “sacrifice” the “problem settlers”, while deluding ourselves that with this all our problems will be solved. The second: the international community, which is expected to support ever-increasing measures against Israel and its citizens.

The second strategy is the strategy of “silencing”, and for this we are seeing the sanctions being applied. As former ambassador David Friedman wrote yesterday, the terms of the American sanctions apply to any Israeli who is opposed to a Palestinian state.

I repeat, e v e r y Israeli.  At the moment this accounts for 80% of Israel’s population, says Friedman. In other words, by writing this column I might be falling into the sanctions trap, as might every dinner table conversation and every newsroom utterance.

This affects not only the matter of free speech, it also means individual control over the actions of each and every Israeli, obviating Israel sovereignty and it’s judicial system. Did you assemble outside Arab student dormitories in Netanya, in a manner they construed to be threatening? Did you demonstrate against your neighbors in Nof HaGalil and did they contemplate moving away? Have you hung an Israel flag from your balcony in Tel Aviv’s Bavli neighborhood and hurt someone’s feelings? There’s no way to be sure you haven’t crossed the line, or as Friedman put it, “Anyone who the State Department feels is hostile to the creation of a Palestinian terror state, could wake up morning and find his funds frozen at his local bank!”.

What is most outrageous is that there are those inside Israel who, by design or by ignorance, go along with this campaign. Never mind if these are ignorant private individuals writing things like “let the Americans do our work for us”, not realizing that the joke is entirely on them. But when the Commander of the Central Command conducts a “kidnapping” maneuver where the kidnappers are settlers, or, as Boaz Golan reported on Channel 14 and on 0404, if the IDF Spokesman anonymously briefs against “settler violence”, thereby stimulating the media reports disproportionally – well in such a case this amounts to moral bankruptcy, it’s part of a misguided, distorted concept. It leads us all down the path to “Fogelization”, whether this be in Judea and Samaria, in the Gaza Envelope, in the Galilee and Golan or in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv.

Our decision-makers have got to come to their senses immediately. They must understand that the “settler violence campaign”, which has been waged for over a decade against Israel, sometimes with insider help – has got to be stopped immediately. We have to direct all our outreach resources in to undermining the “inner logic” of this campaign. Politicians, military men and Israeli media should under no circumstances entertain it. If we fail to make a steadfast stand, we are going to find that (once again) our blood is fair game, and that (once again) this has come to pass with active support from our very selves.

One final anecdote – in his book, Michael Oren tells how he was shocked when President Obama refused to make a comparison between Hamas and al Qaeda. I wonder if he accepts the parallel between Hamas and the Nazis.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט Coming Soon: Sanctions against Settlers from Bavli, Lod and Nof HaGalil הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

With G–d’s help

25 Adar I, 5784

March 5 2024

On February 26, 1993, a truck bomb exploded in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center, bringing death to 6 civilians and injuring 1,042 more people. The USA arrested everyone involved in the attack, but paid no attention to the infrastructure that amounts to a hothouse for terrorism inside US borders. American attitudes persisted unchallenged by the fact that the planner of the attack successfully crossed the border as a phony Iraqi refugee, for example. Or by the fact that he was sheltered at a mosque in a New Jersey city by an Egyptian preacher who had settled there. Or by the fact that the terror infrastructure burgeoned under the wing of institutionalized values held holy by Americans — aid for refugees, and freedom of worship.

Three years later, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was already articulating the plan to collapse the World Trade Center, and he presented it to Bin Laden. After another five years, in 2001, the free world was taken aback when it saw, broadcast in real time, the crumbling of the world’s most famous skyscrapers, which had become a hallmark of Western dominion and might.

As a result, the USA — together with other countries — launched a war in Afghanistan and in other hotbeds of terror in the world. The war lasted 20 years, from 2001 to 2021. The USA deposed the Taliban regime and established a new pro-American order in its place. Then as soon as the American troops exited the borders of Afghanistan, the Taliban regime returned.

Without entering into a historical survey of all the terrorist attacks perpetrated by radical Islam on European soil, it may still certainly be seen how Islamic terror spread through the capitals of Europe.

In May 2013, the UK suffered a brutal attack as two Islamists beheaded a British soldier on a city street in broad daylight. Surprisingly, the terrorists did not hurry to flee the scene but stayed to “inform” the stunned passersby that the attack was their fault. “We swear by almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you,” they said as their bloodstained hands still held the machetes and knives. “The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers. This British soldier is one – he is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,” the terrorists said, brandishing the usual victimization narrative of the Muslim attackers.

A year and a half later, in January 2015, it was France’s turn for a September 11 of its own, as the local media called it. Two masked men burst into the offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris at midday and murdered twelve people — ten journalists and two police officers — after the magazine dared to publish caricatures of Muhammad. That attack engendered a chain of terrorist incidents in and near Paris, including a shooting in which a policewoman was murdered and the Hypercacher supermarket attack in which four hostages died. A total of eighteen people were murdered in that wave of terrorism — fifteen civilians and three police officers.

Despite the horror of the Charlie Hebdo attack, those who termed it France’s September 11 had no idea what the future held for Paris later that same year. In November, Paris endured its deadliest assault since World War II. At a stadium, in the middle of a rock concert, an attack killed 127 people and wounded dozens.

In 2016, Germany too suffered an attack: A terrorist rammed a truck into a crowd and twelve people died, including tourists and locals alike.

Clear threads of commonality stretch between those attacks and others. Firstly, inspiration and imitation link the attacks into chains. Secondly, radical Islam employs cruelty as a work method in order to create deterrence and a psychology of terror, thus deadening the possibility of response from the society being attacked. Third, there is propaganda. Radical Islamic terror comes with a consistent excuse based on the attitude of the persecuted victims whose “sensitivity” to being wronged drives them to commit monstrous crimes against humanity. And fourth, in order to destroy the West, radical Islam leverages the values that the West holds sacred.

The sacred values of the West are used in two ways to destroy it. The first way is to strike at the symbols of the West. The World Trade Center was not chosen at random; it was not only a hub of global commerce but also a symbol of Western ascendency. The French magazine Charlie Hebdo was a symbol of the basic right to free expression. A rock concert in a French stadium symbolizes Western popular culture. The intent, in attacking all those, was to strike at the fundamental values of the West.

The second way that the West is undermined by use of the values it holds sacred is much wilier. Incitement at the mosques obviously maneuvers the West into a dilemma regarding freedom of expression. A terrorist who arrives with refugee papers arouses empathy and reverberates at the humane core of Western values. By constantly accusing the West of aggression, radical Islam exploits the West’s ambivalence regarding the use of force, knowing that the West wishes to bring about peace and shun war. And the masterpiece is the use of the formula whereby the weak are always in the right. The Muslims are always presented as weak in the face of the imperialistic West and therefore more righteous.

In retrospect, one can only wonder what would have happened if after the truck bomb of 1993 the Americans had been compelled to destroy their own country’s terrorist infrastructures, by means including stricter examination of refugees entering the USA, restrictions on mosques and other religious institutions, and revocation of citizenship, with expulsion from US territory, for those practicing incitement.

It may be that not only would the attack on the World Trade Center have been prevented, but in addition the rise of radical Islam would have been more moderate in the face of the West’s decline, and the inspiration for further attacks that took place on European soil would not have existed.

In December 2023, with the approach of last Christmas, Europe was already perceptibly echoing the Israeli discourse of “preparedness for the holidays” and deploying to face Islamic terrorism.

Apparently, Europe is beginning to show signs of life, under the pressure of the Islamic terrorism that is flooding in. In Western Europe alone, thousands of Islamist operatives are being watched. In Germany, for example, the head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (the country’s internal security service) announced that the country was facing “the greatest danger in years” from a possible terrorist attack, and indeed that “such an event could occur any day.” That announcement came in the wake of an attack in Paris not long before. And recently even the British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, said that “our streets have been hijacked by those who are hostile to our values.”

But the hothouses of terrorism, and the terrorists themselves, enjoy a protective umbrella — the importance of which cannot be overestimated — in the form of a policy of accommodation based on acceptance of the psychological propaganda from radical Islam as described above.

Often when radical Islam complains that its violence and cruelty are the fault of “others,” Israel is the one accused. In the case of Israel, radical Islam is all the more an aggressor masquerading as a victim. Beneath the demonstrations of support for the “poor” Gazans is a normalization, in the public mind, of some of the grisliest massacres and rapes that humanity has known. As in every radical Islamic terror attack, and as is customary in the consistently hypocritical policy of Islam, along with the sword comes the assurance that if only the Israelis were not so cruel to us, we would not be forced to rise up even against Europe.

In other words, radical Islam draws an imaginary boundary that purportedly encloses the quarrel and violence, and it creates a mendacious equation whereby if that particular limited quarrel were solved — and it is a different quarrel each time — then Islam would feel no reason to be violent.

Indeed, there are those who swallow the propaganda of radical Islam and volunteer to popularize and normalize the belief in its messages. One example was raised in a recent debate at the British Parliament, in which the BBC was accused of effectively becoming complicit in Hamas’s well-orchestrated disinformation campaign, which according to the parliamentarian contributed to a spike in antisemitism globally.

Anyone who thinks that the BBC is offensive to Israel, and friendly to covert and overt anti-Semitism, is correct but is missing the most important lesson for Europe and the West. Acceptance of the radical Islamic claims, and of the excuses for violence, will vitiate morality and awareness where Europe is concerned, just as it has where Israel is concerned.

Islamic terrorism begins as poisonous propaganda that paralyzes the sense of morality and justice. It leverages Western values against the West, and then it launches its massacre.

The attempt to give the current conflict a fabricated boundary that limits it to Israel, and to impose a ceasefire on Israel in hopes of buying quiet for the West, is no different from Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement in the face of the Nazi enemy, and it could cost the West dearly in blood and in loss of the global hegemony that the West currently possesses.

The attempt to accommodate radical Islamic terrorism is doomed to fail, as the Israeli case study demonstrates.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט The west should learn from Israel on Not Accommodating Terrorism in its own cities הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The deadly terror attack near Maale Edumim shows how the Palestinian Authority’s declared policy of incitement against Israel, including the Pay for Slay law, result in more dead Israelis. Toward Ramadan, it’s time to face the challenge head-on in Judea and Samaria

Against the backdrop of numerous successful counterterrorism operations around the territory of Judea and Samaria by the IDF, the ISA and the Police’s elite units, another well-planned anti-Semitic attack near Maale Edumim today resulted in the death of one Israeli and severely wounded several others. The quick neutralization on the spot by an individual who fought in Gaza for four months, with ample battle experience, illustrates the vitality of trained armed civilians on the scene to address deadly incidents within seconds.

Especially toward Ramadan, and as Israel fights on seven fronts, it is vital to keep an eye out for the possible eighth theater of war – the internal scene, especially in Jerusalem, by Palestinian militants and some factions among Israeli Arabs. The Israeli Police’s activity in East Jerusalem is noteworthy in that regard. The number of arrests and the rampant level of incitement shows the spirit of Palestinian nationalism has not eluded Israel’s capital.

Yet terrorist attacks never occur in a void. For years, the Palestinian Authority has been inciting for anti-Semitism, bragging the success of Fatah, its main faction, in murdering Jews, and actively paying Palestinians to murder more and more Israelis in exchange for lavish paychecks. In our study “Terrorists in the Civil Service”, our Research Department shows how the PA’s official policy, dubbed “Pay for Slay”, is anchored in laws designated to incentivize the everyday Palestinian to join the circle of terrorism as well as reward professional terrorists to murder Jews. Whether affiliated with Fatah, Hamas, Popular Front or unaffiliated, the murderer will be paid over 8 times the Palestinian minimum wage, 4 times more than the average Palestinian professor and engineer – 12,000 NIS per month at the highest bracket.

This attack also shows the complete dismantlement of the PA’s ability to function and govern effectively. As Israel’s security forces successfully clean the mess that the PA leaves around the territory, arresting over 3,000 terrorists and suspects and thwarting hundreds of major attacks, the PA stands powerless against local factions that have effectively taken over enclaves in some part of Judea and Samaria.

In fact, a senior Israeli official said that they were reinvigorated with a determination to completely dismantle the terrorism infrastructure in Judea and Samaria. Past October 7, Hamas’ strategy of the coalescence of theaters – its threat to intervene from Gaza if Israel acts in Judea and Samaria – was rendered moot. The success in Gaza actually motivates the security forces to act around Judea and Samaria – one might even say, the Israeli coalescence of theaters.

It is quintessential to level up the Israeli preparedness for the internal scene toward Ramadan, by doubling down on terrorism infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, in Jerusalem and noting possible effects on radical Israeli Arab factions. That includes increased intelligence, arrests, and strengthening the Rapid Response Squads based on local civilians, armed and organized to respond to events on the scene. In an era of new challenges, the Israeli innovation must bring to the table new and daring measures.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

הפוסט The Underbelly of Terrorism: PA’s Incitement Results in Deadly Attacks הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The approaching Ramadan month will raise more than a few security challenges for Israel. Against the background of war in Gaza and accelerating escalation with Hezbollah in the north, Ramadan will be observed this year in a particularly tense and extreme atmosphere, over and above the challenges and inherent complexities that always accompany the month — a month identified with attempted and successful attacks on Jews.

Because Gaza is, for the most part, currently under Israeli security control, and because the army is poised and prepared for the start of all-out war at the northern border, naturally Israel’s chief remaining worry is related to the Judea and Samaria area and East Jerusalem.

In Judea and Samaria, a significant wave of terrorism has been in progress since late 2021, at varying intensity. Israel’s military action in the various cities of Judea and Samaria since the start of the war in Gaza (and previously, in what were known as “operations” — Operation Breakwater and Operation Home and Garden) has not been sufficiently powerful and broad. It bespeaks a strategy of “mowing the grass” at best, intended to limit the military buildup and empowerment of the area’s terrorist organizations. Since the start of the war in Gaza, Israel has in fact arrested some 3,450 terrorist operatives in various parts of Judea and Samaria, including some 1,500 Hamas operatives, but they form a drop in the bucket and, what’s more, a great number of them apparently have been or will soon be released. There are still well-established and organized terrorist organizations in the area. Some are independent, others are linked variously to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Fatah.

Another challenge is rooted in the area of Jerusalem’s holy sites and East Jerusalem. In recent years Hamas has succeeded — under tutelage of radical Islamic powers such as Qatar, Turkey, and Iran — in acquiring a foothold on the Temple Mount and becoming a barometer for escalation-related matters there. In recent years, every Ramadan has seen anti-Israel rioting by Muslims who ascended the Temple Mount. They have barricaded themselves in the Al-Aqsa Mosque, aimed and shot fireworks as weapons, flung rocks and stones at police, tried to prevent Jews from visiting the Temple Mount, and attacked both civilians and security forces in the area. Moreover, various parts of East Jerusalem itself have turned into war zones.

At the same time, there is still significant fear of an “Operation Guardian of the Walls II” situation of unrest in the mixed cities and in the cities of the Arab “Triangle.” Such a scenario was also feared after the Hamas attack of October 7, but the Israel Police, reinforced and wisely deployed in the mixed cities, stopped that eventuality before it arose. It must also be noted, however, that Israel’s Arab communities showed responsible behavior and maintained calm internally — apparently both because of the ferocity of the Hamas attack, which astonished even them, and because of security warnings from the Israel Police and the Israel Security Agency (ISA), which were prepared for the scenario in advance.

In this coming month of Ramadan, those arenas are liable to be even more challenging because of a convergence of events, including the assignment of religious overtones to the war in Gaza (including the name that Hamas chose for its October 7 attack, “The Al-Aqsa Flood”); attempts by Turkey, Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Authority, and the Hamas leadership abroad to enflame the area by targeted funding and by smuggling weaponry to terrorists; and incitement by radical elements on social media.

Those circumstances could further intensify the attempts at terror attacks by organizations, by unaffiliated squads, and by individuals. A strong, widespread escalation would hamper Israel’s military focus on the Gaza Strip and harm the preparations for possible war on the northern front. Widespread escalation would force the IDF and other security services to redeploy their personnel, diverting fractions of them — while also diverting resources — to cover the various arenas.

In order to make its way through Ramadan during a time of security complications, Israel must take a number of steps. First the Israel Police must reinforce its presence in the mixed cities and Arab cities in the same way that it was deployed after the October 7 attack. In this context, the National Guard should be employed to keep close contact with the grass roots and forestall any chance of riots or of terror attacks.

In Judea and Samaria, the government should instruct the IDF to intensify its military activity, to more broadly authorize targeted assassination by means of UAVs, and to mount a series of extended tactical military operations throughout Ramadan in a number of cities at once (especially in northern Samaria and in the Hebron area) in order to prevent terrorism from raising its head and to limit its ability to attack.

In the Temple Mount area, Israel’s government must provide the Israel Police with wide-ranging support for incapacitating terrorist elements and resources in advance by resolute aggressive action such as confiscating fireworks, knives, and other potential means of terrorism and of injuring the security forces. In addition, a plentiful force of police must be stationed at the compound in order to demonstrate presence and strengthen deterrence.

East Jerusalem requires an overall strategy that integrates physical/military tools with technological tools. The area must be substantially reinforced with personnel from the Border Police and National Guard. In addition, Israel must mount an extensive operation of weapons confiscation and preventive arrests in the various East Jerusalem neighborhoods. Such an operation will strengthen the standing of the State of Israel as the actual government on the ground and will reduce the terror supporters’ ability to harm Jewish citizens. The operation must be carried out together by the Israel Police, the Border Police, the ISA, and the National Guard, with support from various military elements. At the same time, Israeli intelligence must take action to strengthen its hold in the social media by means of advanced artificial-intelligence systems, in order to find terrorist operatives and foil them in advance. Meanwhile, Israel must demand that the social networks’ platform companies expel the disseminators of incitement and block them from the platforms.

The Israeli government’s overall strategy for the Ramadan month, and for overcoming the Muslim terror that accompanies it, must rest on proactive attack rather than merely on defense and response. The rationale should be to smother terrorism in advance in order to stop it from taking hold, just as a fire is smothered to stop it from spreading.

The article was originally published on ynetnews

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

הפוסט The formula for Ramadan: Switch from reacting defensively to attacking proactively הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

For decades, the world at large and Israeli society in specific have been debating the question of Judea and Samaria. Should a Palestinian State take form in those territories? Should Israel annex the area, and can it? Apparently everyone in the West has a firm opinion on the subject, but many are relying on inaccurate data and half-truths, not to say absolute lies.

It is surprising to discover that like the average citizen, the Israeli decision-makers too rely on inaccurate data wherever the matter of Arab demography in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip is concerned. Over the years, the country’s decision-makers have refrained from determining what the exact figures are, and depended instead on figures from the Palestinian Authority’s Central Bureau of Statistics, ^[1] which — by the nature of things — has a clear interest in falsifying data for various reasons, including the padding of budgets, the rallying of world opinion, and most of all, the imposition of pressure on Israel, as Israel would rather yield territory than upset its demographic balance. There is no need to expound on why the answering of such a sensitive question should not be outsourced to an institution that funds terrorism and that objects to the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.

Are the numbers from the Palestinian Authority inflated?

There are currently two main approaches regarding the demographic question. The first contends that the figures from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics are reliable and that there truly is a demographic danger in annexing Judea and Samaria to the State of Israel. Those who favor this approach claim that more than 3 million Arabs presently live in Judea and Samaria in addition to roughly 2 million Arabs in Gaza. ^[2]

The second approach contends that the population figure from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics is a complete falsehood amounting to nearly double the true number of Palestinian residents in Judea and Samaria,^[3] a true number in the area of 1.6 million. This approach relies on independent research that its supporters conduct, along with statements from the past by senior officials of the Palestinian Authority. ^[4] The lower figure means that Judea and Samaria could be annexed with no great fear of the demographic implications. ^[5]

It seems that throughout the Land of Israel the demographic problem is indeed smaller than most people believe: the average number of births per Arab woman in Judea and Samaria is lower today than the number per Jewish woman — approximately 2.98 among the Arabs versus approximately 3.13 among the Jews. ^[6] In addition, there is net emigration from the Judea and Samaria area of 20,000 emigrants per year, mostly young people.^[7] And the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics is also counting people who died many years ago; its census included people born in 1845.

“It’s embarrassing that Israel doesn’t know how many Palestinians live in Area C.”

Considering the issue’s importance, the State of Israel should be expected to determine the exact number of Arabs living in the Judea and Samaria area, in order to let us know whether the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics is in fact falsifying data as experts in the discipline contend and only 1.6 million Palestinians are residing in Judea and Samaria, or whether the figures from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics are actually true and the number of Palestinian residents in Judea and Samaria stands at 3 million or so.

In 2016 a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee met and the question arose as to how many Arabs live in Area C of Judea and Samaria. ^[8] During the discussion, it emerged that the State of Israel is unable say how many people do live in that area and relies on data from the Palestinian Authority^[9]. As Knesset Member Hilik Bar of the Zionist Camp party said during the discussion, “Notwithstanding my respect for the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories and the Population Authority, I feel it’s embarrassing that the State of Israel doesn’t know how many Palestinians are really living in Area C. We know how many tanks are in Syria, but we don’t know about citizens under our own responsibility… And what’s more, because the Prime Minister and Defense Minister have become promoters of the two-state idea, I’d like to know how many Palestinians we would be parting from, or how many potential citizens the state would have.”

That discussion illustrates a deeper point: If the State of Israel doesn’t know how many people reside in Area C, an area where it holds municipal and security responsibilities, how can it know how many people reside in Areas A and B, where most of the Arabs of Judea and Samaria live? How can the State of Israel rely on data from an institution that wants Israel destroyed, hasn’t condemned the Simchat Torah massacre, and is currently cooperating toward the objectives of Hamas?

The specialized unit that closed in 1997

In a 2022 interview following his publication of an open letter, diplomat Yoram Ettinger — a member of the American–Israeli demographic research team — related that between 1993 and 1996 a unit had operated under the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics with the purpose of examining data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. ^[10] That unit exposed discrepancies and contradictions in the Palestinian figures, but the unit was closed in 1997. It appears that since then, the State of Israel has been relying on figures from the Palestinian Authority without verifying them. Isn’t it time to re-establish the unit and stop trusting the Palestinian Authority’s unverified figures?

Besides the political and strategic need, there is an obvious security need for a demographic snapshot of Judea and Samaria, and all the more so in light of the crumbling of assumptions in the wake of the Simchat Torah massacre. How can the IDF prepare for a scenario in which the Arabs of the Judea and Samaria area decide to invade the territory of the State of Israel, if it doesn’t know the number of people in that area? ^[11] How will it know how many battalions and brigades to deploy at the borders? How will it know how many people are capable of bearing arms in those territories? Above and beyond the military considerations, how can the State of Israel be prepared to manage risks at the national level if it doesn’t conduct an organized census that will give it the tools for making fundamental decisions?

In summation, the demographic question in Judea and Samaria presents Israel with many problems and challenges — economic, political, security-related, and more. In order to understand what options are open to us as a state, and to solve the problems, we must know the exact figures from the field. For that purpose, we must ascertain — by whatever means are at our disposal as a nation, whether involving intelligence activity or other tools — how many Arabs are living today in Judea and Samaria, where their residences are, what their trends of migration are, and what conditions the city dwellers and village dwellers of those territories live under. Only afterward will it be possible to arrive at wise decisions regarding the most correct and appropriate solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

The content of this article is solely the opinion of the author and does not reflect a stand on the part of the IDSF.

^[1] See https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/opinions/Article-951114

^[2] See https://www.maariv.co.il/new/military/Article-629256

^[3] See https://www.meteg.co.il/%d7%a2%d7%99%d7%93%d7%9b%d7%95%d7%9f-2023-%d7%a9%d7%9c-%d7%94%d7%a1%d7%95%d7%92%d7%99%d7%94-%d7%94%d7%93%d7%9e%d7%95%d7%92%d7%a8%d7%a4%d7%99%d7%aa-%d7%a8%d7%95%d7%91-%d7%99%d7%94%d7%95%d7%93%d7%99/

^[4] There are known references to a purported 1998 statement by Hassan Abu Libada, a former head of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics who was charged with corruption and fraud, that “We counted 325,000 people who have been living for more than a year outside Palestinian territory.”

^[5] Caroline Glick, Sipuach Achshav, Sela Meir, 2015, pp. 159–172.

^[6] See https://idsf.org.il/opinion/%D7%96%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%90-%D7%94%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%92%D7%A8%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%96%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A8/ and the 2022 figures from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The decline in the number of births per Arab woman is a widespread phenomenon throughout the Middle East, applying in Arab states such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Libya.

^[7] See https://mida.org.il/2018/05/08/%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%A6%D7%AA-%D7%96%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%92/

^[8] See https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/foreignaffairs/news/pages/pr070616.aspx

^[9] In this connection, Abu Libada said of the first Palestinian census, as it was under way in 1997: “In my opinion, it is as important as the intifada … It is a civil Intifada.” See https://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/11/world/palestinian-census-ignites-controversy-over-jerusalem.html

^[10] See https://www.giluydaat.co.il/%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%97-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%90%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%99-%D7%A9%D7%9C-1-5-%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F/

^[11] The distance from the westernmost point of the Green Line to Tel Aviv measures roughly 20 kilometers. Other cities of Central Israel, including Kfar Sava and Rosh HaAyin, are even less distant.

הפוסט Opinion: How has the number of Arabs living in Judea and Samaria remained a mystery? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The Israel Defense Conference was held last Thursday (January 25, 2024) in Ashkelon, at the initiative of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF) and in cooperation with the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), and it was broadcast live through the Ynet website.

Among the participants were senior figures from politics and the security services, soldiers on active duty, media figures, global experts, heads of governmental authorities and districts, and representatives of the hostages’ families and of the footsoldiers. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu participated in the conference remotely and made clear that there is no substitute for total victory. In his speech, he also said to the IDSF movement: “Your support is an important factor for achieving our national goals.”

No finish line: A clear-headed look at the war and at Israel’s security situation

As the conference began, the attendees were asked to stand for a minute of silence in memory of the tens of thousands who were murdered or fell in action at the events of October 7 and in the war of “Iron Swords.” This followed a telling of the personal story of Tzika Lavi of blessed memory, which was no less than the story of all Israel’s determination. Afterward, Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, founder and Chairman of the IDSF movement, related that as long as two years ago, senior personnel from the movement had warned political and security figures of the approach of a war against the State of Israel and had presented them with a strategic situational assessment substantiating that warning. “We understood that we had two alternatives, a Six Day War or a Yom Kippur War,” said Avivi. “We told the Israeli government that the country needs to call a halt to everything, unite, and prepare the IDF. To my regret, on October 7 we found ourselves in the very situation that we’d been so afraid of.” Avivi emphasized that although Israel did fall victim to a horrible surprise attack, he is optimistic that from out of the crisis, the country can grow. “Now we all understand the reality we’re living in, and we see that we need to ensure Israel’s security for generations to come,” he said, and he noted that “the decisions of the coming year will affect the next hundred years.” Avivi concluded his speech with a clear declaration: “I can tell you, one hundred percent, we will win and we will vanquish our enemies, and after that victory, the nation of Israel may expect a new golden age.”

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gershon Hacohen, a co-founder of the IDSF movement, also spoke. He contended that the discussion of “the day after” represented a European–American belief that wars can come to an end. “We are facing a world of Islam that thinks differently,” he explained. “Hamas wants to impose a chronic state of war on Israel. Our war has no finish line.” Hacohen also commented on the idea of establishing a Palestinian state under a revitalized Palestinian Authority. “Most of the public doesn’t understand about it,” he said. “The Palestinian state that’s bruited by the Biden administration — and, to my sorrow, by some Israelis — is a disaster.” Since the signing of the Oslo Accords early in the 1990s, the State of Israel, according to Hacohen, has been on the retreat, and now we must fight for the little that remains in our hands.

Rejecting Qatar and UNRWA: An interview with Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich

The opening speeches were followed by an interview with Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich conducted by journalist Ofer Hadad of Channel 12 News. In the interview, Smotrich contended that continuing the war does not damage the efforts to free the hostages. On the contrary, according to him, only by toppling the rule of Hamas can we successfully maximize the chances of the hostages’ return.

Smotrich also dwelt on Qatar’s involvement in the war. He claims that Qatar has an interest in preserving Hamas and that it thus does all it can to impede Israel’s attempts to bring the hostages home. “My position is that it’s wrong to involve Qatar at all. Even as a go-between,” he said. “Qatar is the most obstructive player. It prevents the hostages from being returned and the war from being ended.” The Finance Minister also stressed that the hostages serve not only as an insurance policy for the personal survival of Sinwar and for the survival of the Hamas organization but also as an insurance policy for the destruction of Israel. “Sinwar wants to eliminate the State of Israel, and he understands that the best way to do it is by cracking Israeli society apart,” Smotrich asserted. “Our task as a nation is to prove to Sinwar and Nasrallah that Israeli society is united.”

The Finance Minister also spoke of the humanitarian aid being passed into the Gaza Strip. In his opinion, that aid is necessary but mismanagement of aid is harming Israel’s ability to achieve its war objectives. “It’s unacceptable that this aid is handled by UNRWA because UNRWA is the same as Hamas,” he explained. “The aid should be delivered at the proper places and in the proper way.” Smotrich concluded his speech by noting that engaging in politics at this juncture is disastrous because the focus today must be on one thing only: victory. “We stand at one of the most critical moments in Jewish history,” he said. “Entire generations depend on the decisions that are now to be made.”

Our enemies are watching: The ramifications of the fighting in Gaza, and the handling of the northern front

The Defense Conference included five panel discussions. The first, “From crisis to victory,” dealt with a weighty issue: How can terrorism be overpowered?

“Before we can answer the question of how to defeat terrorism, we need to examine how not to defeat terrorism,” said Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yiftah Ron-Tal, former head of the Ground Forces Command. He considers that the pullbacks the State of Israel chose to execute — in disengaging from Gaza, and in halting the Second Lebanon War — are what enabled the terrorist organizations around us to gather size and strength. “When a people’s ideology favors destroying Israel, and they have the capacity to do so, they will use it.” According to Ron-Tal, the goals of the current war are justified and clear, and they include defeating Hamas, returning the hostages, and restoring the security of the Israelis at the Gaza periphery by revamping Gaza.

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Oren Solomon, formerly a senior official in the Prime Minister’s Office, added that we are poised at a critical point in the fighting. “Our enemies are watching,” he said, and he emphasized: “We mustn’t show them that hostile terrorist action leads the State of Israel to retreat or show weakness.”

The panelists also discussed the increasingly violent northern front. “Hezbollah is not standing alone, it’s an appendage of Iran,” explained Lt. Col. (Res.) Yaron Buskila, Secretary General of the IDSF movement. “I hope that in the next phase, it will be Israel taking the initiative and mounting surprises in the north. We mustn’t let Hezbollah surprise us, because it has much more significant capabilities than Hamas has.”

Marching together: The common battle over the identity of the Middle East

The second panel discussion was named “The Generation After,” and it focused on the future of the Gaza Strip. According to former Knesset Member Ruth Wasserman Lande, it is important to deal with massive institutionalized incitement. “Along with the military aspect, Israel has an interest in engineering an environment in which the entire system of conveying messages is changed completely throughout the Gaza Strip. It’s already been done in the United Arab Emirates, and it’s possible.”

Adv. Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, director of the Israel Law Center (Shurat HaDin), addressed the matter of the Gaza Strip’s finances. “Each terror organization that’s destroyed continues existing as an idea,” she stressed. “If we don’t block the financial pipeline of Hamas, we’ll find ourselves living with it again. The State of Israel is clever and creative enough to fight the terror organizations’ sources of funding.”

The third panel at the Defense Conference discussed the multi-front war against the Iranian axis, and its participants provided an overview of the battlegrounds and of the roles of Iran, China, and Russia in the conflict. “Iran is trying to shape the Middle Eastern reality and change the global map,” declared Brig. Gen. (Res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, head of the research department at the IDSF movement. “We need to march together into the conflict over the identity of the Middle East. If we hesitate where vanquishing Hamas is concerned, and we call it impossible, the challenge we face will be multiplied many times over.”

Lt. Col. (Res.) Michael Segal, a senior researcher at JPCA, added that the State of Israel must wage a war of counterpropaganda among the Iranian population in order to arouse resistance against the regime. “The Iranian money that pours into the terror organizations could be helping the people of Iran,” he explained, “and Israel should raise such issues with the Iranians themselves.”

No flock of sheep: The perspective of the war zones’ residents

In addition, the Defense Conference devoted a place of honor to the heads of the local councils from the southern and northern war zones. At the fourth panel, three council heads participated from the zone near Gaza, along with the mayor of Kiryat Shmona. The four of them described the difficulties that the evacuated residents confront, and they discussed what conditions would allow for a safe return home.

Despite the many challenges facing residents who have been uprooted from their daily lives, all four leaders agreed that those residents will not be returning home before true security is attained and the communities possess the required defenses. “We aren’t some flock of sheep that can be led out and back,” said Avichai Stern, the mayor of Kiryat Shmona. “We’re prepared to show patience, but we’re not returning just to be evacuated again after a couple of years. We won’t be made ridiculous.”

“If we don’t persist in this war and defeat Hamas, that means the State of Israel is kneeling down to monsters,” asserted Sderot’s Mayor Alon Davidi. “For this war, what demonstrates victory is simply a vanquished Hamas.” Tomar Glam, the mayor of Ashkelon, agreed: “We need to topple Hamas for real, not by sloganeering. If we don’t put paid to the terrorists, they’ll put paid to us.”

The fifth and last panel dealt with the importance of national resilience. The panel featured varied speakers from all sectors of society and included Tzvi Mor, the father of abductee Eitan Mor; Yael Shavit of Makor Rishon; and Ishay Green, a hi-tech entrepreneur and left-wing figure. Despite the differing stances presented by the panel, all the participants agreed on striving for unity among the nation.

“If we’re fit to die together, we’re fit to live together,” contended Aviv Haim Ezra, an active reservist and founder of the Tkuma movement, and he added: “Solidarity and unity are the way, endgame and victory are the objective. Our nation’s duty is to win. It’s the most seemly thing we can do for those who fell in action or were murdered.”

Vardit Kruger, of the Mothers of IDF Soldiers organization, added that the public discourse needs to address questions of historical identity. “We can’t proceed to victory if we don’t understand and remember who we are and why we’re here,” she said. “Those are the most fundamental questions, and we must answer them.”

Until victory: It’s for us to continue, for the sake of the fallen

Between the various panel discussions, other speakers took the rostrum. Lt. Col. (Res.) Shosh Raban, formerly head of the ground forces organization branch, emphasized that the multi-front scenario is not apocalyptic but true to life, and that the army must prepare itself accordingly. She raised the possibility of boosting the retirement age back up for reservists, restoring the full three years of compulsory military service, and properly recruiting the haredi sector into the army. She also took note of the sterling work that women were contributing on all the fronts. “In terms of security, Zionism, spirit, vision — there’s really no difference between men and women,” she said. “I’m a great believer in the power and abilities of women.”

Iris Haim, the mother of abductee Yotam Haim of blessed memory, took part in the conference, and everyone in the hall was moved. “My heart is not held captive in Gaza,” she explained. “Hamas kidnapped my son, and I’m not prepared to let it kidnap my heart.” Subsequently, she related that she had trouble with the term “fallen.” “Soldiers don’t fall down,” she said, “they raise us all up.” Lt. Col. (Res.) Maoz Schwartz, who is currently on the battlefield, asked to put a similar message across: “Those who perish are paving the way for us,” he stressed, and he added: “We are their disciples, and our job is to carry on until victory.”

At the end of the conference, the audience was asked to stand once again, this time not for a minute of silence but for the singing of “Hatikva.” Amid a special atmosphere that had filled the room by the time the series of speeches ended, it seemed that the familiar words of Naftali Herz Imber acquired an extra measure of relevance: Our hope is not yet gone.

הפוסט We are the victory generation: The second Israel Defense Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Abstract

For years the ground forces provided the grist for the cutback mills in the IDF. Usually under orders from the Treasury, the IDF cut back Ground Forces budgets and severely hobbled the infantry, armored corps, the artillery corps, the command, training and skilling – a trajectory that came to a head on October 7. Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Shosh Raban, who was, among her other roles in the Israel security forces, Head of Planning and Organization in the Central Command and in the Ground Forces until 2010, and who now serves as a member of the Advisory Committee of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, explains how this concept came into being and how the concept of waging war without ground forces came crashing down.

“The concept was that there was no need for a large maneuvering ground army. The most senior figures in the Israel security forces believed we could win on the battlefield through an outstanding air force and precision intelligence. And of course,  with technology. So they strengthened the Air Force and they strengthened Intelligence, they built fences everywhere, believing that technology would be able to substitute for humans, saving on the order of battle. We cut back in every conceivable place.

The grand vision underpinning the cutbacks was that of Ehud Barak, and he promoted this vision while serving as Chief of General Staff – “a small, smart army”. “This concept took root among all the system’s senior officials and commanders, who ordered sweeping cutbacks in the number of soldiers and professional servicemen, in the number of tanks, APCs, divisions and maneuvering brigades, and of course in the shortening of the conscription period and lowering the discharge age from reserve military service”.

And you experienced this as Head of Organization Arm?

“Yes, while I was Head of Organization Arm in the Central Command and, subsequently as Head of Organization Arm in the Ground Forces, there were plenty of changes, which all meant continuing erosion of the ground forces – in terms of combat order of battle, in terms of their weapons, and in terms of the headcount in the standing army. Along with this we invested in new technologies and advanced weaponry: state-of-the-art tanks such as the Merkava 4, NAMERs, the Wind Jacket system and the DLA (Digital Land Army) system, under the leadership of Gen. (res.) Yiftach Ron Tal as Commander of the Ground Forces, and we also reinforced the special units – YAHALOM, Egoz, Oketz, Duvdevan and so forth, which in itself was, with hindsight, a highly appropriate decision, in view of the importance of these units in the current war as our “iron fist”.

“We cut back almost a billion from the training budget”

What to these cutbacks look like in reality?

“We closed down division and corps commands, we cut back armored brigades, we combined emergency stockpiles, we converted armored brigades into new brigades and so forth. The Combat Engineering Corps is the only one that was not downsized – in fac there we acquired many new machines such as the D-9 and bulldozers, all critical instruments in this warfare in Gaza and in general”.

Where, in your opinion, have these cutbacks been most severely felt?

“The most severe cutback, at the time, was in training. Training was the first place that took a hit in every round of cutbacks. There were years when the army simply did not conduct maneuvers. The training budget was the most readily-available so it was the first to get cut. Between 2003 and 2006, almost one billion Shekels were cut back from the budget earmarked for training. In recent years too, the reserve army’s training dwindled to a trickle. There are reservists that got drafted on October 7 after years without serving or training. For this reason the two weeks prior to the onset of the ground maneuver were critical for reorganizing, training and returning to combat fitness”.

You’re saying the army actually had not prepared for all-out war?

“I think nobody really believed in a scenario of combat on more than one or two arenas at the most. Nobody really believed we would reach the kind of situation we are in now, and we didn’t really prepare ourselves for this scenario – in any conceivable aspect – order of battle, reserve forces, armaments. Even if the possibility of a war had been taken into consideration, nobody believed the ground army’s role in that war would be so significant, so decisive. The more likely scenario was a war in which we would not have to deploy the ground forces at such numbers and with such force”.

And how, in your opinion, is this going to change now?

“After the war, the priorities will doubtlessly be reshuffled: conscription will be extended back to three years as a minimum, the reserve military service requirement will be restored to 30 days per year as a minimum, and the discharge age might be raised once again too. And of course, the order of battle will be significantly scaled up – more armor, more infantry, more tanks. The special forces will also have to be augmented. Units such as the Combat Engineering Corps’ YAHALOM unit will need to be doubled, if not tripled, in size. We will have to strengthen the entire territorial defense organization and the alert squads – increasing them in numbers, training and arming them. They are our first line of defense”.

Do you think we’re going to need to set up an entirely new corps – the Subterranean Corps”?

Raban speaks not only of numeric changes, but also of an entire, profound conceptual about-face. “We are going to have to rethink our entire defensive strategy. In the past there were plenty of patrols, but over the years these have diminished and we have come to rely on the fence. We will need to go back to relying on the human defense, and also to shift the defense to the other side of the border, to the Palestinian side. Part of our intelligence failure was that the intelligence-gathering bodies had no hold in the field, meaning that in future we will need to restore and revamp the HUMINT element, plus complete operational control over the space and operational flexibility”.

Another change concerns subterranean warfare. “We are going to have to construct an entire subterranean warfare combat doctrine. This is happening as we speak, with the IDF learning lessons and drawing conclusions on the fly, but we will need to look at this in greater detail and we might even need to establish a subterranean corps to deal with this underground warfare with all its different levels. This is a unique form of warfare, it combines elements of infantry, engineering, maneuvering, and other elements”.

Were we mistaken in relying so heavily on technology?

“Every place we cut back and prioritized technology – is where we took a hit. We have got to go back and strengthen certain forces alongside the technology, not instead of it. I believe that after the war we will emerge with a new army, much larger, much better trained and much better equipped. It is excellent even now – but post October 7 we realize it is impossible to win a war from the air. One cannot reach the command posts, the shafts, the hospitals, and to destroy all their capabilities from the air. Add to this the fact that we are an army that works to a different code of ethics. The land army is a keystone of the integrated battlefield and we will need to strengthen it substantially”.

“The military needs to be stricter with its soldiers”

“I think discipline has to be restored in the military. The military needs to be stricter with its soldiers – less parental involvement, less media exposure. When my brother was in Golani 30 years ago, he would come home, fall asleep in his fatigues and wake up at the end of the Sabbath. My mother would peel off his boots, his socks stuck onto his blisters. When my sone was drafted into Golani three years ago, he came home tired, but not sufficiently exhausted, in my opinion. Nowadays soldiers’ welfare and service conditions are much higher on the list of priorities. Training is suspended when it gets exceptionally hot or cold, hazing is forbidden and all sorts of other restrictions apply. I prefer to have our soldiers train under the harshest conditions. “Tough in training, easy on the battlefield” – this is not some empty cliché. Our enemy is determined and ruthless, our soldiers, who already now are exhibiting superiority, infinite fighting spirit and professionalism, have to be prepared for any eventuality”.

“It is a mistake to admit women into units like 669 (Rescue and Evacuation) on grounds of pre-induction waivers”.

One more important conclusion from October 7 is about including women in combat roles. Much has been said of the heroism and resourcefulness of women fighters in the bitter battled fought that day, but Lieutenant Colonel Raban sets limits to this as she sees fit. “I’m a firm believer in women’s capabilities. Women in this war have emerged, and are still emerging, in all their glory, being courageous resourceful, and there is scope for still more combat roles they can fulfill. This being said, I do not agree with the approach of including women in combat when this is based on affirmative action. People’s lives are at stake here, so I do not believe in inclusion of women – unless it is done strictly as equals in every sense of the word. Zero waivers, zero easements. And they can do it”.

“The army didn’t even want to recruit large numbers of ultra-orthodox personnel”

In a related context of upscaling the military headcount and equal sharing of the burden, Raban foresees a revolution in ultra-orthodox recruitment as well. “I think this revolution is already underway, even if it is being rolled out at a slower-than-expected pace. Generally speaking, the army was unprepared to take in large numbers of ultra-orthodox recruits, in fact it might not even have wanted to do this. Induction of ultra-orthodox soldiers is an operation. When we established Battalion 97, an ultra-orthodox battalion, we needed to bring in women with long skirts or assign men to roles normally filled by women, such as education and personnel affairs, we had to obtain special kosher food, enable lengthy prayer and so forth. This process takes time. It is a revolution in every sense of the word. This war is going to open up new possibilities, new ways in which the relative advantages the ultra-orthodox bring to the table, but their service will have to be short and considerate”.

Is there room for optimism?

“We have a powerful army with a robust fighting spirit and immense motivation. In our hour of need we discover that this is the best, most valuable asset the Jewish people have. I hope the senior military echelons will be much more diverse, much more heterogeneous, and that it will install a secure firewall between politics and security. I am also hopeful that the reservists and the conscripts will be spreading the beauty of this unity in spirit, of unconditional love for one another, throughout Israeli society. We have plenty of enemies on the outside and we can only afford to be at war with our real enemies. I have all reason to be optimistic”.

הפוסט Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Shosh Raban: “They thought it was possible to fight without ground forces, using only technology, intelligence and the Air Force” הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The first indicators of the imminent explosion were seen in recent days when mass demonstrations on the fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel, started “spontaneously”. In one event, video footage captured a terror cell walking alongside the fence, when the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) they were carrying exploded, in what has been defined as a “work accident,” killing five of the terrorists.

Before delving into the factors contributing to the imminent explosion, it is important to recall a number of critical facts. In September 2005, Israel completed its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip re-deploying all the IDF troops to the 1949 Armistice Line and forcibly expelling all the Israelis who had lived in the Gaza Strip for almost 30 years. Shortly thereafter, in January 2006, Hamas, an internationally designated terror organization, participated in and won the first general elections held by the Palestinian Authority since 1996. Despite the electoral success, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, deposed the Hamas government, replacing it with members of his own Fatah party. In the summer of 2007, Hamas forcibly expelled the Fatah leadership from the Gaza Strip, on some occasions throwing the Fatah members to their deaths from the tops of buildings. Since then, Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip with an iron fist.

Hamas has earned its international designation as a terror entity by carrying out thousands of terror attacks. Hamas’s Charter calls for the destruction of Israel and declares all of Israel is Islamic Waqf – i.e. Islamic territory – that no one has the right to place under the rule of any non-Islamic foreign entity.

Instead of seizing the golden opportunity given to the Gazans in 2005 to build luxury hotels, resorts, and infrastructure projects that could have been the source of stable employment for the masses, and to turn the beautiful Gaza Strip into a Mediterranean oasis, Hamas and the other terrorists chose a path of violence.

Over the last 18 years, the terrorists in Gaza, who belong to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and a host of other terrorist organizations, have used the Gaza Strip as a launching pad for over 20,000 (twenty thousand) terror attacks against Israel and Israelis. These attacks have included, but are not limited to, firing over 17,000 missiles and mortars, throwing and planting hundreds of IED’s and Molotov Cocktails, hundreds of shooting attacks, launching thousands of “incendiary kites” – kites with incendiary devices attached to them that then land in Israel and cause huge fires, and attempted and successful infiltrations of terrorists into Israel to murder Israelis.

Hamas has squandered tens of millions of dollars building its terror capabilities, including an entire underground tunnel network.

As Hamas and the other terrorists built their terror capabilities, they relied on external aid to provide for the unemployed Gazans. Those who could, fled abroad. Those who stayed, remained pawns, and often even cannon fodder, of the terrorists and their international supporters, in their constant efforts to attack and villify Israel.

On this background, it is now possible to examine the latest impending explosion.

Qatar

One of the most substantial foreign donors to the Gaza Strip has been Qatar. Over the years the Qatari aid has taken different forms. Originally all the aid was provided in the form of suitcases full of dollar bills, carried into the Strip by the Qatari representative. The money was then given to the Hamas authorities who then distributed it as they saw fit.

As the sight of the cash-filled suitcases passing through Israel and the scenes from the distribution became a PR nightmare for all concerned, more intricate systems were developed. For some time, the monthly $30 million aid Qatar has provided to the Gaza Strip has been divided in three: $10 million distributed monthly to 100,000 underprivileged families, at a rate of $100 per family; $10 million is provided in the form of fuel, imported from Egypt, to operate Gaza’s sole power plant; and $10 million to fund projects for the unemployed and pay part of the salaries of Hamas government employees.

In recent months the aid from Qatar has been “delayed”. While the official explanation is that the previous grant expired in April and that the Qatari authorities are trying to renew the aid, the real story is that the Qataris are annoyed with the growing relations between Hamas and the Iranian-Syrian-Hezballah axis of terror. Either way, the fact is that regular flow of money has been disrupted.

The result is that the Hamas authorities are unable to provide basic services for the needy Palestinians or pay salaries to the Hamas employees.

Civil unrest

As a result of the cumulative effects of the worsening financial situation and ongoing disillusion with the Hamas leadership, throughout the summer, different groups of Gazans took to the streets to protest. Unwilling to tolerate any dissent, Hamas moved quickly, and violently, to disperse the demonstrations and prevent their recurrence.

Abbas

As preparations are made for the departure of aging PA dictator Mahmous Abbas (87), now in his 19^th year of his first four-year-term as PA Chairman, it is quickly becoming clear to Hamas that Israel and the international community are doing their utmost to maintain the despotic rule of Fatah over the remnants of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. Hamas has realized that the calls of the international community to hold general Palestinian elections – that Hamas would clearly win – are nothing other than lip service. Hamas, and by consequence the Gaza Strip, will again be left out of the equation and Hamas and the Gaza Strip will continue to suffer the whims of the next Fatah despot.

This factor becomes more time-sensitive by the appearance of Abbas before the UN General Assembly. Clearly, Hamas will not vacate the stage and allow Abbas alone to claim his place as the sole Palestinian representative.

Internal Hamas jockeying

Hamas in the Gaza Strip is run by Yahya Sinwar, a convicted murderer who was released by Israel as part of the deal to free kidnapped Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. Sinwar was narrowly elected for a second term as leader of the organization in Gaza in a secret internal Hamas election in March 2021, but only after he was forced to a third round of voting against opponent Nizar Awadullah.

Smelling the scent of weakness, one of Sinwar’s more prominent rivals, Salah Al-Arouri challenges him. He is the commander of Hamas in Judea and Samaria. Having spent time in an Israeli prison for his involvement in terror, Al-Arouri now resides abroad, mainly in Lebanon. From his residence abroad, Al-Arouri has nonetheless managed to initiate and command substantial terror attacks in Judea and Samaria. Among others, Al-Arouri took credit for the 2014 abduction and murder of three Israeli teens, by Hamas terrorists.

Use of violence to divert attention

In order to prove his credentials as no less of a terrorist than Al-Arouri, Sinwar needs to do something.

In 2018, as part of an intensifying power struggle between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in Ramallah, Sinwar adopted a suggestion to organize massive violent demonstrations on the fence dividing between the Strip and Israel. At one of the demonstrations Sinwar declared to the inflamed crowd, “We will take down the border (with Israel) and we will tear out their hearts from their bodies.” The demonstrations continued for about a year.

To defend the Israeli citizens from the imminent threat posed by the terrorists, IDF soldiers shot many of the terrorists, killing some and injuring others.

Realizing the potential, Sinwar quickly turned the whole event into a PR bonanza, portraying the terrorists as innocent victims of Israeli aggression. The deaths of the terrorists were then used to convince the international community that Israel is “the big bad wolf.” The useful idiots, in the form of yet another Commission of Inquiry established by United Nations Human Rights Council, ignored Hamas’ role in the events, whitewashed the terror, and vilified Israel.

All of Sinwar’s goals were achieved. Attention was again focused on the Gaza Strip, Abbas was forced to change course, the Gazans were rallied behind the ultimate external enemy, and Israel was again blamed. The violence and the canon fodder had served their purpose.

The impending explosion

So when faced with a quickly deteriorating financial situation due to the Qatari decision, together with the already existing internal unrest, combined with the fear of remaining irrelevant even after the departure of Abbas, and all compounded by the possibility of losing his position to a more hardline terrorist, Sinwar may make the obvious terror choice: Violence, violence, and more violence.

Israel will hopefully, from Sinwar’s perspective, be dragged into a full-on battle, with warplanes attacking terror assets throughout the enclave.

Dead Palestinians can then be cynically peddled as a means to rally the troops – both internally and in the international community – and re-direct the public hatred of Hamas towards Israel. Destroyed buildings mean another international effort to “reconstruct Gaza,” which in turn brings in more building materials and provides jobs for thousands. Sinwar simultaneously renews his credentials as the “baddest terrorist on the block”, reinventing the possibility to blame Israel as the evil “occupier” for Hamas’ failures.

While none of this has anything to do with Israel, Sinwar and Hamas are hoping that Israel will step into the fray and use its influence to directly or indirectly persuade Qatar not only to renew its aid, but to also increase it. They will also use the opportunity to impress upon Israel and the international community that Hamas is the true legitimate representative of the Palestinians and that in the day after Abbas, they will not tolerate being ignored.

Considering the different factors driving the potentially imminent violence, it is almost impossible to avert. In the short term, all that remains for Israel to do is to ensure that the Israeli security forces prevent the terrorists from infiltrating Israel and that any salvos of rockets fired from Gaza to indiscriminately target Israel’s civilian population, are shot down by the Iron Dome system.

In the long term, this analysis will form the basis with which to respond to what will inevitably become another biased attempt by the UN Human Rights Council to rewrite history, whitewash the homicidal terrorists and attack Israel.

הפוסט The 2023-2024 Gaza Terror Campaign הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

 
For example:

• The State Department provided an essential tailwind to the Ayatollahs’ rise to power in Iran and the toppling of the Shah, who was “America’s policeman in the Gulf.” Foggy Bottom contended that the Ayatollahs would be moderate, anti-Soviet, pro-US, preoccupied with tractors and not with tanks, and refrain from the global exportation of the Islamic Revolution….
• The State Department considered Saddam Hussein as a potential ally (until the day of his 1990 invasion of Kuwait), worthy of an intelligence-sharing agreement, financial assistance, and the supply of advanced dual-use systems. It communicated to the ruthless despot that a military invasion of Kuwait would be treated as an intra-Arab matter.
• Foggy Bottom welcomed the 2010 turbulence on the Arab Street – which is still raging – as a “Facebook and youth revolution” and the “Arab Spring,” failing to realize that it has been an Arab Tsunami.
• The State Department establishment has opposed the Abraham Accords because they bypassed the Palestinian issue, centering on Arab interests,. However, all of the State Department’s own peace initiatives have crashed on the rocks of Middle East reality, because they dwelt on the superficial assumption that the Palestinian issue was the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a crown jewel of Arab policy making and a core cause of regional turbulence.
• Since January 2021, the State Department has resumed its role as the chief foreign policy maker, as evidenced by the shift from unilateral policy making – based on an independent US national security action – to multilateral policy making, seeking a common denominator with the anti-US UN and international organizations, as well as with Europe, which has lost its will to flex a muscle against Iran’s Ayatollahs and Sunni Islamic terrorism.
• In July 2023, reflecting its multilateral policy, the US rejoined UNESCO, following the 2011 congressional suspension of the annual US contribution to the organization, and the 2018 US withdrawal from UNESCO for falsely disclaiming the 4,000-year-old Jewish roots in the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria – the cradle of Jewish history, religion, culture and language, as documented by a litany of archeological findings throughout the area.

 
In fact, the rejoining of UNESCO commits the US to transfer to UNESCO all its arrears, which amount to some $600mn.

Legal status of Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria

The State Department claims that banning Israeli research and scientific entities in Judea and Samaria from the mutually beneficial US-Israel binational commercial research and development projects is consistent with international law. The State Department claims that international law considers Judea and Samaria an “illegal occupied” area, and that the UN Security Council Resolution 242 mandates an Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.

Is it true?

• According to Prof. Eugene Rostow, a former Dean of Yale University Law School and Undersecretary of State, who co-authored the November 22, 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242: “[Under international law], Jews have the same right to settle in the West Bank as they have in Haifa…. [According to Resolution 242], Israel is required to withdraw ‘from territories,’ not from ‘the territories,’ nor from ‘all the territories,’ but from some of the territories, which included the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights…. Proposed resolutions calling for withdrawal from ‘all the territories’ were defeated in the Security Council and the General Assembly…. Israel was not to be forced back to the fragile and vulnerable 8-15-mile-wide lines… but to ‘secure and recognized’ boundaries, agreed to by the parties…. In making peace with Egypt in 1979, Israel withdrew from the entire Sinai… [which amounts to] more than 90% of the territories….”
• Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, a former President of the International Court of Justice, Deputy Legal Advisor at the State Department and Prof. of International Law at Johns Hopkins University stated: “[The 1967] Israeli conquest of territory was defensive rather than aggressive… as indicated by Egypt’s prior closure of the Straits of Tiran, the blockade of the port of Eilat and the amassing of troops in Sinai… [and] Jordan-initiated hostilities against Israel…. Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem in the 1950 were unlawful…. Modification of the 1949 armistice lines [by Israel] were lawful….”
• The legal status of Judea and Samaria is embedded in the following binding internationally ratified documents:
  • The November 2, 1917 Balfour Declaration, which called for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people [on both sides of the Jordan River]…. Nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine….;”
  • The April 24, 1920 San Remo Peace Conference of the Allied Powers Supreme Council, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, and carved the boundaries of over 20 countries in the Middle East;
  • The July 24, 1922 Mandate for Palestine, ratified by the Council of the League of Nations, and dedicated exclusively to Jewish national rights;
  • The October 24, 1945 Article 80 of the UN Charter incorporated the Mandate for Palestine, which means that Jewish rights in Palestine are legal and may not be transferred;
  • The November 29, 1947 General Assembly Partition Resolution was non-binding and superseded by the Mandate for Palestine.

The bottom line

• The State Department’s determination that Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria constitutes “illegal occupation” has been based on mistaken and misleading interpretation of international law. This determination has yielded false expectations among rogue elements in the Middle East (e.g., Palestinian and Hezbollah terrorists and Iran’s rogue Ayatollahs), which has undermined the attempts to minimize regional instability and advance the cause of peaceful coexistence.
• The decision to punish Israel, by blackballing research institutions in Judea and Samaria – while courting the rogue Ayatollahs, the Muslim Brotherhood and the hate-education Palestinian Authority – is interpreted as an erosion of US’ regional stature by pro-US Arab regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. These regimes have expanded their defense and commercial cooperation with Israel irrespective of the Palestinian issue. In additon, they have also been subjected to US pressure; they oppose the US diplomatic option toward Iran’s Ayatollahs, and they are concerned about the lack of a determined US response to Iran’s aggression (which has pushed them closer to China and Russia).

 
Ambassador (ret.) Yoram Ettinger, “Second Thought: a US-Israel Initiative”

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט US’ banning of Israeli entities in Judea & Samaria – a boomerang הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In recent years, Jenin has regrettably reemerged as a major stronghold of terrorism in Judea and Samaria, alongside Nablus. Israel had attempted to entrust the Palestinian Authority (PA) with managing the area and maintaining order, but, as in the past, the PA failed to address the challenges posed by the residents of Jenin refugee camp. The Palestinian Authority’s shortcomings, coupled with the persistent incitement from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Palestinian Authority itself through the educational and cultural systems, as well as the new generation in Jenin lacking an understanding of Operation “Defensive Shield” in 2002 and the repercussions of the second intifada, have contributed to the city becoming the most dangerous and central hub for terrorism in the region.

A main operational situation room was established in Jenin, serving as the operational center from which terrorists orchestrated attacks against IDF forces. The headquarters served as a gathering place for armed terrorists before and after their activities, an area for weapon and explosive storage, and a communication hub for the militants. Additionally, many terrorists sought refuge in Jenin, assuming it would provide safety. Consequently, the city transformed into a fortified terrorist base, replete with checkpoints, roadblocks and roadside bombs.

During the two-day operation (from July 3 to 5), 12 terrorists were killed, over 300 suspects were apprehended (including 30 who were wanted), numerous explosives, weapons, and ammunition were confiscated or destroyed, including underground explosive laboratories, and terrorist funds were confiscated. However, this operation merely represents the beginning of the called-for change of course, and was not extensive or comprehensive enough to tackle the pervasive terrorism in Jenin. It was intentionally designed for more “modest” objectives. Therefore, similar to the “Break the Wave” approach, it is not accurately characterized as a full-fledged “military operation.” The distinction between a military operation and a military activity is also evident in the number of combatants involved. In the current operation, the IDF deployed a single central combat brigade (“Oz”) compared to the five divisions and thousands of reserve soldiers deployed during the “Defensive Shield” operation.

The “House and Garden” military activity differs from the “Break the Wave” military activity in several aspects, signifying a shift in the perspective of Israel’s decision-makers. Firstly, the “House and Garden” activity spanned two consecutive days without interruption, whereas the “Break the Wave” activity was a daily punctual and non-continuous effort. Secondly, the military activity within Jenin as part of “House and Garden” delved deeper than the day-to-day “Break the Wave” activity. Thirdly, the intensity of the firepower and measures employed in Jenin during “House and Garden” surpassed those of the “Break the Wave” activity, which focused on thwarting real-time terrorist operations and serving as a means of apprehending suspects following attacks.

Another noteworthy development within the framework of “House and Garden” was the utilization of airstrikes in the Jenin area through the use of drones, UAVs, and attack helicopters. This marked a highly unusual occurrence that had not been witnessed since the days of the Second Intifada. Thus, it indicates a significant shift in the way Israeli decision-makers perceive this theater.

The objectives of the “House and Garden” military activity

The objectives of the “House and Garden” military activity were primarily focused on enhancing the IDF’s operational freedom and its capacity to counter terrorism in the Jenin area. Over the past year and a half, the IDF has faced significant and determined resistance whenever it has conducted counter-terrorism operations in Jenin. Additionally, barricades, checkpoints, nets spread out on rooftops, and explosive devices were placed to impede the IDF’s movements.

It is important to note that the goals of this activity were primarily tactical in nature, with limited strategic or political dimensions. The main objective led to the derivation of secondary goals, which included damaging terrorist infrastructure, particularly targeting munitions and rockets laboratories and blocking roads with explosive devices. Additionally, the activity aimed to disable the surveillance cameras utilized by the terrorist organizations in Jenin to plan and coordinate attacks against IDF forces.

Therefore, the activity had no intention or dimension of decision. Instead, it served as foundational preparation for potential future military activities. These could either continue as an extension of the “Break the Wave” activities, escalate into a more intensive operation resembling the “House and Garden” activity, or evolve into a larger-scale military operation akin to “Defensive Shield.” The IDF spokesperson emphasized the need for continued operations, stating that they would return to the refugee camp when intelligence indicated the presence of operatives or wanted individuals planning acts of terrorism.

Consequently, one of the sub-goals of the operational activity was to minimize casualties among terrorists (and avoid civilian casualties), presumably with the aim of preventing escalations in both the Judea and Samaria territories, the Gaza Strip, and potentially the northern region. Israel also sought to obtain and maintain international legitimacy throughout the activity.

For example, Captain D, the commander of the UAV formation involved in the military activity in Jenin, explained that the aerial attacks were not solely aimed at targets. Rather, they were primarily conducted to eliminate threats to ground forces. He further stated that during missions with the commando brigade, they identified armed groups that posed a danger to the forces and conducted flyovers to encourage them to disperse, which they indeed did. Another IDF officer stated that the objective was not to achieve a high body count of 200 dead terrorists, as the operation focused on dismantling significant terrorist infrastructures that were identified and destroyed.

Analysis of the tactics in the “House and Garden” military activity

Accumulation of ground-operational experience

The “House and Garden” military activity involved the deployment of a substantial ground force, showcasing a relatively significant accumulation of operational experience in a demanding setting.

The IDF activated a two brigade combat team (BCT) consisting of Golani fighters, Nahal, paratroopers, the commando brigade (“Oz”), and a Harob battalion. These forces were supported by defensive and logistical assistance from the Menashe territorial brigade. This level of force deployment had not been witnessed since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. The activity’s relatively high intensity, compared to previous operations in the region, provided the opportunity for the forces to engage in combat scenarios resembling a military operation. This stands in contrast to the primary tasks typically assigned to the commando brigade and other combat brigades, such as ongoing security measures or night arrests. Consequently, the combatants gained valuable ground operational experience, particularly in maneuvering through densely populated and complex areas, which could serve in a future counter-terrorism operations or decisive campaigns in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and even Lebanon.

Deepening and enhancing the Utilization of UAVs and Drones

The “House and Garden” operation witnessed extensive and refined use of UAVs and drones, as in recent military operations in the Gaza Strip, such as “Shield and Arrow” (2023) and Breaking Dawn (2021).

The continued and intensified use of these capabilities within the “House and Garden” military activity allowed the IDF to accumulate operational experience, enhance operational efficiency, and improve coordination between ground forces and UAV’s operators.

However, the employment of UAV’s in Jenin differed from their usage in the Gaza Strip or in the northern arena. In Gaza and the northern arena, drones and UAV’s are primarily utilized for targeting terror operatives, damaging terrorist infrastructure, and gathering intelligence. However, in Jenin, the IDF employed drones and UAV’s primarily for the purpose of clearing hostile elements from zones warfare, thereby assisting ground combat forces in advancing through densely populated refugee camp. These assets provided real-time intelligence to ground forces and aided in distinguishing between armed terrorists and innocent civilians.

Furthermore, the “House and Garden” military operation introduced the use of “suicide” drones “Maoz”. These drones were employed by fighters from the commando brigade’s units for targeting terrorist objectives near the Jenin refugee camp.

Overall, the comprehensive utilization of UAVs and drones in the “House and Garden” military operation allowed the IDF to refine their operational techniques, enhance effectiveness, and support ground forces in their mission to neutralize threats while minimizing civilian casualties.

Enhancing Organizational and Operational Jointness

The “House and Garden” military operation significantly bolstered the organizational and operational jointness capabilities of the IDF with other security and intelligence agencies, in an environment resembling that of a military operation. While the IDF collaborates with these organizations on a daily basis, primarily focusing on counterterrorism and law enforcement activities, in the “House and Garden” activity, the integration and cooperation between the IDF’s IOS Division, Shin Bet, and police demonstrated exceptional capabilities. This cooperation was evident in the provision of accurate and reliable intelligence by the Shin Bet, including accompanying the forces in the warfare zone, as well as coordination and joint operations between the Border police, police Special Forces, and IDF units during combat operations.

Furthermore, the “House and Garden” activity displayed operational integration within the IDF itself, which had not been seen to such an extent for quite some time, particularly in terms of the size of forces deployed in the field. In recent years, integration efforts within the IDF had predominantly focused on aspects related to the operation of the air force, armored and artillery, particularly in the Gaza Strip. However, the activity in Jenin provided an opportunity to practice deep maneuvering into the enemy’s core areas, highlighting the cooperation between the engineering corps, infantry, armored units, and the air force. Simultaneously, the IDF demonstrated a high level of integration concerning the coordination and synchronization of drones and UAVs, as well as communication and information sharing between armored forces, commando units, and the air force. This encompassed both the execution of attacks and the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. Additionally, effective communication and updates were maintained between the various troops and battalions operating in the narrow alleyways of Jenin.

Overall, the “House and Garden” military operation marked a significant advancement in organizational and operational jointness, facilitating seamless cooperation among the IDF, security agencies, and various units within the military. This enhanced level of integration played a vital role in achieving the operation’s objectives.

Heightened Intelligence Capabilities

The IDF, along with other security forces, showcased exceptional intelligence capabilities in Jenin during the “House and Garden” operation. These capabilities provided accurate and reliable intelligence products crucial to the mission’s success. For instance, the IDF possessed a detailed intelligence picture of the trapped roads in Jenin, enabling the destruction of approximately two to three kilometers of trapped roads out of 13 kilometers of roads within the refugee camp. This precise intelligence significantly minimized infrastructure damage by preventing broader destruction.

The Shin Bet played a key role in providing precise intelligence throughout the operation. They possessed in-depth familiarity with the refugee camp’s terrain, guiding combatants to the locations where explosives were concealed and identifying and tracking individuals involved in terror activities. The Shin Bet’s intimate familiarity with the area facilitated effective field coordination, directing forces through narrow alleys and pathways amidst residential and mine areas.

The intelligence depth achieved during the operation was a testament to the Shin Bet’s field coordinators’ expertise and understanding of Jenin’s intricate network of alleys and roads. Their deep knowledge allowed for seamless navigation and guidance of the forces operating on the ground, ensuring their safety and success in negotiating complex urban environments.

The Accomplishments of the Military Operation in Jenin

The “House and Garden” military operation, being a relatively short and narrowly defined activity, primarily achieved tactical objectives. The notable accomplishments of the operation include:

Firstly, the IDF successfully destroyed significant military infrastructure and weapons capabilities, effectively disrupting the production of locally manufactured rockets. This achievement curtailed the potential threat posed by these weapons.

Secondly, despite engaging in combat within a densely populated and complex urban environment, the IDF managed to conclude the operation without causing any innocent residents been killed. This outcome highlights Israel’s commitment to minimizing civilian casualties and protecting non-combatants. It is noteworthy that despite this policy and impressive achievements, significant voices in the international community, including the European Union and the United Nations, accused Israel of excessive force or even “extrajudicial killings”, as the EU envoy to Israel said, and defined a 17-year-old armed terrorist who was posing a threat to the soldiers as a “child”. This manifested either lack of familiarity with facts on the ground, or stubborn ideological opposition to any self-defense operation Israel would take.

Thirdly, Israel did garner support from the United States for its actions during the operation, demonstrating diplomatic success in securing international backing.

Fourthly, Israel effectively contained the battle within the confined area of Jenin refugee camp, preventing the conflict from spreading to other parts of Judea and Samaria or triggering a civil uprising. Furthermore, Israel successfully averted the much-discussed “unification of fronts”, or the opening of another front of hostilities, whether from the Gaza Strip or the northern region. Although there were some rocket launches from Gaza towards the end of the operation, Israel responded with measured military actions to maintain control and minimize escalation.

Lastly, Israel achieved a certain degree of deterrence against terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, though not to a significant extent. By demonstrating the ability to launch unexpected operations against terrorist strongholds like Jenin, Israel aimed to convey a message of its capability and resolve to combat terrorism.

It is essential to recognize that this military operation was focused and limited in scope. Therefore, the achievements should be evaluated proportionally, considering the specific objectives and constraints of the activity.

“House and Garden” military activity – a step toward further action

The “House and Garden” activity signifies a shift in perception among Israel’s leaders, but in and of itself it is insufficient in order to achieve significant deterrence and disrupt terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, particularly in Northern Samaria and Jenin. Israel must capitalize on the groundwork laid during this operation to take more aggressive action against terrorism in Jenin and, subsequently, in Nablus. Therefore, the conclusion of the “House and Garden” military activity marks the end of the beginning, signaling the need for the next phase.

It is anticipated that the results of the activity will lead to a temporary reduction in terrorist activities targeting IDF soldiers and Israeli citizens from the Jenin area. However, given the operation’s time, space, and depth limitations, it is likely that terrorist organizations will regroup and regain strength in the near and medium term, seeking to restore their military capabilities in Jenin.

Consequently, in the near and medium term, the IDF must continue launching airstrikes against terrorists and their infrastructure in Judea and Samaria. The focus of the IDF’s offensive and air-based operations should be on Jenin and Nablus. Additionally, regular military raids on Jenin are necessary to prevent the resurgence and rebuilding of terrorist organizations, including their rocket and explosive manufacturing facilities.

Simultaneously, in the longer term, the IDF should develop comprehensive plans for an extensive military operation in Jenin. This operation would involve deploying significantly larger ground and air forces to penetrate deep into the refugee camp, targeting a substantial number of terrorists and the leadership of these terrorist organizations, which represent the enemy’s center of gravity. This operation would be akin to the “Defensive Shield” military operation but limited to the Jenin area only. Subsequently, a similar plan would be required for the Nablus area, another significant terrorist stronghold in Northern Samaria.

By pursuing these strategic actions, Israel aims to dismantle terrorist infrastructure, eliminate key operatives, and ultimately enhance security and stability in the region.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement

הפוסט “House and Garden” – analysis and conclusions of the Israeli military activity in Jenin הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

During his 26-year military career, Fallah experienced many of the events that defined the shape of Israeli society, among others when he served as the Southern Brigade’s Chief Operations Officer during the Disengagement and the Abduction of soldier Gilad Shalit. He also mourned over many among his own soldiers – as a deputy company commander, when he was attacked by an explosive device that wounded him and claimed the lives of two of his soldiers; and again, when terrorists infiltrated the “Africa” stronghold in the Gaza Strip, killing one of his company commanders and three of his soldiers.

Despite all he’s been through, the true difficulty and deepest pain Fallah experiences, came after he ended his military service – when trying to find his place in Israeli society. In a poignant interview with Fallah, he talks about his meaningful military service, outlines the future that young Bedouins in Israel can expect if the current state of affairs does not change, and raises a grave question regarding the consensus in Israeli society: Is a military service indeed the gateway into Israeli society?

”Real-Time Life Saving Information” – The Military Tracker’s Role in the 21^st Century

Your military career, from Golani to The Desert Reconnaissance Battalion (DRB) and from there to the IDF’s Tracker Unit – this is an unusual trajectory.

“True, it really isn’t common. Usually trackers grow up within the Unit, just like my father did: he joined the trackers unit and served there until his discharge. I joined after many years in Golani and the DRB.”

Is the role of the tracker still relevant in the 21^st century with all of its technological developments?

“Technology isn’t airtight. Look what they did in Egypt, for example. They built a fence, set down barbed wire, what they call “blurring roads” to delineate the border, , they brought in robots, what not. And yet, there are some smugglers who still cross the fence. You have to understand: if a smuggler can cross the fence – than so can a terrorist.”

So trackers are another tier of defense?

“More than that. What happens, for example, when a pursuit of a smuggler or a terrorist enters enemy territory? There, not only do you not have any technology, but the enemy knows the terrain much better than you. Look, many times, a fighter’s instinct is to pursue the enemy, but the terrain might have a trap, maybe a planned ambush. Here, the tracker comes into the picture. He can produce real-time, life-saving information, catch the terrorist and lead the fighting force back to home territory safe and sound.”

Between a rock and a hard place: being a Bedouin released from the IDF

Being an Arab-Muslim in the IDF is certainly not easy – neither in terms of service nor in terms of how you are treated at home. How do you deal with such tensions?

‘At home there are no tensions. On the contrary. Everyone is with the security forces, where I live. Even our girls did national service. And in the army? When I wore my uniform, I felt equal among equals. The army evaluated me according to my skills – nothing else. The truth is that as a soldier, you don’t really feel the tensions – not at the base and not when you get back home.

So when do you?

When you become a civilian.

Explain

“After I was released at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, having served as a senior officer, performed a wide gamut of roles, and seen a thing or two during my service. I did my share of fighting, lost friends and soldiers, lain in ambushes, protected the boarders of the county – and then I come into Jewish society to try to make a living with dignity, and – what can I say – I can’t get called to a single job interview. ‘But wait a moment’, I say, ‘I’m supposed to be different from an Israeli-Arab, who has not done what I’ve done; I did something, and contributed to the State.’ If I show up at an interview, I expect them first and foremost to see before them an individual that cares about and loves the country, not the opposite. This is a very big challenge that Israeli society must address, because it’s a problem will just get bigger in the next generation.”

What do you mean?

“Let’s think together: a young Bedouin enlisting into the army – his younger brother, whom is he influenced by? His big brother, naturally. Now, if his big brother ends his service after three years, and Jewish society doesn’t accept him into it, who does? I’ll tell you; he’ll find a job as a truck driver for some Arab moving company or as a laborer for an Arab contractor. What happens when that little brother gets to the age of enlistment? His big brother will tell him ‘Forget it. Go to school. What do you need the army for?’ If I get out of the army and there is no substantial role I can play in Israeli society – what good is it?”

You speak in great pain

“Certainly. Understand, in Arab society – I’m chided for serving in the army and called a traitor. But as far as Jewish society is concerned – I’m an Arab and am not accepted into it. I say, ‘great lord, for Arabs I’m a traitor, and for the Jews I’m too Arab. So where do I go?’ We were born here; served here all of us, the whole family. I’ve done battalion-commander training. Now I’m going to serve as a battalion commander in my reserves’ service, not because I’m after the money, but because I want to contribute and still have the strength, so I’m doing it.”

”There is no reason that the Bedouin can’t be brothers with Jewish society”

What in your opinion is the solution to the situation you portray?

“There’s a lot the IDF can do about it. It can offer Bedouin soldiers in the last year of their service, vocational training or a diploma that is suitable for soldiers so that discharged soldiers have something in their hand when they start their civilian life. The senior veterans from the Bedouin community that complete their service should have secured quotas in government offices that will promote programs for the benefit of the Bedouin community. Furthermore, today there is a division in the Ministry of Defense dedicated to discharged soldiers from the Bedouin community. The problem is that that’s all it is, partial guidance, and that’s it. I expect closer support until a job is attained.”

That’s on the level of the military and government. Is there something that Israeli society can do?

“It’s not a matter of ‘doing’. You have to get to know. The moment that Israeli society really gets to know the Bedouin community, a lot will change here. Today, if I tell the average member of Israeli society that I’m a Bedouin, immediately they think that I live in a tent on the Sinai border and smuggle drugs, or that I lead a life of crime. That’s what you hear about in the news and that’s what you see on television – but there are many Bedouins who contribute, serve, that are integrated in all arms of the security system. And here IDSF HaBithonistim can come into the picture.”

How?

“Look, a member of the organization gives lectures to school students in the 12^th grade in Be’er Sheba? Let him dedicate 10 minutes of the lecture to the Bedouins that served in the army with him. The members of IDSF HaBithonistim, senior ranking officers who’ve served decades in the army, are well familiar with the Bedouins who serve side by side with them over the years.”

Is that the reason you joined IDSF HaBithonistim?

“On a personal level, I served under Amir Avivi, Chairman and Founder of the movement. Alongside my appreciation of him as an individual, the IDSF HaBithonistim movement he founded talks about our country and what can be improved, what can be fixed about it. They mark a target and charge ahead to achieve it. That really speaks to me.”

הפוסט A Gateway to Israeli Society? A Heartfelt and Deeply Emotional Interview with Lt. Col. (res.) Zuheir Fallah הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

However, it appears that the Palestinian Authority saw fit to assume an additional role – the propagation of the struggle to drive out the Zionist “occupier”. Outwardly, and in its official statements in English, PA officials are careful to proclaim that their aspirations are for a future state “within the 67 borders”. And yet, the Palestinian law, its education system, public addresses and in the inciting speech on Palestinian media, prove that from their perspective, the State of Israel which they call “Historic Palestine” – similarly to the perception of Zionist Jews – is a single indivisible entity.

The PA refers to all of the 48 territories as “Palestine” and consequentially, desires to recruit to its ranks Israeli Arabs, whom it refers to as “Arabs of the internal”. According to the national Palestinian perception, Israeli Arabs are expected to fight against Zionism and the “occupation” in their own way. In order to deepen the Palestinian identity among Israeli Arabs, the Authority acts through various channels, three of which we will address in this paper: the “poaching” of Arab-Israeli students to learn in higher education institutions in Jenin, Nablus and other Arab cities; the recruitment of Israeli Arabs to carry out terrorist attacks, among others by means of monetary compensation and accolades as national heroes; and its nationalistic propaganda and incitement to terrorism.

Firstly – the higher education in the PA territories: for years, universities in the PA territories have been known as recruitment centers for terrorism operatives. The movement of young Palestinians (“shabiba”) of the various movements active within these universities, recruit terrorism operatives and publicize propaganda. Therefore, the current growth in the numbers of Israeli-Arab students opting to apply to these institutes is a matter of grave concern. A survey held by reserves Lieutenant Colonel Avi Shalev in 2022[1] shows that the number of Israeli citizens learning in Palestinian universities is estimated at 13,000.

Attorney Morris Hirsch, Head of the Legal Department at the Palestinian Media Watch Institute and a researcher in the Research Department of IDSF-Habithonistim, explains that “the PA attributes great importance to the Palestinization of young Israeli Arabs. The PA accurately identified the years of academic studies – a formative period in the life of a young adult – as a unique opportunity to influence the young students’ self-identity. Studying in Israeli universities – young Arab students may find themselves assimilating into Israeli society. However, if they go to Palestinian universities, they can be steeped in the Palestinian narrative, ethos and propaganda. For this end, using the channel of academic studies, the PA acts toward severing the Arab Israelis from their “Israeliness” and reels them is as ‘Palestinians’”.

Secondly, the Authority is making efforts to recruit Israeli Arabs into its ranks of terrorists, the most telling example of which is the “prisoners’ veteran” Karim Yunis. The Israeli Arab cousins Karim and Maher Younis are considered Palestinian national symbols. In 1980, they abducted the soldier Avraham Bromberg from Hadera Junction and murdered him. Initially they were sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to indefinite imprisonment. In 2012, then-President Shimon Peres again commuted their sentences, and in January of this year they were released from prison after 40 years.

Despite them being Israeli citizens, the PA had made them national heroes. Their affiliation with Fatah – in addition to the fact that at the time of their release they were the most veteran Arab security prisoners in Israel, contributed to their becoming PA icons. Dominant Karim was even appointed member of the Fatah Central Committee. After their release from prison at the beginning of this year, they returned to their village Ara, where a national Palestinian festival of sorts began soon after their arrival. Their house was visited[2] by officials of the highest ranks in the PA, the likes of Abu Mazen’s deputy, in order to show their appreciation.

Abu Mazen went as far as to hold a personal phone call with Karim Yunis. The call was traced by the Palestinian Media Watch Institute, and following is an exclusive excerpt of the translated transcription of the conversation, published here for the first time, in which Abu Mazen is heard showering Maher Yunis with adulation: ”…we are proud of you, and say may Allah give you health. You are the beacon of light of this nation; The beacon of light for this people. You are symbol for the Palestinian nation, You Maher and your brother Karim”. The terrorist on his part praised Abu Mazen: “First I want to express good wishes on you and your wonderful words. The 40 years you were granted are glory for all Palestinian. Allah will show us the liberated land in its entirety”.

At the end of the conversation, in an emotional appeal to Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian terrorist Maher Yunis said: “Inshallah, our meeting on the soil of the homeland is fast approaching. The people will have the unity, the wishes will be fulfilled, and we will liberate the land together.”

As a reward for their “bravery”, the Yunises and the likes of them, receive a monthly income from the PA. Each of the cousins received a total of some $1.1 million USD from the PA by the time of their release, and a $25K release bonus, in addition to a monthly stipend that amounts to $40,000 USD a year for rest of their lives. In this context, the Israeli Ministry of Defense deserves accolades for foreclosing monies and property from terrorist. Yet the fact that Israeli Arab terrorists that executed terrorist attacks for which they receive financial compensation, as part of being Palestinian heroes – is a crucial element in the law of revocation of citizenship and residence from Israeli Arab terrorists and their deportation to the PA territories, recently passed in the Knesset.[3]

Finally, the PA tries to influence the identity of Israeli Arabs by using the Mossawa TV channel it operates, whose target audience is the Arabs of the “occupied internal territories”. At first, the channel broadcast from Nazareth, but in 2016, then-Minister of Public Security, Gilad Erdan, ordered to shut it down because it operated on behalf of the PA without an official license from Israel. However, the channel had relocated its activity to Ramallah, where Israel has no control over the affairs there. Thus, the content is intended for the Israeli Arab target audience, and the channel’s employees– including presenters – are Israeli citizens who commute to Ramallah.[4]

Unsurprisingly, the channel joined the celebration of Karim and Maher Yunis. We bring here, for the first time in English translation, excerpts from the channel’s broadcasts during the celebration of the Yunises’ release, translated by the Palestinian Media Watch Institute. In the program dedicated to the release of Karim Yunis, the presenter said: “This is the greatest time the world has ever know in yearning for liberty. Karim Yunis is breathing that liberty after 40 years in which the symbol of this great struggle, a prisoner of the Israeli occupation prisons, this occupation which still haunts the Palestinian identity represented today by Karim Yunis. As our nation had proved that is resists all the designs of the racist right and fascism. Karim Yunis overcame the jailer with his pride”.

The complex situation in Israel, wherein part of its Arab population identifies with an anti-Zionistic narrative, and is influenced by the PA’s endeavors to win their hearts and minds and motivate them to act against the State of Israel, must be the object of increased attention on part of the Israeli security and political system. It is a security interest of the highest order for the State of Israel to isolate its young Arabs from the PA’s incitement and influence, and facilitate their integration in Israeli society. The propagation of this ideology must be blocked so as Israel does not find itself in a predicament wherein a large portion of its society not only identifies with the enemy, but also is operated by it and does its bidding.

Ahikam Himelfarb, Palestinian Media Watch (PMW) | IDSF-Habithonistim, Research Department

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

[1] Avi Shalev, “Proposal for the Establishment of an Israeli Academy in an Arab City”, Baqa College, 2002
[2] https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hje3omp5o
[3] For further reading, https://idsf.org.il/papers/הפרת-אמונים-שלילת-אזרחות-ותושבות-ממחב/
[4] https://www.now14.co.il/תחקיר-ברשפ-תפרו-מכרז-לטובת-חהכ-איימן-ע/

הפוסט Agent of Chaos: How the Palestinian Authority Acts to Radicalize Israeli Arabs הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey was conducted by the IDSF research department and with statistical guidance from Dr. Hagai Elkayam. The sample was conducted among 1,191 respondents from the adult population (18+) in Israel who use the Internet. For the Jewish sample (956 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±3.17% with a probability of 95%; For the combined sample (1,191 respondents), the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2.84% with a 95% probability; For the Arab sample (235 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±6.39% with a probability of 95%.

A National Asset: The Righteousness of the Path of the People of Zion

We started the survey with an exploration of the emotional-perceptional views of the Israeli public regarding Judea and Samaria. We first set out to examine through varied types of questions, whether the Israeli public perceives Judea and Samaria as an area that contributes to or compromises the security of the State of Israel.

The responses show that 71% of the Jewish public in Israel think that whomever controls Judea and Samaria invariably holds the strategic-security advantage over Israel’s coastal plain as well. In other words, the perception according to which Israel’s control over Judea and Samaria is crucial for maintaining normal life in the Dan metropolis is dominant in Israel’s public. As to the question whether the control over Judea and Samaria compromises Israel’s safety and security – only 22% of the Jewish public thought so.

The following questions were in the same vein: a polar question – “do you view Judea and Samaria as an asset or a liability?” – shows that the majority of Israel’s public (61%) believes that the Judea and Samaria region is an asset, as oppose to only 39%, who believe the region is a liability. In a segmentation of the answers according to nationality, the disparity between Jews and Arabs is evident: a clear majority of the Jewish public perceives Judea and Samaria as an asset, as compared with 26% of that group, who view the region as a liability. As oppose to them – 87% of the Israeli Arabs think that Judea and Samaria are a liability, while only 13% view the region as an asset to the State of Israel.

A segmentation by ideology of the Jewish participants’ responses, shows that an overwhelming majority (98%) of the respondents affiliated with the political right perceive Judea and Samaria as an asset, as compared with 47% of the respondents from the political center and only 12% of those affiliated with the left. Interestingly, a segmentation by gender shows that 82% of the Jewish female respondents thought that Judea and Samaria are an asset to the State, as compared with a lower rate of 65% among the Jewish male respondents. A possible explanation could be the military service in the region, which might be perceived as a personal liability on part of the Jewish male participants.

Terminology of Transfer: Relinquishing or Returning?

With the understanding that broad swaths of the Israeli public perceive Judea and Samaria as an asset to the State of Israel, we sought to examine whether this affects the public’s perception that these areas belong to the people of Israel. The answer is yes.

We asked the Jewish public if it would perceive a peace agreement that entails the transfer of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinian Authority – either as (a) the relinquishing of territories that rightfully belong to Israel or (b) the returning of territories Israel had occupied. The data shows that 71% of the Jewish public thinks that the transfer of the territory to the Palestinian Authority as part of a peace agreement constitutes the relinquishing of land that rightfully belongs to Israel (agreed by 6% of the Arab public).

A segmentation according to ideology shows marked differences between political left and right among the respondents: 95% of the respondents affiliated with the political right thought that transferring territories in Judea and Samaria to the PA would be relinquishing territories rightfully belonging to Israel, whereas less than 1% thought this would constitute a return of territories occupied by Israel to their rightful owners (4% responded that they didn’t know). In contrast, 13% of the left thought that the return of those territories to the PA would be relinquishing territories rightfully belonging to Israel, whereas 64% maintained that the transfer of Judea and Samaria to the PA constitutes the return of occupied territories to their rightful owners, and no less than 23% responded that they did not know – nearly six times the number of right-wing respondents who chose that option.

The data shows the Judea and Samaria are perceived by most of the Jewish public in Israel as territories that rightfully belong to Israel, and are assets for the country – particularly strategic-security assets. In other words: the foundation for the righteousness of the Jewish State’s path is deeply engrained in the Israeli public’s mind, albeit different in those affiliated with the political right and center, as compared with the left.

Who Is Discriminated Against? Depends on Who You Ask

It did not escape our attention that while large portions of the public view Judea and Samaria as an asset – there are others in society who think the region is in fact a liability for the State – namely a moral one. In this context, a prevalent argument often voiced in the debate on the Israel-Palestinian issue is that Israel’s control over Judea and Samaria creates in effect a state of oppression and discrimination, fosters terrorism and is even evocative of Apartheid regimes. One of the more complex issues occasionally discussed in the media is the illegal construction in Judea and Samaria. We explored public opinion on the matter asking the participants whether they feel there is selective enforcement against illegal building in the region, and if so – which group of the region’s population is more discriminated against.

Some 82% of the Israeli public thought that there indeed is selective enforcement against illegal construction in Judea and Samaria. However, 54% thought that the Jewish population is discriminated against while 28% thought the Arab population suffers more discrimination, (4% did not think selective enforcement exists at all in the region while 14% said they did not know).

Ideological affiliation was found to sway opinions on the matter – 90% of the respondents affiliated with the political right thought that the region’s Jewish population suffers more discrimination, while only 9% of the left leaning respondents agreed with this statement. In contrast, only 2% of the right thought that it is the Arab population that suffers most discrimination, while 71% of the left agreed with this statement.

A segmentation according to nationality shows that 62% of Israeli Arabs believe that the Arab population in the region is the target of discrimination, while 9% of those respondents thought that discrimination targets mostly the Jewish population. Of the Jewish respondents, 19% thought that the Arab population is discriminated against while 65% thought that discriminative enforcement against illegal building was aimed predominantly at the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria.

The findings indicate that the perception of discrimination is subjective. Determining which population gets the short end of the discrimination stick is tricky, if at all possible. Each side feels it is discriminated against on part of the law enforcement authorities. Moreover, for each study that shows discrimination against the Arab population in Judea and Samaria – there are studies that claim the contrary – that often the Arab population enjoys leniencies that their Jewish counterparts in the region do not receive.

We further examined the issue of enforcement discrimination in Judea and Samaria, and asked the public if it thought that the Israeli administration in the region creates laws that benefit the Jewish population more than the Arab citizens (a state of affairs that is the basis for allegations of an apartheid regime in the region). Of the Jewish respondents, 29% thought this was true, as oppose to 79% of the Israeli Arabs. We further posed the direct question: “Is Israel, in general, an apartheid state?”. 12% of the Jewish respondents replied “yes”, and 66% of the Israeli Arabs also thought Israel is an apartheid regime.

This indicated that at least in the Jewish public there is a majority that does not maintain that there is selective enforcement against the Arab population in Judea and Samaria, and that the State of Israel is not an apartheid regime. In the Arab public, in contrast, the perception of Israel as an apartheid regime is strong. We explored this perception from another angle.

Is Zionist “Apartheid” Better Than Palestinian Democracy?

As mentioned earlier, a significant majority of 79% of Israel Arabs believe that the Israel administration in Judea and Samaria creates discriminating laws in favor of the Jews living in the region, as compared with its Arabs (which constitutes apartheid). Moreover, 66% of Israel’s Arabs noted that in their opinion, Israel as a state is an apartheid regime.

We checked whether these answers could stand the test of reality. It appears not: we presented the Arab respondents with a scenario in which a Palestinian state will be established in Judea and Samaria, and asked them whether they would relocate their residence to the region and forgo their Israel citizenship in favor of a Palestinian one. 75% of the Arab respondents said they would not move to a Palestinian state and part with their Israeli citizenship; only 12% were willing to do so (13% responded that they did not know).

We further inquired whether the Israeli Arabs would support the annexation of Arab settlements adjacent to Judea and Samaria to a Palestinian state. Here too, 63% opposed such an option and 35% even claimed they would demonstrate against such a move. A mere 19% said they supported such a move, while 18% responded that they did not know.

To conclude the issue of Zionist apartheid, we asked what would Israel’s Arabs do in a situation in which Israel would decide to relinquish its sovereignty over their hometown, transferring control over to a Palestinian state government. Over half of the Arab responded (52%) that they would leave their homes and move to a town that is still under Israel’s rule.

In other words, despite their belief that Israel discriminates against the Arab population, and is in effect and apartheid state, most of them would not relinquish their Israeli citizenship or move from Israel to a Palestinian state, and would opt to leave such a Palestinian state to live in Israel.

It’s All About the Narrative: Palestinization Trends in Arab Society

The data presents a contradiction: on the one hand, most of Israeli Arabs maintain that Israel is an apartheid and displays racism in its treatment of Judea and Samaria’s Arab population. On the other hand, when inquired what course of action they would choose – their beliefs do not stand the test of reality, as the majority rather live under an Israeli “apartheid” than an ostensibly Palestinian democracy.

The contradiction may stem from the growing alignment of large sections of Israeli Arabs with the Palestinization processes and the adoption of the Palestinian narrative, according to which the Zionist entity is racist and the State of Israel applies a discriminatory and selective policy towards the Arab population, even if that narrative does not stand the test of reality.

In the next part of the survey, we explored Palestinization processes within the population of Israeli Arabs. We asked how Israeli Arabs define themselves – Israelis, Palestinians – or both. The data shows that more than a third of Israeli Arabs (36%), who hold an Israeli citizenship, feel more Palestinian than Israeli, and over half of these (19%) feel exclusively Palestinian. About a third (31%) feel equally Israeli and Palestinian, only 16% feel more Israeli than Palestinian and only 11% feel exclusively Israeli (6% replied that they do not know).

Additional data derived from the examination of the relationship between Israeli Arabs and the State of Israel, shows that even with protected rights, 31% of Israeli Arabs are not willing to live in a state with a Jewish majority. Furthermore, 36% of the Israeli Arabs do not acknowledge Israel’s sovereignty on all territories within the Green Line, including Jaffa, Acre, Haifa, West Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Only 14% of the Israeli Arabs believe that the official state symbols are justifiably Jewish.

What Does the Future Hold: The Day After Abu Mazen

What about the day after Abu Mazen? The stability of the PA following President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)’s retirement is a question that affects the security coordination between Israel and the PA, and naturally on the viability of future negotiation with the Authority. Instability would hold off any sustainable agreements.

Only a minority (9%) of the Israeli public thinks that after Mahmoud Abbas’s rule, the transfer of power will occur in an orderly manner. 35% think Hamas will take over the Palestinian Authority in effect; 28% predict anarchy in the Palestinian Authority, forcing the State of Israel to intervene militarily, and 28% did not answer as they felt they do not know what will happen in the Palestinian Authority with the end of Mahmoud Abbas’s rule.

A segmentation of the responses shows that the Jewish public as well is uncertain about what the day after Abu Mazen holds: 5% believes that the transfer of power will proceed in an orderly fashion; nearly a third (28%) maintain that anarchy will break out in the PA forcing Israel to intervene militarily; 20% think that Hamas in effect will take control; 21% predict a coup or military takeover of Judea and Samaria by Hamas, and 26% replied “I don’t know”.

The situation among Israeli Arabs does not paint a dramatically different picture: almost a third (28%) of Israeli Arabs foresee anarchy in the Palestinian Authority with the State of Israel forced to intervene militarily; 17% predict a transfer of power in effect to Hamas; 18% think that Hamas will affect a coup or military takeover of Judea and Samaria, and only 9% think there will be an orderly transfer of power (28% answered “I don’t know”).

In such a state of uncertainty characterizing the near future of the PA’s security and politics, it is to be expected that the State of Israel would be well prepared for what the future might bring. However, the Israeli public does not believe it is: over half (52%) of the public deem Israeli unprepared for the eventualities of the day after Abu Mazen; approximately a third (28%) of the respondent did not know, and only 20% was confident of Israeli preparedness.

Judea and Samaria Are Not the Problem, But the Solution

The overall object of the survey was to determine the status of Judea and Samaria in the public’s view, in a broad context and on different levels. The data indicates several significant conclusions, which have political, economic and security implications for the State of Israel. First, the survey establishes the understanding that the importance of Judea and Samaria cannot be overlooked as an inseparable thread in the fabric of life that is the State of Israel. The value inherent in the region manifests economically, socially and within the familial circle.

Moreover, the survey highlights the strong emotional and historical connection between the Jewish public and Judea and Samaria, which manifests, among others, in the public’s connection through its visits to the Jewish heritage sites of the region. In the bottom line: the Jewish public perceives Judea and Samaria as an asset – not a liability, predominantly in the security-strategic and planning context.

Does control over Judea and Samaria also have its downsides? It appears that the public does not perceive the current situation in the region as one that presents significant disadvantages as compared to alternatives scenarios. The calls by anti-Israeli organizations to boycott the country’s economy as a whole and products manufactured within Judea and Samaria in particular are not echoed in the Israeli public – neither in its Jewish component nor among Israeli Arabs. Furthermore, according to the perception of the Jewish public, Israel does not enforce an apartheid policy in the region. Among the Arab public there is a consensus that the administration in the region is akin to apartheid, but nonetheless, they would not consider moving to territories under the PA control and relinquish their Israeli citizenship, but opt to remain under the wing of the State of Israel. Interestingly – the survey further establishes that the historical and emotional affinity among Israeli Arabs to Judea and Samaria is significantly weaker than that of their Jewish counterparts.

And finally – the argument that Judea and Samaria are a barrier to peace is not perceived as valid among Israel’s public: strong currents of Palestinization are spreading through Israeli Arab society, and are cementing in that society a position according to which the struggle is not only for Judea and Samaria – but for the land of Israel in its entirety, thus nullifying claims that the key to peace with the Palestinians lies within any specific region, including Judea and Samaria at that. Another significant point found in the survey is that even if an agreement concerning the future of Judea and Samaria was a called for decision – there is no partner to sign it with: there is a clear perception in Israel that the Palestinian Authority is far from being stable.

הפוסט The IDSF Index 2023: Judea & Samaria – An Asset for All Israel’s People הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The survey was conducted by the IDSF research department and with professional statistics guidance from Dr. Haggai Elkayam. The survey was conducted among 1,191 Jewish and Arab respondents from the adult age group (ages 18+) in Israel who use the internet. For the combined sample (of all 1,191 respondents), the maximum margin of error is ±2.84% with a 95% probability; The Jewish respondent segmentation (including 956 respondents) has a maximum margin of error of ±3.17% with a probability of 95%; The Arab respondent segmentation (of 235 respondents) has a maximum margin of error of ±6.39% with a probability of 95%.

Connected: Affinity, Ties, and Differences

The findings of the survey are presented here in two parts: the first part, which you are reading now, focuses on the various aspects of the Israel public’s connection to Judea and Samaria, excluding perceptions on matters of security in the region. The second part focuses on political and security perceptions of Judea and Samaria.

The first topic we reviewed was the intensity of the connection Israel’s public has to Judea and Samaria. Often, the Judea and Samaria region is seen as connected to the religious sector, therefore we specified three forms of connection: historical, emotional and religious.

The results show that 70% of the Jewish population feels an historical connection to Judea and Samaria; 63% feels an emotional connection to the region and 48% have a religious connection with it. The overall significance of these results is that an overwhelming majority of the Israelis have a profound connection to Judea and Samaria – at least on an historical level.

Among the Israeli Arabs asked about their connection to the “West Bank” (as they refer to Judea and Samaria) – only 37% feel an historical connection to the region; 33% said they felt an emotional connection to it, and 32% feel a religious connection to Judea and Samaria. In other words: the study shows a much stronger connection to Judea and Samaria among the Jewish public as compared with the Arab public, religiously, emotionally, and in particular – historically.

A less intense connection to Judea and Samaria also characterizes Jews who identified themselves as left-wing politically: only 27% of the respondents from the left feel connected, at least historically, to the region, which is indisputably the cradle of the history and culture of the Jewish people. This is compared with 90% of those identified with the right, who feel historically connected to Judea and Samaria, and with 46% of the respondents affiliated with the political center.

In terms of the intensity of the connection to Judea and Samaria and the perceived right over the area, disparities were evident between the right and the left: 89% of the respondents affiliated with the right felt that the connection of the Jewish people to Judea and Samaria is the foundation for its right to the entirety of Israel, while only 10% of the left agreed with this view.

IDSF sees a fundamental danger in the lack of connection in parts of the Israeli public to the places that are the cradle of the Jewish culture, and in their lack of knowledge regarding the area’s crucial significance and role in establishing the justness of the Jewish people’s path. For this reason, IDSF invests considerable efforts in the cultivation of knowledge in Israel’s Jewish public, by means of educational activities in pre-military preparatory programs, high schools and more.

Visiting Judea and Samaria: Ideological and Religious Influence

Beyond feelings, connections and opinions, we sought to determine how Israelis actually view Judea and Samaria and whether the region is a part of the daily life of the Israeli public. First, we wished to discern how often the Israeli public actually visits Judea and Samaria, and for what purposes.

According to the survey’s findings, 9% of the Israeli public had frequented Judea and Samaria on a weekly basis in the past three years; 17% visited the area on a monthly basis; 41% rarely visited it, and 20% say they have not visited Judea and Samaria at all in the past three years (13% of Israel’s Jewish public lives in Judea and Samaria).

According to another of the survey’s question, 80% of the Israeli public feels that driving through Judea and Samaria is more dangerous as compared to other areas of Israel. This figure raises the question of whether the public would visit Judea and Samaria more frequently were the travel to the area not perceived as dangerous.

A segmentation by ideology of the group of respondents who have not visited Judea and Samaria at all in the past three years reveals a marked difference: whereas only 18% of the respondents who identified with the right have not visited Judea and Samaria in the past three years, 43% of the left-wing respondents have not visited the area in said period.

An interesting picture emerges when segmenting family visits to Judea and Samaria by ideological affiliation: 48% of right-wing Jews frequent Judea and Samaria for the purpose of family visits, compared to only 20% of left-wing Jews. In other words, the family circle largely determines whether one visits Judea and Samaria. As we shall see later in this survey, this has an impact on the perception of Judea and Samaria.

Family & Economics: Visits to Judea and Samaria and National Differences

In the next stage of the survey, we sought to determine whether there are differences between Israeli Jews and Arabs in term of the frequency of visits to Judea and Samaria, and the reasons for Jews and Arabs to visit the region.

The data shows that among the Jewish public that does not live in Judea and Samaria, 9% visit the region on a weekly basis; 17% visit on a monthly basis (in total, at least 26% visit the region on a monthly basis); 47% rarely come to the area, and 27% have not visited Judea and Samaria at all (15% indicated that they live there).

What are the reasons for visiting Judea and Samaria? The most common answer for visiting Judea and Samaria was mainly family visits (42%), followed by visits to heritage sites (36%), field trips (31%), work and business (28%), military and security service (27%), and finally extreme sports (6%).

Among Israeli Arabs, 13% visit Judea and Samaria on a weekly basis; 25% visit on a monthly basis; 49% rarely visit and 10% have never visited Judea and Samaria (3% of Israeli Arabs live there). Compared with the findings relating to the Jewish public, the purpose of visits by Israeli Arabs to Judea and Samaria follows a different set of priorities. First and foremost, Israeli Arabs visit Judea and Samaria for work and business purposes (63%); followed only by family visits (29%). Other purposes, such as travel or extreme sports, appeared at a very low percentage.

One insight from these findings may be that while the connection of Israeli Arabs to Judea and Samaria is first and foremost economic, the connection of Israeli Jews to Judea and Samaria is based on family and social ties. One way or another, the findings as a whole clearly present an inseparable fabric of life that exists between the Israeli public and Judea and Samaria: family, social and economic.

Order of the Day: Heritage Sites in Judea and Samaria

When the Jewish public was asked which of the two following statements would best describe a peace agreement that includes the transfer of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinian Authority –either relinquishing territories that by right belong to Israel or returning territories Israel had occupied – significant differences were found between those who visited Judea and Samaria and those who did not.

Out of those who have visited Judea and Samaria – 71% viewed such an arrangement as the relinquishing of territories belonging to Israel, while 16% viewed it as the returning of territories. Out of the respondents who have never visited Judea and Samaria – only 54% thought that such an arraignment means relinquishing territories, whereas 27% deemed it the returning of territories. Even among respondents who replied they did not know, there is a clear disparity: Among those who visited Judea and Samaria, 13% said they did not know, compared to 19% among those who did not visit the region. One way or another, the data shows that visits to Judea and Samaria have a significant impact on the public’s attitude toward the region.

Next, we inquired which heritage sites in Judea and Samaria Israeli Jews visited most. The data shows that 47% visited the Cave of the Patriarchs; 37% visited Rachel’s Tomb; 27% visited the Tomb of Samuel the Prophet (Nabi Samuel); 25% visited ancient Shiloh; 12% visited Joseph’s Tomb and 12% visited the altar of Mount Ebal.

An ideological segmentation reveals significant differences between respondents from the right and left: 46% of respondents identified with the right compared to 25% identified with the left have visited Rachel’s Tomb; The tomb of the prophet Samuel (Nabi Samuel) was visited by 33% of those identified with the right compared to 18% of those identified with the left; Ancient Shiloh was visited by 31% of the right compared to 10% of the left; Joseph’s Tomb was visited by 15% of the right and only 6% of the left; The altar of Mount Ebal was visited by 14% of the right and 8% of the left.

The data paints a rather bleak picture of the status of Judea and Samaria heritage sites among the Jewish public. Some of these heritage sites are of paramount importance in the history of the Jewish people, and are anchors of archaeological evidence for the history of the Jewish people.

In addition, the data clearly indicates a direct correlation between visiting Judea and Samaria and the perception of the region. In other words: the public that reported visiting Judea and Samaria felt a stronger connection to the region.

BDS and the likes: To What Extent Do Boycott Organizations Affect the Israeli Consumer?

Part of the fabric of life that exists between the Israeli public and Judea and Samaria has economic manifestations as well: the Israeli consumer consumes many products made in factories located in Judea and Samaria. Many organizations, led by BDS, call to boycott products manufactured in Judea and Samaria. The next part of the survey dealt with the purchasing habits of the Israeli public with regard to products from manufacturers in Judea and Samaria. In other words, it sets out to examine whether the boycott called by anti-Israeli organizations affect the reality on the ground.

The simple answer is no: only 4% of the Jewish respondents and 19% of the Israeli Arab respondents boycott products manufactured in Judea and Samaria. As oppose to these, 71% of Jews have no problem purchasing products manufactured in Judea and Samaria, and more than half of them (37%) not only do not perceive this as a problem, but even prefer to buy Judea and Samaria products to begin with. 5% are willing to buy products from Judea and Samaria, but opt for alternatives when available, and as mentioned, only 4% completely boycott such products (20% of the respondents said that they are indifferent to the place of production and do not check where the products are manufactured).

A segmentation of the findings by ideology shows that political affiliation is a strong predictor of a respondent’s willingness to purchase Judea and Samaria-made products: 41% of the respondents affiliated with the left as oppose to 1% of the respondents affiliated with the right, will either try not purchase, or completely avoid purchasing, products made in Judea and Samaria.

Among Israeli Arabs, 53% have no issue with purchasing products manufactured in Judea and Samaria (of which 21% even prefer to buy such products); 13% are willing to buy these products but will refrain from doing so when there are alternatives, and as mentioned – 19% will fully boycott products manufactured in Judea and Samaria (15% are indifferent and do not check where products are manufactured).

It was interesting to find that while 41% of the Jews affiliated with the left try not to buy – of fully boycott – products made in Judea and Samaria, only 32% of the Israeli Arabs do so.

Willingness to Live in Judea and Samaria: Not At All Costs

Judea and Samaria constitute approximately 25% of Israel’s total area. This figure begs the question whether the Israeli public views the region as a possible solution to the country’s housing crisis. The survey found that 66% of the Israeli public thinks that the land reserves in Judea and Samaria can be a plausible solution to the crisis. A segmentation by ideology shows that 90% of the respondents affiliated with the right, and 38% of the respondents from the political center view the land reserves in the region as a plausible solution to the housing crisis, as oppose to only 8% of the left-wing respondents.

In the next part of the survey, we asked whether the Israeli public would consider living in Judea and Samaria if it were economically worthwhile. 47% of the Jewish public would positively consider moving to the region, with 8% conditioning doing so only if they could move to towns located on the Israeli side of the separation fence, and 12% conditioned living in the region on moving only to large towns or cities. (43% would not consider moving there at all and 10% currently reside in the region).

Among Israeli Arabs, 73% would not consider moving to Judea and Samaria at all. Among the 24% who would consider living there, only 11% would consider moving without prior conditions; 7% would move only to cities or large towns in the region, and 6% would consider moving to the region only to communities located on the Israeli side of the separation fence (2% currently live there).

One possible explanation for the unwillingness of parts of the Israeli public to consider living in Judea and Samaria is the political status of Judea and Samaria. For this reason we asked the respondents who said they would not consider living in Judea and Samaria if they would change their minds if the State of Israel applied Israeli law and sovereignty over Area C in Judea and Samaria. Indeed, about a third of them replied that they might change their minds or at least reconsider (29%).

Interim Summary: Judea and Samaria – the Heart of the State

“The survey clearly indicates two key findings: First, indeed, most of the Israeli public today has a special and deep connection to Judea and Samaria. Second, today it is impossible to separate the Israeli public from Judea and Samaria, because there is a deep intricate connection between them, economically, geographically and socially. This is true for both the Jewish public and the Israeli Arab public. In addition, the survey shows that a clear majority of the Jewish public sees Judea and Samaria as a possible solution to the housing crisis, with a high degree of willingness to move there. All this before even addressing the natural resources and strategic advantages of this region,” IDSF founder and chairman Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi concludes the first part of the survey analysis.

“Sadly, the survey also shows a sad state of visits by the Israeli public to the most important heritage sites for the Jewish people: only 12% of the public had ever visited Mount Ebal, perhaps the most important archaeological site for the Jewish people. The survey indicates that one of the reasons for this is the lack of visits by parts of the Israeli public to Judea and Samaria: if there are no family or friends to visit there, they are not exposed to this beautiful region, and there is no desire to go on trips and visit heritage sites, and this directly affects the most basic connection of a people to its land – the historical and national connection to a region that is deeply rooted in the history of our people. IDSF movement understands the importance of this connection to Israel’s national security strategy, and therefore operates in pre-military preparatory programs, in the education system and in field trips, and works through a variety of channels to promote the region of Judea and Samaria among the Israeli public.”

The next part of the survey report will focus on political and security perceptions regarding Judea and Samaria: peace arrangements, the Palestinian Authority post the Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) era, and how Israeli Arabs perceive the State of Israel.

הפוסט The IDSF Index 2023: Judea & Samaria – A Resilient Fabric of Life הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

There is broad consensus among most Zionist leaders, statesmen, public figures and generals of the State of Israel regarding the clear urgency to possess and control this area, including the long stretch of land that constitutes the natural eastern border of the State of Israel and dominates the eastern gateways to Jerusalem, the heart of the country.

Despite the widespread recognition and broad consensus on this matter, displayed by pioneers who settled in the area, no Israeli government has ever mustered the courage to declare full sovereignty over the Jordan Valley to the people of the world. On March 15, 2023, the coalition voted against MK Avigdor Liberman’s bill calling for the declaration of sovereignty over the Jordan Valley. We should now be asking whether Israel’s 37^th government has plans to declare sovereignty over the Jordan Valley during its term? Is the time still not yet ripe for such a declaration, even after more than 3,300 years of history, 75 years of independence, 55 years of control and settlement along the entire length of the valley, and 18 similar bills that have repeatedly been rejected one after another since the 18^th Knesset?

From the Time of Old, and Until the Establishment of the State of Israel

The special affinity of the People of Israel and the Jordan Valley commenced when the Israelites crossed over the Jordan River and entered the Land of Israel on the 10^th of Nissan, 2488 (equivalent to 1273 BCE) according to the Book of Joshua, Chapter 4, Verse 19: “And the people came up out of the Jordan on the tenth day of the first month, and encamped in Gilgal, in the east border of Jericho.” This historical event, which takes place following the exodus from Egypt, and at the end of forty years of wandering in the desert, is celebrated nowadays as Yom Ha’Aliyah (Aliyah Day), which has been added to the official calendar of the State of Israel on the 7^th of Cheshvan.

Yom Ha’Aliya was established by law as a national holiday of the State of Israel, and approved by the Knesset on June 21, 2016, in recognition of the importance of immigration to Israel as the basis for the existence, development and shaping of the State of Israel, as a multicultural society, and to commemorate the day the Israelites crossed over from the desert into the Land of Israel on the 10^th of Nissan. It is worth noting that the 7^th of Cheshvan was chosen to commemorate Aliyah Day also because it’s proximity to Parashat Lech L’cha, the Torah portion during which Abraham is commanded to immigrate to and ‘inherit’ the Land of Israel. As was written in Genesis, Chapter 12, Verses 6-7: “And Abram passed through the land, until the place of Shechem, until the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanites were then in the land. And the Lord appeared to Abram, and He said, ‘To your seed I will give this land,’ and there he built an altar to the Lord, Who had appeared to him.”

We can learn about the strategic importance of the Jordan Valley for the security and control over the Land of Israel in modern times from battles in the region between the British forces, under the command of General Allenby, and the retreating Turkish Ottoman forces, which took place 105 years ago, at the start of the 20^th century. In August 1918, Ze’ev Jabotinsky served as a young officer in the 38^th Battalion (aka The Jewish Legion) led by Colonel John Patterson in an effort to protect Wadi Malha and Um A-Shurt, near current-day Gilgal and Netiv Hagdud.

The battalion’s mission was to prevent the Ottoman forces from regrouping and crossing the Jordan River to the west. The 39^th Battalion, led by Lt. Col. Eliezer Margolin, which had been preparing for the protection of the Wadi Uja region, joined the 38^th Battalion on September 15, the Eve of Yom Kippur. Over the next few nights, these two Jewish battalions fought against the enemy, and were responsible for assisting British forces under the command of Maj. Gen. Edward Chaytor to force their way through to the east all the way to Amman, at which point the Ottoman forces surrendered.

At the San Remo Conference, a meeting of post-World War I allied countries held in April 1920 (103 years ago), territories from the Ottoman Empire were divided up between the European powers. The conference reaffirmed and expanded upon the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which had been signed on May 16, 1916, between France and Great Britain regarding the partition of regional territories between them. The Conference resulted, among other things, in handing over the mandate over the Land of Israel to Great Britain, and assigning it the responsibility of implementing the Balfour Declaration: The holder of the mandate will be responsible for the fulfillment of the declaration that the British government published on November 2, 1917, and which was accepted by the other consenting governments, in favor of the “reconstitution” of a national home, as distinct from the “establishment” of a national home for the Jewish People that had been expressed in the Balfour Declaration, based on the “historical connection between the Jewish People and the Land of Israel.”

Statements and actions aside, the “East Bank of the Jordan River” was removed from the territory that had been designated for the Homeland of the Jewish People in June 1922. This was done to establish a separate administrative unit that would serve the British in their Middle East version of the Game of Thrones that it was conducting against the local sheikhs. This entity, which became known as the Emirate of Transjordan, achieved independence in 1947, at which time it changed its name to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In this way, the border of the Jewish National Home as the Land of Israel is known today became the Jordan River. The division was carried out to protect the heart of the Irgun activists, whose symbol includes the land on both sides of the Jordan River, which caused great sorrow to members of Betar and the Revisionist Movement, as well as their leader Jabotinsky, who wrote a poem in 1929 titled East Bank of the Jordan, which ended each stanza with the following line: “Two Banks has the Jordan – This is ours and, that is as well.”

Eighty-four years ago, under the auspices of the British Mandate, Kibbutz Beit Ha’Arava was established on May 8, 1939 by a pioneering youth group called Hamahanot Ha’Olim (“the Olim Camps”), which was associated with Kibbutz Hameuhad. The kibbutz has seen significant development until the outbreak of the War of Independence, when all of a sudden the kibbutz was deemed extremely dangerous in light of the danger it could be cut off from Jerusalem. Apart from this risk, Kibbutz Beit Ha’Arava stood firm until the Arab Legion joined the fighting after the Declaration of Independence 75 years ago. Gush Etzion had fallen, with many casualties, just a few days earlier, and this hastened the decision to evacuate Kibbutz Beit Ha’Arava, which was overtaken on May 20, 1948.

From the Establishment of the State of Israel, Up Until the Upcoming 75^th Independence Day

Nineteen years after the Jordan Valley, Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem were occupied by Jordan’s Arab Legion, the IDF liberated these areas and brought them back under Israeli control during the Six Day War. This year, we will mark 56 years since the outbreak of that war.

The minutes from the meeting of the sub-committee of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, which took place on June 15, 1967 (7^th of Sivan 5727), and were classified as top secret, reveal the discussion that took place between senior members of the committee regarding the future of the territories that had been liberated. These included staunch political rivals, coming from various parties and conflicting ideologies, all agreeing on the Jordan Valley as an essential condition for Israel’s national security being an obvious departure point.

Menachem Begin, who served as a minister in the unity government on the eve of the Six Day War, declared emphatically: “As for the eastern part of the Land of Israel, not even one centimeter of land will be returned, for that would mean handing it over to foreign rule.” Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated that the Jordan River should serve as the eastern border of the State of Israel – this was one of the three principles he put forward: “The Israeli border is the Jordan River, and the West Bank does not belong to Hussein.” Later on, he said, “In the matter of the West Bank and the Jordan River, these are matters of security. They will not have weapons, there will be no cannons or tanks. The border is ours – it is a matter of security.”

Zarakh Verhaftig, who was serving as Deputy Minister of Religions, claimed that even after Israel had made peace with Jordan, the border must remain the Jordan River. The Minister of Labor, Yigal Allon, went the extra mile by making a proposal to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol: “We should establish a strip of settlement between Tirat Zvi and Beit Ha’Arava, composed of four to five communities. The core of members already exists. I suggest doing this inside the Jordan Valley. Whatever decisions we make regarding the Arabs at a later time, at least in the meantime we’ll have established Jewish agricultural communities on the border.” It should be noted that Yigal Allon held this view regarding the necessity of controlling the valley even before the war broke out, due to the fact that the entire mountainous region had “enormous strategic vitality,” in his words.

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol used his typical cautious language, in a message addressed to the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson: “We can tell Wilson that we intend to keep the Jordan River as a border.” At the end of the second part of the Ministerial Committee, which had been convened in the evening of the same day, a decision was reached: “Israel’s border with Jordan is the Jordan River.”

There is no doubt that Yigal Allon had a highly developed strategic perspective. He viewed the Jordan Valley as a meaningful security asset that had great significance for the young State of Israel. Allon viewed the Jordan Valley as an integral part of the history of the Land of Israel, and the eastern bank was transferred to the Hashemite Kingdom at the behest of Britain in 1922. In his book, Curtain of Sand, Allon writes, “Israel has no desire for territorial expansion at the expense of its neighbors. This is not the case with the occupied territories of the Greater Land of Israel: If it comes to that, and the IDF crosses the borders of the divided land, it must not retreat any further, but must strive from now on to establish its natural borders from a historical, economic and security perspective.”

In his writings, Allon expresses his worldview, that Israel must establish settlements, and not just military forces, in the Jordan Valley: “Since the establishment of the ‘Mother of all Moshavot’ [Petah Tikva – “Em Hamoshavot”] and until the establishment of the state in 1948, the areas of Jewish settlement, led by the pioneer movement have coincided with the areas of Hebrew control and dominance over the Land of Israel. The more the settlement movement managed to expand and spread to inner regions of the country, to get closer to its political borders, the more the basis of the settlement’s economic and social existence expanded and the military and political power of the people returning to Zion has strengthened.”

Since the resumption of Jewish settlement in the Jordan Valley in 1968, following the end of the Six Day War, all of Israel’s prime ministers have publicly supported the continuation of Jewish settlement in that region. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin reiterated in his speech on October 5, 1995, that despite the Oslo Accords on which he had been a signatory, that, “The security border needed for the defense of the State of Israel will be placed in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of this term.” Moreover, even after announcing the disengagement plan from Gaza in 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told Ha’aretz Newspaper on April 14, 2005, that Israel must continue controlling the Jordan Valley in the broadest sense of this term, reaching all the way to the eastern slopes above the Allon Road.

On September 10, 2019, during his election campaign for the 22^nd Knesset, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented his annexation plan for the Jordan Valley. According to the plan, the area that would be annexed was the land stretching between the Jordan River and the Allon Road, which was the strategic border that was proposed in the Allon Plan. In addition, the area reaching the northern shore of the Dead Sea would also be annexed. On August 13, 2020, in conjunction with the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE, Netanyahu announced that he was suspending all actions connected to the annexation of the Jordan Valley, as per terms set by the UAE. Is this suspension still valid?

Whether the suspension is still valid or not, remarks made by various leaders attest to the support in principle for the process that was delayed. For example, on January 22, 2020, Naftali Bennett, who at the time was Defense Minister and Chairman of the Yamina Party, called on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to hold a Cabinet vote regarding sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, followed by seeking an approval by the Knesset. “Discussions about applying sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, Samaria and Judea are welcome,” Bennett claimed. “For now, however, this is just talk. The test will be to see if any action is taken. Only action in practice will make a difference.” This statement was made just one day after Prime Minister Netanyahu promised that, “We will apply Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and the Northern Dead Sea without delay, and without a veto from Ahmad Tibi.”

Additionally, Aryeh Deri announced in January 2020 that his party would support any law or initiative that applied sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, and settlements in Judea and Samaria. “This is the land of our ancestors that was promised to the Jewish People for generations,” Deri said. “We will continue to work with all our might to establish our hold on the Land of Israel, and to strengthen Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley, Judea and Samaria.” A day earlier, during a tour of the Jordan Valley with Telem Chair Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon, he stated that the Jordan Valley is “an inseparable part of the State of Israel,” that it is “the eastern border of the State of Israel,” and also “the eastern protective wall of the State of Israel.” Blue and White Chair Benny Gantz stated that, “We view this strip of land as an integral part of the Land of Israel.” The two latter politicians also used to be the IDF Chief of Staff.

The latest political reference came from Yisrael Beiteinu Chair Avigdor Liberman, who on March 2, together with members of his political party, toured in the vicinity of the Megilot Regional Council around the Dead Sea. While standing on the spot near the Dead Sea where Elan Ganeles was murdered, Liberman said that the solution to the wave of terrorism and instability in the Palestinian Authority is to apply Israeli sovereignty on the Jordan Valley and Megilot. “The Jordan Valley is the broadest consensus, from Yigal Allon to Gandhi (Rehavam Ze’evi). We all believe in the same plan that Yigal Allon presented on July 26, 1967,” Liberman claimed. “We will fight to apply sovereignty, and we will do everything to develop this region, from the Jordan Valley, Ma’aleh Efraim and Megilot Regional Council. We will submit a bill proposal to apply sovereignty over this area, Megilot.” As mentioned, the latest bill, which was preceded by 14 similar proposals and 4 identical proposals that have been submitted since the 18^th Knesset, this one was also removed from the Knesset agenda on March 15, when 65 members of Knesset voted against it, and only 14 in favor.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Determining the borders of the State of Israel over the years has been and still remains a sensitive topic that is raised in both internal and external discussions. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that any political plan that is brought up for review, a number of subjects will be taken into account, chief among them being Israel’s essential security needs. Experience has taught us that in order for the State of Israel to ensure its security, it must rely only on itself as much as possible, and to refrain from relying too much on foreign guarantees, if at all, including assistance offered from the UN or our greatest ally, the United States of America. As a result, a basic condition for protecting the security of the State of Israel from threats that might arise on its eastern border, which crosses over into Jordan, and then on to Iraq and Iran, is full control over the Jordan Valley in the broadest sense of the term.

Secondly, any political plan must take into account the historical affinity of the Jewish People to its land. Failing to do so would render the holding of the Land of Israel and the continuation of Zionism devoid of meaning. The Jordan Valley, in its broadest sense – from the Jordan River to the mountains, up until Mount Ebal and Ma’aleh Adomim – continues the legacy of the Jewish People, since they crossed over the Jordan River, officially became a nation and inherited the Land.

Thirdly, political, economic and social issues must be taken into consideration so that the State of Israel can preserve its identity and character as a Jewish and democratic country. Such a country needs to strengthen its economy by expanding its settlements, bolstering its agriculture, tourism and industry sectors, and preserving political freedom. The first two Jewish communities that were established in the Jordan Valley in 1968, were the outposts Nahal Mihola and Nahal Argaman. Fifty-five years later, the area now comprises 21 Jewish communities, the last of which was founded in 2002. The time has come to establish new communities there, to create more jobs and industry, to build roads and infrastructure that will also incorporate an Israeli-Jordanian cooperation and benefit local Arab communities, similar to the Jordan Gate Industrial Project. The Jordan Valley is a large and important area that could become home for hundreds of thousands of Jews who would serve to strengthen Israel’s grip on the Land of Israel, develop the economy, and alleviate the housing crisis that is felt strongly by young Israeli families.

As the late Yigal Allon himself stated, “Only a civilian, military and political Israeli presence, in a geo-strategic array, which guarantees the country’s geographical depth and topographical outposts convenient for defense, can function as the basis of Israel’s security.”

Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, and the declaration of it as an indispensable part of the State of Israel in any future political agreement, is a necessary step that is widely agreed upon by the Israeli public, despite the ongoing rejection of legislation regarding this subject in the Knesset. It is therefore appropriate to declare sovereignty over the Jordan Valley as a first step, on Israel’s upcoming 75^th Independence Day, alongside the establishment of at least one new community to mark the 55^th anniversary of the renewal of settlement in the Jordan Valley.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

הפוסט The Jordan Valley הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

The IDSF Index survey was conducted by the Research Department with statistical support from Dr. Hagay Elkayam. 1,059 respondents were sampled – adult (over 18 years of age) Internet users in Israel, and has been reviewed to ensure fair representation in terms of age, gender, nationality, religion, and political affiliation. For the integrated sample (1,059 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.01% with a 95% probability. For the Jewish sample (802 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±3.46% with a 95% probability. For the Arabic survey (258 respondents) the maximum sampling margin of error is ±6.1% with a probability of 95%.

The Bone of Contention: Jerusalem

A claim often heard regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict is that the only way to put an end to the conflict is the two-state solution. This is why we began our survey by drilling down into this claim. We divided the questions into two parts: inquiry into attitudes within the Israeli public regarding a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, and inquiry into their attitudes regarding a Palestinian state where Jerusalem remains under Israeli sovereignty.

In order to fine-tune the question and eliminate any bias, we worded the question as follows: “Would you support a peace agreement with the Palestinians, backed by security arrangements, which includes the establishment of a Palestinian state on the majority of the Judea and Samaria territories, with Jerusalem as its capital? 60% of the Israeli public object to such an agreement, 28% are in favor (12% responded “Don’t know”).

When segmented by nationality, the differences come into clearer relief: among the Jews, 72% object to such an agreement and 17% are in favor, as opposed to 67% of the Arabs being in favor of such an agreement and 17% who oppose it (the rest responded “Don’t know”). Ideologically segmented, 92% of the respondents that identify with the right oppose such an agreement while only 2% are in favor, while 60% of the left supports such an agreement and 25% oppose it (the rest responded “Don’t know”).

Next, we asked the exact same question, with only the ending being changed: “Would you support a peace agreement with the Palestinians, backed by security arrangements, which includes the establishment of a Palestinian state on the majority of the Judea and Samaria territories, with East Jerusalem remaining under Israeli sovereignty”?

The data shows that 52% of the Israeli public object to such an agreement, while 30% are in favor (the rest responded “Don’t know”). When segmented by nationality, The data shows that 54% of the Israeli public object to such an agreement, while 29% are in favor. Among the Arabs, on the other hand, 45% object to such an agreement and 32% are in favor (the rest responded “Don’t know”). Ideologically segmented, while 76% of the right object to such an agreement and 12% are in favor, 16% of the left oppose such an agreement and 63% are in favor.

The first insight from the data is that among the Israeli public, there is no support for the two-state solution. such a solution is not supported where Jerusalem remains under Israeli sovereignty, and all the more so does the Israeli public object to an agreement in which Jerusalem comes under the sovereignty of a Palestinian state.

Another insight is that when approaching the two-state solution, it is important to understand that Jerusalem is the main stumbling block. There is no way – as the data shows – to “leave Jerusalem for the final phase of the talks”, as the two-state solution supporters sometimes claim.

However perhaps the most significant insight is, that even when Israeli Arabs were asked about a settlement that includes handing Jerusalem over to Palestinian rule, only 67% came out in favor. In other words, even in an agreement in which the Jewish population is theoretically prepared to accede to all of the Palestinians’ demands, one third of Israel’s Arabs have reservations regarding this solution.

Managing the conflict: A change in the situation will only make things worse

Ruling out a solution is easier than suggesting a new one. But perhaps the current situation is preferable to a new solution? We asked the Israeli public whether Israel is more secure in its current state compared with a situation in which a peace agreement is signed with the Palestinians, which includes withdrawal from Judea and Samaria.

Only 34% of the Israeli population believe Israel will be more secure if a peace agreement would be signed to include withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, as opposed to 49% who believe Israel is more secure in its current state (the rest responded “Don’t know”).

Segmentation by nationality shows that among the Jews, 58% believe Israel is more secure in its current state, as opposed to 19% among Arabs that think so. In other words, the majority of Jews prefer to continue with what is termed “conflict management”.

When segmented ideologically, there were no surprises. 84% of all right-wing respondents prefer to keep the current situation while only 7% believe Israel would be more secure if a peace treaty were signed, which includes withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. Among the left-wing respondents, the data shows an almost perfect mirror picture: 82% favor an agreement that includes withdrawal from Judea and Samaria while 7% are in favor of maintaining the current situation (the rest responded “Don’t know”).

If a peace treaty is signed – will there be peace?

The May 2021 riots have left a profound impression on Israeli public opinion: the concept of coexistence got undermined even among the diehard optimists. A widespread string of violent attacks, perhaps even unprecedented, on the part of a large proportion of Israel’s Arabs, overwhelmed the streets in Israel’s mixed cities, catching the police unprepared for such severe public disorder.

In the next part of the survey we examined whether a peace treaty might have an effect on riots of the kind we witnessed in May 2021. 57% of the Israeli public believe a peace treaty with the Palestinians will not prevent or reduce incidents of violence on the part of Israel’s Arabs. Among the Jews, 64% agree with this statement and among the Arabs, 35% agree.

When segmented ideologically, 84% of the right wing believe a peace treaty with the Palestinians will not prevent or reduce incidents of violence among Israel’s Arabs, compared with only 20% on the left that believe so. This data indicates a conceptual divergence of opinion between the way those identified with the left wing perceive the Israeli Arabs, and the way the Israeli Arabs portray reality: while only 20% of left-wingers believe a peace treaty with the Palestinians is not going to prevent or reduce the incidence of violence among Israel’s Arabs, 35% of Israel’s Arabs believe violent incidents will not be prevented or reduced following a peace treaty.

In other words, even if a peace treaty will be signed, more than one out of three Israeli Arabs doubt this will dampen violent outbursts of the kind we witnessed in May 2021. This reinforces the belief that solving the 1967 conflict will not solve the 1948 conflict.

Yes partner, no partner: and what will happen after a peace treaty has been signed?

The person in charge of the Palestinian Authority at the moment is Abu Mazen. Therefore any effort to work toward a peace treaty with the Palestinian Authority means negotiating with him. We asked the Israeli public whether Abu Mazen is a credible partner for peace talks with the Palestinians. The results were literally astounding: only 10% of all Jews and 24% of all Arabs in Israel believe that Abu Mazen is a credible partner. And what about the moral and ethical aspects of an agreement with the Palestinian Authority? We asked the Israeli public whether the Palestinian Authority takes care of the well-being of its residents. The data shows that only 11% of Israeli Arabs and 4% of the Jewish population believe the Palestinian Authority takes care of its residents’ well-being. In other words, an agreement with the Palestinian Authority is not going to mean an improvement of its residents’ well-being.

Moreover, even if a peace treaty will be signed with the Palestinian Authority, its viability is in doubt, since Palestinian Authority residents do not feel the Authority is looking out for their well-being, therefore the Authority’s stability is in doubt. To read more about the Palestinian Authority’s stability, look here.

There are two conclusions one can draw from these data: One is that Israeli public opinion, both Jewish and Arab, is globally convinced that currently there is no partner; the second is that even if there was a partner, the stability of such an agreement, not to mention its moral validity – would be highly dubious.

Brigadier-general (Res.) Amir Avivi: “The majority of public opinion is opposed to a Palestinian State in Judea and Samaria”

“The two-state solution has become the dominant pattern of thinking. It precludes the possibility of any other solutions”, says the Movement’s Founder-Chairman, Brigadier-General (Res.) Amir Avivi, “so first of all – other solutions do exist. Secondly, the index shows that in any case, the majority opposes such a solution. The public is no fool – the public is aware that establishing a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria means a de-facto Gaza reincarnate on steroids right in the country’s heartland”.

“Besides that, the index unequivocally shows there is no partner”, Avivi adds. “Abu Mazen is perceived as unreliable – to Israeli Arabs and certainly among the Jewish population. The Palestinian Authority is perceived – categorically and across all sectors – as one that neglects its residents’ well-being. Let those that seek to make peace with the Palestinian Authority from a position of enlightenment and for the sake of human rights ask themselves whether this is how we will assure the well-being of the Authority’s residents”.

הפוסט “IDSF Index” 2022: “Peace” – Pipe Dream or Practical Agreement? הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

In the current, and final, chapter of the series, we will review the emerging “Battalions” phenomena, uncontrollable Palestinian militant groups, as a parable of the PA’s loss of control over large sections of Judea and Samaria, which are supposed to be under its security control – particularly in important cities such as Jenin and Nablus. I will present the exclusive testimony of a Palestinian security forces officer, who attests to the plummeting moral and escalating disobedience among Palestinian police officers, which also leads to many of them joining the “Battalions” who are rebelling against their employer, the Palestinian Authority. Internal sources also attest to the growing status of the armed resistance group  – “Lion’s Den”. In addition, Israel should be concerned about the increasing cooperation between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front under the guidance of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which might create a new and coordinated type of terrorist threat in Judea and Samaria, on the backdrop  of a disintegrating Palestinian Authority.

The PA, which has incited against Israel and encouraged perpetrators of terror attacks from the outset, has adopted an “if you can’t beat them, join them” policy encouraging the Battalions in light of its incompetence to deal with these rebel militants. This policy makes some contribution in easing tensions between it and the challenging factions, and in closing ranks among Palestinians. One this policy’s main expressions is in the decision to halt security coordination with Israel following the IDF counterterrorism raid in Jenin which led to the killing of 9 terrorists. In the PA’s perspective, it is better off escalating tensions with Israel – which is interested in its stability and survival – than confronting terrorist factions that can threaten its integrity. This is a highly problematic development for Israel.

During the recent period, against the backdrop of the PA’s incompetence and inability to deal with the focal points of terrorism and violence in Samaria, a momentum is gathering which is posing a serious threat to the Palestinian Authority – the establishment of the “Battalions”: armed groups that are forming into actual militias, first germinating in Jenin (called the “Wasp Nest” battalion) and already reaching Nablus, where the “Lion’s Den” militant group has been formed. This process was set into motion when Mahmoud Abbas announced a large-scale operation in Jenin – a teeming center of resistance to the PA’s government – lasting only a day and a half and ending with the dismissal of the entire top command of the Palestinian security forces in the district.

Speaking about the situation on the ground, one officer in the Jenin Palestinian Preventive Security (PPS) service told us: “The situation in Jenin points to the loss of control, and especially to a complete disconnect between the reality on the ground and the statements made by senior Palestinian Authority officials who believe that they will be able to gain control of the territory, and those made by  senior IDF officials, claiming that another operation would break the militants”. He adds: “The militants in Jenin are highly motivated and far from ready to surrender. Your military operations are not going in the direction you want.”

Now, the “Battalions” phenomenon in Samaria is accelerating and posing a real threat to a weak, bankrupt, corrupt PA, which is rife with infighting due to the succession struggles. Against this backdrop, it is important to mention the unrest in the universities against the PA, the growing social protests – especially since the killing of social activist Nizar Banat by Palestinian security officers in Hebron during an investigation – and, above all, the cancellation of the elections.

While Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) calls for “unity of the ranks” – as it dubbed the IDF’s Operation Breaking Dawn in the Gaza Strip in August 2022, the terrorist organizations in northern Samaria have already united into groups operating under the name “Jenin Battalions” or “Nablus Battalions” – violent umbrella associations shared by Fatah, Hamas, the PFLP, and Islamic Jihad (PIJ). At the same time, institutionalized organizations continue to promote terror attacks independetly, such as the planned PIJ terror attack whose thwarting led to the killing of 9 terrorists and serves as a pretext for the following terror attacks.

The close ties between Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP with Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards should concern Israel, which may find itself facing Iranian “proxy” organizations in Samaria that unite a number of rival Palestinian factions for the purpose of the armed struggle against it.

The Nablus “Battalions” Declare Civil Mutiny and Grow Closer to Iran

Mahmoud al-Banna, a resident of Nablus, is currently in command of the “al-Aqsa Martyrs” group in the city. He is referred to by his comrades  as “Hawk” (“Saqer”), a tribute to the violent “Fatah Hawks” group that operated under Fatah during the first intifada, and alongside the “Martyrs” in the second intifada.

Al-Banna’s partners are PFLP operative Muhammad Tabanja and senior Hamas figure Mus’ab Shtayyeh, who has been detained for months in the PA prison in Jericho. Both of them, along with Ibrahim Nabulsi, who was recently assassinated in Nablus (al-Banna had attended his funeral already as commander of the Nablus Battalions) were in contact with Bassam Sa’adi, a senior Islamic Jihad figure, who was arrested by Israel before Operation Breaking Dawn – an arrest that sparked a significant escalation between Israel and the Palestinians. When Sa’adi was arrested, the ISA – Shin Bet issued a statement according to which “Sa’adi was engaged in building a significant military force in Samaria”. A few weeks later, Hossein Salami, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, shed light on the affair, saying in interviews: “We are arming Samaria just as we armed the Gaza Strip”.

In fact, a few days before Sa’adi’s arrest, he was scheduled to meet with the three and was saved from an operation in which their terrorist squad comrades were eliminated. All these targets are at the top of Israel’s terrorist list and are considered targets for elimination, like their predecessors.

Convening with parallel resistance groups is nothing new: in the past, senior “al-Aqsa martyrs” figures had been convicted of ties to Hezbollah and sentenced to prison for the transgression.

Al Bana – “Hawk” – is living on borrowed time; A few months ago, when the Shin Bet coordinator in Nablus spoke with al-Banna and offered him to turn himself in before he was assassinated, al-Bana replied, “Come deal with me face to face” and refused the generous offer. The Shin Bet is putting heavy pressure on his family to turn him in, and as part of this effort, his brother, Muhammad, was arrested in a special units’ raid on the Halat al-Amud neighborhood in Nablus.

**

While al-Bana commands the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs”, Muhammad Tabanja, a released prisoner, heads “Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades” – the PFLP’s military wing, which already several years ago had joined forces with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza and became a very important element in the opposition against the Palestinian Authority. The front command squadis complemented by Hamas’ Masaab Shtayeh, who is also a released prisoner from the village of Salem, east of Nablus.

Shtayeh and his family have a long history of terrorism activity: he himself was wounded in the operation to assassinate Ibrahim Nabulsi; One of his relatives was formerly a close aide to Hamas engineer Yahya Ayash, who was killed with the remotely detonated phone smuggled into the Gaza Strip in 1996; His brother, Akaf, also a Hamas operative, was detained and sent to prison by Mahmoud Abbas’ Preventive Security service.

**

In Nablus, the terrorist activity is concentrated around Joseph’s Tomb, in an attempt to harm worshippers and IDF soldiers, and in the checkpoints around the city. Palestinian sources claim that the “Nablus Battalions” had begun operating a few months after the battalions have initiated operation in Jenin. Ibrahim Nabulsi and his squad mates were the ones who drew the inspiration from Jenin – from  senior PIJ official Sa’adi – and translated it into an action in Jabal al-Nar, “the mountain of fire,” as Nablus is nicknamed.

It can be assumed that it was Sa’adi who was their “source of authority”, as described in the Shin Bet’s arrest announcement, and this is concurrent with assessments on part of Palestinian sources.

In September 2021, when six Palestinian prisoners escaped from Gilboa Prison, the unsurprising collaboration was already evident between the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs”, represented by Zakaria Zubeidi, and “Islamic Jihad”, which was represented by five of its members in the escape operation. This breakout rekindled the resistance movement in Jenin, a movement that is now migrating south to Nablus, and some would say to even to Ramallah.

The members of the “Battalions”, all with long beards, dressed in black baseball caps, military uniforms, and sporting white, black, green or red headbands (depending on the mother organization),  mostly originate from the Nablus Kasbah (bazar), the neighborhoods of Al-Yasmina and Makhalat al-Amud, and from the refugee camps of Balata and Askar. In Jenin, they are mostly from the refugee camp, which during the second intifada became the symbol of resistance. These are all places where the “Oslo achievements”, which are noticeable on every street in Ramallah, are literally unfelt.

**

The Palestinian Authority is all but helpless in the face of the “Nablus Battalions”, which defy it and declare open military struggle against Israel. One phenomenon currently worrying Ramallah is the fact that many of the “Battalions” members are the sons or relatives of officers in the Palestinian Authority itself. The most prominent of these was Ra’ad Hazem, the perpetrator of the attack in Dizengoff, who was the son of a colonel in the Palestinian security forces, and Ala Nabulsi, the father of the assassinated commander of the “Martyrs”, and colonel-ranking officer in the Preventive Security and a released prisoner.

Yet this should come as no surprise, as many of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs” – including members of the “Al-Asafa” and “Fatah Hawks” – were integrated into the Palestinian security apparatuses, while others, under the tutelage of senior Fatah figures who were spurned by Mahmoud Abbas and the PA leadership, continued to be members of semi-organized groups and waited for the opportune moment to take revenge on the PA. Palestinian sources estimate that the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs”, who in the past operated under the leadership of Fatah and the PA and enjoy high-level connections, are the leading force behind the “Battalions” in Nablus.

**

The members of the Nablus and Jenin “Battalions” are mostly young men between the ages of 19 and 30, who have long since disengaged from Fatah and are actively working against the crumbling PA. Against them, Mahmoud Abbas declared a “large-scale military operation” in Jenin, but the operation lasted barely two days and ended with the heads of Palestinian security admitting a scathing defeat and the entire top command of the security mechanism was axed by Mahmoud Abbas overnight.

The Kasbah in Nablus is one of the power strongholds of the ”Martyrs” – a place that already a few years ago had become an ex-territory for the Palestinian Authority, which preferred to steer clear of its neighborhoods. It is no coincidence that many of them also come from universities, which in recent months have become hotbeds of political unrest against the Palestinian Authority.

**

After the “Battalions” began to operate and claimed casualties in Israel, the IDF launched Operation Wave Breaker, in which many of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs” commanders in Nablus were eliminated. The most prominent of these are Adham Mabruka, nicknamed  “The Chechen”; Muhammad Dakhil; Ashraf Mabaslet; Bashar Azazi; Abed Rahman Sobh; Islam Sabah; Hussein Taha; Ibrahim Nabulsi and others. However, despite Israel’s military efforts, Nablus is once again at the spearpoint of terrorism, as it was on the eve of the first intifada and at the beginning of the second intifada, when the IDF considered the town the “capital of terrorism”.

In the Gaza Strip, the operatives of these groups have become an integral part of the terrorist organizations operating under Hamas and under the joint operations room, and it can be assumed that if the activities of the Battalions in northern Samaria expand as a united force of Jihad, Hamas and the PFLP, their operatives will become another “Iranian proxy” a stone’s throw from Jewish Afula or an hour’s drive from Tel Aviv.

The PA and the Battalions – A Fight for Control Over Samaria

Since the establishment of the Battalions, the PA has been waging a battle for survival in Samaria and is fighting for its future. Violent incidents that broke out in Nablus with the arrest of a Hamas operative – a member of one of the networks – escalated to become some of the most serious clashes between the Palestinian Authority and armed groups in Judea and Samaria since the PA was established almost 30 years ago.

Employing violence, the militants demanded the release of the Hamas member, and representatives from the city had begun to mediate between the militants and the PA. According to a Palestinian security official “All scenarios are on the table and we are even preparing for a contingency of street battles”. The Palestinian Authority understood that this was not just a test of governance, but a test of survival in the face of what appeared to be the development of violent civil uprising after the “Lion’s Den” declared civil disobedience. The implication of this was closed businesses, road blocks with burning tires, etc. The armed groups also threatened that any police officer who ventured outside while wearing a uniform might be attacked. Sources in Nablus reported that “police officers took off their uniforms, blended in with the demonstrators and participated themselves in the defacing of public property. Store owners have been ordered to close under duress…”

The PA grabbed and arrested in the city center a Hamas member Mus’ab Shtayyeh alongside another member of the armed group, Amid Tabileh for reasons of its own – the PA explained that Shtayyeh was detained for security reasons that “will soon be made clear”,  but sources indicate that he was involved in purchasing weapons and recruiting operatives who were also designated for action against the PA itself.

The escalation in Nablus led a situation wherein, for the first time, the PA in its own territory, was forced to face on the one hand a coalition of armed groups on the ground, and on the other – a political opposition in the form of Hamas and PIJ.

The PA’s Proposal to the Nablus Battalions

The PA became acutely aware of the threats to its very existence after it had lost control of Jenin. However, in Nablus it is still trying to curtail the armed groups, but with little success. As part of its efforts it offered the militants to lay down their arms and sell them to the PA in exchange for amnesty, a hefty financial compensation and an opportunity to join the ranks of its security forces. The militants on their part, rejected the offer out of hand. Referring to these events, a Palestinian security official said: “The Palestinian Authority is waking up very late”.

At a recent meeting with Mahmoud Abbas, several heads of the Palestinian security forces proposed purchasing the weapons of the armed groups in Nablus. A Palestinian source reports that the meeting was fraught by grave concern over the spillover of the organized armed groups into central and southern Judea and Samaria. During the meeting, Mahmoud Abbas demanded that the law be enforced and that political contacts with Israel be given another chance, however, some of the top command feel little faith in that regard and some even voiced their concerns that he would not be able to guarantee and secure the peace on the ground.

The heads of the Palestinian security establishment are still trying to isolate the armed groups, which have turned the Nablus Kasbah and the refugee camps into their strongholds. Palestinian Interior Minister Ziad Hab Rih, commented  along those lines, saying that the PA was putting into gear a series of important moves in Nablus and Jenin.

Exclusive Testimony from the Heart of the “The Lion’s Den”

A former senior “al-Aqsa Martyrs” member, who collaborated with Hezbollah and spent many years in Israeli jails, and who is now very close to the Nablus “Lion’s Den”, reveals new details about the terrorist group that plagues Israel and the PA.

The senior official, a member of the “Martyrs” and a resident of Nablus who operated in early 2000 and was one of the generators of the armed intifada, has so far refused interviews to foreign media, demanding to remain anonymous. Here he provides a rare glimpse into the “Lion’s Den” group, which was formed after the assassination of Ibrahim al-Nabulsi, one of the heads of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades”.

The operative says that the establishment of the “Lion’s Den” group was the birth of a new national revolutionary movement that had pulled the rug from under the feet of the Palestinian Authority and shattered the doctrine of American General Dayton, who sought to build a significant Palestinian military force to fight terrorism. General Keith Dayton served as the American security coordinator between Israel and the Palestinian Authority from 2005 to 2010, helping the PA build security apparatuses popularly known as the “Dayton Forces”, which form the backbone of Palestinian security coordination with Israel.

The operative says that the “Lion’s Den” members are establishing local headquarters in all the Palestinian cities with the aim of establishing themselves in every village and refugee camp and to become a new revolutionary national organization that operates with great force while opposing the PA.

He said that while the headquarters are currently being set up separately from each other, they all adopt the name “Lion’s Den”, and that they are not just a few dozen in Nablus, as is commonly thought in Israel. This he asserts, is because “The ‘Lion’s Den’ groups are a national phenomenon and not a local one”. He adds: “The ‘Lions’ managed to escape the watchful eye of the Israeli Shin Bet and proved that both the Palestinian Authority, the Americans, and the Israeli Shin Bet cannot stand up to the new spirit of resistance.”

Moreover, the operative claims that the “Lions” were supported by Hamas and operated under the direction of the organization’s leadership and even received special funding from Hamas. Most of the young commanders in the new network are Hamas members. “The Hamas is the mind and the Fatah is the arms”, he asserts.

The heads of the “Lions” are Fatah activists who although still subscribing to the organization’s ideology, have chosen to operate in the “spirit of Hamas and Islamic Jihad”. “The members of the network are desperate young people who, in practice, have left the central Fatah leadership and are now accepting and adopting the spirit of Hamas’ resistance,” said the Palestinian activist, adding, “This is an improved model of the ‘al-Aqsa Martyrs’ organization – these are Fatah activists operating under Hamas”.

“In 2000, the ‘al-Aqsa Martyrs’ operated in coordination with Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and also in coordination with Hamas, but today the situation is different and Hamas has a much more significant role in establishing the armed buildup of the organization”,  he said. But “it is impossible to reveal everything and the extent of Hamas’s involvement”,  concluded the source from Nablus.

The Test of Security Coordination: Terrorist Operatives within The PA’s Security Forces, Disobedience And Low Morale

Since the beginning of the IDF’s Operation Wave Breaker in Judea and Samaria, Palestinian sources have been reporting severe incidents of refusal among police officers and security  junior officers to comply with PA directives to act against Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas as part of its security coordination with Israel.

The sources report severe morale problems in the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatuses, which explains among others, the enlisting of more than 20 Palestinians – members of the security forces, or the sons of senior members of the security apparatuses – to the ranks of terrorism, which on the one hand acts against Israel but at the same time defies the Palestinian Authority.

Testimony to this are the dozens of shooting incidents at the Jenin governor’s building, the provocation of violence between Palestinian police officers and youths in the refugee camps – particularly in Balata or the Nablus Kasbah, and the declaration on part of the “Lion’s Den” in Nablus of civil disobedience against the Palestinian Authority as a result of the arrest of one of their members.

A point in case: one of the two terrorists who carried out the attack in Jenin, in which IDF Major Bar Pelech was killed, was a member of Palestinian military intelligence. The number of PA police officers involved in recent terrorist acts is already approaching 20. One mid-level officer from the security forces shares unknown exclusive information that raises the concern that the PA’s security apparatuses suffer from low morale, and it is doubtful whether they would be able to contain the mounting terrorism in their jurisdiction.

The officer added that there is significant unrest within the security apparatuses, with a growing number of police officers refusing to obey the “security coordination” with Israel, the political arrests, on behalf of the corrupt and disintegrating PA. He spoke of a degenerate PA, whose heads enjoy an abundance of amenities and privileges while the junior police officers barely manage to get 80 percent of their salary. On the other hand, the officer says, the fast-growing terrorist organizations offer a respectable status to their members and perhaps even more appropriate wages… and are considered the heroes of the day on the Palestinian street, as opposed to police officers who are accused of treason.

In Conclusion

As mentioned at the beginning of this series, the PA’s medical chart is a mile long with endless ailments – and the so called “lack of diplomatic horizon” is far from the worst of them. The testimonies presented here by officers from the within the PA security forces, “Battalions” operatives sources close to the “Lion’s Den”, alongside a review of a series of cases in which senior Fatah figures display increasing unease from the disintegration of the institutions to which they belong – even appealing to elements in Jordan and Egypt – and a series of testimonies to Hamas’ stellar ascent in the face of an ebbing Fatah, create a disturbing and compelling picture according to which the PA is rapidly losing altitude both in terms of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public and in its security control in key Palestinian cities, such as Jenin and Nablus. Senior Palestinian officials strongly question the PA’s power, status, and chances of survival, and now all that remains is to examine Palestinian politics and the dynamics between Israel and the PA in light of these facts, in order to establish a more realistic assessment of the status of the body, which is considered Israel’s partner in Ramallah.

The PA, which has incited against Israel and encouraged perpetrators of terror attacks from the outset, has adopted an “if you can’t beat them, join them” policy encouraging the Battalions in light of its incompetence to deal with these rebel militants. This policy makes some contribution in easing tensions between it and the challenging factions, and in closing ranks among Palestinians. One this policy’s main expressions is in the decision to halt security coordination with Israel following the IDF counterterrorism raid in Jenin which led to the killing of 9 terrorists. In the PA’s perspective, it is better off escalating tensions with Israel – which is interested in its stability and survival – than confronting terrorist factions that can threaten its integrity. This is a highly problematic development for Israel.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the movement.

הפוסט Chapter 3: The Palestinian Authority’s Gradual Loss of Security Controls הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Apartheid Regime? “Simply not True”

Lt. Col. (res.) Adv. Maurice Hirsch, a South African who lived and studied in the UK and immigrated to Israel, has served in the IDF Military Advocacy for 19 years. In his last role in the army, Hirsch served as Head of the Military Prosecution in Judea and Samaria. He is an expert on international, martial and criminal law and a member of IDSF-HaBithonistim’s research department. Adv. Hirsch is also the head of the legal department at Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), which researches the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian society through media analysis.

We sat down with Adv. Hirsch and asked him to shed some light on the legal reality of Judea and Samaria and on the relationship between the Palestinian media and Israeli law, and to share with us the story of how FIFA, the international soccer federation, got involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Let’s start off with an explosive topic: what should be the response to those who claim that Israel is an apartheid regime?

“This is a blatant lie. Apartheid is an oppressive regime that was based on racial segregation of whites and blacks in South Africa during the last century. There’s no such thing in Israel. It’s true that there is a conflict between two peoples, but it is devoid of any characteristics of apartheid. Proof of that are the numerous members of the Arab sector in Israel who carry positions of the highest rank – be they army generals, police superintendents, Israel’s Prison Service commissioners, Supreme Court justices and heads of hospital departments, to mention but a few.”

That’s all very well, but allegedly, Israel uses two legal systems based on ethnic-national belonging, and in effect, there are two separate legal systems in Judea and Samaria – one system for Israelis and a Jordanian system for Palestinians, right?

“In order to address this misconception, we need to go back in time a bit: following the Six Day War in 67, Israel’s government came to the conclusion that it will not enforce Israeli law on the Judea and Samaria region, despite it having full legal justification. This decision had implications in terms of international law. For example, international law stipulates that when a state holds territories under military control, the judicial system predating the occupation continues to have jurisdiction in that territory. “

Meaning – in this case – Jordanian law?

“In 67, when we entered Judea and Samaria, we found three legislative tiers in place: legacy laws from the Ottoman Empire, British Mandatory legislation and Jordanian law. These were the circumstances into which the IDF stepped, adding a tier of its own. As international law dictates. All these legislative tiers apply to Judea and Samaria, regardless of religion, color, age or race. Fast forward to the Oslo Accords: the Military Advocacy comes and states that it is delegating powers over civil matters to the Palestinian Authority. So on top of all the existing judicial tiers I’ve mentioned – now A and B Areas are in addition subjected to the Palestinian legal system, while Israelis living in Judea and Samaria have an additional tier of Israeli law.”

So, there is one law for Israelis and another for Palestinians, right?

“In its formative years, the State of Israel had adopted a judicial approach in regard to its citizens that stipulates that Israeli law will apply to Israelis wherever they may be in the world. This bred a claim that Israel applies one set of laws to Jews and another – to Palestinians. However, this is a gross misconception. The term ‘Israelis’ encompasses Israeli Arabs as well. So it follows that if an Israeli Arab breaks the law in Judea and Samaria, that person will stand trial before a civil court and not a martial court. “

Has this happened in the past?

“Absolutely. Case in point: an Israeli Arab, who was employed by the Palestinian Authority Police force, held an AK-47 rifle as part of his job. Insofar as Israeli law goes – this is considered illegal possession of weapons. Therefor, that person was bought to trial in the Israeli legal system.”

”You Can’t Annex What is Already Yours”

“People who routinely travel on the roads of Judea and Samaria know they have to be extra vigilant; some drivers on these roads must feel that the traffic signs are there for cosmetic reasons and that a solid line that prohibits overtaking another car – is a mere recommendation. The feeling is that of a modern Wild West. Recently, this issue took to the media headlines, even earning the nickname ‘the Arab highway terrorism’, due the fact that the portion of Arab drivers involved in accidents there is significantly higher than their portion of the population.”

How can we deal with criminal offenses committed by Palestinian civilians against Israeli civilians?

“The Israeli law authorities have full jurisdiction to prosecute Israelis who’ve committed offenses in C Areas, which are under Israeli civil and security control and constitute 60% of Judea and Samaria. The martial court has the jurisdiction to try Palestinians who’ve committed offenses in this area.”

But reality paints a different picture: just one example are the Palestinian drivers who do as they please on Judea and Samaria roads and get away with it

“Look, the truth of the matter is that the State of Israel doesn’t wish to deal with enforcing its sovereignty on C Areas – be it illegal construction, traffic violations, rock throwing and so forth. Generations of Israeli administrations have given up on that area. The highway terrorism is the result of decades of neglect and the petty argument between the Ministry of National Security and the Defense Ministry over which of them should be in charge of this territory, with each trying to roll the responsibility over to the other. The result is the neglect of the Israeli citizens of Area C.”

What in your opinion could be the solution for the legal predicament created in Judea and Samaria?

“I believe that it’s time to end the story of martial law in Area C and enact Israeli law on the entire area. At the same time, the enclaves of A and B Areas should be left to local Palestinian governance, without legislative jurisdiction and with no central government such as the PA.”

In other words – annexation?

“It’s not annexation. ‘annexation’ isn’t the right word. Rather, it’s the enforcement of Israeli law over a territory that belongs to us. Judea and Samaria were granted by the world’s nations to Israel and the Jewish people already in 1920, for the purpose of establishing a national home. You can’t annex what is already yours. In 67 we expelled the true occupier, Jordan, so the use of the word ‘annexation’ is inappropriate.”

Backing Up the Soldiers: The ICC, the Military Advocacy and Rules of Engagement

In 2003, the White House military spokesman announced that during a strike against military targets, an American missile hit the Al Jazeera offices, killing a correspondent. The Americans summarily apologized for the unfortunate mistake but in the same breath stated that these mistakes are part and parcel of battle arenas. The international court acknowledged this and took no issue with the statement.

In 2021, during Operation Guardian of the Walls, the IDF bombed the al-Jalaa building in Gaza City – a communications building that was used by the Hamas terrorist organization as a facility to develop means to intercept Israel’s Iron Dome defense system. The IDF issued a clear warning to the occupants prior to the strike, and as a consequence – no civilians were killed. However, a list of organizations hurried to condemned the attack and called for an investigation of the event as a war crime by the Hague International Criminal Court.

Legally speaking, is there any truth to the claims of these organizations?

“Not only was it not a war crime, but in reality – there isn’t even cause to see it as an offense. That building was targeted as it was an undisputable military target. The IDF did whatever it could to reduce casualties and collateral damage, and by doing so, complied with the demands of war laws. And even if the terrorists come and claim that the place was a purely civilian target with absolutely no military affiliation – this is groundless. “

Commonly, the Israeli public boasts having an IDF that is “the most ethical military in the world” – is this true? Where do we stand in comparison to other armies regarding military morality?

“To answer this question, one has to compare the IDF to foreign militaries and their behavioral patterns. For example, rape during battle is very common in foreign armies, but is nonexistent in the IDF; looting during battle is extremely common in foreign armies but is virtually nonexistent in the IDF. Want to talk about hitting civilian targets? Look at the numbers of civilian casualties in conflicts involving foreign armies as compared with the number of Palestinian casualties in conflicts with the IDF – we have a huge advantage against all other armies precisely because of the caution we take with this issue.”

And yet, at times it feels like the Military Advocacy hasn’t got its soldiers’ backs

“The common narrative today regarding the Military Advocacy is phantasmagoric and untrue. The responsibility of the Military Advocacy is to be the army’s guardian of the law. In this capacity, it must try soldiers who’ve committed offenses. Such offenses can be in a wide rage of areas. Some are related to a soldier’s military conduct. For example, a soldier who enters Gaza as part of a military operation, fights like a lion and kills terrorists – is doing his job to the highest standard. But let’s say that same soldier notices a stack of dollars in one of the houses and decides to pocket the money – and unfortunately, these things happen, albeit rarely – this soldier must be brought to justice. Does this have anything to do with his operational performance? No. Should the court’s ruling on the matter be impacted by his performance? Also no.”

Frequently after operations or wars, the word “Hague” or “ICC” hovers over our heads. Is this a concrete threat?

“So far, those brought to trial before The Hague comprised mostly of African dictators and such. Never has an Israeli stood trial before the international court at Hague. The real question here is whether there is cause to fear the ICC in The Hague, and that’s an entirely different issue, since there is a certain concern that one day the ICC will begin to prosecute the State of Israel and soldiers and officers who’ve served in the IDF. It is not impossible that one day we’ll wake up to a news headline stating that an IDF veteran officer was apprehended in Europe for allegedly committing crimes during a military operation or war. So even though there are no evidential, legal or ethical grounds for such an arrest – such an eventuality should not be taken lightly.”

“The Palestinian Media is Similar in Nature to Soviet Russian Media Outlets”

You’re a researcher at Palestinian Media Watch. What does this institute do?

“The object of Palestinian Media Watch is to monitor the Palestinian Authority’s policy with respect to the peace agreements with Israel. The method chosen for this is to monitor Palestinian media. Why specifically the media? Because the media reports on policy, statements by the leadership and through the media you can learn a lot about the Palestinian Authority’s platform, and what the positions it chooses to present to the Palestinian public.”

Can the media teach us about the Palestinian government’s position?

“Of course. You must understand that the Palestinian media is similar in nature to Soviet Russia’s media outlets: everything is controlled by the PA. The government funds the central newspaper, television and radio. The employees of the PA’s various media bodies are appointed by Mahmoud Abbas. Every word printed or broadcasted is subject to the approval of the Palestinian Authority, which is why we can learn through the Palestinian media what the Palestinian Authority aims to convey to its people.”

What does law have to do with the Palestinian media?

“The media is just the platform: the information that we gather can be used in various ways to support Israel’s legal struggle. For example, the first project I worked on was with FIFA – the international soccer federation.”

What does soccer have to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

“In 2013 the Palestinian Authority launched a vicious attack against Israel, claiming that the Israeli Soccer Association is in violation of the FIFA rules in that it included in its member teams six clubs that are located in Judea and Samaria. FIFA was very attentive to the PA’s claim, which received tailwind from anti-Israel organizations. The attack against Israel mounted and FIFA decided to appoint a committee to examine why Israel is in violation of its rules. In 2017 it was decided that the committee will rule that Israel is violating FIFA rules and will recommend sanctions against the country.”

And were sanctions imposed against Israel?

“No, because at that point we stepped into the picture. I took all the materials of Palestinian Media Watch and my legal expertise, and authored an indictment against Jibril Rajoub – head of the Palestinian soccer association – in which I detailed his activities of incitement of terrorism and additional behaviors that blatantly violate FIFA rules. At the same time, I wrote a statement of defense for the Israeli Soccer Association. It’s important to emphasize that all this we did independently and unsolicited.”

Did FIFA accept these claims?

“You bet. Following our documents, FIFA understood that the Palestinian Authority’s claims can’t hold water. Initially, FIFA only put off the submission of its committee’s recommendations, but later also rejected the claims of the Palestinians and decided to quash all Palestinian claims against Israel on the matter. In other words, within a half a year we tore down the four-year Palestinian campaign and protected the Israel Soccer Association from sanctions. Fun fact: we continued pressing claims against Jibril Rajoub to the point that FIFA fined and suspended him for an entire year.”

You are also a member of IDSF HaBithonistim and are a member of its research department. Why?

“IDSF-HaBithonistim’s struggle is multi-pronged, the most forceful of which is the security effort. But it is important and imperative to place these efforts on the proper legal grounds. Not everything a general wants can be upheld by international law. For this reason the combination of military operation with the legal aspect legitimizes our actions. The coupling of military and law is what I do in IDSF-HaBithonistim’s research department.”

“We’re Really Living the Prophets’ Prophecies”

It seems that we have so many challenges yet ahead. Still, are you optimistic about the future here in the country?

“I’m very optimistic. The State of Israel has done wonderful things here in 74 years. You cannot overlook the fact that we’ve established a charitable and generous society that champions labor and development; a geographically small country with outstanding and unbelievable achievements. We’re living the prophets’ prophecies. Jews are coming to the Temple Mount and the laughter of children is heard on the streets of Jerusalem. 2,500 years ago Jeremiah prophesized that the day will come when Jews shall plant vines in Samaria. This did not happen until our time, but today you can tour Samaria and see – not only are the vineyards verdant, they also sweep prizes in international wine contests. We’re really living the prophets’ prophecies and are fortunate to belong to the generation who see all this come to life. True, there are challenges – but the big picture is fantastic. What reason would I have not to be optimistic?”

הפוסט Soccer, the Oslo Accords and Stone Throwing: An Interview with Lt. Col. (res.) Adv. Maurice Hirsch הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

A terrorist recognized as a President who accuses Israel of carrying out “50 Holocausts”; Security and government personnel involved in hostile sabotage activity; Attacking and murdering Israeli civilians and Jews receive extensive support and encouragement under the auspices of the hostile government; Wild and widespread incitement pervades every official institution and street corner without interruption; Occupation of homeland territories through illegal construction and destruction of heritage sites; A call to act against Israel from every stage in the world and aid to its enemies beyond its borders… Is this an enemy or a legitimate partner? Could it be that one side (the weaker actually) insists on seeing the other as an enemy while the other (the stronger) insists on seeing it as a partner? Who is sane here and who is delusional? Who lives and knows the reality in the Middle East, and who is living in a dream world?

As part of Operation “Breaking Dawn” that was carried out in the Gaza Strip between August 5 and 7, Israel attacked terrorist targets of the Islamic Jihad and avoided hitting Hamas targets. The latter, for its part, is happy that Israel is eliminating some of its enemies within, after it had already eliminated its main enemies very effectively and efficiently by itself in the same number of days of fighting between June 12 and 14, 2007, in what is known as the “Palestinian Civil War”, a violent and brutal move in which Hamas forcibly took over Gaza Strip and made the Fatah organization and the Palestinian Authority (the “PA”) clearly irrelevant. At the same time as what was happening in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority pursued, and is still pursuing, Hamas in the territories of Judea and Samaria in order to restrict its choices of action, mainly under the auspices and assistance of the IDF and mainly the GSS (the General Security Service, the internal security arm of the Israeli government).

From 2007 until today, it seems that the Hamas organization is maintaining its stability in the Gaza Strip, while the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria has lost some of its power. It is wallowing in its corruptions and internal struggles, faltering and dying like its leader but remains protected, sedated and is on life support thanks to the Israel Defense Forces. And all of this is after the Palestinian Authority voluntarily absolved itself of the right to handle security issues that undermine its status as an exclusive entity recognized at the international level.

The IDF and the GSS remain the main and exclusive guardians and breathers, on behalf of the Israeli government, of the Palestinian Authority headed by Abu Mazen who long ago lost control over the mechanisms, agreements and more. The IDF, which has been carrying out arrests every night for years, which have been intensifying lately since “Operation Breakwater” began, has replaced the corrupt, inefficient, and dual-interested PA mechanisms that wish to receive a fixed salary and official recognition as the leaders of the struggle against Israel, without taking risks or being considered as collaborating with Israel.

Israel as an enemy of the Palestinian Authority

The government of Israel practically exempts the PA from almost any responsibility for what happens on its territory, actions that have fatal, serious and destructive consequences for the State of Israel and its citizens; actions that, if committed against it by any other political entity, would be considered acts of hostility and even grounds for war; actions that for some reason Israel contains, absorbs or ignores them, such as severe and unceasing incitement against the State of Israel and Jews that begins in the educational institutions, in mosques and in the media, continuing up to the head of the snake – Dr. Abu Mazen himself denies the Holocaust, illegal construction and takeover of Area C through construction and planting, the paving of unapproved roads and more, damage to natural and landscape assets through damage to fauna and flora as well as ecological damage with the opening of dozens of illegal quarries, discharge of sewage and pollution of the aquifer, destruction of Israeli national heritage sites and more.

Above all of these, the Palestinian Authority allows physical harm to Israeli citizens, encourages terrorism and is a declared supporter of its operations, without hesitation, reluctance or fear.

The Academy of the Hebrew Language defines an enemy as “a country, military organization, and the like that is in a state of war or in hostile relations with another country or military organization.” Although the Palestinian Authority is not a state and it is good that it is not, it is certainly a political entity. It may not be a military organization, but it meets the definition of “and the like” by having security mechanisms that are armed and organized as a de facto army.

The Palestinian Authority considers Israel to be an enemy by definition, according to any measure and common sense, while Israel’s leaders refuse to recognize this and cling to the fragments of the apparent imaginary peace that resulted from the largely expired Oslo Accords. Israel’s leaders are clinging to the remains of the PA and the last breaths of the terrorist who heads it, as if it were a great bargain with the potential for salvation, prosperity and flourishing, instead of recognizing them as an enemy that constitutes its failure and therefore requires a decision.

The Authority sees Israel as a de facto enemy because it has absolved itself of a significant and substantial part of its obligations appearing in the clauses of the agreements with it, does not make an effort to implement them and is afraid to confront those whose actions violate them. It does not invest its trained forces in curbing terrorism, and there are those trained also for this purpose by the US and other forces, but on the contrary – it incites and stirs up the flames with all its might and with every means at its disposal, while expressing open and direct support for the perpetrators of murderous attacks and giving extensive assistance to their family members of the “heroic” martyrs and prisoners who massacred families in their homes and harmed civilians traveling innocently on the roads.

While the PA behaves as an enemy entity and in its actions “demands” Israel to accept such apparent status; in Israel, people adamantly refuse to acknowledge the bitter reality and try to avoid such a declaration, to cover up the harsh reality and to apparently transmit messages that “the majority is in order and in control”.

If not, how can the “hushed-up terror” be explained? Events that include dozens of stone throwing incidents and harassment of Jews every day, which do not appear in the monthly statistics that the GSS constantly publishes, alongside other serious events that do not grab headlines in the news programs. Why does throwing a stone at a family’s car while it is driving not receive equal treatment to the attempted murder of a woman or at the very least, a shooting attack that was carried out unsuccessfully? After all, everybody knows that even a stone can kill just as well as a bullet from a gun.

In order to stimulate your thoughts and open your eyes to the data, it is enough that you try to remember the number of events of terrorism that happened in the last two months throughout Judea and Samaria and how many of them did you hear about or were reported in the media? According to the GSS report in June, there were zero (0) stone-throwing attacks in the Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem sector, compared with a single attack in July. So what is all the fuss about? Because the GSS only lists stone-throwing attacks which involved people wounded moderately and above. What does this look like? Shooting at an innocent citizen where the bullet scratched him slightly and therefore it can be ignored. This, in contrast to the other attacks included in the report, such as the throwing of Molotov cocktails, the number of which in June was 117 and in July was 75, the throwing of 42 pipe bombs in June compared with 27 in July, 11 incidents of small arms fire in June compared with 15 in  July, 16 incidents of arson in June compared with 12 in July and two events of stabbing in each of these months.

Does the PA work to bring peace and strengthen the security and well-being of the Arabs in its territory, or is it engaged in hostilities against Israel so that it can exist with zero effort and at an adequate level of corruption, which will prolong its life as much as possible?

Summary and recommendations

The PA is in a difficult situation and its leadership is in a little more than that. The main actions of the Authority and its leader are aimed at preserving what little is left of their status, honor and property, before they change and / or pass away from the world.

The next Israeli government should recognize the Palestinian Authority as a hostile entity, or simply – as an enemy, just as it behaves and conducts itself above any possible stage, in words and in actions, towards the State and its Jewish citizens who are attacked in their cities, while traveling on the main roads and whose judgment is passed if somebody unfortunately made a mistake and entered one of the villages, until it proves otherwise.

Since this is the way things are, and since we should not expect help and salvation from the leaders of the PA and its security mechanisms, who were armed in the past by the courtesy of our generous government, a series of significant moves have to be made, ones that will make it clear to everyone who is the sovereign and ruler of the Chosen Land, and what will be the sentence of anyone who dares to harm the Jews in their homeland, which is their only home and fortress in the world.

Among the steps that must be demanded from the next government: the application of real sovereignty over territories, including the Jewish settlement blocs in Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley; the restoration of governance in Area C, which includes the establishment of new Israeli settlements; recognizing and extending the grip and control over Israel’s heritage sites and preventing damage to them, such as the Altar of on Mount Ebal and Joseph’s Tomb, which constitute an essential layer in understanding the deep and strategic significance of what National Security is; attacking every armed terrorist, by any means available to our forces, deep in Arab territory and in accordance with the security concept moving the fighting to the territory of the enemy and taking early preventive steps against any trouble;

cutting out any mention and destroying any website or infrastructure that glorifies and praises “martyrs” – terrorists who murdered Jews; stopping the terrorist funds and support transferred from Israel and the human rights-loving world to the Palestinian Authority, which are used for incitement, for salaries to terrorists and which are transferred to the families of the “martyrs” and prisoners in Israeli prisons;

restoring deterrence and carrying out acts of retribution and deterrence in every Arab village from which terrorists came out or from which terrorist acts are carried out on a regular basis against Jews. For example, the “Russian Roulette” that involves traveling on the roads of Judea and Samaria must be stopped immediately, even at the cost of cutting down orchards and demolishing greenhouses and buildings that overlook the route and enable the throwers of stones and Molotov cocktails to hide, so that the IDF forces can better identify them and thwart them before they carry out their plot. It is worth asking why it was possible to stop the traffic in the Gaza Strip for fear of a missile being fired at an Israeli vehicle and many IDF forces were prepared and even attacked the terrorists, while every day Israeli vehicles and civilians are threatened and injured by those assassins on the roadsides of Judea and Samaria and by those terrorists who come out of the nearby villages. Is a vehicle that is hit by a rock that injures its occupants or causes the driver to lose control and commit a fatal accident, any different from a missile or sniper fire that achieves the same result in the end?

To conclude: if it thinks like an enemy, talks like an enemy, acts like an enemy – it is an enemy! And regarding the well-known cliché that “we talk with the enemy” – then such a thing is done when he voluntarily lays down his weapon and changes his ways for some of the time, or after he has been defeated.

הפוסט Defining the Palestinian Authority as an Enemy הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

Ridiculous, right? Well, this does not amuse us and therefore we decided to examine this issue in depth, in order to understand why this is happening and what can be changed.

The phenomenon of people throwing stones and Molotov cocktails throughout Judea and Samaria has long since become a strategic challenge that undermines the sense of security of the civilian population and contributes to the stability and continuity of the Palestinian terror routine.

The dimensions of this phenomenon leave no room for the misperception that these are “individual attackers”. The data indicates an entirely different picture: these phenomena are the final expression of an organized system of institutional incitement to commit terrorist operations against Israel on the part of the Palestinian Authority.

Despite this being a dangerous strategic phenomenon that harms human life, in practice the civil and military courts are lenient with the terrorists and avoid implementing the full measure of the law upon them. In addition, very few terrorists are actually brought to justice and many complaints are closed by the police on the grounds of “unknown felon”.

Why is all this happening? Our Research Department examined this issue in depth and reached some interesting insights.

Cost Versus Benefit, Opportunity Versus Deterrence

The flourishing of this form of terrorism was made possible by a convergence of five key reasons:

1. Cost: It is easy, simple and cheap to carry out attacks of this type, whether due to the availability of rocks and stones in the area and that they do not require significant preliminary organization, or due to the relative ease of preparing a Molotov cocktail.
2. Benefit: A rock or Molotov cocktail that hit a vehicle can easily start a chain reaction that ends with many casualties. In other words, the potential casualty index for both injuries and death as a result of such an attack, alongside the psychological effect of a declining sense of security when traveling along roads, are impressive. In addition to this, stone throwing is perceived as less threatening than use of firearms or knife, and therefore it is easier to carry out attacks of this type without being exposed to significant media scrutiny.
3. Opportunity: As a result of the daily friction between the Palestinian population and the Israeli population and security forces, the attackers have plenty of opportunities to carry out attacks of this type.
4. The Absence of Operational Deterrence: The security forces preferred, at least until recently, to avoid friction over attacks that are considered lighter, and focused upon thwarting and arresting attackers who planned or carried out shooting, kidnapping, bombing and other types of attacks.
5. The Absence of Legal Deterrence: the military and civilian courts prefer to be lenient with terrorists who make use of rocks and Molotov cocktails and avoid implementing the full measure of the law upon those attackers. Despite the dimensions of the phenomenon of stone throwing, in practice very few terrorists are brought to justice, and the penalties that are actually imposed upon them do not deter at all.

Thousands of Attacks, Dozens of Injured

At present, there are about 20 hotspots that are known for stone throwing throughout Judea and Samaria, mostly along transportation routes and at locations near the separation fence. Those involved are mostly young men ages 10-20 facing off against IDF forces, sometimes with the encouragement of local agitators and far left organizations.

For example, 1,884 stone throwing attacks and 496 Molotov cocktail attacks have been reported in 2020, which led to the injury of 154 civilians and soldiers. On average, 2021 saw an increase of 210% in rock throwing attacks and 156% in Molotov cocktail attacks relative to the previous year.

The IDF and police are operating against this threat by deploying ambushes and making arrests. However, the primary operational challenges include the density of the areas in which the attacks are carried out, internal assistance in the escape of the terrorists, multiple scenes of attacks vis-à-vis the limited security forces, the operational ineffectiveness of the means the IDF deploys against this phenomenon, release or non-continuation of incarceration of those apprehended, cumbersome rules of engagement and a legal proceeding that ends with a lenient penalty.

An increase of 156% in Molotov cocktail attacks and 210% in rock throwing attacks in the years 2020-2021*

*A comparison between the monthly average according to annual figures in 2021 and monthly figures from December 2022

Legal Helplessness: Cases Closed, Lenient Penalties

As stated, one of the challenges of dealing with the rock throwing phenomenon is the lack of deterrence stemming from a legal proceeding that ends with a lenient punishment. From an examination of all the cases opened against those accused of throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails in years 2019-2020, a harsh picture emerges of significant lenience on the part of the civil and military courts in actual penalties compared with the penalties stipulated by law up to prison sentences that are 95% shorter than that stipulated by law, at times merely a few days or months. In 11% of the rock throwing cases no prison sentences were set, despite the circumstances of the failure to set prison sentences not being known and requiring an individual examination of the cases.

The average penalties stand at only 8.3 months in prison for throwing rocks and only 13 months prison for throwing Molotov cocktails, compared with the maximum sentence of 10-25 years as stipulated by law, subject to the circumstances. Moreover, comparative examination revealed that a significant percentage of the reported events do not end with indictments: In the first half of 2020 only 21% of the reported rock throwing events and 33% of the reported Molotov Cocktail throwing events Ended with an indictment.

“Words of the Investigator”

The insights that emerged from the comprehensive study we conducted were examined by senior members of the IDSF, who formulated concrete recommendations for changing the situation. These recommendations include defining certain areas as high risk for loss of life as a result of rock throwing and defining Molotov cocktail throwing as a life endangering attack, which justifies taking defensive measures such as firing in order to neutralize; a concentrated effort to arrest those who recruit, encourage and direct the attackers; setting up a computer system with a database for synchronization; and formulating legislation that would enable imposing appropriate and harsher penalties upon those involved in terrorist activities.

“This position paper was written by the Research Department in preparation for a debate in the Knesset’s Interior and Security Committee on the issue of implementing the full measure of the law upon rock throwers in Judea and Samaria”, says Yaron Buskila, Lt. Col. (res.) and IDSF Director of Operations, who is signed on the study. “The reason for writing the document was to legislate minimum penalties in the law imposed upon throwers of rocks and Molotov cocktails in a manner that does not allow judges to be significantly lenient in penalties, as is the case today. The document was written in conjunction with litigators specializing in the laws of war, experts on the issue of Judea and Samaria, researchers entrusted with collecting data and senior commanders who serve as regional commanders in Judea and Samaria. The document was presented in a committee meeting in which ministers, MKs, senior police officers, IDF officers from Judea and Samaria and representatives of the Judge Advocate General and the state Attorney’s Office were present. Following the issues that were presented in the Movement’s document, at the end of the meeting, the Knesset having instructed the state Attorney’s Office to present the meanings of establishing minimum penalties and scheduled an additional hearing in order to promote a change in the law.”

To download the full position paper

הפוסט “Touchstone”: Bring the Throwers of Stones and Molotov Cocktail to Justice הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.

This incentives mechanism is not concealed, swept under the rug or whispered in backrooms. This is the avowed and clear policy of the Palestinian Authority, which leave a trail of Jewish blood behind it. In order to assess the scope of this phenomenon, we decided to research and construct, for the first time, the full picture of the Palestinian terror financing mechanism. We did this by reviewing the Palestinian law, analyzing the economic conditions in the Palestinian Authority and translating the declarations and speeches of senior Palestinian officials.

A Billion Shekels Per Year: This Is What an Official Policy for Murdering Jews Looks Like

Under Palestinian law, imprisoned terrorists receive remunerations in accordance with the number of years they serve in prison, with salaries reaching NIS 12,000 per month from the 30^th year and onward. This is a level of wages that is equivalent to that of the President of the Palestinian Supreme Court, eight times higher than the average minimum wages in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and four times higher than the monthly income per capita for an average Palestinian.

Additional payments are added to the salaries paid to terrorists while serving their sentences. For instance, imprisoned terrorists who have been released after serving over five years of actual prison time continue to receive wages even after their release, this in addition to a one-time release grant between $5,000 and $25,000. As stated, the Authority is also required by law to employ released terrorists in its ranks in order to grant them economic and job security for the rest of their lives, including fully subsidized health insurance and education, as well as prioritizing them in the annual assignments for positions in all government institutions.

In practice, the Authority expends on average over NIS 1 billion per year as payment to terrorists and their families, an amount that is equivalent in most of the years surveyed in the study to about 7% of its budget, and almost half of all the foreign aid that it receives from other countries and donors.

Thus, for instance, in 2018 the total budget for payments to imprisoned terrorists, released terrorists and the families of the “Shahids” and injured stood at NIS 1.237 billion, which was about 7.4% of the Authority’s budget, or about 44% of the total foreign aid budget it was supposed to receive from other contributing countries and entities.

The numbers leave no room for doubt: this is an official and widely extensive mechanism of terrorism, which constitutes an important and central pillar of the Palestinian Authority’s general activities. This mechanism of bloodshed creates a reality in which it is worthwhile for the Palestinian citizen to choose terrorism as a route for action that not only wins him honor and appreciation, but also rewards him generously – much more than the average Palestinian citizen. Not only does this constitute an incentive for murder (since the money is promised in advance) and a gross violation of the Oslo Accords, but it is also a systemic standardization of the Palestinian armed conflict. Unfortunately, this mechanism is also showing results in the field: at present, 5,000 prisoners and 7,200 released prisoners are enjoying these payments, in addition to the 37,500 families of the “Shahids” and the injured.

Murder as a Preferred Profession: The Shahids are at the Top of the Palestinian List of Priorities

The Palestinian Authority enjoys the image of a civil, moderate and pragmatic Palestinian government, especially when compared to the competing Palestinian organization Hamas. But the numbers tell a different story, one where the Palestinian Authority takes an active and deliberate part in the armed struggle against Israel in many ways, including by way of operating a well-oiled and heavily budgeted mechanism intended to incentivize popular organized terrorism against innocent Israelis. This mechanism can be called Pay for Slay – payment for the killing of Jews or, put another way: murder as a preferred profession.

It is important to remember that terrorism is considered a central and legitimate tool in the realization of the PLO’s and the Palestinian Authority’s ultimate goal: The establishment of a Palestinian state with the destruction of the State of Israel. Within this framework, the salaries and employment mechanism is viewed by the Authority as an important strategic pillar in preserving terrorist operations and transforming the Palestinian armed struggle into an institutionalized policy.

This mechanism may not be prominently visible to the outside observer, but if one listens to the Authority’s senior officials, they learn that this is an avowed and clear policy spoken loudly and clearly, and published in the media and on openly available sources.

Thus, for instance, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, who had called the “Shahids” the “Stars in the sky of the Palestinian people struggle” who are at “the top of the Palestinian list of priorities”, emphasized repeatedly, including from the podium of the UN, that “even if we only had one cent in our hands, we would pay it to the families of the Shahids and the prisoners.”

By engaging in this activity, the Palestinian Authority meets the Israeli and global definition of a “terrorist organization”: not only does it incentivize terrorism and finances terrorism through prisoners, released prisoners and the families of the “Shahids” and the injured, but it also employs many of them as public servants – including, absurdly enough, in the ranks of its own security forces who are supposed to be fighting terrorism.

How do Israel and the world respond?

Israel, as well as the United States, have passed laws against this phenomenon. In Israel, a law was passed to freeze funds that the Palestinian Authority transfers to terrorists out of the taxes that are collected for it by Israel, while in the United States the law prohibits the transfer of certain economic aid to the Authority as long as this policy persists.

But in the greater scheme of things, the international community for the most part, has responded to this phenomenon with language that is weak and accepting of the Palestinian Authority’s victimhood narrative, even though the Authority’s policy completely contradicts the global struggle against terrorism. Transferring the funds of the contributing countries to the terrorists also contradicts the laws of the contributing countries themselves, as well as international conventions pertaining to terrorist financing. Indirectly, this aid money constitutes a significant injection of oxygen into the Authority’s terrorist mechanism against innocent Israelis under the cover of humanitarian aid.

The Goal: Knesset Members, Diplomats and the American Congress

The study was accompanied by Brigadier General (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, the former Head of the Research Division in IDF Intelligence Corp. and Colonel (res.) Maurice Hirsch, the former IDF Chief Prosecutor in Judea and Samaria. “The research we conducted assembles, for the first time, the full picture of the Palestinian terrorist financing mechanism”, says Or Yissachar, Head of the Research Department of the IDSF and the person who prepared this report. “The data clearly shows the Palestinian Authority’s commitment to the armed campaign against the State of Israel.”

So, what can be done? A lot. First, on the economic level: we can define the Palestinian Authority as a terror financing entity, including the freezing of economic aid and cooperation on the part of the international community and shutting down its consulates. We can also enforce the Offset Law in Israel in order to force the Authority to choose between complete economic collapse and the salary mechanism for terrorists and their employment. On the political level, we must make it clear to the Authority that any progress towards a final political settlement is contingent upon the immediate and permanent termination of this policy on the part of the Authority. Finally, we must encourage a fact-based discussion that puts the true nature of the Authority as an organization that employs terrorism against Israelis on the center stage, irrespective of the political position regarding negotiations with it or with any other Palestinian entity.

The key points of the research have been formulated into an official position paper of the IDSF and have enjoyed broad media attention. The position paper was even submitted to all members of the Knesset, as well as to foreign diplomats in Israel.

“We continue to act”, Or Yissachar clarifies. “We continue to follow the report’s impact among the decision makers and continue to distribute it among American Congressmen.”

To download the full position paper

https://idsf.org.il/en/position-papers/terrorists-in-the-civil-service/

הפוסט The Official Policy of the Palestinian Authority: Murder of Jews as a Profession הופיע לראשונה ב-IDSF.